作者：前自由亚洲记者 孙诚

编辑：张致君 责任编辑：李聪玲   校对：熊辩 翻译：戈冰

近年来，中国出现了一股争议风潮：一批人开始挑战官方“中国自古强大，都怪1840鸦片战争帝国主义入侵，导致中国近代衰落”这种叙事，称中国古代十分美好，只是因为“满清1644年入主中国，才导致了中国近代衰落”。

目前，这一争论，似正引起中共统战部和中共《解放军报》的互相攻讦，其中前者试图找一些御用文人，维护官方的“1840史观”和所谓“民族团结“叙事。而后者则似乎更钟情于更强硬的皇汉主义叙事，发表文章，提出不能只讲团结。

在笔者看来，无论1644还是1840史观，本质上都是伪概念，两者的争论也是一种伪争论。

事实上，中共所说的“两千年封建社会”历史，本质上就是一部专制王朝史。从民权的角度看，这两千年里百姓从没有机会选择自己的统治者，夺取天下者都是靠杀伐、武断暴力上位，其身份也不外乎流氓（汉、明）、阴谋家（晋）、军头（隋唐、五代、宋）、北族（元清）这几类。事实上，这些人都可称之为“僭主”，与英国光荣革命后的立宪君主相比，毫无半点合法性可言！

当然，其中有些朝代的一些时候或许君权小一些，百姓说话的空间有那么一些。至于民众的结社自由，就算在两千年皇权政治的巅峰时代，也还是有一些的，不至于像如今中共时代那么极度严苛，这些当然都是宝贵的自由传统。但本质上，皇帝和“草民”政治权利悬殊，这一点两千年来不变。

所谓“1644史观”，就是吹捧“汉人皇帝”的时代，怀念能“做稳奴隶”的时代。

所谓“1840史观”，就是吹捧无论什么族裔的古代皇帝的“丰功伟绩”，怀念从秦皇汉武到雍正乾隆这些暴君。

1644史观称“没有满清，中国近代就能赶上西方”，实质上是在为僭主皇权政治唱赞歌。

1840史观称“没有西方，中国近代就能赶上西方”，实质上是在为僭主皇权政治唱赞歌。

更何况，两者实际上都试图推行一种为极端民族主义服务的“国耻教育”，即：树立一个“十恶不赦的外敌”作为靶子，试图唤起皇汉、粉红等各路炮灰的“同仇敌忾”。可以说，两者没什么真正的不同。

此外，两者同样反西方，其中前者（1644史观）加上了“满人”这个“敌人”，试图推行极端皇汉主义，试图把中共针对维吾尔人的暴行推广到更多族群。后者（1840史观）则是长期以来的中共官史，用于维护中共所谓“结束半殖民地半封建社会”的“合法性”，为中共继续奴役民众添砖加瓦。（当然，笔者观察到，也有一些对中共不满的声音，在借助1644史观借古讽今，以清拟共，这种现象要另作讨论，在此不展开讲了。）

那么，我们究竟需要什么史观呢？笔者认为，我们需要的是1911史观。

1911年的辛亥革命，事实上终结的并非简简单单一个清朝，而是一场对两千年僭主皇权的否定，亦是一次跳出朝代循环死局的重大尝试。1911开启的时代，有约法与制宪的努力，有司法独立的伟业，有民众投入宪政选举的热忱，有地方自治及民族自决风潮，如1913年藏人的民族自决就是正常民族自决的典型。中共鼓吹的那种所谓“民族自治”则是一种伪自决，本质上是为其最终颠覆全世界自由服务的一步棋而已……这个时代，固然有种种野心家试图重建帝制、重建专制的企图，更有苏联这一赤色恶魔竭尽全力的颠覆活动，但依然存在着无数人为捍卫民权所作的非凡努力，仍然存在着昂扬向上的时代精神，仍然存在着向良好政治发展的可能路径。那时，人们似乎真的有可能选择自己的政府、政体、生活方式。这种良好路径可能性的存在，是民国史的最大意义。

尽管今日，中共已扼杀了这个昙花一现的时代，且在其统治之下，人们陷入了“1644史观”vs“1840史观”的伪争论。然而，如果我们真正重新审视历史，以民众为思考的本位，就不难得出结论：所谓1644史观和1840史观大同小异，只有1911史观才是我们需要的东西。

1644 historical perspective? 1840 historical perspective? What we need is the 1911 historical perspective.

