渗透美国——从唐人街到黑豹党

作者：陀先润

1970年，黑豹党领袖休·牛顿从监狱里出来，买了一张去中国的机票。

他在中国待了十天，见了周恩来，参观了工厂、学校和公社，看到了一个欣欣向荣的社会主义国家。他回到美国之后，做了一件让所有人都看不懂的事：宣布黑豹党放弃武装革命，不再谋求推翻美国政府。

就在一年前，他还是一个狂热的毛泽东崇拜者，把毛主席语录当作圣经，把中国革命当作自己的榜样。他入狱的时候，黑豹党的其他成员去中国朝圣，见毛泽东，见中共领导人，把中国视为全世界被压迫人民的精神故乡。

为什么回来之后就变了？

很多人说是他性情大变，说是监狱改变了他，说是他开始吸毒。这些解释听起来都说得通，但都没有触及真正的原因。真正的原因是，在北京，周恩来告诉了他一件事：中国即将和美国改善关系，中国不再支持黑豹党的武装革命，经济援助也会随之停止。

牛顿从中国回来，不是一个被改变的人，而是一个被通知的人。他知道靠山撤了，只能自己找出路。

这件事要从头说起。

中共在美国的布局，比大多数人想象的要早得多，也深得多。1927年，国共分裂之后，一批在美国的中共党员申请加入了美国共产党，美国共产党专门为此成立了一个机构，叫中国局，设在旧金山，名义上归旧金山美共第十三区领导，实际上做的是在美华人华侨的地下工作。

中国局的第一任书记叫施晃。施晃不是普通的党务工作者，他后来被派去古巴建立古巴共产党，回来之后又去莫斯科受训，然后进入香港海员工会系统。香港海员工会在那个年代是中共在海外最重要的情报和组织网络之一，是中共把手伸进海外华人社区的一个关键渠道。

中国局的第二个重要人物叫徐永英。1928年他在旧金山成立了华工俱乐部，这被认为是中共在美国群众运动的正式开端。他后来进入太平洋国际学会，担任研究员，利用这个学术机构的掩护，影响美国知识界和政治界对中国的看法。他回国之后进入外交部，担任美洲澳洲司司长。

第三个人更有意思，叫纪朝鼎。他是清华大学毕业的，留美之后加入美共中国局，同时通过美共的关系网络，打入了国民政府的财政系统。他成了孔祥熙的秘书，跟宋子文也搞得火热，每周和宋爱龄一起打桥牌。他在国民政府财政系统里做了一件影响深远的事：主导了抗战胜利后沦陷区的货币兑换比率。

当时沦陷区的伪币和法币在黑市上的兑换比率大约是八十比一，但纪朝鼎说服宋子文定了一个官方强制兑换比率：两百比一。这意味着沦陷区的老百姓手里的积蓄，一夜之间缩水了将近七成。国民党的接收官员发现，拿着法币去沦陷区按两百比一换伪币，再去买便宜的黄金、房产、货物，运回大后方转手就是几倍的利润。腐败就这样被制度化了，国统区的经济在这个比率的冲击下迅速崩溃，民心彻底离散。

后来有历史学家评价，纪朝鼎用一个汇率，帮中共打赢了国共内战。他是有功于中共的，但正如有人说过的：纪朝鼎有功于中共，但有罪于中华民族。他死得很早，1963年就去世了，没有等到足够多的人明白他到底做了什么。

从施晃到徐永英到纪朝鼎，这三个人勾勒出了中共在美国布局的基本逻辑：以美共为掩护建立组织网络，以学术机构和新闻媒体为渠道影响舆论，以打入国民政府内部的方式直接破坏对手的根基。这三条线同时运作，互相配合，而真正的操盘者是周恩来和董必武，中共情报系统里最顶端的两个人。

1933年之后，中国局已经不再做表面的党务工作，专门转型为情报组织和秘密基地建设机构。他们在纽约建立了根基，因为纽约有大量的华人移民，有香港海员工会的网络，有美共的保护，是一个可以深耕的土壤。法拉盛就是在这个基础上，经过几十年的经营，变成了今天这个样子。

麦卡锡主义兴起之后，美共在美国受到了严厉打压，公开的党务活动几乎全部停止。中共在美国的力量转入更深的地下，以帮会、同乡会、劳工组织、文化团体的形式继续存在，一层套一层，从外面看是普通的华人社区组织，里面的核心人员才知道真正的归属。

1960年代，毛泽东认为自己已经可以取代斯大林，成为世界革命的领袖，中共开始全球范围内的输出革命。在美国，这种冲动找到了一个意想不到的出口：黑人民权运动。

中共打黑人牌不是从黑豹党开始的。早在1959年，黑人作家杜波依斯就访问了中国，和毛泽东、周恩来、陈毅全都见了面。1961年，全国有色人种协进会的领导人威廉姆斯，因为鼓吹黑人武装自卫被起诉，逃到古巴，1965年又在毛泽东和周恩来的邀请下来到中国，在北京得到庇护，住了好几年。这批人和中共之间的联系，是后来黑豹党和中国关系的前奏。

黑豹党成立于1966年，创始人是休·牛顿和鲍比·希尔。牛顿是毛泽东的狂热崇拜者，他不是读毛选，是从语录开始读的，然后越读越痴迷，把毛泽东思想变成了黑豹党的意识形态基础。黑豹党的钱从哪里来，一直是个谜。官方说法是他们到旧金山的亲中书店，以两毛钱一本的价格买进毛主席语录，然后在伯克利大学校园里以一美元一本卖出去，一本赚八毛钱，用这个钱买枪。

这个说法可笑得令人叹服。卖一本语录赚八毛钱，买一支散弹枪要七八十美元，需要卖将近一百本才能买一支枪。黑豹党鼎盛时期有统一服装、统一武器，在全美十九个城市每天向两万名儿童提供免费早餐，还有免费诊所、法律援助、社区巡逻队。这些钱，不是卖语录卖出来的。

1963年，毛泽东发表了一篇公开声明，支持美国黑人的民权运动，把它定性为全球反帝国主义斗争的一部分。1966年文化大革命爆发，中共开始全球范围内推动武装革命，黑豹党就在这个时机点成立了，获得了来自中国的实质性支持。具体金额没有任何公开记录，但从黑豹党的活动规模来看，支持是真实存在的。

