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行政起诉状

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行政起诉状

原告:陈树庆,男,浙江省杭州市人,现住杭州市拱墅区大关苑东五苑6幢5单元202室,身份证号330106196509260073,联系电话15958160478.

被告一:杭州市拱墅区人力资源和社会保障局
地  址:杭州市拱墅区文晖路1号,联系电话:0571-89505558
负责人:林轶     职务:局长


被告二:杭州市拱墅区人民政府
地  址:杭州市拱墅区台州路1号,联系电话:0571-89509522
负责人:陈宇    职务:区长

案由:行政确认

诉讼请求:

 一:请求被告一杭州市拱墅区人力资源和社会保障局履行法定社会保险责任,为原告及时办好退休资格确认及核定应发退休金的手续;

二:请求撤销被告二杭州市拱墅区人民政府《杭州市拱墅区人民政府行政复议决定书》杭拱政复[2026]67号。

 事实与理由: 

原告陈树庆于2025年12月25日已满60周岁3个月,实际已缴社会保险统筹24年4个月,超过了15年的最低缴费年限。在2025年12月办理退休手续时,被告一杭州市拱墅区人力资源和社会保障局办事人员以原告于2007年因煽动颠覆国家政权罪被判刑4年和2016年因颠覆国家政权罪被判刑10年6个月为由,将社保缴费年限扣除两项刑期累加年限剩余缴费仅9年多,已不足最低缴费年限,拒不办理原告的退休手续。

 再三交涉中,原告不满被告一的工作人员停留在口头上含糊其辞的“根据相关政策”,曾提出政府信息公开申请。2025年12月25日,被告一工作人员陈祖朋在其办公室向原告出具《杭州市拱墅区社会保险管理服务中心办理事项告知单》、《告知书》及《关于被判处有期徒刑人员基本养老保险有关问题的复函(此件依申请公开)》(浙人社函[2010]358号),书面正式确认被告一拒不办理原告退休手续的决定。

 原告认为前述文件所依据的法律适用不当,政策效力不足,于2026年1月27日就此事申请行政复议,被告二拱墅区人民政府于2026年4月30日做出的《杭州市拱墅区人民政府行政复议决定书》杭拱政复[2026]67号维持被申请人即本案被告一拒不办理陈树庆退休手续的前述《告知单》。原告不服,现向贵院提起行政诉讼,请求依法审理,做出公正的判决。

 原告认为,契约精神是现代文明社会得以稳定运行的基石,民以吏为师,全社会的诚实守信,政府行为要做表率。本案20多年来,原告、原告家属、原告工作或社保挂靠的单位替原告缴纳社会保险,从未遇到服刑期间不能缴费的明确告知,甚至2025年3月10日原告最后一次刑满释放后,到被告一设在拱墅区香积寺东路58号的政务服务中心几次补缴中间断交的最近几年(包括部分刑期内的期间)社保费用也都顺利完成。被告收取保险缴费的时候好好的,现在要被告履行保险责任的时候,突然变卦,以所谓“属于违规参保缴费”为托词,拒不履行被告应负的社会保险责任,却让缴费人本案原告陈树庆单方面承担所谓“违规”的不利后果,使得人民群众对政府行为信赖利益的保护原则荡然无存。

 从被告一提供的《告知书》中可见,其推翻约定、拒不履行对原告社会保险责任的理由是:根据《中华人民共和国劳动法》第二条第一款“在中华人民共和国境内的企业、个体经济组织(以下统称用人单位)和与之形成劳动关系的劳动者,适用本法”、第七十二条“用人单位和劳动者必须依法参加社会保险,缴纳社会保险费”,《中华人民共和国社会保险法》第十条第一款、第二款“职工应当参加基本养老保险,由用人单位和职工共同缴纳基本养老保险费。无雇工的个体工商户、未在用人单位参加基本养老保险的非全日制从业人员以及其他灵活就业人员可以参加基本养老保险,由个人缴纳基本养老保险费”,《浙江省人力资源和社会保障厅关于被判处有期徒刑人员基本养老保险有关问题的复函》(浙人社函[2010]358号)规定“服刑人员在服刑期间不属于职工基本养老保险参保对象”。

 显而易见,上述《劳动法》和《社会保险法》包括《浙江省职工基本养老保险条例》里的规定,是要求用人单位和劳动者去缴纳社会保险费。立法目的是保障从业人员的社会保险权利,里面并没有“服刑人员不能参加社会保险”的强制性规定;至于浙人社函[2010]358号《复函》,是(此件依申请公开),根据法律未经公布不生效的原则,“依申请公开”不能等同于“公布”,没有对抗不知情相对人的任何效力;《复函》做出日期是“二〇一〇年九月三十日”、印发日期是2010年10月9日,对原告在2010年9月13日已经结束的第一次服刑四年期间缴费显然没有追溯效果;更何况《复函》不具备《中华人民共和国立法法》中有关法律、行政法规、地方性法规、自治条例和单行条例、规章的级别和效果,属于无立法权的政府部门替自己“既当运动员,又当裁判员”制定的“比赛规则”,里面所指的“服刑人员不能参加社会保险”明显属于2018年2月8日施行的《最高人民法院关于适用〈中华人民共和国行政诉讼法〉的解释》99 条将典型的关于行政主体“重大且明显违法”的情形之“第二,减损权利(本案:法律没有明确禁止而该《复函》加以禁止)或增加义务(结合现行政策,该《复函》的本案结果:要原告60岁后另行增加每年连续社保缴费义务直到5年后允许补足15年,才能享有早就该有的退休资格)的行政行为没有法律依据。”,所以《复函》也不能作为政府自己违约的依据。所谓“法无德不立”,一个良法的原理,比如最高法关于适用行政诉讼的《解释》第99条,不仅公布于形式,更应该在司法实践中适用。

 原告在与被告一的工作人员交涉时,有工作人员解释说“你坐牢期间,无法成为前述《劳动法》等法律条款中规定的缴费企业的真实劳动者,你的职工养老保险只是虚拟的代缴形式,不符合法律和政策的规定。”当时原告申辩说:“社保代缴,法律至今没有明令禁止,是社会保险开始统筹以来一直默认并在实践中广泛实行的政策,近二十多年来包括你们人社部门在内的机关事业单位许多一线工作人员,并没有在劳务派遣单位真实上班,但由劳务派遣单位代发报酬代缴社保,你们不能对人对己双重标准”,他们回答说:“劳务派遣是有法可依的。”原告事后进一步了解了有关劳务派遣的法律、法规、规章和机关事业单位使用劳务派遣工的历史与现状后发现,这是试图以“合法”的形式实际上超越了法律的规定,掩盖编制内外实际上的双轨制所造成的身份性职业歧视,是严重违反《劳动法》、《劳动合同法》等法律“同工同酬”要求的行径。说其超越法律授权的用人范围,因为《劳务派遣暂行规定》第二条明确规定:“劳务派遣单位经营劳务派遣业务,企业(以下称用工单位)使用被派遣劳动者,适用本规定。依法成立的会计师事务所、律师事务所等合伙组织和基金会以及民办非企业单位等组织使用被派遣劳动者,依照本规定执行。”并未将机关事业单位列入使用被派遣劳动者的用工单位。而且,近年来国家有关部门在纠错、改进措施中明令禁止,例如:财政部令第102号《政府购买服务管理办法》第十条 “以下各项不得纳入政府购买服务范围:……购买主体的人员招、聘用,以劳务派遣方式用工,以及设置公益性岗位”。原告认为,被告一利用手中的权力对于原告的社会保险权利以“法未包含”即“违规”来“法无禁止而禁止”,对于自己大量使用劳务派遣工“法无授权”却滥用。被告一的这种做法,不仅公然违背了法治社会“公民权利法无禁止即自由,政府权力法无授权不可为”的基本要求,成为又一个类似“只许州官放火,不许百姓点灯”的典型案例。

 申请人认为自已经到了法定年龄,享受退休的资格与待遇,除了前述实际已缴费的年限及对政府信赖利益保护原则以外,没有任一现行法律的条款明确规定服刑人员在服刑期间不得参与社会保险(包括社保缴费)。而在对申请人的两次判刑的判决书中,判决了剥夺一定期限的人身自由与政治权利,并没有判决剥夺社会经济权利当然包括享有社会保险的权利。根据中华人民共和国政府1997年10月27日签署、全国人民代表大会常务委员会2001年2月28日批准的已经具备法律效力的《经济、社会及文化权利国际公约》“第九条:本盟约缔约国确认人人享有社会保障,包括社会保险”的规定,申请人陈树庆并不因为其服刑就成了“人人”之外,应该享有社会保险。

 更何况,本案如果进一步展开下去,还牵涉到中国监狱普遍的对犯人强迫无偿劳动的问题。原告陈树庆第一次坐牢期间自2008年1月至2010年9月共计2年零8个月在浙江省乔司监狱六分监狱七监区参与生产外贸箱包3个月及伙房菜班组进行菜肴初加工2年5个月;第二次坐牢期间自2017年1月至2025年3月共计8年2个月在浙江省乔司监狱三分监狱六监区参与生产外贸箱包3个月及伙房面食组烧制犯人主食7年11个月。两次坐牢期间不算第一次坐牢看守所里的零星劳动,实际参加监狱劳动累计10年10个月,所以,根据早在1948年12月10日联合国大会通过的《世界人权宣言》第四条:“任何人不得使为奴隶或奴役,一切形式的奴隶制度和奴隶买卖,均应禁止”;第二十二条“每个人,作为社会的一员,有享有社会保障,并有权享有他的个人尊严和人格的自由发展所必须的经济、社会和文化方面各种权利的实现,……”;第二十三条第(二)款“人人有同工同酬之权利,不容任何区别”。中华人民共和国政府1998年10月5日签署的《公民权利及政治权利国际公约》也有“任何人不得使充奴工”的相关规定。按照这些国际法的要求,即使监狱犯人依法判决并以改造为目标的强制服“苦役”,也应与《中华人民共和国劳动法》相应的同工同酬及社会保险接轨。如果作为联合国常任理事国的我国政府能够遵守这些宣言与公约,将原告服刑期间参加劳动应有的劳动报酬与社会保障予以考量和贯彻,即使原告自己及亲朋好友工作单位替我服刑期间的缴费不算甚至没有交费,也够15年以上办理退休的资格与相关手续。

 当然,政府遵守已经签署,甚至有的已经批准的《国际公约》,不仅是法治社会依法行政的要求,也是一个文明社会起码的“公序良俗”。

 综上,鉴于原告实际社保缴费24年4个月已经超过规定的最低缴费标准15年,鉴于无论第一被告出具的《告知书》、《告知单》还是第二被告做出的《复议决定书》中都无视作为一个法治政府及其机关在行政中不可忽视的下述事实及其法律效果:

 (一)原告人本人及打工企业、家属等在过去缴纳或补交社保费用时从未遇到服刑期间不能缴费的告知,在本案原告办理退休资格确认时提出《政府信息公开申请》前《浙人社函[2010]358号复函(此件依申请公开)》从未公开,不能作为政府违约赖账对抗不知情相对人,从而严重损害政府行为的信赖利益保障原则;

 (二)在法律适用“范围”的解释与应用时,被告对己对人双重标准。对于自己的人员招收和使用,“法律未包含”而公然且大量使用劳务派遣工严重侵犯同工同酬的法律要求,却对原告社保权利以“法律未包含”即所谓的“违规”予以排除,这种“只许州官放火,不许百姓点灯”行径,有违于法治社会“政府行为法无授权不可为,民众行为法无禁止即自由”的基本要求;

 (三)《中华人民共和国劳动法》、《中华人民共和国社会保险法》及其他任何一个具有《中华人民共和国立法法》所包含的具有法律地位与效力的规范性文件对于服刑期间的社保参与人并没有强制性条款明确排除;

 (四)法院对于本案原告已生效判决只明确剥夺人身及政治权利并没有剥夺社会经济权利(包括社会保险的权利),本案被告行为是对原告超越现行法律明确规定的额外“惩罚”;

 (五)原告服刑期间参加劳动及我国政府已经加入或批准具有国家法律效力的国际公约对于公民同工同酬及普遍无例外的社会保障要求。

 对于上述原告围绕争议焦点提出的五点理由,两被告在本案具体行政行为中如果是不能回答(认可或依法反驳),说明本案被告的行政失信行为经不起认真的依法推敲;如果是不屑回答,涉嫌权力肆无忌惮的傲慢,为建设法治社会、建立法治政府之大忌,更加应该加以制止和防范。

 至此,原告特提起本案行政诉讼,请求贵院依法审判此案,对原告的诉讼请求予以支持,促使被告一及时办理原告的退休资格并履行对原告按照缴费24年4个月年限应负的社会保险责任,同时撤销被告二做出的《杭州市拱墅区人民政府行政复议决定书》杭拱政复[2026]67号。

  

此致!
 杭州市拱墅区人民法院

  

                          具状人:陈树庆
                           2026年5月12 日

  附: 

一、 本诉状副本2份;

二、 原告陈树庆身份证复印件包含正反两面1份;

三、《养老保险历年参保证明》1份;

四、《杭州市拱墅区社会保险管理服务中心办理事项告知单》1份;

五、 盖有“杭州市拱墅区社会保险管理服务中心”印章的《告知书》1份;

六、《浙人社函[2010]358号》1份;

七、《杭州市拱墅区人民政府行政复议决定书》杭拱政复[2026]67号1份;

行政起诉状

Administrative Complaint

Plaintiff: Chen Shuqing, male, native of Hangzhou City, Zhejiang Province, currently residing at Room 202, Unit 5, Building 6, Daguan Yuan Dong Wu Yuan, Gongshu District, Hangzhou City, ID Number: 330106196509260073, Contact Phone: 15958160478.

Defendant One: Human Resources and Social Security Bureau of Gongshu District, Hangzhou City
Address: No. 1 Wenhui Road, Gongshu District, Hangzhou City, Contact Phone: 0571-89505558
Responsible Person: Lin Yi
Position: Director

Defendant Two: People’s Government of Gongshu District, Hangzhou City
Address: No. 1 Taizhou Road, Gongshu District, Hangzhou City, Contact Phone: 0571-89509522
Responsible Person: Chen Yu
Position: District Mayor

Cause of Action: Administrative Confirmation

Claims:

1.Request Defendant One, the Human Resources and Social Security Bureau of Gongshu District, Hangzhou City, to fulfill its statutory social insurance responsibilities and timely complete the procedures for confirming the retirement qualification of the Plaintiff and verifying the retirement pension due;

2.Request to revoke the “Administrative Reconsideration Decision of the People’s Government of Gongshu District, Hangzhou City” Hang Gong Zheng Fu [2026] No. 67 issued by Defendant Two, the People’s Government of Gongshu District, Hangzhou City.

