博客 页面 4

办报纸的人,被判了20年

0
办报纸的人,被判了20年

——《在野党》声援黎智英

作者:《在野党》杂志社副主编 张致君

编辑:李聪玲 校对:程筱筱 翻译:彭小梅

办报纸的人,被判了20年

这个人一辈子做过很多事。他在中国大陆吃到一颗巧克力,就知道在另一方天地,梦都是甜的,人生有无限可能,千山万水他来到香港,小时候在工厂打工,后来做生意,再后来办了一份报纸。

他没有当官,没有带兵,没有发号施令,他只是办报纸。现在,他78岁,他要在监狱里再待20年。在这个年代,一个人只要办报纸,就足够被判这么久。

我们常常以为,权力最怕的是炸弹和子弹。其实不是,权力真正害怕的,是一张报纸。因为子弹只能杀人,而报纸能让人醒来。

黎智英不是因为做了什么“惊天动地”的事被抓的。他只是做了一件在正常社会里再普通不过的事:把发生的事情写出来。

可是在中共政权下,把事情写出来,本身就成了一种罪。

媒体的工作,就是让权力不舒服。

权力天生不喜欢被看见。它喜欢黑暗,喜欢模糊,喜欢“大家都别问”。

媒体的工作恰恰相反:它要照亮,要追问,要把话说清楚。

所以媒体和权力,从来就不是朋友。它们如同一对天生的对手。一个正常社会里,媒体负责提问,政府负责回答。

但中共政府只想命令,不想解释。于是,提问的人就成了“危险人物”。

宪法和基本法写得很清楚,只是没人照着做。

中共自己的《宪法》里写着:公民有言论、出版的自由。

《基本法》也写着:香港居民享有新闻和出版自由。

这些话都在。一个字都没删。但现实告诉我们:写在纸上的自由,不算数;活在空气里的恐惧,才算数。

当一个人因为办报纸被关进监狱,宪法就成了一本摆在橱窗里的书——看起来很庄严,其实没人翻。

国安法不是保护国家,是保护权力。

国安法的逻辑很简单:不是你做了什么,而是你“像不像敌人”。不是看证据,而是看态度。

你批评了,就有问题;你沉默过,也可能有问题;你曾经站出来过,那就更有问题。

它不是在防止犯罪,而是在防止思想。它不抓坏人,它吓好人。

黎智英不是一个人,是一个时代的缩影。他们关押的不是黎智英,而是——香港曾经存在过的那种可能性。那种记者可以问问题,报纸可以骂政府,市民可以讨论政治的可能性。

他们不允许这种可能性继续存在。于是,办报纸的人被判了20年。写评论的人被判了7年。当总编辑的人被判了10年。不肯指证别人的人被判了10年。连带着一个报纸钥匙扣的人,都可以被带走。

这不是审判罪行,这是清算记忆。

《在野党》的立场很简单。

我们不仅仅是为了一个人而愤怒。我们是为了一个原则:媒体存在的意义,就是监督政权。

如果媒体不能监督权力,那它就只剩下一个功能——替权力说话。

如果宪法和基本法不能保护办报纸的人,那它们连丢尽厕所擦屁股的资格都没有,卫生纸尚且柔软,而它们又臭又硬。

黎智英坐在监狱里,仅仅是因为他清醒。

一个社会最怕清醒的人。因为清醒的人会问:你凭什么?

他问了。于是他进了监狱。但问题还在。报纸可以被关掉,人可以被关起来,可问题不会自动消失。它们会留在空气里,留在记忆里,留在那些还愿意思考的人心里。

《在野党》声援黎智英,不是因为他是英雄,而是因为他只是一个不肯闭嘴的普通人。

而一个社会,如果连普通人都不能说话,那它也就不再配谈“国家安全”了。

它真正安全的,只有权力。

The Newspaper Publisher Was Sentenced to 20 Years— Opposition Party Expresses Support for Jimmy Lai

Author: Zhang Zhijun, Deputy Editor-in-Chief of Opposition Party MagazineEditor: Li ConglingProofreader: Cheng XiaoxiaoTranslator: Peng Xiaomei

办报纸的人,被判了20年

This man did many things in his lifetime.When he tasted a piece of chocolate in mainland China, he realized that in another world, even dreams were sweet and life held infinite possibilities. Crossing mountains and rivers, he came to Hong Kong. As a child he worked in factories. Later he went into business. Later still, he founded a newspaper.

He did not hold office. He did not command troops. He did not issue orders. He simply ran a newspaper. Now he is 78 years old, and he must spend another 20 years in prison. In this era, running a newspaper is enough to earn such a sentence.

We often think that power fears bombs and bullets the most. It does not. What power truly fears is a newspaper. Because bullets can only kill people, but newspapers can awaken them.

Jimmy Lai was not arrested for doing something “earth-shattering.” He simply did something utterly ordinary in a normal society: he wrote down what happened.

But under the CCP regime, writing down what happened has itself become a crime.

The job of the media is to make power uncomfortable.

Power naturally dislikes being seen. It prefers darkness. It prefers ambiguity. It prefers that “nobody ask questions.”

The job of the media is the opposite: to illuminate, to question, to speak clearly.

Therefore, media and power have never been friends. They are natural adversaries. In a normal society, the media asks questions, and the government answers them.

But the CCP government only wants to command, not to explain. Thus, those who ask questions to become “dangerous individuals.”

The Constitution and the Basic Law are clearly written—no one simply follows them.

The CCP’s own Constitution states that citizens have freedom of speech and of the press.

The Basic Law also states that Hong Kong residents enjoy freedom of the press and publication.

Those words are all still there. Not a single character has been deleted. But reality tells us: freedom written on paper does not count; fear that lives in the air does.

When a person is imprisoned for running a newspaper, the Constitution becomes a book placed in a display case—looking solemn yet never opened.

The National Security Law does not protect the nation; it protects power.

The logic of the National Security Law is simple: it is not about what you did, but whether you “look like an enemy.” It is not about evidence, but about attitude.

If you criticize, there is a problem.If you were silent, there might also be a problem.If you once stood up and spoke out, then there is certainly a problem.

It does not prevent crime; it prevents thought. It does not arrest bad people; it intimidates good people.

Jimmy Lai is not just one person; he is a symbol of an era. What they are imprisoning is not Jimmy Lai himself, but the possibility that once existed in Hong Kong—the possibility that journalists could ask questions, newspapers could criticize the government, and citizens could discuss politics.

They do not allow that possibility to continue to exist. Thus, the man who ran a newspaper was sentenced to 20 years. The one who wrote commentaries was sentenced to 7 years.The editor-in-chief was sentenced to 10 years. The one who refused to testify against others was sentenced to 10 years. Even someone with a newspaper keychain could be taken away.

This is not a trial of crimes; it is the liquidation of memory.

The position of Opposition Party is simple.

We are not angry merely for one individual. We are angry for a principle: the purpose of the media is to supervise those in power.

If the media cannot supervise power, then it has only one function left—to speak on behalf of power.

If the Constitution and the Basic Law cannot protect those who run newspapers, then they are not even fit to be used as toilet paper. At least toilet paper is soft; they are foul and rigid.

Jimmy Lai sits in prison simply because he was clear-minded.

A society fears clear-minded people the most. Because clear-minded people ask: By what right?

He asked. And so he went to prison. But the question remains.

Newspapers can be shut down. People can be locked up. But questions do not disappear automatically. They remain in the air, in memory, in the hearts of those still willing to think.

Opposition Party supports Jimmy Lai not because he is a hero, but because he is an ordinary person who refused to stay silent.

And if a society cannot even allow ordinary people to speak, then it no longer deserves to speak of “national security.”

The only thing truly secure in such a society is power itself.

我们要从思想上获得自由

0

作者:李锦华 编辑:Gloria Wang 校对:王滨 翻译:周敏

在中国共产党的统治下,是不允许有个人思想的。中国共产党控制了中国人的思想,以便可以为国家更好地服务。如果你敢站出来说真话、说实话,你就会被安一个“莫须有”的罪行。

中国的十年文化大革命,多少人受到了政治迫害,他们不以为耻,反以为荣,把他们这种独裁说成是政治、社会、经济的需要。所以共产党不希望中国人有思想,只要跟着党走即可,但凡你敢说真话、说实话,没有和共产党的路线统一,那么你的余生可能就会在监狱里度过。这是一个多么令人恐惧、令人窒息的政权。

疫情期间,中国政府三年“清零”运动,更是让我们清楚地认识到了共产党对科学与常识的漠视和践踏。各地官员的荒唐之举:即使小规模的疫情,也要整座城市全部封掉;他们会对进口来的食品、鱼类甚至建材进行“新冠病毒检测”。多少民众为这种疫情付出了代价,很多人因此丢掉工作,丢掉家庭。即便这样也是无休止的封锁。自由依赖于勇气和持续的冒险。但绝大多数中国人认为,即使是哲学层面上的反抗也是不可能的,个人的生存取决于服从。他们在焦虑中逆来顺受,像绵羊一样排着长队等待接受新冠病毒检测,或者在突然封城之前抢购食物。

因为我们从小接受的就是这种教育,要听党指挥,服从命令。就这样,我们一代又一代的人被中国共产党控制,没有人权,没有话语权。成百上千万中国人为现代中国日益增长的财富和实力感到自豪。但这种幸福的感觉是由表面的物质利益、关于西方衰落的不断宣传和对知识自由的压制而幻化出来的海市蜃楼。事实上,在党的影响下,中国也每况愈下。中国共产党可以掩盖他所谓的真相,无论发生什么事,民众得到的永远是官方的表面信息。甚至连选举也存在造假行为,可见共产党是多么害怕人民知道真相。在中国,所有的“真相”都只能来自党。过去十年里,情况越来越糟。当局抹杀了残存的独立思想,也在不断摧毁中国人民独立思考的能力。

所以能来到这个自由的国家,我深感幸运,因此我要为那些受到迫害的中国民主党党员和异议人士发声。中国民主党今天强烈谴责中共当局惨无人道地迫害回国的反对党人士和国内政治异议人士,并持续侵犯公民基本人权的行为,并呼吁各国政府和国际社会共同关注国内民主党员的处境和人身安全,谴责中共当局继续变本加厉地侵犯人权。

临近春节,在这个合家团圆的日子里,我们呼吁中共立即释放政治犯,让他们回家过年。我们更不能忘记那些因坚持自由、法治与人权而付出巨大代价的人。不能让他们的家属独自承担这一切后果。因此,我们民主党党员今天在这里发声:我们有人出人,有力出力,为民主事业更加壮大贡献自己的一份力量。

We Must Attain Freedom of Thought

Author: Li Jinhua Editor: Gloria Proofreader: Wang Bin Translator: Zhou Min

Under the rule of the Chinese Communist Party, individual thought is not allowed. The Chinese Communist Party controls the thoughts of the Chinese people so that they can better serve the state. If you dare to stand up and speak the truth, tell the facts, you will be framed with a “trumped-up” crime.