黑豹党在FBI局长胡佛眼里是美国国内安全的最大威胁。胡佛的判断不是没有道理，因为黑豹党真的在做一件危险的事：争夺民心。免费早餐、免费诊所、法律援助，这些项目让黑豹党在贫困黑人社区里建立了真实的群众基础，这才是让政府真正感到恐慌的东西，不是他们手里的枪。

然后，1971年，牛顿去了中国，回来之后宣布放弃武装革命。

黑豹党内部的分裂随之爆发。一批人认为牛顿背叛了革命，拒绝接受这个转变。逃亡阿尔及利亚的克里弗在电话里和牛顿公开决裂，被开除出党。另一批人跟着牛顿转型，开始走社区服务和选举政治的路线，希尔后来竞选市长，竞选州长，成了一个正常的民主党政客。

这个分裂的过程，正好和中美关系改善的时间线完全吻合。1971年基辛格秘密访华，1972年尼克松访问北京，中美开始走向正常化。中国不再需要在美国国内维持一支武装的颠覆力量，黑豹党完成了它的使命，被安静地放弃了。

但中共在美国的布局并没有因此消失，只是换了形式。

1978年，一个叫义和拳的组织宣告解散，同年成立了一个叫革命斗争联盟的新组织，说是纯粹的美国本土组织，和中共没有关系。1985年，这个组织又和其他几个亲中团体合并，成立了自由道路社会主义组织。这个组织至今存在，成员以保密身份参与，不公开党籍，是标准的地下党模式。

更直接的是加州华人进步会。这个组织由义和拳在旧金山建立，义和拳是从纽约派来的，纽约的根子在中国局。加州华人进步会存活至今，是美国西海岸最重要的亲中华人组织之一。黑命贵运动的创始人之一加尔萨，成立了一个叫黑人未来实验室的组织，这个实验室的唯一金主，就是加州华人进步会。

从1920年代的中国局，到1960年代的黑豹党，到2010年代的黑命贵，这条线是连续的，不是偶然的巧合，而是同一张网在不同时代的不同表现形式。

习近平后来把这张网提前引爆了。黑命贵运动在2020年爆发，时机和中美关系的急剧恶化高度重合，美国情报界很快意识到背后有外部力量在推动。中共本来打算在台海问题最关键的时刻把这张牌打出来，在美国国内制造混乱，消耗政府精力，压制干涉台海的政治意愿。结果被提前用在了一场总统选举里，把几十年的布局暴露在了美国情报机构的视野之下。

这个操作让中共的长期谋划损失惨重，相当于把一枚准备在最关键时刻引爆的炸弹，拿来吓唬邻居的狗。

编辑：黄吉洲 校对：孔祥庆 翻译：戈冰

Party Pawn—The Secret History of the CCP’s Export of Revolution (Part VI)

Infiltrating the United States: From Chinatown to the Black Panther Party

Author: Tuo Xianrun

In 1970, Huey Newton, leader of the Black Panther Party, was released from prison and bought a plane ticket to China.

He stayed in China for ten days, met Zhou Enlai, visited factories, schools, and communes, and witnessed a thriving, prosperous socialist country. After returning to the United States, he did something that confounded everyone: he announced that the Black Panther Party was renouncing armed revolution and would no longer seek to overthrow the U.S. government.

Just a year prior, he had been a fanatical admirer of Mao Zedong, treating the Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung as a Bible and viewing the Chinese Revolution as his model. While he was in prison, other members of the Black Panther Party went on pilgrimages to China, meeting Mao Zedong and top CCP leaders, regarding China as the spiritual homeland for all oppressed people across the globe.

Why did he change so drastically upon his return?

Many claimed his temperament had undergone a shift, that prison had altered him, or that he had begun abusing drugs. These explanations all sound plausible, yet none hit upon the true reason. The true reason was that in Beijing, Zhou Enlai delivered a piece of news to him: China was about to improve its relations with the United States, China would no longer support the Black Panther Party’s armed revolution, and economic aid would be cut off accordingly.

Newton returned from China not as a man who had undergone a personal transformation, but as a man who had received an eviction notice. Knowing that his backer had pulled out, he had no choice but to forge a new path on his own.

This story must be told from the very beginning.

The CCP’s strategic footprint in the United States began much earlier and ran far deeper than most people realize. In 1927, following the split between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, a group of CCP members in the U.S. applied to join the Communist Party USA (CPUSA). The CPUSA established a dedicated organ for this purpose called the Chinese Bureau. Headquartered in San Francisco, it was nominally placed under the direction of District 13 of the CPUSA in San Francisco, but in reality, it operated as an underground network targeting Chinese immigrants and overseas Chinese in the United States.

The first secretary of the Chinese Bureau was Shi Huang. Shi Huang was no ordinary party worker; he was later dispatched to Cuba to assist in establishing the Communist Party of Cuba, and upon his return, he was sent to Moscow for training before entering the system of the Hong Kong Seamen’s Union. In that era, the Hong Kong Seamen’s Union was one of the CCP’s most crucial intelligence and organizational networks overseas, serving as a key channel through which the CCP extended its reach into overseas Chinese communities.

The second key figure of the Chinese Bureau was Xu Yongying. In 1928, he founded the Chinese Workers’ Club in San Francisco, an event considered the formal beginning of the CCP’s mass movements in the United States. He later joined the Institute of Pacific Relations as a research fellow, utilizing the cover of this academic institution to influence the perceptions of the American intelligentsia and political circles regarding China. After returning to China, he entered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and served as the Director-General of the Department of American and Australian Affairs.

The third individual was even more interesting: Ji Chaoding. A graduate of Tsinghua University, he joined the CPUSA Chinese Bureau after studying in the United States, while simultaneously infiltrating the financial system of the Nationalist Government through the network of the CPUSA. He became a secretary to H. H. Kung, got along famously with T. V. Soong, and played bridge with Soong Ai-ling every week. Within the Nationalist Government’s financial system, he accomplished something with far-reaching consequences: he spearheaded the determination of the currency exchange rate in former occupied areas following the victory in the War of Resistance.

At the time, the black-market exchange rate between the puppet currency in the occupied territories and the Fabi (legal tender) stood at roughly eighty to one, but Ji Chaoding persuaded T. V. Soong to establish an official, mandatory exchange rate of two hundred to one. This meant that the savings of ordinary people in the occupied zones shrank by nearly seventy percent overnight. Takeover officials from the Nationalist Government discovered that by bringing Fabi to the occupied territories, exchanging it at the two-hundred-to-one rate for puppet currency, and then buying cheap gold, real estate, and commodities to transport back to the Nationalist rear areas, they could reap multi-fold profits. Corruption was thus institutionalized; under the impact of this exchange rate, the economy in Nationalist-controlled areas rapidly collapsed, and the hearts of the public were completely alienated.

