社会主义为什么不好之一
作者：华言
编辑：李聪玲 责任编辑：鲁慧文 翻译：鲁慧文
任志强说：发表《共产党宣言》时，马克思30岁，恩格斯27岁。两个小伙子，没见过飞机，也没听说过相对论，更没有手机和互联网，纯属凭空虚构的乌托邦，而在中国，却捧为圣条，写入宪法，学校从小学到大学都是必修课！两个年轻人闭门造车出来的乌托邦成了中国的国教，这不是愚昧无知吗？
在马克思那里，科学社会主义=共产主义，不区分社会主义和共产主义，两者指的是同一涵义；但在实践中，共产主义的完美性不可能实现，不能用现实的混乱来标榜共产主义在人间损害共产主义的伟大。理论家们为了捍卫共产主义的神圣，将社会主义从共产主义中独立出来，形成了资本主义社会、社会主义社会、共产主义社会三个阶段。马克思主义者认为，社会主义是资本主义走向共产主义的一个必经阶段。社会主义是实现共产主义的革命和建设阶段，具有相对独立性。从理论上看，社会主义兼具资本主义社会和共产主义社会的混合性。
一、什么是社会主义
社会主义是一种政治、社会、经济哲学和思潮，社会主义在批判近代资本主义之缺陷基础上产生。社会主义可以简单的分为两个类型：一是革命版的，科学社会主义，即马列-斯大林主义，宣扬阶级优越论，政治上采用暴力革命夺权，发动无产阶级（工人阶级）、农民阶级武装暴动取得了国家政权。经济形态，都采用公有制经济和计划经济体制。二是温和版的，民主社会主义（或称社会民主主义）。民主社会主义是指民主宪政之下的社会主义经济，对资本主义的社会化改良，提倡和平改良社会，反对暴力，提倡混合经济，不反对私有制。民主社会主义认为，没有自由就没有社会主义，社会主义只有通过民主才能实行，政治上提倡不同思想的党派共存。
科学社会主义的基础是历史唯物论。历史唯物论认为生产关系和生产力是决定历史发展的关键。每一历史阶段，都会因生产力发展而产生相应的生产关系。但随着生产力持续发展，既有的生产关系将难以适应，并阻碍生产力进步，于是两者出现冲突，导致社会革命，最后促成新的更高阶的生产关系。欧洲、美国高度发达的资本主义本来最应该产生社会主义革命，但是却未发生社会主义革命，马克思主义诞生以来一百多年的欧美资本主义发展史证明了社会主义的破产。
二、为什么要反对社会主义
杜光说：“历数近百年来出现的社会主义国家，没有一个不是把专制主义当作社会主义的”。
社会主义的失败是由于这一理论体系本身所带来的难以克服的弱点。社会主义之所以失败，不是因为社会主义好而只是做错了，而是因为社会主义本身就是错误的，它只是一场很糟的空想。中共的改革开放是共产党人对资本主义作出巨大让步，才得以把政权撑持下来。要强迫人们把他们私有的东西交出来，并且要他们放弃个人利益来服从国家的需要，这就要求公务机关须享有无限的权力。无限的权力必然导致无限的腐败与堕落。计划经济要求命令-执行的体系来运转，必然是不平等的，导致人人平等的梦想消失了。国家把包括经济在内的国民生活各部门都拿了过来，它需要有一套庞大的官僚机构来管理这些事。把那些生产资料收归国有，就是要把那些生产资料的管理权交到那些官僚手里去。而那些官僚，既没有能力也没有什么物质刺激足以使他们能有效地去经营那些生产资料，必不可免的结果就是生产不断下降。
概括而言：一是经济上，共产党没收私有财产，导致短缺经济，实行社会主义的地方都是缺衣少食的。二是政治上，共产党搞一党专政、无产阶级专政，本质上是现代版的专制皇帝，党天下。压制言论自由、思想自由、经济自由、宗教自由、通信自由、个人私隐保密的自由、免于匮乏的自由、免于恐惧的自由等，屏蔽并惩罚反对共产党的言论，不惜一切手段的伪造历史，避免让国民知道共产党的错误行径，营造伟大光荣正确的神话。
国家的一切资源都由“共产党官僚”掌控，共产主义革命是以取消阶级为号召开始，最后造成一个握有空前绝对权威的新阶级。在社会主义革命胜利之后 , 无产阶级将会在新的国家里上升为统治阶层。
新阶级是一个掌握权力的集团。新阶级来源于官员队伍 , 因为只有他们才有可能利用权力谋取特权 , 才有享受不该享受的权利的条件。新阶级内存在严格的上下等级之分。因为“新阶级 ”主要由党政干部组成，不同等级的官员享有不同的特权 , 越是高级的官员享受的特权越多。他们对上级唯命是从、明哲保身、高高在上、不问群众疾苦。他们是一批地地道道的官僚。新阶级在意识上推行垄断，不允许有别于自己的思想出现。人民内部的所有思想都被政府压制 , 自由和民主的风气已经全部丧失。
马克思主义作为社会主义国家的“信仰 ”，本身就是一种具有专制性质的思想。他们为了保证自己正统思想的地位 , 排斥各种与自己的理论不相容的科学理论。 共产党不可避免地把专制主义带到了社会主义国家政权建设中。
社会主义理念不仅是政治错误，更是道德错误。反社会主义不是政治问题，是良心问题，是光明生活与黑暗生活的选择问题。
三、不人道的社会主义
社会主义理论说，社会主义将在全世界兴起，资本主义将在全世界灭亡。1991年的苏联东欧剧变，是人类历史发展的一个重大转折，标志着高举“科学社会主义”旗帜的国际共产主义运动的彻底失败。以“科学社会主义”为指导纲领的国际共产主义运动的失败，是一种全局的、不可逆转的、永劫不复的失败。
生产资料公有制＋计划经济＋无产阶级专政这三大体制为基本架构的社会主义制度的失败是历史的必然。共产党阶级斗争、无产阶级专政的基本思想，狂热地沉溺于暴力革命夺取政权，沉溺于无产阶级专政，沉溺于以暴虐的阶级斗争，推行同人类传统文明彻底决裂的路线、方针、政策，实施对社会生产资料和自然资源高度集中的独占垄断，实施对人类社会生活全面、彻底、集中的一体化控制的计划经济，把人类推向了灾难的深渊。首先，是残暴剥夺地主富农特别是全体农民的土地和全体资本主义工商业者、全体个体手工业者的生产资料。其次，将整个国家的自然资源，包括山脉、河流、矿山、森林等国有化，并对其进行掠夺性地开发，以致造成严重的环境污染和环境破坏。再次，对国人，特别是对农民实行残酷盘剥。对工人、知识分子、公务人员实行数十年一贯制的超低工资制，还对他们实行食品和生活必需品最低限度的定量凭证供应制度，迫使他们勒紧裤带，缩衣节食，为国家节省每一粒粮食、每一分钱，用来生产。
在专制独裁体制下，整个社会按照一个人的意志、按照共产党设计的目标完全一致地、“一体化”地行动。共产党的头脑发起热来，紧跟着的全国亿万生灵也就都要跟着发疯了。其后果，真是罄竹难书。
四、法西斯主义与社会主义—双胞胎
法西斯主义与社会主义在政治上都强调“一个主义、一个政党、一个领袖”，经济上都强调经济控制，占领经济至高权；文化上都强调科学的、先进的文化，至于是什么不重要，他们决定了的就是科学的文化、先进的文化。
他们共同宣扬的是同一思想，都主张对社会实施大规模的有计划的控制，都把自己说成是真理的代言人，都让社会、人民服从于统治者的意识形态。建立意识形态，都对媒体实行全面集中的检查，都建立军事化的先锋党，都把国家建立在恐怖、暴力镇压的基础上，都用秘密警察、司法公审来完善国家机器。第一个共同特点是割裂人类社会，并且在不同的人群之间挑拨离间，制造仇恨。认为自己最高尚，都把自己作为宇宙真理的化身，对暴力和流血手段的无比尊崇，赤裸裸地宣扬暴力和恐怖行为。第二个共同特点是热衷于控制社会、镇压异己、剥夺人民的自由，都严厉控制舆论工具，镇压言论自由。因为他们是靠谎言和暴力夺取政权巩固政权的，他们害怕人民利用言论自由来揭穿他们的谎言，反抗他们的暴力；他们是黑暗中的动物，手中没有真理，而言论自由正是剥除他们伪装，还其本来面目的灿烂阳光。第三个共同特点是他们都反对自由经济而主张用国家机器来垄断经济命脉。第四个共同特点是他们为扩张势力范围而乐于输出革命甚至侵略别国。他们对内镇压、对外扩张，他们是现代专制主义的产物，是同胞兄弟。所不同的特征是细微的：社会主义模式以阶级划分为基础；纳粹主义以种族划分为基础，纳粹主义是种族极权主义。
法西斯主义已经被扫进历史的垃圾堆；社会主义还在中国横冲直撞。同样的基因，不同的名字、不同的历史命运。
Why Socialism Is Harmful (Part I)
Summary:
Socialism, centered on planned economy and dictatorship, leads to poverty and tyranny, and creates a corrupt bureaucratic “new class.” Its ideas are fundamentally flawed, both a political disaster and a moral catastrophe. Sharing roots with fascism, socialism is destined to be discarded by history.
Author: Hua Yan
Editor: Li Congling Executive Editor: Lu Huiwen Translator: Lu Huiwen
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Ren Zhiqiang once remarked: When the Communist Manifesto was published, Marx was 30 and Engels was 27. Two young men, who had never seen an airplane, never heard of relativity, and certainly never encountered cell phones or the internet, produced a purely imaginary utopia. Yet in China it was exalted as sacred doctrine, written into the Constitution, and taught as compulsory curriculum from elementary school to university! That two youngsters’ armchair utopia became China’s state religion—what greater ignorance could there be?