Abstract: The so-called 1644 historical perspective and 1840 historical perspective are essentially variants of autocratic imperial power and nationalism. Only the 1911 historical perspective denies two thousand years of tyrannical politics and affirms the historical possibility of civil rights, constitutional governance, and the people’s choice of government.

Author: Former Radio Free Asia reporter Sun Cheng

Editor: Zhang Zhijun Managing Editor: Li Congling

Proofreader: Xiong Bian Translator:Ge Bing

In recent years, a wave of controversy has emerged in China: a group of people has begun to challenge the official narrative that “China has been strong since ancient times, and it is all the fault of the 1840 Opium War and imperialist invasion, which led to China’s modern decline,” claiming that ancient China was very beautiful, and that it was only because “the Manchus took over China in 1644 that modern China declined.” Currently, this debate seems to be provoking mutual accusations between the United Front Work Department of the Communist Party of China and the People’s Liberation Army Daily, with the former trying to find some official scholars to uphold the official “1840 historical perspective” and the so-called “narrative of national unity.” The latter, on the other hand, seems to prefer a more hardline Han imperialist narrative, publishing articles that state that unity cannot be the only topic.

In my view, whether it is the 1644 or 1840 historical perspective, they are essentially pseudo-concepts, and the debate between them is also a pseudo-debate. In fact, the “two thousand years of feudal society” history referred to by the Communist Party is essentially a history of autocratic dynasties. From the perspective of civil rights, the people have never had the opportunity to choose their rulers in these two thousand years; those who seized power did so through killing and arbitrary violence, and their identities were nothing more than thugs (Han, Ming), conspirators (Jin), warlords (Sui, Tang, Five Dynasties, Song), or northern ethnic groups (Yuan, Qing). In fact, these people can all be called “tyrants,” and compared to the constitutional monarchs after the English Glorious Revolution, they have no legitimacy whatsoever!

Of course, there were some dynasties at certain times when imperial power was somewhat lessened, allowing the people a bit more space to speak. As for the freedom of association for the populace, even during the peak of two thousand years of imperial politics, there was still some degree of it, not as extremely harsh as in today’s Communist era; these are certainly valuable traditions of freedom. But essentially, the political rights of the emperor and the “common people” have been vastly different, and this has not changed in two thousand years.

The so-called “1644 historical perspective” glorifies the era of “Han emperors,” reminiscing about the time when one could “be a stable slave.” The so-called “1840 historical perspective” glorifies the “great achievements” of ancient emperors of all ethnicities, reminiscing about tyrants from Qin Shi Huang and Han Wu to Yongzheng and Qianlong. The 1644 historical perspective claims that “without the Manchus, modern China could catch up with the West,” which is essentially singing praises for tyrannical imperial politics. The 1840 historical perspective claims that “without the West, modern China could catch up with the West,” which is also essentially singing praises for tyrannical imperial politics.

Moreover, both perspectives actually attempt to promote a “national humiliation education” that serves extreme nationalism, namely: establishing a “mortal enemy” as a target, trying to evoke a sense of “shared hatred” among various factions such as Han imperialists and “pink” supporters. One could say there is no real difference between the two.