Later, historians commented that Ji Chaoding helped the CCP win the Chinese Civil War with a single exchange rate. He was a man of great merit to the CCP, but as some have said: Ji Chaoding was a benefactor to the CCP, yet a perpetrator of crime against the Chinese nation. He passed away very early, in 1963, without living to see enough people understand what he had actually done.

From Shi Huang to Xu Yongying to Ji Chaoding, these three individuals outlined the foundational logic of the CCP’s strategic layout in the United States: using the CPUSA as cover to build organizational networks, employing academic institutions and news media as channels to shape public opinion, and infiltrating the interior of the Nationalist Government to directly undermine the rival’s foundation. These three lines operated simultaneously and in tandem with one another, while the actual masterminds behind the scenes were Zhou Enlai and Dong Biwu—the two men at the very apex of the CCP’s intelligence apparatus.

After 1933, the Chinese Bureau ceased engaging in superficial party affairs and explicitly transformed into an intelligence organization and an agency for building clandestine bases. They established their roots in New York because New York possessed a vast population of Chinese immigrants, the network of the Hong Kong Seamen’s Union, and the protection of the CPUSA—a fertile soil in which to cultivate deep operations. Flushing, built upon this foundation and nurtured over decades of operation, became what it is today.

Following the rise of McCarthyism, the Communist Party USA suffered severe suppression within the United States, and open party activities virtually ground to a complete halt. The CCP’s forces in the United States transitioned into an even deeper underground, continuing their existence under the guise of secret societies, native place associations, labor organizations, and cultural groups. Layer was nested within layer; viewed from the outside, they appeared to be ordinary Chinese community organizations, and only the core personnel on the inside knew their true affiliation.

In the 1960s, Mao Zedong came to believe that he was already positioned to replace Stalin as the leader of the world revolution, and the CCP initiated the export of revolution on a global scale. Within the United States, this impulse found an unexpected outlet: the Black Civil Rights Movement.

The CCP’s strategy of playing the “Black card” did not begin with the Black Panther Party. As early as 1959, the Black writer W. E. B. Du Bois visited China, meeting with Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, and Chen Yi. In 1961, Robert F. Williams, a leader of the NAACP, was indicted for advocating Black armed self-defense and fled to Cuba. In 1965, upon the invitation of Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, he traveled to China, took refuge in Beijing, and lived there for several years. The connections between these individuals and the CCP served as a prelude to the relationship that later developed between the Black Panther Party and China.

The Black Panther Party was founded in 1966 by Huey Newton and Bobby Seale. Newton was a fanatical admirer of Mao Zedong; he did not begin by reading the Selected Works of Mao Zedong, but rather started with the Quotations, becoming increasingly obsessed as he read until he turned Mao Zedong Thought into the ideological foundation of the Black Panther Party. Where the Black Panther Party’s funding originated has always remained a mystery. The official narrative claims they went to pro-China bookstores in San Francisco, purchased copies of Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung at twenty cents each, and resold them on the UC Berkeley campus for one dollar each, making an eighty-cent profit per copy to purchase firearms.

This explanation is laughable to an astonishing degree. Making an eighty-cent profit per copy meant that buying a single shotgun, which cost seventy to eighty dollars, would require selling nearly a hundred copies. At its peak, the Black Panther Party maintained uniform attire and standardized weaponry, provided free breakfast to twenty thousand children daily across nineteen cities in the United States, and operated free clinics, legal aid, and community patrols. This money was not made by selling copies of the Quotations.

In 1963, Mao Zedong issued a public statement supporting the African American civil rights movement, framing it as an integral part of the global anti-imperialist struggle. When the Cultural Revolution broke out in 1966, the CCP began promoting armed revolution worldwide; it was precisely at this historical juncture that the Black Panther Party was established, receiving substantive support from China. While no public record exists detailing specific financial figures, judging by the operational scale of the Black Panther Party, this support was undoubtedly real.

In the eyes of FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, the Black Panther Party posed the greatest threat to internal security in the United States. Hoover’s judgment was not without foundation, as the Black Panther Party was engaged in something truly dangerous: the battle for hearts and minds. Through programs providing free breakfasts, free medical clinics, and legal aid, the Black Panther Party established a genuine mass base within impoverished Black communities. This—far more than the firearms in their hands—was what struck genuine terror into the government.

Then, in 1971, Newton traveled to China, and upon his return, he announced the renunciation of armed revolution.

An internal split immediately erupted within the Black Panther Party. One faction viewed Newton as a traitor to the revolution and refused to accept this transition. Eldridge Cleaver, then exiled in Algeria, publicly broke with Newton over the phone and was subsequently expelled from the party. The other faction followed Newton’s path of transformation, embarking on a course of community service and electoral politics; Bobby Seale later ran for mayor and state governor, ultimately transitioning into a conventional Democratic politician.

This process of fragmentation coincided precisely with the timeline of improving Sino-American relations. In 1971, Henry Kissinger made his secret visit to China, and in 1972, Richard Nixon visited Beijing, signaling the start of normalization between China and the United States. China no longer needed to maintain an armed subversion force inside the United States; having fulfilled its mission, the Black Panther Party was quietly abandoned.

Yet, the CCP’s strategic footprint in the United States did not vanish as a result; it merely adopted a different form.

In 1978, an organization named I Wor Kuen announced its dissolution, and that same year, a new organization called the League of Revolutionary Struggle was established, presenting itself as a purely domestic American organization with no ties to the CCP. In 1985, this organization merged with several other pro-China groups to form the Freedom Road Socialist Organization. This organization continues to exist to this day, with its members participating under covert identities and keeping their party affiliations unpublicized—a textbook operational model of an underground party.

Even more direct is the Chinese Progressive Association in California. This organization was established in San Francisco by I Wor Kuen, who were sent from New York, with their roots in New York tracing back to the Chinese Bureau. Having survived to this day, the Chinese Progressive Association in California remains one of the most important pro-China Chinese organizations on the West Coast of the United States. Alicia Garza, one of the co-founders of the Black Lives Matter movement, founded an organization called the Black Futures Lab; the sole fiscal sponsor of this lab was none other than the Chinese Progressive Association in California.

From the Chinese Bureau in the 1920s, to the Black Panther Party in the 1960s, to Black Lives Matter in the 2010s, this line is continuous—it is no accidental coincidence, but rather the varying manifestations of the very same network across different eras.

