读西汉酷吏史结合当代中共酷吏现象的思考

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Reflections on the History of Han Dynasty Tyrannical Officials and the Phenomenon of Contemporary CCP Enforcers

作者:侯改英    8/1/2025 纽约编辑:胡丽莉 责任编辑:罗志飞 翻译:何兴强

  “酷吏”一词出自《汉书•酷吏传》指那些“执法刻深,无所宽贷,虐酷于下”的官吏。该称谓起源于西汉武帝刘彻为推行政治主张而重用的一批酷虐、执法刻深的刀笔吏,其中以王温舒、张汤被最为典型。观察汉《酷吏列传》中的十一名酷吏,不难发现他们与中共独裁者习近平麾下的鹰犬爪牙具有以下共性:一、圆滑机变,擅揣圣意;二、绝对忠诚,只对上峰负责;三、创造性执法,法外施法;四、铁血手腕,执法刻深。  

西汉史中酷吏因为武帝扫清决策障碍得以立足。如张汤臭名昭著的“腹诽之罪”,王温舒则以极其严酷血洗治安,使广平曾现“道不拾遗”的假象,传说连狗都不敢在夜里叫一声。但最终,酷吏起于酷虐,终于酷虐,张汤自裁,王温舒则被灭五族。

由此对比当今中共复现之酷吏现象,浅谈一下中国历史及当代酷吏现象及其背后的成形逻辑。首先我们要明确,酷吏杀人绝不是因为自己喜欢杀人。提出著名“尚德缓刑”政治主张的王温舒直言酷吏杀人之多“非憎人也,自安之道在人之死。”这揭示了酷吏背后的制度逻辑:杀人越多,地位越稳。

在这样的逻辑驱使下,办案人员坚决执行落实上峰的政治主张和意识形态,宁愿过度执行,也绝不敢执行不到位。独裁暴君习近平培养并启用的鹰犬爪牙蔡奇、赵克志、陈全国等人,因暴虐迫害被美国依据《马格尼茨基人权问责法》列入黑名单。他们的执法手段之惨无人道,甚至犯下了扒人祖坟、种族灭绝等反人类罪行,可见其行为背后俨然有一套执行逻辑:宁可执法从严,矫枉过正,宁可错杀千人,不能使一人漏网。因为“如果放宽松了,就可能会被免职、遭到制裁”,“如果心慈手软,就犯了大忌”。制度本身将“严酷”和“高压”当作忠诚和执行力的象征。

在这种环境下,杀人越多、执法越严酷,甚至超纲、法外执法,手段越狠,反而能证明你“能干”、“斗争性强”,你的饭碗才“可持续”。这就制造出一种可怕的恶性循环:办案人员不得不持续制造“战果”,不断有人被抓、被逼供、被判,甚至被处决,以满足上级“肃清”“打击”“震慑”的绩效要求。

由此可见酷吏的本质是体制维稳、肃杀、恐吓和“可持续打击”的执行工具。中共借助甚至依赖酷吏来实现的两大目标:一是清洗异己,比如陈全国治理新疆、蔡奇整肃低端人口、用极端手段打压公民反抗、封堵异见言论;二是制造政治恐惧,比如傅政华主导“709律师大抓捕”,使整个法律界噤声,达到了让全民政治恐惧、沉默和自我审查,形成“原子化个体”便于统治。同时,酷吏更强化了唯上峰是从,只对领导负责,无残忍不升迁之官场驯化,更进一步加强了习近平的集权和独裁。

但历史经验告知我们:习近平的鹰犬用后即被弃之如蔽履,被双规下狱,甚至被自杀,与古代酷吏最终下场高度契合。体制并不视酷吏为“人”只要你“好用”,适时顺手就能留用;一旦你表现出人性、同情、正义感,甚至不知甚时度势、功成身退,就会变成“钝器”、“废件”,甚至要强行背锅。 对统治者来说,统治效率优先于真相,斗争高于程序,忠诚胜过正义。而正义,在这个邪恶制度中更是毫无存在感,被统治效率彻底碾压。