During China’s ten-year Cultural Revolution, so many people suffered political persecution; they [the CCP] did not feel ashamed but rather took pride in it, describing this kind of dictatorship as a political, social, and economic necessity. Therefore, the Communist Party does not want the Chinese people to have thoughts; they only need people to follow the Party. If you dare to speak the truth, tell the facts, and do not unify with the Communist Party’s line, then the rest of your life may be spent in prison. This is such a terrifying and suffocating regime.

During the pandemic, the Chinese government’s three-year “Zero-COVID” movement made us recognize even more clearly the Communist Party’s disregard and trampling of science and common sense. The absurd actions of officials in various places: even with a small-scale outbreak, an entire city would be completely locked down; they would conduct “COVID-19 tests” on imported food, fish, and even building materials. So many citizens paid the price for this pandemic; many people lost their jobs and their families because of it. Even so, it was endless lockdown after lockdown. Freedom depends on courage and continuous risk-taking. But the vast majority of Chinese people believe that even resistance on a philosophical level is impossible; individual survival depends on obedience. They resign themselves to anxiety, lining up like sheep in long queues to wait for COVID-19 tests, or scrambling for food before a sudden city lockdown.

Because the education we have received since childhood is this kind of education: to follow the Party’s command and obey orders. In this way, generation after generation of our people are controlled by the Chinese Communist Party, with no human rights and no right to speak. Hundreds of millions of Chinese people feel proud of modern China’s increasing wealth and strength. But this feeling of happiness is a mirage conjured by superficial material interests, continuous propaganda about the decline of the West, and the suppression of intellectual freedom. In fact, under the influence of the Party, China is also going from bad to worse. The Chinese Communist Party can cover up its so-called truth; no matter what happens, what the public receives is always official, superficial information. Even the elections involve fraudulent behavior, showing how much the Communist Party fears the people knowing the truth. In China, all “truth” can only come from the Party. In the past ten years, the situation has become worse and worse. The authorities have erased the remaining independent thoughts and are continuously destroying the Chinese people’s ability to think independently.

Therefore, to be able to come to this free country, I feel deeply fortunate; thus, I want to speak out for those persecuted China Democracy Party members and dissidents. Today, the China Democracy Party strongly condemns the CCP authorities’ inhumane persecution of returning opposition figures and domestic political dissidents, and their continuous violation of citizens’ basic human rights, and calls on governments of all countries and the international community to jointly pay attention to the situation and personal safety of domestic Democracy Party members, and to condemn the CCP authorities for continuing to intensify their violations of human rights.

As the Spring Festival approaches, on this day of family reunion, we call on the CCP to immediately release political prisoners and let them go home for the New Year. We must not forget those who have paid a huge price for adhering to freedom, the rule of law, and human rights. We cannot let their families bear all these consequences alone. Therefore, we Democracy Party members are speaking out here today: those with people contribute people, those with strength contribute strength, contributing our own share of power to make the cause of democracy grow stronger.

                        

政治民主(长篇连载)

0

作者:祝正明

编辑:李聪玲 翻译:戈冰

内容提要

本书共十二章,探讨了政府应该发挥的作用,政府与百姓的相互关系,专制政权的特征,民主政治体制的思想理论和民主政治活动的具体做法,剖析了民主政治所特有的政府结构模式,分析了中国社会的民族性和社会发生政府重组的各种途径。相信在百姓对政治问题普遍不甚关心和了解的状况下,对增强百姓的参政议政意识能起到积极的作用。对如何促进社会的民主与法治建设,促进政府高效廉洁地为人民服务进行了充分的理论探讨。

民主政治的内容

集权统治者认为,社会离不开他们,是他们为社会提供了安定和秩序,没有他们就会天下大乱。无政府主义者认为,社会不需要有政府,政府不仅向人民征收苛捐重税,还制定大量的惩罚条例来约束民众,没有他们,人民可以更自由幸福地生活。民主主义者认为,民众本身并不须要政府,只是因为民众有一些共同需要,才须要建立起一个公共服务机构来满足民众的这些需要,民众据此授予他们一定的权力,但权限仅限于使他们能服务于民众而不能加害于民众,这是民主政治的基本思想原理。

民主政治是建立在对人的不信任基础之上的,认为人只要拥有权力,就存在滥用权力的趋势,因此,必须严格限制政府权力的使用,不给政府官员留下任何滥用权力的空间,以充分完善的法律制度建设,来保证社会时刻有一批优秀分子在为人民提供服务,同时,还有其他一批同样优秀的社会精英分子时刻在监督与提防着他们,一旦发现这些人中有人不称职或滥用职权、贪污腐化,任何一位都会随时被撤离职位,受到惩罚,从而保证了国家的政治权力在被使用时能够满足百姓的苛刻要求。除了周期性的选举以外,绝大多数民众都可以尽管放心地去从事他们的工商业活动,改善自己的生活条件,所需做的只是偶尔看看这些人提供的述职报告,健全的制度建设会使政府自动地像仆人一样照顾着自己的利益,为自己提供着最好的服务。而周期性的选举,即是防止这些人形成新的阶级的手段,也是显示人民始终是权力的主人的表现,人民可以随时收回交给这些人代为行使的权力,交给新的一批人去行使。

民主运动是一场深刻的社会变革,它不同于历代的任何一次改朝换代,形成打天下者坐天下的格局。它首先是将国家的政治权力收回到人民手中,然后运用一种科学的机制,建立、控制与监督政府,使民众始终保有这种权力。民主运动是一场以增进全民利益为目的的运动,全体国民是其受益者,因此,所有的公民都有义务和责任参加这项运动,促进民主政治的早日实现。

政府及其作用

在我们生活的这个世界,你可能已经发觉:不论你生在何时,身处何地,都会受到别人的管制,不论你是一贫如洗的平头百姓,或者是腰缠万贯、被人前呼后拥,都同样无法摆脱这种管制。有人总是规定你必须做什么,不能做什么,你必须服从他们,如果你不服从,就会受到他们严厉的对待和残酷的打击。他们无时不在,无处不在,无法架避,这就是政府和它的雇员。

多少年来,我们祖祖辈辈已经习惯了这样一种现实,认为人降生到这个世界上,就象必然就会伴随有山水草木一样,自然就有朝廷或政府,它是人们生活中必不可少的一部分,无法摆脱。

这种概念已经变成我们社会的一种遗产,代代相传,以致于当突然没有皇帝朝廷或政府时,人们便会惊惶失措,坐立不安,赶紧要立一个新皇帝,即便他非常的年幼无知。否则,就认为一定会天下大乱。

政府跟百姓是一种什么关系呢?它在起什么作用呢?

首先,它要人们向它进贡纳税。任何人,不管是个体摊贩、私营业主还是收入稍高的工薪阶级,任何形式的厂矿、企业、公司等,都要将自己辛苦经营出来的一部分利润或个人收入上缴给他们。这是强制性的,不管你是否愿意。其次,他们制定出很多的法律、条例,规定人们哪些是允许做的,哪些是不允许做的。如果你不避从他们的规定,与他们对抗,他们就会对你进行罚款,没收你的财产,甚至拘禁你的人身,扼杀你的生命。他们依靠广泛的税收,养活着一支庞大的警察队伍和武装部队,随时准备击溃任何来自民间的反抗。它们中的许多人不从事任何劳动就能享受到荣华富贵,无任何特长仍能花天酒地。它们在内部划分势力范围,规定层层等级,享受各类特权。它们有时贪污腐化,恣意妄为,甚至敲诈勒索。在人类历史上,几乎所有耸人听闻的事件都与它们有关。

既然如此,干吗还要政府呢?没有它们,人们不是可以生活得更好吗?

回答是:也不行,有很多事情,还必须要由政府来做。

在现代社会,我们需要政府来维持社会治安、保障经济合同的履行,需要政府来修筑道路、管理交通、兴办教育、医疗、管理老年人的退休保障,需要政府来监督食品卫生、控制环境污染,建立应急医护消防力量。所有这些问题都无法依靠公民个人的力量去解决,即便是很有组织能力、很有威望、经济实力非常强大的富豪或公司。

显然,社会还是存在着各种公共和社会福利问题,需要有一个强有力的公共机构也就是被称为政府的机构来解决和管理的。如果一个社会真的没有政府,人们也将很难过上正常的生活。

但是,显而易见,社会真正需要的,是一个根据民意设立,受民众的控制,为民众利益服务、以满足民众需要为其存在目的的政府,而不是一个脱离民意,漠视百姓利益,依靠自己的暴力工具强制征收税款、暴力镇压反抗而维持其存在的强权政府。

但是,既然需要设立政府,不管其建立的基础是依靠暴力或依靠民意,都无法避免这样一个事实:政府必然是一个庞大的组织,拥有广泛的权力,政府官员大权在握,在政府官员以这种权力社会安定提供某种保障的同时,这种权力也给他们侵犯百姓的利益提供了种种机会。他们可能忠心耿耿地为大众服务,也可能会滥用职权。结果,人民大众得到社会安定的好处的同时,往往也有可能付出过重的经济代价甚至是惨重的人身自由代价。

那么,难道民众非得在享受政府提供的益处的同时,也必须忍受它对民众可能会有的种种伤害吗?

