作者：张宇
编辑：周志刚 责任编辑：韩瑞媛 校对：冯仍 翻译：吕峰
独裁者背后代表着一个集团，一个有约束的意志，一股集中的和指导明确的力量。而敌手方面，则尽可能无计划地从一切圈子和阶级吸收人员。在另一方面，在对政权不满的人中间，有卓越的爱国志士，他们被暴发户当权者激怒。那些暴发户立足不久之后，竟然能够把最舒服和最能挣钱的位置弄到手。这样，反对派虽然在数量上较多（由最高贵和最卑贱的分子所组成），但对政治现状不满的人未能集结力量去追求一个理想，他们徒劳地抱怨，永远只是势能而不能变为动能。这是一群暴民，却要对抗一支部队；这是无组织的、心怀不满的乌合之众，却要对抗有组织的恐怖，所以无法取得进展。他们从来没有有力地联合起来反对他，使独裁者得以对他们各个击破。
————斯蒂芬·茨威格《异端的权利》
我是一名普通的中国人。我和大多数中国人一样，从小就接受要“热爱祖国、拥护共产党”的教育。然而，随着我的成长和经历，我逐渐发现，社会的现实和共产党宣传之间存在着巨大的差异。正是这些差异，让我对中国共产党失去了信任。
一、言论的不自由
自中国开展“清朗行动”以来，对网络言论管控逐渐升级，今年9月，已有多位知名主播账号在各大平台被突然消失。先是网红博主蓝战非、张雪峰被封禁消息传出，9月30日，网红“户晨风”在全网账号被永久注销或清空，这标志其彻底退出了国内社交平台。
在户晨风的一个视频中，他在街头看见一个老人，与老人交谈之后，知道老人每月仅仅只靠107元人民币，所谓的政府养老金生活。这段视频很快在网络上走红，登上热搜后迅速被删除。户晨风的账号首次遭到封禁，他一共有5次被封禁记录，其中2次为短暂封禁。今年自9月以来，户晨风已经历三次被封禁。
户晨风2024年4月受到广泛关注是因为在直播中有观众突然问了他一个敏感问题：“习近平他是一个独裁者吗？” 户晨风当时被吓坏了并激烈地指责对方，他大声说，“这种人严重违反直播规范”“这种人疯了吧？”“我第一时间给他挂掉！” 但最终户晨风的账号还是被封。户晨风是属于比较大胆的中国人，但是即便如此。当他听到有关习近平是不是独裁者问题的时候，仍然惊恐万分。这种对红色独裁的恐惧深深地刻在了中国人的基因里。更恐怖是：战战兢兢的户晨风当时因这个直播节目被封杀，现在又被红色恐惧的暴风扫出了中国国内社交平台。
二、信仰与人权被打压
目前中国官方承认的5大宗教为：佛教、道教、伊斯兰教、天主教和基督教。五大宗教都有一个隶属于政府的协会，并由「国家宗教事务局」和「中国共产党统战部」进行“指导和监督”，其中包括外国人在宗教活动中的作用。
为表达“独立自主”的国家精神，中国政府自1950年起即将中国天主教会与罗马教廷分离，由政府指定的“爱国教会”管理，凡是不在“爱国教会”管理下的宗教活动都被指非法，受到镇压和迫害，这些教会被称为“地下教会”。此外，中国也为基督教成立了“三自教会”，以自治、自养、自传为原则，企图使中国的基督教走上自主自办的道路，但仍有许多基督教徒不愿接受“三自教会”管辖，选择在未经登记的家庭住所从事基督教宗教活动，这些教会被称为“家庭教会”。凡是未登记的宗教团体成员均不断遭受到政府当局的各种不同程度迫害，包括恐吓、骚扰和拘留，特别是被其定位为「邪教」的法轮功组织。
在坚持无神论的前提之下，中国政府打压迫害宗教的方式通常是把教会组织定性为外国阴谋渗透组织，强力取缔天主教、基督教等宗教的各种教会组织，动辄将神职人员拘押或下放劳改，并强迫教徒加入政府所操控的“爱国教会”，2004年9月蔡卓华因领导6个“家庭教会”并出版宗教杂志被秘密逮捕，公安部即将这起案件定义为建国以来最大的一起境外宗教渗透案。
在人权方面，有媒体和组织指控中国政府利用再教育营的名目，大规模且非正当的扣押数以百万计的本国维吾尔族穆斯林，以及少量的基督徒和外国公民（尤其哈萨克斯坦公民）。再教育营内部条件恶劣，部分被关人员时常经历被“虐待”、“洗脑”、强迫劳动等，甚至死亡。还有媒体报道再教育营中存在语言及文化清洗、强制分离孩童父母和强制绝育等行为，亦有学者、媒体、国际组织及政客将新疆再教育营与文化大革命比较，称其为“维吾尔族种族灭绝”。由联合国人权事务高级专员办事处赴中国调查新疆人权问题的《联合国新疆人权报告》亦指出中国官方可能已犯下危害人类罪，联合国秘书长古特雷斯要求中国立即释放被关押的维吾尔族人。
一个正常的社会，应该允许不同的信仰、不同的声音并存，而不是用高压的方式去打压、恐吓。信仰自由是基本人权，但在中国，这个权利已全然丧失。
三、权力缺乏监督
一个缺乏权力制衡，没有独立媒体的反腐，就一定是选择性的反腐。这里的道理很浅显。经济学归纳个人的一般行为方式是自利 。商人和政治家更是如此，不然他们就没有兴趣在商场或官场上为钱为权为名博弈。因为执政者是自利的，他反腐的对象只会是侵犯他的利益或者和他利益无关的贪官，而不是他自己或者和自己名誉利益攸关的贪官。古今中外都如此。
习近平反腐目的是保住红色江山世代接班。如此可以解读当今中国反腐中的选择性。一，若要葬送红色江山的如批评现政权的民间反腐，是不允许的。二，刑不上红二代太子党。照理太子党权力更大因此腐败也更严重，但除了薄熙来因为要搞非组织活动企图抢班夺权之外，其他人安然无事。
任何权力如果缺乏制衡，最终都会腐败。中国共产党长期执政，但缺少有效的监督和制约。很多决策并不是为了人民的利益，而是为了维护政权的稳定。普通人往往成了代价的承担者，却没有发声的机会。
