作者：华言（大陆）
编辑：周志刚 责任编辑：罗志飞 翻译：吕峰
“劣币驱逐良币”源于格雷欣法则，原指在货币流通中，劣质货币因其低成本和高流通性，趋于取代优质货币。在社会政治领域，此法则可引申为：低价值、低成本的行为主体（“劣币”）因制度激励而占据优势，排挤高价值、高成本的行为主体（“良币”）。此处，“良币”指具有独立思考、创新能力或道德原则的个体，“劣币”则指顺从、投机或平庸者。
列宁党极权专制制度以高度集中的权力结构、单一意识形态的强制性控制和对异见的系统性压制为特征。其制度逻辑必然导致“劣币驱逐良币”。
机制1：单一意识形态压制多元思想，排挤独立与创新主体。极权制度以单一意识形态为核心，视任何偏离为威胁。为维护意识形态的绝对权威，制度通过审查、惩罚等手段压制异见，导致独立思考者、创新者即良币面临高成本（如迫害、流放），而顺从者即劣币因迎合官方路线获得低成本收益。因此，制度激励低价值的顺从行为，排斥高价值的批判性思维。
机制2：以忠诚而非能力为选拔标准，平庸者占据权力核心。极权制度的权力集中性决定要建设最小获胜同盟，这就决定了选拔机制优先考虑对领导或体制的忠诚，而非客观能力或贡献。忠诚者因低风险和高回报（政治晋升、资源分配）占据优势，而有能力但持异见者因高成本（被边缘化或清洗）被排除。此机制导致“劣币”（忠诚但平庸者）取代“良币”（有能力但独立者）。
机制3：恐惧文化抑制真实表达与道德行为，助长投机与虚伪。极权制度通过监控、告密与惩罚机制制造普遍恐惧，迫使个体为自保选择低成本行为，如沉默或附和，而非高成本的真实表达或道德坚持。告密与投机者因适应恐惧环境而获利，而正直与勇气者因高风险被边缘化。此文化进一步强化“劣币”的生存优势。
机制4：资源向忠诚者而非贡献者倾斜，阻碍社会效率与创新。极权制度的资源分配由中央控制，优先流向忠诚的个体或机构，通过恩庇制度团结盟友，而非基于效率或贡献。高效、创新的主体因缺乏资源支持而受限，而低效但忠诚的主体得以存续。此扭曲导致资源浪费与社会停滞，强化“劣币”对“良币”的驱逐。
“劣币驱逐良币”的后果具有深远的社会与政治意涵：
一是社会活力丧失。创新与批判性思维被压制，导致经济停滞与技术落后。
二是道德秩序崩塌。恐惧与告密文化破坏社会信任，助长虚伪与投机。
三是制度危机。长期的“劣币”主导导致决策失误与资源浪费，最终威胁政权稳定。
列宁党极权专制制度通过单一意识形态、忠诚优先、恐惧文化与资源错配，系统性地激励“劣币”行为，排挤“良币”主体。其逻辑的严密性与历史的普遍性表明，“劣币驱逐良币”是该制度的必然结果。
The Systemic Logic of “Bad Money Drives Out Good” in Totalitarian Rule
Author: Huayan (Mainland China)
Editor: Zhou Zhigang Responsible Editor: Luo Zhifei
Translation: Lyu Feng
Abstract:
This article examines the inevitability of the phenomenon “bad money drives out good” within the Leninist totalitarian system. Drawing on the analogy of Gresham’s Law, it argues that under conditions of highly centralized power, single-ideology control, and loyalty-first selection mechanisms, the compliant and opportunistic often prevail because of their low risk and institutional protection, whereas independent thinkers, innovators, and those upholding moral principles are marginalized due to their higher costs.
The idea that “bad money drives out good” originates from Gresham’s Law, which originally referred to monetary circulation: inferior currency, due to its lower cost and greater ease of circulation, tends to drive superior currency out of use. In the realm of socio-political life, this principle can be extended to mean that low-value, low-cost actors (“bad money”) gain advantage through institutional incentives, thereby displacing high-value, high-cost actors (“good money”). Here, “good money” refers to individuals with independent thought, innovative capacity, or moral integrity, while “bad money” refers to those who are submissive, opportunistic, or mediocre.
The Leninist totalitarian system is characterized by a highly centralized power structure, the coercive imposition of a single ideology, and systematic repression of dissent. Its institutional logic inevitably results in “bad money driving out good.”
Mechanism 1: Single ideology suppresses plural thought, marginalizing the independent and innovative.
A totalitarian system elevates one ideology as its core, treating any deviation as a threat. To maintain the absolute authority of ideology, the regime uses censorship, punishment, and repression against dissent. As a result, independent thinkers and innovators—the “good money”—bear extremely high costs (persecution, exile), while the submissive—the “bad money”—reap low-cost benefits by aligning with the official line. Thus, institutional incentives favor low-value conformity while excluding high-value critical thought.
Mechanism 2: Loyalty, not ability, as the selection criterion—mediocrity occupies the core of power.
The concentration of power in totalitarian systems necessitates building a minimal winning coalition, which leads to loyalty being prioritized over objective ability or contribution in cadre selection. Loyalists enjoy low risks and high rewards (political promotion, resource allocation), while capable individuals who voice dissent face high costs (marginalization or purge). This mechanism ensures that “bad money” (loyal but mediocre actors) replace “good money” (capable yet independent actors).
Mechanism 3: A culture of fear suppresses genuine expression and moral behavior, fostering opportunism and hypocrisy.
Through surveillance, denunciation, and punitive measures, the regime creates pervasive fear. To protect themselves, individuals adopt low-cost behaviors—silence or conformity—rather than the high-cost path of truthfulness or moral steadfastness. Informants and opportunists thrive under such an environment, while integrity and courage are punished. This culture further consolidates the survival advantage of “bad money.”
Mechanism 4: Resources flow to loyalists rather than contributors, obstructing efficiency and innovation.
Resource distribution in totalitarian regimes is centrally controlled, flowing preferentially to loyal individuals or institutions. Through patronage, allies are bound together, regardless of efficiency or actual contribution. Consequently, efficient and innovative actors are starved of support, while inefficient yet loyal actors endure. This distortion leads to resource waste, societal stagnation, and further strengthens the displacement of “good money” by “bad.”
Consequences:
The dominance of “bad money” has profound socio-political implications.
1. Loss of social vitality: Suppression of innovation and critical thinking results in economic stagnation and technological backwardness.
2. Collapse of moral order: Fear and denunciation corrode social trust, fostering hypocrisy and opportunism.
3. Systemic crisis: The long-term dominance of “bad money” produces decision-making errors and resource misallocation, ultimately undermining regime stability.
The Leninist totalitarian system, through its mechanisms of single ideology, loyalty-first selection, fear culture, and distorted resource allocation, systematically incentivizes “bad money” behavior and marginalizes “good money” actors. The rigor of this logic, combined with its historical universality, demonstrates that “bad money drives out good” is the inevitable outcome of such a system.