Additionally, both are anti-Western; the former (1644 historical perspective) adds the “Manchu” as an “enemy,” attempting to promote extreme Han imperialism and trying to extend the Communist Party’s atrocities against Uyghurs to more ethnic groups. The latter (1840 historical perspective) has long been the official history of the Communist Party, used to maintain the so-called “legitimacy” of the Communist Party’s claim to have “ended the semi-colonial and semi-feudal society,” adding bricks to the Communist Party’s continued enslavement of the people. (Of course, I have observed that there are also some voices dissatisfied with the Communist Party, using the 1644 historical perspective to criticize the present by drawing parallels with the Qing, but this phenomenon requires separate discussion and will not be elaborated on here.)

So, what kind of historical perspective do we really need? I believe what we need is the 1911 historical perspective. The Xinhai Revolution of 1911 did not simply end the Qing Dynasty; it was a denial of two thousand years of tyrannical imperial power and a significant attempt to break out of the cycle of dynastic deadlock. The era opened by 1911 included efforts at constitutional law and constitution-making, achievements in judicial independence, enthusiasm from the people for participating in constitutional elections, and a wave of local autonomy and national self-determination, such as the 1913 Tibetan self-determination being a typical example of normal national self-determination. The so-called “national autonomy” promoted by the Communist Party is a form of pseudo-self-determination, essentially just a strategic move to ultimately subvert freedom worldwide… This era, while there were various ambitious individuals attempting to restore the empire and autocracy, and the Soviet Union, that red demon, exerting its utmost efforts to subvert, still saw countless extraordinary efforts by people to defend civil rights, a vibrant spirit of the times, and the potential paths toward good political development. At that time, it seemed that people really had the possibility to choose their own government, political system, and way of life. The existence of this potential for a good path is the greatest significance of the history of the Republic of China.

Although today, the Communist Party has strangled this fleeting era, and under its rule, people are caught in a pseudo-debate between the “1644 historical perspective” versus “1840 historical perspective.” However, if we truly re-examine history, placing the people at the center of our thinking, it is not difficult to conclude that the so-called 1644 historical perspective and 1840 historical perspective are largely similar, and only the 1911 historical perspective is what we truly need.

作者：Lewis Lin
编辑：李晶
责任编辑：李聪玲 校对：程筱筱 翻译：吕峰

引言：历史书写与责任问题 任何一个现代国家的合法性，都离不开对自身历史的解释能力。历史不仅是过去的记录，更是现实政治进步的基础。中共自1949年执政以来，发动并主导了一系列深刻改变中国百姓命运的政治运动，这些运动在中共的叙事中往往被描述为“必要的历史阶段”或“探索中的曲折”。然而，随着档案逐步解密、幸存者回忆、出版、以及国内外学者的研究积累，诸多问题无法回避：这些政治运动造成了何种规模的社会伤灾难？责任与机制又是如何运作？ 本文将以史学研究与公开资料为基础，系统梳理中共执政以来若干关键政治运动的背景、实施方式与社会代价，并讨论其制度性成因。一、土地改革与“镇反”：革命暴力的制度化起点

1949年后，中共迅速在全国范围内推行土地改革。其目标是摧毁传统乡村精英结构，重构契合中共的政治与社会秩序。根据官方文件与后来的研究，土地改革的目的并非是经济政策，更重要的是广泛的阶级划分与暴力清算。 1950—1952年的“镇压反革命运动”（镇反）是中共建政初期最重要的政治清洗之一。根据中共内部后来披露的数据，被处决人数在数十万到上百万之间。学者如杨继绳、丁抒等通过地方档案推算，认为这一数字可能更高。    值得注意的是，镇反并非失控的暴力，而是高度制度化的政治行动：中共政权明确下达“杀人指标”，要求公开处决以震慑社会，司法程序高度简化甚至取消，这奠定了一种政治逻辑：中共政权可以在“政治需要”之下，合法化大规模剥夺人民生命的行为。二、大跃进与饥荒：政策失误还是结构性灾难？

