活动通报铭记709 · 捍卫人权 · 声援正义为纪念“709人权律师大抓捕”十一周年，声援所有因坚持法治、捍卫人权而遭受迫害的人权律师和良心人士，中国民主党纽瓦克支部将于2026年7月9日在中国驻旧金山总领事馆前举行和平抗议集会。活动信息活动名称： 铭记709人权律师大抓捕十一周年抗议集会活动时间： 2026年7月9日（星期四）下午2:00—4:00活动地点： 中国驻旧金山总领事馆1450 Laguna Street, San Francisco, CA 94115活动主题铭记709 捍卫人权 声援正义活动诉求铭记709人权律师大抓捕历史，拒绝遗忘。声援所有遭受政治迫害的人权律师、维权人士及良心犯。要求立即释放所有因言论、信仰及维权而被关押的政治犯。呼吁国际社会持续关注中国人权状况，支持法治与基本人权。坚持和平、理性、非暴力方式表达诉求，共同守护自由、公义与法治精神。组织单位中国民主党纽瓦克支部工作人员发起人： 张善城、王战士，汪峰活动召集： 方政、胡丕正活动主持人：周君红活动策划： 陈森锋、李树青活动义工： 周小俊，吴志创，陈所明，李小林诚挚邀请历史不能遗忘，正义不能沉默。我们诚挚邀请关心中国人权、法治与自由的朋友共同参加本次和平集会，以行动纪念709事件，声援仍在坚持良知与正义的人们。时间：2026年7月9日（星期四）下午2:00地点：中国驻旧金山总领事馆（1450 Laguna Street, San Francisco, CA 94115）让我们共同发声：铭记709 捍卫人权 声援正义！

记者:张致君

2026年7月5日，一场聚焦中国未来政治转型的学术座谈会在美国加州自由雕塑公园举行。本次活动以《三民主义能否救中国》为题，邀请八九学运亲历者、文献学者、网络“孙文学校”创办人封从德博士担任主讲。多位海外异议学者、民运人士及年轻一代华人到场，围绕“三民主义“政治思想的当代启示、中国未来制度承接框架以及政治转型的潜在风险展开了深度研讨。座谈会所在地自由雕塑公园，地处加州内陆荒漠，因长期展示“六四”、香港抗议及中国人权议题的大型地标性雕塑，已成为海外许多华人追求自由的精神坐标。与以往聚焦于历史伤痛纪念的集会不同，本次座谈会在漫天黄沙与具有强烈批判色彩的装置间，呈现出一种冷峻的学术思辨氛围。

（自由雕塑公园陈维明（中）在现场发言）

自由雕塑公园陈维明先生表示，自由雕塑公园未来除了持续用雕塑这种艺术展现形式反抗暴政，也会逐渐搭建民主政治学术研讨会，讨论主题也不仅从历史清算与政治抗议等“解构性叙事”出发，同样会增加对宪法文本、过渡期合法性来源等“建构性制度设计”的理性探讨。会议先对7月2日在联合国门前为抗议中共对藏人压迫而自焚的Pawo Lobga Rangzen悼哀。

（与会者悼念藏人Lobga Rangzen）

在主旨发言中，封从德首先表示该次研讨会的”救国“应当再”重建民国“之后，提出用”三民主义，四六宪法，以建民国，以进大同“的政治行动第一步，将“三民主义”（民族、民权、民生）置于现代国家建构的脉络中进行诠释。他认为，三民主义并非历史陈迹，而是应对现代政治危机的“现成制度框架”。对中国历史的充分认识，不被中共统战下的思想与谎言历史所污染至关重要，这会影响未来中国政治反对派道路的判断力。

他在会中详细分析了中共在海外民主运动中的统战思想与语言叙事，解释了中共对反对运动中的词汇污染，例如他解释”和理非“中的”非暴力“是严重被曲解的，”非暴力“并不代表放弃”武力革命“，但中共将“武力”与“暴力”的含义混淆，暴力是非法的，而武力是合法的，中共的统战叙事就是将反对派合法的叙事方式变成非法叙事方式，进一步引起反对派内部分裂;再例如他指出，反对派不要落入”统独叙事“，这也是中共分裂反对派的统战战略之一。

封从德尖锐地指出，后极权时代中国面临的最大危机，并非“如何打破旧体制”，而是“旧体制崩溃后的权力真空与社会失序”。 他借用“普京化”一词，警告转型初期因制度设计缺陷导致强人政治复辟、民主形式化的危险。他在会中提到了中共的“沉船计划“，指出中共在全球所部署的经济、科技等战略部署不仅仅是在扩张中共在国际上的影响力，更是在为其政权崩溃后的政权部署，中共将现有大量资金与技术资源外移后，得以保留中共的政治势力，再分裂中国，制造混乱，中共自己占据中国现在疆域板块中资源最富饶的沿海等枢纽区域。

（封从德主讲并回答与会者提问）

“三民主义的精髓在于其整体性。民权保障自由，民生约束资本，民族确立认同。这套互为表里的架构，能有效对冲转型期极易出现的流氓无产阶级民粹主义或威权政客的窃国倒退。”封从德表示。

作为“民国宪政法统”的坚定捍卫者，封从德在会上多次提到1946年通过的《中华民国宪法》（“四六宪法”）。他主张，该宪法由当年全中国各党派共同制定，具备无可辩驳的历史正统性。在未来转型期，直接宣布“回归四六宪法”并将其作为临时宪法，可以最大程度降低制宪成本，避免社会因“重新发明轮子”而陷入分裂。

然而，这一具有鲜明立场的“回归法统论”，在现场参与者内部随即引发了激烈的路线交锋。支持法统派的人士在发言中主张“继承资产”，认为历史法统是成本最低、最能凝聚共识的平稳过渡工具。

新宪派与联邦派则对该路径的可操作性提出质疑。他们指出，“四六宪法”在政治现实、地缘政治及国际承认层面存在巨大的历史断层，面对当下错综复杂的两岸关系与地方治理，其过渡机制设计显得过于理想化，缺乏现实对接的抓手。值得注意的是，本次座谈会并未流于枯燥的历史复述，而是展现了强烈的时代感。在互动环节中，与会者就两岸体制差异、以及“三民主义在数字经济背景下的再解释”等前沿议题展开了思想激荡。针对年轻人提出“如何将三民主义推广和三民主义在现代国际关系与中台局势中是否还有受众”这一隐忧，封从德给予了积极回应。他赞同并鼓励年轻一代打破意识形态框架，从历史文献中汲取关于“三民主义“运用的智慧，用现代政治经济学语言向年轻世代重新阐释。

座谈会持续了近三个小时，在落日余晖洒满大漠时落下帷幕。正如与会研究者所言，这场在沙漠中展开的政治辩论，其意义或许不在于立即拿出一套完美的建国方案，而在于它在威权政治的阴影之外，保留了一处探讨中国未来可能性的“理论绿洲”。尽管“三民主义救中国”的法统路径在现实政治层面仍面临诸多难以逾越的鸿沟，但此类社群内部共识的建构与思想火花的碰撞，正为未来的宪政转型做着知识上的防震准备。

主办方透露，未来自由雕塑公园将继续推出围绕“中国政治”的系列深度研讨活动，将这一思考持续引向深入。

摄影:刘敖 编辑：李晶 校对：毛一炜 翻译：戈冰

Feng Congde Discusses the “Three Principles of the People” at Liberty Sculpture Park, Focusing on the Path of Legal Continuity and Constitutional Deliberation

Reporter: Zhang Zhijun

On July 5, 2026, an academic seminar focusing on China’s future political transition was held at the Liberty Sculpture Park in California, USA. Titled “Can the Three Principles of the People Save China?”, the event invited Dr. Feng Congde, an eyewitness of the 1989 Student Movement, archival scholar, and founder of the online “Sun Yat-sen School,” to serve as the keynote speaker. Multiple overseas dissident scholars, democracy activists, and younger-generation Chinese attended the event, engaging in in-depth discussions surrounding the contemporary enlightenment of the “Three Principles of the People” political thought, the structural framework for China’s future institutional succession, and the potential risks of political transition.