For Marx, “scientific socialism” was identical with communism; he made no distinction. But in practice, the perfection of communism is impossible, and its failure in reality cannot be used to claim that communism’s greatness was tarnished by flawed implementation. To protect the sanctity of communism, theorists carved socialism out as a distinct stage—creating a three-step model: capitalist society, socialist society, communist society. Marxists argued that socialism was the necessary transition toward communism. Socialism was thus treated as the revolutionary and constructive phase, theoretically possessing characteristics of both capitalism and communism.
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I. What Is Socialism?
Socialism is a political, social, and economic philosophy, born as a critique of capitalism’s flaws. Broadly, socialism divides into two types:
1. Revolutionary version — “scientific socialism.” The Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist form, grounded in class supremacy, advocating violent revolution to seize state power by mobilizing workers and peasants. Economically, it enforces public ownership and planned economy.
2. Moderate version — “democratic socialism” (or social democracy). Practiced under constitutional democracy, this version advocates peaceful reform of capitalism, favors a mixed economy, accepts private ownership, and insists “no socialism without freedom.” It supports pluralism in politics, with coexistence of multiple parties and ideas.
The foundation of scientific socialism is historical materialism, which claims productive forces and relations of production drive history. Yet despite Marx’s prediction, socialist revolutions did not erupt in advanced capitalist countries. The more than 100 years of capitalist development in Europe and America after Marx’s time demonstrate socialism’s bankruptcy.
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II. Why Oppose Socialism?
Du Guang once said: Looking back at nearly a century of socialist states, not one failed to embrace despotism in the name of socialism.
Socialism failed because its very theoretical framework is flawed. It is not that socialism was “good but misapplied”; socialism itself is wrong—an ill-conceived fantasy. The CCP’s “reform and opening” was a massive concession to capitalism, the only way its rule could survive.
To force people to surrender private property and abandon self-interest in obedience to the state requires government agencies with unlimited power. Unlimited power inevitably breeds unlimited corruption. Planned economy requires command-and-execution structures, inherently unequal, making the dream of equality vanish. When the state assumes control over all sectors of life, it requires a massive bureaucracy. Handing over the management of nationalized production to bureaucrats who lack both competence and incentives inevitably leads to declining production.
Summarizing:
• Economically: Confiscation of private property caused chronic shortages. Wherever socialism was imposed, people went cold and hungry.
Politically: The Communist Party established one-party dictatorship—a modern version of imperial despotism—suppressing freedom of speech, thought, religion, privacy, and liberty itself. Dissent was punished, history falsified, errors covered up, while propaganda spun the myth of greatness and infallibility.
All national resources came under the monopoly of Communist bureaucrats. A revolution launched in the name of abolishing classes ended up creating an unprecedented, all-powerful “new class.”
This new class consisted of officials, enjoying privileges denied to the people, stratified by rank, and entrenched in power. They obeyed superiors slavishly, insulated themselves from the public, and turned into a thoroughly bureaucratic caste. They monopolized ideology, suppressing all dissent. Freedom and democracy disappeared.
Marxism, as the “faith” of socialist states, is itself authoritarian. To maintain ideological orthodoxy, it excluded all rival theories. In practice, socialism inevitably dragged authoritarianism into the foundations of state power.
Thus socialism is not only a political error but also a moral error. To oppose it is not merely a political matter, but a matter of conscience—a choice between light and darkness.
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III. The Inhumanity of Socialism
Socialist theory claimed socialism would rise worldwide and capitalism would perish globally. Yet the collapse of the USSR and Eastern Europe in 1991 marked a turning point: the final and irreversible failure of international communism under the banner of “scientific socialism.”
The socialist system—public ownership of the means of production, planned economy, and dictatorship of the proletariat—was doomed to fail. Obsessed with violent revolution, class struggle, and total state control, socialism severed ties with human civilization, monopolized natural and social resources, and drove society into disaster.
• It confiscated land from farmers and property from capitalists, stripping them bare.
• It nationalized natural resources—mountains, rivers, mines, forests—and exploited them rapaciously, causing environmental ruin.
• It imposed extreme expropriation on the people: decades of artificially low wages, rationing of food and essentials, forcing the public to tighten belts so the state could hoard grain and money for production.
Under a dictatorship, the whole of society acted in unison to the will of one man. When the Party’s brain fever rose, hundreds of millions were compelled to go mad together. The consequences are unspeakable.
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IV. Socialism and Fascism — Twin Brothers
Socialism and fascism share common DNA.
• Politically: Both emphasize “one ideology, one party, one leader.”
• Economically: Both demand state control of the economy, seizing command of resources.
• Culturally: Both claim to embody “scientific, advanced culture,” defining truth at will.
They enforce large-scale social control, claim to be the sole truth, demand submission to ideology, censor the media, build militarized vanguard parties, base their rule on terror, violence, secret police, and show trials.
Common features:
1. Divide and incite hatred. They split society, set groups against each other, and glorify violence.
2. Suppress dissent and freedom. They tightly control speech, crush opposition, and rely on lies and terror to maintain power.
3. Oppose free economy. They monopolize lifelines of the economy with the state machine.
4. Expansionist aggression. They export revolution or invade abroad, while crushing their own people at home.
The only difference is one of classification: socialism organizes by class, fascism by race. Fascism is racial totalitarianism; socialism is class totalitarianism.
Fascism has been swept into the dustbin of history. Socialism still rampages in China. Same genes, different names, different fates.
王沪宁承认“四千万饿殍”与大饥荒真相
作者：冯仍
编辑：胡丽莉 责任编辑：鲁慧文 翻译：鲁慧文
今天我读到一篇2012年7月13日的旧文，时任中共中央政策研究室主任王沪宁在《学习时报》上发表的长文《文革反思与政治体制改革》。这篇文章在十八大前夕刊出，经过五次修改才定稿，背景极其特殊。当年胡锦涛将要交权习近平，党内对“文革”记忆与现实政治暗流涌动。文章中最引人注目的，不是所谓的“制度反思”，而是王沪宁亲口承认：“大跃进饿死四千多万人”。
这句话的分量极重。过去，关于大饥荒的死亡人数众说纷纭。官方长期回避，只用“1960年全国人口比上年减少1000万”来模糊带过。而社会上、学界与海外研究，数字在2000万到4500万之间不等。直到王沪宁以“中共中央政策研究室主任”的身份明确写出“饿死四千多万人”，这就意味着：哪怕在体制内部，这一惨烈数字也被承认为不可否认的历史事实。
中共官方一直称1959—1961年为“三年自然灾害”或“困难时期”。但大量档案与学术研究表明，天灾并非主要原因。华东师范大学教授杨奎松就指出，1958-1960年各省的气象记录并没有显示严重的天灾，真正的原因是政策性错误。
大跃进时期，高指标、浮夸风、人民公社和公共食堂，构成了大饥荒的三大根源。1958年虚报产量 “放开肚皮吃饭” ，粮食被集中进公社食堂，农民家中颗粒无存。与此同时，国家继续高征购，导致农民人均口粮不足一斤，重灾区甚至只剩几两。河南信阳事件就是极端案例：虚报产量，强征口粮，结果至少一百万人饿死。讽刺的是，当地粮库依旧满仓，而农民宁饿死也不敢抢，正如学者胡平所说，这是此前血腥运动制造的恐惧在作祟。
至于“苏联逼债”的说法，更是事后推卸责任。档案显示，苏联不仅没有逼债，还在1961年提供了上百万吨粮食援助。真正的决定，是毛泽东自行下令提前还债。
独立学者杨继绳的《墓碑》、冯客的《毛的大饥荒》，都提供了详实数据。杨继绳通过多年研究，认定饿死3600万人，少出生4000万人，共计7600万人生命消失。冯客则根据档案估算死亡人数高达4500万。中国统计局前局长李成瑞估算2200万，茅于轼、刘宾雁等均认定超过3000万。这些不同数字虽然有差距，但都指向一个结论：大饥荒是一场导致数千万非正常死亡的巨大人祸。
而王沪宁的“四千万”说，正好落在学界共识的区间内。这说明，即便在中共最高层，内部知情者早已心知肚明。
今天重读这段历史，心情异常沉重。一个政权如果连几千万生命的逝去都要掩盖、淡化、推诿，那么它的历史观和执政合法性就必然是脆弱的。王沪宁在2012年的文字，原本似乎想为体制“拨乱反正”，但他之后十年却成为新一轮极端主义的帮凶，这更凸显出中共内部的虚伪与自我矛盾。
大饥荒不是天灾，而是制度灾难。它揭示出高度集权、缺乏监督与信息封锁的政治体制，必然导致大规模的人道惨剧。社会制度不改，文革类灾难会反复重演。
几千万条生命消逝在饥荒的黑暗中，他们不是数字，而是每一个有血有肉的中国人。他们的饥饿与死亡，是历史永远抹不去的血账。无论当权者如何掩盖，真相终会昭然若揭。
Wang Huning Admits “40 Million Starved to Death” and the Truth of the Great Famine
Summary:
In 2012, Wang Huning admitted in Study Times that “over 40 million people starved to death during the Great Leap Forward.” Scholars generally agree that the Great Famine was not a natural disaster but the result of inflated production targets, false reporting, and the people’s communes with communal canteens, leading to tens of millions of unnatural deaths. The famine was a man-made catastrophe rooted in the system, and this blood account of history will ultimately be settled.
Author: Feng Reng
Editor: Hu Lili Executive Editor: Lu Huiwen Translator: Lu Huiwen
Today I read an old article dated July 13, 2012, in which Wang Huning—then Director of the CCP’s Central Policy Research Office—published a long essay in Study Times titled Reflections on the Cultural Revolution and Political System Reform. The piece appeared on the eve of the 18th Party Congress, finalized only after five revisions, against an extraordinarily sensitive backdrop: Hu Jintao preparing to hand power to Xi Jinping, with memories of the Cultural Revolution and undercurrents of current politics colliding.