    1958年开始的大跃进，被官方长期解释为“急于求成的错误”。但自20世纪80年代以来，国内外学者逐步形成共识：1959—1961年的大饥荒，是20世纪全球最严重的由中共党人人为制造的饥荒之一。    关于死亡人数，研究估计从1500万到4000万不等。即便取最低值，也已构成巨大的社会灾难。关键问题不在于数字争议，而在于中共政权的制度机制；虚报产量：中共各级政府层层加码的政治压力导致粮食产量被严重夸大；强制征购：中共政权在已知粮食不足的情况下继续高额强征农民的粮食；信息封锁：实情被系统性压制，各级政府默许甚至参与欺懣虚报；责任豁免：政策制定者与执行者皆不承担直接后果。多项研究指出，这场饥荒并非自然灾害，而是由中共高度集权体制下的欺懣虚报至决策情报失真所引发。三、文化大革命：权力斗争与社会崩解

    1966—1976年的文化大革命，是中共历史上破坏性最强、影响最深远的政治运动。官方定性为“十年内乱”，但对其深层机制的讨论始终限制。

文革的显著特征包括：以意识形态忠诚取代法治与专业标准；鼓励民众对民众间相互仇恨争斗的政治暴力；系统性羞辱、迫害知识分子等精英群体；国家机器在相当时期内被中共政权夺去基本治理功能。研究者指出，文革不但是单纯的“个人错误”，而是在缺乏权力制衡的体制中，最高领袖意志被无限放大的结果。死亡人数难以精确统计，但学界普遍认为至少数百万非正常死亡，更多人和家庭遭受终身创伤。四、1989年政治风波：改革限度的边界

    1989年的学生运动与随后发生的武力镇压，是改革开放后最具标志性的政治事件之一。尽管官方至今对相关资料严密控制，但国内外研究已基本还原事件脉络。

      这场由北京知名大学生发起的8964运动，关键意义在于：表明中共的政治改革有不可逾越的红线；军队被用于对付国内民众与中共政权之间的政治冲突；形成一段长期的历史禁区与记忆断裂。

   此后，中共在经济领域继续改革，但在政治领域确立了高度警惕与严厉控制的中共党国路线。五、有限反思与制度性遗忘

改革开放后，中共对部分历史问题虽有进行过有限反思，如：为冤假错案平反，否定文革，调整经济路线等；但这些反思具有明显边界，不追究最高决策层的制度责任，不允许民间独立研究，不形成可问责的政治机制，其结果是，历史被“技术性纠错”，却不能及造成重大灾难的权力责任人和中共党国政权体制本身。罪恶没有被追究、体制没有被纠正。六、制度视角下的总结

      从历史角度看，上述政治运动并非孤立事件，而是呈现出一致的结构特征：权力高度集中，缺乏独立司法与监督，信息垄断，中共的意识形态凌驾于民众的生命之上。这使得整个社会的个人悲剧能够不断被制度性复制，而不仅仅依赖于个体的“坏人”。

历史研究的现实意义，目的不应该限于制造仇恨，而更应该在于理解政权的机制。只有当社会能够正视制度性错误，承认生命不可替代的价值，历史才可能真正成为未来的警示，而不是灾难循环的节奏。然中共对他们执政过程中人为造成的诸多如此在重大历史灾难问题上的回避、粉饰、掩盖，必让这个政权下的历史悲剧和灾难不断重演！

Lewis Lin: A Historical Review of Major Political Campaigns Launched by the Chinese Communist Regime and Their Social Costs

Author: Lewis LinEditor: Li JingManaging Editor: Li ConglingProofreader: Cheng XiaoxiaoTranslator: Lyu Feng

Abstract

Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has launched multiple large-scale political campaigns that have inflicted immense suffering on the Chinese population, including the loss of tens of millions of lives. Behind these campaigns lay the CCP’s imperative to preserve its authoritarian rule and to manage internal power struggles within the Party.