The Liberty Sculpture Park, where the seminar took place, is situated in the inland desert of California. Because of its long-term exhibition of large, landmark sculptures concerning “June Fourth,” Hong Kong protests, and Chinese human rights issues, it has become a spiritual coordinate for many overseas Chinese pursuing freedom. Different from past gatherings that focused on commemorating historical trauma, this seminar, amidst the vast blowing sand and the intensely critical installations, presented a sober atmosphere of academic deliberation.

(Chen Weiming [center] of Liberty Sculpture Park speaking at the scene)

Mr. Chen Weiming of Liberty Sculpture Park stated that in the future, in addition to continuously using sculpture as an artistic form of expression to resist tyranny, the Liberty Sculpture Park will gradually establish academic seminars on democratic politics. The themes of discussion will not only proceed from “deconstructive narratives” such as historical reckoning and political protests, but will likewise increase rational discussions on “constructive institutional design,” such as constitutional texts and the sources of legitimacy during transition periods. The meeting first observed a moment of mourning for Pawo Lobga Rangzen, who committed self-immolation in front of the United Nations on July 2 to protest the Chinese Communist Party’s oppression of Tibetans.。

(Participants mourning the Tibetan, Lobga Rangzen)

In his keynote speech, Feng Congde first stated that the “saving of the nation” in this seminar should follow the “reconstruction of the Republic of China,” proposing the first step of political action using the phrase “The Three Principles of the People, the 1946 Constitution, to build the Republic, to advance to the Great Unity,” placing the “Three Principles of the People” (Nationalism, Democracy, and Livelihood) within the context of modern state-building for interpretation. He contended that the Three Principles of the People are not historical relics, but rather a “ready-made institutional framework” for dealing with modern political crises. A full understanding of Chinese history, without being contaminated by the ideological and untruthful history under the Chinese Communist Party’s united front work, is of vital importance, as this will affect the judgment regarding the path of the future Chinese political opposition.

During the meeting, he analyzed in detail the CCP’s united front ideology and linguistic narrative within the overseas democratic movement, explaining the CCP’s contamination of vocabulary within the opposition movement. For instance, he explained that the concept of “non-violence” within “rational, peaceful, non-violent” (He-Li-Fei) is severely distorted; “non-violence” does not mean abandoning “armed revolution,” but the CCP confuses the meanings of “armed force” and “violence.” Violence is illegal, whereas armed force is legal. The CCP’s united front narrative aims precisely to turn the opposition’s legal narrative methods into illegal ones, further causing internal divisions within the opposition. As another example, he pointed out that the opposition must not fall into the “unification versus independence narrative,” which is also one of the CCP’s united front strategies to divide the opposition.

Feng Congde sharply pointed out that the greatest crisis China faces in the post-totalitarian era is not “how to break the old system,” but “the power vacuum and social disorder after the collapse of the old system.” Borrowing the term “Putinization,” he warned of the danger in the early stages of transition where flaws in institutional design lead to the restoration of strongman politics and the formalization of democracy. During the meeting, he mentioned the CCP’s “Shipwreck Plan,” pointing out that the economic, technological, and other strategic deployments positioned by the CCP globally are not merely expanding the CCP’s international influence, but are furthermore preparing deployments for the regime after its collapse. After shifting a large amount of existing capital and technological resources abroad, the CCP will be able to preserve its political forces, and then split China to create chaos, with the CCP itself occupying the hubs such as the coastal areas, which are the most resource-rich within China’s current territorial boundaries.

(Feng Congde delivering the keynote speech and answering questions from attendees)

“The essence of the Three Principles of the People lies in its alignment as a whole. Democracy guarantees freedom, Livelihood restrains capital, and Nationalism establishes identity. This system of mutually reinforcing structures can effectively hedge against the lumpenproletariat populism or authoritarian politicians’ state-stealing retrogressions that are extremely prone to emerge during the transition period,” Feng Congde stated.

As a staunch defender of the “constitutional legal continuity of the Republic of China,” Feng Congde repeatedly mentioned during the meeting the Constitution of the Republic of China passed in 1946 (the “1946 Constitution”). He advocated that this constitution was jointly formulated by all political parties across China at that time, and thus possesses undeniable historical legitimacy. In the future transition period, directly declaring a “return to the 1946 Constitution” and utilizing it as an interim constitution could reduce the costs of constitutional drafting to the greatest extent, preventing society from falling into division due to “reinventing the wheel.”

However, this distinctly positioned “theory of returning to legal continuity” immediately triggered a fierce confrontation of political lines among the participants at the scene. Supporters of the legal continuity faction advocated for “inheriting assets” in their speeches, believing that historical legal continuity is the smooth transition tool with the lowest cost and the greatest capacity to build consensus.

The new-constitution faction and the federalist faction, on the other hand, raised questions regarding the feasibility of this path. They pointed out that the “1946 Constitution” suffers from a massive historical fault line at the levels of political reality, geopolitics, and international recognition; facing the current intricate cross-strait relations and local governance, its transitional mechanism design appears overly idealized, lacking practical leverage for real-world application.

Notably, this seminar did not degenerate into dull historical repetition, but instead exhibited a strong sense of the contemporary era. During the Q&A session, participants engaged in a brainstorm of ideas regarding cutting-edge topics such as the systemic differences across the Taiwan Strait and the “re-interpretation of the Three Principles of the People against the backdrop of the digital economy.” In response to the concern raised by young people regarding “how to promote the Three Principles of the People and whether the Three Principles of the People still have an audience in modern international relations and the China-Taiwan situation,” Feng Congde gave a positive response. He agreed with and encouraged the younger generation to break through ideological frameworks, draw wisdom concerning the application of the “Three Principles of the People” from historical archives, and re-explain it to the younger generation using the language of modern political economy.

The seminar lasted for nearly three hours and drew to a close as the afterglow of the setting sun spilled across the vast desert.

As an attending researcher remarked, the significance of this political debate unfolding in the desert perhaps lies not in immediately producing a perfect plan for state-building, but rather in its preservation of a “theoretical oasis” for exploring China’s future possibilities outside the shadow of authoritarian politics. Although the legal continuity path of “the Three Principles of the People saving China” still faces numerous insurmountable chasms at the level of realpolitik, the construction of consensus within such communities and the collision of intellectual sparks are making intellectual anti-seismic preparations for future constitutional transition.

The organizers revealed that in the future, the Liberty Sculpture Park will continue to launch a series of in-depth seminar activities centered around “Chinese politics,” continuously guiding this reflection into greater depth.

