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洛杉矶 6月3日 《全球觉醒》第74期 六四 37周年祭

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洛杉矶 6月3日 《全球觉醒》第74期 六四 37周年祭
洛杉矶 6月3日 《全球觉醒》第74期 六四 37周年祭
《全球觉醒》第七十四期

自由之钟 时刻敲响 全球觉醒 民主联盟 消灭独裁 推翻暴政活動主題:「六四」37週年祭:告別被動的「紀念」,開啟主動的「清算」今天是「六四」天安門大屠殺三十七週年。三十七年來,海內外的正義力量年年齊聚,點燃蠟燭,追悼那些在坦克和槍彈下倒下的冤魂。然而,單純的悲傷與被動的紀念,已經無法撼動那個日益狂妄的極權機器。面對一個三十七年來從未停止犯罪、甚至將暴政黑手延伸至全球的獨裁政權,今天我們站在這裡,必須展現徹底的改變,我們要將延續了三十七年的「紀念」,全面升級為對獨裁暴政的主動「清算」! 在過去的時間裡,中共用謊言抹殺記憶,用利益誘買國際社會,試圖讓世人忘記長安街上的血腥。但歷史的血債絕對不會一筆勾銷。那個當年向愛國學生開槍的政權,還在用同樣的殘暴剝奪同胞的自由,用窮兵黷武的戰爭叫囂綁架整個國家的未來,將中國推向文明世界的對立面。如果我們只停留在每年的悲傷回憶中,就是對獨裁者無能的妥協。 改變,從這一刻開始。我們不再是只會哭泣的悼念者,而是正義的法官和歷史的清算者!中國不等於中共,海內外覺醒的同胞拒絕再為極權者的瘋狂買單。我們絕不會讓烈士的鮮血白流,我們要凝聚所有拒絕遺忘的力量,在領館門前用最堅定的聲音向極權宣戰:清算中共的歷史血債,終結獨裁統治,讓真正的自由與民主重回中華大地!我們的口號:毋忘六四血債!清算中共暴政!中國不等於中共!自由屬於人民!結束一黨專政!建立民主中國!時間:2026年6月3日(星期三)7:00PM (下午)地點:中共駐洛杉磯總領館地址:443 Shatto Pl, Los Angeles, CA 90020活動召集人:劉廣賢/廖军活動規劃: 王付青/孫曄活動主持:易勇組織者:胡月明4806536918/周蘭英6264924286梁振华6268289079/王尊福6269773679 / 朱明昌6264927033 /苏毅 6264768956曹文博6265576783/黄思博6262345396活動義工:于海龍 /王彪/张维清 /于越/薛涛/劳绍海/陳胜/李享/李偉攝影:Ji Luo /劉樂園主辦單位:中國民主黨聯合總部美西黨部中國民主黨聯合總部美南黨部自由鐘民主基金會

洛杉矶 5月31日 天安门大屠杀图片展

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洛杉矶 5月31日 天安门大屠杀图片展
洛杉矶 5月31日 天安门大屠杀图片展

2026年5月31日,周日,下午2点到7点。1989年6月4日,天安门大屠杀图片展,真实记录,勿忘历史。地址:350 S Mc Pherrin Ave, Monterey Park, CA 91754公园免费停车。2点到7点之间随时可以来活动地点参观。

影子、血证与家书

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作者:曾洪伟

记忆回到2023年11月的美国加州旧金山。我和朋友在街头参与针对中国最高领导人访美的抗议活动。当时,对自由的渴望支撑着我们,但未曾料到,那只无形的手从未缩回,红色恐怖正精准地将阴影投射到我的生活里。

街头的影子与开枪的手势

在群情激愤的街头,一个异常的细节破坏了安全感。在马路对面的路口,一名身高约170公分、留短发、戴口罩的华人男子,正手持设备鬼鬼祟祟地对我和朋友进行近距离偷拍。

当我和朋友感到异样并试图上前制止时,他立刻转身穿过马路逃跑。而在逃跑的过程中,他突然转过身,对我们做了一个开枪的手势。那个极具恐吓意图的动作,在光天化日下的美国街头显得荒诞而冰冷,它在警告我们:反抗可能意味着肉体毁灭。

次日的血证与断裂的安全感

跨国镇压的残酷性在于,它的恐吓绝非虚张声势,而是会以极快的速度演变为现实的暴力。

就在抗议活动结束后的第二天,一位与我一同并肩参与抗议的异见人士,在机场遭到了不明身份人员的残酷殴打,致使浑身是血。前一天路口戴口罩男子的开枪手势,在第二天就变成了同伴流血的肉体事实。这种极短时间内的暴力升级,瞬间击碎了海外的安全感。它向所有发声者释放了一个清晰信号:即便在自由世界,你依然随时可能沦为被猎杀的孤立目标。

跨洋的盘问与隐性的株连

然而,红色恐怖的触角并不仅限于海外街头的肉体威胁,更致命的是指向国内家人的隐性株连与跨洋的信息追踪。

抗议活动结束仅仅几天后,远在中国国内的警察便突然前往我父亲的住所。他们向我父亲详细盘问了我在国外的具体下落,目前在海外做什么,并严令索要我最新的联系方式。得知警察正在国内追查我行踪的消息,以及父亲透露出的深深担忧,让我感到极大的震撼与不安。在这场跨国镇压的链条中,这种跨越太平洋的恐吓传递,本身就是一种隐性的“敲山震虎”,试图通过让国内的亲人陷入恐惧,从而达到让海外异见者失声的目的。

守望相助,保障安全

经历这一连串的变故,说不恐惧是骗人的。在很长一段时间里,我和家人都陷入了巨大的心理挣扎中。但恐惧过后的冷思让我彻底明白:对抗庞大国家机器的唯一方式,就是用组织的力量去对冲个体的脆弱。

正是基于这样的深刻痛感,我选择加入旧金山中国民主党,在合法政治团体的守望相助中寻找盾牌。在此,我向所有流亡海外、同样生活在跨国镇压阴影下的异见人士发出真诚的呼吁:请放下犹豫,打破孤立的状态,加入到民主党中来。我们只有融入一个有组织、有担当的成熟政治团体,互相帮助,才能把分散的微光汇聚成火炬,保障我们共同的安全,抵御潜在的风险。自由的土地不容红色恐怖跨境蚕食,克服恐惧的唯一方式,就是将那些在阴影里颤抖的个体,凝聚成并肩站立的钢铁盾

编辑:黄吉洲 校对:熊辩 翻译:戈冰

Shadows, Blood Evidence, and Family Letters

By Zeng Hongwei

My memory returns to San Francisco, California, in November 2023. My friends and I were participating in a street protest against the visit of China’s top leader to the United States. At the time, our longing for freedom sustained us, but we never imagined that the invisible hand would never retreat—that the Red Terror was casting its shadow precisely onto my life.

Shadows on the Street and a Gesture of Firing

Amid the heated atmosphere on the street, an unusual detail shattered our sense of security. At the intersection across the street, a Chinese man—about 170 centimeters tall, with short hair and wearing a mask—was furtively using a device to take close-up photos of my friend and me.

When my friend and I sensed something was amiss and tried to approach him to stop him, he immediately turned and fled across the street. As he ran, he suddenly turned back and made a gun gesture at us. That highly threatening gesture seemed absurd and chilling on a broad daylight American street; it was warning us that resistance could mean physical annihilation.

The Next Day’s Bloodstained Evidence and Shattered Sense of Security

The cruelty of transnational repression lies in the fact that its threats are never mere bluffs; they rapidly escalate into actual violence.

Just one day after the protests ended, a dissident who had stood shoulder-to-shoulder with me at the demonstrations was brutally beaten by unidentified assailants at the airport, leaving him covered in blood. The gun-pointing gesture made by the masked man at the intersection the day before had, by the next day, become the bloody reality of a comrade’s suffering. This rapid escalation of violence instantly shattered the sense of security we had felt abroad. It sent a clear signal to all who speak out: even in the free world, you can still become an isolated target to be hunted down at any moment.