由此可见,当制度缺乏正义制衡时,酷吏就会滋生。而酷吏之所以在极权社会不断再生,是因为极权本质上不信任制度,而只信任人——尤其是信任那些“对上峰越忠诚、对敌人越狠”的人。这是极权体制自身的属性带来的必然结果。所以酷吏不是偶然的社会现象,而是与制度相适应的必然存在。同时,酷吏统治对法治的破坏将更加深远,因为恶法是一切罪恶的源头。

记得曾有人问我对中国历史怎么看?因为我一直对中国历史“任人打扮”诟病不已,所以我悲观的认为,中国历史从几百年前到现今并没有任何真正积极意义上的演进。尽管表面上已演进到现代行政制度,但权力从未真正下沉到人民手中。现代中共甚至将党组织架构渗透至一切社会机构,并原子化每一个社会个体,其极权手段比传统帝制更隐形,更令人惊悚。

说到底,酷吏存在的根源并非个人品质恶劣,而是极权体制需要通过“暴力秩序”来掩盖其“合法性缺位”的深层焦虑。酷吏是这种制度的必然衍生物。只有彻底推翻现行极权暴政,建立真正的民主宪政制度,才能从根源上解决酷吏问题,以及由此衍生出的一系列司法公正,权力滥用和冤假错案现象。

所以,只要制度逻辑得不到彻底的颠覆,酷吏就永远有滋生的土壤,历史便永远只能像骰子的六个面不断循环往复。从某种意义上,也阐明了一个残酷的事实:只要天安门城楼上的毛腊肉像存在一天,无论是一百岁的老者还是刚出生的婴儿,他们本质上都生活在同一时代。

读西汉酷吏史结合当代中共酷吏现象的思考

当代酷吏:蔡奇

 

本文作者:侯改英  

Reflections on the History of Han Dynasty Tyrannical Officials and the Phenomenon of Contemporary CCP Enforcers

Author: Hou Gaiying  8/1/2025 New York

Editor: Hu Lili 

Responsible Editor: Luo Zhifei

Translator:He XingQiang

Abstract: Tyrannical officials (“cruel enforcers”) are not merely the result of individual malice, but institutional tools created by totalitarian systems. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is reenacting the Han Dynasty model of cruel governance, using harsh laws and violence to maintain its rule, strengthen loyalty, suppress dissent, and create fear. To eradicate this phenomenon, the totalitarian regime must be overthrown, and a democratic constitutional system established.

The term “酷吏” (kùlì, “cruel official”) comes from the Book of Han – Biography of the Cruel Officials, referring to those “who enforce the law with extreme harshness, grant no leniency, and abuse the people.” The term originated during the reign of Emperor Wu of Han dynasty (Liu Che), who promoted a group of harsh, ruthless bureaucrats to implement his political agenda, among whom Wang Wenshu and Zhang Tang were the most typical representative. Observing the eleven cruel officials recorded in the Han history, we found that they share striking similarities with the subordinate of CCP dictator Xi Jinping:

1.Cunning and adept at guessing the ruler’s will;

2.Absolute loyalty, answering only to superiors;

3.Creative law enforcement, bending or going beyond the law;

4.Iron-fisted measures, enforcing laws with extreme severity.

In the Han Dynasty, such cruel officials rose to prominence because Emperor Wu needed them to clear away obstacles to his policies. Zhang Tang became notorious for the crime of “internal criticism” (fufei), while Wang Wenshu violently “cleansed” public order to such an extent that Guangping reportedly reached the false state of “doors left unlocked and property untouched,” and it was said that even dogs dared not bark at night. Yet in the end, cruelty begets cruelty—Zhang Tang committed suicide, and Wang Wenshu was executed along with his entire clan.

Comparing this to the modern CCP’s reproduction of the cruel official phenomenon, we can see the underlying historical and institutional logic. Cruel officials do not kill because they enjoy killing. Wang Wenshu, who once advocated the political principle of “valuing virtue and using lighter punishments,” openly admitted that the reason cruel officials kill so many is “not because we hate people, but because our own safety lies in their deaths.” This reveals the systemic logic: the more people you kill, the more secure your position.