Facts and Reasons:

The Plaintiff, Chen Shuqing, reached the age of 60 years and 3 months on December 25, 2025. He has actually paid into the social insurance pool for 24 years and 4 months, exceeding the minimum payment period of 15 years. When handling retirement procedures in December 2025, the staff of Defendant One, the Human Resources and Social Security Bureau of Gongshu District, Hangzhou City, on the grounds that the Plaintiff was sentenced to 4 years in prison in 2007 for the crime of inciting subversion of state power and 10 years and 6 months in prison in 2016 for the crime of subverting state power, deducted the total accumulated years of the two prison sentences from the social security payment period, leaving the remaining payment period at only 9-plus years, which is less than the minimum payment period, and refused to process the Plaintiff’s retirement procedures.

During repeated negotiations, the Plaintiff was dissatisfied with Defendant One’s staff members remaining at the level of verbal, ambiguous statements regarding “according to relevant policies,” and previously submitted an application for government information disclosure. On December 25, 2025, Chen Zupeng, a staff member of Defendant One, issued to the Plaintiff in his office the “Handling Matters Notification Form of the Social Insurance Management and Service Center of Gongshu District, Hangzhou City,” the “Notification Letter,” and the “Reply Concerning Issues Related to Basic Endowment Insurance for Persons Sentenced to Fixed-Term Imprisonment (This Document Disclosed Upon Application)” (Zhe Ren She Han [2010] No. 358), formally and in writing confirming Defendant One’s decision to refuse to process the Plaintiff’s retirement procedures.

The Plaintiff believes that the files mentioned above apply the law improperly and lack sufficient policy validity. He applied for administrative reconsideration regarding this matter on January 27, 2026. The “Administrative Reconsideration Decision of the People’s Government of Gongshu District, Hangzhou City” Hang Gong Zheng Fu [2026] No. 67, made by Defendant Two, the People’s Government of Gongshu District, on April 30, 2026, sustained the aforementioned “Notification Form” by which the respondent (namely Defendant One in this case) refused to handle Chen Shuqing’s retirement procedures. The Plaintiff does not accept this and now files an administrative lawsuit with your Honorable Court, requesting a trial in accordance with the law and a just judgment.

The Plaintiff believes that the spirit of contract is the cornerstone for the stable operation of a modern civilized society. The people take officials as their teachers; for the whole society to be honest and trustworthy, government behavior must set an example. In this case, for more than 20 years, the Plaintiff, the Plaintiff’s family members, and the units where the Plaintiff worked or where his social security was registered paid social insurance for the Plaintiff. They never encountered any clear notification that payments could not be made during the period of serving a sentence. Even after the Plaintiff was released from prison for the last time upon completion of his sentence on March 10, 2025, he went several times to Defendant One’s government service center located at No. 58 Xiangjisi East Road, Gongshu District, to make up for the broken payments of recent years (including periods within part of the prison terms), and all were successfully completed. The Defendant was perfectly fine when collecting insurance premium payments, but now, when the Defendant is required to fulfill its insurance responsibilities, it suddenly changes its mind. Using the so-called “belonging to non-compliant participation in insurance and premium payment” as a pretext, it refuses to perform the social insurance responsibilities that the Defendant should bear, but makes the payer, the Plaintiff Chen Shuqing in this case, unilaterally bear the adverse consequences of the so-called “non-compliance,” causing the principle of protecting the trust interest of the masses in government behavior to completely vanish.

As can be seen from the “Notification Letter” provided by Defendant One, its reasons for overturning the agreement and refusing to fulfill the social insurance responsibility toward the Plaintiff are: according to Paragraph 1 of Article 2 of the “Labor Law of the People’s Republic of China,” “This Law applies to enterprises and individual economic organizations (hereinafter collectively referred to as employing units) within the territory of the People’s Republic of China and laborers who form a labor relationship with them,” and Article 72, “Employing units and laborers must participate in social insurance and pay social insurance premiums in accordance with the law”; Paragraph 1 and Paragraph 2 of Article 10 of the “Social Insurance Law of the People’s Republic of China,” “Employees shall participate in basic endowment insurance, and basic endowment insurance premiums shall be jointly paid by employing units and employees. Individual industrial and commercial households without employees, part-time employees who do not participate in basic endowment insurance in employing units, and other flexible employment personnel may participate in basic endowment insurance, and basic endowment insurance premiums shall be paid by individuals”; and the provisions of the “Reply of the Department of Human Resources and Social Security of Zhejiang Province Concerning Issues Related to Basic Endowment Insurance for Persons Sentenced to Fixed-Term Imprisonment” (Zhe Ren She Han [2010] No. 358) stating that “Persons serving sentences during the period of serving sentences do not belong to the targets of participation in basic endowment insurance for employees.”

Obviously, the provisions in the aforementioned “Labor Law” and “Social Insurance Law,” including the “Regulations of Zhejiang Province on Basic Endowment Insurance for Employees,” require employing units and laborers to pay social insurance premiums. The legislative purpose is to protect the social insurance rights of employed personnel, and there is no mandatory provision inside stating that “persons serving sentences cannot participate in social insurance.” As for the “Reply” Zhe Ren She Han [2010] No. 358, it is marked as “(This Document Disclosed Upon Application).” According to the legal principle that a law does not take effect unless it is promulgated, “disclosed upon application” cannot be equated with “promulgation” and has no effect against an uninformed counterpart. The date on which the “Reply” was made is “September 30, 2010,” and the date of printing and distribution is October 9, 2010. It obviously has no retroactive effect on the four-year period of the Plaintiff’s first prison sentence, which had already ended on September 13, 2010. Furthermore, the “Reply” does not possess the status and effect of laws, administrative regulations, local regulations, autonomous regulations, separate regulations, or rules under the “Legislation Law of the People’s Republic of China.” It belongs to a “game rule” formulated by a government department without legislative power for itself, acting as “both the athlete and the referee.” The phrase “persons serving sentences cannot participate in social insurance” referred to therein clearly falls under Article 99 of the “Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court on the Application of the ‘Administrative Litigation Law of the People’s Republic of China'” (effective February 8, 2018), which outlines typical circumstances regarding administrative subjects being “seriously and obviously illegal.” Specifically: “Second, administrative acts that reduce rights (in this case: prohibited by the ‘Reply’ while not explicitly prohibited by law) or increase obligations (combined with current policies, the result of the ‘Reply’ in this case: requiring the Plaintiff to separately increase the obligation of continuous social security payments every year after the age of 60 until 5 years later when it is allowed to make up the full 15 years, before being able to enjoy the retirement qualification he should have had long ago) have no legal basis.” Therefore, the “Reply” cannot serve as a basis for the government itself to breach the contract. As the saying goes, “A law cannot stand without virtue.” The principle of a good law, such as Article 99 of the Supreme Court’s “Interpretation” on the application of administrative litigation, should not only be published in form but should be applied even more in judicial practice.

When the Plaintiff was negotiating with the staff of Defendant One, a staff member explained: “During your time in prison, you were unable to become a real laborer of a paying enterprise as stipulated in the aforementioned legal clauses such as the ‘Labor Law.’ Your employee endowment insurance was merely a virtual form of payment on your behalf, which does not comply with the provisions of laws and policies.” At that time, the Plaintiff defended himself by saying: “Payment of social security on behalf of others has not been explicitly prohibited by law to this day; it is a policy that has been defaulted to and widely implemented in practice since the overall pooling of social insurance began. For nearly twenty years, many front-line staff members of state organs and public institutions, including your human resources and social security departments, have not actually worked at labor dispatch units, but have had their remuneration paid and social security premiums paid on their behalf by labor dispatch units. You cannot have double standards for others and for yourselves.” They replied: “Labor dispatch has laws to rely on.” After the event, the Plaintiff further understood the laws, regulations, rules regarding labor dispatch and the history and current situation of state organs and public institutions using dispatched workers, and discovered that this is an attempt to actually transcend the provisions of the law in a “legal” form, covering up the status-based occupational discrimination caused by the actual dual-track system inside and outside the staff establishment. It is an act that seriously violates the “equal pay for equal work” requirement of laws such as the “Labor Law” and the “Labor Contract Law.” It transcends the scope of personnel use authorized by law because Article 2 of the “Interim Provisions on Labor Dispatch” explicitly stipulates: “This Provision applies where labor dispatch units engage in labor dispatch business and enterprises (hereinafter referred to as employing units) use dispatched laborers. Where partnership organizations such as accounting firms and law firms established according to law, as well as organizations such as foundations and private non-enterprise units use dispatched laborers, they shall execute in accordance with this Provision.” It does not list state organs and public institutions among the employing units that use dispatched laborers. Moreover, in recent years, relevant state departments have explicitly prohibited this in measures for correcting errors and making improvements. For example, Article 10 of the Ministry of Finance Decree No. 102 “Administrative Measures for Government Procurement of Services” stipulates: “The following items shall not be included in the scope of government procurement of services: … the recruitment and hiring of personnel by the purchasing entity, the use of labor in the form of labor dispatch, and the setting up of public welfare posts.” The Plaintiff believes that Defendant One uses the power in its hands to “prohibit what is not prohibited by law” by labeling the Plaintiff’s social insurance rights as “non-compliant” because they are “not included in the law,” while abusing its own power to extensively use dispatched workers despite having “no authorization by law.” This practice of Defendant One not only openly violates the basic requirement of a society under the rule of law that “for citizens, what is not prohibited by law is freedom; for the government, power cannot be exercised without authorization by law,” but also becomes another typical case similar to “the magistrate may light a fire, while the common people are forbid even to light a lamp.”

The Applicant believes that he has reached the statutory age and is qualified for and entitled to enjoy retirement benefits. Apart from the aforementioned years of actual premium payments and the principle of protecting the trust interest in the government, there is no single clause in any current law that explicitly stipulates that persons serving sentences must not participate in social insurance (including social security premium payments) during the period of serving sentences. In the judgment documents of the two sentences against the Applicant, the deprivation of personal freedom and political rights for a certain period was adjudged, but the deprivation of socio-economic rights—which naturally includes the right to enjoy social insurance—was not adjudged. According to the provisions of Article 9 of the “International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,” which was signed by the Government of the People’s Republic of China on October 27, 1997, approved by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on February 28, 2001, and already possesses legal validity: “The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to social security, including social insurance.” The Applicant, Chen Shuqing, does not cease to be part of “everyone” just because he served a sentence, and he should enjoy social insurance.

Furthermore, if this case is further expanded, it also involves the problem of forced unpaid labor of prisoners that is widespread in Chinese prisons. During the Plaintiff Chen Shuqing’s first imprisonment, from January 2008 to September 2010, totaling 2 years and 8 months, he participated in the production of foreign trade luggage and bags for 3 months in the Seventh Ward of the Sixth Sub-prison of Qiaosi Prison, Zhejiang Province, and performed preliminary processing of dishes in the kitchen vegetable team for 2 years and 5 months; during his second imprisonment, from January 2017 to March 2025, totaling 8 years and 2 months, he participated in the production of foreign trade luggage and bags for 3 months in the Six Ward of the Third Sub-prison of Qiaosi Prison, Zhejiang Province, and cooked prisoners’ staple food in the kitchen pastry team for 7 years and 11 months. During the two prison terms, excluding scattered labor in the detention center during the first imprisonment, he actually participated in prison labor for a cumulative total of 10 years and 10 months. Therefore, according to Article 4 of the “Universal Declaration of Human Rights” adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on December 10, 1948: “No one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all their forms”; Article 22: “Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security and is entitled to realization, through national effort and international co-operation and in accordance with the organization and resources of each State, of the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his personality”; Article 23, Paragraph (2): “Everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to equal pay for equal work.” The “International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,” signed by the Government of the People’s Republic of China on October 5, 1998, also has relevant provisions stating that “No one shall be required to perform forced or compulsory labor.” According to the requirements of these international laws, even if prison inmates are sentenced according to law and perform forced “hard labor” with rehabilitation as the goal, it should also be connected with the corresponding equal pay for equal work and social insurance under the “Labor Law of the People’s Republic of China.” If our government, as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, can abide by these declarations and covenants, and take into consideration and implement the labor remuneration and social security that the Plaintiff should have had for participating in labor during his prison terms, even if the payments made by the Plaintiff himself and his relatives’ or friends’ working units during his prison terms do not count or if no payments were made, it would still be enough for more than 15 years to qualify for retirement and relevant procedures.

Of course, the government’s compliance with the “International Covenants” it has signed, and some of which it has approved, is not only a requirement for administration according to law in a rule-of-law society, but also the baseline “public order and good customs” of a civilized society.

To sum up, in view of the fact that the Plaintiff’s actual social security payment of 24 years and 4 months has already exceeded the stipulated minimum payment standard of 15 years, and in view of the fact that whether in the “Notification Letter” and “Notification Form” issued by the First Defendant or the “Reconsideration Decision” made by the Second Defendant, they all ignore the following facts and their legal effects, which cannot be neglected in the administration of a government under the rule of law and its organs:

(1) The Plaintiff himself, the enterprises where he worked, and his family members never encountered any notification that payments could not be made during the period of serving sentences when paying or making up social security expenses in the past. Before the Plaintiff in this case submitted the “Application for Government Information Disclosure” when processing his retirement qualification confirmation, the “Zhe Ren She Han [2010] No. 358 Reply (This Document Disclosed Upon Application)” had never been made public. It cannot be used as a basis for the government to breach the contract and deny debts against an uninformed counterpart, thereby seriously damaging the principle of protecting trust interests in government behavior;

(2) When interpreting and applying the “scope” of legal application, the Defendants use double standards for themselves and for others. For the recruitment and use of their own personnel, they openly and extensively use dispatched workers despite it being “not included in the law,” which seriously violates the legal requirement of equal pay for equal work; yet, they exclude the Plaintiff’s social security rights by labeling them as so-called “non-compliant” because they are “not included in the law.” This act of “the magistrate may light a fire, while the common people are forbid even to light a lamp” violates the basic requirements of a rule-of-law society that “government behavior cannot be done without authorization by law, and public behavior is freedom if not prohibited by law”;

(3) The “Labor Law of the People’s Republic of China,” the “Social Insurance Law of the People’s Republic of China,” and any other normative document possessing legal status and validity included under the “Legislation Law of the People’s Republic of China” do not contain mandatory clauses explicitly excluding social security participants during their prison sentences;

(4) The legally effective judgments of the court against the Plaintiff in this case only explicitly deprived him of his personal freedom and political rights, and did not deprive him of his socio-economic rights (including the right to social insurance). The behavior of the Defendants in this case is an extra “punishment” on the Plaintiff that transcends the explicit provisions of current laws;

(5) The fact that the Plaintiff participated in labor during his prison sentences and the international covenants joined or approved by our government that possess national legal validity require equal pay for equal work and universal social security without exception for citizens.