Transatlantic Interrogations and Covert Retaliation

However, the tentacles of the Red Terror extend far beyond physical threats on overseas streets; what is even more deadly is the covert retaliation targeting family members back home and the transatlantic tracking of information.

Just a few days after the protests ended, police in China suddenly arrived at my father’s residence. They interrogated him in detail about my exact whereabouts abroad, what I am currently doing overseas, and sternly demanded my latest contact information. Learning that the police were tracking my whereabouts back home, coupled with the deep concern my father expressed, left me deeply shaken and unsettled. Within this chain of transnational repression, this trans-Pacific transmission of intimidation is itself a form of implicit “striking the mountain to scare the tiger”—an attempt to silence overseas dissidents by instilling fear in their loved ones back home.

Mutual Support and Safety Assurance

To say I wasn’t afraid after this series of upheavals would be a lie. For a long time, my family and I were plunged into immense psychological turmoil. But the clear-headed reflection that followed my fear made me fully realize: the only way to confront the massive state apparatus is to use the strength of an organization to counteract the vulnerability of the individual.

It is precisely because of this profound sense of pain that I chose to join the Chinese Democratic Party of San Francisco, seeking a shield in the mutual support of a legitimate political organization. Here, I extend a sincere appeal to all dissidents living in exile overseas who similarly live under the shadow of transnational repression: Please set aside your hesitation, break out of isolation, and join the Democratic Party. Only by integrating into a mature, organized, and responsible political group—and by helping one another—can we gather scattered glimmers of light into a torch, safeguard our shared security, and ward off potential risks. The land of freedom must not be eroded by the red terror across borders. The only way to overcome fear is to unite those trembling in the shadows into a steel shield standing shoulder to shoulder.

Editor: Huang Jizhou Proofreader: Xiong Bian Translator: Ge Bing

中国民主人权联盟洛杉矶中领馆前集会声援国内良心犯

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中国民主人权联盟洛杉矶中领馆前集会声援国内良心犯

作者:沈美花   

2026年5月24日,中国民主人权联盟在中国驻洛杉矶总领事馆前举行了声援徐光活动。当天阳光很强,大家顶着烈日站在中领馆门口,高举横幅与标语,希望让更多人知道徐光以及毛庆祥目前遭遇的不公。现场来了不少民主人士、人权活动人士以及关心中国人权问题的朋友。大家拉起民主党创始人朱虞夫先生毛笔手书的大型横幅:“中共摧残徐光天理难容!迫害毛庆祥神人共愤!”并讲述了毛庆祥和徐光在浙江活动的一些故事。

中国民主人权联盟洛杉矶中领馆前集会声援国内良心犯

很多人手里举着“徐光无罪”、“声援徐光”的牌子,还有人展示介绍徐光经历的展板。站在中领馆门口,我感触很深。虽然只是一场海外街头的抗议活动,但大家都希望能通过这样的方式,让外界继续关注中国异议人士的处境。据朱老介绍,徐光曾参与1986年和1989年学生民主运动,也曾参与中国民主党浙江筹委会工作;1999年,他曾因“颠覆国家政权罪”被判刑五年;2022年,又被以“寻衅滋事罪”判刑四年。让我尤其难受的是,徐光在狱中长期绝食抗议,身体状况令人担忧。但即使如此,外界对他的关注依然十分有限,所以大家才会来到中领馆前,希望发出声音。除了声援徐光,我们也声援毛庆祥,他只是因为在徐光出狱后前去探望徐光,并在微信朋友圈发布了与徐光会面的照片,随后就被警方带走。到活动当天为止,已经超过48小时没有被释放。很多参加活动的人都认为,仅仅因为探望朋友,发布合影照片就遭到拘押,是非常令人震惊的事情。现场我们不断呼喊,希望立即释放毛庆祥。希望通过这样的活动,让更多人知道,在中国仍然有人因为言论、因为交朋友、因为表达观点而失去自由。活动现场还进行了募捐,委托《在野党》杂志,转交给徐光家属。我们也会把类似活动及募捐项目持续下去。我站在人群里,看着大家举着横幅、喊着口号,内心很复杂:一方面,觉得个人的力量很小;但另一方面,如果连声音都没有,那很多事情就真的会被遗忘。也许一次活动无法改变什么,但至少我们没有沉默。

编辑:黄吉洲      校对:熊辩翻译:沈美花

China Democracy & Human Rights Alliance Holds Rally in Front of the Chinese Consulate in Los Angeles to Support Prisoners of Conscience in China

Author: Shen Meihua

On May 24, 2026, the China Democracy & Human Rights Alliance held a rally in front of the Consulate General of the People’s Republic of China in Los Angeles in support of Xu Guang. Under the blazing sun, participants stood outside the consulate holding banners and signs high, hoping to bring greater public attention to the injustices currently faced by Xu Guang and Mao Qingxiang.

Many democracy advocates, human rights activists, and friends concerned about human rights issues in China attended the event. Participants displayed a large banner handwritten in calligraphy by Mr. Zhu Yufu, founder of the China Democracy Party:

“The CCP’s persecution of Xu Guang is intolerable to heaven’s justice! The persecution of Mao Qingxiang arouses the indignation of both humanity and heaven!”

Participants also shared stories about the activities and experiences of Mao Qingxiang and Xu Guang in Zhejiang Province.

Many participants held signs reading “Xu Guang Is Innocent” and “Support Xu Guang,” while others displayed boards introducing Xu Guang’s background and experiences. Standing outside the consulate, I was deeply moved. Although this was only a street protest overseas, everyone hoped that through such actions the international community would continue to pay attention to the situation of Chinese dissidents.

According to Mr. Zhu, Xu Guang participated in the student democracy movements of 1986 and 1989 and was also involved in the preparatory committee of the Zhejiang branch of the China Democracy Party. In 1999, he was sentenced to five years in prison on charges of “subverting state power.” In 2022, he was again sentenced to four years in prison on charges of “picking quarrels and provoking trouble.”

What troubled me most was learning that Xu Guang has been on a prolonged hunger strike in prison and that his physical condition is a cause for serious concern. Even so, public attention to his situation remains very limited. That is why people came to the Chinese consulate—to make their voices heard.

In addition to supporting Xu Guang, we also expressed support for Mao Qingxiang. After Xu Guang was released from prison, Mao simply went to visit him and later posted a photo of their meeting on WeChat Moments. He was subsequently taken away by the police. As of the day of the rally, he had been detained for more than 48 hours without being released. Many participants believed it was deeply shocking that someone could be detained merely for visiting a friend and posting a photo together. Throughout the event, we repeatedly called for Mao Qingxiang’s immediate release. Through activities like this, we hope more people will learn that in China, individuals can still lose their freedom because of their speech, their friendships, or their expressed opinions.

A fundraising effort was also conducted during the event. The donations will be entrusted to 《The Opposition Party》 magazine for transfer to Xu Guang’s family. We plan to continue organizing similar activities and fundraising projects in the future.

Standing among the crowd, watching people hold banners and chant slogans, I felt conflicted. On one hand, I felt that an individual’s power is very limited. On the other hand, if no one speaks out, many things will truly be forgotten.

Perhaps a single event cannot change much, but at least we did not remain silent.

Editor: Huang Jizhou Proofreader: Xiong Bian Translator: Shen Meihua

谁在购买这场暴力

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——宏志达青少年成长基地殴打学员致盲事件探讨

作者:周敏

母亲节那天,张先生一家收到了儿子从湖北黄石市阳新县宏志达青少年成长基地写的感恩信。那封信是基地安排写的,他们不知道这一点,以为是儿子的心声。但在同一天晚上,儿子在宿舍里写了另一张纸条,是求救信,托一个快要离开的学员带出去,请妈妈来救他出去。

两封信,出自同一双手。一张是这套系统要他写的,一张是他自己想写的。

前者送到了家长手里。后者被班主任发现,被暴打导致昏迷和右眼失明。

张先生不是坏父亲。他实地考察时看到孩子打球下棋,也听到了不打骂的承诺。他付了3.28万元,以为买来了孩子的转机。是什么样的处境,让一个爱孩子的父亲,签下了那份合同?

