作者：陀先润
编辑：周志刚 责任编辑：罗志飞
中秋将至, 我想先澄清一个长期存在的误区：习近平并没有“开倒车”。外界流传的所谓“改革开放倒退论”，其实是对中共历史认知的误解。事实是：中国共产党从未真正改变过行进的轨道。从毛泽东到邓小平，从江泽民到胡锦涛，再到习近平，路线始终如一，只不过演绎方式不同。
很多人以为邓小平开启了改革开放，中国才走上了新的道路。实际上，这不过是一场精心设计的“画皮”。共产党并未放弃极权体制，只是在经济层面做出有限让步，以换取生存空间。所谓“政治改革会随着经济改革推进”的说法，是党内三十多年对内对外的宣传话术。西方上当了，中国知识分子也上当了。
真正有心推动政治体制改革的领导人，屈指可数。胡耀邦、万里短暂提出过探索，但很快被压制。此后，无论是江泽民的“三个代表”，还是胡温时代的“四万亿”，本质上都是为了强化党的统治，而非制度转型。
习近平因修宪取消任期限制，被指“开倒车”。但我们回顾历史，毛泽东终身执政，邓小平虽无正式头衔，却垂帘听政十五年。江泽民更是从1994年至2012年实际掌握最高权力。相比之下，习近平只是撕下了虚伪的遮羞布，把前任们的伪装公开化而已。
许多人怀念江泽民的“开放”、胡锦涛的“温和”，甚至称朱镕基是“改革派”。但事实并不如此。朱镕基主导的高校扩招、医疗市场化、土地财政和三峡工程，造就了今天的教育贬值、看病难、房地产畸形发展等沉疴。胡锦涛、温家宝时代提出的“国进民退”，以及2008年4万亿刺激，直接让国企坐大，挤压民营经济。江泽民表面引入企业家入党，实则是把民营经济纳入统战体系，加强党对经济的全面掌控。他们的所谓“改革”，不是走向民主，而是维护权力的另一种手段。
习近平与前任的不同，不在于方向，而在于速度。他没有像江胡那样演戏，而是直截了当加速了体制的本质。过去那辆在旧轨道上行驶的大巴，本来还要二三十年才驶向悬崖；习近平拉开窗帘，踩下油门，让所有人更快看清车外的虚假风景与体制的真实面目。因此，说习近平“开倒车”并不准确。他并没有掉头，而是让中国共产党更快走向既定的结局。
四十多年来，中国并没有走过一条新路。所谓的“改革开放”，只是在旧轨道上伪装前行。政治清洗、思想高压、经济控制，从未停歇，只是形式不同。习近平的“独裁”，不过是前任们的延续与加速。他让人们看清了一个现实：中共从未开向过民主与自由的方向。
Forty Years of Reform and Opening Up: An Old Road That Never Changed
Author: Tuo Xianrun
Editor: Zhou Zhigang | Executive Editor: Luo Zhifei
Abstract: Xi Jinping has not been “reversing course.” The Chinese Communist Party’s political system has never changed. By using the deception that “political reform will follow economic reform,” China fooled the world into believing it was on a path toward democracy. The CCP even seeks to export communism globally by leveraging the economic influence it gained from this deception.
As the Mid-Autumn Festival approaches, I want to clarify a long-standing misconception: Xi Jinping has not “turned back the clock.” The popular notion of a “reversal of reform and opening up” is a misunderstanding of CCP history. The truth is this: the Chinese Communist Party has never truly deviated from its original trajectory. From Mao Zedong to Deng Xiaoping, from Jiang Zemin to Hu Jintao, and now to Xi Jinping, the path has always been the same—the difference lies only in performance style.
Many people believe Deng Xiaoping initiated reform and opening up, leading China onto a new road. In reality, this was nothing more than a carefully crafted façade. The CCP never abandoned its totalitarian system; it merely made limited concessions in the economic sphere in exchange for survival. The claim that “political reform will follow economic reform” was propaganda repeated for over three decades, both at home and abroad. The West fell for it, and so did many Chinese intellectuals.
The number of leaders who genuinely sought political reform can be counted on one hand. Hu Yaobang and Wan Li briefly explored it but were quickly suppressed. After that, whether it was Jiang Zemin’s “Three Represents” or Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao’s “Four Trillion Yuan Stimulus,” the essence was always to strengthen Party rule, not to initiate systemic transformation.
Xi Jinping’s constitutional amendment abolishing term limits has been called “backtracking.” But if we look at history: Mao Zedong ruled for life; Deng Xiaoping, though without formal titles, controlled power for fifteen years behind the scenes; Jiang Zemin effectively held supreme authority from 1994 to 2012. By comparison, Xi merely tore away the pretense, making public what his predecessors had disguised.
Many nostalgically recall Jiang Zemin’s “openness” or Hu Jintao’s “moderation,” and some even call Zhu Rongji a “reformer.” But in fact, Zhu’s policies of massive university enrollment expansion, medical marketization, land finance, and the Three Gorges Dam created today’s chronic problems: devalued education, unaffordable healthcare, and a distorted real estate sector. Hu and Wen’s policy of “the state advances as the private sector retreats,” coupled with the 2008 four-trillion stimulus, directly empowered state-owned enterprises while squeezing the private economy. Jiang Zemin’s move to allow entrepreneurs to join the Party was merely co-opting the private sector into the United Front system, tightening the CCP’s grip on the economy. Their so-called “reforms” never pointed toward democracy but were just alternative methods to maintain power.
The difference with Xi is not in direction, but in speed. Unlike Jiang or Hu, he did not bother with theatrics—he accelerated the system’s essence openly and directly. The bus traveling on the old track would have taken another twenty or thirty years to reach the cliff; Xi pulled open the curtain, slammed the accelerator, and made everyone see more clearly the false scenery outside and the system’s true nature. Therefore, saying Xi is “reversing course” is inaccurate. He has not turned around—he has simply hastened the CCP’s predetermined destination.
Over the past forty years, China has not taken a new road. What was called “reform and opening up” was merely a disguise while continuing down the old track. Political purges, ideological repression, and economic control never ceased; only their forms differed.