What stood out most in the article was not its so-called “institutional reflection,” but Wang Huning’s explicit admission: “Over 40 million people starved to death during the Great Leap Forward.”
This sentence carries enormous weight. For decades, the death toll of the Great Famine had been subject to dispute. Official accounts long evaded it, vaguely stating only that “China’s population decreased by 10 million in 1960 compared to the previous year.” Independent research, both inside and outside China, placed the number between 20 million and 45 million. That Wang, in his capacity as Director of the CCP’s Policy Research Office, put into print “over 40 million starved to death” signaled that even within the system, this staggering figure was acknowledged as undeniable historical fact.
The CCP officially referred to 1959–1961 as the “Three Years of Natural Disasters” or “Three Years of Hardship.” Yet archival evidence and academic studies demonstrate that natural calamities were not the main cause. Yang Kuisong, professor at East China Normal University, noted that meteorological records from 1958–1960 showed no major disasters. The true causes were policy errors.
During the Great Leap Forward, inflated quotas, falsified yields, the people’s communes, and communal dining halls formed the core roots of the famine. In 1958, exaggerated reports of bumper harvests led to the slogan “Eat your fill,” with grain concentrated into communal canteens, leaving nothing in farmers’ homes. At the same time, the state maintained high procurement levels, resulting in rations of less than half a kilo per person per day—sometimes mere ounces in the hardest-hit areas. The Xinyang Incident in Henan is a notorious example: inflated yields and forced grain requisitions led to the starvation of at least one million people. Grimly, local granaries remained full, but terror from previous bloody campaigns left villagers too afraid to seize grain, even to save their lives.
As for the claim that the Soviet Union demanded debt repayment—it was little more than retrospective scapegoating. Archives reveal that not only did the USSR not press for repayment, but in 1961 it provided over one million tons of grain aid. The decision to repay early was Mao Zedong’s alone.
Independent scholar Yang Jisheng’s Tombstone and Frank Dikötter’s Mao’s Great Famine both supply extensive data. Yang’s years of research concluded that 36 million died of starvation, and 40 million fewer were born, totaling 76 million lives lost. Dikötter’s archival work estimated 45 million deaths. Li Chengrui, former head of China’s National Bureau of Statistics, estimated 22 million. Mao Yushi, Liu Binyan, and others placed it above 30 million. Though the figures differ, they all point to one conclusion: the Great Famine was a man-made calamity that caused tens of millions of unnatural deaths.
Wang Huning’s figure of 40 million falls squarely within the scholarly consensus. This indicates that even at the highest levels of the CCP, insiders had long known the truth.
Rereading this history today, I feel an overwhelming heaviness. A regime that must conceal, downplay, or deflect responsibility for the deaths of tens of millions cannot help but reveal the fragility of its historical narrative and political legitimacy. Wang’s words in 2012 might have seemed like an attempt at “rectifying the record,” but his subsequent decade as an architect of new extremism only underscores the hypocrisy and contradictions within the CCP.
The Great Famine was no natural disaster—it was a systemic disaster. It demonstrates how a highly centralized, unsupervised, and information-sealed political system inevitably produces mass humanitarian catastrophes. Without systemic change, Cultural Revolution-style tragedies will recur.
Tens of millions of lives perished in the darkness of famine. They are not numbers, but flesh-and-blood human beings. Their hunger and deaths are a blood account history cannot erase. However much the rulers try to conceal it, the truth will ultimately stand revealed.
中国官场腐败的文化根源与体制反思
——从官本位教育到走向民主
作者：林小龙
编辑：何清风 责任编辑：鲁慧文 翻译：鲁慧文
引言
我曾经是一名中国的法官。在法庭与现实的双重场域中，我亲眼目睹了无数腐败的案例，也见证了许多干部的蜕变。他们中有的出身寒门，有的原本勤勉正直，但在体制逻辑与文化氛围的共同作用下，逐渐变得冷漠、贪婪，甚至与犯罪勾结。
流亡海外后，我有了更多的时间与空间去反思。在国际社会的对比之下，我更清楚地看到，中国腐败问题的特殊性与顽固性：它既不是单纯的制度缺陷，也不是个体失德，而是一种文化与体制合谋的结果。一方面，延续千年的“官本位”思想，使整个社会普遍将权力作为成功的唯一象征；另一方面，中共的独裁体制不仅没有打破这种思想，反而把它变成了巩固统治的工具。在这种环境下，底层出身的干部尤显矛盾，他们在成长经历中积累的匮乏感和身份焦虑，使他们在掌权后往往走向“反噬式压迫”。
这正是我试图揭示的主题：中国腐败的根源在于文化与体制，而摆脱腐败的唯一道路是结束独裁、走向民主。
一、官本位思想的文化基因
1. 家庭教育与社会价值的单一化
在中国，几乎所有家庭教育都绕不开一个主题：“孩子要有出息，就要考公务员。”我在司法实践中见过很多家庭，即便已经供养孩子读到研究生博士，最终的目标依旧是进入体制内。社会的评价体系单一，将“官员”视作“人上人”，而忽略其他职业的社会价值。
2. 乡土社会的心理积淀
在广大农村与底层社会，父母对子女的期望往往简单直白：“只有当官，家族才能翻身。”这种观念代代相传，逐渐形成群体性的心理积淀。孩子们在耳濡目染中成长，早早内化了“官即成功”的价值判断。
3. 社会流动焦虑
改革开放以来，社会流动的门槛逐渐提高。普通人若想改变命运，体制内的身份仍是最稳定、最可靠的路径。由此形成的“社会焦虑”，使官本位文化在现代社会愈加牢固。
二、底层出身干部的反噬逻辑
1. 匮乏记忆的补偿性心理
农民或工人家庭出身的干部，往往有着“穷怕了”的童年记忆。这种匮乏感会转化为补偿心理，使他们在掌权后急于通过权力换取财富，以弥补内心的不安全感。
2. 身份焦虑与社会区隔
他们担心被人看不起，担心被揭露“原本不过是个农民的孩子”。于是，他们会刻意通过压制底层群体来划清界限。比如，在征地拆迁、税费征收、治安管理中，底层出身的干部常常比出身优渥者更冷酷无情。这种行为是一种“身份宣誓”，以证明自己已完全脱离原阶层。
3. 权力依赖与腐败惯性
当权力成为确认身份的唯一依靠时，腐败就成为必然选择。许多落马官员都有类似经历：出身寒门，发迹之后却贪得无厌。他们的腐败，不仅是贪婪，更是心理补偿的本能反应。
三、体制与文化的共谋
作为法官，我深知：单靠法律是无法遏制腐败的，因为体制本身在助长腐败。
• 政绩导向的考核机制，逼迫干部追求短期数据，忽视长期民生。
• 社会对“官”的过度尊崇，让干部心理压力倍增，进而依赖特权。
• 缺乏有效监督，使得腐败行为可以长期隐藏，甚至被纵容。
最终，文化的执念与体制的设计结合在一起，构成了腐败的温床。
四、中共独裁体制的放大效应
1. 权力高度集中
独裁体制将所有资源与权力集中在少数人手中，使“当官”成为几乎唯一的社会上升通道。这不仅没有打破官本位，反而使它合法化、常态化。
2. 监督的缺失
没有司法独立，没有新闻自由，没有民间组织监督，权力几乎零成本滥用。在这样的体制下，腐败成为一种安全的“制度性收益”，而非高风险行为。
3. 底层群体的双重受害
最残酷的是，底层群体在这种体制下既是腐败的受害者，也是官本位文化的受害者。他们本寄希望于“草根干部”能体恤民情，但现实往往相反：草根干部最先背弃底层。这种“背叛”，是我在司法案件与现实观察中最痛心的发现。
五、走向民主的必要性
1. 民主打破官本位
民主制度通过多元价值与社会认同，让不同职业都能获得尊重。成功不再等于“当官”，工人、农民、学者、企业家都可以实现自我价值。
2. 民主遏制腐败
在民主制度下，权力分立、司法独立、媒体监督、选举问责，可以让腐败的成本高得难以承受。
3. 民主带来公平流动
个人不再依赖体制身份来改变命运，而是可以通过教育、创业、技能等多种途径实现阶层跃升。这能大大减轻干部的身份焦虑，从根本上减少“反噬”现象。
六、历史逻辑与中国的未来
从东欧到拉美，从韩国到台湾，历史已经证明：独裁与腐败如影随形，而民主与清廉相辅相成。独裁体制必然制造腐败，民主制度才能逐渐削弱腐败。
中国也不可能例外。结束中共独裁，走向民主，既是政治选择，也是历史必然。这不仅是对制度的重建，更是对文化的重塑。只有在民主环境下，才能淡化官本位，培养公民意识，重建社会信任。
结论
作为一名流亡法官，我的结论是明确的：中国官场腐败并非偶然，而是文化与体制的合谋。官本位思想提供了腐败的文化基因，而中共独裁体制提供了腐败的制度保障。底层出身干部的反噬现象，更是揭示了这一合谋的残酷逻辑。
因此，中国若要真正根治腐败，必须迈出关键一步：结束独裁，走向民主。唯有民主，才能逐渐淡化官本位文化，重建公平与正义，让干部回归公共服务的本位，让人民真正成为国家的主人。这是我林小龙作为流亡法官的亲身见证与沉痛呼吁，也是中国未来必须面对的历史课题。
The Cultural Roots and Institutional Reflections on Corruption in China’s Officialdom
— From “Official Supremacy” Education to the Path Toward Democracy
Author: Lin Xiaolong
Editor: He Qingfeng Executive Editor: Lu Huiwen Translator: Lu Huiwen
Abstract:
Corruption in China’s officialdom is not merely the result of individual greed or moral decline. It is an inevitable phenomenon produced jointly by deep-rooted cultural traditions and institutional structures. Culturally, the ideology of “official supremacy” is deeply ingrained; institutionally, the CCP’s dictatorial rule, through monopoly of power and lack of oversight, has normalized corruption as a systemic outcome.