Regarding the above five reasons raised by the Plaintiff around the focus of the dispute, if the two Defendants cannot answer them (either accept them or refute them according to law) in the specific administrative acts of this case, it shows that the Defendant’s administrative dishonesty cannot withstand serious scrutiny according to law; if they disdain to answer, it involves the reckless arrogance of power, which is a great taboo in building a society under the rule of law and establishing a government under the rule of law, and should be all the more stopped and guarded against.

At this juncture, the Plaintiff specially files this administrative lawsuit, requesting your Honorable Court to try this case in accordance with the law, support the Plaintiff’s claims, urge Defendant One to timely handle the Plaintiff’s retirement qualification and fulfill the social insurance responsibilities it should bear according to the payment period of 24 years and 4 months, and simultaneously revoke the “Administrative Reconsideration Decision of the People’s Government of Gongshu District, Hangzhou City” Hang Gong Zheng Fu [2026] No. 67 made by Defendant Two.

Sincerely,

To: People’s Court of Gongshu District, Hangzhou City

Complainant: Chen Shuqing

May 12, 2026

Enclosures:

1.Two copies of this Complaint;

2.One copy of the Plaintiff Chen Shuqing’s ID card, including both the front and back sides;

3.One copy of the “Proof of Historical Participation in Endowment Insurance”;

4.One copy of the “Handling Matters Notification Form of the Social Insurance Management and Service Center of Gongshu District, Hangzhou City”;

5.One copy of the “Notification Letter” stamped with the seal of the “Social Insurance Management and Service Center of Gongshu District, Hangzhou City”;

6.One copy of “Zhe Ren She Han [2010] No. 358”;

7.One copy of the “Administrative Reconsideration Decision of the People’s Government of Gongshu District, Hangzhou City” Hang Gong Zheng Fu [2026] No. 67.

行政起诉状

母亲节随想

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 作者:金米

 朋友圈里的母亲节上周就开始了。 各类商家带头出来,呼吁关爱妈妈,鲜花、红包、转账、祝福长文,这样一年一场集体性的表演,我看了很多年。人们在今天高喊“母亲伟大”,可到了明天,又默认一个女人就该回到厨房、婚姻和忍耐里。 我始终不太喜欢“母亲节快乐”这句话,我只是祝愿过少数几个活出女性姿态的女性。在我这里,她们对孩子无私,但仍保有自我,这才是我欣赏的母亲。我认为首先懂得爱自己的母亲才有能力和精力去爱孩子。 所以,那些铺天盖地的节日祝福,在我这里就像一种奖章。奖励她们又一年没有崩溃,没有逃走,没有停止奉献。 不得不承认,至少我看到的中国社会直到今天,骨子里依然默认女性是“附属品”。年轻时是谁的女儿,结婚后是谁的妻子,老了是谁的母亲。 唯独很少有人问,她自己是谁。 很多女性从小被教育要懂事、顾家、情绪稳定。她们被允许温柔,却不被允许自私;被要求牺牲,却不能喊累。社会一边歌颂“伟大的母亲”,一边又默认家务、育儿、照顾老人,本来就该是她的责任。 最荒唐的是,人们竟把这种消耗叫作女性应该具备的美德,如果没有,那就是不道德的事。 可一个人如果长期不能做自己,再体面的生活,也只是缓慢的窒息。 比起节日里的歌颂,我更希望她们能真正自由一点。可以不贤惠,可以不伟大,可以不永远把别人放在前面。 真正的爱,从来不是在今天集体喊一句“母亲节快乐”。而是在每一个普通日子里,都允许她首先成为她自己。 我很少会刻意在今天说一句“母亲节快乐”。因为我对妈妈的爱,不是集中在某个被提醒的日子里,而是藏在一年四季无数个寻常时刻。 比起“节日快乐”,我更希望妈妈们这一生,能够真正做自己。不只是某个人的母亲、妻子、女儿,也依然是那个有热爱、有情绪、有梦想的人。 愿妈妈们不用永远坚强,不用总把别人放在前面。 愿她们自由、松弛、平安,活得肆意热烈,不论何时何地何把年纪,也依旧对世界怀有温柔与好奇。 孩子爱妈妈,从来不需要靠一个节日来证明。

编辑:钟然 校对:熊辩 翻译:周敏

 

Reflections on Mother’s Day

Author: Jin Mi

Abstract: Behind the bustle of Mother’s Day, many women are still expected by default to bear sacrifice and devotion. Compared to the praise during the festival, what is more important is to allow them, in their daily lives, to truly possess the freedom and dignity to be themselves.

Mother’s Day in the Friends Circle (Moments) started as early as last week.

Various merchants took the lead to come out, calling for care for mothers—flowers, red envelopes, money transfers, long text blessings. This kind of annual, collective performance is something I have watched for many years.

Today, people loudly shout “Mothers are great,” but by tomorrow, they default to the idea that a woman should return to the kitchen, marriage, and endurance.

I have always disliked the phrase “Happy Mother’s Day” somewhat; I only wish it to a few women who live out a true feminine stance. In my view, they are selfless toward their children but still retain themselves—this is the kind of mother I admire. I believe that only a mother who first knows how to love herself has the capacity and energy to love her child.

Therefore, those overwhelming festival blessings feel to me like a medal. Rewarding them for another year of not breaking down, not running away, and not stopping their devotion.

It must be admitted that, at least in the Chinese society I see even today, people still default in their bones to the idea that women are “appendages.” A daughter to someone when young, a wife to someone after marriage, and a mother to someone when old.

Yet, rarely does anyone ask who she herself is.

Many women are educated from childhood to be sensible, family-oriented, and emotionally stable. They are permitted to be gentle, but not permitted to be selfish; they are required to sacrifice, but cannot complain about being tired. Society praises “great mothers” on one hand, while defaulting to the idea that housework, childcare, and caring for the elderly are naturally her responsibilities on the other.

The most absurd part is that people actually call this consumption a virtue that women ought to possess; if they do not have it, it is deemed an immoral thing.

But if a person cannot be themselves for a long time, no matter how decent life looks, it is just a slow suffocation.

Compared to the praise during festivals, I prefer that they could be truly a bit more free. It is okay not to be virtuous, okay not to be great, and okay not to always put others first.

True love is never about collectively shouting “Happy Mother’s Day” today. Rather, it is about allowing her, in every ordinary day, to first become herself.

I rarely deliberately say “Happy Mother’s Day” today. Because my love for my mother is not concentrated on a certain reminded day, but is hidden in countless ordinary moments throughout the four seasons of the year.

Compared to “Happy Festival,” I prefer that mothers, in this lifetime, can truly be themselves. Not just someone’s mother, wife, or daughter, but still that person who has passions, emotions, and dreams.

May mothers not have to be strong forever, and not always have to put others first.

May they be free, relaxed, and safe, living willfully and passionately, retaining gentleness and curiosity toward the world no matter when, where, or at what age.

A child’s love for their mother never needs a festival to be proven.

Editor: Zhong Ran Proofreader: Xiong Bian Translator: Zhou Min

鋼鐵春暉:獻給所有在中共暴政下抗爭的女性

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作者:鄭偉

      摘要 :致敬在中共高壓下堅持抗爭的女性與母親,讚揚她們在迫害與監控中守護真相、法治與自由的不屈勇氣。 

        在這個溫柔的節日,我們將目光投向那些在風暴中依然堅持、堅守、溫暖的女性。

        她們是母親。但她們的“母親”身份,在暴政下被賦予了更為沉重,也更為悲壯的含義。

        我們致敬“天安門母親”。她們是一群被惡魔奪走孩子的母親,在長達三十七年的漫長黑夜裡,她們用孱弱的身體築起真相的長城。她們拒絕遺忘,拒絕沉默,在嚴密的監控和年歲的蠶食下,依然堅持著那一聲對正義的追問。她們是中國當代最堅韌的良心。

        我們致敬維權母親。如丁家喜的妻子羅勝春,高智晟的妻子耿和,余文生的妻子許艷,王全璋的妻子李文足,維權媽媽何方美、可可……她們原本或許只是想做一個平靜生活的妻子、媽媽,但當暴政奪走了丈夫、孩子的自由和健康,她們在恐懼中起身,從一位普通女性轉變為在法院門口,在國際舞台上疾呼的人權捍衛者。她們用柔弱的雙肩,扛起了營救家人和追求法治的雙重重擔。

        我們更要致敬那些自己身陷囹圄、不斷抗爭的女性代表。是張展用絕食的身軀展現的道德高度,是黃雪琴用筆寫下的女性尊嚴,是王宇在酷刑前不屈的法律人風骨,是王荔蕻在弱勢群體前的抗爭,是熱依拉·達吾提對民族文化血脈的堅守。還有“白紙運動”中那些年輕的面孔,她們用青春的勇氣打破了沉默,證明了正義的火種未曾在年輕一代中熄滅。

        在中共的強權下,她們面臨的是全方位的迫害:非法的拘禁,獄中的酷刑,剝奪通訊,醫療權的虐待、對家人的監控與威脅。暴政企圖通過摧毀她們的身體、割裂她們的家庭關係來讓她們屈服。

        然而,她們沒有屈服。

        她們的抗爭,超越了個人的不幸。她們在為孩子追求一個免於恐懼的未來,她們在為社會追求一個有法治、有真相的明天。

       暴政可以囚禁她們的身體,卻無法囚禁她們的意志;可以切斷她們與外界的聯繫,卻無法切斷她們與正義的共鳴。

       在這個母親節,讓我們記住這些名字:丁子霖、張先玲、張展、王宇、黃雪琴、曹芷馨……她們是女兒、是妻子、是母親,更是鋼鐵般的公民。

        她們的堅韌,如同寒冬後的春暉,雖然微弱,卻在無情地消融著暴政的冰雪。

        致敬她們的勇氣!祈願她們的自由!

        祝福所有偉大的女性,母親節快樂!

編輯:胡麗莉 校对:熊辩 翻译:周敏

Steel Spring Radiance: Dedicated to All Women Resisting Under CCP Tyranny

Author: Zheng Wei

Abstract: A tribute to the women and mothers who persist in resistance under high pressure from the CCP, praising their unyielding courage in guarding truth, the rule of law, and freedom amidst persecution and surveillance.

On this gentle holiday, we turn our gaze toward those women who still persist, hold fast, and remain warm amidst the storm.

They are mothers. But their identity as “mothers,” under tyranny, has been endowed with a heavier and more tragic meaning.

We pay tribute to the “Tiananmen Mothers.” They are a group of mothers whose children were snatched away by demons. In the long night spanning thirty-seven years, they have used their frail bodies to build a Great Wall of truth. They refuse to forget, refuse to remain silent; under strict surveillance and the erosion of age, they still persist in that one inquiry for justice. They are the most resilient conscience of contemporary China.

We pay tribute to the rights-defense mothers. Such as Luo Shengchun, wife of Ding Jiaxi; Geng He, wife of Gao Zhisheng; Xu Yan, wife of Yu Wensheng; Li Wenzu, wife of Wang Quanzhang; and rights-defense mothers He Fangmei, Keke… They might have originally just wanted to be wives and mothers living a peaceful life, but when tyranny took away the freedom and health of their husbands and children, they stood up amidst fear, transforming from ordinary women into human rights defenders shouting at court gates and on international stages. With their delicate shoulders, they have carried the double burden of rescuing their families and pursuing the rule of law.

We must pay even greater tribute to those female representatives who are themselves imprisoned and constantly resisting. It is the moral height shown by Zhang Zhan with her hunger-striking body; it is the female dignity written by Huang Xueqin with her pen; it is the unyielding integrity of a legal professional shown by Wang Yu in the face of torture; it is the struggle of Wang Lihong before vulnerable groups; it is Rahile Dawut’s persistence in guarding the cultural lifeblood of her nation. There are also those young faces in the “White Paper Movement”; they used the courage of youth to break the silence, proving that the sparks of justice have never been extinguished among the younger generation.

Under the power of the CCP, they face all-around persecution: illegal detention, torture in prison, deprivation of communication, abuse of medical rights, and surveillance and threats against their families. Tyranny attempts to make them yield by destroying their bodies and severing their family relationships.

However, they have not yielded.

Their struggle transcends personal misfortune. They are pursuing a future free from fear for their children; they are pursuing a tomorrow with the rule of law and truth for society.

Tyranny can imprison their bodies, but it cannot imprison their will; it can cut off their connection with the outside world, but it cannot cut off their resonance with justice.

On this Mother’s Day, let us remember these names: Ding Zilin, Zhang Xianling, Zhang Zhan, Wang Yu, Huang Xueqin, Cao Zhixin… They are daughters, wives, mothers, and even more so, citizens of steel.

Their resilience is like the spring radiance after a cold winter; though faint, it is relentlessly melting the ice and snow of tyranny.

Salute their courage! Pray for their freedom! Blessings to all great women, Happy Mother’s Day!

Editor: Hu Lili Proofreader: Xiong Bian Translator: Zhou Min

历史不会因沉默而消失

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作者:周小星  

1989年6月4日,北京。

一群渴望自由、反腐败、追求民主与法治的学生和市民,最终等来的不是对话,而是坦克、子弹和镇压。

那一年,来自全国各地的大学生走上街头,他们并非暴徒,也不是所谓“动乱分子”。很多人只是单纯地希望国家变得更好,希望结束腐败,希望拥有更多言论自由,希望中国能够走向更加开放和文明的未来。

他们聚集在天安门广场,静坐、绝食、演讲,用和平方式表达诉求。广场上有年轻人的理想,也有普通市民对未来的期待。

但中共最终选择了最残酷的方式回应。

军队开进北京,坦克驶入街道,枪口对准自己的人民。长安街上的枪声、履带声和哭喊声,成为那个时代最沉重的记忆。许多年轻生命永远停留在1989年的夏天,很多家庭从此支离破碎。

真正令人愤怒和悲哀的,不仅仅是那一夜发生的流血事件,更是37年来中共对这段历史持续不断的封锁和掩盖。

在中国,“六·四”成了禁词,相关书籍被删除,网络内容被屏蔽,讨论被压制。无数年轻人甚至从未听说过这段历史。一个政权如果真的问心无愧,就不会如此恐惧人民记住过去。

中共害怕的从来不是纪念本身,而是真相被更多人知道。

因为一旦人们开始了解历史,就会明白:当一个政权把维稳置于人民生命之上,把不同声音视为威胁,把遗忘当作统治工具,它最惧怕的永远是独立思考和自由意志。

37年过去,很多事情已经改变,但有些伤口仍未愈合。

纪念“六·四”,不是为了沉浸在仇恨中,而是拒绝遗忘,拒绝让谎言改写历史。

历史不会因为删帖、封号和沉默而消失。

那些逝去的生命,值得被记住;那段被掩盖的历史,值得被讲述。

铭记1989,勿忘“六·四”。

自由从来不是免费的。

编辑:钟然 校对:熊辩 翻译:周敏

History Will Not Vanish Through Silence

Author: Zhou Xiaoxing

Abstract: During the June 4th Incident in 1989, students and citizens pursuing democracy and freedom were met with military suppression by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). For 37 years, the authorities have continuously blocked the truth of history, but history and the deceased should not be forgotten.