Photography: Liu Ao Editor: Li Jing Proofreader: Mao Yiwei Translator: Ge Bing

作者：李聪玲

       2026年7月1日，《中华人民共和国民族团结进步促进法》正式施行。中国政府表示，这部法律旨在铸牢中华民族共同体意识，维护国家统一，促进各民族共同发展。然而，在我看来，这部法律并非真正促进民族团结，而是进一步强化中国共产党对民族、文化、教育、宗教和言论领域的控制封锁的一项立法。我反对这部法律，因为我认为，真正的团结并不能建立在独裁统治的基础上，而应建立在自由、平等、尊重和多元之上。

       民族团结从来不是要求所有民族拥有同一种思想、同一种文化、同一种历史叙事。一个真正成熟和自信的国家，应当能够包容不同民族保留自己的语言、宗教、传统和历史记忆，而不是通过法律去塑造一种唯一正确的民族认同。当国家将特定的民族观念上升为法律要求，并贯穿教育、文化、媒体和社会治理时，这已经最大程度压缩了合法表达和文化发展的空间。

        对于许多流亡藏人而言，这部法律进一步加深了他们长期以来的忧虑。西藏的藏语教育、宗教活动和传统文化近年来受到越来越严格的管理，因此担心新法律会进一步强化这一趋势，使民族文化和宗教传统的传承更加困难。中国政府则表示，依法保障各民族合法权益，并持续投入资源保护藏族文化、发展教育和改善民生。围绕这些政策的实际效果及其影响，各方长期存在明显分歧。对于许多流亡藏人而言，这部法律的出台，不仅是一项新的立法，更像是他们长期担忧不断累积后的又一个象征。

       就在这部法律生效后不久，一名被流亡藏人组织确认身份的藏人活动人士Lobga Rangzen，在纽约联合国总部外自焚身亡，希望借此引起国际社会对西藏问题的关注。据警方，这名男子因严重烧伤死亡；流亡藏人组织表示，他希望通过这一极端方式呼吁国际社会关注西藏的未来以及藏人的处境。中国政府则一贯表示，西藏事务属于中国内政，依法保障各民族合法权益，并反对任何分裂国家的活动。

       没有任何生命应该以这样的方式结束。无论人们如何评价他的政治立场，自焚都是一场无法挽回的人间悲剧。它也提醒世人，当一个人认为自己的声音长期无法被听见时，可能会采取极端而悲剧性的方式表达诉求。这起事件再次引发了国际社会对西藏问题的关注，也让许多流亡藏人感到，他们的民族认同、文化传承和宗教自由仍然面临严峻挑战。事实上，自2009年以来，已有一百多名藏人在中国境内以及流亡社区发生自焚事件。这些事件在流亡藏人看来，是对西藏现状的绝望抗议；而中国政府则认为，这些行为受到分裂势力煽动，危害社会稳定，并依法予以打击。

       对于许多维吾尔人而言，这部法律同样引发担忧。近年来，新疆政策持续受到国际关注。一些联合国专家、人权组织以及部分国家政府批评当地存在严重的人权问题，并对文化、宗教和社会生活受到限制表示关切；中国政府则坚决否认这些指控，表示相关措施属于依法反恐、去极端化和促进发展的政策，并认为外界批评存在政治化倾向。正是在这种持续存在重大争议的背景下，这部法律可能进一步巩固现有民族治理模式，使民族文化和宗教表达面临更大的压力。

       台湾，中华民国，长期以来拥有自己的政府、军队、司法体系、货币、护照、选举制度以及完整的公共行政体系，形成了独立运作的政治和社会制度。基于这一现实，我认为台湾应由生活在台湾的人民决定自己的未来，中华人民共和国的法律不应成为约束台湾社会的依据，也不应通过国内立法影响台湾人民的政治选择。这其实是侵略台湾的另一种说辞。

       在我看来，一个真正稳定的国家，不应害怕人民保留自己的文化和身份认同。真正的国家自信，不需要依赖法律去规定人民应该如何理解自己的民族，也不需要通过统一的政治叙事来证明国家的合法性。历史反复说明，民族认同无法依靠命令形成，也无法依靠法律消除。任何忽视文化多样性的政策，都可能削弱信任，而不是增强团结。《民族团结进步促进法》如果在实践中进一步强化对民族认同、宗教活动、语言教育和文化表达的管控，而缺乏充分保障合法文化权利和表达空间，可能会进一步加深部分少数民族群体的疏离感，而不是实现真正意义上的民族团结。

       我反对《中华人民共和国民族团结进步促进法》。我希望未来有关民族事务的立法能够更多建立在尊重人权、保护文化多样性、保障公民自由和坚持法治原则的基础上。我相信，一个真正团结的社会，不是所有人都说同一种声音，而是不同民族都能够在平等、尊严和自由中生活，共同塑造彼此信任的未来。真正的民族团结，不是统一思想，而是尊重差异；真正的国家强大，不是消除多元，而是能够包容多元；真正持久的稳定，不是来自恐惧，而是来自人民对公平、自由和尊严的共同信任。

编辑：李晶 校对：王滨 翻译：沈美花

In the Name of Unity, in Practice an Act of Encroachment

Author: Li Congling

On July 1, 2026, the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress officially came into effect.

The Chinese government states that this law is intended to strengthen the consciousness of the Chinese national community, safeguard national unity, and promote the common development of all ethnic groups. In my view, however, this law does not genuinely promote ethnic unity. Rather, it constitutes another piece of legislation that further strengthens the Chinese Communist Party’s control over ethnicity, culture, education, religion, and freedom of expression.

I oppose this law because I believe that genuine unity cannot be built upon authoritarian rule. Instead, it should be founded on freedom, equality, respect, and diversity.

Ethnic unity has never meant requiring all ethnic groups to possess the same ideas, the same culture, or the same historical narrative.

A truly mature and confident country should be able to accommodate different ethnic groups in preserving their own languages, religions, traditions, and historical memories, rather than using legislation to shape a single, officially sanctioned ethnic identity.

When the state elevates a particular concept of ethnicity into a legal requirement and embeds it throughout education, culture, media, and social governance, the space for legitimate expression and cultural development is already being compressed to the greatest extent possible.

For many Tibetans living in exile, this law further deepens concerns they have held for many years.

In recent years, Tibetan-language education, religious activities, and traditional culture in Tibet have come under increasingly strict regulation. As a result, many fear that the new law will reinforce this trend, making it even more difficult to preserve ethnic culture and religious traditions.

The Chinese government, meanwhile, maintains that it protects the lawful rights and interests of all ethnic groups in accordance with the law and continues to invest resources in preserving Tibetan culture, developing education, and improving living standards.

There have long been significant disagreements among different parties regarding the actual effects and consequences of these policies.

For many Tibetans in exile, the enactment of this law is not merely new legislation; it is another symbol of concerns that have accumulated over many years.

Shortly after the law took effect, a Tibetan activist identified by Tibetan exile organizations as Lobga Rangzen died after setting himself on fire outside the United Nations headquarters in New York, hoping to draw international attention to the issue of Tibet.

According to police reports, the man died from severe burn injuries. Tibetan exile organizations stated that he chose this extreme act in the hope of drawing international attention to Tibet’s future and the situation facing Tibetans.

The Chinese government has consistently maintained that affairs related to Tibet are China’s internal affairs, that the lawful rights and interests of all ethnic groups are protected under the law, and that any activities aimed at separating the country are firmly opposed.