Under this logic, law enforcers rigidly implement the leader’s political will and ideology, preferring over-enforcement to any risk of under-enforcement. CCP officials like Cai Qi, Zhao Kezhi, and Chen Quanguo—nurtured and empowered by Xi Jinping—have been sanctioned under the U.S. Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act for their brutality. Their inhumane actions, including desecrating graves and committing genocide, illustrate the execution logic behind their behavior: better to be excessively harsh than risk being seen as lenient; better to kill a thousand by mistake than let one “slip through.” If they relax control, they may be dismissed or punished; if they show mercy, they commit the gravest taboo. The system itself treats “severity” and “high pressure” as symbols of loyalty and competence.

In such an environment, the more people you kill, the harsher your enforcement—even beyond the law—the more you prove yourself “capable” and “combative,” and the more secure your position becomes. This creates a vicious cycle: law enforcers must constantly produce “results,” ensuring there are always arrests, forced confessions, heavy sentences, and even executions to meet performance targets for “purging,” “cracking down,” and “deterring.”

The essence of cruel officials is that they are tools for maintaining stability, purging opponents, and sustaining fear. The CCP relies on them for two main purposes:

1.Eliminating dissent—as seen in Chen Quanguo’s rule over Xinjiang, Cai Qi’s purging of “low-end population,” and the use of extreme measures to crush public resistance and silence opposition.

2.Instilling political terror—as in Fu Zhenghua’s orchestration of the “709 mass arrest” of human rights lawyers, which silenced the entire legal profession, creating a climate of fear, self-censorship, and the “atomization” of individuals, making them easier to control.

Furthermore, cruel officials reinforce the culture of serving only the leader, answering only superiors , and advancing only through ruthless action—further cementing Xi Jinping’s centralized power.

Yet history shows: once these officials have served their purpose, they are discarded—investigated, imprisoned, or even driven to suicide—much like the cruel officials of old. The regime never sees them as human beings; they are merely tools to be kept while useful, and scrapped when they show humanity, compassion, or any hint of independence. For the ruler, efficiency trumps truth, struggle overrides due process, and loyalty outweighs justice. Justice, in such an evil system, is entirely absent—crushed under the wheels of “governance efficiency.”

When a system lacks checks and balances, cruel officials will inevitably arise. They persist in totalitarian societies because such regimes distrust institutions and trust only individuals—especially those “most loyal to the leader and most ruthless to enemies.” This is an inherent feature of totalitarianism, making cruel officials an inevitable product of the system. Moreover, cruel governance inflicts deep and lasting damage to the rule of law, for unjust laws are the root of all evil.

When asked my view of Chinese history, I often criticize its “malleability to the victor’s narrative.” I pessimistically believe that from centuries past to today, there has been no genuine, positive political evolution. Power has never truly been placed in the hands of the people. The modern CCP has gone further by embedding Party structures into every social institution and atomizing every individual. Its methods of control are more invisible and more terrifying than the imperial autocracy of old.

Ultimately, the existence of cruel officials is not due to personal wickedness, but because a totalitarian system needs “violent order” to mask its deep anxiety over the absence of legitimacy. Cruel officials are a natural byproduct of such a system. Only by completely overthrowing the current totalitarian tyranny and establishing a genuine democratic constitutional system can we truly solve the problem of cruel officials and the resulting injustices, abuses of power, and wrongful convictions.

As long as the institutional logic remains untouched, cruel officials will always have fertile ground to grow, and history will continue to roll like a six-sided die—cycling endlessly. In a certain sense, this also reveals a cruel fact: as long as the portrait of “Mao Zedong” hangs over Tiananmen Gate, whether you are a centenarian or a newborn baby, you are essentially living in the same era.

Contemporary Cruel Official: Cai Qi

Author: Hou Gaiying

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