Introduction: Historical Writing and the Question of Responsibility

The legitimacy of any modern state depends fundamentally on its capacity to interpret and confront its own history. History is not merely a record of the past; it constitutes the foundation for political accountability and social progress in the present. Since assuming power in 1949, the CCP has initiated and directed a series of political campaigns that profoundly reshaped the fate of the Chinese people. In the Party’s official narrative, these campaigns are often framed as “necessary historical stages” or as “twists and turns in the process of exploration.”

However, as archival materials have gradually become available, survivor testimonies have been published, and both domestic and international scholarship has accumulated, a number of questions can no longer be avoided: What was the scale of social devastation caused by these political campaigns? Through what mechanisms were responsibilities exercised and obscured?

Drawing on historical research and publicly available sources, this article systematically reviews several key political campaigns under CCP rule, examining their backgrounds, modes of implementation, and social costs, while also discussing their underlying institutional causes.

I. Land Reform and the “Suppression of Counterrevolutionaries”: The Institutionalization of Revolutionary Violence

After 1949, the CCP rapidly implemented land reform across the country. Its objective was not merely economic redistribution, but the destruction of traditional rural elites and the reconstruction of a political and social order aligned with the Party’s rule. According to official documents and later scholarly research, land reform functioned less as an economic policy than as a process of mass class labeling and violent liquidation.

The Campaign to Suppress Counterrevolutionaries (1950–1952) was one of the most significant political purges in the early years of the PRC. Data later disclosed within the Party indicate that the number of executions ranged from several hundred thousand to over one million. Scholars such as Yang Jisheng and Ding Shu, drawing on local archives, argue that the true figure may have been even higher.

It is crucial to note that the violence of the suppression campaign was not accidental or uncontrolled. It was a highly institutionalized political action: the regime issued explicit “killing quotas,” mandated public executions as a means of social intimidation, and drastically curtailed or abolished judicial procedures. This established a political logic in which the CCP could legitimize the large-scale deprivation of life under the banner of “political necessity.”

II. The Great Leap Forward and the Famine: Policy Error or Structural Catastrophe?

The Great Leap Forward, launched in 1958, was long portrayed in official discourse as an error born of excessive haste. Since the 1980s, however, a broad scholarly consensus—both in China and internationally—has emerged that the famine of 1959–1961 was one of the most severe man-made famines of the twentieth century.

Estimates of excess deaths range from 15 million to 40 million. Even the lowest estimate constitutes an immense social catastrophe. The core issue is not the precise number, but the institutional mechanisms that produced it:

Falsification of production figures: Political pressure at all administrative levels led to systematic exaggeration of grain output.

Compulsory procurement: The state continued to requisition grain at high levels even when food shortages were already known.

Information suppression: Accurate reports were systematically blocked, while deception and false reporting were tolerated or encouraged.

Absence of accountability: Neither policy designers nor implementers bore direct responsibility for the consequences.

Numerous studies have concluded that this famine was not the result of natural disasters, but rather of distorted decision-making caused by extreme centralization, systemic falsification, and information failure within the CCP’s political system.

III. The Cultural Revolution: Power Struggles and Social Disintegration

The Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) stands as the most destructive and far-reaching political campaign in CCP history. Officially labeled a “ten-year catastrophe,” deeper analysis of its structural mechanisms has long been constrained.

Key characteristics of the Cultural Revolution included: the replacement of legal norms and professional standards with ideological loyalty; the encouragement of mass-on-mass violence and social antagonism; systematic humiliation and persecution of intellectuals and other elite groups; and, for extended periods, the effective paralysis of state governance. Scholars have emphasized that the Cultural Revolution was not merely the product of individual error, but the consequence of an unchecked system in which the will of the supreme leader was infinitely amplified.

While precise mortality figures remain contested, academic estimates commonly suggest that at least several million people died unnatural deaths, with countless others and their families suffering irreversible trauma.