Introduction
I was once a judge in China. In the dual arenas of courtroom and reality, I personally witnessed countless cases of corruption and the transformation of many cadres. Some came from humble backgrounds, some were once diligent and upright, but under the combined influence of institutional logic and cultural atmosphere, they gradually became indifferent, greedy, even colluding with crime.
After going into exile overseas, I gained more time and space for reflection. In contrast with international society, I see more clearly the uniqueness and stubbornness of China’s corruption problem: it is neither a simple institutional flaw nor individual moral failure, but a result of the collusion between culture and system. On one hand, the millennia-old ideology of “official supremacy” makes society equate power with success; on the other, the CCP’s dictatorship has not broken this ideology, but instead turned it into a tool for consolidating rule. In this environment, cadres from grassroots backgrounds are particularly conflicted: the sense of deprivation and identity anxiety accumulated during their upbringing often lead them, once in power, to exercise “retaliatory oppression.”
This is the theme I seek to reveal: the roots of corruption in China lie in both culture and system, and the only way out is to end dictatorship and move toward democracy.
I. The Cultural Gene of “Official Supremacy”
1. Family Education and Monolithic Social Values
In China, nearly every family education revolves around one theme: “For a child to succeed, they must become a civil servant.” Even families who invest in advanced education for their children—master’s, doctoral degrees—still consider entering the bureaucracy the ultimate goal. Society’s evaluation system is singular: officials are “superior beings,” while the value of other professions is ignored.
2. Psychological Imprint of Rural Society
In rural and grassroots communities, parental expectations are blunt: “Only by becoming an official can the family rise.” Passed down through generations, this belief forms a collective psychological imprint. Children grow up internalizing the judgment that “to be an official is to succeed.”
3. Anxiety Over Social Mobility
Since reform and opening, barriers to upward mobility have grown. For ordinary people, bureaucratic status remains the most stable, reliable path to change fate. This social anxiety has only reinforced the culture of “official supremacy” in modern times.
II. The Retaliatory Logic of Grassroots Cadres
1. Compensatory Psychology of Deprivation
Cadres from farming or working-class families often carry childhood memories of poverty. This sense of deprivation transforms into a compensatory psychology: once in power, they rush to exchange power for wealth, seeking to soothe their insecurity.
2. Identity Anxiety and Social Separation
They fear being looked down upon, fear being exposed as “just a peasant’s child.” Thus, they deliberately oppress the lower classes to draw a line. In land requisitions, taxation, and law enforcement, grassroots-origin cadres are often more ruthless than those of privileged birth. Such behavior acts as an “identity declaration,” proof of total separation from their original class.
3. Power Dependence and Corruption Inertia
When power becomes the sole basis for identity, corruption becomes inevitable.
Many disgraced officials share similar backgrounds: born poor, once risen they became insatiable. Their corruption is not only greed, but also an instinctive response of psychological compensation.
III. The Collusion of System and Culture
As a judge, I know well: law alone cannot curb corruption, for the system itself fosters it.
• Performance-driven evaluations force cadres to chase short-term data at the expense of long-term welfare.
• Social reverence for officials adds psychological pressure, deepening reliance on privilege.
• Lack of effective oversight allows corruption to hide and even thrive unchecked.
In the end, cultural obsession and institutional design combine to form a breeding ground for corruption.
IV. The Amplifying Effect of the CCP’s Dictatorship
1. Extreme Centralization of Power
Dictatorship concentrates all resources and authority in the hands of a few, making “being an official” virtually the only path of social mobility. Far from breaking official supremacy, it legitimizes and normalizes it.
2. Absence of Oversight
With no judicial independence, no press freedom, no civil society supervision, power is abused at negligible cost. In such a system, corruption becomes a safe “institutionalized return,” not a high-risk act.
3. Double Victimization of the Grassroots
The cruelest reality is that the grassroots are both victims of corruption and victims of official supremacy culture. They once hoped “grassroots cadres” would empathize with them; instead, these cadres are the first to betray them. This betrayal is the most painful pattern I witnessed both in court and in society.
V. The Necessity of Moving Toward Democracy
1. Democracy Breaks Official Supremacy
Through plural values and diverse social recognition, democracy ensures all professions are respected. Success is no longer equated with “becoming an official.” Workers, farmers, scholars, entrepreneurs can all realize self-worth.
2. Democracy Curbs Corruption
Democracy introduces separation of powers, judicial independence, media oversight, and electoral accountability. These make corruption unbearably costly.
3. Democracy Ensures Fair Mobility
Individuals need not rely on bureaucratic identity to change fate, but can rise through education, entrepreneurship, skills. This reduces identity anxiety, thereby lessening the “retaliatory oppression” of grassroots-origin cadres.
VI. Historical Logic and China’s Future
From Eastern Europe to Latin America, from South Korea to Taiwan, history proves: dictatorship and corruption go hand in hand, while democracy and integrity reinforce each other. Dictatorship inevitably breeds corruption; democracy gradually reduces it.
China is no exception. Ending CCP dictatorship and moving toward democracy is not only a political choice, but a historical inevitability. This is not merely institutional reconstruction but cultural renewal. Only under democracy can “official supremacy” be weakened, civic consciousness fostered, and social trust rebuilt.
Conclusion
As an exiled judge, my conclusion is clear: corruption in Chinese officialdom is no accident, but the collusion of culture and system. The ideology of “official supremacy” supplies the cultural gene; the CCP dictatorship provides the institutional guarantee. The retaliatory behavior of grassroots-origin cadres further exposes this cruel logic.
Therefore, if China truly wishes to eradicate corruption, it must take the decisive step: end dictatorship and move toward democracy. Only democracy can gradually dissolve the culture of official supremacy, rebuild fairness and justice, restore officials to the role of public service, and make the people true masters of the nation. This is my personal testimony and painful appeal as a judge in exile—and the historical task China must face.
《君无戏言》之账本与头颅
作者：张致君
编辑：何清风 责任编辑：鲁慧文 翻译：鲁慧文
“有人爱拿算盘当正义，拨得响，便以为天理也该进项；只是到最后，账上盈余，头上却少了几颗。”
城里风声异样。传说国用亏虚，像老屋梁上忽见裂缝，先召木匠，再召鼓手，鼓手负责把锣敲响，叫四邻围观：屋梁要救，人人出力。什么叫出力？就是有人递钉子，有人献肩膀，更精明些的，便把旁人家的门板拆了拿来加固。门板一拆，门后的人就站在风里，衣角被掀起，和贴在墙上的票据似的。
票据会说话：公平稳定。说得越多，越像旧年熟词，贴在每一出整顿的门框上。整顿总要有对象，于是有人开始清点：谁家账面干净，谁家账面油光；谁家最肥，谁家最不易叫喊。清点完毕，纸上画圈，圈里不写名字，只写“某某企业的某某人士”；圈外自然是掌声。掌声与圈，彼此成全。
自古清账与清人，常是一条路上的两口井：一口口沿宽，叫法；一口口沿窄，叫势。先让人低头去看法，看完便顺势跌入势。跌下去的人，不一定有罪，却一定有价，价目贴在另一张账上，名为“没收”。没收是好字，和失而复得一样；只是失的是人，得的是物。旁人若问：为何？答曰：历史有先例。说罢，便把厚厚一本史书翻到几页熟处，指给你看：某年“整风”，某年“公私合营”，某年“三反五反”，某年“运动”，每一页都很整齐，整齐得看不见血。血一旦溅上去，过几日也会被删去，字仍是黑，纸仍是白，只余几处皱折，像被谁攥过。