人类有充分的智慧去战胜自然,追求幸福美好的生活。但是,人类社会自身的这个问题,却成了人类追求幸福的一大障碍。人类有能力和智慧去解决它吗?这是无数仁人志士思考过、并进行过种种探索和尝试的问题。现在,它再一次摆到我们面前。所幸的是,我们已经可以从前人进行的大量成功和不成功的实践中总结经验教训,选择最佳方案,少走弯路。

实际上,政府及其组织结构也和人类社会的其他许多事物一样,是由人类自己创造的,因此人类完全有能力对它进行设计、改造。探讨理想的政治模式,对各种社会问题及弊端的起因进行研究,以寻求最佳的解决办法,是人类完全有能力做到的事,这也正是政治学的研究内容。像其它自然学科一样,政治学同样是人类长期积累的智慧结晶,是为人们自身的利益服务的。人类有能力对政治模式和政府结构进行不断的实践、总结与改进。

但是现在,当我们还很年幼,尚未具备独立的思维能力之前,我们就被灌输了某种思维方式和意识形态。我们已经习惯于以该种思维方式在这种意识形态的范围内去思考问题,以致于我们在做任何事情的时候,都要在这种思想理论中寻找依据,或者打上它的旗号才会感到放心。这就产生了一种悲剧,本来是人们掌握了一种思想理论,结果反而却是这种思想理论控制了我们的思维方式,我们成了这种理论的仆人,不是它在为我们服务,而是我们在为它服务。

人类改造自然的能力是没有止境的。人类社会的生活方式是在不断发展进步的,就像各种自然科学和工程技术科学在不断发展一样。对任何一种社会制度进行仔细而公正的研究而不发现其缺点是不可能的。试图把任何一种思想理论与社会制度当作完美无缺的真理而不允许触动是荒谬的,停留在某种社会体制而自认为已经达到了顶峰,只能是极端愚蠢的表现。

但是,没有一个统治阶级会愿意主动交出权力,自愿退出政治舞台。因此,在专制统治时代,研究政治与社会问题常常具有危险性。因为这会触及少数大权在握的人的既得利益,从而可能给探索者带来灾难性的后果。这也正是极少有人敢于或愿意进行这种探索的原因。尽管社会非常需要有人去做这项工作,却很少有人会去做。

但是,有充分的理由使我们认识到,一种健全的政治制度是促进社会福祉的最有效工具,而一个腐败的政治制度是社会进步的最可怕敌人。那么,相对任何其它科学而言,政治科学就应该是人们最值得花精力去研究的科学。

地球上曾经存在及目前正在运作的政府中,没有一个是没有缺点的。政治制度的现代化需要与社会的经济与科技发展同步进行。任何政权也不应该坚持不改自己的制度,尤其不应对探索人类社会各种问题及解决办法的行为进行惩罚,限制富于创造性的探索。正是因为有了思想的自由地探索,科学与技术才能发展到今天的程度,只有让思想自由地探索,人类社会才能继续发展到更美好的境界。(下期待续)

祝正明简历

祝正明,男,汉族,浙江江山人,工程师,1962年10月2 日生,1982年7月毕业于浙江大学化学工程系,分配在江苏仪征化纤工业联合公司,曾任团支部书记,被评为联合公司先进生产者,1988年调入杭州,从事过工程设计、施工安装、设备调试等技术性工作,并担任车间主要负责人。1998年春被选拔参加省经委举办的全省大中企业管理人员工商管理培训班,为期三个月。

具有强烈的正义感和社会责任感,痛恨专制不平等现象。

89年学运期间,曾在北京天安门发表演说,并向天安门学运领袖递交过十条政治运作建议,“六四”后回杭潜心从事西方历史、政治思想史研究,遍阅各主要图书馆的大部分有关民主的中外文书籍,95年开始,从基本民主观念入手,写成《政治民主》一书,98年1月完稿,联系近十家出版社无人敢接印,4月进行自费印刷,遭查封。

98年6月初,分析了国内社会现状和政治时局,积极筹划建党活动,起草《中国民主党浙江筹备委员会成立公开宣言》和《中国民主党章程(草案)》,并进行印刷、散发,联络诸位民运朋友于6月25日前往注册,从而掀起了一轮冲击党禁的全国民运浪潮。1月10日,遭抄家,被抄走电脑、打印机、数字收音机、数千页文稿、通讯录、大量《公开宣言》和《章程(草案)》等三十一种物品,被关押十六天,监视居住五十天。于11月8日经选举为中国民主党浙江筹委会常务工作组负责人,全国筹委会筹委。

祝正明于99年初被捕,同年年底因中国民主党案,以颠覆国家政权罪判处有期徒刑十年。

Political Democracy (Serialized Novel)

Abstract: Democratic politics asserts that power originates from the people, imposes strict constraints on government, employs institutional oversight to prevent abuse of authority, ensures government serves the public interest, and advances social welfare and the development of freedom.

Author: Zhu Zhengming

Editor: Li Congling Translator: Ge Bing

Synopsis

This twelve-chapter work explores the proper role of government, the relationship between government and citizens, the characteristics of authoritarian regimes, the theoretical foundations of democratic political systems, and practical approaches to democratic political activities. It dissects the unique governmental structures inherent to democratic politics and analyzes the distinct national character of Chinese society alongside various pathways for societal transformation leading to governmental restructuring. It is believed that in a context where citizens generally lack interest in or understanding of political issues, this work can play a positive role in enhancing public awareness of political participation and deliberation. It offers thorough theoretical exploration on how to advance social democracy and the rule of law, and promote efficient and clean government service for the people.

The Content of Democratic Politics

Authoritarian rulers assert that society cannot function without them, claiming they provide stability and order—without them, chaos would ensue. Anarchists contend that society requires no government, arguing that governments not only impose heavy taxes on the people but also enact numerous punitive regulations to constrain them. Without governments, they maintain, people could live more freely and happily. Democrats contend that the people themselves do not inherently require government. Rather, because the people share certain common needs, it becomes necessary to establish a public service institution to meet these needs. The people thereby grant them certain powers, but these powers are strictly limited to enabling them to serve the people and not to harm them. This is the fundamental principle of democratic politics.

Democratic governance is founded on a distrust of human nature, recognizing that power tends to corrupt. Therefore, the exercise of governmental authority must be strictly constrained, leaving no room for abuse. A comprehensive and well-developed legal system ensures that society is perpetually served by a cohort of capable individuals. Simultaneously, another group of equally capable social elites constantly monitors and guards against them. Should any official prove incompetent, abuse authority, or engage in corruption, they can be removed from office and punished at any time. This ensures that when political power is exercised, it meets the exacting demands of the populace. Beyond periodic elections, the vast majority of citizens can confidently pursue their commercial and industrial activities to improve their living conditions. All they need do is occasionally review the performance reports submitted by these officials. A robust institutional framework ensures the government automatically serves as a steward of their interests, providing the best possible service. Periodic elections serve both to prevent these officials from forming a new privileged class and to demonstrate that the people remain the ultimate masters of power. Citizens can at any time reclaim the authority they entrusted to these representatives and delegate it to a new group.

The democratic movement represents a profound social transformation distinct from any historical dynastic change that established a pattern of “those who conquer the realm rule the realm.” It first reclaims the nation’s political power into the hands of the people, then employs a scientific mechanism to establish, control, and oversee the government, ensuring the populace perpetually retains this authority. The democratic movement is a campaign aimed at advancing the interests of all citizens, with the entire nation as its beneficiaries. Therefore, every citizen bears the obligation and responsibility to participate in this movement, accelerating the realization of democratic governance.

Government and Its Role

In the world we inhabit, you may have noticed: regardless of when or where you were born, you are subject to regulation by others. Whether you are a penniless commoner or a wealthy individual surrounded by attendants, you cannot escape this regulation. Some always dictate what you must do and what you must not do. You must obey them; if you disobey, you will face their harsh treatment and cruel punishment. They are ever-present, inescapable—this is the government and its employees.

For generations, our ancestors have grown accustomed to this reality, viewing the existence of a court or government as as natural and inevitable as the presence of mountains, rivers, and vegetation. It has become an indispensable part of human life, impossible to evade.

This concept has become a legacy of our society, passed down through generations. Consequently, when an emperor, court, or government suddenly vanishes, people panic, become restless, and rush to install a new ruler—even if he is young and ignorant. Otherwise, they believe chaos will inevitably ensue.

What kind of relationship exists between the government and the people? What role does it play?

First, it demands tribute and taxes from the people. Everyone—whether individual vendors, private business owners, or salaried workers with slightly higher incomes—along with all forms of factories, mines, enterprises, companies, and so forth, must surrender a portion of their hard-earned profits or personal income to them. This is compulsory, regardless of willingness. Second, they enact numerous laws and regulations dictating what people are permitted to do and what is forbidden. If you fail to comply with their rules or resist them, they will impose fines, confiscate your property, or even detain you, threatening your very life. They rely on extensive taxation to sustain a vast police force and armed military, ever ready to crush any popular resistance. Many among them enjoy opulent lifestyles without performing any labor, living in luxury despite lacking any special skills. Internally, they carve out spheres of influence, establish rigid hierarchies, and enjoy various privileges. They sometimes engage in corruption, act arbitrarily, and even resort to extortion. Throughout human history, nearly every shocking event has been linked to them.

Given this, why do we need governments at all? Wouldn’t people live better without them?

The answer is: No, they wouldn’t. There are many things that must be done by governments.

In modern society, we need governments to maintain public order and ensure the fulfillment of economic contracts. We need governments to build roads, manage traffic, provide education and healthcare, and administer retirement security for the elderly. We need governments to oversee food safety, control environmental pollution, and establish emergency medical and firefighting services. None of these issues can be resolved by individual citizens alone—not even by the most organized, influential, or financially powerful individuals or corporations.

Clearly, society still faces various public and welfare challenges that require a robust public institution—the government—to address and manage. Without a government, people would struggle to lead normal lives.

However, it is evident that what society truly requires is a government established according to the will of the people, controlled by the populace, serving the interests of the citizens, and existing to meet their needs—not a coercive authority detached from public sentiment, indifferent to the welfare of its subjects, and relying on its instruments of violence to forcibly collect taxes and suppress dissent to maintain its existence.

Yet, since government is necessary—whether founded on force or consent—it inevitably becomes a vast organization wielding extensive power. Government officials hold considerable authority. While this power provides some assurance of social stability, it also creates numerous opportunities for them to infringe upon the people’s interests. They may serve the public faithfully or abuse their authority. Consequently, while the populace reaps the benefits of social stability, they often pay an excessive economic price—or even suffer severe losses of personal liberty.

Must the people endure potential harm from the government while enjoying its benefits?