一、焦虑制造

张浩今年读初中二年级,13岁,今年4月开始逃学、夜不归宿。按照任何正常的发展心理学标准,这都只是需要关注、需要介入的信号,并不是危机。

然而在张先生的处境里,这就是危机。

理解这一点,得先理解中国家长的焦虑是在什么土壤里长出来的。

独生子女政策实施了近四十年,最深远的心理后果之一,是将所有的期望、资源和焦虑,全集中在一个孩子身上。这个孩子没有兄弟姐妹可以分担父母的期待,没有堂表亲可以提供缓冲和交流。他是唯一的赌注。

高考制度又深化了焦虑。在一个教育资源高度不均,学历与阶层流动高度挂钩的社会里,孩子”废掉了”,意味着家族数十年积累的社会位置可能就此中断。这一点都不夸张。

2000年代,出现了“网瘾”这个概念。媒体与部分专家联手完成了一次道德恐慌:打游戏被等同于精神疾病,网络是毁掉下一代的洪水猛兽。正常的青春期探索和挣扎,被定义成需要干预的病态。

张浩逃学、夜不归宿,在这种环境下,不是一个需要理解和沟通的信号,而是一个需要被治疗和矫正的病。张先生的焦虑是真实的,同时也是被系统性放大的。

二、求助空白

作为家长,面对一个逃学、夜不归宿的13岁儿子,上哪儿寻求帮助?

学校心理老师是第一个答案,也是第一个失望。中国中小学心理健康教师的配置长期严重不足,而且其职能以维稳为导向:压制危机、安抚情绪、防止事件扩大,并不以孩子的长期利益为核心提供支持。对于一个逃学的孩子,学校更常见的反应是施压、约谈家长,而非提供实质性的心理支持。

公立医院的青少年心理科是第二个答案。在北京、上海等大城市,知名儿童医院的心理科候诊期以月计,部分热门专家的号需要提前数月预约。就算挂上号,费用大多不在医保覆盖范围内,长期心理治疗对普通家庭是沉重的经济负担。对于一个居住在江西九江的普通家庭,这条路太难。

家庭治疗是第三个答案。在中国,这几乎不存在。家庭治疗师是稀缺的私人服务,价格昂贵,在大多数二三线城市也没有足够的从业者。

社区支持是第四个答案。中国的社区服务体系,在青少年心理健康这个领域,基本上是空白一片。

当所有的答案都失效,一个父亲在网上搜索,看到了宏志达的宣传。

这个空白怎么来的?是长期把教育资源集中于应试,将心理健康视为可有可无的软性需求,将家庭问题私有化处理的政策积累而来。国家撤出了它本应有的位置,让市场填了进来。

市场填补空白的方式很精密。2022年在福建晋江开张的四维成长基地,校长向明胜先向泉州民政局申请了”未成年人成长指导服务中心”的公益资质,取得批文后迁址另立,挂上民政局主管的牌子对外招生。武女士当场缴纳六万元,理由只有一个:政府办的,肯定正规。民政局后来回应:早就要求该中心关闭了,不知道他们跑到晋江的村里建了这个基地。国家不作为的空白,被一块假冒的政府招牌填上。四维基地在两年内虐待了至少八名青少年,其中14岁的小武在二十八天里被通宵罚站、跪举水盆、关入小黑屋铁笼,最终落下终身残疾。被踢骨折当晚,校长打电话给武女士,说孩子跑步摔了个小伤。

这就是市场带来的解决方案:暴力监禁填补了公共服务的缺失,政府招牌填补了家长的信任需求。

三、共谋完成

这是这篇文章最难写也最必要的部分。

张先生在付款前,知道六个月内不能与儿子联系。他知道孩子会被骗配合调查电信诈骗的说法以来到基地,但家长配合了这个安排。怀着信任签了协议,付了款。

这构成了一种共谋。

在使用这个词之前,需要说清楚它的含义。共谋不是主谋。张先生完全没想伤害儿子。他的出发点是爱,是这个社会里走投无路之后的孤注一掷。

但共谋是真实存在的,它包含了三种成份:

第一个是绝望状态下的认知收窄。心理学研究认为,人在极度焦虑和压力下,决策质量下降,对风险的评估会失真,对解决方案的渴望会压过一切审慎。张先生在付款前实地考察,看到孩子们打球娱乐,听到不打骂的承诺,这些信息被他的绝望过滤之后,变成了他想看到的样子。六个月不联系这个显然值得警惕的条款,在绝望状态下被接受为专业方法。

第二个是”为你好”的文化。在中国家长主流文化里,管教孩子天然是爱的表达,严厉是美德,痛苦是成长的必要代价。”不打不成器”是一套完整的教育哲学,在数代人之间传递。当一个基地告诉家长”我们会用严格的方式教育你的孩子”,这个文化框架会帮助家长将严格与暴力之间的边界模糊掉。

第三个是对国家改造逻辑的深度消化。这是最隐蔽也最根本的一层,起了决定性作用。长期生活在一个”问题人口可以被关押改造,隔离可以产生转化,强制是为了当事人好”的社会结构里,这种表达在不知不觉中成为常识。它不是书面的规则,但存在于空气中,被每一代人呼吸进去。当张先生考虑把儿子送进一个封闭基地时,并没有意识到自己正在重复一套国家改造术的民间版本。他以为这是一个主动的选择。

共谋就这样完成了。通过呼吸般自然的逻辑,一个爱孩子的父亲,在法律允许的范围内,将孩子的人身自由让渡给了一个靠着暴力运营的机构。

正视这一点,不是为了谴责张先生,也不是减轻班主任教官的责任。而是为了寻找一个紧迫的答案:下一个走投无路的父母,需要什么,才能不再走上同一条路?

四、出路在何方

答案其实是清晰的:专业支持体系,去污名化的青少年心理健康服务,学校真正承担辅导功能而不是只管分数,社区的家庭支持网络。

但这些答案面临双重障碍。

第一重障碍是资源和制度的问题。上述体系需要持续的公共投入、专业人才的培养、将心理健康纳入公共卫生优先议程的政策,这些不是不可能,但需要优先级的重新排列。

第二重障碍更深,也更难。只要”强制改造问题人口”的国家逻辑没有被反问,民间版本就永远有它的土壤。公共服务能减少家长走投无路的绝望,但无法彻底消除家长认知的被塑造。一个在这种国家级逻辑里成长的家长,即使有更好的选择,也仍然倾向于相信强制能够改变人。

这是一个需要几代人才能完成的文化工程,而它的起点,是愿意正视强制改造的源头。

五、两张纸条

母亲节那天,感恩信被送出去了,求救纸条没有送出去。

这两张纸条之间的距离,是一套系统在运作的证明:它知道如何管理信息,如何让外部看到它想让人看到的,如何将声音压制在封闭空间里。

这套系统不是某个成长基地建立的。它由市场搭建,由文化背书,由制度空白提供生存土壤,由家长的签名和付款完成最后一公里的授权。

张浩的右眼,在黑暗里度过了一夜。那个黑暗剧情,由不同的角色共同建造。

编辑:黄吉洲 校对:熊辩 翻译:戈冰

Who Is Paying for This Violence?

—A Discussion of the Incident at the Hongzhida Youth Development Center Where a Trainee Was Beaten Blind

Author: Zhou Min

On Mother’s Day, Mr. Zhang’s family received a thank-you letter from their son, written at the Hongzhida Youth Development Center in Yangxin County, Huangshi City, Hubei Province. They were unaware that the center had instructed him to write the letter; they believed it reflected their son’s true feelings. But that same evening, in his dormitory, the son wrote another note—a plea for help. He entrusted it to a fellow student who was about to leave, asking him to take it out and beg his mother to rescue him.

