作者：毛一炜
编辑：何清风 责任编辑：罗志飞 翻译：程铭
农民几十年辛苦缴纳社保，到老却得不到应有的保障，缴纳的钱大部分流向城市特权阶层，这就是制度的真实写照。城市职工养老金大多上千甚至上万，而农民几十年的辛勤劳作，到手的养老金往往只有几百元。王志安在《王局拍案》中直言不讳地指出，农民缴纳的社保实际上成为支撑城市福利的“隐形补贴”。这种差距绝非偶然，而是制度设计与权力逻辑共同作用的结果。
大陆社保长期实行城乡二元制度。城镇社保由财政兜底，保障稳固；农村社保几乎完全依赖个人缴费，回报微薄。农民即便进城打工多年，也无法享受与城市职工同等待遇。更令人质疑的是，这些缴纳款项并非完全用于农民本身，而在制度上被挪用或用于支撑城市特权阶层的福利。换言之，中共通过社保体系形成了对农民的长期敛财机制：表面是保障，实际上是把农民辛苦劳作变为城市财政和特权阶层的资金来源。
台湾的经验提供了鲜明对比。早在1995年，台湾就建立了“老农津贴”，只要年满65岁并在农会登记，农民就能领取养老金。金额不高，却体现了制度对农民劳动价值的尊重。台湾实行全民健保，城乡差异被大幅缩小，农民与城市居民享有同等医疗待遇。这种公平不是口号，而是民主监督下制度设计的必然结果。
造成大陆农民社保长期不公的根源，不在资金短缺，而在权力逻辑安排。城市优先、权力优先，农民被系统性边缘化，缴纳的资金被挪用或消耗于非农民群体。台湾能够实现相对公平，是因为农民拥有选票，政治人物必须回应，否则会面临下台风险。没有民主监督，就没有制度公平；没有民意压力，农民永远是制度牺牲者。
社保欺农背后的敛财逻辑，也揭示了中共制度本质：社会资源被用于维持权力结构，而非真正保障民生。农民缴纳的钱，经过层层行政运作和地方财政调剂，往往难以真正回到缴纳者手中。这种制度设计，使得农民不仅承担劳动负担，也成为城市福利和特权阶层的长期资金来源。所谓“共同富裕”，在这种体系下，只是空洞口号。
农民缺乏有效监督权力的能力，无法阻止这一体系运作。缴费年限越长，贫困风险越高，养老金却越来越低。这种结构性不公，让农民长期处于制度的被动和边缘地位。台湾的经验告诉我们，即便资源有限，民主机制也能保证弱势群体享有基本权利；而在中共体制下，农民只能被动接受不平等安排。
可以看到，大陆社保欺农的问题核心在制度和权力逻辑，而非技术问题或资金不足。学台湾，不只是学政策表象，更要学民主监督和权力制衡。一个国家，如果农民辛劳一生，到老仍被制度抛弃，缴纳款项反而被权力结构吸收，用于特权阶层福利，这个国家就失去了最基本的正义。真正的改革，不仅要调整社保数字，更要让农民拥有发声权和参与权，让制度不再成为权力敛财的工具，而是真正保护他们的尊严。
Farmers’ pensions are meager, and the Communist Party of China’s social security has become a money-gathering tool.
Abstract: Wang Zhi’an bluntly pointed out in “Wang Bureau Shooting Case” that the social security paid by farmers has actually become an “invisible subsidy” to support urban welfare. As early as 1995, Taiwan established the “Old Farmers’ Allowance”. As long as they are 65 years old and registered with the Farmers’ Association, they can receive pensions.
Author: Mao Yiwei
Editor: He Qingfeng Responsible Editor: Luo Zhifei Translator：Ming Cheng
Farmers have worked hard to pay social security for decades, but they are not guaranteed when they are old. Most of the money they pay flows to the urban privileged class. This is the true picture of the system. Most urban workers’ pensions are thousands or even tens of thousands, while farmers often get only a few hundred yuan after decades of hard work. Wang Zhi’an bluntly pointed out in “Wang Bureau Shooting” that the social security paid by farmers has actually become an “invisible subsidy” to support urban welfare. This gap is by no means accidental, but the result of the joint effect of institutional design and power logic.
Mainland social security has implemented a dual system between urban and rural areas for a long time. Urban social security is guaranteed by the bottom of the government; rural social security is almost entirely dependent on individual contributions, and the return is meager. Even if farmers work in the city for many years, they cannot enjoy the same treatment as urban workers. What is more questionable is that these contributions are not entirely used for the farmers themselves but are institutionally misappropriated or used to support the welfare of the urban privileged class. In other words, the Communist Party of China has formed a long-term money-raising mechanism for farmers through the social security system: on the surface, it is a guarantee, but in fact, it turns farmers’ hard work into a source of funds for urban finance and privileged classes.
Taiwan’s experience provides a sharp contrast. As early as 1995, Taiwan established the “Old Farmers’ Allowance”. As long as they are 65 years old and registered with the Farmers’ Association, they can receive pensions. The amount is not high, but it reflects the system’s respect for the labor value of farmers. Taiwan implements universal health insurance, the gap between urban and rural areas has been greatly reduced, and farmers and urban residents enjoy the same medical treatment. This kind of fairness is not a slogan, but the inevitable result of the institutional design under democratic supervision.
The root cause of the long-term injustice of social security for mainland farmers is not the shortage of funds, but the logical arrangement of power. Cities are given priority, power is given priority, farmers are systematically marginalized, and the funds paid are misappropriated or consumed by non-farmer groups. Taiwan can achieve relative fairness because farmers have votes, and politicians must respond, otherwise they will face the risk of being out of power. Without democratic supervision, there is no institutional fairness; without public pressure, farmers will always be institutional victims.
The logic of making money behind the social security bullying farmers also reveals the essence of the Communist Party of China’s system: social resources are used to maintain the power structure, not to truly protect people’s livelihood. The money paid by farmers is often difficult to return to the taxpayers after layers of administrative operation and local financial adjustment. This institutional design makes farmers not only bear the labor burden but also become a long-term source of funds for urban welfare and privileged classes. The so-called “common prosperity” is just an empty slogan under this system.
Farmers lack the ability to effectively supervise power, which cannot prevent the system from operating. The longer the contribution period, the higher the risk of poverty, but the lower the pension. This structural injustice has put farmers in a passive and marginal position in the system for a long time. Taiwan’s experience tells us that even with limited resources, democratic mechanisms can ensure that vulnerable groups enjoy basic rights; under the Communist Party of China, farmers can only passively accept unequal arrangements.
It can be seen that the core of the problem of social security bullying farmers in mainland China is the logic of system and power, not technical problems or lack of funds. To learn from Taiwan, we should not only learn from the appearance of policies, but also from democratic supervision and power checks and balances. In a country, if farmers work hard all their lives and are still abandoned by the system in old age, and the contributions are absorbed by the power structure and used for the welfare of the privileged class, the country will lose the most basic justice. The real reform should not only adjust the social security figures but also let farmers have the right to speak out and participate, so that the system no longer becomes a tool for power to make money but truly protect their dignity.