No human life should end in such a manner.

Regardless of how one evaluates his political views, self-immolation is an irreparable human tragedy.

It also serves as a reminder that when people believe their voices cannot be heard for a prolonged period of time, they may resort to extreme and tragic means to express their demands.

This incident once again drew international attention to the Tibet issue and led many Tibetans in exile to feel that their ethnic identity, cultural heritage, and religious freedom continue to face serious challenges.

In fact, since 2009, more than one hundred Tibetans have carried out acts of self-immolation either within China or in Tibetan exile communities.

To many Tibetans in exile, these incidents represent desperate protests against conditions in Tibet. The Chinese government, however, maintains that such actions are instigated by separatist forces, threaten social stability, and are therefore subject to legal suppression.

For many Uyghurs, this law also raises concerns.

In recent years, policies in Xinjiang have remained the subject of sustained international attention.

Some United Nations experts, human rights organizations, and the governments of several countries have criticized what they describe as serious human rights problems in the region and have expressed concern about restrictions on cultural, religious, and social life.

The Chinese government firmly rejects these allegations, arguing that the relevant measures constitute lawful policies aimed at counterterrorism, de-radicalization, and development, and that external criticism is politically motivated.

Against this backdrop of continuing and substantial controversy, the law may further consolidate the existing model of ethnic governance and place additional pressure on ethnic cultural and religious expression.

Taiwan, the Republic of China, has long maintained its own government, military, judicial system, currency, passport, electoral institutions, and comprehensive public administration, forming a political and social system that operates independently.

Based on this reality, I believe that Taiwan’s future should be determined by the people who live in Taiwan.

The laws of the People’s Republic of China should not serve as a basis for governing Taiwanese society, nor should domestic legislation be used to influence the political choices of the Taiwanese people.

In essence, this is simply another rhetorical justification for the invasion of Taiwan.

In my view, a truly stable country should not fear its people retaining their own cultures and identities.

True national confidence does not require laws that dictate how citizens should understand their own ethnicity, nor does it require a unified political narrative to prove the legitimacy of the state.

History has repeatedly demonstrated that ethnic identity cannot be created by command, nor can it be erased by legislation.

Any policy that disregards cultural diversity may weaken trust rather than strengthen unity.

If, in practice, the Law on Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress further strengthens control over ethnic identity, religious activities, language education, and cultural expression without adequately protecting lawful cultural rights and spaces for expression, it may deepen feelings of alienation among some ethnic minority communities rather than achieve genuine ethnic unity.

I oppose the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress.

I hope that future legislation concerning ethnic affairs will be based more firmly on respect for human rights, protection of cultural diversity, guarantees of civil liberties, and adherence to the rule of law.

I believe that a truly united society is not one in which everyone speaks with the same voice, but one in which different ethnic groups can live with equality, dignity, and freedom while together shaping a future founded on mutual trust.

True ethnic unity is not the uniformity of thought, but respect for differences.

True national strength is not the elimination of diversity, but the ability to embrace diversity.

True and lasting stability does not arise from fear, but from the people’s shared trust in fairness, freedom, and dignity.

Editor: Li JingProofreader: Wang BinTranslator: Shen Meihua

作者：胡平

去年7月6日，达赖喇嘛九十华诞，达赖喇嘛发表讲话，对自己的继任问题作出明确阐述。其内容可归纳为以下三点： 达赖喇嘛制度将会延续。 「甘丹颇章信托基金会」（Gaden Phodrang Trust）及其董事会，将负责寻访并认证转世灵童；该基金会将遵循藏传佛教传统，并与各大教派领袖及其他宗教领袖协商。 继任者将诞生于自由世界，即中国之外。

不出意料，中共当局对达赖喇嘛的这番阐述表示强烈否定。中共搬出所谓的《藏传佛教活佛转世管理办法》，其核心内容亦可归纳为三点： 必须在中国国内寻访； 必须以「金瓶掣签」方式确定； 必须经「中央政府批准」。 然而，中共的这三项主张皆站不住脚。

 一、关于「国内寻访」 

在藏传佛教历史上，早已有于中国以外寻访转世活佛的先例。例如第四世达赖喇嘛云丹嘉措（1589–1616）诞生于蒙古，是蒙古族人。当时中国为明朝（1368–1644），而明朝版图并不包括蒙古。 其理甚明：藏传佛教的弘传本就超越西藏地域与中国国界。活佛转世的寻访范围主要依据藏传佛教的信仰传播与信众分布，自然不受地理疆界限制。自古以来，藏传佛教的信仰圈已涵盖北至蒙古、南及印度诸地，因此在蒙古与印度寻访达赖喇嘛转世灵童，早有先例。

 当代以来，自第十四世达赖喇嘛于1959年流亡印度后，藏传佛教已走向世界，在中国之外的信众达五六百万之多，遍布蒙古、印度及欧美各地；事实上，中国境外已有多位转世活佛，其中不少并非藏族。因此，在中国以外的自由世界寻访达赖喇嘛转世灵童，既合理，又完全正当。

二、关于「金瓶掣签」

清代曾有若干皇帝以「金瓶掣签」方式介入达赖喇嘛转世的认定，但实际上，真正依此程序认定的达赖喇嘛仅一两位，多数历代达赖喇嘛——包括现任第十四世——均未经过金瓶掣签程序而确定。

退一步说，清朝皇帝之所以如此，尚有其宗教理由：彼等信奉佛教，并尊奉达赖喇嘛为上师。满清皇帝介入转世事宜，是基于与西藏间「施主与上师」的特殊关系。

然而中共当局既不信仰佛教，又不尊奉达赖喇嘛为上师，何以有资格干涉达赖喇嘛转世？

达赖喇嘛早已明言：「现今的中共是批评宗教的无神论者，尤其视佛教为愚昧落后的象征，且不遗余力地指责我是魔鬼。若他们说不允许魔鬼转世，倒也说得过去；但如今却是中共坚持要自己寻找魔鬼的转世。若中共政府要插手达赖喇嘛的转世问题，必须先成为宗教信徒，承认轮回，再去找出毛泽东与邓小平的转世，然后再来干涉我的转世，那才合理。总之，这是我的转世，除了我之外，谁都没有理由插手。」

他并补充道：「任何政治权威，包括中华人民共和国的政治领导人，若出于政治需要选出所谓达赖喇嘛转世灵童，则无人需要承认或信奉那个孩童。」

三、关于「中央政府批准」

中共外交部发言人洪磊曾称：「达赖喇嘛的称号是中央政府册封的，否则不具合法性。第十四世达赖喇嘛也是经当时的民国政府批准认定的。」

此说并不符合事实。第十四世达赖喇嘛并非经民国政府批准认定。事实上，民国政府曾有意干预，但西藏政府并未理会。从寻访、确认到坐床，均由西藏摄政王及僧团自行完成。坐床典礼时，民国政府仅派蒙藏委员会代表吴忠信前往观礼。

阿沛·阿旺晋美于1989年即明确指出：「没有吴忠信主持坐床仪式这回事，他只是以国民政府代表身份‘观礼’而已。」

为何民国政府当年希望参与？因当时西藏政教合一，达赖喇嘛既为宗教领袖，又为政治领袖，即西藏地方政府首脑。对国民政府而言，作为宗教领袖的产生他们无权干涉，但作为地方政府首脑的产生，则与中央有关。为体现「中央—地方」关系，他们主张至少须经中央认可。然而，多数藏人并不承认西藏是中华民国的一部分，也不接受中央的从属定位。结果，国民政府欲干预而未果，只能派员观礼。中央方面报称是「主持」，但藏方仅视之为「贵宾观礼」。