June 4, 1989, Beijing. A group of students and citizens longing for freedom, opposing corruption, and pursuing democracy and the rule of law ultimately did not receive dialogue, but rather tanks, bullets, and suppression.

That year, university students from all over the country took to the streets. They were not thugs, nor were they so-called “rioters.” Many simply hoped for the country to become better, hoped for an end to corruption, hoped for more freedom of speech, and hoped that China could move toward a more open and civilized future.

They gathered in Tiananmen Square—sitting in, fasting, and giving speeches—expressing their demands through peaceful means. In the square, there were the ideals of the youth and the expectations of ordinary citizens for the future.

However, the CCP ultimately chose the most brutal way to respond. The military marched into Beijing, tanks drove into the streets, and muzzles were aimed at their own people. The sound of gunfire, the roar of treads, and the cries on Chang’an Avenue became the heaviest memories of that era. Many young lives remained forever in the summer of 1989, and many families were shattered from that moment on.

What is truly infuriating and sorrowful is not only the bloodshed that occurred that night, but also the continuous blockade and cover-up of this history by the CCP for 37 years.

In China, “June 4th” has become a forbidden term. Relevant books are deleted, internet content is blocked, and discussions are suppressed. Countless young people have never even heard of this history. If a regime truly had a clear conscience, it would not fear the people remembering the past so much.

What the CCP fears has never been the act of commemoration itself, but rather the truth being known by more people. Because once people begin to understand history, they will realize: when a regime places “stability maintenance” above human life, regards different voices as threats, and uses forgetting as a tool of governance, what it fears most will always be independent thinking and free will.

Thirty-seven years have passed, and many things have changed, but some wounds have yet to heal. To commemorate “June 4th” is not to immerse oneself in hatred, but to refuse to forget and to refuse to let lies rewrite history.

History will not vanish because of deleted posts, banned accounts, or silence. Those lost lives deserve to be remembered; that covered-up history deserves to be told.

Remember 1989; do not forget “June 4th.” Freedom is never free.

Editor: Zhong Ran Proofreader: Xiong Bian Translator: Zhou Min

东航MU5735中共暴力切断真相

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东航MU5735中共暴力切断真相

作者:毛一炜

中共为了维持天下太平的谎言,将此事隐瞒。在中共统治下,面子高于人命。

2022年3月21日,东航MU5735航班在广西梧州呈垂直姿态坠毁,132条生命瞬间消逝。整整四年过去了,中国民航局的通报始终在绕圈子,除了机械性地重复“飞机没故障”、“天气没问题”,对最核心的坠机原因却像防贼一样严防死守。如果不是近期美国国家运输安全委员会(NTSB)公开了那份近两千页的调查数据,真相恐怕要被彻底埋在地底。

美方披露的数据直接戳穿了中共维持的太平假象。黑匣子记录得清清楚楚:在飞机脱离航线的瞬间,左右两台发动机的燃油控制开关被同时人为关闭,随后操纵杆被死死推向俯冲姿态。这根本不是什么机械意外,而是副机长张正平蓄谋已久的自杀行为。一个因降职和投资失败而心理扭曲的职业飞行员,在万米高空拉着131个无辜的乘客为他的绝望陪葬。

东航MU5735中共暴力切断真相

这种惨绝人寰的真相,在文明国家是必须公开的社会教训,但在中国,它却成了不能说的“国家机密”。

更令人心寒的是,真相在墙内遭到了疯狂的围追堵截。最近几天,抖音、小红书上有不少懂行的网友通过引用NTSB报告,以隐晦的方式科普了“副机长关闭发动机燃油开关”的细节。然而,这种极其微弱的真相火苗,仅仅燃烧了不到一天就被彻底扑灭。那些揭露事实的视频被成批删除,发帖的账号被禁言甚至封号。中共的网信部门像疯了一样清理所有关于5735航班的非官方解读,只留下一片死寂的沉默。

这就是血淋淋的现实:在中共治下,真相必须为政治让路,面子永远高于人命。132个家庭在长达四年的煎熬中,等不来一个诚实的交代,反而等来了冷冰冰的审查。这种对事实的隐瞒,是对遇难者家属的二次谋杀,是对生命尊严的极度践踏。

这一切再次向世人证明,在中共的统治下,中国根本没有新闻自由,媒体不过是粉饰太平的工具;这里更没有言论自由,老百姓哪怕只是想知道自己是怎么死的,都会被扣上“危害安全”的帽子。中共控制了整个新闻系统,甚至连中国人想知道事实真相的一点基本要求都要彻底剥夺。只要谎言的黑箱不被砸碎,每一个身处其中的普通人,都随时可能成为下一个无声消逝的牺牲品。

编辑:周志刚 校对:熊辩 翻译:戈冰

The Truth about the CCP’s Violent Disruption of China Eastern Airlines Flight MU5735

Author: Mao Yiwei

Abstract: On March 21, 2022, China Eastern Airlines flight MU5735 crashed in Wuzhou, Guangxi, killing 132 people.

The CCP concealed this incident in order to maintain the lie of a peaceful world.

Under the rule of the CCP, face is more important than human life.

On March 21, 2022, China Eastern Airlines flight MU5735 crashed vertically in Wuzhou, Guangxi, and 132 lives were lost in an instant.

A full four years have passed, and the Civil Aviation Administration of China’s statements have always been evasive. Apart from mechanically repeating that “the plane had no faults” and “the weather was fine,” the most crucial cause of the crash has been guarded like a secret.

If it were not for the recent release of nearly 2,000 pages of investigation data by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) of the United States, the truth would likely have been completely buried.

The data disclosed by the United States directly exposed the illusion of peace maintained by the CCP.

The black box records clearly: at the moment the plane deviated from its course, the fuel control switches of the left and right engines were manually turned off simultaneously, and then the control stick was pushed firmly into a dive position.

This was not a mechanical accident at all, but a long-planned suicide by the co-pilot, Zhang Zhengping.

A professional pilot, psychologically distorted by a demotion and investment failure, took 131 innocent passengers with him to an altitude of 10,000 meters to be buried with his despair.

东航MU5735中共暴力切断真相

The truth about this tragic event is a social lesson that must be made public in a civilized country, but in China, it has become a “state secret” that cannot be spoken of.

What is even more chilling is that the truth was frantically pursued and blocked within the walls.

In recent days, many knowledgeable netizens on Douyin and Xiaohongshu have quoted the NTSB report to subtly popularize the detail that “the co-pilot turned off the engine fuel switch.”

However, this extremely faint spark of truth burned for less than a day before being completely extinguished.

Those videos exposing the facts were deleted in bulk, and the accounts that posted them were banned or even suspended.

The CCP’s cybersecurity department frantically purged all unofficial interpretations of Flight 5735, leaving only a dead silence.

This is the bloody reality: under the rule of the CCP, the truth must give way to politics, and face is always more important than human life.

After four years of torment, 132 families have not received an honest explanation, but instead have received cold censorship.

This concealment of the facts is a second murder of the families of the victims and an extreme trampling of the dignity of life.

All this once again proves to the world that under the rule of the CCP, there is no freedom of the press in China at all, and the media is nothing more than a tool for whitewashing the situation. There is even less freedom of speech here. Even if ordinary people just want to know how their loved ones died, they will be labeled as “endangering security.”

The CCP controls the entire news system, and even the basic right of the Chinese people to know the truth is completely denied.

As long as the black box of lies is not smashed, every ordinary person inside it could become the next victim to disappear silently at any time.

Editor: Zhou Zhigang Proofreader: Xiong Bian Translator: Ge Bing

人民的钱,党做主

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——中国银行管控的系统性不对称

作者:周敏

编辑:胡丽莉 校对:王滨 翻译:戈冰

银行,在世人常识中是储户资金最安全的去处。存入,取出,天经地义。但是你发现没有?近年来,一个奇异的景象在中国银行体系中反复上演:骗子和内部人员能以惊人的效率将储户的钱转走,而储户自己要取回这笔钱,却要面对预约、盘问、证明、审查,乃至被拒之门外。

而这番景象,究根结底,是1949年后中国一切为党服务的制度设计之必然结果。

一、两个场景,两种速度

2025年10月,吉林省扶余市。储户陈冰将1000万元企业备用金存入扶余惠民村镇银行,业务由该行员工赵某丽经办。同月,另一储户王女士也将800万元积蓄存入同一银行,同样由赵某丽负责。赵某丽此前以完成存款指标为由,向储户承诺高于公开利率的回报,多次准时兑付,储户逐渐放松警惕。

2025年12月,陈冰发现手机银行无法登录,前往营业厅查询,被告知银行卡已挂失,账户内仅余一万余元——1000万元几近转空。王女士的800万元同样不翼而飞,银行拒绝提供资金流水凭证,隐瞒资金去向。事后查明,赵某丽通过伪造签名、冒名挂失补办银行卡等手段,将两人合计1800万元非法转走。赵某丽事发后服药轻生,被救回后已被批捕。

两笔共计1800万元的资金,从存入到被转空,整个过程银行系统没有触发任何有效预警,没有任何人主动通知储户。

现在再把镜头切换到另一个场景。

2024年,邢台,一名女子因丈夫病重急需现金支付医疗费用,前往银行取款。她被柜员以”大额取现”为由长时间盘查,反复追问资金用途,取款受阻。同年,沈阳一女子欲取5000元,被要求其丈夫必须到场。青岛一男子因无法当场提供”资金来源证明”,无法取出自己账户里的钱。吉林省某银行更一度要求取款超过2万元,须持辖区派出所出具的证明。

同一金融系统,同类账户里的钱。内部人员转走1800万,无声无息;储户自己取几万,困难重重。

二、管控的方向

要理解这种不对称,就得先理解这套管控机制究竟是为谁设计的。

中国银行体系在名义上服务储户,在结构上却是向上负责——对党政体系、监管机构、中共维稳负责。储户在法律意义上对银行拥有债权,而非对自己资金的直接所有权。这个区别在正常时期几乎感知不到,在危机时刻则暴露无遗。

大额现金管理制度要求5万元以上取现须提前预约,取款时须说明用途。这套机制的官方理由是反洗钱和反电信诈骗,但其实际功能远不止于此:这是让国家实时掌握大额资金流向,防范资本外逃,监控政治敏感资金异动。换言之,它首先是一套资本管控工具,其次才是反诈工具,保护储户则排在更后面。

柜员层面还存在一个自我加强的机制:若柜员放行了一笔事后被认定为涉诈的资金,将被个人处罚扣薪。这意味着柜员的理性选择必然是尽可能设置障碍,因为柜员清楚地看到,误伤普通储户的代价,远远低于放行涉诈资金的代价。于是每一个急需用钱的病人家属,每一个临时周转的商户,都成了这套风控机制的潜在嫌疑人。

与此形成鲜明对比的是,内部人员作案时走的则是监控之外的路径。系统级权限、职务便利、伪造票证——这些手段绕过柜台风控流程与前端审查。看见了吗?监控最严密的地方,恰恰是普通人取自己钱的窗口;漏洞最多的地方,恰恰是内部人员施展空间的后台。

三、爆雷之后的维权困境

内部人员作案尚属个案,但是,当机构本身成为掠夺者,这套不对称就会以更大的规模呈现。

2022年,河南四家村镇银行毫无预警地同时关闭线上取款渠道,约40万储户发现自己的存款无法提取。事后查明,银行股东以河南新财富集团为核心,通过内外勾结,将储户资金系统性转移,涉案金额据估计逾百亿元人民币。在这里,作恶的是谁?正是银行本身。

储户前往郑州维权,健康码被莫名赋红,无法进入郑州。大规模抗议现场出现身份不明的白衣人强行驱散人群,部分储户遭到殴打。随后,当局以”先垫付5万元以下”的方式分化维权队伍——拿到钱的人不再闹,剩下大额储户人数越来越少,声音越来越小。时至今日,仍有逾千名储户未获任何赔偿。

这套处置方式表明了一件事:当储户利益与维稳目标发生冲突,优先被保护的并不是储户利益。

四、制度性不对称的本质

上述案例放在一起通盘观察,可以看见一个清晰的脉络:

这套系统对资金流动的管控方向是倒置的。它对内部人员盗转、股东掏空几乎无效,对普通储户取回自己的钱反倒层层设防、令人崩溃。反洗钱反电诈的说法,为机构失职提供了合规掩护,同时还把监控资本流动的成本,以审查程序的名义转嫁给了储户。

工行南宁分行原高管梁建红,以伪造存单、替换票证的方式,历时数月转走11名储户约2.5亿元存款,银行系统全程未能有效识别。判决后,银行的第一个动作就是把责任归咎于员工个人行为;储户的民事赔偿诉求则被要求”先刑后民”,等待刑事追赃程序走完——而那个程序,可以漫长得以年来计算。

当储户被要求向银行证明自己有权取回自己的钱,这个关系已经不是存款关系,而是实质上的管控关系。银行不是服务方,而是施压方、管理方、控制方。

在一个法治健全的金融体系里,举证责任天然地落在银行一侧:银行须证明有法定理由才能拒绝支付。而在今天的中国,这个举证责任已经悄然倒置。储户不再是委托人,而更像是需要持续自证清白的被审查者。

面对这样的结构,储户究竟还能做什么来保护自己?这个问题,恐怕没有在现行体制内寻找答案的空间。

The People’s Money, the Party’s Decision

—Systemic Asymmetry in China’s Banking Oversight

Author: Zhou Min

Editor: Hu Lili Proofreader: Wang Bin Translator: Ge Bing

Abstract: In many regions, banks have failed to issue timely warnings when internal staff embezzle funds, while depositors face strict scrutiny and restrictions when attempting to withdraw their money. This article highlights the asymmetry within the financial system regarding the treatment of ordinary depositors versus internal risk management.

In the common understanding, banks are the safest place for depositors’ funds. Depositing and withdrawing money is a matter of course. But have you noticed? In recent years, a bizarre phenomenon has repeatedly unfolded within China’s banking system: fraudsters and insiders can transfer depositors’ money away with astonishing efficiency, while depositors themselves face appointments, interrogations, proof requirements, and scrutiny—and are even turned away—when trying to retrieve their own funds.

Ultimately, this phenomenon is the inevitable result of China’s post-1949 institutional design, which prioritizes serving the Party above all else.