闲时茶楼有两位先生谈话。一位长衫，一位夹克。长衫沉吟道：“如今讲‘依法依规’，应不至于走老路。”夹克点头如捣葫芦：“自然，自然。”正点得欢，茶博士端来一碟花生，泛着油光，像刚抄完家的清单。夹克忽然压低声音：“只是你听没听说，某地有位‘领衔人物’，忽而‘轻生’。”长衫忙摆手：“嘘，茶楼墙薄。”墙果然薄，薄得能把人心的风声都漏出去。风声绕一圈，又从告示牌上吹回来：正在调查，切勿传谣。于是两位先生不再谈，埋头剥花生，花生壳落在桌上，凋零的如同两封无人敢收的信。
传言多处出，证据总在别处。别处往往是在程序那里。程序是个慈祥的长者，说话慢，步子稳；只是他站台时常背光，你只看见一个黑影，再听见几句熟词，便自觉安心。安心久了，胆子也就小了，眼睛也就近了，只看见脚下那条配合的线：照这线走，谁也不找你麻烦；偏离一步，便有温柔的手搭在你肩上，笑道：还是进去吧。
有一次，我看最高领袖召开 “营商环境推介会”。场上灯光明亮，背景板上写着“护航发展”。“护航”二字写得很宽，像两张手掌，掌心却并不柔软。主持人高声念：优化、升级、共赢、普惠。台下的掌声像潮，潮里却夹着沙。散会时，角落里一位穿西装的伙计悄悄把名片塞给参会的人，名片上印着“专项服务”。他们低声问他何谓专项。他眨眨眼：“你懂的。风向来了，先把帽子戴好；若帽子来不及戴，就把头低下。”要是问那头要低多久。他说看天色——天若阴，低久一点；天若晴，也不要抬太高。说罢，他抬手比划一个高度，刚及胸口。
我忽然想起旧时一条规矩：抬棺不过胸。便觉背脊微凉。
所谓“没收”，也讲究姿势。有的姿势是自愿，有的姿势是依法，还有一种姿势，名叫配合调查。被配合者常常在镜头前点头，说“相信组织、服从安排”，像扭开了机器人的开关。在场的人点头，屏外的人也点头；点头的海洋里，只有几个孩子抬着眼睛，不懂大人们在同意什么。孩子问我：“阿姨，什么是没收？”我想了想，说：“你把心爱的玻璃球借给隔壁一阵子，后来他说那球本在他家祖谱上，写着‘公共’，你便把球留下也不是，还回也不是。”孩子点点头，又问：“那我以后还借吗？”我呐呐不能答，只得把他领到窗边，指着天说：“风在那儿，现在先别玩球。”
有人喜欢把“清欠”写在红纸上贴满街，用来“刮骨疗毒”。毒字可怖，人人避之不及；于是“疗”变得无限正当。只是疗得久了，骨便薄，薄到风一吹就嗦嗦响。响声被解释为“换骨”的征兆，便更要再刮几刀，好让大家听个明白。明白也好，疼也好，都是写进统计里的两列数据：一列叫“治理成效”，一列叫“个案处置”。至于那些空下来的椅子，桌上的相框，半页未签完的合同，统统被擦拭得干干净净，摆进展示柜，配上灯光，题名曰“警示”。灯光很亮，人影却淡，淡得像被水洗过三十遍的真相。
我想起旧年见闻。老会计做账一辈子，识得钱的冷暖。世上的钱有两种，一种走在账上，一种走在人身上。走在账上的，总要对得平衡；走在人身上的，多半没有凭据。我问他如今是哪一种多。他叹道：“如今钱走在说辞上。”说辞是软的，钱是硬的；硬物一旦被软物包住，便不再有响声。没有响声，便没有人看它走到哪里去了。等到要用的时候，便说“亏虚”。亏虚也好，是个正经病名；接下来就要配药。药名一个比一个雅：整顿、净化、规范、提质。吃药的人，常常不是生病的人；生病的人，反倒坐在桌前敲碗：再来一剂。
我知道几家做生意的，忽然学会了沉默。昔日谈笑，今朝谨慎，话到嘴边，先用眼睛度量一下四周：是否安全。安全这个词，在这些年里越长越大，几乎占满了门面。门面里的人把安全当拐杖，拄着走，走久了，忘了脚本可以用来自行。脚一旦忘了，就需要被带路；带路的人自有地图，地图上每一块空白都写着待开发。于是路越走越直，直到尽头，出现一道门：配合、承诺、共享、交割。门后还有门，门后的人皆笑，说欢迎回到大家庭。大家庭的饭菜热气腾腾，只是上桌之前先要缴纳。缴纳的名目多：心意、责任、政治、信任。名目越多，胃口越小；最后人人只剩一口汤，端着碗，谢恩。
生意人追问：为何屡见不鲜？我只好指给他看一条旧时的河。河边立着一块碑，上刻：某年公私合营。再往下游，是某年专项运动；再下游，是某年“严打”；再远些，是若干轮“整肃”。河从碑旁绕过，浑而不止。每到拐弯处，河水总要掀一层浪，把岸上的摊子打翻几个。摊主多半不懂水文，只会收拾残局，换地再摆。摆了几回，耳聪些的，学会了看天色；看久了，眼神便像旧镜，光亮里夹着裂纹。
开会的领袖下文说：“这都是谣言。”我笑而不答。谣言这物事，在历史上与真相常作邻居；隔着一道薄墙，墙薄到风可过。风若从谣间吹来，真相的烛火就摇；从真间吹去，谣言的尘土就飞。执烛的人于是愤怒，要把风抓住。风抓不住，便抓人。抓到的是衣角、影子、姓名、章程；抓不到的是那只捏在暗处的手：是谁在拨算盘？算盘打得正，事情便也正；打得响，事情便也响。只是算盘再会打，终究算不出一件事：人的胆寒。胆寒一来，市井无语，坊间失笑，灯火早早关门。关门之后，谁还敢为一纸契据去撑天？
我愿意给未来的事留一行字：做账要清，做事要清，做人更要清。只是“清”这个字，落在不同的手上，就有不同的温度。落在铁手上，叫清算；落在纸手上，叫清理；落在温手上，才是清明。清明远了，清算近了；近得像那张忽然递来的纸：配合。配合之后，门可开；再配合，窗可关。窗一关，屋里只剩一盏灯，灯下只照见账本。账本翻了一页又一页，页页有章，章章有痕。痕迹像鱼骨，卡在喉咙，咳不出，咽不下。
写到这里，想起街口的那家铺子。掌柜原先爱把算盘挂在门梁下，日头一晒，珠子透亮；如今算盘不见了，门梁却更低，低得进门要弯腰。弯腰久了，人会忘记直立。忘记直立的人，最合适和功绩合影。合影上人人端正，背景板写着：风清气正、法治保障、稳中向好。我也站在那合影里，学着把笑挂在嘴边。摄影师喊三声，我在第三声里听见一点细碎的回响，是旧年的木头被拧紧的呻吟。那声音极小，小到只够我自己听。听完，我不自觉地把头又低了一寸。
头低了，我就能从狗洞里钻出去。我也确实钻了出去，经年累月的，腰又直不起来。
我去寻医：可有良方治我的驼背？
寻来寻去就只得到两句话：第一把账本摊在阳光下，第二把帽子从人头上摘下来。
阳光能照见数目，帽子也许能保住人。
若还要第三句，便是：让人先安，国用自会慢慢安；切莫反过来，把“安”先写在账上，再去找人头去补缺。
但这些都由不得从狗洞里爬出来的人做主。我的驼背，又什么时候能治好？
“A Ruler’s Words Are No Jest” — Of Ledgers and Heads
Summary:
I watched as the supreme leader convened a “Business Environment Promotion Conference.” The lights on stage were bright, the backdrop read “Safeguard Development.” I know several businessmen who, all of a sudden, had learned the art of silence. Where once there was laughter, now there was caution. Before a word is spoken, eyes first scan the surroundings: is it safe?
Author: Zhang Zhijun
Editor: He Qingfeng Executive Editor: Lu Huiwen Translator: Lu Huiwen
“Some love to treat the abacus as justice; the louder the beads click, the more they believe heaven’s principle must also be accounted for. Yet in the end, the surplus shows up on the ledger, while a few heads go missing.”
The city feels uneasy. Rumor says the state finances are in deficit—like spotting a crack on an old roof beam. First they summon the carpenter, then the drummer; the drummer’s task is to bang the gong, draw in the neighbors: the beam must be saved, everyone must help. What is help? Some hand over nails, some lend their shoulders; the shrewder ones dismantle someone else’s door panel for reinforcement. Once the panel is gone, those behind the door are left in the draft, their hems fluttering like unpaid bills pasted to a wall.
The bills speak: fairness, stability. The more often these words appear, the more they sound like stock phrases from years past, posted on the frames of every new “rectification.” And rectification always needs a target. So counting begins: whose books are clean, whose books shine with grease; who is fattest, who will cry the least. When the tally is done, circles are drawn. Inside, no names, only “so-and-so from such-and-such enterprise.” Outside, naturally, there is applause. Applause and circles, each sustaining the other.
From of old, settling accounts and settling people have been like two wells along the same road: one wide-mouthed, called Law; the other narrow, called Power. First people are made to lower their heads to look into the Law; when done, they fall straight into Power. Those who fall may not be guilty, but they are surely of value—the price tag posted on another ledger, called “Confiscation.” Confiscation sounds righteous, like something regained; only what is lost are people, what is gained are things. If others ask why, the answer is: history provides precedent. A thick history book is flipped to familiar pages: this year “Rectification,” that year “Public-Private Partnership,” another year the “Three-Anti, Five-Anti,” another the “Movements.” Each page looks neat—so neat you cannot see the blood. When blood does splash, a few days later it is erased. The words remain black, the paper white, only a few wrinkles left, as if clenched in someone’s fist.
In idle hours, two gentlemen converse at a teahouse. One in a long gown, the other in a jacket. The gown muses: “Now that they speak of ‘ruling according to law,’ surely we won’t tread the old path.” The jacket nods furiously: “Of course, of course.” Just then, the teahouse boy brings peanuts, their oily sheen like a freshly seized household inventory. The jacket suddenly lowers his voice: “But have you heard? Somewhere, a ‘leading figure’ suddenly ‘took his own life.’” The gown quickly waves his hand: “Hush, the teahouse walls are thin.” And thin they are—thin enough for whispers of the heart to slip out, then circle back on the bulletin board: “Under investigation, do not spread rumors.” So the two gentlemen talk no more, burying themselves in peanuts. Shells fall on the table like two letters no one dares to receive.
Rumors sprout in one place, proof lies elsewhere—most often in procedure. Procedure is a kindly elder, speaking slowly, stepping steadily. Yet when on stage he always stands against the light; you see only a shadow, hear only familiar phrases, and feel at ease.
Ease long enough breeds timidity; timidity narrows the gaze until one sees only the line of compliance at one’s feet: follow it, no one troubles you; stray a step, and a gentle hand lands on your shoulder, smiling: better come inside.
Once, I watched the supreme leader at the “Business Environment Promotion Conference.” The lights were bright, the backdrop read “Safeguard Development.” The word “safeguard” was written wide, like two palms, but the palms were not soft. The host intoned: optimization, upgrading, win-win, inclusivity. Applause surged like tides, yet within the tide was sand. At dispersal, a man in a suit quietly slipped business cards into hands: “Special Services.” They asked softly what that meant. He blinked: “You know. When the wind shifts, wear the hat; if you cannot in time, lower your head.” And how long must the head stay down? He said it depends on the sky—longer if overcast, shorter if clear, but never too high. He raised his hand, indicating chest height.
I suddenly recalled an old rule: coffins must not be lifted above the chest. A chill ran down my spine.