IV. The 1989 Political Crisis: The Limits of Reform

The student-led movement of 1989 and its violent suppression constitute one of the most defining political events of the reform era. Although official information remains tightly controlled, domestic and international research has largely reconstructed the sequence of events.

The significance of the 1989 movement lies in several respects: it demonstrated the existence of non-negotiable boundaries to political reform under CCP rule; it marked the deployment of the military against domestic civilians in a political conflict; and it created a long-term historical taboo and rupture in collective memory.

In the aftermath, the CCP continued economic reforms while entrenching heightened vigilance and stringent control in the political sphere, consolidating a party-state model characterized by economic liberalization without political pluralism.

V. Limited Reflection and Institutionalized Amnesia

Since the onset of reform and opening, the CCP has undertaken limited forms of historical reassessment, such as rehabilitating victims of wrongful convictions, repudiating the Cultural Revolution, and adjusting economic policies. Yet these reflections have clear boundaries: they avoid assigning institutional responsibility to the highest decision-making levels, prohibit independent civil research, and fail to establish mechanisms of political accountability.

As a result, history has been subjected to “technical correction” without confronting the systemic structures or power holders responsible for catastrophic outcomes. Crimes remain unaccounted for, and the underlying political system remains fundamentally unchanged.

VI. A Structural Perspective: Concluding Observations

From a historical perspective, these political campaigns were not isolated घटन, but manifestations of consistent structural features: extreme concentration of power, absence of independent judicial oversight, monopolization of information, and the elevation of Party ideology above human life. Under such conditions, individual tragedies are endlessly reproduced by the system itself, rather than arising solely from the actions of a few “bad actors.”

The contemporary significance of historical research should not lie in the cultivation of hatred, but in the understanding of political mechanisms. Only when a society confronts systemic errors and affirms the irreplaceable value of human life can history serve as a genuine warning for the future rather than a recurring cycle of catastrophe. The CCP’s persistent evasion, embellishment, and concealment of the man-made disasters that occurred under its rule all but ensure that historical tragedies and social calamities will continue to recur under the same regime.

作者： 国内来稿 编辑：冯仍 责任编辑：侯改英 校对：程筱筱 翻译：周敏

2025年12月12日，当某国《人民日报》头版打出“钟声”那句“在世界各国的中国人民，

必须做好准备，坚决捍卫和平与正义！——随时待命”的口号时，某位独裁官僚本人或许以为又是一次成功的全国总动员。结果，只用了不到90分钟，评论区就彻底沦陷了。

“高市早猫都敢公布财产了，你们敢吗？我代表14亿人民向你们下战书！”

“谁要是敢鼓动打仗，我就先把他定点清除，谢谢。”

“发我一支枪，我现在就去机场，保证一个熟人都不放跑。”

“兰兰，护照和美元准备好了吗？”

“喝酒吃肉不喊我，打仗喊我拼命？对不起，我手机没电了。”