I. Two Scenarios, Two Speeds

October 2025, Fuyu City, Jilin Province. Depositor Chen Bing deposited 10 million yuan in corporate contingency funds into Fuyu Huimin Rural Commercial Bank, with the transaction handled by bank employee Zhao Mouli. That same month, another depositor, Ms. Wang, also deposited 8 million yuan in savings into the same bank, again under Zhao Mouli’s supervision. Zhao Mouli had previously promised depositors returns higher than the published interest rates, citing the need to meet deposit quotas, and made timely payments on multiple occasions, causing the depositors to gradually let down their guard.

In December 2025, Chen Bing discovered he could not log into the mobile banking app. Upon visiting the branch to inquire, he was informed that his bank card had been reported lost, and only about 10,000 yuan remained in his account—the 10 million yuan had nearly vanished. Ms. Wang’s 8 million yuan had also disappeared without a trace, and the bank refused to provide transaction records, concealing the funds’ whereabouts. Subsequent investigations revealed that Zhao Mouli had illegally transferred a total of 18 million yuan from the two women by forging signatures and fraudulently reporting their cards lost to obtain replacements. After the incident, Zhao attempted suicide by overdosing on medication; she was rescued and has since been arrested.

Throughout the entire process—from the deposit of the two sums totaling 18 million yuan to their complete depletion—the bank’s system failed to trigger any effective alerts, and no one proactively notified the depositors.

Now let’s shift our focus to another scenario.

In 2024, in Xingtai, a woman went to a bank to withdraw cash urgently needed to cover her husband’s medical expenses. She was subjected to a lengthy interrogation by a teller on the grounds of a “large cash withdrawal,” repeatedly questioned about the funds’ intended use, and ultimately prevented from withdrawing the money. That same year, in Shenyang, a woman attempting to withdraw 5,000 yuan was told her husband must be present. In Qingdao, a man was unable to withdraw money from his own account because he could not provide “proof of funds” on the spot. A bank in Jilin Province even went so far as to require a certificate issued by the local police station for withdrawals exceeding 20,000 yuan.

The same financial system, money in similar accounts. When an insider transfers 18 million yuan, it goes unnoticed; when a depositor tries to withdraw a few tens of thousands, they face immense difficulties.

II. The Direction of Control

To understand this asymmetry, one must first understand for whom this control mechanism was actually designed.

China’s banking system nominally serves depositors, but structurally, it is accountable upward—to the Party and government system, regulatory bodies, and the CCP’s stability maintenance apparatus. Legally speaking, depositors hold claims against the bank, rather than direct ownership of their funds. This distinction is barely perceptible in normal times but becomes glaringly obvious in times of crisis.

The large-cash management system requires advance reservations for cash withdrawals exceeding 50,000 yuan, with the purpose of the withdrawal to be stated at the time of withdrawal. The official justification for this mechanism is anti-money laundering and anti-telecom fraud, but its actual functions go far beyond that: it allows the state to track the flow of large sums of money in real time, prevent capital flight, and monitor politically sensitive financial movements. In other words, it is first and foremost a tool for capital control, secondarily an anti-fraud tool, with the protection of depositors ranking even lower on the list of priorities.

At the teller level, there is a self-reinforcing mechanism: if a teller approves a transaction that is later identified as fraud-related, they face personal penalties, including salary deductions. This means that the rational choice for a teller is inevitably to create as many obstacles as possible, because they clearly see that the cost of mistakenly inconveniencing ordinary depositors is far lower than the cost of allowing fraud-related funds to pass through. Consequently, every family member of a patient in urgent need of funds and every merchant seeking temporary liquidity becomes a potential suspect under this risk control mechanism.

In stark contrast, when internal personnel commit fraud, they take paths outside the scope of surveillance. System-level permissions, the convenience of their positions, and forged documents—these methods bypass counter-level risk control processes and front-end reviews. Do you see? The most heavily monitored areas are precisely the windows where ordinary people withdraw their own money; the areas with the most vulnerabilities are precisely the back offices where internal personnel have room to operate.

III. The Dilemma of Seeking Redress After a Financial Scandal

While insider fraud is typically an isolated incident, when the institution itself becomes the predator, this asymmetry manifests on a much larger scale.

In 2022, four village banks in Henan simultaneously shut down their online withdrawal channels without warning, leaving approximately 400,000 depositors unable to access their funds. Subsequent investigations revealed that bank shareholders, led by the Henan New Fortune Group, had systematically diverted depositors’ funds through collusion with both internal and external parties, with the total amount involved estimated to exceed 10 billion yuan. Who was responsible for this wrongdoing? It was the banks themselves.

When depositors traveled to Zhengzhou to demand their rights, their health codes were inexplicably marked red, preventing them from entering the city. At the site of large-scale protests, unidentified individuals in white clothing forcibly dispersed the crowd, and some depositors were beaten. Subsequently, the authorities sought to divide the protest group by offering “advance payments of up to 50,000 yuan”—those who received the money stopped protesting, while the number of depositors with larger balances dwindled, and their voices grew fainter. To this day, over a thousand depositors have yet to receive any compensation.

This approach reveals one thing: when the interests of depositors conflict with the goal of maintaining social stability, it is not the depositors’ interests that are prioritized.

IV. The Essence of Institutional Asymmetry

When viewed holistically, the cases described above reveal a clear pattern:

This system’s approach to controlling capital flows is inverted. It is virtually ineffective against embezzlement by insiders or asset stripping by shareholders, yet it erects layer upon layer of barriers—often to the point of frustration—to prevent ordinary depositors from retrieving their own money. The rhetoric of anti-money laundering and anti-telecom fraud provides a compliance cover for institutional dereliction of duty, while simultaneously shifting the cost of monitoring capital flows onto depositors under the guise of review procedures.

Liang Jianhong, a former senior executive at the Nanning Branch of the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), embezzled approximately 250 million yuan in deposits from 11 depositors over several months by forging deposit certificates and swapping physical documents—a scheme the banking system failed to detect throughout the entire process. Following the verdict, the bank’s first move was to attribute the blame to the employee’s individual actions; meanwhile, depositors’ civil compensation claims were met with the requirement to “pursue civil claims after criminal proceedings,” forcing them to wait for the criminal asset recovery process to conclude—a process that can take years.

When depositors are required to prove to the bank that they have the right to retrieve their own money, this relationship is no longer one of depository banking but has effectively become one of control. The bank is not a service provider but rather an entity that exerts pressure, manages, and controls.

In a financial system governed by the rule of law, the burden of proof naturally falls on the bank: the bank must demonstrate that it has legal grounds to refuse payment. In today’s China, however, this burden of proof has quietly been reversed. Depositors are no longer clients but rather subjects under scrutiny who must constantly prove their own innocence.

Faced with such a structure, what can depositors actually do to protect themselves? It seems there is little room to find an answer to this question within the current system.

中国公民(前上海律师)彭永和的入党申请公开信

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致:中国共产党总书记习近平

申请人:彭永和,中国公民(前上海律师),76年生,江西籍,无固定住所地。

本人彭永和,希望能像前总理朱镕基那样,怀着“不管前面是地雷阵还是万丈深渊,我都将一往无前,义无反顾,鞠躬尽瘁,死而后已”的为人民服务” 的历史责任感和使命感而申请加入中国共产党。

同时,我正式邀请习近平你作为本人的入党介绍人。

我深知,以我现在可疑的政治立场,上海方面不可能接受我的入党申请,其它省份的又根本不了解我,所以,目光只能投向你!至于理由:“你懂的”!

本人申请加入中国共产党的动机和目的:

1,消除误会:

在长达九年的被维稳过程中,说本人有政治倾向问题;说本人虽然嘴上不说,可心里和所作的事情就是要推翻中国共产党的领导!

为此,前几年我特意给上海市司法局和市政府写了一封公开信,信中说“本人坚决反对专政、反对独裁、接受普世价值”——如果这是政治倾向的话———这可不是我彭永和首先提出来的,早在抗战及国共内战时期,“新华社”就向全体国人公开发表过类似的表态;毛泽东也曾在1945 年的《论联合政府》中提到,中国应实现林肯的“民有、民治、民享”原则和罗斯福的“四大自由”——这能是政治倾向有问题?这能是要推翻中国共产党的领导的意思?

之后,记得还曾经两次给上海市长龚正写公开信明确表示希望“消除误会”然,从未得到回应。

2, 害怕打击报复:

他们曾跟我说:“你我是敌对关系,…….”。

3, 可以自由去北京看升国旗、敬礼:

今年1月底,我到北京的当天就被上海的国宝带到了北京的一个派出所说:“你在公安部的黑名单里,你不能待在北京……….”。北京的那个国宝也对我说:“我是不可能让你待在北京的……”。

4, 恢复律师证:

因涉及政治倾向问题,2021年1月份我的律师证就被上海市司法局注销了,注销前的申辩书的标题是“给中共中央总书记国家主席习近平的公开信”,具体内容你去看看,国保那有。

5, 兑现对上海全体律师的承诺博取名声:

我说过要努力促成《上海市律师协会选举和罢免规则》的尽早颁布,2022年本人就制定了此规则草案发给了上海市律师协会和司法局,就在今年的3月份在给上海市委书记陈吉宁、市长龚正的公开信(二)中还提及了此事,甚至在总理李强当上海市委书记的时候借助疫情的公开信寻求过他的帮助。

6, 获得巨额赔偿:

在今年3月份给上海市委书记陈吉宁、市长龚正的公开信(一)中公开进行索赔,我估算了一下大概一百五十万元左右。

你想,如果我入了党,我们之间的关系就是同志了对吧,也就说明之前确实是个误会阿,既然是误会,那么这么多年的不能律师执业的损失就应该赔偿给我对吧?

7,被养老金分配状况刺激、担心自己十年后:

如今,公务员、事业单位退休每月平均六七千,农民和城市居民平均二百多点。而,2025年世界银行修订,联合国统计司 (UNSD)发布的国际绝对贫困标准线是“日均生活消费3美元”。折合人民币约每月630元,也就是说还不到国际贫困线的一半!

如果我今年入了党,那么,我一定会同你一道还有其他同志一起想办法把农民和城市居民的养老金到明年提高到每月一千元,后年继续提高,直至跟公务员和企业职工相当的水平。

哎!要是李克强总理还活着,我想,他一定会全力支持我们的!

8, 被医疗保障制度所刺激,担心自己和孩子看不起病:

网友总结为:不是没有免费医疗,而是免费医疗的名单里没有你!

如果我今年入党了,我就跟你一起不论前面是地雷阵还是万丈深渊,将一往无前,义无反顾,鞠躬尽瘁,死而后已”,目标是在三年内实现全民“平等基础保障的免费医疗”。

9,被(2026)沪7101行初309号行政裁定书所刺激:

一审法院裁定书表述如下:………..实际系对市司法局是否履行了对上海律协的监督管理职责的异议,明显不属于《条例》所调整的范畴,被诉告知对原告的权利义务不产生实际影响,……..故原告的起诉不符合法定起诉条件。

如果真如法院认为的那样,本人为何不去控告、投诉或者以行政不作为为由提起诉讼?又或者如给上海市委书记陈吉宁、市长龚正的公开信(二)中那样明确要求对上海市司法局相关涉案人员渎职的行为进行调查处理?反而是申请信息公开律师协会的财务审计报告和材料———到底是法院脑残还是本人脑残?

另,法院不开庭,就可以避免查明:本人立案时提交的律师执业证证据上面记载的时间和本人的实际执业年份在所申请的上海律师协会第十、十一届期间,从而关系到本人的财产权、知情权、监督权。如此,就可以装糊涂用对原告的权利义务不产生实际影响结案,从而避免上海律协每年“亿”元会费的实际支出情况被公开的可能性,从而影响到上海几万名律师的心情和律师行业的稳定!

10, 被于凯等言论自由权案件的刺激:

我的朋友于凯律师,因在司法部门前举牌反映“律协自治、会费、黑名单等问题被涉嫌寻衅滋事犯罪。

黑名单问题,我是亲历者,被明确告知上了上海市司法局黑名单。

外交部发言人反复说中国公民有言论自由权,没有任何一个公民会“因言获罪”。 我入党之后,我将更有力量与你一起和其他同志促使《新闻法》在一年之内制定和颁布。届时,将明确言论自由权的边界,避免类似如我朋友于凯案的再次发生。

我初步的设想的言论自由的边界是:非因故意制作、编造、发表或明知是虚假旨在攻击、诋毁政府及工作人员履行公职行为或现状的言论、信息而传播的,不得为罪。

前款因故意除已然造成社会功能上的停止或丧失,或已然处于紧迫状态政府不得不通过武力对公共场所和秩序所进行干预、预防和布置外的,也不得为罪。

11,对阳光法案的期盼和被巨额财产来源不明罪金额上调至300万的刺激:

《公职人员财产公示法》已然是被绝大多数国家已验证的最好的反腐败方法之一,只要该法颁布,巨额财产来源不明罪金额根本无需上调,反而可以下调甚至废除此罪。如,新加坡。如有巨额财产来源不明一律按“贪污处理”。

我入党之后,将与你并肩作战,二年内颁布《公职人员财产公示法》,如你曾说的“扎紧制度的篱笆”,自己亲自为自己带上“枷锁”、拴上锁链、筑起笼子。

12,我的兄弟丁家喜和朋友张展案件的刺激:

我的兄弟丁家喜,这次又被判刑12年;朋友张展这次又是4年。

我知道,那些办理他们案件的公检法人员也知道,他们的追求和目标其实跟你跟党是一模一样———民主、宪政、法治中国。

这激起了我强烈的对隐藏在党内的腐败份子清除欲望。届时,你我将并肩作战,对腐败份子0容忍。

13,…….

太多了,待续。

以上,或许有人会说——彭永和,你动机不纯,贪名贪财阿,你这种人怎么能入党呢?

这个问题问得非常好!

我的答复是:我是血肉之身,不是特殊材料制作的,所以,我必须直视人性尊重人性,一切从人性出发,不叫口号,事实求是,不隐瞒不欺骗组织。我想,只有这样才具备申请加入中国共产党的资格吧。你说是吧?

最后,我要说明一下为什么要以公开信的方式。原因就是:既然我决心要为人民服务,那么,本申请书涉及的信息和“服务事项”就自然应当公开接受全民的核实检验和监督,如果在本申请书中你发现或经举报核实有任何故意捏造的事实,本人将永远不再申请加入中国共产党。

习近平主席、 全体中国公民、全体中国共产党员、其他八个党派党员、川普总统、内塔尼亚胡总理、泽联斯基总统、安东尼奥·古特雷斯,联合国秘书长等所有文明的境外势力和追求文明的人们,如果你认为我彭永和更有可能真的会履行共产党的宗旨、践行共产党对十四亿中国人的承诺“全心全意为人民服务”,请支持我加入中国共产党。谢谢!