Xi Jinping later detonated this network prematurely. The Black Lives Matter movement erupted in 2020, its timing heavily coinciding with the sharp deterioration of Sino-American relations, and the U.S. intelligence community quickly realized that external forces were pushing behind the scenes. The CCP had originally intended to play this card at the most critical juncture over the Taiwan Strait issue to create domestic chaos within the United States, drain the energy of its government, and suppress its political will to intervene in the Taiwan Strait. Instead, it was deployed prematurely in a presidential election, exposing decades of strategic layout to the view of U.S. intelligence agencies.

This operation caused catastrophic losses to the CCP’s long-term calculations—equivalent to taking a bomb meant to be detonated at the most critical moment, and using it merely to intimidate a neighbor’s dog.

Editor: Huang Jizhou Proofreader: Kong Xiangqing Translator: Ge Bing

兄弟反目——日共与中共

作者：陀先润

在全球所有的共产党里，骂中国共产党骂得最狠的，不是美国，不是欧洲，而是日本共产党。日共骂中共骂了几十年，骂独裁，骂军国主义，骂文化大革命，骂天安门，骂习近平。骂得比日本自民党还要狠，比美国的民主党共和党加起来还要难听。这件事本身就很奇怪——两个共产党，同属国际共运，为什么会变成这副局面？

答案要从他们之间纠缠了半个世纪的爱恨情仇说起。

日共比中共资历更老，成立于1922年，比中共晚一年。但日共一直认为自己才是亚洲共产主义运动真正的源头，理由不是没有道理：中国最早接触马克思主义的那批人，包括李大钊、陈独秀，读到的都是日文翻译的马列著作。马克思和恩格斯的思想经过俄文翻译，再经过日文翻译，再经过中文翻译，到了中国共产党创始人手里已经是三手材料。日共因此一直觉得自己是老大哥，中共是小弟，这种心态在他们后来的关系里从来没有真正消失过。

但日共在日本本土的处境从一开始就极为艰难。日本政府把共产党视为颠覆国家的组织，从1930年代开始展开大清洗，大批日共党员被逮捕入狱，总书记德田球一坐了将近二十年的牢。剩下没被抓的，要么流亡海外，要么转入地下。一部分人辗转到了苏联，一部分人留在了中国，这就是后来所说的延安派。

延安派里最重要的人物叫野坂参三。他在延安待了好几年，帮中共做日本战俘的思想工作，参加反战同盟，和毛泽东、周恩来都有过来往。1946年他回到日本，在日共五大上提出了一个后来引发巨大争议的主张：日本共产党要走和平革命的路线，不搞武装斗争，通过议会选举来实现社会主义。

这个主张在当时的共产主义世界里是异端。苏联代表共产党情报局公开批评野坂参三，说他是修正主义，说他背叛了革命原则。但批评归批评，野坂参三背后站着的是中国，是一直在延安收留他、培养他的中共。苏联人看得很清楚，这个主张代表的是中国的某种想法，不是野坂参三个人的发明。

日共内部随之分裂成两派。一派叫所感派，支持野坂参三的和平路线，德田球一是代表人物。另一派叫国际派，认为应该跟着苏联走，坚持武装斗争，拒绝妥协。国际派在共产党情报局的支持下，把所感派从日共开除了。

开除之后，所感派的德田球一跑去了中国，在北京召开了日共的中央代表大会，见了毛泽东，又去见了斯大林，试图在中苏两党之间寻找支持。这个操作现在看起来像是闹剧，但在当时的政治格局里是一种现实的生存策略。国际派迫于压力，最终在1954年提交了自我批评，两派重新合并。

但合并之后，日共内部对中共的态度已经分裂，这道裂缝再也没有真正愈合过。国际派的干部记得，是中共和苏共联手，把他们在内部政治斗争里玩弄了一番。这种记忆埋得很深，等待着合适的时机爆发出来。

1966年，机会来了。

那一年，日共总书记宫本显治来中国访问，和周恩来等人进行了会谈。他看到的中国，正在文化大革命的前夜，各种迹象都显示一场大规模的政治运动即将爆发。宫本显治回去之后发表了一份公报，表达了日共对中国国内政治走向的担忧，同时坚持日共走自己的和平议会路线，不跟着中国搞武装革命。

毛泽东看了这份公报，说太软弱了，说这是和平共处，是修正主义。双方就此撕破了脸。中共在日共内部的浮线随之开始浮出水面。

所谓浮线，是中共在日共里长期埋下的一批亲中人士。这批人在日共和中共决裂之后，被日共认定为搅局者，陆续被开除出党。他们出来之后成立了新的派别，继续鼓吹毛泽东思想，继续走武装革命路线。这些分裂出来的小团体，后来成了日本赤军最重要的思想来源之一。

日本赤军的起源可以追溯到1958年成立的共产主义同盟。这个组织最大的特点是，它学习的不是列宁主义，不是苏联模式，而是毛泽东思想，是农村包围城市，是枪杆子里出政权。1966年文化大革命爆发之后，日本的学生运动越来越激进，到1969年，正式成立了赤军派。

赤军派刚成立就遇到了麻烦。他们在大菩萨岭集结了数百人准备军事训练，计划训练完毕之后刺杀日本首相，被日本警察一网打尽。这次失败让赤军派分裂成两股：一股留在日本，和另一个叫革命左派的组织合并，成立了联合赤军，继续在日本本土搞武装斗争；另一股出走海外，寻找新的战场。

留在日本的联合赤军，走上了一条极为惨烈的自我毁灭之路。他们认为之前的失败是因为队伍不纯洁，于是开始内部整风，逐一审查每个成员的革命纯洁性。审查的方式是严刑逼供，逼出认罪之后继续追问，追问出更多的名字，然后对那些名字继续审查。这个过程里，联合赤军自己杀死了自己十四名成员，有些人是被打死的，有些人是在寒冬里被强迫暴露在室外冻死的。

1972年，联合赤军的残余部分躲进了长野县的浅间山庄，被日本警察包围。这场对峙被日本电视台全程直播，全国收视率据说超过了百分之九十。最后警察攻入山庄，逮捕了里面的人。那场直播里有一个细节，当时的纪录片里都有：一个母亲对着山庄喊话，叫里面的儿子出来，说毛泽东已经和尼克松握手了，中美不再是敌人了，你们的使命已经完成了。山庄里回答她的，是她儿子打出来的子弹。