Humanity possesses sufficient wisdom to conquer nature and pursue a happy, fulfilling life. Yet this inherent problem within human society itself has become a major obstacle to that pursuit. Do we have the capacity and wisdom to resolve it? This is a question pondered by countless visionaries, who have undertaken diverse explorations and experiments. Now, it confronts us once more. Fortunately, we can draw lessons from the vast array of successful and unsuccessful practices of our predecessors, select the optimal solutions, and avoid unnecessary detours.

In truth, governments and their organizational structures, like many other aspects of human society, are creations of humanity itself. Therefore, humanity possesses the full capacity to design and transform them. Exploring ideal political models, researching the root causes of various social problems and ills, and seeking optimal solutions are tasks well within humanity’s capabilities—and precisely the domain of political science. Like other natural sciences, political science is the crystallization of humanity’s accumulated wisdom, serving the interests of people themselves. Humanity possesses the capacity to continuously experiment with, evaluate, and refine political models and governmental structures.

But now, while we are still young and have not yet developed independent thinking abilities, we are indoctrinated with a certain mindset and ideology. We have grown accustomed to thinking within the confines of this ideology, to the extent that we feel uneasy unless we can find justification for our actions within its theoretical framework or claim its banner as our own. This has led to a tragedy: instead of people mastering a theory, the theory has come to control our thinking. We have become its servants—not serving it, but being served by it.

Humanity’s capacity to transform nature knows no bounds. Human society’s way of life evolves and advances continuously, just as the natural sciences and engineering disciplines do. It is impossible to study any social system with care and impartiality without uncovering its flaws. It is absurd to treat any ideology or social system as flawless truth beyond challenge. To cling to a particular social structure while believing it represents the pinnacle of achievement is an act of extreme folly.

Yet no ruling class willingly relinquishes power or voluntarily exits the political stage. Thus, in eras of autocratic rule, studying political and social issues often carries danger. Such inquiry threatens the vested interests of those wielding power, potentially bringing catastrophic consequences upon the explorer. This is precisely why few dare or choose to undertake such exploration. Though society desperately needs such work done, few step forward.

Yet compelling reasons compel us to recognize that a sound political system is the most effective instrument for advancing social welfare, while a corrupt political system is the most formidable enemy of societal progress. Thus, relative to any other science, political science ought to be the discipline most worthy of human effort.

No government that has ever existed or currently operates on Earth is without flaws. The modernization of political systems must advance in tandem with a society’s economic and technological development. No regime should stubbornly cling to its own institutions, especially by punishing the exploration of humanity’s problems and solutions or stifling creative inquiry. It is precisely through the free exploration of ideas that science and technology have reached their present heights. Only by allowing thoughts to roam freely can human society continue advancing toward a more splendid future. (To be continued)

Zhu Zhengming’s Resume

Zhu Zhengming, male, Han ethnicity, born October 2, 1962, in Jiangshan, Zhejiang Province. Engineer. Graduated from the Department of Chemical Engineering at Zhejiang University in July 1982. Assigned to the Yizheng Chemical Fiber Industrial Joint Company in Jiangsu Province, where he served as Youth League Branch Secretary and was recognized as an Advanced Producer. Transferred to Hangzhou in 1988, engaging in technical work including engineering design, construction installation, and equipment commissioning, while also serving as primary workshop supervisor. In the spring of 1998, he was selected to participate in a three-month provincial-level business management training program for managers of large and medium-sized enterprises, organized by the Provincial Economic Commission.

He possesses a strong sense of justice and social responsibility, detesting authoritarianism and inequality.

During the 1989 student movement, he delivered a speech at Beijing’s Tiananmen Square and submitted ten political operational recommendations to the student movement leaders there. After the June Fourth incident, he returned to Hangzhou and devoted himself to researching Western history and the history of political thought. He extensively studied most relevant Chinese and foreign books on democracy in major libraries. Beginning in 1995, starting from fundamental democratic concepts, he wrote the book Political Democracy, completing it in January 1998. After contacting nearly ten publishers, none dared to print it. In April, he self-funded its printing, only to have it confiscated.

In early June 1998, analyzing China’s social conditions and political climate, he actively planned party-building activities. He drafted the “Public Declaration on the Establishment of the Zhejiang Preparatory Committee of the China Democratic Party” and the “Draft Constitution of the China Democratic Party,” which were printed and distributed. He coordinated with fellow democracy activists to register the party on June 25, sparking a nationwide wave of democracy movements challenging the ban on political parties. On January 10, his home was raided. Thirty-one items were confiscated, including a computer, printer, digital radio, thousands of pages of manuscripts, address books, and large quantities of copies of the “Public Declaration” and “Draft Charter.” He was detained for sixteen days and placed under residential surveillance for fifty days. On November 8, he was elected as the head of the Standing Working Group of the Zhejiang Preparatory Committee of the China Democratic Party and as a member of the National Preparatory Committee.

Zhu Zhengming was arrested in early 1999 and sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment for subversion of state power in the China Democratic Party case later that year.

《在野党》杂志社严正声明:谴责中共当局重判黎智英

0

    《在野党》杂志社就中共当局依据所谓“国安法”对香港传媒人黎智英判处二十年有期徒刑一事,表示最强烈的关切与最严正的谴责。

    黎智英长期从事新闻与出版工作,其职业行为属于正当的媒体活动范畴。在任何具备基本法治与宪政原则的社会中,新闻工作者依法行使报道、评论与监督权力之职责,理应受到保护,而非遭到刑事打压。中共当局以“国家安全”为名,对正常新闻活动实施重判,已严重背离现代法治精神,公然侵犯言论自由与新闻自由。

    我们郑重指出,中国《宪法》及香港《基本法》均明文保障公民享有言论、出版与新闻自由。当前以国安法之名行政治清算之实,不仅损害司法独立与程序正义,也从根本上侵蚀社会对法律的信任基础。

    《在野党》杂志社郑重呼吁中共当局立即停止以法律工具压制良心与真相的做法,切实尊重新闻自由与公民基本权利。

    我们将持续关注黎智英及所有良心犯的处境,并坚定声援一切为真相与自由发声的人士。

——《在野党》杂志社

Statement by “The Opposition” Magazine: A Solemn Condemnation of the CCP’s Heavy Sentencing of Jimmy Lai

“The Opposition” (Zai Ye Dang) Magazine expresses its deepest concern and strongest condemnation regarding the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) authorities’ decision to sentence Hong Kong media mogul Jimmy Lai to twenty years in prison under the so-called “National Security Law.”

Jimmy Lai has long been dedicated to journalism and publishing; his professional conduct falls squarely within the scope of legitimate media activities. In any society governed by the basic principles of the rule of law and constitutionalism, journalists exercising their duty to report, commentate, and provide oversight should be protected, not subjected to criminal suppression. By imposing such a heavy sentence on normal journalistic activities under the guise of “national security,” the CCP authorities have gravely departed from the spirit of modern rule of law and committed an overt violation of the freedoms of speech and the press.

We solemnly point out that both the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China and the Hong Kong Basic Law explicitly guarantee citizens the rights to freedom of speech, publication, and the press. Utilizing the National Security Law to carry out political liquidations not only undermines judicial independence and procedural justice but also fundamentally erodes the foundation of public trust in the law.

“The Opposition” Magazine solemnly calls upon the CCP authorities to immediately cease the practice of using legal instruments to suppress conscience and truth, and to earnestly respect press freedom and the fundamental rights of citizens.

We will continue to monitor the situation of Jimmy Lai and all prisoners of conscience, and we stand in firm solidarity with all those who speak out for truth and freedom.

— “The Opposition” (Zai Ye Dang) Magazine

旧金山 2月14日 抗议中共非法重判黎智英先生

0
旧金山 2月14日 抗议中共非法重判黎智英先生
旧金山 2月14日 抗议中共非法重判黎智英先生

旧金山民主活动通告

集会主题:抗议中共非法重判黎智英先生

活动时间:

2/14/2026 13:00

活动地点:

旧金山中共总领馆

(1450 Laguna St,San Francisco,CA 94115)

联办单位:

中国民主党旧金山党部

US HKers Club

NorCal HK Club

HKers in San Diego

洛杉矶 2月14日 《全球觉醒》第五十九期 抗议港共政权重判黎智英

0
洛杉矶 2月14日 《全球觉醒》第五十九期 抗议港共政权重判黎智英
洛杉矶 2月14日 《全球觉醒》第五十九期 抗议港共政权重判黎智英

《全球覺醒》第五十九期

自由之鐘 時刻敲響 全球覺醒 民主聯盟 消滅獨裁 推翻暴政

活動主題:抗議港共政權重判黎智英!

現年78歲的黎智英先生,被控以「串謀勾結外國勢力」等罪名,判處二十年徒刑。此一刑期,在其年齡與已被長期羈押的現實背景下,事實上等同於終身監禁。其餘多名被告亦被判處六年至十年不等的長期徒刑。

這是《香港國安法》實施以來,首宗所謂「勾結罪」案件的判刑,也是目前為止刑期最重、政治象徵意義最強烈的案件。此案不只是對個別民主人士的打擊,而是一場系統性、示範性的政治清算。黎智英案標誌著中共對《香港基本法》及「一國兩制」的破壞,已從體制侵蝕階段,正式進入「司法工具化、法律武器化、異議犯罪化」的實質終結階段。

這是對香港民主運動的清算,也是對全體中國人的警告。黎智英案並非個案,而是中共在香港進行政治肅清與歷史清算的重要一環。

它向世界傳遞了一個極度危險的訊號:

• 追求民主自由不再被視為權利,而被定調為罪行

• 堅持良知、新聞良心與公共責任,可能付出一生自由的代價

• 法律不再是限制權力的工具,而是服務權力的武器

我們堅決反對中共以《香港國安法》之名迫害民主人士

• 我們堅定支持黎智英先生及所有因追求民主自由而遭打壓的香港人士

• 我們將持續揭露、記錄並追究中共破壞香港法治與人權的歷史責任

我們嚴正呼籲:

立即釋放黎智英!立即釋放香港民主人士!

立即停止對記者、寫作者與公民的政治迫害!

恢復基本新聞自由,廢除《香港國安法》!

我們的口號:

新聞無罪!寫作無罪!

真相無罪!良心無罪!

停止迫害!釋放黎智英!

