本文来源：罗翔-破幕推墙

编辑：钟然 校对：毛一炜 翻译：戈冰

近日，红潮国安部又发了一篇雄文，义正辞严地指出：年轻人躺平，是境外势力渗透！是颜色革命的新花样！是敌对分子在背后搞鬼！读完我差点笑出声——这届国安部怕不是把《西游记》当内部文件学了，天天都能抓出个“境外妖怪”。

躺平有那么可怕吗？年轻人不996了，不内卷了，不想当韭菜了，就成了“国家安全隐患”？这逻辑也太好笑了。古人说“达则兼济天下，穷则独善其身”。可如今呢？达者们早就不兼济天下了，他们只兼济自己和亲戚朋友的账户余额。穷者想独善其身，躺平一下，喘口气，就被扣上“境外势力”的帽子。妙啊，这叫什么？叫只许州官放火，不许百姓点灯；只许权贵躺赢，不许平民躺平。

你们这些“达者”当年是怎么兼济天下的？

房地产大潮里，左手政策右手土地，轻松把几代人的财富收割进腰包；互联网红利期，平台经济野蛮生长，996福报喊得震天响，转头就把程序员当电池用完即弃；疫情期间，一边歌颂“动态清零是人间大爱”，一边让小商贩、打工仔倾家荡产；现在经济下行，又突然发现“躺平是境外势力”，赶紧把锅甩给美帝、日帝、台独、港独、境外NGO……反正只要不是自己无能，天下就没有解决不了的“境外势力”。

年轻人躺平的真正原因，你们心里比谁都清楚：

房价高不可攀，结婚生娃成了奢侈品；996干到35岁就被优化，35岁成了职场死刑；内卷卷到头秃，回报却越来越薄；阶层固化比水泥还硬，拼爹的时代，普通人再努力也只是给别人做嫁衣。

这时候你们不反思自己“兼济天下”干了什么好事，反而怪穷人“独善其身”？这不就是典型的“自己吃肉不给别人喝汤，还怪别人不感恩”吗？

更绝的是，国安部这篇雄文里，估计又要列举一堆“境外网站”“境外博主”“境外App”在教唆躺平。拜托，你们自己把国内互联网管得铁桶一般，连个正常发声的地方都不留，年轻人不翻墙还能去哪儿听真话？结果翻墙听了句“别卷了，保重身体”，就成了境外势力？那请问，当年教我们“知识改变命运”“努力就有未来”的那些鸡汤，又是哪国势力？是不是也该一起抓？

讽刺的是，最该躺平的其实是你们自己。

你们这些既得利益者，早就躺平在权力和垄断红利上几十年了：子女海外留学、资产海外配置、医疗海外就诊，自己躺得舒舒服服，却要求国内年轻人“站起来奋斗”“为民族复兴添砖加瓦”。砖瓦是你们搬吗？瓦刀是你们挥吗？最后累死累活的还是底层，享受成果的还是你们。

这叫什么兼济天下？这叫“达则兼济自家，穷则怪你不卷”。

躺平不是不奋斗，是拒绝被你们定义的“奋斗”当燃料。

年轻人选择低欲望、低消费、低婚育、低期待，本质上是对你们这套游戏规则的消极抵抗。他们不傻，看得比谁都清楚：再怎么卷，也卷不过关系、卷不过平台、卷不过政策风向。既然终点早已内定，那我干嘛还拼了命去跑？躺平，至少不会被你们当燃料烧完。

国安部啊国安部，你们越是急着把“躺平”打成境外势力，越说明这套系统已经病入膏肓。真正的境外势力，从来不是教年轻人躺平的那几个推文，而是把中国年轻人逼到只能躺平的那套制度和既得利益集团。

达者不再兼济天下，却要穷者必须卷到死，这才是真正的“国家安全隐患”。

如果躺平真是境外势力教唆的，那为什么境外势力没教权贵们也躺平呢？他们怎么还卷得那么起劲？

转发、点赞、保存——别让“境外势力”又多了几个！

The True Nature of the Crackdown on “Lying Flat”: The Successful No Longer Seek to Benefit All, Yet Blame the Poor for Looking Out Only for Themselves

Source: Luo Xiang – Breaking the Curtain, Tearing Down the Wall

Editor: Zhong Ran Proofreader: Mao Yiwei Translator: Ge Bing

Abstract: The authorities attribute young people’s “lying flat” to foreign forces, ignoring real pressures such as high housing prices, hyper-competition, and class固化; young people’s choice of a low-desire lifestyle is, in essence, a passive response and resistance to an unreasonable competitive system.

Recently, the “Red Tide” Ministry of State Security published another bombastic article, sternly declaring: Young people’s “lying flat” is the infiltration of foreign forces! It’s a new tactic of color revolutions! It’s hostile elements pulling strings behind the scenes! After reading it, I almost burst out laughing—this Ministry of State Security must have been studying *Journey to the West* as an internal manual; they seem to catch a “foreign demon” every single day.

Is “lying flat” really that terrifying? Just because young people refuse to work 996, reject the rat race, and refuse to be treated like chives, does that make them a “threat to national security”? That logic is laughable. The ancients said, “When one is successful, one benefits all under heaven; when one is in adversity, one cultivates oneself.” But what about today? The “successful” ones stopped benefiting the world long ago; they only benefit their own bank accounts and those of their relatives and friends. The “poor” want to cultivate themselves, lie back, and catch their breath, yet they’re branded as “foreign forces.” Brilliant! What do you call this? It’s called “officials are allowed to set fires, but the common people aren’t allowed to light lamps”; it’s called “the powerful are allowed to win without lifting a finger, but the common people aren’t allowed to lie back.”