出走海外的那一股，去了中东，和巴勒斯坦的武装组织合作，在中东的沙漠里打游击，搞劫机，制造爆炸。这就是后来被称为日本赤军的那个组织，领袖是一个叫重信房子的女人，后来在第一篇里已经提到过：她被捕时的护照上有二十多次进入中国的记录，在北京居住的时间加起来将近两年。

日共和中共的决裂，最终对两者产生了截然不同的影响。

中共失去了一个潜在的盟友，但在日本留下了一批不受控制的激进势力，这些人后来造成的麻烦，远比一个听话的日共要大得多。日共则在决裂之后，逐渐把自己的政治路线向欧洲社会民主主义方向调整，放弃了武装革命的幻想，专心做议会政治。他们在日本的议席越来越稳固，在地方选举里表现不错，成了日本政治格局里一个正常的组成部分。

这个结局印证了本系列一直在说的那条规律：和中共切割得越彻底，活得越好。马共和泰共紧跟北京，最后在丛林里消耗殆尽。日共在1966年彻底和中共决裂，然后活到了今天，而且活得比任何一个曾经和中共保持密切关系的亚洲共产党都要健康。

日共骂中共骂得那么狠，不是没有原因的。他们比任何人都更清楚，那只手伸进来之后会做什么。

编辑：黄吉洲 校对：周敏 翻译：戈冰

The Party’s Pawns — The Secret History of the CCP’s Export of Revolution (Part V)

Turn Against Brothers—The Japanese Communist Party and the Chinese Communist Party

Author: Tuo Xianrun

Among all the Communist Parties across the globe, the one that fiercely denounces the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) most harshly is neither America nor Europe, but the Japanese Communist Party (JCP).

The JCP has cursed the CCP for decades—denouncing its dictatorship, militarism, the Cultural Revolution, Tiananmen, and Xi Jinping. Their criticisms are even harsher than those of Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), and more biting than the U.S. Democratic and Republican Parties combined. This phenomenon itself is exceedingly strange: two Communist parties belonging to the same international communist movement—why did they end up in such a state?

The answer lies in the half-century of tangled love, hate, and resentment between them.

The JCP possesses a seniority nearly on par with the CCP, having been founded in 1922—just one year after the CCP. Yet the JCP has always considered itself the true origin of the Asian communist movement, and their reasoning is not without foundation: the earliest figures in China to encounter Marxism, including Li Dazhao and Chen Duxiu, read Marxist-Leninist texts translated into Japanese. The ideas of Marx and Engels passed from Russian translations, through Japanese translations, and finally into Chinese translations, reaching the founders of the Chinese Communist Party as third-hand material. Consequently, the JCP always viewed itself as the elder brother and the CCP as the younger brother, a mindset that never truly vanished from their subsequent relationship.

However, the JCP’s predicament within Japan itself was extremely dire from the very beginning. The Japanese government regarded the Communist Party as an organization aimed at subverting the state, launching massive purges starting in the 1930s. Large numbers of JCP members were arrested and imprisoned, with General Secretary Tokuda Kyuichi serving nearly twenty years in prison. Those remaining who escaped arrest either went into exile abroad or went underground. Some eventually made their way to the Soviet Union, while others remained in China—forming what would later be known as the Yan’an faction.

The most critical figure within the Yan’an faction was Nosaka Sanzo. He stayed in Yan’an for several years, assisting the CCP with ideological work among Japanese prisoners of war, participating in anti-war leagues, and interacting directly with Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai. Returning to Japan in 1946, he proposed a proposition at the 5th National Congress of the JCP that later sparked immense controversy: the Japanese Communist Party should pursue a path of peaceful revolution, eschewing armed struggle and achieving socialism through parliamentary elections.

This proposition was considered heresy within the communist world at the time. Representing the Cominform, the Soviet Union publicly criticized Nosaka Sanzo, accusing him of revisionism and betraying revolutionary principles. Yet criticism aside, standing behind Nosaka Sanzo was China—the CCP, which had sheltered and nurtured him in Yan’an for years. The Soviets saw quite clearly that this proposition reflected certain ideas held by China, rather than being Nosaka Sanzo’s personal invention.

Consequently, the JCP split into two internal factions. One was the Mainstream Faction (Shokan-ha), which supported Nosaka Sanzo’s peaceful line and had Tokuda Kyuichi as its leading figure. The other was the International Faction (Kokusai-ha), which believed in following the Soviet Union, adhering to armed struggle, and refusing compromise. Backed by the Cominform, the International Faction expelled the Mainstream Faction from the JCP.

Following the expulsion, Tokuda Kyuichi of the Mainstream Faction fled to China, convened a National Conference of the JCP Central Committee in Beijing, met with Mao Zedong, and then went to see Stalin, seeking support between the Chinese and Soviet parties. While this maneuver may look like a farce today, within the political landscape of that era, it represented a realistic survival strategy. Yielding to pressure, the International Faction ultimately submitted a self-criticism in 1954, leading to the reunification of the two factions.

However, after the merger, the internal attitude of the JCP toward the CCP remained divided, and this rift never truly healed. Cadres of the International Faction remembered that the CCP and the CPSU had joined forces to play them like pawns in internal political struggles. This memory ran deep, waiting for the right moment to erupt.

In 1966, that opportunity arrived.

That year, JCP General Secretary Miyamoto Kenji visited China and held talks with Zhou Enlai and others. The China he observed stood on the eve of the Cultural Revolution, with all signs indicating that a massive political movement was about to break out. Upon his return, Miyamoto Kenji issued a communiqué expressing the JCP’s concerns over the trajectory of China’s domestic politics, while insisting that the JCP would pursue its own peaceful parliamentary route rather than following China into armed revolution.

Upon reading this communiqué, Mao Zedong declared it to be too soft, calling it peaceful coexistence and revisionism. The two sides completely fell out over the matter.

Consequently, the hidden networks embedded by the CCP within the JCP began to surface.

These so-called hidden networks referred to a cohort of pro-China figures long planted by the CCP inside the JCP. Following the rift between the JCP and the CCP, these individuals were identified by the JCP as troublemakers and were expelled from the party one after another. After their expulsion, they formed new factions, continuing to advocate Mao Zedong Thought and adhering to the path of armed revolution. These splinter micro-groups later became one of the most critical ideological origins of the Japanese Red Army.