今日去北京! 此入党申请书公开前,该不会又被上海或北京的公安控制了吧!

申请人:彭永和

电话微信:13816353773

邮箱:[email protected]

[email protected]

2026年5月10日

2026年5月11日临近中午火车到北京西站,刚走出车厢即被北京警方控制,当天晚上被上海警方带回上海。

Open Letter of Application for Party Membership by Peng Yonghe, a Chinese Citizen (Former Shanghai Lawyer)

To: Xi Jinping, General Secretary of the Communist Party of China

Applicant: Peng Yonghe, a Chinese citizen (former Shanghai lawyer), born in 1976, native of Jiangxi Province, with no fixed residence.

I, Peng Yonghe, wish to apply for membership in the Communist Party of China with the same historical sense of responsibility and mission to serve the people as former Premier Zhu Rongji, who declared: “Whether I face a minefield or a bottomless abyss, I will press forward without hesitation, devote myself wholeheartedly, and serve until my dying breath.”

At the same time, I formally invite you, Xi Jinping, to serve as my sponsor for Party membership.

I am well aware that, given my current questionable political stance, the authorities in Shanghai will not accept my application for Party membership, and those in other provinces simply do not know me. Therefore, I have no choice but to turn to you! As for the reason: “You know why!”

My motives and objectives for applying to join the Communist Party of China:

1. To clear up misunderstandings:

During the nine-year-long process of being “maintained for stability,” it was claimed that I had political leanings; that although I did not speak of it openly, my heart and my actions were aimed at overthrowing the leadership of the Communist Party of China!

To address this, a few years ago I specifically wrote an open letter to the Shanghai Municipal Bureau of Justice and the Municipal Government, stating: “I firmly oppose dictatorship and autocracy, and embrace universal values”—if this constitutes a political orientation—this is not something I, Peng Yonghe, first proposed. As early as the War of Resistance and the Chinese Civil War, Xinhua News Agency had publicly issued similar statements to all Chinese citizens; Mao Zedong also mentioned in his 1945 essay “On the United Government” that China should realize Lincoln’s principle of “government of the people, by the people, for the people” and Roosevelt’s “Four Freedoms”—how could this be considered a problematic political stance? How could this be interpreted as an intent to overthrow the leadership of the Communist Party of China?

Afterward, I recall writing two open letters to Shanghai Mayor Gong Zheng, explicitly expressing my hope to “clear up the misunderstanding,” yet I never received a response.

2. Fear of Retaliation:

They once told me, “We are enemies, ……”.

3. Freedom to go to Beijing to watch the flag-raising ceremony and salute:

In late January of this year, on the very day I arrived in Beijing, I was taken by a Shanghai police officer to a Beijing police station, where I was told: “You’re on the Ministry of Public Security’s blacklist; you cannot stay in Beijing…” The Beijing police officer also told me: “There’s no way I’m going to let you stay in Beijing…”

4. Restoration of my lawyer’s license:

Due to issues involving political leanings, my lawyer’s license was revoked by the Shanghai Municipal Bureau of Justice in January 2021. The title of my defense statement submitted before the revocation was “Open Letter to Xi Jinping, General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee and President of the People’s Republic of China.” You can review the specific contents—they are on file with the State Security Bureau.

5. Fulfilling a promise to all Shanghai lawyers to gain a reputation:

I have stated that I would strive to facilitate the early promulgation of the “Shanghai Bar Association Rules on Election and Recall.” In 2022, I drafted these rules and submitted them to the Shanghai Bar Association and the Bureau of Justice. As recently as March of this year, I mentioned this matter in my “Open Letter (II) to Shanghai Municipal Party Secretary Chen Jining and Mayor Gong Zheng.” I even sought assistance from Premier Li Qiang via an open letter during the pandemic when he was serving as Shanghai Municipal Party Secretary.

6. Securing Substantial Compensation:

In my first open letter to Shanghai Municipal Party Secretary Chen Jining and Mayor Gong Zheng this past March, I publicly demanded compensation. I estimate the amount to be approximately 1.5 million yuan.

Just think: if I were to join the Party, our relationship would be that of comrades, right? That would mean what happened before was indeed a misunderstanding. And since it was a misunderstanding, shouldn’t I be compensated for the losses incurred over all these years during which I was unable to practice law?

7. Alarmed by the current state of pension distribution and worried about my situation ten years from now:

Today, retired civil servants and public institution employees receive an average monthly pension of 6,000 to 7,000 yuan, while farmers and urban residents receive an average of just over 200 yuan. Meanwhile, according to the World Bank’s 2025 revision and the international absolute poverty line published by the United Nations Statistics Division (UNSD), the threshold is “an average daily living expense of $3.” Converted to RMB, this amounts to approximately 630 yuan per month—meaning it is less than half the international poverty line!

If I join the Party this year, I will certainly work with you and other comrades to find ways to raise the pensions for farmers and urban residents to 1,000 yuan per month by next year, and continue to increase them the year after, until they reach a level comparable to that of civil servants and enterprise employees.

Ah! If Premier Li Keqiang were still alive, I believe he would wholeheartedly support us!

8. Provoked by the healthcare system and worried about being unable to afford medical treatment for myself and my children:

Netizens have summed it up as: “It’s not that there is no free healthcare—it’s just that you aren’t on the list for free healthcare!”

If I join the Party this year, I will stand with you, and no matter whether we face a minefield or a bottomless abyss ahead, we will press forward undaunted, without hesitation, dedicating ourselves wholeheartedly until our dying breath. Our goal is to achieve “free healthcare with equal basic coverage for all” within three years.

9. Provoked by Administrative Ruling No. (2026) Hu 7101 Xing Chu 309:

The first-instance court’s ruling states as follows: ……….. This is in fact an objection to whether the Municipal Bureau of Justice has fulfilled its supervisory and management duties over the Shanghai Bar Association, which clearly falls outside the scope of the Regulations. The contested notice has no actual impact on the plaintiff’s rights and obligations,…. …Therefore, the plaintiff’s lawsuit does not meet the statutory conditions for filing a lawsuit.

If the situation is truly as the court claims, why did I not file a criminal complaint, lodge a formal complaint, or initiate a lawsuit on the grounds of administrative inaction? Or, as explicitly requested in my Open Letter (II) to Shanghai Municipal Party Secretary Chen Jining and Mayor Gong Zheng, why did I not demand an investigation and disciplinary action against the relevant personnel at the Shanghai Municipal Bureau of Justice for their dereliction of duty? Instead, I applied for the disclosure of the Bar Association’s financial audit reports and materials—is it the court that is brain-dead, or am I?

Furthermore, by refusing to hold a hearing, the court can avoid ascertaining that the date recorded on the attorney’s license I submitted upon filing the case corresponds to my actual years of practice during the 10th and 11th terms of the Shanghai Bar Association, which directly relates to my property rights, right to know, and right to oversight. In this way, they can feign ignorance and dismiss the case on the grounds that it has no practical impact on the plaintiff’s rights and obligations, thereby preventing the disclosure of the Shanghai Bar Association’s actual annual expenditure of “hundreds of millions” in membership fees—which would affect the morale of tens of thousands of lawyers in Shanghai and the stability of the legal profession!

10. Stimulated by the case involving Yu Kai and others regarding the right to freedom of speech:

My friend, Attorney Yu Kai, was suspected of committing the crime of “picking quarrels and provoking trouble” for holding up a sign in front of the judicial authorities to protest issues such as “bar association autonomy, membership fees, and blacklists.”

Regarding the blacklist issue, I am a firsthand witness; I was explicitly informed that I had been placed on the Shanghai Municipal Bureau of Justice’s blacklist.

The spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has repeatedly stated that Chinese citizens have the right to freedom of speech, and that no citizen will be “punished for their words.” After I join the Party, I will have greater strength to work with you and other comrades to ensure that the “Press Law” is drafted and enacted within one year. At that time, the boundaries of the right to freedom of speech will be clearly defined, preventing the recurrence of cases similar to that of my friend Yu Kai.

My preliminary conception of the boundaries of freedom of speech is as follows: it shall not constitute a crime to produce, fabricate, publish, or disseminate speech or information that is not intentionally created, or that is knowingly false, with the intent to attack or defame the government or government officials in the performance of their official duties or regarding the current state of affairs.

Furthermore, the acts described in the preceding paragraph shall not constitute a crime if they are committed intentionally, unless they have already caused a functional halt or loss of social order, or unless the government is already in a state of emergency and is compelled to intervene, prevent, or deploy forces in public spaces and to maintain public order.

11. Expectations for the Sunshine Act and the stimulus of raising the threshold for the crime of unexplained wealth to 3 million:

The “Public Officials’ Asset Disclosure Act” is already one of the best anti-corruption methods proven effective by the vast majority of countries. Once this law is enacted, there will be no need to raise the threshold for the crime of unexplained wealth; on the contrary, it can be lowered or even abolished. For example, in Singapore, any case of unexplained wealth is uniformly treated as “corruption.”

Once I join the Party, I will fight alongside you to enact the “Public Officials’ Asset Disclosure Law” within two years. As you once said, we must “tighten the institutional fence”—personally placing “shackles” on ourselves, fastening chains, and building a cage.

12. The Impact of the Cases Involving My Brother Ding Jiaxi and My Friend Zhang Zhan:

My brother, Ding Jiaxi, has once again been sentenced to 12 years in prison; my friend, Zhang Zhan, has been sentenced to another 4 years.

I know—and the officials from the public security, procuratorial, and judicial authorities handling their cases know as well—that their aspirations and goals are actually identical to yours and those of the Party: democracy, constitutional government, and the rule of law in China.

This has sparked in me a strong desire to root out the corrupt elements hiding within the Party. When that time comes, you and I will fight side by side, with zero tolerance for corrupt officials.

13,…….

There is too much to say; to be continued.

Regarding the above, some might say—Peng Yonghe, your motives are impure; you crave fame and wealth. How could someone like you ever join the Party?

That is an excellent question!

My response is: I am made of flesh and blood, not some special material. Therefore, I must face human nature head-on and respect it. I must approach everything from the perspective of human nature, avoid empty slogans, seek truth from facts, and never conceal or deceive the organization. I believe that only in this way do I qualify to apply for membership in the Communist Party of China. Don’t you agree?

Finally, I would like to explain why I am submitting this as an open letter. The reason is this: since I am determined to serve the people, the information and “matters of service” contained in this application should naturally be made public to be verified, examined, and supervised by the entire nation. If you discover, or if it is verified through a report, that there are any intentionally fabricated facts in this application, I will never again apply to join the Communist Party of China.

President Xi Jinping, all Chinese citizens, all members of the Communist Party of China, members of the other eight political parties, President Trump, Prime Minister Netanyahu, President Zelenskyy, António Guterres, Secretary-General of the United Nations, and all civilized foreign forces and people who pursue civilization—if you believe that I, Peng Yonghe, am more likely to truly uphold the Communist Party’s principles and fulfill the Party’s commitment to 1.4 billion Chinese people to “serve the people wholeheartedly,” please support my application to join the Communist Party of China. Thank you!

Heading to Beijing today! Before this application for Party membership is made public, I hope I won’t be detained by the Shanghai or Beijing police again!

Applicant: Peng Yonghe

Phone/WeChat: 13816353773

Email: [email protected]

[email protected]

May 10, 2026

On May 11, 2026, shortly before noon, my train arrived at Beijing West Station. As soon as I stepped out of the carriage, I was detained by Beijing police and taken back to Shanghai by Shanghai police that same evening.

一名被中共迫害的中国女律师写给川普总统的公开求助信

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作者:周君红 编辑:胡丽莉 校对:毛一炜 翻译:戈冰

尊敬的川普总统先生:

您好!

我叫周君红,原是一名中国律师,也是一位因中共迫害而与三个年幼孩子长期分离的母亲。

获悉您即将于5月14日访问中国,我思虑良久,决定写下这封公开求助信。恳请善良而伟大的您,在访问中国期间,能够关注中国人权律师、异议人士以及宗教信仰群体的艰难处境。

我本人,就是这一切的亲历者。2024年3月,我在美国以中国律师身份参加完加州律师考试,原本准备回国继续执业与生活。然而,仅因在网络上发表批评中共的言论,我便遭到打击报复。面对回国后因言获罪的恐惧,我被迫流亡美国,从此与远在中国的三个孩子、丈夫以及父母天各一方。

至今,我们已分离两年有余。我不敢回国,家人也因我不断遭受威胁与骚扰。而身在美国的我,每一天都活在不安与牵挂之中。

我深知,像我这样因中共迫害而家庭破碎、亲人离散的人,绝非个例。只是更多人在沉默中承受着恐惧与苦难。而我唯一稍感幸运的是,我还有自由,还能发声求助。

如:湖南谢阳律师,曾在“709律师大抓捕”中被以“煽动颠覆国家政权罪”判刑并吊销律师执照;2026年,又因发表反共言论再次被以同样的罪名判刑五年。

上海张展律师,因报道武汉新冠疫情,被以“寻衅滋事罪”判刑四年;出狱后,又再次因言论被以同样的罪名判刑四年。

湖北丁家喜律师,因倡导公民权利,被以“颠覆国家政权罪”重判十二年;同案学者许志永博士,被判十四年。

北京律师高智晟原本是中国司法部评选的“全国十佳律师”,仅因代理人权案件、公开批评中共,长期遭受秘密拘押与酷刑,2017年再次被强制失踪,至今下落不明、生死未卜。

一直以来,中共要求律师“讲政治”,强调律师必须拥护其统治。凡对其提出批评者,往往都会遭到严厉打压与制裁。因坚持言论自由而被迫害的律师,不胜枚举。

而中共对宗教自由的打压也从未停止。

去年10月,中共在北京、上海、浙江等七个城市大规模抓捕牧师、传道人与信徒,其中三十名锡安教会基督徒被捕,创始人金明日牧师亦遭关押。为其辩护的张凯律师,先是遭到骚扰、恐吓,后被吊销律师执照。

此外,北京守望教会、成都秋雨圣约教会等家庭教会长期遭受迫害。秋雨圣约教会创会牧师王怡,于2019年被判刑九年。 2025年5月,西安锡安之光教会高全福牧师被拘留。次月,山西临汾金灯堂家庭教会十二名成员被判刑,联合创办人王晓光牧师与其妻杨荣丽,分别被判九年与十五年。

中共对法轮功群体的迫害,更早已引发国际社会广泛关注。自1999年起,中共官方便将法轮功列为“邪教”并予以取缔。多年来,关于活摘法轮功学员器官的指控,也持续受到国际社会关注与谴责。

中国宪法虽然写着保障言论自由与宗教信仰自由,但现实中,中共却不断践踏这些最基本的人权,并凌驾于法律之上。其根本原因,在于中共对意识形态的绝对控制。它害怕真相传播,害怕中国人民在看清其本质之后,产生群体性的觉醒与反抗。

中共表面上高喊“为人民服务”,本质是为其独裁统治服务。这也是中国社会灾难频发的重要根源。如:新冠疫情初期,中共为了封锁消息,打压“吹哨人”李文亮医生,最终导致无数生命逝去。

与此同时,中国失踪人口问题持续恶化。《中国走失人口白皮书(2020)》指出,中国每年走失人口人次约为100万。根据中国公安系统公开数据,2026年第一季度,中国人口失踪案件同比增加17.3%。

而中共制造的冤假错案,更是堆积如山。父母为子女奔走申冤,子女为父母寻求公道,妻子为丈夫鸣冤叫屈,手足之间相互上访求助。这些人间悲剧,在中国早已司空见惯。

借着您即将访问中国的宝贵机会,我代表自己,也代表无数遭受中共迫害、却无法发声的中国人,向您公开求助。恳请您关注中共对人权律师、异议人士以及宗教信仰群体长期而系统的迫害。

我期盼所有遭受迫害的人,能够早日重获自由;所有被迫分离的家庭,能够早日团圆重聚。

我更希望,有一天,中国能够真正成为一个尊重生命、尊重信仰、尊重自由、尊重法治的国家。

《圣经》说:“你们祈求,就给你们;寻找,就寻见;叩门,就给你们开门。”

——《马太福音》7:7

“并要在患难之日求告我;我必搭救你,你也要荣耀我。”——《诗篇》50:15

唯愿我的呼求能够得到神的垂听,也能够得到川普总统先生的关注与帮助。

此致

敬礼!