So-called confiscation also has its poses. Some voluntary, some “by law,” others called “cooperating with investigation.” The “cooperating” often nod on camera, declaring “faith in the organization, obedience to arrangements”—like a robot switch being flicked on. Those present nod; those behind screens nod; an ocean of nods, while only a few children look up, not understanding what the adults are agreeing to. A child asked me: “Auntie, what is confiscation?” I thought and said: “You lent your favorite marble to the neighbor, and later he claims it’s in his family’s genealogy marked ‘public.’ You cannot keep it, nor return it.” The child nodded, then asked: “So should I lend again?” Tongue-tied, I led him to the window: “Look at the wind there—best not to play marbles for now.”
Some like to plaster “Debt Clearance” on red paper all over town, a “bone-scraping cure.” The word “poison” terrifies, so everyone accepts the “cure” as just. But prolonged cure thins the bones, until the slightest breeze makes them rattle. The rattling is explained as a sign of “rebirth,” requiring still more scraping, so all may hear. Clarity or pain, all logged in statistics: one column “results of governance,” another “individual cases handled.” The empty chairs, half-signed contracts, photos scrubbed clean and placed under glass with bright lights—titled “Warning.” The lights shine bright, but the shadows faint, like truth washed thirty times in water.
I recall an old accountant’s words. After a lifetime with ledgers, he knew money’s chill and warmth. There are two kinds of money, he said: one runs on ledgers, the other on people. Ledger money must balance; people-money seldom leaves receipts. Which kind prevails now? He sighed: “Now money runs on words.” Words are soft, money is hard; once the hard is wrapped in the soft, no sound remains. Without sound, none can trace where it flows. When the time comes to use it, they say “deficit.” Deficit sounds like a proper diagnosis; next comes the prescription. The medicines bear elegant names: rectification, purification, standardization, quality improvement. Yet those forced to take them are often not the sick; the sick, instead, sit at the table banging their bowls: another dose!
I know businessmen who, suddenly, learned silence. Where once they laughed, now they measure safety with their eyes. Safety has grown so large these years, filling the whole shopfront. Inside, people walk with safety as a crutch; long enough, they forget feet can walk on their own. Forgetting feet, they need a guide; the guide has his map, each blank space marked “to be developed.” The path grows straighter until at its end stands a door: cooperation, commitment, sharing, delivery. Behind it, more doors, and people smiling: welcome back to the family. The meals steam hot, but before sitting you must pay. Payment names are many: goodwill, responsibility, politics, trust.
The more names, the smaller the appetite; in the end, each is left with only a mouthful of soup, bowl in hand, giving thanks.
Businessmen ask: why so often? I point them to an old river. A stele by its bank reads: such year, Public-Private Partnership. Downstream: such year, Special Campaign. Further: such year, “Strike Hard.” Further still: rounds of “Rectification.” The river curves past the stele, turbid and unceasing. At each bend, the waves topple stalls ashore. Stallkeepers, ignorant of hydrology, only gather what remains and set up again. After several times, the sharper ones learn to watch the sky; long enough, their eyes become like old mirrors—gleaming yet cracked.
At the close of the conference, the leader declared: “All this is rumor.” I smiled without reply. Rumor and truth have long been neighbors in history, separated by a thin wall. Thin enough for wind to pass. If wind blows from rumor, truth’s flame flickers; if from truth, rumor’s dust stirs. The candle-bearer, angered, tries to catch the wind. Wind cannot be caught, so people are caught instead—grabbing hems, shadows, names, regulations. What cannot be caught is the hand flicking the abacus in the dark. If the abacus beats in tune, matters are said to be in order; if it beats loudly, matters are declared sound. Yet no abacus, however deft, can calculate one thing: human dread. With dread, the marketplace falls silent, jokes vanish, lights are doused early. Afterward, who dares uphold the sky for a contract?
For the future, I wish to leave this line: books must be kept clean, deeds must be kept clean, above all, people must be kept clean. Yet the word “clean” changes temperature by whose hand it falls into. In iron hands, it is “settlement”; in paper hands, “tidying”; in warm hands, true “clarity.” Clarity drifts far, settlement comes near; as near as that paper suddenly handed over: cooperation. Cooperate, the door opens; cooperate again, the window shuts. Once shut, only a lamp remains, its light falling on ledgers. Pages turn, stamped and marked. The traces like fishbones, stuck in the throat—neither coughed out nor swallowed down.
I think of a shop I once saw. Its owner used to hang an abacus on the door beam, beads glowing in the sun. Now the abacus is gone, and the beam lower—so low one must bow to enter. Bow long enough, one forgets to stand straight. Those who forget to stand are best suited for merit photos. In the photo, everyone sits proper, backdrop reading: Integrity, Rule of Law, Steady Progress. I too stand in the photo, practicing a smile. At the count of three, I hear on the third beat a faint echo—the creak of old wood being tightened. The sound is faint, enough only for me to hear. On hearing it, I lower my head another inch.
Lowering it, I find I can crawl out through the doghole. And crawl I did, but years bent, my back cannot straighten.
I sought a doctor: is there a cure for my hunch?
After much searching, only two prescriptions: first, lay the ledger open under sunlight; second, remove the hat from people’s heads. Sunlight can reveal the numbers; the hat, perhaps, can save the head.
If there must be a third, it is this: let the people rest first, and the state accounts will settle in time. Do not reverse it, writing “peace” first into the books, then seeking heads to make up the shortfall.
But such choices are not made by those crawling from dogholes.
When will my bent back ever be healed?
社会主义为什么不好（二）
作者：华言
编辑：李聪玲 责任编辑：鲁慧文 翻译：鲁慧文
社会主义在理论上追求平等与集体福祉，但在实践中常引发诸多问题。首先，“铁的政党”导致权力高度集中，单一政党垄断政治资源，压制异议，限制自由。缺乏竞争与监督，执政者易腐败，决策僵化，效率低下。其次，社会主义常催生“新奴隶”现象：国家控制经济，个人丧失自主权，被迫服从集体目标，创新与个性被压抑。再次，个人崇拜在社会主义体制中常见，领袖被神化，民众盲目追随，失去理性判断力，易导致政策失误甚至灾难。最后，集体主义虽强调共同利益，却常忽视个体权利，强制统一思想，扼杀多样性，造成社会活力不足。社会主义的理想在现实中常因人性与权力的复杂性而扭曲，经济停滞、自由受限、效率低下成为其弊端。实践证明，过度强调集体而忽视个体，难以实现真正的繁荣与公平。
一、社会主义的建党学说–铁的政党
社会主义的建党学说是：一、阶级斗争产生并且需要政党，政党在阶级斗争中发展，在和平中走向死亡。二、共产党是以马克思主义理论武装的工人阶级先进部队，有严密的组织和统一的纪律，讲党性就是要讲无条件的服从性。三、党是无产阶级专政和社会主义建设的领导力量，长期执政是唯一的、根本的利益。
群众是划分为阶级的，没有阶级也要按照一定的标准制造出来，阶级如何划分，这取决于本国社会结构。组织是寡头统治的温床，在任何组织中，无论它是一个政党、工会组织，还是其他任何类型的协会，其贵族化倾向都是显而易见的。因此，政党通常是由愿意服从、愿意执行命令的人来组成的，他们是一批人，是一个稳定的集团，党内分为领导和被领导集团，领袖自认为是半人半神，是天生的领导者，党员是被领导者。领袖的专断是一定的，这是组织运转的关键，掌控着组织大权的领袖组成了小圈子，形成自己的特殊利益。政党的组织化程度越高，党的领导人凌驾于党组织之上的可能性就越高，变得骄横跋扈。
党在阶级斗争中壮大，所以要不断的制造敌人，在对敌人的斗争中发展阶级基础和经济基础，导致社会陷入不断的冲突中。党是一支讲党性、不讲人性的组织，党内扼杀自由与民主，导致党成为一具僵化的尸体，党的中下层丧失了独立思考的能力，全党听一个人或几个人的号令，不知反抗、不知反省。一党专制不仅将窒息社会的公共生活，清除所有与当权者不同的声音，党内也将形成排斥异己、领袖独裁的格局。
党为了长期执政，对反对它执政的一切团体和个人进行剿灭，从源头开展巩固统治，贫民、愚民、弱民就成为选择。党除了自己的利益，没有别的利益。
铁的政党，不仅对内部的党员铁血镇压，对社会全体大众也是铁血镇压的。
二、社会主义的新人改造–新奴隶
统治者都有一种不切实际的幻想：他们希望老百姓面对统治者时，唯唯诺诺，又希望百姓面对侵略者时，铁骨铮铮。
共产党革命的终结目标既要建立新社会，也要塑造新人。社会主义新人是：透过革命斗争，升华人和解放人，使得人在通向完美的阶梯上不断攀登，直到完美。新人的特征：把精神和道德放在物质和欲望之上，有政治忠诚和献身精神，个人服从于集体，为了一个更卓越的目标而生活。为此，我们要实施新人工程：在革命斗争中锤炼出来，思想改造升华起来的以彻底改造人性为目的的社会工程。
唯物主义的环境决定论：人性由环境塑造并直接对环境做出反映，人是那个环境的产物，人是一件未完成的产品，个人和共同体的完美结合从而反映出人的真正性质，人具有可塑性和可完美性。人的可完美性本身是唯意志论观点，与马列主义所尊崇的唯物主义格格不入。