从民国角度看，他们的干预尚有一点道理——因当时政教合一。但此理于今日已不复存在。流亡藏人自2011年实现政教分离，第十四世达赖喇嘛退出政治职务，仅保留宗教领袖身份；而中国境内自1965年成立「西藏自治区」后，法律上也规定达赖、班禅不再是地方政府领导人。既如此，现今中共当局又有何理由干预其转世？

此外，中共当局还声称「藏传佛教没有活佛自行指定接班人的做法」。此说同样错误。2013年6月，《亚洲周刊》（第27卷第22期）刊载中共中央党校社科教研部靳薇教授访谈，文中指出：「历史上也有活佛自行指定接班人的传统。」这句话极为关键，因为它属于史实而非观点。凡了解藏传佛教史者皆知确有其事。

达赖喇嘛转世制度已有六百余年历史，其间并非一成不变，今后亦可调整。而决定是否变革、如何变革的权力，自然在达赖喇嘛本人与藏传佛教机构及信众之手，与中国政府毫无关联。 此处，不妨参照西方罗马教皇的继承制度，以助理解。

在十一世纪以前，罗马教皇由世俗君主或意大利贵族遴选或认可。教皇尼古拉二世于1059年规定，教皇由枢机主教选举产生，但仍需法兰克王亨利一世及其继任者批准。至1179年第三次拉特朗会议与1274年第二次里昂会议确认后，才正式规定教皇可由枢机主教单独选出，惟法、西、奥三国君主仍保有否决权。至二十世纪初，教皇庇护十世废除此种世俗否决权。1914年，本笃十五世遂成为首位无需世俗介入而由教会单独选出的教皇。 由此可见，早期世俗权力对教皇继承影响极大；随历史发展，其影响力逐渐削弱，终至归零。 

昔时君主干预教皇继承，是因政教合一，君主皆信仰基督教，奉教皇为精神领袖。彼时教权与王权互为依存：新教皇须得到君主认可，君主登基亦需教皇加冕，以示「君权神授」。 随后政教分离制度确立，教皇继承制度的改革由教会自行决定，非世俗权力所能干预。今日欧洲已完全政教分离，教皇由宗教机构单独产生，世俗君主登基亦无需教皇加冕。 这即是政教分离——国家机器不干涉宗教，宗教亦不干涉国家。 

达赖喇嘛已多次阐述转世观念、制度起源与寻访方法，强调：达赖喇嘛转世属宗教事务，任何政治权威皆无权干涉。其立场——无论从藏传佛教传统、政教分离原则，或藏传佛教全球化的现实——皆完全合理、正确。 简言之：达赖喇嘛转世，是达赖喇嘛的事，是藏传佛教的事，与中共这个无神论政权毫无关系。中共当局无权干预达赖喇嘛转世。 中共当局炮制的那一套「寻找与确认达赖喇嘛转世」办法，错误而荒谬。未来若真推出所谓「官方达赖喇嘛」，必不会得到绝大多数藏传佛教信众的承认。这场政治操弄注定成为历史笑柄，最终被彻底废弃。

编辑：黄吉洲    校对：周敏 翻译：周敏

the Dalai Lama’s Reincarnation

Author: Hu Ping

On July 6 last year, on the occasion of his 90th birthday, the Dalai Lama delivered a speech, explicitly expounding upon the issue of his succession. Its content can be summarized into the following three points: The institution of the Dalai Lama will continue; The “Gaden Phodrang Trust” and its board of directors will be responsible for searching for and recognizing the reincarnated soul boy; the foundation will follow Tibetan Buddhist traditions and consult with leaders of major sects and other religious leaders.The successor will be born in the free world, namely, outside of China.

Unsurprisingly, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) authorities strongly rejected this exposition by the Dalai Lama. The CCP brought out the so-called “Measures on the Management of the Reincarnation of Living Buddhas in Tibetan Buddhism,” the core content of which can also be summarized into three points:The search must be conducted within China; It must be determined through the method of “drawing lots from the golden urn”; It must be approved by the “Central Government.” However, all three claims of the CCP are untenable.

I. Regarding “Searching Within China”

In the history of Tibetan Buddhism, there have long been precedents of searching for reincarnated Living Buddhas outside of China. For instance, the Fourth Dalai Lama, Yonten Gyatso (1589–1616), was born in Mongolia and was of ethnic Mongolian descent. At that time, China was under the Ming Dynasty (1368–1644), and the territory of the Ming Dynasty did not include Mongolia.

The reason is very clear: the propagation of Tibetan Buddhism has inherently transcended the geographic region of Tibet and the national borders of China. The scope of searching for a Living Buddha’s reincarnation is primarily based on the spread of the Tibetan Buddhist faith and the distribution of its believers; naturally, it is not restricted by geographic boundaries. Since ancient times, the sphere of Tibetan Buddhist belief has encompassed Mongolia to the north and various places in India to the south. Therefore, searching for the reincarnated soul boy of the Dalai Lama in Mongolia and India has long had historical precedents.

In the contemporary era, since the 14th Dalai Lama went into exile in India in 1959, Tibetan Buddhism has moved toward the world, with five to six million believers outside of China spread across Mongolia, India, Europe, and the Americas. In fact, there are already multiple reincarnated Living Buddhas outside of China, many of whom are not of Tibetan ethnicity. Therefore, searching for the reincarnated soul boy of the Dalai Lama in the free world outside of China is both reasonable and completely legitimate.

II. Regarding “Drawing Lots from the Golden Urn”

Certain emperors of the Qing Dynasty did intervene in the recognition of the Dalai Lama’s reincarnation through the method of “drawing lots from the golden urn,” but in reality, only one or two Dalai Lamas were truly determined according to this procedure. The majority of successive Dalai Lamas—including the current 14th Dalai Lama—were determined without going through the golden urn lottery procedure.

Stepping back, the reason why the Qing emperors did so still had its religious rationale: they believed in Buddhism and revered the Dalai Lama as their spiritual master (Guru). The Manchu Qing emperors’ intervention in reincarnation matters was based on the special “Priest-Patron” (Cho-Yon) relationship between the Qing court and Tibet.

However, the current CCP authorities neither believe in Buddhism nor revere the Dalai Lama as a spiritual master. On what grounds are they qualified to interfere in the Dalai Lama’s reincarnation?

The Dalai Lama has long stated explicitly:

“The current CCP consists of atheists who criticize religion, especially viewing Buddhism as a symbol of ignorance and backwardness, and they spare no effort in accusing me of being a demon. If they said they would not allow a demon to reincarnate, that would make some sense; but now it is the CCP that insists on finding the reincarnation of the demon themselves. If the CCP government wants to meddle in the issue of the Dalai Lama’s reincarnation, they must first become religious believers, acknowledge reincarnation, go find the reincarnations of Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping, and only then come to interfere in my reincarnation—that would be logical. In short, this is my reincarnation; no one besides me has any reason to meddle.”