周君红

2026年5月12日

An Open Letter of Appeal to President Trump from a Chinese Female Lawyer Persecuted by the Chinese Communist Party

Author: Zhou Junhong

Editor: Hu Lili Proofreader: Mao Yiwei Translator: Ge Bing

Summary: Chinese lawyer Zhou Junhong has written to the U.S. President, stating that she has been persecuted and forced into exile for expressing critical views, and calling for attention to the suppression and family separations faced by Chinese human rights lawyers, religious groups, and dissidents.

Dear President Trump:

Greetings!

My name is Zhou Junhong. I am a former Chinese lawyer and a mother who has been separated from my three young children for an extended period due to persecution by the Chinese Communist Party.

Upon learning of your upcoming visit to China on May 14, I have given this matter much thought and have decided to write this open letter of appeal. I earnestly implore you, a kind and great leader, to pay attention to the difficult circumstances faced by Chinese human rights lawyers, dissidents, and religious groups during your visit to China.

I myself am a firsthand witness to all of this. In March 2024, after passing the California Bar Exam in the United States as a Chinese lawyer, I had originally planned to return to China to continue practicing law and living there. However, simply for expressing criticism of the Chinese Communist Party online, I became the target of retaliation. Fearing that I would be punished for my words upon returning home, I was forced into exile in the United States, and since then, I have been separated from my three children, my husband, and my parents, who remain far away in China.

To this day, we have been separated for over two years. I dare not return home, and my family continues to face threats and harassment because of me. Here in the United States, I live every day in anxiety and constant worry.

I know full well that people like me—whose families have been torn apart and loved ones scattered due to the CCP’s persecution—are by no means isolated cases. It is just that many more are enduring fear and suffering in silence. The only thing I consider a small measure of luck is that I still have my freedom and can speak out to ask for help.

For example: Lawyer Xie Yang from Hunan was sentenced for “inciting subversion of state power” and had his law license revoked during the “July 9th Crackdown on Lawyers”; in 2026, he was sentenced to five years in prison on the same charge again for making anti-Communist remarks.

Shanghai lawyer Zhang Zhan was sentenced to four years for “picking quarrels and provoking trouble” after reporting on the COVID-19 outbreak in Wuhan; upon her release, she was sentenced to another four years under the same charge for her remarks.

Hubei lawyer Ding Jiaxi was sentenced to a harsh twelve years for “subversion of state power” for advocating for civil rights; Dr. Xu Zhiyong, a scholar in the same case, was sentenced to fourteen years.

Beijing lawyer Gao Zhisheng was originally named one of the “Top Ten Lawyers in China” by the Ministry of Justice. Yet, simply for representing human rights cases and publicly criticizing the CCP, he has long suffered secret detention and torture. In 2017, he was forcibly disappeared once again, and his whereabouts and fate remain unknown to this day.

The CCP has consistently demanded that lawyers “be politically conscious,” emphasizing that they must support its rule. Anyone who criticizes the Party is often subjected to severe repression and sanctions. There are countless lawyers who have been persecuted for upholding freedom of speech.

Meanwhile, the CCP’s crackdown on religious freedom has never ceased.

Last October, the CCP carried out large-scale arrests of pastors, evangelists, and believers in seven cities, including Beijing, Shanghai, and Zhejiang. Among them, 30 Christians from Zion Church were arrested, and the church’s founder, Pastor Jin Mingri, was also detained. Lawyer Zhang Kai, who defended them, was first subjected to harassment and intimidation, and later had his law license revoked.

In addition, house churches such as Beijing Watchman Church and Chengdu Autumn Rain Covenant Church have long suffered persecution. Wang Yi, the founding pastor of Autumn Rain Covenant Church, was sentenced to nine years in prison in 2019. In May 2025, Pastor Gao Quanfu of Xi’an Zion Light Church was detained. The following month, twelve members of the Jin Deng Tang house church in Linfen, Shanxi, were sentenced; co-founder Pastor Wang Xiaoguang and his wife Yang Rongli were sentenced to nine and fifteen years, respectively.

The CCP’s persecution of the Falun Gong community has long drawn widespread attention from the international community. Since 1999, Chinese authorities have classified Falun Gong as a “cult” and banned it. For many years, allegations of forced organ harvesting from Falun Gong practitioners have also drawn continuous attention and condemnation from the international community.

Although the Chinese Constitution guarantees freedom of speech and freedom of religious belief, in reality, the CCP continually tramples on these most basic human rights and places itself above the law. The root cause lies in the CCP’s absolute control over ideology. It fears the spread of the truth and fears that the Chinese people, upon seeing its true nature, will experience a collective awakening and rise up in resistance.

While the Chinese Communist Party ostensibly proclaims “serving the people,” its true purpose is to serve its own dictatorial rule. This is also a major root cause of the frequent social disasters in China. For example, in the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic, the CCP suppressed information and cracked down on “whistleblower” Dr. Li Wenliang in an effort to cover up the outbreak, ultimately leading to the loss of countless lives.

Meanwhile, the issue of missing persons in China continues to worsen. The *White Paper on Missing Persons in China (2020)* indicates that approximately 1 million people go missing in China each year. According to publicly available data from China’s public security system, missing persons cases in China increased by 17.3% year-on-year in the first quarter of 2026.

Moreover, the CCP has created a mountain of wrongful convictions and miscarriages of justice. Parents campaign for justice for their children, children seek justice for their parents, wives cry out for their husbands, and siblings petition the government for help. These human tragedies have long been commonplace in China.

Taking advantage of your upcoming visit to China, I am writing to you on my own behalf and on behalf of the countless Chinese people who have suffered persecution by the CCP but are unable to speak out. I earnestly ask you to pay attention to the CCP’s long-standing and systematic persecution of human rights lawyers, dissidents, and religious groups.

I hope that all those who have suffered persecution will regain their freedom as soon as possible, and that all families forced apart will be reunited.

I further hope that one day, China will truly become a nation that respects life, faith, freedom, and the rule of law.

The Bible says: “Ask, and it will be given to you; seek, and you will find; knock, and the door will be opened to you.”

—Matthew 7:7

“Call upon me in the day of trouble; I will deliver you, and you will honor me.”— Psalm 50:15

I pray that my plea may be heard by God and also receive the attention and assistance of President Trump.

Sincerely,

Zhou Junhong

May 12, 2026

不让躺平的本质:达者不再兼济天下,却怪穷者独善其身

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本文来源:罗翔-破幕推墙

编辑:钟然 校对:毛一炜 翻译:戈冰

近日,红潮国安部又发了一篇雄文,义正辞严地指出:年轻人躺平,是境外势力渗透!是颜色革命的新花样!是敌对分子在背后搞鬼!读完我差点笑出声——这届国安部怕不是把《西游记》当内部文件学了,天天都能抓出个“境外妖怪”。

躺平有那么可怕吗?年轻人不996了,不内卷了,不想当韭菜了,就成了“国家安全隐患”?这逻辑也太好笑了。古人说“达则兼济天下,穷则独善其身”。可如今呢?达者们早就不兼济天下了,他们只兼济自己和亲戚朋友的账户余额。穷者想独善其身,躺平一下,喘口气,就被扣上“境外势力”的帽子。妙啊,这叫什么?叫只许州官放火,不许百姓点灯;只许权贵躺赢,不许平民躺平。

你们这些“达者”当年是怎么兼济天下的?

房地产大潮里,左手政策右手土地,轻松把几代人的财富收割进腰包;互联网红利期,平台经济野蛮生长,996福报喊得震天响,转头就把程序员当电池用完即弃;疫情期间,一边歌颂“动态清零是人间大爱”,一边让小商贩、打工仔倾家荡产;现在经济下行,又突然发现“躺平是境外势力”,赶紧把锅甩给美帝、日帝、台独、港独、境外NGO……反正只要不是自己无能,天下就没有解决不了的“境外势力”。

年轻人躺平的真正原因,你们心里比谁都清楚:

房价高不可攀,结婚生娃成了奢侈品;996干到35岁就被优化,35岁成了职场死刑;内卷卷到头秃,回报却越来越薄;阶层固化比水泥还硬,拼爹的时代,普通人再努力也只是给别人做嫁衣。

这时候你们不反思自己“兼济天下”干了什么好事,反而怪穷人“独善其身”?这不就是典型的“自己吃肉不给别人喝汤,还怪别人不感恩”吗?

更绝的是,国安部这篇雄文里,估计又要列举一堆“境外网站”“境外博主”“境外App”在教唆躺平。拜托,你们自己把国内互联网管得铁桶一般,连个正常发声的地方都不留,年轻人不翻墙还能去哪儿听真话?结果翻墙听了句“别卷了,保重身体”,就成了境外势力?那请问,当年教我们“知识改变命运”“努力就有未来”的那些鸡汤,又是哪国势力?是不是也该一起抓?

讽刺的是,最该躺平的其实是你们自己。

你们这些既得利益者,早就躺平在权力和垄断红利上几十年了:子女海外留学、资产海外配置、医疗海外就诊,自己躺得舒舒服服,却要求国内年轻人“站起来奋斗”“为民族复兴添砖加瓦”。砖瓦是你们搬吗?瓦刀是你们挥吗?最后累死累活的还是底层,享受成果的还是你们。

这叫什么兼济天下?这叫“达则兼济自家,穷则怪你不卷”。

躺平不是不奋斗,是拒绝被你们定义的“奋斗”当燃料。

年轻人选择低欲望、低消费、低婚育、低期待,本质上是对你们这套游戏规则的消极抵抗。他们不傻,看得比谁都清楚:再怎么卷,也卷不过关系、卷不过平台、卷不过政策风向。既然终点早已内定,那我干嘛还拼了命去跑?躺平,至少不会被你们当燃料烧完。

国安部啊国安部,你们越是急着把“躺平”打成境外势力,越说明这套系统已经病入膏肓。真正的境外势力,从来不是教年轻人躺平的那几个推文,而是把中国年轻人逼到只能躺平的那套制度和既得利益集团。

达者不再兼济天下,却要穷者必须卷到死,这才是真正的“国家安全隐患”。

如果躺平真是境外势力教唆的,那为什么境外势力没教权贵们也躺平呢?他们怎么还卷得那么起劲?

转发、点赞、保存——别让“境外势力”又多了几个!

The True Nature of the Crackdown on “Lying Flat”: The Successful No Longer Seek to Benefit All, Yet Blame the Poor for Looking Out Only for Themselves

Source: Luo Xiang – Breaking the Curtain, Tearing Down the Wall

Editor: Zhong Ran Proofreader: Mao Yiwei Translator: Ge Bing

Abstract: The authorities attribute young people’s “lying flat” to foreign forces, ignoring real pressures such as high housing prices, hyper-competition, and class固化; young people’s choice of a low-desire lifestyle is, in essence, a passive response and resistance to an unreasonable competitive system.

Recently, the “Red Tide” Ministry of State Security published another bombastic article, sternly declaring: Young people’s “lying flat” is the infiltration of foreign forces! It’s a new tactic of color revolutions! It’s hostile elements pulling strings behind the scenes! After reading it, I almost burst out laughing—this Ministry of State Security must have been studying *Journey to the West* as an internal manual; they seem to catch a “foreign demon” every single day.

Is “lying flat” really that terrifying? Just because young people refuse to work 996, reject the rat race, and refuse to be treated like chives, does that make them a “threat to national security”? That logic is laughable. The ancients said, “When one is successful, one benefits all under heaven; when one is in adversity, one cultivates oneself.” But what about today? The “successful” ones stopped benefiting the world long ago; they only benefit their own bank accounts and those of their relatives and friends. The “poor” want to cultivate themselves, lie back, and catch their breath, yet they’re branded as “foreign forces.” Brilliant! What do you call this? It’s called “officials are allowed to set fires, but the common people aren’t allowed to light lamps”; it’s called “the powerful are allowed to win without lifting a finger, but the common people aren’t allowed to lie back.”

How exactly did you “successful” ones benefit the world back in the day?

During the real estate boom, with policies in one hand and land in the other, you effortlessly raked in the wealth of generations into your own pockets; during the internet boom, as the platform economy grew unchecked, you shouted “996 is a blessing” at the top of your lungs, only to turn around and treat programmers like disposable batteries; during the pandemic, while extolling “dynamic zero-COVID as the greatest love on earth,” you drove small vendors and working-class people into bankruptcy; Now that the economy is slowing down, you’ve suddenly declared that “lying flat” is the work of “foreign forces,” and you’re scrambling to shift the blame onto the U.S., Japan, Taiwanese separatists, Hong Kong separatists, and foreign NGOs… After all, as long as it’s not your own incompetence, there’s no problem in the world that can’t be solved by blaming “foreign forces.”

You know better than anyone else the real reasons why young people are “lying flat”:

Housing prices are sky-high, making marriage and having children a luxury; Working 996 until age 35 only to be “optimized”—35 has become a death sentence in the workplace; the rat race is so intense it makes your hair fall out, yet the returns keep getting thinner; class固化 is harder than concrete; in this era of “connections,” no matter how hard ordinary people work, they’re just working to line someone else’s pockets.