这些评论不是出现在推特、不是出现在YouTube，而是在《人民日报》自己的APP底

下，在实名制、绿码、铁腕控评的最后一块阵地里，堂而皇之地挂在热评前十，点赞几十万，删都删不完。

这已是本周第三起大型翻车事故： 国防部抖音号那条“全民皆兵”视频，评论区直接变

成“领导子女先上”的接力赛；

共青团中央那句“把青春融入强国强军”，被顶成“先把北京户口融入我青春”；

连新华社英文账号发的一条“China is ready”（中国准备好了）的推文，都被海外华人

刷成了“Ready to run”（准备好逃生）。

过去十年，官媒翻车是偶发事件；如今，官媒不翻车才是新闻。 翻车的不只是账号，

而是整个以土皇帝为核心建立起来的那套个人信用体系彻底崩盘。

老百姓发现：喊“共同富裕”的，从来不公布自己家庭财产；

喊“清零”的，自己家人第一时间润去新西兰；

喊“准备战斗”的，子女早就在美国读博士后；

喊“敢于斗争”的，从来没让自己的孩子上过前线。

当土皇上的每一句谎言、每一个手势、每一篇“钟声”，都被现实活生生地打成反讽，

人们就不再恐惧，也不再表演了。 他们用最狠的段子、最冷的眼神、最决绝的“躺”，公开宣判： 这个人的信用，已经彻底破产了。

当《人民日报》的评论区都敢明目张胆地喊“守机场”，当“兰兰”成了全国人民心照不宣

的暗语，当每一次官方动员都以史诗级翻车告终，这已经不是简单的宣传失灵，而是整个统治合法性的末日倒计时。

当极权社会信用破产的日子，官媒翻车的每一声巨响，都是人民在用最中国式的方式

，给独裁政权敲响的末日丧钟。

Bankruptcy of Credibility: Official Media Facing Constant Backlash

Author: Domestic Submission Editor: Reng Feng Managing Editor: Gaiying Hou Proofreader: Xiaoxiao Cheng Translator: Min Zhou

On December 12, 2025, when the front page of People’s Daily featured a “Zhong Sheng” commentary declaring, “Chinese people across the world must be prepared to resolutely defend peace and justice! — Stand by,” the autocratic bureaucrats themselves likely thought this was another successful national mobilization. Instead, in less than 90 minutes, the comment section completely collapsed as below:

“Sanae Takaichi dares to disclose her assets; do you? On behalf of 1.4 billion people, I challenge you!”

“Whoever dares to incite war, I’ll perform a ‘targeted elimination’ on them first, thanks.”

“Give me a gun and I’m heading to the airport immediately; I guarantee not a single ‘acquaintance’ [corrupt official] will escape.”

“Lanlan, are your passport and US dollars ready?”

“You didn’t call me when you were drinking and eating meat, but you call me to risk my life for war? Sorry, my phone is dead.”

These comments didn’t appear on X (Twitter) or YouTube; they appeared under the People’s Daily app itself. In the final stronghold of real-name registration, health codes, and iron-fisted censorship, these comments sat brazenly in the top ten, with hundreds of thousands of likes, appearing faster than they could be deleted.

This marks the third major “rollover” (PR disaster) this week:

The Ministry of National Defense’s Douyin video on “National Mobilization” saw its comment section turn into a relay race of “Let the leaders’ children go first.”

The Communist Youth League’s slogan “Integrate your youth into a strong nation and military” was countered by the top comment: “Integrate a Beijing Hukou (residency permit) into my youth first.”

Even Xinhua News Agency’s English post on X stating “China is ready” was swarmed by overseas Chinese replying, “Ready to run.”

Over the past decade, official media “rollovers” were isolated incidents; today, it is news when they don’t fail. It isn’t just the accounts that are failing—it is the entire personal credit system built around the “local emperor” that has utterly collapsed.

The common people have realized:

Those shouting “Common Prosperity” never disclose their own family assets.

Those shouting “Zero-COVID” were the first to have their families “run” to New Zealand.

Those shouting “Prepare for Battle” have children already doing post-docs in the United States.

Those shouting “Dare to Struggle” never send their own children to the front lines.

When every lie, every gesture, and every “Zhong Sheng” article from the “Emperor” is turned into living irony by reality, people cease to fear and cease to perform. Using the harshest satire, the coldest stares, and the most resolute “lying flat,” they have publicly declared: This person’s credibility is completely bankrupt.

When people dare to openly shout “Guard the airport” in the comments of People’s Daily, when “Lanlan” becomes a nationwide code word, and when every official mobilization ends in an epic PR disaster, it is no longer simple propaganda failure. It is the final countdown for the regime’s legitimacy.

In the days of bankrupt credit in a totalitarian society, every thunderous collapse of official media is the people—in the most Chinese of ways—tolling the funeral bell for the autocracy.