時間:2026年2月14日(星期六)1:00PM(下午)

地點:中共駐洛杉磯總領館

地址:443 Shatto Pl, Los Angeles, CA 90020

活動召集人:劉廣賢/吳飛文

活動規劃:廖軍/孙晔

活動主持:易勇

組織者:

胡月明4806536918 /张星 8728672257

何宇6265033889 /李錦華9092207666

黄思博 6262345396 /于越 6266498381

活動義工:于海龍 /劉樂園/ 張帥/鐘文/高孟霞/陈健

攝影:Ji Luo /王永 /張允密

主辦單位:

香港人會館(洛杉磯)

協辦單位:

中國民主黨聯合總部美西黨部

中國民主黨聯合總部美南黨部

自由鍾民主基金會

盛世下的谢幕:中国农村老人“自杀潮”背后的体制真相

0

作者:周敏

编辑:李聪玲 校对:程筱筱 翻译:吕峰

当全球目光聚焦于东方中国崛起的宏大叙事时,在繁华的阴影深处,一场无声的生命收割正在农村上演。社会学田野调查显示,中国农村老人的自杀率已达到惊人的水平,部分地区甚至高出城市五倍。这并非单纯的心理疾患,而是一场由体制性排斥、经济剥削与乡土文化坍塌共同酿成的“社会性屠杀”。

绝命的理性:当死亡成为最后一次“奉献”

在《中国卫生健康统计年鉴》与学者刘燕舞等人的调查中,农村老人的自杀呈现出一种平静的惨烈。在广袤的黄土地上,80岁以上老人的自杀率远超每10万人中60人的心理红线。曾经,剧毒农药“百草枯”是他们通往终点的捷径。这种药剂因极高的致死率被禁,其残忍之处在于:它会引起不可逆的肺部纤维化,让呼吸器官枯竭如干透的丝瓜络,而患者在长达数周的窒息过程中,意识始终清醒。

然而,禁药治标,却治不了绝望。当药瓶被收走,老人们转向了更原始、更决绝的方式:“软自杀”。 他们在清醒状态下断食、断药、拒医。这种方式极具隐蔽性,常被计入“自然病故”,本质上是生命权的主动放弃。与年轻人的冲动不同,老人的离去是经过周密计算的,具有明确的“利他性”。他们往往避开农忙,甚至选好时间在子女打工返乡前换好寿衣,以便子女能在极短的休假期间“顺便”办完丧事后迅速返岗。这种被邻里赞许为“懂事、不拖累家人”的死亡,揭示了农村最冷酷的心理逻辑:当生命被视为家庭的“负资产”,自杀便成了他们对家庭最后一次、也是最彻底的“奉献”。

制度性剥夺:二元结构下的权利弃子

这场悲剧并非孤立的个体选择,而是深植于中国特有的资源错配与制度缺失。

福利分配的体制性歧视:在城乡二元结构中,农民长期被定位为资源的输出者,却在二次分配中沦为边缘。当城市体制内的养老金保障了晚年的尊严时,农村老人每月仅有的一两百元基础养老金,在今天通胀的物价面前近乎一种羞辱。他们劳作一生支持了工业化进程,却在丧失劳动能力后被排除在国家安全网之外。

乡土秩序的全面溃败:随着城镇化浪潮的抽割,曾经作为宗族堡垒的农村已成为了空壳。青壮年流入城市,留守农村的不仅是老弱的身躯,更是社区互助、精神寄托与医疗监护的全面真空。在这些被形容为“废土”的村庄里,老人不仅失去了经济来源,更失去了作为人的尊严感。

权力者的伪善:收走了农药,留下了绝望

这种自杀潮,本质上是“无价值者”被社会主流系统抛弃的过程。一个能将巨额预算投入基建与对外援助的体制,却无法为种粮一辈子的老农们提供一份基本的临终关怀,这本身就是一场集体自杀的共犯。

权力者通过禁止百草枯来维持“治理成绩”,却不愿在老人的碗里多加一勺温热的粥、在药盒里多放几颗救命药。这种治理是典型的伪善。如果一个盛世的延续,需要靠最弱势群体以“主动退出”的方式来维持低成本运行,那么这个盛世的根基早已从内里腐烂。

老人的药瓶里,装的不只是农药,还有对时代的绝望。这不仅是农村的谢幕,更是整个社会文明的悲哀。当一个社会不再敬畏那些曾为它奠基的生命,它所引以为傲的盛世繁华,不过是建立在沙滩上的虚幻蜃景。

A Curtain Call in an Age of Prosperity:The Structural Tragedy Behind the “Suicide Wave” Among Elderly People in Rural China

AbstractThe land does not speak, nor do its silent guardians. Across the widening divide between urban and rural China, a generation of farmers is completing its final exit in an intensely tragic yet hidden manner. This article leads us into villages overshadowed by the smell of pesticides and the weight of loneliness, seeking to understand the structural sorrow behind what some describe as a tide of “soft suicide.” This is not only the pain of the countryside; it is a challenge to the conscience of civilization. When dignity in old age is reduced to the cost of a bottle of pesticide, everyone who lives within modern society becomes a bystander to this quiet departure of life.

Author: Zhou MinEditor: Li ConglingProofreader: Cheng XiaoxiaoTranslator: Lyu Feng

While global attention often focuses on the grand narrative of China’s rise, a silent loss of life is unfolding in rural areas, away from the glare of prosperity. Field research in sociology has suggested that suicide rates among elderly villagers are strikingly high, in some regions several times those of cities. Many observers argue that this cannot be explained simply as mental illness, but rather reflects a combination of institutional exclusion, economic hardship, and the erosion of traditional rural structures.

Rationality at the Edge: When Death Is Seen as a Final Contribution

Drawing on materials such as the China Health Statistics Yearbook and investigations by scholars including Liu Yanwu, some studies portray elderly suicide in rural regions as calm yet devastating. In certain reports, the rate among those over eighty far exceeds commonly cited warning thresholds.

In the past, highly toxic pesticides such as paraquat were frequently mentioned in discussions of rural suicide. Because of their lethality, such substances were later banned. Yet removing access to a means does not necessarily eliminate despair. Some elderly individuals may instead choose to stop eating, discontinue medication, or decline treatment. Because these actions are less visible, they are often recorded as natural deaths. Researchers note that, compared with impulsive acts sometimes associated with youth, decisions among the elderly can be deliberate and intertwined with considerations about burdening family members.

In local moral language, deaths described as “not causing trouble for the children” may even be regarded as considerate. Such narratives reveal a harsh psychological reality: when a life is perceived as an economic liability, withdrawal can come to be framed as a final act of responsibility.

Structural Disadvantage: Marginalization Within a Dual System

Observers who take a structural perspective argue that these tragedies are not isolated personal choices but are connected to long-standing disparities.

Unequal welfare arrangements.Within the urban–rural divide, farmers historically contributed labor and resources, yet in redistribution often receive limited returns. Compared with pensions available to many urban retirees, the basic monthly benefits in rural areas can be modest relative to rising living costs. For critics, this gap symbolizes exclusion from a comprehensive safety net after a lifetime of work.

The weakening of community life.Urban migration has drawn younger generations away, leaving behind aging populations. Traditional networks of mutual aid, emotional support, and everyday care have been strained. In villages described by some as hollowed out, older residents may lose not only income but also social roles that once affirmed their worth.

Governance and Moral Debate

For commentators, banning dangerous chemicals may improve public health statistics, yet it does not automatically resolve the deeper questions of livelihood, care, and dignity. They argue that if rapid development coexists with situations in which the most vulnerable feel compelled to withdraw from life, then material success alone cannot define social progress.

In this interpretation, what sits inside an elderly person’s medicine cabinet is more than a substance; it is a condensed expression of anxiety about belonging in a changing era. The issue therefore extends beyond the countryside and becomes a broader reflection on how a society values those who helped build it.

一个“没有国家的议会”的民主实践

0
一个“没有国家的议会”的民主实践

——从流亡藏人选举看民主政治的真正根基

作者:张致君

编辑:李聪玲 校对:王滨 翻译:吕峰

一个“没有国家的议会”的民主实践

一个“没有国家的议会”,正在用最直接、也最刺眼的方式,拷问拒绝民主的中共政权:权力到底从哪里来?

2026 年 2 月 1 日,分布在全球 27 个国家的流亡藏人,用选票选出了自己的议会。他们没有主权国家、没有领土、没有军队、没有国际法承认的政权架构,却依然坚持用选举和议会来组织政治生活。这是一种极其清醒的政治判断:如果一个群体还想作为“人”存在,而不是作为被安排、被管理、被代表的对象存在,那它就必须掌握决定自身命运的权利。

他们的实践本身,就是对一切专制政治的讽刺。

中共国不让人民投票;而没有国家的人却坚持让人民投票。

中国官方将西藏流亡议会称为“闹剧”“非法组织”,真正荒诞的恰恰是一个拥有十四亿人口、拥有完整国家机器、拥有全球影响力的政权,至今仍然不允许人民用自由选举产生真正的立法机关,不允许人民通过选票决定最高权力的归属,不允许人民用制度性方式持续监督和制衡权力。

我们有“人民代表大会”,却没有人民选择代表的权利;我们有“协商会议”,却没有公开、自由、平等的协商;我们有无数会议,却没有一次真正让人民说“同意”或“不同意”的机会。

在中国,权力不是从人民那里来,而是从体制内部循环中来;不是对选民负责,而是对上级负责;不是接受监督,而是被保护起来。人民在这个结构中,始终只是“治理对象”,而不是“政治主体”。

而民主议会的逻辑恰恰相反。它的核心不是“稳定优先”,不是“集中统一”,不是“正确路线”,而是三个简单却致命的问题:

谁授权你掌权?

你凭什么继续掌权?

你出了问题,谁能让你下台?