社会主义新人的人是：一个集体的人和党的人，听党话跟党走，而不是作为个体的人，一个有自由意志和独立思想的人。社会主义新人伦理道德基础：每一个人生下来就欠了党、政府和社会的债，他的一生就是用贡献来还债，所以要自我牺牲和为别人服务。苏联、中共精心组织了一系列运动和组织措施对党的成员进行脱胎换骨的改造，对个人的思想、心理甚至个性的控制，通过强化学习文件、向党交心和坦白个人历史、自我解剖和自我批判、用体力劳动来触及思想等等，让个人有获得“新生”的感觉，并把自己完全等同于党的工具。
“灵魂深处闹革命”，用掏心挖肺式的自我解剖和苦行僧般的自我拒绝来达到彻底否定个人存在的目标，导致的后果是新人都有领袖崇拜情结，领袖崇拜从根源上说是个人虚弱和个性泯灭的结果，个人唯有在集体中才能找到自己生存的意义和力量。
现在普遍认为,人性是永恒的和不可改变。各个国家塑造“新人”的实践都失败了，因为建设新人工程的地基是架构在不可靠的假设上的。 新人工程，在现实中的是不可行性，而且改造人性的社会工程本身不具有伦理的合理性。
三、个人崇拜：社会主义定制
个人崇拜是以权力的力量神化领导人,在整个国家为大众塑造了一尊高高在上、不可挑战的神，以他的话语为天条，不受任何制约,全国全党谁也管不了，全党和全体国民都要自觉放弃思考，听从这个神的指挥。政治本应该是众人之事，是人类结群而居、自我组织的需要。在一切政治体中,不应该出现个人崇拜,但在社会主义国家都出现过个人崇拜。对于社会主义国家来说，个人崇拜就是驾驭术，操控人的思想，统一意志、统一思想、统一行动，步调一致的前进。
个人崇拜的产生。一是人类具有英雄情结的心理。在人类统治秩序上，先民为了活下去，产生了首长领导模式，敬畏信赖最高权力者。现代社会,一些政治集团常常利用群众对政治强人的需求，有目的地制造个人崇拜，利用其掌握的强大的宣传机器，有意识地推动社会的个人崇拜氛围，塑造一个强势领袖的形象，让群众认为，只有领袖才能解决迫在眉睫的各种社会问题。二是被洗脑教育的结果。将个人崇拜种植到民众大脑里，观念被灌输进去的，对单一来源的信息坚信不疑，统治者的官方教科书初始设置了他们的底层逻辑和核心价值观,并产生特定的认知反应：党伟大，领袖英明；领袖的话是真理，要无条件服从。洗脑教育下，普通大众是韭菜，却处处维护镰刀，并把自己当镰刀去砍伐同类。统治者最担心对教育失控，害怕人们传播知识、说出真相，使人觉醒。对中国民间教育培训行业进行打击就是一个例子。三是是群体声浪挟裹下的从众心理。口号喧天、谬论泛滥，成为主流意识形态，让愚昧无知的人群进入癫狂，在这种情况下，从众就是保护自己的最佳手段。个人崇拜本质上是一种权力崇拜，官员为了获得升迁并保住他们手中的权力，只能通过对领袖的无原则的效忠和吹捧来达到；普通百姓害怕不唱赞歌会被责罚，失去沉默的自由，他们只能附和并追随，裹挟他们一起为领袖而疯狂，失去自我、失去独立。
社会主义必然产生个人崇拜。社会主义国家出现有组织的个人崇拜是一种正常的政治活动，是无法根绝的痼疾。其组织根源在于马克思主义的政党学说：在党的中央领导层，需要有个核心，并赋予该核心比其他领导人更大的权力。社会主义国家权力过度集中于党，党政不分、以党代政。党的权力，被党内一小部分人掌握。权力过度集中于少数人，必然造成个人崇拜。
个人崇拜的危害。一是以专权和独裁的方式，领导、控制一切生活。不受监督和制约的权力必然会走向腐败和专横。他们利用手中不受任何约束的权力，粗暴地干预国家社会生活的一切领域，用残酷的手段对付党内外的反对派，用权力裁判学术论争，用庞大的机构对整个社会、包括党和国家的高层领导人进行严密的控制和无法无天的镇压。二是以暴力和野蛮手段，压制、打击一切不同声音。正确的意见，正义的声音，受到摧残，大话、假话、空话充斥全国。科学思想、科学研究、科学决策被打击排挤甚至被铲除，人的尊严受到摧残践踏，整个社会陷入极端恐怖之中。
四、社会主义价值观–集体主义
个人才是目的本身，任何集体主义终极还是要实现个人的幸福生活和生命的价值。集体主义是主张个人从属于社会，个人权利受到集体权利的限制，个人利益应当服从集团、民族、阶级和国家利益，当个人利益和集体利益发生矛盾的时候要服从集体利益。集体主义的最高标准是一切言论和行动符合人民群众的集体利益，这是无产阶级世界观的重要内容。
（一）集体内部的不平等。形成集体，就会在集体内部形成领导层和非领导层，造成集体内部个人的不平等，把集体内部人员分了贵贱，为集体的团结留下隐忧。同时，集体中的非核心个体也因此而丧失了与集体相等的权利，集体主义具有独裁的性质。
（二）集体主义的道德。社会主义国家的道德，建立在集体主义上的。集体主义的缺陷在于，既然要求“集体利益至上”，那么，就必须确定“集体”的范围，凡是与这一“集体”目标不一致的，就是敌人。在集体主义的社会，集体本身必须要有某些人来代表，代表人是否由集体中大多数人同意产生，代表人能否没有任何私心杂念地代表集体利益，集体利益如何界定界定？这些都是问题。结果是：集体主义只是话语权的代表人实现它们个人理想，冠冕堂皇地以集体利益的名义，肆无忌惮地侵犯他人利益，以集体的名义挥霍公共财产满足私欲，奴役其他个人服务自己。
社会主义价值观是宣扬社会本位的集体主义价值观；普世价值观是以美国为代表的西方发达国家的资本主义价值观，宣扬个人本位的个人主义价值观。个人本位的确是有自私自利的思想，但个人本位在任何情况下都不可能演化成最坏的极端个人主义。因为，极端个人主义必然会侵犯他人权益，而被侵犯的个人是不会像集体主义者那样作出牺牲的。个人本位社会中的个人主义，无论有多么自私，都只能建立在不侵犯他人利益这个基本共识上。
集体主义归根到底是为独裁集团服务，是它们奴役人民的遮羞布。
Why Socialism Is Harmful (II)
Summary:
Socialism pursues equality but leads to power concentration, the loss of personal freedom and independence, the creation of new slaves, and the rise of personality cults. Collectivism is abused as a tool of dictatorship, ultimately strangling individual rights and social vitality.
Author: Hua Yan
Editor: Li Congling Executive Editor: Lu Huiwen Translator: Lu Huiwen
In theory, socialism pursues equality and collective well-being, but in practice it often causes serious problems. First, the “iron party” leads to extreme centralization of power, with a single party monopolizing political resources, suppressing dissent, and restricting freedom. Without competition and oversight, rulers are prone to corruption, rigid decision-making, and inefficiency. Second, socialism often creates “new slaves”: with the state controlling the economy, individuals lose autonomy, forced to submit to collective goals, while innovation and individuality are stifled. Third, personality cults are common in socialist systems—leaders are deified, the masses blindly follow, lose rational judgment, and policies are prone to mistakes or disasters. Finally, although collectivism emphasizes common interests, it often ignores individual rights, enforcing ideological conformity and suffocating diversity, resulting in a lack of social vitality. The ideals of socialism are distorted by human nature and the complexity of power; economic stagnation, restricted freedom, and inefficiency become its chronic problems. Experience proves that when the collective is overemphasized and the individual neglected, true prosperity and fairness are impossible.
I. The Socialist Party-Building Doctrine — The Iron Party
The socialist doctrine of party-building includes:
1. Class struggle produces and requires parties; parties develop through class struggle but perish in peace.
2. The Communist Party, armed with Marxist theory, is the vanguard of the working class, with strict organization and unified discipline; party loyalty means unconditional obedience.
3. The Party is the leading force of the dictatorship of the proletariat and socialist construction, and long-term rule is its sole, fundamental interest.
The masses are divided into classes, and even if none exist, they must be artificially created. Class boundaries are determined by the social structure of each country. Organization is the cradle of oligarchy. In any organization—whether a party, a trade union, or an association—the tendency toward aristocracy is obvious. Thus, parties are usually composed of those willing to obey and carry out orders; they form a stable group divided into leaders and the led. Leaders see themselves as semi-divine, born rulers; members are subordinates. Autocracy by leaders is inevitable, being the key to organizational operation. Leaders who control organizational power form cliques with special interests. The more organizationally consolidated the party is, the greater the chance that its leaders stand above the party, becoming arrogant and domineering.
Since the Party grows through class struggle, it must continually create enemies. By fighting enemies, it expands its class base and economic foundation, plunging society into constant conflict. The Party is an organization of “party nature without human nature.” Freedom and democracy are crushed within, leaving the Party a rigid corpse. The rank and file lose the capacity for independent thought; the entire Party listens to the command of one or a few individuals, ignorant of resistance or self-reflection. One-party dictatorship not only suffocates public life, eliminating dissent, but also produces internal exclusion and leadership despotism.
To maintain long-term rule, the Party eradicates any groups or individuals that oppose it. From the outset, it consolidates its power by choosing the poor, the ignorant, and the weak as its base. Apart from its own interests, the Party has none. The iron party not only ruthlessly suppresses its members but also oppresses the entire populace.
II. The Socialist Project of “New Man” — The New Slaves
Rulers harbor unrealistic fantasies: they want the people to be submissive before them, yet defiant before invaders.
The revolutionary goal of the Communist Party is not only to build a new society but also to create a “new man.” This socialist “new man” is to be elevated and liberated through revolutionary struggle, constantly climbing toward perfection. Characteristics of the new man: placing spirit and morality above material and desire, political loyalty and devotion, submission to the collective, and living for a higher goal. Hence, the “New Man Project” is a vast social engineering effort aimed at thoroughly reshaping human nature—hammered out through revolutionary struggle and uplifted through thought reform.
Materialist environmental determinism holds that human nature is shaped by environment; man is a product of his environment, an unfinished product. The perfect union of the individual and community reflects true human nature, implying human plasticity and perfectibility. Yet this notion of perfectibility is itself voluntarist, incompatible with the materialism Marxism exalts.
Thus, the socialist “new man” is a collective being, a party being—one who follows the Party rather than an individual with free will and independent thought. The ethical basis of the socialist new man: everyone is born indebted to the Party, the state, and society; life is a repayment of that debt through sacrifice and service.