He further added: “Any political authority, including the political leaders of the People’s Republic of China, who chooses a so-called reincarnated soul boy of the Dalai Lama out of political necessity—then no one needs to recognize or believe in that child.”

III. Regarding “Approval by the Central Government”

Hong Lei, a spokesperson for the CCP Ministry of Foreign Affairs, once claimed: “The title of the Dalai Lama is conferred by the Central Government, otherwise it lacks legitimacy. The 14th Dalai Lama was also approved and recognized by the then Republican Government.”

This statement does not conform to the facts. The 14th Dalai Lama was not approved and recognized by the Republican Government. In fact, the Republican Government did intend to intervene, but the Tibetan Government ignored them. From the search and confirmation to the enthronement (sitting-in-the-bed ceremony), everything was completed independently by the Tibetan Regent and the monastic community. During the enthronement ceremony, the Republican Government merely sent Wu Zhongxin, a representative of the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission, to attend and observe.

Ngapoi Ngawang Jigme explicitly pointed out in 1989: “There was no such thing as Wu Zhongxin presiding over the enthronement ceremony; he merely ‘observed’ in his capacity as a representative of the National Government.”

Why did the Republican Government wish to participate back then? Because at that time, Tibet practiced a system of the unity of state and religion (theocracy); the Dalai Lama was both the religious leader and the political leader, namely, the head of the local government of Tibet. For the National Government, they had no right to interfere in his emergence as a religious leader, but his emergence as the head of a local government did concern the central authorities. To manifest the “Central-Local” relationship, they advocated that it must at least be recognized by the center. However, the majority of Tibetans did not recognize Tibet as a part of the Republic of China, nor did they accept the subordinate positioning under the center. As a result, the National Government desired to intervene but failed to do so, and could only send personnel to observe. The central authorities reported it externally as “presiding,” but the Tibetan side merely viewed them as “distinguished guests observing.”

From the perspective of the Republic of China, their intervention still held a sliver of logic—because it was during a period of theocratic rule. But this logic no longer exists today. The exiled Tibetans achieved the separation of church and state in 2011, and the 14th Dalai Lama retired from political duties, retaining only his status as a religious leader. Meanwhile, within China, since the establishment of the “Tibet Autonomous Region” in 1965, the law has also stipulated that the Dalai and Panchen Lamas are no longer leaders of the local government. This being the case, what reason do the current CCP authorities have to interfere in his reincarnation?

Furthermore, the CCP authorities also claim that “there is no practice in Tibetan Buddhism where a Living Buddha designates his own successor.” This statement is equally erroneous. In June 2013, Yazhou Zhoukan (Asia Weekly, Vol. 27, Issue 22) published an interview with Professor Jin Wei of the Department of Social Science Teaching and Research at the Central Party School of the CCP. The text pointed out: “Historically, there has also been a tradition of Living Buddhas designating their own successors.” This sentence is extremely critical because it belongs to historical fact, not mere opinion. Anyone who understands the history of Tibetan Buddhism knows that this is indeed the case.

The institution of the Dalai Lama’s reincarnation has a history of over six hundred years; during this time, it has not been immutable and can be adjusted in the future. The power to decide whether to reform and how to reform naturally rests in the hands of the Dalai Lama himself, Tibetan Buddhist institutions, and the believers; it has absolutely no connection to the Chinese government.

Here, one might as well look at the succession system of the Western Roman Pope to assist in understanding.

Prior to the 11th century, the Roman Pope was frequently selected or approved by secular monarchs or Italian aristocrats. Pope Nicholas II stipulated in 1059 that the Pope would be elected by the College of Cardinals, but still required approval from Henry I, King of the Franks, and his successors. It was not until the confirmations of the Third Council of the Lateran in 1179 and the Second Council of Lyon in 1274 that it was formally decreed that the Pope could be elected solely by the Cardinals, though the monarchs of France, Spain, and Austria still retained a right of veto. Until the early 20th century, Pope Pius X formally abolished this kind of secular veto power. In 1914, Benedict XV thus became the first Pope in history to be elected solely by the Church without any secular intervention.

It is evident from this that in the early stages, secular power exerted an immense influence on papal succession; however, with historical development, this influence gradually weakened and ultimately dropped to zero.

When monarchs intervened in papal succession in the past, it was due to the unity of church and state, and because the monarchs all believed in Christianity, honoring the Pope as their spiritual leader. At that time, religious power and royal power were interdependent: a new Pope had to receive recognition from the monarch, and a monarch’s ascension also required coronation by the Pope to signify “the divine right of kings.”

Subsequently, the system of the separation of church and state was established, and reforms to the papal succession system were decided independently by the Church, entirely beyond the intervention of secular power. Today, Europe is completely separated in terms of church and state; the Pope is generated independently by religious institutions, and the ascension of secular monarchs no longer requires coronation by the Pope.

This is the true essence of the separation of church and state—the state apparatus does not interfere in religion, and religion does not interfere in the state.

The Dalai Lama has repeatedly expounded upon the concepts of reincarnation, the origin of the institution, and the methods of searching, emphasizing: the reincarnation of the Dalai Lama is a religious affair, and no political authority has the right to interfere. His stance—whether viewed from the traditions of Tibetan Buddhism, the principle of the separation of church and state, or the reality of the globalization of Tibetan Buddhism—is completely reasonable and correct.

In short: the reincarnation of the Dalai Lama is the Dalai Lama’s business and Tibetan Buddhism’s business; it has absolutely nothing to do with the atheist regime of the CCP. The CCP authorities have no right to interfere in the Dalai Lama’s reincarnation.

That set of methods for “searching for and confirming the reincarnation of the Dalai Lama” engineered by the CCP authorities is erroneous and absurd. If a so-called “official Dalai Lama” is indeed pushed forward in the future, he will certainly not receive the recognition of the vast majority of Tibetan Buddhist believers. This political manipulation is destined to become a historical laughingstock and will ultimately be completely discarded.

Editor: Huang Jizhou Proofreader: Zhou Min Translator: Zhou Min

——2026年7月2日自焚前最后公开讲话

编者：冯仍

2026年7月2日，旅居美国的藏人活动人士洛尕然赞（Lobga Rangzen）在美国纽约联合国总部外，以自焚的方式抗议中国政府对西藏长期实行的高压统治。经送往医院抢救后，于当晚因伤势过重去世。

据现场视频显示，洛尕然赞在联合国总部外竖起雪山狮子旗，并开启 Facebook 直播，随后点燃自己，以生命表达对西藏命运的抗议。

据其友人介绍，洛尕然赞在行动前，于自家车库录制并发布了最后一段视频，同时在个人 Facebook 页面发表遗言。值得注意的是，“Rangzen（然赞）”并非其本名，而是他为自己选择的名字，在藏语中意为“独立”“自由”。这一名字既体现了他的政治信念，也成为其毕生追求的象征。因此，本文尊重其本人意愿，统一采用“洛尕然赞（Lobga Rangzen）”这一译名。

在遗言中，洛尕然赞向仍生活在西藏境内、长期承受高压统治的藏人表达敬意，并将主要内容留给流亡海外的藏人。他呼吁流亡群体珍惜自由民主的环境，不忘自身责任，停止内耗、加强团结，继续为西藏的语言、文化、宗教信仰及民族未来努力。他强调，自己此次行动并非出于个人生活困境，而是希望以生命唤起国际社会对西藏问题的持续关注。