没有议会,这三个问题永远不能公开提出;没有选举,这三个问题永远没有制度答案。

流亡藏人用最不利的条件,做了最标准的民主动作:选举、授权、监督。他们没有等“形势成熟”,没有等“国际承认”,没有等“条件允许”,他们只认一个原则:只要我们还是人,我们就有权参与决定自己的命运。选票不是国家发给人民的奖励,而是人民对权力发出的许可。

反观中国,政治从来不是让人民参与,而是让人民“理解”“配合”“执行”。政策可以一夜之间改变一个行业、一个群体、几代人的命运,却从来不需要经过人民授权;法律可以决定一个人一生的边界,却从来不需要经过真正代表民意的立法机关讨论。人民被当成治理对象,而不是政治主体;被当成统计数据,而不是权力来源。

这不是技术问题,这是文明层级的问题。

一个社会如果长期不允许人民通过制度表达意志,最终只会得到两样东西:表面稳定与内部空心。权力越集中,社会越沉默;沉默越久,爆裂越不可控。压制不是消灭问题,而是把问题推向地下;控制不是解决矛盾,而是把矛盾延迟到更剧烈的形式爆发。

西藏流亡议会给中国最刺眼的启示是:民主不是国家给的,是人民要的。他们用选票维系政治共同体,而我们却用沉默换取表面秩序。一个靠人民投票维系的共同体,哪怕没有国家;一个靠人民沉默维系的国家,终究会失去人民。

中国若要真正成为一个现代政治文明国家,唯一的路径不是继续强化控制,而是建立真正意义上的民主议会制度。不是象征性的“代表机构”,而是实质性的权力来源;不是对上负责的官僚结构,而是对选民负责的政治结构;不是密室政治,而是公开辩论。

民主议会的意义,不在于它多热闹,而在于它让权力不得不回答人民的问题。议会存在的真正价值,是让权力失去“天生正确”的特权,让任何决定都必须接受质询、审查和否决。

没有这一套制度,中国就永远只能是“被管理得很好的社会”,而不是“由人民自己管理的国家”。

很多人说,中国太大、太复杂、不适合民主。这是对人民的侮辱。世界上没有哪一个民族天生适合被统治、不适合自治。真正的问题不是人民“能不能民主”,而是权力“肯不肯让步”。

流亡藏人用一个“没有国家的议会”,向中国人展示了一种政治可能性:即便在最不利的条件下,只要人民不放弃对尊严与参与的坚持,民主就不会死亡。他们用制度对抗流亡,用选票抵抗消失,用议会证明自己还活在政治意义上。

而中国的问题正好相反:国家还在,机器还在,权力还在,但人民在政治上越来越“消失”。不消失在物理意义上,而是消失在制度中。没有选票,没有议会,没有授权,没有制衡,人民只剩下服从和忍耐。

一个没有人民授权的国家,终究只是一套运转良好的管理系统,而不是一个真正的政治共同体。管理系统需要效率,政治共同体需要尊严。管理系统追求秩序,政治共同体追求正当性。

中国现在的问题,不是发展够不够快,而是政治是否够正当;不是经济够不够大,而是权力是否来自人民。

流亡藏人的选举提醒我们:民主不是疆界的产物,而是人的权利;不是国家赐予的装饰,而是人民争取的根基。一个政治文明是否成熟,不取决于权力多强,而取决于人民是否拥有制度性发声权。

对中国这样一个拥有悠久历史与深厚文明积淀的国家来说,建立真正意义上的民主议会,不仅是制度改革,更是一场文明跃迁。它意味着人民从“被管理者”变成“政治主体”,意味着权力从“自我合法”变成“人民授权”,意味着国家从统治结构变成公共共同体。

流亡藏人用一个“没有国家的议会”,为这个时代留下了一句极其沉重的话:国家可以没有,尊严不能没有;政权可以被剥夺,参与权不能被取消;土地可以失去,政治主体性不能放弃。

而对中国来说,问题只剩下一个:

什么时候,十四亿人,才能像那九万名流亡者一样,真正拥有一张决定国家方向的选票?

A Democratic Practice Without a State— What the Tibetan Exile Elections Reveal About the True Foundation of Politics

Author: Zhang ZhijunEditor: Li ConglingProofreader: Wang BinTranslator: Lyu Feng

Abstract: By maintaining elections and a parliamentary system despite lacking a state, territory, or sovereignty, the Tibetan community in exile demonstrates that democracy is not bestowed by a state but originates from the people. In contrast to China’s political reality, the absence of ballots and a real legislature strips power of its legitimacy.

一个“没有国家的议会”的民主实践

A “parliament without a state” is confronting, in the most direct and piercing way, a regime that rejects democracy: where does power truly come from?

On February 1, 2026, Tibetans in exile, spread across 27 countries, elected their own parliament. They have no sovereign state, no territory, no army, and no internationally recognized governmental structure. Yet they still insist on organizing political life through elections and a legislature. This reflects an extraordinarily lucid political judgment: if a community wishes to exist as human beings—rather than as objects to be arranged, managed, or represented—then it must hold the right to determine its own destiny.

Their practice is, in itself, a satire of all authoritarian politics.

In China, people are not allowed to vote; those without a state insist on voting.

Chinese authorities describe the Tibetan parliament-in-exile as a “farce” or an “illegal organization.” The real absurdity, however, is that a regime governing 1.4 billion people, possessing a complete state apparatus and global influence, still does not permit its citizens to freely elect a genuine legislative body, to determine the ultimate holder of power through ballots, or to supervise and check authority through institutional means.

We have “people’s congresses,” yet no right for the people to choose their representatives.We have “consultative conferences,” yet no open, free, or equal consultation.We have countless meetings, yet not a single occasion where the people can truly say “yes” or “no.”

In China, power does not come from the people; it circulates within the system itself. Officials are not responsible to voters but to their superiors. Power is not subjected to oversight; it is shielded. Within this structure, the populace remains merely the object of governance, never the subject of politics.

The logic of a democratic parliament is the opposite. Its core is not “stability first,” not “centralized unity,” not the “correct line,” but three simple—and fatal—questions:

Who authorized you to rule?Why are you entitled to continue ruling?If you fail, who has the power to remove you?

Without a parliament, these questions cannot be publicly raised.Without elections, they have no institutional answer.

Under the most unfavorable conditions, Tibetans in exile have performed the most standard democratic acts: election, authorization, supervision. They did not wait for “maturity,” international recognition, or permission. They recognized only one principle: as long as we are human beings, we have the right to participate in deciding our fate. The ballot is not a reward granted by the state; it is a license issued by the people to power.

By contrast, politics in China has never been about participation; it is about asking the people to “understand,” “cooperate,” and “execute.” Policies can alter the destiny of entire industries, social groups, and generations overnight, without public authorization. Laws can define the boundaries of a person’s life without ever being deliberated by a truly representative legislature. People are treated as data, not as the source of authority.

This is not a technical issue. It is a matter of civilizational level.

If a society long forbids institutional expression of the popular will, it will ultimately produce only two things: superficial stability and internal hollowness. The more concentrated power becomes, the more silent society grows; the longer the silence lasts, the more uncontrollable the eventual rupture. Suppression does not eliminate problems—it drives them underground. Control does not resolve contradictions—it postpones them until they erupt in more violent forms.

The most striking lesson offered by the Tibetan parliament-in-exile is this: democracy is not something a state gives; it is something people demand. They sustain a political community through voting, while we trade silence for the appearance of order. A community maintained by ballots can endure even without a state; a state maintained by silence will eventually lose its people.

If China wishes to become a truly modern political civilization, the only path is not tighter control but the establishment of a genuine parliamentary system: not symbolic representation but real sources of authority; not a bureaucracy responsible upward but a structure accountable to voters; not politics behind closed doors but open debate.

The meaning of a parliament lies not in its liveliness but in its ability to force power to answer the people’s questions. Its true value is to strip authority of the privilege of being “naturally correct,” to require every decision to withstand inquiry, scrutiny, and rejection.

Without such a system, China can at best remain a “well-managed society,” not a country governed by its own people.

Many argue that China is too vast and complex for democracy. That is an insult to the people. No nation is born suited to be ruled and unsuited to self-government. The real issue is not whether people are capable of democracy, but whether those in power are willing to yield.

Through a parliament without a state, Tibetans in exile demonstrate a political possibility: even under the harshest conditions, as long as people refuse to relinquish dignity and participation, democracy does not die. They use institutions to resist exile, ballots to resist disappearance, and a legislature to prove their political existence.

China faces the opposite predicament: the state remains, the machinery remains, power remains, yet the people are increasingly disappearing politically—not physically, but institutionally. Without ballots, legislatures, authorization, or checks, what remains is obedience and endurance.

A state without the people’s authorization is merely an efficient management system, not a true political community. Management systems seek efficiency; political communities seek dignity. Management systems pursue order; political communities pursue legitimacy.

China’s challenge today is not whether development is fast enough, but whether politics is legitimate; not whether the economy is large enough, but whether power comes from the people.

The Tibetan exile elections remind us: democracy is not a product of borders but a human right; not decoration granted by the state but a foundation fought for by the people. The maturity of a political civilization is measured not by the strength of power, but by whether citizens possess institutionalized voice.

For a country with China’s long history and deep cultural heritage, establishing a genuine parliamentary system would not merely be reform; it would be a civilizational leap. It would mean transforming people from the governed into political subjects, turning power from self-justifying into authorized by the people, and reshaping the state from an apparatus of rule into a public community.

With their parliament without a state, Tibetans in exile leave the era a heavy sentence: a state can be lost, but dignity cannot; a regime can be stripped away, but the right to participate cannot; land may vanish, but political subjectivity must not.

For China, only one question remains:

When will 1.4 billion people, like those ninety thousand exiles, truly hold a ballot that determines the direction of their country?

当一个孩子的死亡让人们走到法院门前

0

——从“小洛熙案”看中国社会底线的破裂与觉醒

作者:李聪玲

编辑:张致君 校对:程筱筱 翻译:戈冰

小洛熙开庭当天,宁波的冬天并不喧闹,却显得异常沉重。法院门前,没有统一组织的横幅,没有正式的动员口号,却聚集了来自各地的普通人:打工者、宝妈、老人、年轻人。他们彼此并不相识,却在同一时间站在同一个地点,只为了一个五个月大的孩子。

这是一个必须被认真对待的事实:小洛熙开庭声援不是谣言,不是“境外势力”,也不是少数激进者的行为,而是一次真实发生的、广泛的、自发的民众集结。在一个长期被塑造成“稳定”“理性”“不关心公共事务”的社会里,这样的场景本身,就已经说明了问题。长期以来,中国社会被灌输一种叙事:普通人只要“好好过日子”,不碰政治、不惹麻烦,就可以换来基本的安全与安宁。公共事务被描述成“与你无关”,不公被解释为“个案”“偶然”,而一切抗争都被贴上“闹事”“不理性”的标签。

但小洛熙案之所以刺破这种叙事,是因为它触碰的不是某个抽象概念,而是最原始、最不可退让的人性底线。一个婴儿。一个无法说话、无法维权、无法自救的生命。一个本应在医学与制度保护下被全力呵护的对象。当这样一个生命在高度专业化、制度化的医疗体系中迅速消失,而家属却被推诿、被冷处理、被质疑动机、被消耗时间时,人们突然意识到:如果连孩子都无法被保护,那么所谓的“安全”,究竟还剩下什么?