The Soviet Union and the CCP carefully organized movements to remake members: thought reform, confession of personal history, self-criticism, physical labor as ideological discipline, producing a sense of rebirth—until the individual wholly identifies as a Party tool.
“Revolution in the depths of the soul” demands ruthless self-denial, ascetic self-rejection, aimed at obliterating individuality. The result is a universal cult of leadership: worship rooted in personal weakness and erased individuality. Individuals find meaning only in the collective.
It is now widely recognized that human nature is enduring and unchangeable. Efforts to create a “new man” have failed everywhere, because the project rests on unreliable assumptions. The attempt to engineer human nature is both unfeasible and ethically indefensible.
III. Personality Cult — A Socialist Customization
The cult of personality uses the force of power to deify leaders, raising them as untouchable gods whose words are law, beyond all constraint. Politics, however, should be the business of all, born of humanity’s communal existence and self-organization. In any polity, personal worship should not exist, yet every socialist state has produced it.
For socialist states, personality cult is a technique of domination, used to control thought, unify will, thought, and action, and march in lockstep.
Origins of personality cult:
1. Hero psychology — Humans have a tendency to revere strong leaders. Early societies trusted chiefs for survival. Modern political groups exploit this, deliberately manufacturing cults through propaganda and mass mobilization.
2. Brainwashing education — Indoctrination implants obedience in minds. Official textbooks instill core values: the Party is great, the leader wise; his words are truth, to be obeyed unconditionally. People, reduced to “chives,” defend the scythe that harvests them, even wielding it against their peers. Fear of uncontrolled education explains attacks on private teaching in China.
3. Conformist psychology — In a climate of slogans and falsehoods, conformity becomes survival. Personality cult is essentially worship of power: officials gain promotion through sycophancy; citizens, fearing punishment, echo propaganda and lose independence.
Personality cult is inevitable in socialism. Its roots lie in Marxist party doctrine: central leadership needs a core with greater power than others. In socialist states, power is concentrated in the Party; Party and state are fused. A few leaders wield immense authority, inevitably producing cults.
Dangers: • Despotism — Unchecked power becomes corrupt and tyrannical, intervening in all aspects of life, crushing opposition inside and outside the Party. Academic debate, scientific research, and freedom are destroyed.
• Violence and repression — Different voices are suppressed with brutality. Lies dominate public discourse; dignity is trampled; terror pervades society.
IV. Socialist Values — Collectivism
The individual is the end in itself. All collectivism must ultimately serve personal happiness and the value of life.
Collectivism asserts that the individual is subordinate to society, with personal rights restricted by collective rights. Personal interests must yield to group, class, national, or state interests. When they conflict, the individual must obey the collective.
Problems with collectivism:
1. Inequality within the collective — Any collective produces leaders and the led, stratifying members, leaving ordinary individuals unequal. Non-core members lose equal rights. Collectivism breeds authoritarianism.
2. Morality of collectivism — Socialist morality rests on collectivism. Since “collective interests come first,” one must define “the collective.” Those outside its scope become enemies. Representatives of the collective, often a few elites, hijack the concept to realize personal ambitions, squander public wealth, and enslave others in the name of collective interest.
Socialist values exalt collectivism; universal values, exemplified by Western capitalist democracies, exalt individualism. Though individualism can be selfish, it cannot degenerate into extreme individualism that violates others’ rights, for victims will resist. Thus, even selfish individualism rests on a consensus of non-infringement.
Collectivism, however, ultimately serves dictatorships—a fig leaf for enslaving the people.
中南海红二代的海外特权
作者：毛一炜
编辑：冯仍 责任编辑：鲁慧文 翻译：鲁慧文
中共权贵家族在海外的隐秘布局揭示了红二代如何利用政治背景攫取财富，并稳固家族利益。这不仅是个体特权，更折射出制度性腐败与权力滥用。红二代通过掌握资源、金融规则和国际网络，将政治优势转化为经济收益，并在制度保护下合法化运作。普通民众却无法享有同等机会，监督和问责机制在权贵面前形同虚设。
以温家宝之子温云松为例，他在2005年成立私募股权基金“新天域资本”，启动资金主要来自境外投资者，包括日本软银SBI控股和新加坡淡马锡基金。江泽民孙子江志成的基金同样吸引外国资本，为家族利益服务。这些事实显示，权力不仅可以直接获取经济优势，更能通过制度漏洞被掩护，而社会大众却无法监督或追责。
“编程随想” 整理的中共太子党家族谱系表
红二代在海外的财富布局不仅是经济行为，更体现制度对权贵的保护。中共通过内部规则、信息封锁和海外投资渠道确保家族利益不受外界干扰。社会公众无从知晓，责任无法追究，公平与正义被系统性蚕食。这种隐秘运作模式暴露出中共体制本质：权力为少数人服务，制度漏洞让特权阶层凌驾于法律和监督之上。
同时，红二代利用海外教育、金融和投资经验，将国际资本与中共内部资源结合，实现财富和影响力叠加。这种制度性优势让权贵家族遥遥领先，也加固权力结构的封闭性，使社会资源配置不公平成为常态。普通民众在教育、金融和商业机会上的劣势被固化，社会阶层流动性受限，权力与财富高度集中，进一步加剧社会不平等。
这种现象对社会的影响深远。权力保护下的特权阶层逃避监督，阻碍社会透明和民主发展；制度漏洞让公共资源被少数人占据，社会公平受侵蚀；权力和财富的集中加剧民众的不满，却在体制下无法表达。红二代海外生活的特权不仅反映家族私利，更暴露了中共制度对公民权益的系统性忽视。
控诉这种制度暴行，不只是揭露红二代的特权，更是对权力结构的质问：账谁来结？名如何藏？责由谁挡？中共用制度保护少数权贵，牺牲公共利益，掩盖真实历史与社会不公。这种不透明、不受约束的权力模式，是制度腐败的核心，也是社会公平被侵蚀的根源。
红二代海外生活不仅是特权展现，也是制度性腐败的缩影。社会必须正视这种跨国财富与权力结合，不仅反映权贵家族私利，也暴露中共制度对民众权益的系统性忽视。控诉制度暴行，不仅要记录个案，更要揭示结构性问题，让真相被看见，让权力滥用被监督。每一个跨国财富和权力网络背后，都是制度漏洞和社会不公的真实写照。
The Overseas Privileges of Zhongnanhai’s “Second Red Generation”
Summary:
This article reveals how the “Second Red Generation” of Zhongnanhai exploits political backgrounds and systemic loopholes to amass wealth overseas, using funds and transnational capital to consolidate family interests. Ordinary citizens have no way to supervise, while fairness and justice are systematically eroded. This is not merely individual privilege, but a microcosm of the CCP’s systemic corruption, reflecting the social injustice caused by the extreme concentration of power and wealth.
Author: Mao Yiwei
Editor: Feng Reng Executive Editor: Lu Huiwen Translator: Lu Huiwen
⸻
The secret overseas arrangements of CCP elite families reveal how the “Second Red Generation” converts political background into wealth and secures family interests. This is not merely individual privilege but reflects systemic corruption and abuse of power. By controlling resources, financial rules, and international networks, the princelings transform political advantage into economic gains, legalized under systemic protection. Ordinary people, however, cannot enjoy the same opportunities; mechanisms of supervision and accountability are meaningless in the face of privilege.
Take the case of Wen Yunsong, son of Wen Jiabao, who in 2005 founded the private equity fund “New Horizon Capital.” Its startup capital came mainly from overseas investors, including Japan’s SoftBank SBI Holdings and Singapore’s Temasek Fund. Jiang Zhicheng, grandson of Jiang Zemin, established a similar fund attracting foreign capital, serving family interests. These cases demonstrate that power not only yields direct economic advantages but also exploits systemic loopholes, hidden from public oversight or accountability.
(Reference: “Program Think” compilation of CCP princeling family genealogies)
The overseas wealth networks of the “Second Red Generation” are not merely economic activities but also an embodiment of systemic protection for the powerful. Through internal rules, information blockades, and overseas investment channels, the CCP ensures that elite family interests remain shielded from outside interference. The public cannot know, responsibility cannot be pursued, and fairness and justice are systematically eroded. This hidden operational model exposes the essence of the CCP system: power serves a minority, while systemic loopholes allow privileged groups to rise above law and oversight.
Meanwhile, the “Second Red Generation” leverages overseas education, finance, and investment experience, merging international capital with CCP internal resources to achieve compounded wealth and influence. This systemic advantage places elite families far ahead, while reinforcing the closed nature of the power structure. Social resource allocation becomes inherently unfair, mobility between classes is restricted, and the concentration of power and wealth intensifies inequality.
The impact on society is profound. Privileged groups shielded by power evade oversight, obstruct transparency, and hinder democratic development. Systemic loopholes allow public resources to be monopolized by a few, corroding social fairness. The concentration of power and wealth fuels public resentment, but within the system there is no channel for expression. The overseas privileges of the “Second Red Generation” are not only about family interest but also expose the CCP system’s systemic disregard for citizens’ rights.
To condemn these systemic abuses is not merely to expose princeling privilege but to question the structure of power itself: Who will settle the accounts? How are the names concealed? Who bears responsibility? The CCP protects a handful of elites through systemic design, sacrificing public interest while covering up true history and social injustice. This opaque and unrestrained mode of power is the core of systemic corruption and the root cause of eroded social fairness.
The overseas lifestyles of the “Second Red Generation” are not only displays of privilege but microcosms of systemic corruption.
Society must confront this fusion of transnational wealth and power, which not only reflects elite family interests but also exposes the CCP system’s systemic disregard for the rights of its people. To denounce systemic abuses is not only to document individual cases but also to reveal structural problems—so that truth may be seen, and the abuse of power may be subject to oversight. Behind every network of cross-border wealth and power lies a systemic loophole and a true portrait of social injustice.