Two letters, written by the same hand. One was what the system forced him to write; the other was what he truly wanted to say.

The former reached the parents’ hands. The latter was discovered by the homeroom teacher, leading to a brutal beating that left him unconscious and blind in his right eye.

Mr. Zhang is not a bad father. During his on-site visit, he saw his son playing sports and chess, and he was assured that there would be no physical punishment or verbal abuse. He paid 32,800 yuan, believing he had purchased a new beginning for his son. What kind of situation led a father who loves his child to sign that contract?

I. The Creation of Anxiety

Zhang Hao is currently in his second year of junior high school; he is 13 years old. Since April of this year, he has been skipping school and staying out all night. By any standard of developmental psychology, this is merely a signal that attention and intervention are needed—not a crisis.

Yet in Mr. Zhang’s situation, this was a crisis.

To understand this, one must first understand the soil in which Chinese parents’ anxiety takes root.

The one-child policy has been in place for nearly four decades, and one of its most profound psychological consequences is that all expectations, resources, and anxiety are concentrated on a single child. This child has no siblings to share the parents’ expectations, no cousins to provide a buffer or a sounding board. He is their sole stake.

The college entrance exam system has further intensified this anxiety. In a society where educational resources are highly unequal and academic credentials are closely tied to social mobility, a child “failing” means that the social standing accumulated by the family over decades could come to an abrupt end. This is by no means an exaggeration.

In the 2000s, the concept of “internet addiction” emerged. The media and certain experts joined forces to create a moral panic: playing video games was equated with mental illness, and the internet was portrayed as a flood of monsters destroying the next generation. Normal adolescent exploration and struggles were defined as pathological conditions requiring intervention.

In this environment, Zhang Hao’s truancy and staying out all night were not seen as signals requiring understanding and communication, but as a disease requiring treatment and correction. Mr. Zhang’s anxiety was real, yet it was also systematically amplified.

II. A Gap in Support

As a parent, where does one turn for help when faced with a 13-year-old son who skips school and stays out all night?

The school counselor is the first answer—and the first source of disappointment. China has long suffered from a severe shortage of mental health professionals in primary and secondary schools, and their roles are primarily focused on maintaining stability: suppressing crises, soothing emotions, and preventing incidents from escalating, rather than providing support centered on the child’s long-term well-being. For a child who skips school, the school’s more common response is to apply pressure and summon the parents for a meeting, rather than offering substantive psychological support.

The adolescent psychiatry departments at public hospitals are the second option. In major cities like Beijing and Shanghai, waiting times at the psychiatry departments of renowned children’s hospitals are measured in months, and appointments with some popular specialists must be booked several months in advance. Even if an appointment is secured, the costs are largely not covered by medical insurance, and long-term psychological treatment places a heavy financial burden on ordinary families. For an ordinary family living in Jiujiang, Jiangxi, this path is simply too difficult.

Family therapy is the third option. In China, this is virtually nonexistent. Family therapists are a scarce private service, expensive, and there are not enough practitioners in most second- and third-tier cities.

Community support is the fourth option. China’s community service system is essentially non-existent when it comes to adolescent mental health.

When all other options failed, a father searched online and came across an advertisement for Hongzhida.

How did this void come about? It is the result of a long-standing accumulation of policies that have concentrated educational resources on exam-oriented education, treated mental health as a dispensable “soft” need, and privatized the handling of family issues. The state has withdrawn from its rightful position, allowing the market to fill the gap.

The market’s method of filling this void is quite sophisticated. When the Siwei Growth Base opened in Jinjiang, Fujian, in 2022, Principal Xiang Mingsheng first applied to the Quanzhou Civil Affairs Bureau for public welfare accreditation as a “Minor Growth Guidance Service Center.” After obtaining approval, he relocated and reestablished the facility, hanging a sign indicating supervision by the Civil Affairs Bureau to recruit students. Ms. Wu paid 60,000 yuan on the spot, citing a single reason: since it was run by the government, it must be legitimate. The Civil Affairs Bureau later responded: “We had long required the center to close; we had no idea they had moved to a village in Jinjiang to set up this base.” The void left by the state’s inaction was filled by a counterfeit government sign. Over the course of two years, the Siwei Base abused at least eight adolescents. Among them, 14-year-old Xiao Wu was forced to stand all night, kneel while holding a basin of water, and was locked in a small, dark iron cage for 28 days, ultimately suffering a lifelong disability. On the night he was kicked and suffered a fracture, the principal called Ms. Wu, claiming the child had sustained a minor injury while running.

This is the “solution” the market has produced: violent confinement fills the void left by the absence of public services, while a government-issued sign satisfies parents’ need for trust.

III. The Conspiracy Is Complete

This is the most difficult yet most essential part of this article.

Before making the payment, Mr. Zhang knew he would be unable to contact his son for six months. He knew his son had been deceived into coming to the facility under the pretext of cooperating with an investigation into telecom fraud, yet the parents went along with this arrangement. They signed the agreement and paid the fees in good faith.

This constitutes a form of conspiracy.

Before using this term, its meaning must be clarified. Conspiracy does not equate to being the mastermind. Mr. Zhang had absolutely no intention of harming his son. His motivation was love—a last-ditch effort after running out of options in this society.

Yet the collusion is real, and it comprises three elements:

The first is cognitive narrowing under conditions of despair. Psychological research suggests that under extreme anxiety and stress, decision-making quality declines, risk assessments become distorted, and the desire for a solution overrides all caution. Before making payment, Mr. Zhang visited the facility in person. He saw the children playing ball and heard promises that there would be no physical punishment. However, filtered through his desperation, this information was reshaped into what he wanted to see. The clause stipulating no contact for six months—which should clearly have raised red flags—was accepted in his desperate state as a professional approach.

The second factor is the “it’s for your own good” culture. In mainstream Chinese parenting culture, disciplining children is inherently seen as an expression of love; strictness is a virtue, and suffering is a necessary cost of growth. “No pain, no gain” is a complete educational philosophy passed down through generations. When a facility tells parents, “We will educate your child through strict methods,” this cultural framework helps parents blur the line between strictness and violence.

The third factor is a deep internalization of the state’s logic of reform. This is the most hidden yet fundamental layer, and it plays a decisive role. Having lived for a long time within a social structure where “problem individuals can be detained and reformed, isolation can bring about transformation, and coercion is for the individual’s own good,” this mindset has unconsciously become common sense. It is not a written rule, but it exists in the air, breathed in by every generation. When Mr. Zhang considered sending his son to a closed facility, he did not realize that he was repeating a civilian version of the state’s reform techniques. He believed it was a voluntary choice.

And so, the conspiracy was complete. Through a logic as natural as breathing, a father who loved his child, within the bounds of the law, surrendered his child’s personal freedom to an institution that operated through violence.

Facing this reality is not meant to condemn Mr. Zhang, nor to diminish the responsibility of the homeroom teacher. Rather, it is to seek an urgent answer: what does the next desperate parent need to avoid walking down the same path?

IV. Where Lies the Way Forward?

The answer is actually clear: a professional support system; youth mental health services free from stigma; schools that genuinely fulfill a counseling role rather than focusing solely on grades; and community-based family support networks.

But these solutions face two major obstacles.

The first obstacle concerns resources and institutional frameworks. The aforementioned system requires sustained public investment, the training of professional personnel, and policies that prioritize mental health within the public health agenda. While these are not impossible, they demand a reordering of priorities.

The second obstacle runs deeper and is more difficult to overcome. As long as the state’s logic of “forcibly reforming problematic individuals” remains unchallenged, its civilian counterpart will always find fertile ground. Public services can alleviate the desperation of parents who feel they have nowhere else to turn, but they cannot completely erase the shaped perceptions of parents. A parent raised within this state-level logic will still tend to believe that coercion can change people, even when better options are available.