The origin of the Japanese Red Army can be traced back to the Communist League founded in 1958. The defining characteristic of this organization was that what it studied was not Leninism or the Soviet model, but Mao Zedong Thought—encircling the cities from the countryside and political power growing out of the barrel of a gun. After the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution in 1966, the Japanese student movement grew increasingly radical, culminating in the official establishment of the Red Army Faction in 1969.

The Red Army Faction ran into trouble immediately upon its inception. They assembled hundreds of people at Mount Daibosatsu to undergo military training, planning to assassinate the Prime Minister of Japan once the training was complete, only to be caught in a single sweep by the Japanese police. This setback caused the Red Army Faction to split into two streams: one remained in Japan, merging with another organization called the Revolutionary Left to form the United Red Army and continuing armed struggle on the Japanese mainland; the other stream went overseas to seek new battlefields.

The United Red Army that remained in Japan embarked on an extraordinarily tragic path of self-destruction. Believing that their previous failures stemmed from ideological impurity within their ranks, they initiated internal rectification campaigns, auditing the revolutionary purity of each member one by one. The method of audit was torture to extract confessions; once a confession was forced out, further questioning ensued to yield more names, followed by audits of those newly named individuals. In this process, the United Red Army killed fourteen of its own members—some were beaten to death, while others were forced into outdoor exposure in the dead of winter and froze to death.

In 1972, the remnants of the United Red Army took refuge in the Asama-Sanso villa in Nagano Prefecture, surrounded by the Japanese police. This standoff was broadcast live by Japanese television networks across the nation, with ratings reportedly exceeding ninety percent. Ultimately, police stormed the villa and arrested those inside. A detail from that live broadcast, captured in documentaries of the time, remains vivid: a mother called out to the villa, pleading for her son inside to come out, telling him that Mao Zedong had already shaken hands with Nixon, that China and the United States were no longer enemies, and that their mission had concluded. The answer returned to her from inside the villa was a bullet fired by her son.

The stream that fled overseas went to the Middle East, partnering with Palestinian armed organizations to conduct guerrilla warfare, hijackings, and bombings in the Middle Eastern deserts. This was the organization later known as the Japanese Red Army, led by a woman named Shigenobu Fusako—who was previously mentioned in the first article: upon her arrest, her passport contained records of over twenty entries into China, with her cumulative time living in Beijing adding up to nearly two years.

The break between the JCP and the CCP ultimately exerted starkly different impacts on both parties.

The CCP lost a potential ally while leaving behind an uncontrolled force of radicals in Japan; the trouble subsequently caused by these individuals was far greater than what a compliant JCP would have ever produced. The JCP, meanwhile, progressively adjusted its political trajectory toward European social democracy following the split, abandoning illusions of armed revolution to focus exclusively on parliamentary politics. Their seats in Japan’s parliament grew increasingly secure, and their strong performance in local elections established them as a normal component of the Japanese political landscape.

This outcome substantiates the law reiterated throughout this series: the more thoroughly one severs ties with the CCP, the better off one lives. The Malayan Communist Party (CPM) and the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) followed Beijing closely, only to be completely consumed and erased in the jungles. The JCP broke with the CCP completely in 1966 and has survived to this day—living far more healthily than any other Asian communist party that once maintained close ties with the CCP.

There is good reason why the JCP denounces the CCP so fiercely. Better than anyone else, they understand precisely what that hand will do once it reaches in.

Editor: Huang Jizhou Proofreader: Zhou Min Translator: Ge Bing

作者：张兴贵

极权主义重视“地面上看得见”的建设，而轻视下水管道等“看不见”的基础设施，其根源在于体制的内在逻辑：表演性政治、合法性生产、权力展示的结合。

一、表演性政治。极权主义本质上是“剧场国家”。汉娜·阿伦特在《极权主义的起源》中指出，这种体制依赖持续制造神话、运动感和集体幻觉来维持统治。地面上宏大的、视觉冲击强的项目——宽阔的林荫大道、巨型广场、纪念碑、高耸的政府大楼、标志性体育场或水电站——完美服务于这一需求。它们是可被观看、可被摄影、可被宣传的“景观”，能瞬间制造“政权强大、领袖英明、事业辉煌”的叙事。相反，下水管道、污水处理系统、地下管网等隐形基础设施，却“沉默无声”。它们无法举办仪式，无法成为背景板，无法转化为宣传口号。它们的功能是长期、分散、预防性的——减少内涝、保障公共卫生、支撑日常民生——却缺乏即时戏剧效果。因此，在资源有限的极权体制下，优先序自然倒向“看得见”的项目，这是政治选择。

二、合法性赤字的替代。极权政权普遍面临深刻的“合法性赤字”：缺乏民主选举的程序合法性，也难以长期依赖真实的经济绩效。于是，它们转向“表演合法性”——通过可见成就制造合法性幻象。宏大地面工程提供即时、可量化的“胜利叙事”：多少公里大道、多少座高楼、多少个“世界第一”。这些数据容易统计、容易上报、容易通过国家媒体转化为“历史性成就”。而地下管网的完善，需要数十年持续投入、专业规划、分散维护，其效益滞后且难以归因于某位领袖或某次运动。故障往往在多年后才爆发，极易被淡化为“自然灾害”。这种偏好形成恶性循环：政权越依赖可见绩效来弥补合法性，就越忽视隐形系统；隐形系统越脆弱，政权就越需要新的地面工程来转移视线、制造新神话。

三、可见即控制，可控即象征。首先，可见建设便于权力展示与威慑。宽阔笔直的大道利于阅兵、群众集会和监控；巨型建筑象征对自然、对历史、对“旧世界”的征服，强化领袖作为“历史推动者”和“救世主”的形象。地下设施则无法承载这种象征重负。其次，它服务于资源集中与控制。极权体制擅长“举国体制办大事”，通过自上而下的动员调动资源。但隐形基础设施需要地方自主、专业判断和持续预算，这与高度集权的决策模式相冲突。资源有限时，必然优先投向能直接服务政权存续、能被中央直接掌控的可见项目。再次，从心理学角度，这是不安全感的补偿。极权领袖和官僚深知权力基础脆弱，依赖恐惧而非共识，因此需要不断通过“看得见的胜利”来强化自我合法性与群众顺从。地面景观成为心理麻醉剂：越是内部矛盾尖锐，越需外部（或视觉）辉煌来掩饰。

四、体制激励的扭曲。极权官僚体系的激励机制进一步放大了这一偏差。官员晋升依赖“政绩工程”——上级看得见、媒体拍得到、能快速出成果的项目。修建下水管道难以“出彩”，维护它更无“亮点”。相比之下，民主或开放治理中，媒体监督、选民压力和专业自治会推动对隐形基础设施的重视。因为民生问题会直接转化为政治问责。而在极权下，民众声音微弱，责任链条模糊，导致“可见优先、隐形拖延”的结构性选择。

极权主义重视地面景观、轻视地下管网是权力哲学问题。真正的文明治理，从不追求舞台上的永恒高潮，而是致力于让每一位公民在日常中活得安全、有尊严。

编辑：李聪玲 校对：周敏 翻译：戈冰

Totalitarian Phenomenon，Part VIII: Prioritizing “That Which Can Be Seen”

Author: Zhang Xinggui

The totalitarian tendency to prioritize visible above-ground construction while neglecting hidden infrastructure such as drainage systems stems directly from the system’s inner logic: the confluence of performative politics, the production of legitimacy, and the display of power.