以下内容根据洛尕然赞生前公开发布的视频进行听译整理，力求忠实呈现其原意。为便于中文阅读，个别语句在不改变原意的前提下作了适当调整。

以下为其遗嘱内容整理 (听译):

我们在国外举办任何活动，都是为了抗议中共对境内藏地的高压政策，反抗中国对藏地藏人的统治。今天，我想说几句话。 对境内藏人，要谢谢他们，我没有什么可以多说的。因为他们一直冒着生命危险，以最大的勇气，为拯救我们藏民族的语言、文化与尊严，不断努力。因此，我没有什么资格再对他们说什么。 我今天主要是想对流亡藏人说四点：

第1， 流亡藏人不能忘记自己的责任。 我们在流亡当中，享受着自由民主的生活。这样的自由民主，是尊者达赖喇嘛给予我们的。尊者让我们拥有自由，并不是要让我们自己内耗，也不是要让我们用民主自由之名，在内部彼此斗争。 我们每一个人都应该为图伯特的自由发声，为图伯特的未来想办法。尊者达赖喇嘛曾经说过，生活在国外的藏人，不要因为自己有了房子、有了车子，就感到满足，因为图伯特境内的藏人仍然生活在苦难之中。

第2， 我们要明白，藏人的苦难，是因为我们失去了自己的国家。 尊者达赖喇嘛是世界的和平导师，他为所有众生的和平与幸福奔波，所以他不会把话说得太多、太重。但是我们自己要明白：为什么图伯特境内的藏人没有任何自由？为什么我们的民族面临被消灭的危机？为什么我们连供奉尊者达赖喇嘛法相的权利都没有？这都是因为我们失去了自己的国家，失去了自己的自由。很多人说我们没有国家。不是的，我们有国家；只是我们的国家被中国占领了。

第3， 流亡藏人不要再分地域、教派，而要真正团结起来。 中共打压藏人时，并不会区分你是康巴人、安多人，还是卫藏人；也不会区分你属于哪一个教派。他们同样打压所有藏人，也同样破坏所有宗教。所以，我们在外的藏人，真的不应该再分什么康巴、安多、卫藏，也不应该再分各个教派。我们每一个人都应该团结起来，为恢复藏人的自由、为藏民族的独立，做出更多努力。

第4， 不要因为我的行动而停止应该去做的事；真正的哀悼，是继续为图伯特奋斗。 如果这一次我要做一个大的行动、一个引起轰动的行动，我双手合十请求大家：不要因为这件事，而停止我们现在正在做的事情。我们现在做的，是为了保存自己的语言与文化。所以，该跳舞的还是要跳舞，该唱歌的还是要唱歌。因为这些都是为了让年轻一代的藏人，能够接受并传承自己的语言与文化。 特别是现在，我们即将迎来尊者达赖喇嘛九十一岁华诞。我希望全球各地的藏人，都要盛大举办尊者的祝寿活动。这些都非常重要。我们不要因为一个人的行动，就只停留在悲哀或默哀之中。

我们真正需要悲哀、需要默哀的，是我们失去了自己的国家。我们每一个人都应该为此发起更大的行动。 我今天要做这个行动，不是因为我缺乏衣食住行，不是因为我没有吃的、没有穿的、没有住的，也不是为了我个人的生活问题。这一切，是为了图伯特的独立，为了图伯特的抗争。 因此，我双手合十请求大家：如果你们真的要哀悼我，请按照我在这里所说的愿望去做。希望每一个人都为图伯特的事情继续努力，继续奋斗。最后，我想说：图伯特民族的独立万岁！博嘉洛 （图伯特必胜 ）！！！

2026年7月2日

编后记：

洛尕然赞（Lobga Rangzen）的离世，是一场沉重的悲剧，也是一份无法回避的历史证词。

无论人们如何评价他的抗议方式，他在遗言中所表达的，对民族命运的忧虑、对文化传承的坚持、对自由与尊严的追求，都值得被认真记录。尤其是他提醒流亡者不要因身处自由社会而忘记仍在高压之下的人，这不仅关乎西藏，也关乎所有被专制统治压迫的人群。

《在野党》刊载此文，是为了保存这份公开遗言的文献价值，也是为了提醒读者：真正的纪念，不应止于悲伤，而应继续关注那些仍被剥夺自由、信仰、语言、文化与尊严的人。

愿逝者安息。愿自由终有归途。

资料来源：

本文遗言内容主要根据以下公开资料整理：

1、“华语青年挺藏会（Lhasa Spring）”发布的《洛尕然赞遗言》听译整理；

2、洛尕然赞（Lobga Rangzen）生前公开发布于 Facebook 的视频及文字内容；

3、网络公开报道及现场公开视频等公开资料。

由于原视频为藏语，经公开中文听译后整理，本文无法保证所有细节与原始藏语表达完全一致，如有出入，请以原始视频内容为准。

翻译：戈冰

The Last Words of Lobga Rangzen

—Final Public Speech Before Self-Immolation on July 2,2026

Editor: Feng Reng

On July 2, 2026, Lobga Rangzen, a Tibetan activist residing in the United States, protested the Chinese government’s long-term high-pressure rule over Tibet by means of self-immolation outside the United Nations Headquarters in New York, USA. After being rushed to the hospital for emergency rescue, he passed away that evening due to the severity of his injuries.

According to video footage from the scene, Lobga Rangzen raised the Snow Lion Flag outside the United Nations Headquarters and started a Facebook live broadcast, subsequently setting himself on fire to express his protest against the fate of Tibet with his life.

According to his friends, before taking action, Lobga Rangzen recorded and released his final video in his own garage, while simultaneously publishing his last words on his personal Facebook page. It is worth noting that “Rangzen” is not his original name, but rather a name he chose for himself, which means “independence” and “freedom” in the Tibetan language. This name both reflects his political convictions and has become the symbol of his lifelong pursuit. Therefore, this article respects his own wishes and uniformly adopts the translated name “Lobga Rangzen.”

In his last words, Lobga Rangzen expressed his respect to the Tibetans who still live inside Tibet and have long endured high-pressure rule, while leaving the primary content for the Tibetans exiled overseas. He called upon the exiled community to cherish the environment of freedom and democracy, not to forget their own responsibilities, to stop internal friction, to strengthen unity, and to continue striving for Tibet’s language, culture, religious beliefs, and national future. He emphasized that his action this time was by no means out of personal life difficulties, but rather in the hope of using his life to awaken the international community’s continuous attention to the Tibet issue.

The following content has been transcribed and translated based on the video publicly released by Lobga Rangzen during his lifetime, striving to faithfully present his original meaning. For the convenience of Chinese reading, individual sentences have been appropriately adjusted under the premise of not altering the original meaning.

The following is the text of his last testament as compiled and organized (transcribed and translated):

Any activity we hold abroad is for the purpose of protesting the Chinese Communist Party’s high-pressure policies against the Tibetan areas inside the border, and resisting China’s rule over the Tibetan areas and Tibetan people. Today, I want to say a few words. To the Tibetans inside the border, I want to thank them; I have nothing more to say. Because they have always been risking their lives, with the greatest courage, continuously striving to save our Tibetan nation’s language, culture, and dignity. Therefore, I have no qualifications to say anything more to them. Today, I mainly want to say four points to the exiled Tibetans:

Exiled Tibetans must not forget their own responsibilities. In our exile, we enjoy a life of freedom and democracy. This kind of freedom and democracy is what His Holiness the Dalai Lama gave to us. His Holiness allowed us to have freedom, but it was not to let us engage in internal friction, nor was it to let us use the name of democracy and freedom to fight each other internally. Every single one of us should speak out for Tibet’s freedom and find ways for Tibet’s future. His Holiness the Dalai Lama once said that Tibetans living abroad should not feel satisfied just because they have houses and cars, because the Tibetans inside Tibet are still living in suffering.