This is a cultural project that will take generations to complete, and its starting point is the willingness to confront the root causes of forced rehabilitation.

V. Two Notes

On Mother’s Day, the thank-you letter was sent, but the note asking for help was not.

The distance between these two notes is proof that a system is at work: it knows how to manage information, how to show the outside world only what it wants them to see, and how to suppress voices within a closed space.

This system was not established by a single “growth camp.” It was built by the market, endorsed by culture, sustained by institutional loopholes, and granted its final authorization through parents’ signatures and payments.

Zhang Hao’s right eye spent the night in darkness. That dark narrative was constructed by a cast of characters.

Editor: Huang Jizhou Proofreader: Xiong Bian Translator: Ge Bing

(组图)旧金山纪念六四37周年系列活动——清洗民主女神像暨六四图片展

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(组图)旧金山纪念六四37周年系列活动——清洗民主女神像暨六四图片展

摄影记者:关永杰

清洗旧金山华埠花园角广场的民主女神像,是美国加州湾区每年纪念六四的一项标志性传统活动。5月24日,由中国民主教育基金会、人道中国、中国民主党旧金山党部、中国民主人权联盟、华语青年挺藏会、美国香港人会馆等多个海外民运与人权团体联合发起,各界人士再次齐聚旧金山唐人街花园角广场(Portsmouth Square),为铜锈斑驳的女神像进行一次彻底的清洗,从而拉开湾区整个六四周年纪念系列活动的序幕。

这座高约10英尺的民主女神青铜雕像,于1994年六四事件5周年时正式落成,是1989年天安门广场上被坦克推倒的民主女神像原形的化身,它也是全球第一座在公共土地上永久竖立的民主女神复制像。

六四事件亲历者、本次活动召集人之一方政表示,清洗雕像象征着“洗去历史的尘埃,拂去对真理的掩盖”;通过亲手擦拭,人们在海外延续着对真相的守望、对极权历史的拒绝遗忘,以及更坚定对中国未来实现自由民主的信念。

(组图)旧金山纪念六四37周年系列活动——清洗民主女神像暨六四图片展

活动参与者与方政先生在民主女神像前合照

同时举行的还有“六四”事件图片展,吸引众多旧金山市民及游客驻足观看,图片展的目的在于让世人重新认识和了解这段被中国共产党极力掩盖的历史

六四学生领袖之一周锋锁先生现场发言:六四要纪念的,不只是死难者,更是中国人曾经为民主、自由、不惜牺牲的精神。1989年,数百万中国人在三百多个城市和平抗议,却遭中共以坦克、机枪镇压,至今死难人数仍不明。尽管中共长期封锁与打压,但仍有无数人持续纪念六四。无论是“坦克人”、民主女神像,还是后来白纸运动中的年轻人,都说明追求自由与正义的精神从未消失。六四已经不仅属于中国,也成为世界追求民主、人权与自由的重要象征。

本次活动的另一主题是“每人一美金,援助良心犯”,为刚刑满出狱的徐光先生捐款。旧金山地区由中国民主人权联盟的李海风负责,所得款项将转交给朱虞夫先生,然后再统一送到徐光先生手中。

(图片来自网络)

徐光(1968年9月11日出生,浙江省富阳市人)是中国著名的政治异见人士、八九学运领袖,以及“中国民主党”浙江委员会的核心创办人之一。他因为长期在中国大陆公开坚持民主宪政理念并参与政治抗争,曾多次被捕入狱,累计服刑时间已超过 9 年。他已于 2026 年 5 月 19 日凌晨刑满出狱。据海外中国民主党同仁及多位杭州异议人士透露,徐光在长达 4 年的羁押与服刑期间,为了抗议当局的构陷,长期处于绝食抗争状态,后半程主要依靠监狱方面进行强制鼻饲维持生命。这导致他出狱时身体状况极度糟糕、骨瘦如柴(体重一度降至80多斤),出狱当天是由几个人用担架将其抬回杭州市西湖区的外东山弄家中。出狱后,徐光通过海外友人表达了谢意,并再度发表感言,呼吁外界“勿忘六四”。

现场共收到捐款710美元。

活动结束,参与者大合照

重申今年纪念活动的口号:勿忘六四,审判中共,还我民主!

编辑:钟然 校对:周敏 翻译:戈冰

(Photo Gallery) San Francisco’s 37th Anniversary of June 4th Commemorative Events—Cleaning of the Statue of Democracy and June 4th Photo Exhibition

Photojournalist: Guan Yongjie

Summary: The annual cleaning of the Statue of Democracy in San Francisco’s Chinatown took place, kicking off the Bay Area’s June 4th commemorations. A photo exhibition was held on-site to raise funds for recently released dissident Xu Guang, calling on people not to forget the history of June 4th.

The cleaning of the Statue of Democracy at Portsmouth Square in San Francisco’s Chinatown is an iconic annual tradition in the Bay Area to commemorate June 4th. On May 24, organized jointly by the China Democracy Education Foundation, Humanitarian China, the San Francisco Chapter of the China Democratic Party, the China Democracy and Human Rights Alliance, the Chinese Youth Support Tibet Association, the Hong Kong Association of America, and other overseas pro-democracy and human rights groups, people from all walks of life once again gathered at Portsmouth Square in San Francisco’s Chinatown to thoroughly clean the bronze statue, which had become mottled with rust, thereby kicking off the Bay Area’s series of events commemorating the June 4th anniversary.

This approximately 10-foot-tall bronze statue of the Goddess of Democracy was officially unveiled in 1994 on the fifth anniversary of the June 4th Incident. It serves as a representation of the original Goddess of Democracy statue that was toppled by tanks in Tiananmen Square in 1989, and it is the first replica of the Goddess of Democracy to be permanently erected on public land anywhere in the world.

Fang Zheng, an eyewitness to the June 4th incident and one of the event’s organizers, stated that cleaning the statue symbolizes “washing away the dust of history and brushing aside the veil over the truth.” By personally wiping the statue, people overseas continue to uphold the pursuit of truth, refuse to forget the history of totalitarianism, and strengthen their belief in the realization of freedom and democracy in China’s future.
(组图)旧金山纪念六四37周年系列活动——清洗民主女神像暨六四图片展

Event participants pose for a group photo with Mr. Fang Zheng in front of the Statue of Democracy

A photo exhibition on the June 4th Incident was held concurrently, attracting many San Francisco residents and tourists to stop and view the displays. The exhibition aims to help the world re-examine and understand this chapter of history that the Chinese Communist Party has strived to conceal

Mr. Zhou Fengsuo, one of the student leaders of the June 4th movement, spoke at the event: “What we commemorate on June 4th is not only the victims, but also the spirit of the Chinese people who were willing to sacrifice everything for democracy and freedom.”

In 1989, millions of Chinese people peacefully protested in over 300 cities, only to be suppressed by the CCP with tanks and machine guns; the death toll remains unknown to this day.

Despite the CCP’s long-standing suppression and censorship, countless people continue to commemorate June 4th. Whether it be the “Tank Man,” the Statue of Democracy, or the young people in the later White Paper Movement, all demonstrate that the spirit of pursuing freedom and justice has never faded. June 4th no longer belongs solely to China; it has become an important symbol of the world’s pursuit of democracy, human rights, and freedom.

Another theme of this event is “One Dollar Per Person to Aid Prisoners of Conscience,” a fundraising effort for Mr. Xu Guang, who was recently released from prison after serving his sentence. In the San Francisco area, Li Haifeng of the Chinese Democracy and Human Rights Alliance is coordinating the effort. The funds raised will be transferred to Mr. Zhu Yufu, who will then deliver them to Mr. Xu Guang.