I. Performative Politics

Totalitarianism is, at its core, a “theatre state.” As Hannah Arendt noted in The Origins of Totalitarianism, such regimes rely on the continuous manufacturing of myths, a sense of momentum, and collective illusions to sustain their rule. Grand, visually striking above-ground projects—spacious boulevards, giant plazas, monuments, towering government edifices, iconic stadiums, and megastructures like hydroelectric dams—serve this need perfectly. They are “spectacles” to be viewed, photographed, and broadcast, instantaneously crafting a narrative of “a powerful regime, a brilliant leader, and a glorious cause.”

Conversely, invisible infrastructure like drainage pipes, sewage treatment systems, and underground utility networks remains “silent.” These subterranean networks cannot host ceremonial gatherings, serve as backdrops for photOps, or be transformed into propaganda slogans. Their functions are long-term, decentralized, and preventive—mitigating urban flooding, safeguarding public health, and sustaining everyday livelihoods—yet they lack immediate dramatic effect. Consequently, under a resource-constrained totalitarian system, priorities naturally tilt toward “visible” projects as a deliberate political choice.

II. Substitutes for the Legitimacy Deficit

Totalitarian regimes universally confront a profound “legitimacy deficit”: they lack procedural legitimacy derived from democratic elections, and they struggle to rely perpetually on genuine economic performance. Hence, they pivot toward “performative legitimacy”—creating an illusion of legitimacy through high-visibility achievements. Grand above-ground engineering projects supply an immediate, quantifiable “narrative of victory”: how many kilometers of boulevards paved, how many skyscrapers erected, how many “world firsts” achieved.

Such metrics are straightforward to compile, convenient to report to higher authorities, and easily translated into “historic achievements” through state media. Improving underground networks, by contrast, requires decades of sustained investment, technical planning, and decentralized maintenance; its benefits are delayed and hard to attribute to a specific leader or political campaign. Failures often erupt only years down the line, making them easily downplayed or dismissed as mere “natural disasters.” This preference fosters a vicious cycle: the more a regime relies on visible performance to offset its legitimacy deficit, the more it neglects hidden systems; the more fragile these hidden systems become, the more the regime requires fresh above-ground projects to divert attention and manufacture new myths.

III. Visibility Means Control, and Controllability Means Symbolism

First, visible construction facilitates the display and deterrence of power. Wide, straight avenues lend themselves to military parades, mass rallies, and surveillance; gargantuan structures symbolize the conquest of nature, history, and the “old world,” reinforcing the leader’s image as the “engine of history” and a “savior.” Underground infrastructure, by contrast, cannot bear such symbolic weight.

Second, it serves resource concentration and control. Totalitarian regimes excel at mobilizing resources from the top down through the “whole-of-nation system.” Invisible infrastructure, however, requires local autonomy, professional judgment, and sustained budgetary commitments—demands that clash directly with highly centralized decision-making models. When resources are constrained, priority is inevitably given to visible projects that directly serve regime survival and remain under the central authority’s direct control.

Third, from a psychological perspective, this reflects a compensation for deep-seated insecurity. Totalitarian leaders and bureaucrats are acutely aware of the fragility of their power base, which relies on fear rather than consensus. Consequently, they must constantly rely on “visible victories” to reinforce self-legitimacy and compel mass obedience. Above-ground spectacles become a psychological narcotic: the sharper internal contradictions grow, the greater the need for external (or visual) grandeur to mask them.

IV. Distortion of Systemic Incentives

The incentive structure within totalitarian bureaucracies further amplifies this bias. Official promotion depends on “vanity and trophy projects”—initiatives that are visible to superiors, capture well on camera, and deliver rapid, tangible results. Building drainage pipes rarely offers opportunities to “shine,” and maintaining them yields even fewer “highlights.”

By contrast, under democratic or open governance, media scrutiny, voter pressure, and professional autonomy push hidden infrastructure to the forefront, as livelihood issues translate directly into political accountability. Under totalitarianism, however, the voice of the populace is muted and the chain of accountability remains blurred, leading to a structural choice that prioritizes the visible while deferring the invisible.

The totalitarian tendency to prioritize above-ground spectacles over subterranean networks is fundamentally a question of power philosophy. Genuine civil governance never pursues an eternal crescendo on the political stage; rather, it dedicates itself to ensuring that every citizen lives with safety and dignity in their daily lives.

Editor: Li Congling Proofreader: Zhou Min Translator: Ge Bing

作者：张兴贵

在极权主义体制中，“领导的事再小也是大事，百姓的事再大也是小事”并非简单的官僚主义偏差或个人作风问题，而是这一政体逻辑的必然产物。这一现象的必然性在于–极权主义追求对社会生活的“总体”控制，必须将领袖（或领导集团）神圣化、绝对化，使其成为意识形态的化身和权力的唯一源泉；而民众则被工具化为实现“历史使命”的手段，其个体诉求必须服从于这一抽象的“整体”。

一、领袖作为“真理”与“历史必然”的化身。极权主义的核心在于一套“极权意识形态”，如法西斯主义、斯大林主义等，它声称掌握了历史的绝对规律和人类的终极真理。领袖并非普通政治人物，而是这一真理的活的体现、历史的发动机和人民的“父亲”。领袖的思想、决定甚至日常事务，都被等同于“党的意志”“国家的命运”“历史的进步”。因此，领袖的一言一行、一举一动，都被上升为“大局”——任何轻视都是对真理的背叛。相反，百姓的事再大也是“小事”，因为在这一意识形态下，个体不是目的，而是实现“集体意志”的工具。民众的饥饿、苦难、权利诉求，被视为“历史进程中的暂时阵痛”或“局部矛盾”，必须为“伟大事业”让路。这种二元对立是必然的：若承认百姓个体权利的优先性，就等于否定了意识形态的绝对性，动摇了整个权力大厦的合法性基础。个人崇拜正是这一机制的制度化表达，它通过现代宣传机器（大众媒体、文艺、仪式）将领袖神化，使其超越法律、道德和常识。