声援小洛熙的人,并不一定都懂医学,也未必掌握完整的案件细节。他们来到法院门前,并非因为每一个人都能给出严谨的法律判断,而是因为他们都读懂了一种危险的信号:制度正在用冷漠、程序与权力优势,把个体的生命价值不断压缩。

当家属面对的是一个封闭的系统——医疗机构内部调查、鉴定结论迟迟不出、信息披露高度不对称、维权成本被无限拉长,那么,这已经不仅仅是一场医疗纠纷,而是一场制度与个体之间的力量对比实验。

而人们的到场,恰恰说明了一个变化正在发生:越来越多的中国人开始明白,“事不关己”的安全感是虚假的。当制度习惯性站在强者一边,任何人都可能在下一刻成为“个案”。

在中国,真正罕见的从来不是悲剧,而是被看见的悲剧。多年来,从矿难、疫苗事件、校车事故,到铁链女、唐山事件,人们一次次被迫目睹制度失灵的后果,却又一次次被要求“向前看”“不要情绪化”。久而久之,愤怒被压抑,表达被自我审查,社会逐渐形成了一种危险的状态:悲剧被接受为常态,底线被不断下调。

但小洛熙案的不同之处在于,它发生在一个人们“以为最安全”的领域——医疗。它涉及一个“最不该被牺牲”的群体——婴儿。它发生在一个“无法用道德污名化”的家庭身上。于是,许多曾经选择沉默的人,第一次发现自己无法继续退让。有人说,到场声援的人是在“被情绪裹挟”。但恰恰相反,真正危险的不是情绪,而是长期被压制到麻木的情绪。一个社会如果对儿童的死亡无动于衷,对制度性冷漠习以为常,对家属的绝望视而不见,那才是彻底失去自我修复能力的征兆。

声援者的出现,说明还有人拒绝接受这种麻木。他们或许无法改变判决,但他们至少在表达一个清晰的态度:生命不能被轻易对待,权力不能免于质疑。这不是政治动员,而是道德本能。值得注意的是,这次声援并未出现激进对抗,也没有暴力冲突。人们只是站着、看着、等待着,用身体在公共空间中表达关注。这种克制,本身就说明了中国社会并非“无法理性表达”,而是长期缺乏被允许的表达空间。

当一个社会把所有公共议题都压缩进“内部处理”,把所有质疑都归类为“别有用心”,那么任何一次合法、和平的聚集都会显得“异常”。但异常的不是人们的出现,而是一个需要靠恐惧维持秩序的环境。小洛熙案不会是最后一起这样的案件。真正的问题是:当下一次悲剧发生时,人们是继续选择沉默,还是继续走出来?

觉醒并不意味着立刻改变制度,它首先意味着拒绝谎言,拒绝遗忘,拒绝被迫接受不公为“正常”。觉醒意味着人们开始意识到,权利不是被赐予的,而是通过持续的关注与坚持,被一点点争取的。在法院门前的那些普通人中,没有英雄,也没有领袖。他们只是明白了一件事:如果今天不为一个孩子站出来,明天就可能无人为自己站出来。一个社会的底线,从来不是写在文件里的,而是体现在人们是否还愿意为他人的不公感到不安。小洛熙案让人痛苦,但它也让人看见了一线微弱却真实的光——那是良知尚未熄灭的证明。

当越来越多的人不再把悲剧当作“别人的事”,当越来越多的人开始走到现实中表达关切,中国社会或许仍然艰难,但至少,它还没有完全沉沦。而这,正是觉醒的开始。

When a Child’s Death Brings People to the Courthouse Steps

—The Little Luoxi Case Reveals the Erosion and Awakening of China’s Social Conscience

Abstract: The Little Luoxi case sparked spontaneous public gatherings outside the courthouse, fueled by outrage and unease over the institutional indifference toward an infant’s life. It exposes the relentless decline of societal standards while showcasing ordinary citizens’ refusal to grow numb—a reawakening of conscience and action.

Author: Li Congling

Editor: Zhang Zhijun Proofreader: Cheng Xiaoxiao Translator: Ge Bing

On the day of Little Luoxi’s trial, Ningbo’s winter was not bustling, yet it felt unusually heavy. Before the courthouse, there were no organized banners or formal rallying cries, yet ordinary people from all walks of life gathered: migrant workers, stay-at-home moms, the elderly, and young adults. Though strangers to one another, they stood together at the same place, at the same time, united for a five-month-old child.

This is a fact that must be taken seriously: the courtroom solidarity for Little Luoxi was not a rumor, not the work of “foreign forces,” nor the act of a few radicals. It was a real, widespread, and spontaneous gathering of the people. In a society long portrayed as “stable,” “rational,” and “unconcerned with public affairs,” this scene itself speaks volumes. For years, Chinese society has been fed a narrative: ordinary people need only “live quietly,” avoid politics, and stay out of trouble to secure basic safety and peace. Public affairs are portrayed as “none of your business”, injustices dismissed as “isolated incidents” or “coincidences” , and all forms of resistance labeled as “troublemaking” or “irrational”.

But the Little Luoxi case pierces this narrative precisely because it touches not some abstract concept, but the most primal, non-negotiable baseline of humanity. An infant. A life unable to speak, unable to defend itself, unable to save itself. A being who should have been safeguarded with all possible care under medical and institutional protection. When such a life vanishes rapidly within a highly specialized, institutionalized healthcare system, while the family faces buck-passing, cold treatment, questioning of their motives, and drawn-out delays, people suddenly realize: If even children cannot be protected, what exactly remains of this so-called “safety”?

Those rallying for Little Luoxi may not all understand medicine, nor possess the full details of the case. They gather outside the courthouse not because each can offer rigorous legal analysis, but because they recognize a dangerous signal: the system is using indifference, bureaucracy, and institutional power to steadily diminish the value of an individual life.

When families confront a closed system—where internal medical investigations drag on, expert conclusions remain indefinitely delayed, information disclosure is severely asymmetrical, and the cost of seeking justice is stretched to the limit—this ceases to be merely a medical dispute. It becomes a test of strength between the system and the individual.

The very presence of these people signals a shift underway: an increasing number of Chinese citizens are realizing that the security of “it doesn’t concern me” is illusory. When the system habitually sides with the powerful, anyone could become the next “isolated case” at any moment.

In China, what is truly rare is never tragedy itself, but tragedy that is seen. Over the years, from mining disasters, vaccine scandals, and school bus accidents to the chained woman and the Tangshan incident, people have been forced time and again to witness the consequences of systemic failure, only to be repeatedly told to “look forward” and “avoid emotional reactions.” Over time, anger has been suppressed, expression self-censored, and society has gradually descended into a dangerous state: tragedy is accepted as the norm, and moral boundaries are constantly lowered.

But the Little Luoxi case is different. It occurred in a realm people “believed to be the safest”—healthcare. It involved a group that “should never be sacrificed”—infants. It happened to a family that “cannot be morally stigmatized.” Thus, many who once chose silence found themselves unable to retreat any further. Some claim those who came to show support were “carried away by emotion.” But quite the opposite is true: the real danger lies not in emotion itself, but in emotions suppressed to the point of numbness. A society that remains unmoved by a child’s death, that treats systemic indifference as routine, that turns a blind eye to a family’s despair—that is the sign of a society that has utterly lost its capacity for self-repair.

The emergence of supporters demonstrates that some refuse to accept this numbness. They may not alter the verdict, but they clearly express a stance: life cannot be treated lightly, and power cannot be exempt from scrutiny. This is not political mobilization but moral instinct. Notably, this solidarity remained free of radical confrontation or violent conflict. People simply stood, watched, and waited—using their physical presence in public space to convey concern. This restraint itself demonstrates that Chinese society is not incapable of rational expression, but rather has long lacked permitted spaces for such expression.

When a society compresses all public issues into “internal handling” and labels all questioning as “ulterior motives” , any lawful, peaceful gathering inevitably appears “abnormal.” Yet the abnormality lies not in people’s presence, but in an environment that relies on fear to maintain order. The Little Luoxi case will not be the last of its kind. The real question is: When the next tragedy strikes, will people choose silence again, or will they step forward?

Awakening does not mean immediate systemic change. It first means rejecting lies, refusing to forget, and refusing to accept injustice as “normal.” Awakening means recognizing that rights are not granted—they are won through sustained vigilance and persistence. Among those ordinary people gathered outside the courthouse, there were no heroes, no leaders. They understood only one thing: if we don’t stand up for a child today, tomorrow there may be no one left to stand up for us. A society’s moral baseline is never written in documents; it manifests in whether people still feel uneasy about injustice inflicted upon others. The Little LuoXi case is painful, yet it also reveals a faint yet real glimmer of light—proof that conscience has not yet been extinguished.

When more and more people stop viewing tragedies as “someone else’s problem,” when more and more people begin stepping into reality to voice their concerns, Chinese society may still face hardships, but at least it has not yet sunk completely. And this, precisely, is the beginning of awakening.