(Image from the internet)

Xu Guang (born September 11, 1968, in Fuyang City, Zhejiang Province) is a renowned Chinese political dissident, a leader of the 1989 student movement, and one of the core founders of the Zhejiang Committee of the “China Democratic Party.” Due to his long-standing public advocacy for democratic constitutionalism and participation in political resistance in mainland China, he has been arrested and imprisoned multiple times, serving a cumulative prison term of over nine years. He was released from prison in the early hours of May 19, 2026, after completing his sentence. According to colleagues from the overseas Chinese Democratic Party and several dissidents in Hangzhou, during his four-year detention and imprisonment, Xu Guang engaged in a prolonged hunger strike to protest the authorities’ fabricated charges. In the latter part of his incarceration, he survived primarily through forced nasogastric feeding administered by prison officials. As a result, his physical condition was extremely poor upon release—he was emaciated (his weight had dropped to just over 80 jin)—and on the day of his release, several people carried him on a stretcher back to his home on Waidongshan Lane in Hangzhou’s West Lake District. After his release, Xu Guang expressed his gratitude through overseas friends and issued a statement once again, calling on the outside world to “Never Forget June 4th.”

A total of $710 in donations was collected at the event.

Group photo of participants at the end of the event

Reaffirming the slogans for this year’s commemoration: “Never Forget June 4th,” “Put the CCP on Trial,” and “Restore Our Democracy!”

Editor: Zhong Ran Proofreader: Zhou Min Translator: Ge Bing

“文革”2.0:一场改头换面的控制升级

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“文革”2.0:一场改头换面的控制升级

文:黄利娥

从更长的历史看,这种逻辑一再重复:制造敌人、动员群众、再由国家机器完成清洗。个体的疯狂只是结果,制度性的运作才是根源。

“文革”2.0:一场改头换面的控制升级

今年是“文革”爆发60周年。

每到这个时间,都会有人回顾那段历史:红卫兵、批斗会、抄家、破四旧、武斗、全民恐惧。很多年轻人把“文革”理解成一场群众疯狂,仿佛只是时代失控造成的一次悲剧。

但“文革”从来不是简单的社会失序。

如果没有最高权力的发动,没有宣传系统的煽动,没有整个体制的默许和配合,它根本不可能席卷全国,更不可能持续十年。

所以,“文革”最值得反思的,从来不只是红卫兵。

红卫兵只是表面现象,真正的问题是背后的权力结构。

回头看中共历史就会发现,“文革”并不是孤立事件。

从土地改革、镇压反革命、三反五反,到反右运动、大跃进,再到“文革”,以及后来的“六·四”镇压,中共历史几乎始终伴随着政治斗争和系统性暴力。

这种暴力并不只是肉体层面的。

它既包括公开镇压,也包括思想改造、舆论控制、社会清洗,以及通过恐惧让整个社会服从。

每一次政治运动的逻辑都高度相似:先制造敌人,再发动群众,最后由国家机器完成清洗和整肃。

敌人可以是地主、右派、资本主义道路当权派,也可以是“境外势力”“历史虚无主义”或者“不稳定因素”。

名称一直在变,但逻辑并没有真正改变。

这也是为什么,很多人今天回看现实,仍然会感到一种熟悉感。

没有了红卫兵,但有了网络审查。

没有了大字报,但有了算法过滤和关键词屏蔽。

没有了群众批斗,却有越来越精密的监控系统和数据治理。

时代进步了,技术升级了,但某种控制方式只是换了外衣。

说到底,问题不在于某一代人突然疯狂,也不只是某一个领导人的个人错误。

真正的问题在于:一个缺乏权力制衡、把政治凌驾于法律之上的体制,本身就天然容易滑向暴力。

当权力无需接受约束,当异议被视为威胁,当政治忠诚高于个人权利,暴力就不再只是手段,而会逐渐成为制度的一部分。

“文革”已经过去60年,但它留下的最大警示,不只是历史记忆。

而是提醒人们:如果制造“文革”的制度土壤没有被真正清算,类似悲剧就始终存在重演的可能。

这或许才是“文革”60周年最沉重的现实意义。

编辑:Geoffrey Jin

校对:熊辩

翻译:戈冰

本文由周小星提供

“Cultural Revolution” 2.0: An Upgraded Form of Control in Disguise

By Huang Li’e

Abstract: The “Cultural Revolution” was not an accidental tragedy resulting from mass chaos, but rather the outcome of power mobilization, propaganda promotion, and institutional collaboration. The Red Guards were merely a surface manifestation; what truly requires reflection is the power structure behind them.

From a broader historical perspective, this logic has repeated itself time and again: creating enemies, mobilizing the masses, and then having the state apparatus carry out the purge. Individual madness is merely the result; institutional operation is the root cause.

“文革”2.0:一场改头换面的控制升级

This year marks the 60th anniversary of the outbreak of the “Cultural Revolution.”

Every year at this time, people look back on that period: the Red Guards, public criticism sessions, home raids, the destruction of the “Four Olds,” violent clashes, and widespread fear. Many young people view the “Cultural Revolution” as a frenzy of the masses, as if it were merely a tragedy caused by a society spiraling out of control.

But the “Cultural Revolution” was never simply a case of social disorder.

Without the instigation of the highest authorities, without the incitement of the propaganda apparatus, and without the tacit approval and cooperation of the entire system, it could never have swept across the nation, much less lasted for a decade.

Therefore, what deserves the most reflection regarding the Cultural Revolution has never been merely the Red Guards.

The Red Guards were merely a surface phenomenon; the real issue lies in the power structure behind them.

Looking back at the history of the Chinese Communist Party, one will discover that the Cultural Revolution was not an isolated event.

From the Land Reform, the Suppression of Counter-Revolutionaries, the “Three Anti” and “Five Anti” campaigns, to the Anti-Rightist Movement, the Great Leap Forward, the Cultural Revolution, and the subsequent June Fourth crackdown, the history of the Chinese Communist Party has almost always been accompanied by political struggles and systemic violence.

This violence is not merely physical.

It encompasses not only open suppression but also ideological re-education, control of public opinion, social purges, and the use of fear to force the entire society into submission.

The logic behind each political campaign is strikingly similar: first, create an enemy; then, mobilize the masses; and finally, have the state apparatus carry out the purge and crackdown.

The enemy could be landlords, rightists, or those in power who follow the capitalist road; it could also be “foreign forces,” “historical nihilism,” or “destabilizing elements.”

The labels have changed, but the logic has not truly changed.

This is why, when many people look back at reality today, they still feel a sense of familiarity.

The Red Guards are gone, but internet censorship remains.

The big-character posters are gone, but algorithmic filtering and keyword blocking have taken their place.

Public denunciations are gone, but increasingly sophisticated surveillance systems and data governance have emerged.

Times have progressed, technology has advanced, but certain methods of control have merely changed their outward appearance.

Ultimately, the problem does not lie in a particular generation suddenly going mad, nor is it merely the personal mistake of a single leader.

The real problem lies in a system that lacks checks and balances and places politics above the law—a system that is inherently prone to sliding into violence.

When power faces no constraints, when dissent is viewed as a threat, and when political loyalty takes precedence over individual rights, violence ceases to be merely a means and gradually becomes an integral part of the system.

Sixty years have passed since the Cultural Revolution, but the greatest warning it leaves behind is not merely a historical memory.

Rather, it serves as a reminder that if the institutional conditions that gave rise to the Cultural Revolution are not truly addressed, similar tragedies will always have the potential to recur.

This, perhaps, is the most profound practical significance of the 60th anniversary of the Cultural Revolution.