二、真理垄断。极权主义通过垄断真理生产，系统性扭曲认知框架。宣传、媒体、教育和仪式共同构建了一个“第二现实”：领袖事务被永恒放大为“关乎民族命运”“体现人民意志”的大事；民众疾苦则被最小化、外部化，归咎于“敌人”“历史遗留”，或辩证化，“暂时的、必要的”。

三、提拔规则。下级官员的晋升、生存完全依赖于对上级（最终是对最高领袖）的绝对忠诚。考核标准不是民生绩效，而是“落实领导指示”的热情与效率。在这种结构下，信息流动必然扭曲：基层真实民情被层层过滤，只有符合“领导关怀”叙事的内容才能上传。资源配置同样遵循权力逻辑——巨额人力、物力、财力优先保障“领导工程”“形象工程”，因为这些直接关系到权威的可见性与神圣性。百姓的住房、医疗、环境等问题，即使涉及数百万人生死，也被视为“可调控的次要变量”，在“稳定压倒一切”或“集中力量办大事”的旗号下被牺牲。历史经验证明，这种结构具有自我强化机制。任何试图把百姓大事置于领导小事之上的尝试，都会被解读为“政治不忠”，遭到清洗。这导致整个官僚体系的“习得性无助”，逐渐内化“领导的事比天大”的认知；官员则通过“精致服务”换取安全与晋升。这种心理结构使现象超越个人，成为体制的“文化基因”。

“领导的事再小也是大事，百姓的事再大也是小事”是极权主义权力异化的必然镜像。它根植于意识形态的绝对主义、真理垄断、人事规则等，这些要素相互锁定，形成闭合逻辑。不如此，极权便不成其为极权。

编辑：李聪玲 校对：周敏 翻译：戈冰

Totalitarian Phenomenon, Part VII: “The Leader’s Smallest Concern Is a Major Event; the People’s Greatest Hardship Is a Trifling Matter”

Author: Zhang Xinggui

In a totalitarian regime, the dictum “the leader’s smallest concern is a major event, while the people’s greatest hardship is a trifling matter” is neither a simple bureaucratic aberration nor a mere problem of personal style; rather, it is the inevitable product of the system’s underlying political logic. The inevitability of this phenomenon stems from the fact that totalitarianism pursues “total” control over social life. It must sacralize and absolutize the leader (or the leadership clique), making them the living incarnation of ideology and the sole source of power. Meanwhile, the general public is instrumentalized as a mere means to fulfill a “historical mission,” and their individual demands are forced to submit to this abstract “whole”.

I. The Leader as the Incarnation of “Truth” and “Historical Inevitability.”

The core of totalitarianism lies in a set of “totalitarian ideologies”—such as Fascism or Stalinism—that claim to possess the absolute laws of history and the ultimate truth of humanity. The leader is no ordinary political figure, but the living embodiment of this truth, the engine of history, and the “father” of the people. The leader’s thoughts, decisions, and even daily routines are equated with the “will of the Party,” the “destiny of the nation,” and the “progress of history.” Consequently, every word, action, and gesture of the leader is elevated to the status of the “overarching interest”—and any slight against them is deemed a betrayal of the truth.

Conversely, no matter how monumental the people’s concerns may be, they remain “trifling matters.” Under this ideology, the individual is not an end in itself, but an instrument for realizing the “collective will”. The suffering, hunger, and rights claims of the populace are dismissed as “temporary growing pains in the course of historical progress” or “localized contradictions” that must yield to the “grand cause”.

This binary opposition is inevitable: to recognize the priority of individual rights would be tantamount to denying the absolute authority of the ideology, thereby shaking the very foundations of legitimacy upon which the power structure rests. The cult of personality is the institutionalized expression of this mechanism. Through the modern propaganda apparatus—encompassing mass media, literature, art, and state rituals—it deifies the leader, placing them above the law, morality, and common sense.

II. Monopoly on Truth

Totalitarianism systematically distorts cognitive frameworks through its monopoly on the production of truth. Propaganda, the media, education, and public rituals jointly construct a “second reality”: the affairs of the leader are perpetually magnified as grand matters “concerning the destiny of the nation” and “reflecting the will of the people”; meanwhile, the hardships of the populace are minimized, externalized—blamed on “enemies” or “historical legacies”—or rationalized dialectically as “temporary and necessary.”

III. Promotion Rules

The promotion and political survival of subordinate officials depend entirely on absolute loyalty to their superiors, and ultimately to the supreme leader. The performance metric for evaluation is not the livelihoods of the people, but the zeal and efficiency with which “instructions from the leadership” are implemented. Under this structure, the flow of information is inevitably distorted: true local conditions at the grassroots level are filtered layer by layer, and only content that fits the narrative of “leadership care and concern” is transmitted upward.

Resource allocation likewise follows the logic of power—enormous human, material, and financial resources are prioritized to secure “leadership projects” and “image projects,” because these directly relate to the visibility and sanctity of authority. Issues affecting the populace—such as housing, healthcare, and the environment—even when involving the life and death of millions, are treated as “secondary, adjustable variables” to be sacrificed under the banners of “stability overrides everything” or “concentrating resources to accomplish major tasks.”

Historical experience proves that this structure possesses a self-reinforcing mechanism. Any attempt to place the major concerns of the people above the minor affairs of the leadership is interpreted as “political disloyalty” and met with purges. This results in a state of “learned helplessness” across the entire bureaucratic system, gradually internalizing the mindset that “the leader’s affairs are paramount.” Officials, in turn, trade “meticulous service” for personal safety and advancement. This psychological structure enables the phenomenon to transcend individual agency and become the system’s “cultural DNA.”

“The leader’s smallest concern is a major event; the people’s greatest hardship is a trifling matter” is the inevitable reflection of totalitarian power alienation. It is rooted in ideological absolutism, the monopoly on truth, and personnel rules, among other elements that interlock to form a closed logic. Without this, totalitarianism would cease to be totalitarianism.

Editor: Li Congling Proofreader: Zhou Min Translator: Ge Bing