我逐渐明白，中国共产党不等于中国。热爱祖国，并不等于必须拥护共产党。真正的爱国，是希望这个国家的人民能有尊严、有自由，能生活在一个开放、公正的环境里。共产党剥夺了人民这些基本的权利，那么反思和质疑它，就是出于对国家和人民真正的关切。
正因如此，我对中国共产党失去了信任。我相信，一个健康的社会应该允许不同的声音存在，应该有制度让人民监督权力，应该让人们有选择的自由，说话的自由与尊严不是奢侈品，而是每个人与生俱来的权利。
The Fall of Dictatorial Regimes
Author: Zhang Yu
Editor: Zhou Zhigang Executive Editor: Han Ruiyuan Proofreader: Feng Reng Translation: Lyu Feng
Behind every dictator stands a group — a will bound by constraints, a concentrated and well-directed force. On the opposing side, however, people are drawn from every circle and class in a disorganized manner. Among those dissatisfied with the regime, there are outstanding patriots provoked by the parvenus in power — upstarts who, shortly after seizing their positions, have managed to occupy the most comfortable and profitable posts. Thus, although the opposition is large in number — composed of both the noblest and the basest elements — those dissatisfied with the current political order fail to unite around a common ideal. They complain in vain, possessing potential energy that never turns into kinetic force. It is a mob against an army — a disorganized, resentful rabble against an organized terror, and thus they make no progress. They have never united effectively against the dictator, allowing him to crush them one by one.— Stefan Zweig, “The Right to Heresy”
I am an ordinary Chinese citizen. Like most Chinese people, I was taught from childhood to “love the motherland and support the Communist Party.” However, as I grew up and experienced life, I gradually realized the vast gap between the reality of society and the propaganda of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). It is precisely this disparity that caused me to lose trust in the CCP.
I. The Absence of Free Speech
Since China launched the “Clean Internet Campaign,” censorship of online speech has escalated. By September this year, multiple well-known streamers and commentators had suddenly disappeared from major platforms. Influencers such as Lan Zhanfei and Zhang Xuefeng were banned, and on September 30, the popular blogger Hu Chenfeng saw all his social media accounts permanently deleted — marking his complete erasure from China’s digital space.