Editor: Geoffrey Jin

Proofreader: Xiong Bian

Translator: Ge Bing

This article was provided by Zhou Xiaoxing

改造术的民间授权:从再教育到成长基地

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改造术的民间授权:从再教育到成长基地

作者:周敏

事情刚刚发生在2026年5月,湖北黄石市阳新县宏志达青少年成长基地的一名班主任,用木戒尺和空心铁杆打断了一个13岁男孩逃离的念头。戒尺打断就用铁棍接上,直到孩子跪到地上,教官认为他在装,继续用拳头打他的头和眼睛。孩子鼻血流在地上,在昏迷中原地躺了一夜,没人过问。

次日教官得知男孩右眼失明,用鸡蛋替他滚眼睛消肿。后经过了七小时开颅手术,右眼仍然无法视物。

这个案子的细节如此地触目惊心,足以引发又一轮循环:舆论愤慨、家长质问、官方表态,然后复归平静。但我们不应该只停留在愤慨里,而是进一步盘问:这个”认为孩子异常→强行隔离→强制矫正”的处理手法从何而来?其实,我们在别处见过它,还不止见过一次。

改造术的民间授权:从再教育到成长基地

图片来源于网络

一、改造术的国家谱系

1957年,中国建立了劳动教养制度。它的运作是简洁有效的:无需经过司法审判,公安机关即可将”轻微违法”或”思想有问题”的人关押长达四年,以教育改造之名。这套制度整整存续达五十六年,2013年才正式废除。

在五十六年里,中国社会完成了一次深刻的观念训练:问题人口可以被隔离,隔离是为了改造,改造是为了他好。

这个冠冕堂皇的说法在不同时期有不同的实施对象。针对法轮功学员的转化工程,把家属动员进来,让亲情成为改造工具——如果你的孩子、父母来劝你放弃信仰,转化的成功率会更高。新疆的职业技能教育培训中心,强制寄宿,切断与外界的联系,开设思想转化课程,对外一律宣称是自愿参加的职业培训。强制隔离戒毒所,将“成瘾”医学化,用治疗的名义完成人身控制。

这些国家机构的外壳各色不同,但内部结构出奇地一致:封闭空间、信息隔断、强制身份重塑、对外宣称是为当事人好。

宏志达的运营手册,和上述这些国家机构是一样的DNA。家长被告知六个月内不得探视,不得与孩子通话,只能通过班主任在微信群里发布的照片和视频了解孩子动态。孩子是被骗进基地的,以”配合调查电信诈骗案件”为由骗上车。基地对外宣称用专业方式和传统文化思想教育孩子。

唯一的差别在于,宏志达是民营,改造孩子的授权来自家人。

二、杨永信的范本

中国民间改造术的形成,杨永信这个名字是绕不过去的。

2000年代中期,网瘾成了中国最显眼的社会议题之一。媒体、专家、官员形成了一个罕见的共识联盟:网络游戏正在毁掉中国的下一代,必须干预。陶宏开、杨永信等人在这个背景下登场,获得媒体的大量正面报道。

杨永信的方法很简单——电击。他在山东临沂的精神科病房里,对被家长送来的青少年实施电击治疗,声称可以矫正网瘾,戒除不良习惯。病人描述电击时的感受是剧烈疼痛、全身抽搐。

2009年,央视《新闻调查》对此进行曝光,引发全国震动。然而有一个细节被很多报道忽略了:曝光后,相当数量的家长选择继续留下来,甚至对记者表示感谢。他们看到了”效果”——孩子变得顺从听话、不再反抗。

家长的选择比电击本身更引人深思。它说明,家长对这套逻辑的接受,并非被骗,而是主动认同。他们认同孩子需要被强制改造,笃信“痛苦是矫正的必要代价”,也认为封闭隔离是有效手段。

杨永信的机构撑到2016年才被叫停电击治疗,一部分原因是他依托的是正规精神科病房——国家医疗体制的背书,为他提供了持续的合法性外壳。这个外壳被撤除之后,电击停了,但强制封闭的模式本身,却保留下来,没有受到质疑。

杨永信证明了一件事:民间市场对这套改造逻辑,有真实而持续的需求。

三、上之所好,下必甚焉

国家强制改造术的精神遗产,是它所确立的正当性:问题人口可以被隔离和强制转化,痛苦是改造的合理代价。这套正当性一旦成为社会常识,民间就会主动复制。

医学术语被军事化语言改造了。治疗就是训练,病人成为学员,疗程变成了成长周期。这样一来,准入门槛被降低,绕开了卫生监管,同时保留了专业性的表象。

关键的一个变化是国家授权被家长授权替代。劳教需要公安机关的决定,精神科强制住院要医院和家属联署,而送孩子进成长基地,只要家长的签名和汇款就行了。授权链条被缩短到底,摩擦成本极低。

信息封锁则从国家管控手段变成了商业标准条款。六个月不得联系,这是张先生在付款前就已经知道并接受的条件。这俨然已是一种教育手法——孩子得和原有环境彻底切断,才能完成改造。

民间化的本质,就是去掉了官僚程序、文件审批,只保留了暴力内核,然后以市场价格售出。

四、国家的暧昧态度

宏志达案曝光后,阳新县教育局的回应值得读一读:涉事基地前身为某双语学校,现已注销,执照由市场监管局颁发,因此教育局没有监管职能。市场监管局被联系到后,工作人员回答”不知道”,直接挂断了电话。

为什么国家对这类机构的态度长期这么暧昧?

因为这类机构处理的,恰巧是国家也想处理的人群:不服管、偏离轨道的、让家庭和学校头疼的青少年。对他们进行关押隔离、强制他们服从,这套手法国家自己还在使用,只是用于不同的对象和场所而已。

只打击成长基地的暴力手段,却不质疑强制封闭本身的性质,这是整治行动的局限所在。杨永信被叫停的仅仅是电击,并不是强制寄宿、信息封锁,也不是人身控制。这个边界的划定,本身就表达了政府的立场。

只要”问题人口可以被强制改造”的前提不被触动,成长基地就永远有它的生存土壤。换块牌子,换一个县,就可重新开张。

五、打人

张浩一个孩子在地上躺了一夜。疼痛冰凉的夜。

被狠狠打断的木尺、嗖嗖挥舞的空心铁棍,它们在空中冷冽的回声是一套绵延数十年的改造术在民间的倒影——从国家的劳教所,到精神科病房,再到军事化训练营,里面慌张的面庞,一次比一次年轻、一群比一群懵懂。

我们谴责那个教官,对的;我们追问那个基地,也对。但如果追问就停到这儿,我们就让这套违背人性的操作链条滑走了——这链条环环相扣,每一环都在宣告,问题人口可以被关押,隔离可以产生改变,惩罚暴打是矫正的合理代价。

这条长长的锁链,它不从宏志达开始,也不会以宏志达结束。

编辑:黄吉洲

校对:毛一炜

翻译:戈冰

Folk Authorization of “Reformation Techniques”: From Re-education to Growth Bases

By Zhou Min

This incident occurred in May 2026 at the Hongzhidai Youth Growth Base in Yangxin County, Huangshi City, Hubei Province, where a homeroom teacher used a wooden ruler and a hollow iron rod to crush a 13-year-old boy’s attempt to escape. When the ruler broke, the instructor replaced it with an iron rod, continuing to strike the boy until he knelt on the ground. Believing the boy was faking it, the instructor then punched him in the head and eyes. The boy’s blood flowed onto the floor, and he lay unconscious on the spot all night, with no one checking on him.

The next day, upon learning that the boy had lost sight in his right eye, the instructor used an egg to roll over his eye to reduce the swelling. After undergoing a seven-hour craniotomy, the boy’s right eye remained blind.

The details of this case are so shocking that they are bound to trigger yet another cycle: public outrage, parents’ demands for answers, official statements, and then a return to calm. But we should not stop at outrage; we must ask further: Where does this approach—“deeming a child abnormal → forcibly isolating him → subjecting him to forced correction”—come from? In fact, we have seen it elsewhere, and not just once.

改造术的民间授权:从再教育到成长基地

Image source: Internet

I. The State’s Genealogy of “Re-education”

In 1957, China established the system of re-education through labor. Its operation was simple and effective: without judicial trial, public security authorities could detain individuals deemed to have committed “minor offenses” or to have “ideological problems” for up to four years, in the name of “re-education.” This system persisted for a full fifty-six years before it was officially abolished in 2013.

Over those fifty-six years, Chinese society underwent a profound ideological indoctrination: problematic individuals could be isolated; isolation was for the purpose of re-education; and re-education was for their own good.