We must understand that the suffering of Tibetans is because we have lost our own country. His Holiness the Dalai Lama is a spiritual leader of world peace; he bustles about for the peace and happiness of all sentient beings, so he will not speak too much or too heavily. But we ourselves must understand: why do Tibetans inside Tibet not have any freedom? Why is our nation facing a crisis of being eradicated? Why do we not even have the right to revere and display the portrait of His Holiness the Dalai Lama? This is all because we lost our own country and lost our own freedom. Many people say we do not have a country. No, we have a country; it is just that our country has been occupied by China.

Exiled Tibetans must stop dividing into regions and sects, and must truly unite. When the Chinese Communist Party suppresses Tibetans, it does not distinguish whether you are a Khampa, an Amdowa, or a U-Tsangpa; nor does it distinguish which sect you belong to. They suppress all Tibetans equally, and destroy all religions equally. Therefore, we Tibetans abroad really should no longer divide into Khampa, Amdo, or U-Tsang, nor should we divide into various sects. Every single one of us should unite and put forth more effort to restore the freedom of Tibetans and for the independence of the Tibetan nation.

Do not stop doing what ought to be done because of my action; true mourning is to continue struggling for Tibet. If this time I am to carry out a major action, an action that causes a sensation, I press my palms together and beg everyone: do not, because of this matter, stop the things that we are currently doing. What we are doing now is for the purpose of preserving our own language and culture. Therefore, those who should dance should still dance, and those who should sing should still sing. Because these are all for the purpose of enabling the younger generation of Tibetans to accept and pass down their own language and culture. Especially now, we are about to welcome the ninety-first birthday of His Holiness the Dalai Lama. I hope that Tibetans all over the globe will grandly hold birthday celebration activities for His Holiness. These are all extremely important. We must not, because of the action of one person, only remain at a standstill within sorrow or silent tribute.

What we truly need to feel sorrow for, and what we need to pay silent tribute to, is that we have lost our own country. Every single one of us should launch greater actions for this. My carrying out this action today is not because I lack food, clothing, shelter, or transportation, not because I have nothing to eat, nothing to wear, or nowhere to live, nor is it for my personal life problems. All of this is for the independence of Tibet, and for the resistance of Tibet. Therefore, I press my palms together and beg everyone: if you truly want to mourn me, please act according to the wishes I have stated here. I hope every single person continues to work hard and continues to struggle for the affairs of Tibet. Finally, I want to say: Long live the independence of the Tibetan nation! Bhö Gyalo (Victory to Tibet)!!!

July 2, 2026

Editor’s Postscript: The passing of Lobga Rangzen is a heavy tragedy and an unavoidable historical testimony.

No matter how people evaluate his method of protest, what he expressed in his last words—the anxiety over his nation’s destiny, the perseverance in cultural inheritance, and the pursuit of freedom and dignity—all deserve to be seriously recorded. Especially his reminder to the exiles not to forget those who are still under high pressure just because they themselves are in a free society; this concerns not only Tibet, but also all populations oppressed by autocratic rule.

The Opposition Party publishes this text in order to preserve the documentary value of this public last testament, and also to remind readers: true commemoration should not stop at sadness, but should continue to pay attention to those who are still deprived of their freedom, beliefs, language, culture, and dignity.

May the deceased rest in peace. May freedom eventually find its way home.

Sources of Information: The content of the last words in this article is mainly compiled and organized based on the following public materials:

The transcribed and translated text of The Last Words of Lobga Rangzen released by the “Chinese Youth Supporting Tibet Association (Lhasa Spring)”;

The video and text content publicly released on Facebook by Lobga Rangzen during his lifetime;

Public materials such as public online reports and public on-scene videos.

Since the original video was in Tibetan and organized after public Chinese transcription and translation, this article cannot guarantee that all details are completely consistent with the original Tibetan expression. If there are any discrepancies, please refer to the original video content as the standard.

Translator: Ge Bing

闻道读书会第28期，韩战风云第三讲：《1951上半年》

韩战风云第三讲：《1951上半年》

副标题建议：从砥平里到第五次战役：联合国军如何扭转战场节奏？

活动核心问题：

砥平里之战为何被视为韩战转折点？

李奇微如何识别并反制中共军的作战模式？

联合国军如何应对第五次战役中的大规模攻势？

麦克阿瑟为何被解职？军事指挥与政治决策之间发生了什么张力？

斯大林与毛泽东如何逐步认清战场现实，并被推向谈判桌？

活动目标：

帮助参与者理解1951年上半年韩战从运动战走向僵持与谈判的关键转折。

通过具体战役、人物决策和国际政治互动，建立对韩战中段局势的整体认识。

为读书会成员提供一个兼具历史叙事、军事分析和政治判断的讨论场域。

目标受众

主要受众：

对近现代史、冷战史、军事史感兴趣的读书会成员

关注中美关系、朝鲜半岛问题、国际政治史的读者

已参加或关注“韩战风云”系列前两讲的听众

适合传播的人群标签：

喜欢历史现场感与关键人物分析的人

想理解“战争如何被政治约束”的读者

对李奇微、麦克阿瑟、毛泽东、斯大林等人物决策感兴趣的人

希望通过一场讲座补齐韩战关键转折线索的人

参与门槛建议：

不要求提前阅读专门书籍

建议宣传中说明：即使没有参加前两讲，也可以从本讲进入韩战中段的关键局势

活动信息

活动名称：韩战风云第三讲《1951上半年》时间：2026年7月12日，晚上 7:00-9:00地点：2077 Gold St, Alviso, CA 95002分享人：孙诚

闻道读书会第29期：人人被造平等：重读〈独立宣言〉250周年

 活动主题

《人人被造平等：重读〈独立宣言〉250周年》

副标题建议：从一句“created equal”看美国革命的价值根基与现代宪政秩序

活动时间：2026年7月19日，周日，7:00-9:00 PM活动地点：2077 Gold St, Alviso, CA 95002活动形式：主题分享 + 文本共读 +提问回答

人人被造平等：重读〈独立宣言〉250周年

2026年是美国《独立宣言》问世250周年。每当人们提起这份文件，最常被引用的便是那句：

“All men are created equal.”

中文里，它常被译为“人人生而平等”。但如果细读原文，会发现 created 并不只是一个普通词。它与后文 “endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights” 形成了完整的思想结构：人之所以拥有不可剥夺的权利，并不是因为国王、议会或政府授予，而是因为人作为被造者，本身就具有平等的尊严与权利。

本次读书会将围绕这一核心问题展开：为什么《独立宣言》写的是 created equal，而不是 born equal？这一区别如何帮助我们理解美国革命的合法性来源、政府权力的边界，以及美国革命与法国革命的不同走向？

活动中，我们将结合中文导读材料，进行主题分享、文本共读与开放讨论。无需专业背景，只要你愿意认真阅读、倾听和交流，都欢迎参加。