被制度“诊断”的人

0

——从湖北精神病院骗保案,看一个拒绝透明的治理逻辑

作者:李聪玲

编辑:张致君 校对:程筱筱 翻译:戈冰

近年来,中国社会频繁出现一些令人不安却高度相似的场景:未成年人在校园中“非正常死亡”,调查迅速定性;普通人被送进精神病院,出院却难如登天;家属提出质疑,随即被纳入“维稳”对象;信息被封锁,讨论被压制,结论被提前写好。这些经历并非彼此孤立的“个案”,而是高度集权体制在现实运行中,对普通人进行系统性碾压的结果。

新京报近期披露的湖北多家精神病医院骗保调查,正是这一治理逻辑的一个极端却典型的缩影。据新京报调查报道,湖北襄阳、宜昌多家精神病医院,以“免费住院、医药费和生活费全免”为诱饵,违规收治大量并无明显精神障碍的人员,涉嫌通过虚构诊疗项目、伪造病历,系统性套取医保资金。

2025年12月,记者以护工身份卧底进入襄阳宏安精神病医院、宜昌夷陵康宁精神病医院,发现住院者中不仅包括戒酒者、行动不便的老年人,甚至连护工、保安本人,也被办理成“精神病人”住院手续,只为配合医院完成医保报销流程。医生直言,只要“能走医保”,病历是可以“写”的。在这些医院中,将正常人“写成精神病”并非偶发失误,而是一种高度制度化的操作方式。记者查询收费系统发现,大量账目中反复出现“心理治疗”“行为矫正”等收费项目,但无论是记者本人还是其他病人,均未见相关治疗实际开展。仅这些虚构项目,日均费用约130元。一名护工私下透露:“一个病人一年能套六万,一百个就是六百万。”

为了规避监管,有医院在检查前安排病人“假出院”,检查结束后再重新收治,形成事实上的长期滞留。住院人数越多、住院时间越长,医院获取的医保资金就越多,而病人则被彻底物化为维持医院运转的“指标”。多名病人反映,入院极其容易,出院却几乎不可能。即便病情好转,甚至本就不存在精神疾病,也常被以各种理由强行留院。记者卧底期间,多次目睹医护人员对病人实施暴力:扇耳光、脚踹、用水管抽打,甚至将病人捆绑在床上,最长达三天三夜。有病人形容,“住院就像坐牢”,有人因长期无法出院而陷入绝望,甚至发生自杀行为。

这些医院多位于偏远地区,运营成本低、扩张速度快,通过下乡拉人、介绍提成等方式争抢“病源”。在医保结算机制与监管缺位的双重作用下,一套以剥夺人身自由、践踏人格尊严为代价的牟利模式,得以长期存在。必须指出的是,湖北精神病医院骗保与非法收治现象,并不能被简单归因为“地方乱象”。其真正的危险性,在于它暴露的并非个别道德沦丧,而是一整套制度性激励失衡所催生的必然结果。

在现行医保体系中,精神病院具有特殊优势:诊断标准高度依赖专业判断,外部难以复核;住院周期缺乏明确上限;病人往往被视为“无完全行为能力者”,其拒绝权与申诉权在现实操作中极易被忽视。一旦监管缺位,医疗机构便天然拥有“低风险、高回报”的操作空间。同时,医保支付机制对“住院人数”和“住院时长”形成客观激励。在缺乏独立审计与透明问责的情况下,这种激励并不会自动导向更好的医疗服务,反而容易异化为对“病人数量”的追逐。湖北曝光的“虚构诊疗”“假出院”“长期滞留”,正是这一逻辑的直接产物。更值得警惕的是,被违规收治者往往是最缺乏反抗能力的人群:老年人、残障人士、戒酒者、社会边缘人。一旦被贴上“精神异常”的标签,其个人陈述与社会信用便迅速贬值,侵害人身自由反而披上了“医学”“照护”“稳定”的外衣。

从校园中被迅速定性的未成年人死亡,到精神病院中被随意书写的“精神异常”,这些事件看似不同,实则遵循着同一治理逻辑:当一个人的存在被视为“风险”,而不是权利主体,他就会被制度性地处理掉。在这一逻辑下,死亡不再首先被追问真相,而被纳入舆情管控;诊断不再是医学问题,而成为控制工具;家属的合理质疑被重新定义为“不稳定因素”。当“维稳”凌驾于真相之上,当“效率”高于人的尊严,制度本身便开始系统性地制造受害者。

湖北多家精神病医院骗保事件真正令人不寒而栗的,并不只是暴力与贪婪,而是它揭示了一个现实:在一个缺乏独立监督的体制中,最弱势的人,最容易被合法地伤害。当正常人可以被写成精神病,当孩子的死亡可以不经独立调查便被迅速结案,当公共制度不再服务于人的安全,而是服务于权力的便利,那么任何人,都无法确信自己不会成为下一个“被处理对象”。问题从来不在某一家医院、某一个地方、某一次事件,而在于一个拒绝透明、排斥问责、惩罚追问的治理体系。只要这一结构不被改变,类似的悲剧就不会停止,只会不断更换场景、对象与说辞。

一个正常的社会,不需要靠封锁信息来维持秩序;一个负责任的政府,也不需要通过剥夺人的尊严来证明稳定。真正的安全,来自真相被允许出现,来自权力被置于监督之下,来自每一个生命被当作目的,而不是手段。

People Diagnosed by the System

—The Hubei Psychiatric Hospital Insurance Fraud Case Reveals a Governance Logic That Resists Transparency

Abstract: The Hubei psychiatric hospital insurance fraud case exposes how, under a system lacking transparency and accountability, diagnosis has been distorted into a tool of control. Vulnerable groups face legal deprivation of freedom and dignity, while so-called “stability” comes at the cost of creating victims—reflecting a systemic governance crisis.

Author: Li Congling

Editor: Zhang Zhijun Proofreader: Cheng Xiaoxiao Translator: Ge Bing

In recent years, Chinese society has witnessed a disturbing pattern of strikingly similar scenarios: minors suffering “abnormal deaths” on school campuses, with investigations swiftly concluding their causes; ordinary citizens being committed to psychiatric hospitals, only to face insurmountable hurdles upon discharge; families raising questions immediately becoming targets of “stability maintenance”; Information is blocked, discussions suppressed, and conclusions predetermined. These experiences are not isolated “individual cases,” but rather the result of systematic oppression of ordinary people within the highly centralized system’s practical operations.

The recent investigation by The Beijing News into multiple psychiatric hospitals in Hubei Province defrauding medical insurance funds serves as an extreme yet typical microcosm of this governance logic. According to the newspaper’s investigative report, several psychiatric hospitals in Xiangyang and Yichang, Hubei, used “free hospitalization, medication, and living expenses” as bait to illegally admit large numbers of individuals without obvious mental disorders. They are suspected of systematically siphoning medical insurance funds by fabricating treatment plans and falsifying medical records.

In December 2025, reporters posing as nursing assistants infiltrated Xiangyang Hong’an Psychiatric Hospital and Yichang Yiling Kangning Psychiatric Hospital. They discovered that among the hospitalized patients were not only individuals undergoing alcohol rehabilitation and elderly people with mobility issues, but even nursing assistants and security guards themselves had been registered as “psychiatric patients” solely to facilitate the hospitals’ medical insurance reimbursement processes. Doctors openly admitted that medical records could be “written” as long as they “qualify for insurance coverage.” In these hospitals, classifying healthy individuals as “psychiatric patients” was not an isolated error but a highly institutionalized practice. A review of billing systems revealed repeated charges for “psychological therapy” and “behavioral correction” across numerous accounts. However, neither the reporter nor other patients observed any actual implementation of such treatments. These fabricated charges alone amounted to approximately 130 yuan per day. One caregiver privately disclosed: “One patient can generate 60,000 yuan annually; a hundred patients mean 6 million yuan.”

To evade oversight, some hospitals arrange “fake discharges” before inspections, only to readmit patients afterward, effectively creating prolonged stays. The more patients hospitalized and the longer their stays, the more medical insurance funds the hospital receives—reducing patients to mere “metrics” sustaining hospital operations. Multiple patients reported that admission was extremely easy, while discharge was nearly impossible. Even when their condition improved, or they had no mental illness to begin with, they were often forcibly retained under various pretexts. During the undercover investigation, the reporter repeatedly witnessed medical staff using violence against patients: slapping, kicking, beating with water hoses, and even restraining patients to beds for up to three days and nights. One patient described hospitalization as “like being in prison.” Some, trapped indefinitely, succumbed to despair and even attempted suicide.

These hospitals, predominantly located in remote areas, operate with low costs and rapid expansion. They aggressively recruit patients through rural outreach and referral commissions. Amidst gaps in medical insurance settlement mechanisms and oversight, a profit model built on depriving individuals of their freedom and trampling on their dignity has persisted. It must be emphasized that the insurance fraud and illegal admissions at Hubei psychiatric hospitals cannot be simplistically dismissed as “local chaos.” Their true danger lies not in isolated moral failures, but in exposing the inevitable outcome of systemic incentive imbalances.

Within the current medical insurance system, psychiatric hospitals hold unique advantages: diagnostic criteria heavily rely on professional judgment, making external verification difficult; inpatient stays lack clear upper limits; and patients are often deemed “legally incompetent,” with their rights to refuse treatment and file complaints frequently overlooked in practice. When oversight is absent, medical institutions inherently gain “low-risk, high-return” operational leeway. Simultaneously, the medical insurance payment mechanism creates objective incentives for “hospitalization numbers” and “length of stay.” Without independent audits and transparent accountability, these incentives do not automatically lead to better medical services but instead easily degenerate into a pursuit of “patient volume.” The exposed practices in Hubei—fictitious diagnoses, fake discharges, and prolonged detentions—are direct products of this logic. More alarmingly, those admitted under irregularities are often the most vulnerable: the elderly, disabled individuals, alcoholics in recovery, and marginalized members of society. Once labeled as “mentally abnormal,” their personal accounts and social credibility rapidly devalue, while infringements on personal liberty are cloaked in the guise of “medical care,” “support,” and “stability.”

From minors swiftly categorized in schools to arbitrary “mental abnormality” diagnoses in psychiatric hospitals, these seemingly disparate incidents follow the same governance logic: when an individual’s existence is viewed as a “risk” rather than a rights-bearing subject, they become subject to systemic disposal. Under this logic, death is no longer primarily investigated for truth but incorporated into public opinion control; diagnosis ceases to be a medical issue and becomes a tool of control; and families’ legitimate doubts are redefined as “unstable factors.” When “maintaining stability” overrides truth-seeking, and “efficiency” trumps human dignity, the system itself begins to systematically create victims.

What is truly chilling about the insurance fraud incidents at multiple psychiatric hospitals in Hubei is not merely the violence and greed, but the reality they expose: within a system lacking independent oversight, the most vulnerable are most easily harmed with impunity. When sane individuals can be labeled mentally ill, when a child’s death is swiftly dismissed without independent investigation, when public systems serve not human safety but the convenience of power—no one can be certain they won’t become the next “target for disposal.” The problem never lies in a single hospital, location, or incident, but in a governance system that rejects transparency, shuns accountability, and punishes inquiry. As long as this structure remains unchanged, similar tragedies will not cease. They will only change their settings, subjects, and justifications.

A normal society does not need to maintain order by blocking information; a responsible government does not need to prove stability by stripping people of their dignity. True security comes from allowing truth to emerge, from placing power under oversight, and from treating every life as an end in itself, not a means to an end.