This noble-sounding rationale targeted different groups at different times. The “re-education” campaign against Falun Gong practitioners mobilized family members, turning familial bonds into tools of re-education—if your children or parents came to persuade you to renounce your faith, the success rate of “re-education” would be higher. In Xinjiang’s vocational skills education and training centers, participants are forced into residential programs, cut off from the outside world, and subjected to ideological re-education courses—all while the regime publicly claims these are voluntary vocational training programs. Compulsory drug rehabilitation centers medicalize “addiction,” using the guise of treatment to exert control over individuals.

While the outward appearances of these state institutions vary, their internal structures are strikingly consistent: closed spaces, information blackouts, forced identity reshaping, and the public claim that it is all for the individual’s own good.

Hongzhida’s operational manual shares the same DNA as these state institutions. Parents are told they cannot visit for six months, cannot speak with their children, and can only learn about their children’s well-being through photos and videos posted by the homeroom teacher in a WeChat group. Children are lured into the facility under the pretext of “cooperating with an investigation into telecommunications fraud.” The facility claims to educate children using professional methods and traditional cultural values.

The only difference is that Hongzhidai is privately run, and its authority to reform the children comes from their families.

II. The Yang Yongxin Model

When discussing the development of China’s private reform practices, the name Yang Yongxin is impossible to ignore.

In the mid-2000s, internet addiction became one of China’s most prominent social issues. The media, experts, and officials formed a rare coalition of consensus: online gaming was destroying China’s next generation, and intervention was necessary. Against this backdrop, figures like Tao Hongkai and Yang Yongxin emerged, receiving extensive positive media coverage.

Yang Yongxin’s method was simple: electric shock therapy. In a psychiatric ward in Linyi, Shandong, he administered electric shock treatments to adolescents sent by their parents, claiming it could correct internet addiction and cure bad habits. Patients described the experience as intense pain and full-body convulsions.

In 2009, CCTV’s *News Investigation* exposed these practices, causing a nationwide uproar. However, one detail was overlooked by many reports: after the exposure, a significant number of parents chose to stay, even expressing gratitude to the reporters. They had witnessed the “results”—their children had become obedient and compliant, no longer resisting.

The parents’ choice is more thought-provoking than the electric shocks themselves. It demonstrates that their acceptance of this logic was not the result of being deceived, but rather of active endorsement. They believed their children needed to be forcibly reformed, firmly held that “pain is a necessary price for correction,” and considered isolation an effective means to that end.

Yang Yongxin’s institution managed to continue its electric shock therapy until 2016, partly because it operated within a formal psychiatric ward—the endorsement of the state healthcare system provided him with a continuous veneer of legitimacy. Once this veneer was stripped away, the electric shocks ceased, but the model of forced confinement itself remained intact, unchallenged.

Yang Yongxin proved one thing: there is a real and persistent demand in the private market for this logic of “reformation.”

III. When the State Approves, the People Will Exaggerate

The spiritual legacy of state-sanctioned forced “re-education” lies in the legitimacy it established: problematic individuals can be isolated and forcibly transformed, and suffering is a reasonable cost of re-education. Once this legitimacy becomes common social knowledge, the private sector will actively replicate it.

Medical terminology has been redefined through militarized language. Treatment becomes training, patients become trainees, and treatment cycles become “growth cycles.” This lowers the entry barrier, bypasses health regulations, while maintaining the appearance of professionalism.

A key shift is the replacement of state authorization with parental consent. Re-education through labor requires a decision by public security authorities; involuntary psychiatric hospitalization requires joint signatures from the hospital and family members; yet sending a child to a “growth base” requires only a parent’s signature and a bank transfer. The chain of authorization has been shortened to the extreme, with minimal friction costs.

Information blackouts have shifted from state control measures to standard commercial clauses. “No contact for six months”—this was a condition Mr. Zhang knew and accepted before making payment. This has effectively become an educational tactic: children must be completely cut off from their original environment to complete their “reformation.”

The essence of this privatization is the removal of bureaucratic procedures and document approvals, retaining only the violent core, which is then sold at market prices.

IV. The State’s Ambiguous Stance

Following the exposure of the Hongzhida case, the response from the Yangxin County Education Bureau is worth reading: The facility in question was formerly a bilingual school that has since been deregistered; its license was issued by the Market Regulation Bureau, so the Education Bureau has no regulatory authority over it. When contacted, staff at the Market Regulation Bureau replied, “I don’t know,” and hung up the phone.

Why has the state maintained such an ambiguous stance toward these institutions for so long?

Because these institutions deal precisely with the very groups the state also wishes to deal with: unruly, wayward adolescents who cause headaches for families and schools. Detaining and isolating them, forcing them to obey—the state itself still employs these methods, albeit on different subjects and in different settings.

Cracking down only on the violent tactics of “growth bases” while failing to question the nature of forced confinement itself is the limitation of these rectification efforts. Yang Yongxin was ordered to stop only the use of electric shocks—not the forced boarding, information blackout, or physical restraint. The very drawing of this line reflects the government’s stance.

As long as the premise that “problem individuals can be forcibly reformed” remains untouched, these “growth bases” will always have fertile ground to thrive. Change the sign, move to a different county, and they can reopen.

V. Physical Abuse

Zhang Hao, a child, lay on the ground all night. A night of pain and cold.

The wooden rulers snapped in half, the hollow iron rods whizzing through the air—their chilling echoes are a reflection of a reform technique that has persisted for decades in society: from state re-education through labor camps to psychiatric wards, and on to militarized training camps. The panicked faces within grow younger with each passing year, and the groups grow more and more bewildered.

We condemn that drill instructor—and rightly so; we hold that base to account—and rightly so. But if our questioning stops here, we let this inhuman chain of operations slip away—a chain where every link is interlocked, each one declaring that “problem individuals” can be detained, that isolation can bring about change, and that brutal beatings are a reasonable price to pay for “correction.”

This long chain does not begin with Hongzhidai, nor will it end with Hongzhidai.

Summary: In 2026, a 13-year-old boy at the Hongzhidai facility in Hubei attempted to escape and was brutally beaten by an instructor with a ruler and an iron rod, resulting in the loss of sight in his right eye. This case is a concrete manifestation of the Chinese Communist Party’s consistent authoritarian governance mindset: viewing individuals as tools to be forcibly reshaped by the state or parents, where violence and deprivation of liberty are deemed legitimate as long as they are carried out “for your own good.”

Editor: Huang Jizhou

Proofreader: Mao Yiwei

Translator: Ge Bing

旧金山 6月3日 星火不灭 缅怀勇士 悼念六四大屠杀死难者

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旧金山 6月3日 星火不灭 缅怀勇士 悼念六四大屠杀死难者
旧金山 6月3日 星火不灭 缅怀勇士 悼念六四大屠杀死难者

勿忘六四-37週年-星火不滅-緬懷勇士——悼念六四大屠殺死難者燭光晚會聯合主辦方:中國民主教育基金會 中國民主黨舊金山黨部 人道中國北加州香港會 美國香港人會館 舊金山致公總堂擦星星事務所 中國民主人權聯盟時間:6月3日 7:00pm – 9:00pm地點:舊金山中國領事館前1450 Laguna St, San Francisco, CA 94115Never Forget June 4th — 37th AnniversaryThe Spark Will Never Die — Honoring the BraveCandlelight Vigil to Mourn the Victims of the June 4th MassacreCo-organizers:China Democracy Education FoundationChina Democracy Party, San Francisco BranchHumanitarian ChinaNorthern California Hong Kong ClubUS Hongkongers ClubSan Francisco Gee Tuck Sam Tuck AssociationCa Xingxing OfficeChina Democracy and Human Rights AllianceTime: June 3, 7:00 PM – 9:00 PMLocation: In front of the Chinese Consulate in San Francisco1450 Laguna St, San Francisco, CA 94115