At a time like this, instead of reflecting on what good your “benefiting all under heaven” has actually done, you blame the poor for “looking out only for themselves”? Isn’t this the classic case of “eating the meat yourself while denying others even the broth, then blaming them for being ungrateful”?

What’s even more outrageous is that this “masterpiece” from the Ministry of State Security will likely list a bunch of “foreign websites,” “foreign bloggers,” and “foreign apps” as instigators of the “lying-flat” movement. Come on—you’ve locked down the domestic internet like a fortress, leaving no space for people to speak their minds. Where else can young people go to hear the truth without circumventing the Great Firewall? So if they use a VPN to hear a single phrase like “Stop the rat race, take care of your health,” does that make them foreign agents? Then may I ask: which foreign power was behind all that inspirational fluff back in the day that taught us “knowledge changes destiny” and “hard work leads to a bright future”? Shouldn’t they be rounded up too?

The irony is, the ones who really need to “lie flat” are actually you yourselves.

You vested interests have been coasting on the dividends of power and monopoly for decades: sending your children to study abroad, shifting your assets overseas, and seeking medical treatment abroad. You lie back in comfort while demanding that young people in China “stand up and strive” and “contribute to the nation’s rejuvenation.” Are you the ones carrying the bricks? Are you the ones wielding the trowels? In the end, it’s the working class who toils themselves to death, while you reap the rewards.

What kind of “benefiting all under heaven” is this? This is “when we’re prosperous, we benefit our own families; when we’re poor, we blame you for not competing hard enough.”

Lying flat doesn’t mean not striving; it means refusing to be used as fuel for the “striving” you’ve defined.

When young people choose low desires, low consumption, low marriage and childbirth rates, and low expectations, it is essentially a passive resistance to your set of rules. They aren’t stupid; they see it clearer than anyone else: no matter how hard they compete, they can’t outcompete connections, platforms, or shifting policy winds. Since the finish line has long been predetermined, why should I run myself to death? Lying flat—at least—means I won’t be burned out as fuel by you.

Ministry of State Security, oh Ministry of State Security, the more you rush to label “lying flat” as the work of foreign forces, the more it proves that this system is already beyond salvation. The real foreign forces are never those few tweets teaching young people to lie flat, but rather the system and vested interest groups that have driven China’s youth to the point where lying flat is their only option.

The privileged no longer strive to benefit the world, yet the poor are forced to compete until they die—this is the true “threat to national security.”

If “lying flat” really were instigated by foreign forces, then why didn’t those foreign forces tell the privileged elite to lie flat too? How come they’re still competing so fiercely?

Share, like, save—don’t let the “foreign forces” gain a few more followers!

为什么保存他们的尸体?

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作者:余晓平(原文于2013年3月8日发表)

编辑:胡丽莉 校对:程筱筱 翻译:戈冰

  在这个世界上,只要是智力正常的人都会选择去做有意义的事情,无论是好人坏人。区别在哪里呢?坏人做对自己有意义的事情时一般都让别人付出代价。

  一个众所周知的常识,当今世界上最著名的几具由国民付出代价来保存的尸体都是无神论者,像列宁、金日成、胡志明、毛泽东等等。人们通常以为尸体膜拜属于唯心主义有神论者的行为,但是我们发现,有宗教信仰的人并不这样做,比如说基督教盛行的美国人觉得上帝面前人人平等。

  从这一点看,我们知道他们在自己执政期间宣扬唯物主义的目的了,要想让自己有别于其他人,那就一定要消灭那个高于所有人的神。消灭了所有的神,为的是把自己树为神。果然,他们的目的达到了,他们在世的时候受到神一般的膜拜。但他们抗拒不了作为一个人所必然拥有的规律,那就是死亡。

  这样一来,就给后继者带来很大的麻烦,神死了,神话还要延续。用一句特别通俗的话来说就是,你走了,弟兄们怎么办?我们还要继续获取利益呢。所以我觉得,保存尸体未必是那个尸体生前的愿望,即使是,那也是属于咬牙跺脚为了自己后代着想而作出的牺牲。中国人讲,入土为安,也许正因为这样,一语成谶,他们的后代以及继任者才生活在惶惶不可终日当中。

  是什么驱使有人不惜重金去保护那些尸体呢?

  首先是后继者的需求。不同于世袭制的封建社会,推翻帝制以后继任者的合法性受到空前的挑战——凭什么你可以坐在原本那个神的位置上。那个尸体生前的钦点是直接的原因,大兴土木兴建那个纪念堂就是为了提醒人们,那个神还存在,神在,被钦点的人就具有合法性。于是各国发生了基本上雷同的一幕,那就是不惜重金保护尸体,这是继任者最关心的头等大事。

  其次是继任者所属组织的需求。继任者并不是一个人,而是一个组织。继任者为了自己的利益必须将利益分散给那些拥护辅佐自己的人。但问题是不可能将利益分给所有人。这个道理很简单,每个人都希望自己投入产出比大些,如果付出多少,得到多少,凭什么还拼命支持一个名不正,言不顺的人在台上?于是一部分人的利益被侵害了,某个支持继任者的组织利益得到最大化。而民主制度下,人们靠选票使继任者合法化,这就是独裁统治为什么反人类的原因——因为太浪费资源,侵害大多数人的利益(大约是十三亿减去八千万)。

  利益的获得者的需求。一次和博友吃饭接触了当年毛泽东的警卫,从他的举止言谈体现出对毛泽东的无限敬仰和感恩。他反复强调的一句话揭示了其中的奥秘,他说,我曾经是个普通的农民,是老人家让我成为现在这个样子。的确,自从他当了毛泽东的警卫以后不但自己的命运发生了改变,而且还惠及了家人和朋友。但是他忽视了有多少人当年从他现在这个状态无缘无故地跌落到地狱里面去。

  感觉上认为自己是利益获得者的需求。人们觉得自己需要感谢让中国人民站起来的大救星。中国人到底是什么时候站起来的?是在日本投降以后的1945年,那时候中国的国土是一片秋海棠叶子,比现在大不少。在联合国也有合法的席位,所有外国列强都撤出殖民地……然而接下去的内战导致国土缩减,台湾分裂,百姓民不聊生。人们通常觉得是蒋介石导致的内战,那么我问你,要是你组织个政党,控制了广州军区,然后再扩展到四川军区,国家应该怎么办?是谁挑起了内战?这是常识,非执政党控制军队是违法行为。甚至在民主共和国的定义里面,政党控制军队本身就违法。

  还有就是借尸还魂的既得利益者。一个国家发展的过程当中肯定会遇到各式各样的问题,执政党为了自己的执政利益不愿借鉴西方人实践了几百年的民主选举制度,因为那样足令某些人权力不保。但那种既没有完整理论依据,又没有实践证明的所谓中国特色根本就经不起实践的考验,所以出现很多问题。病急乱投医的心理导致一些人需要借尸还魂,将原本淘汰的东西照搬回来,这样才能有既得利益,在中央里抢夺一席位置。

  再有就是人们的禁忌。人类社会有些禁忌是阻碍自己发展的,对尸体的处理就是禁忌之一。往往很多后来的执政者为了平衡多方面的关系而不愿意触及某些人的心理,比如说俄罗斯对列宁尸体的态度。正因为这样导致很多独裁的思想阴魂不散,让普京迷恋那个手握大权的位置。因此我们说,民主的进程实际上就是人类与贪婪争斗的过程,将权力关进笼子的本意是将贪婪关进笼子里。

  最后我们说说中国人常见的心理,这也是很多社会主义国家常有的心理,那就是搞不清楚国家的钱到底是哪里来的。记得过去人们常说的一句很不负责任的话——反正那是共产党的,其实你错了,因为政党不产生财富。而政府的作用不是领导,而是保护财富的产生和交换,残酷的洗脑使大家搞不清楚财富的来源,认为自己的财富被人无节制地收走是一件天经地义的事情。要知道,西方民主社会政府从老百姓手里收走的税率不是政府定的,花钱的人根本就没资格确定收多少钱。

  现在我们说到从百姓手里收上来的钱如何处置了——一笔将近100万美元的费用来保存那个尸体,当然还有那个纪念堂的维护成本。这笔巨款可以用来改善人民生活,可以解决失学儿童上学的问题,可以配置安全一点的校车,可以让看不起病的人多维持自己的生命……..但实际上只是维护了少部分人的利益,让所有人都付出了代价。

Why Preserve Their Bodies?

Author: Yu Xiaoping (Originally published on March 8, 2013)

Editor: Hu Lili Proofreader: Cheng Xiaoxiao Translator: Ge Bing

Abstract: Starting from the perspectives of the legitimacy of power and vested interests, this article analyzes the political and institutional logic behind the system of body preservation and commemoration, critiquing how it perpetuates symbols of rule and contributes to the unequal distribution of resources.

  In this world, any person of sound mind will choose to do meaningful things, whether they are good or bad. Where does the difference lie? When bad people do things that are meaningful to themselves, they generally make others pay the price.

It is a well-known fact that the most famous corpses in the world today—those preserved at the expense of their nations—are all atheists, such as Lenin, Kim Il-sung, Ho Chi Minh, Mao Zedong, and others. People usually assume that the worship of corpses is the behavior of idealistic theists, but we find that people with religious faith do not act this way. For example, Americans, where Christianity is prevalent, believe that all are equal before God.

From this perspective, we understand the purpose behind their promotion of materialism during their time in power: to distinguish themselves from others, they must eliminate the God who stands above all. By eliminating all gods, they aim to elevate themselves to the status of gods. Sure enough, they achieved their goal: while alive, they were worshipped as gods. Yet they could not resist the inevitable law of human existence—death.

This, in turn, created a major problem for their successors: the god is dead, but the myth must continue. To put it in very plain terms: now that you’re gone, what are we supposed to do, brothers? We still need to keep reaping the benefits. So I believe that preserving a corpse may not have been the deceased’s wish; even if it was, it was a sacrifice made through gritted teeth and clenched fists, all for the sake of their descendants. The Chinese say, “Rest in peace in the earth.” Perhaps precisely because of this, the saying became a self-fulfilling prophecy, and their descendants and successors have lived in constant fear and anxiety.

  What drives people to spend vast sums of money to preserve those bodies?

First and foremost, it is the need of the successors. Unlike feudal societies with hereditary systems, after the overthrow of the imperial system, the legitimacy of successors faced unprecedented challenges—on what grounds can you sit in the seat once occupied by that deity? The late leader’s personal endorsement was the direct cause; the massive construction of that memorial hall was intended to remind people that the deity still exists—and as long as the deity is present, the designated successor possesses legitimacy. Thus, a strikingly similar scenario unfolded across nations: the preservation of the body at any cost became the successor’s foremost priority.

  Second is the need of the organization to which the successor belongs. The successor is not an individual but an organization. To secure their own interests, the successor must distribute benefits to those who support and assist them. But the problem is that it is impossible to share the benefits with everyone. The logic is simple: everyone wants a higher return on their investment. If they receive only what they put in, why would they fight tooth and nail to keep someone in power who lacks legitimate authority and moral standing? Consequently, the interests of some are infringed upon, while the interests of a specific organization supporting the successor are maximized. Under a democratic system, people legitimize the successor through their votes. This is why dictatorship is anti-human—because it wastes too many resources and infringes upon the interests of the majority (roughly 1.3 billion minus 80 million).

  The needs of those who have benefited. Once, while dining with a blog friend, I met a former bodyguard of Mao Zedong. His demeanor and speech revealed boundless admiration and gratitude toward Mao. A phrase he repeatedly emphasized revealed the secret behind it all: “I used to be an ordinary farmer; it was the Old Man who made me what I am today.” Indeed, ever since he became Mao Zedong’s bodyguard, not only did his own fate change, but his family and friends also reaped the benefits. But he overlooked how many people, back then, fell from his current position into hell for no reason at all.

  The perception that one is a beneficiary of the system. People feel they need to thank the great savior who made the Chinese people stand up. When exactly did the Chinese people stand up? It was in 1945, after Japan’s surrender. At that time, China’s territory resembled a hibiscus leaf—considerably larger than it is today. It held a legitimate seat at the United Nations, and all foreign powers had withdrawn from their colonies… Yet the ensuing civil war led to a shrinking of the national territory, the separation of Taiwan, and the people struggling to make ends meet. People generally believe that Chiang Kai-shek caused the civil war, so let me ask you: if you were to organize a political party, take control of the Guangzhou Military Region, and then expand into the Sichuan Military Region, what should the state do? Who instigated the civil war? This is common sense: it is illegal for a non-ruling party to control the military. In fact, even within the definition of a democratic republic, a political party controlling the military is inherently unlawful.

Then there are the vested interests seeking to resurrect the past. In the course of a nation’s development, it is inevitable to encounter all sorts of problems. The ruling party, for the sake of its own political interests, refuses to adopt the democratic electoral system that Westerners have practiced for hundreds of years, because doing so would threaten the power of certain individuals. However, this so-called “Chinese characteristic”—which lacks both a comprehensive theoretical foundation and empirical validation—simply cannot withstand the test of practice, which is why so many problems have arisen. Driven by desperation, some resort to resurrecting the past, blindly reimporting ideas that have long been discarded, solely to preserve their vested interests and secure a seat at the central leadership table.

Then there are societal taboos. Certain taboos in human society hinder progress, and the handling of corpses is one such taboo. Often, subsequent rulers are reluctant to touch upon certain psychological sensitivities in order to balance various relationships—take, for example, Russia’s attitude toward Lenin’s body. It is precisely this that allows the specter of authoritarianism to linger, fueling Putin’s obsession with clinging to absolute power. Thus, we say that the process of democracy is, in essence, a struggle between humanity and greed; the original intent of “putting power in a cage” was to cage greed itself.

  Finally, let’s discuss a common mindset among Chinese people—and one shared by many socialist nations—which is the failure to understand where the state’s money actually comes from. I recall a rather irresponsible saying people used to repeat: “It’s the Communist Party’s money anyway.” In reality, this is incorrect, because political parties do not generate wealth. The government’s role is not to lead, but to protect the creation and exchange of wealth. Brutal brainwashing has left people confused about the source of wealth, leading them to believe that having their wealth taken away without restraint is only natural. It is important to understand that in Western democratic societies, the tax rates levied on the people are not set by the government; those who spend the money have no right to determine how much is collected.

  Now let’s talk about how the money collected from the people is being spent—a sum of nearly $1 million to preserve that corpse, not to mention the maintenance costs of the memorial hall. This enormous sum could be used to improve people’s lives, to provide schooling for children who cannot afford it, to provide safer school buses, or to help those who cannot afford medical care extend their lives… but in reality, it only serves the interests of a small minority, while everyone else pays the price.