In one of Hu Chenfeng’s videos, he met an elderly man on the street who revealed that he survived on a government pension of merely 107 RMB per month. The video quickly went viral but was soon deleted after trending. This was the first of five bans Hu suffered — two temporary and three permanent.
Hu came under particular scrutiny in April 2024, when a viewer asked during his livestream, “Is Xi Jinping a dictator?” Terrified, Hu angrily rebuked the questioner: “This violates streaming rules!” “This person must be crazy!” “I hung up immediately!” Despite his defensive reaction, Hu’s account was soon shut down. Even for a relatively bold Chinese citizen, the mere mention of “dictatorship” provoked sheer terror. This fear of red tyranny is deeply engraved into the Chinese psyche. Ironically, despite his caution, Hu Chenfeng was eventually swept away by the same storm of red terror.
II. The Suppression of Faith and Human Rights
China officially recognizes five religions: Buddhism, Taoism, Islam, Catholicism, and Protestantism. Each has a state-controlled association supervised by the State Administration for Religious Affairs and the United Front Work Department of the CCP, which regulate all religious activities, including those involving foreigners.
Since 1950, the Chinese government has severed ties between the Catholic Church in China and the Vatican, replacing it with the state-run Patriotic Catholic Association. Any worship not under its jurisdiction is deemed “illegal” and suppressed; such churches are known as “underground churches.” Similarly, the Three-Self Patriotic Movement was established to “independently manage” Protestant churches under the principles of self-governance, self-support, and self-propagation. Yet many Christians refuse to accept state control and instead gather privately in unregistered “house churches.” Members of these groups are routinely harassed, detained, or imprisoned — especially those labeled as belonging to “evil cults,” such as Falun Gong.
Under its atheistic ideology, the CCP often portrays independent religious groups as “foreign infiltration networks.” It arrests priests, shuts down religious publications, and forces believers to join state-controlled organizations. In 2004, Cai Zhuohua was secretly arrested for leading six house churches and publishing religious magazines — an event the Ministry of Public Security labeled as “the largest foreign religious infiltration case since 1949.”
In terms of human rights, numerous media outlets and NGOs have accused the Chinese government of detaining millions of Uyghur Muslims — along with some Christians and foreign nationals, especially Kazakh citizens — in so-called “re-education camps.” Inside these camps, detainees endure abuse, indoctrination, forced labor, and sometimes death. Reports describe forced sterilization, child–parent separation, and cultural erasure, with many international scholars and officials calling it “genocide.” The United Nations Human Rights Office’s Xinjiang Report found that China’s actions may constitute crimes against humanity. UN Secretary-General António Guterres has urged China to immediately release all detained Uyghurs.
A normal society should tolerate diverse beliefs and voices instead of suppressing them through coercion. Freedom of religion is a basic human right — one that has been entirely extinguished in China.
III. Power Without Oversight
An anti-corruption campaign without an independent press or checks on power is inevitably selective. The logic is simple: as economics tells us, individuals act out of self-interest — especially businessmen and politicians. A ruler’s anti-corruption efforts target only those who threaten his own interests or have fallen out of favor, never himself or his allies.
Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption drive is designed not to cleanse the system, but to safeguard the red dynasty’s continuity. Hence its pattern of selectivity:
Any grassroots or civil anti-corruption effort that threatens the regime is strictly forbidden.
The “princelings” — children of high-ranking Communist leaders — remain untouchable. Though their power and corruption are greater, they are immune, with the exception of Bo Xilai, who was purged not for corruption but for challenging the power structure itself.
Unchecked power inevitably breeds corruption. The CCP has ruled for decades without genuine accountability. Many of its policies serve to preserve the regime, not the people. Ordinary citizens bear the cost but have no voice.
I have come to understand that the Chinese Communist Party is not China. Loving one’s country does not mean supporting the Party. True patriotism is wanting the people to live with dignity and freedom — in an open and just society. The CCP has deprived the Chinese people of these basic rights. Therefore, to question and challenge it is not betrayal, but an act of conscience born from love for one’s nation.
I have lost faith in the Chinese Communist Party. I believe a healthy society must allow diverse voices, institutional oversight, and freedom of choice. The right to speak, to believe, and to live with dignity are not privileges — they are inalienable rights of every human being.
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