How exactly did you “successful” ones benefit the world back in the day?

During the real estate boom, with policies in one hand and land in the other, you effortlessly raked in the wealth of generations into your own pockets; during the internet boom, as the platform economy grew unchecked, you shouted “996 is a blessing” at the top of your lungs, only to turn around and treat programmers like disposable batteries; during the pandemic, while extolling “dynamic zero-COVID as the greatest love on earth,” you drove small vendors and working-class people into bankruptcy; Now that the economy is slowing down, you’ve suddenly declared that “lying flat” is the work of “foreign forces,” and you’re scrambling to shift the blame onto the U.S., Japan, Taiwanese separatists, Hong Kong separatists, and foreign NGOs… After all, as long as it’s not your own incompetence, there’s no problem in the world that can’t be solved by blaming “foreign forces.”

You know better than anyone else the real reasons why young people are “lying flat”:

Housing prices are sky-high, making marriage and having children a luxury; Working 996 until age 35 only to be “optimized”—35 has become a death sentence in the workplace; the rat race is so intense it makes your hair fall out, yet the returns keep getting thinner; class固化 is harder than concrete; in this era of “connections,” no matter how hard ordinary people work, they’re just working to line someone else’s pockets.

At a time like this, instead of reflecting on what good your “benefiting all under heaven” has actually done, you blame the poor for “looking out only for themselves”? Isn’t this the classic case of “eating the meat yourself while denying others even the broth, then blaming them for being ungrateful”?

What’s even more outrageous is that this “masterpiece” from the Ministry of State Security will likely list a bunch of “foreign websites,” “foreign bloggers,” and “foreign apps” as instigators of the “lying-flat” movement. Come on—you’ve locked down the domestic internet like a fortress, leaving no space for people to speak their minds. Where else can young people go to hear the truth without circumventing the Great Firewall? So if they use a VPN to hear a single phrase like “Stop the rat race, take care of your health,” does that make them foreign agents? Then may I ask: which foreign power was behind all that inspirational fluff back in the day that taught us “knowledge changes destiny” and “hard work leads to a bright future”? Shouldn’t they be rounded up too?

The irony is, the ones who really need to “lie flat” are actually you yourselves.

You vested interests have been coasting on the dividends of power and monopoly for decades: sending your children to study abroad, shifting your assets overseas, and seeking medical treatment abroad. You lie back in comfort while demanding that young people in China “stand up and strive” and “contribute to the nation’s rejuvenation.” Are you the ones carrying the bricks? Are you the ones wielding the trowels? In the end, it’s the working class who toils themselves to death, while you reap the rewards.

What kind of “benefiting all under heaven” is this? This is “when we’re prosperous, we benefit our own families; when we’re poor, we blame you for not competing hard enough.”

Lying flat doesn’t mean not striving; it means refusing to be used as fuel for the “striving” you’ve defined.

When young people choose low desires, low consumption, low marriage and childbirth rates, and low expectations, it is essentially a passive resistance to your set of rules. They aren’t stupid; they see it clearer than anyone else: no matter how hard they compete, they can’t outcompete connections, platforms, or shifting policy winds. Since the finish line has long been predetermined, why should I run myself to death? Lying flat—at least—means I won’t be burned out as fuel by you.

Ministry of State Security, oh Ministry of State Security, the more you rush to label “lying flat” as the work of foreign forces, the more it proves that this system is already beyond salvation. The real foreign forces are never those few tweets teaching young people to lie flat, but rather the system and vested interest groups that have driven China’s youth to the point where lying flat is their only option.

The privileged no longer strive to benefit the world, yet the poor are forced to compete until they die—this is the true “threat to national security.”

If “lying flat” really were instigated by foreign forces, then why didn’t those foreign forces tell the privileged elite to lie flat too? How come they’re still competing so fiercely?

Share, like, save—don’t let the “foreign forces” gain a few more followers!

作者：陀先润

编辑：韩立华 校对：程筱筱 翻译：戈冰

网上很多人看到这条新闻的第一反应是觉得不对劲。37个浙江渔民，集资1.5个亿，造了中国第一艘”民间科考船”。本能上就感觉这事有猫腻，但又说不清楚到底哪里不对。大部分人的质疑停在一个层面：渔民哪来那么多钱，平均每人400万，这不可能。

这个质疑方向是错的。

舟山群岛的离岛渔民，很多人真的有这个钱。那些岛上的渔村，常年在海上搏命，积累下来的财富远超外界想象，住宅、船只、生活方式都说明这一点。所以用”渔民没钱”来否定这件事，否定不了。这件事假，但假在另一个地方，假在这艘船本身。

一艘渔民”买不起、不该懂、也管不着”的船

先说这艘船装了什么。全电推进、薄冰区破冰能力、六级海况下一米精度动力定位、最长一万米水下光缆释放系统、深潜器布放能力。把这串参数摆出来，任何一个懂行的人都能看出来，这不是一艘用来研究鱼群或者海洋气象的科考船，这是一艘专门用来做海底地形勘测和航道绘制的船。

全电推进在科考船上有两个核心用途。第一是降噪，让声呐回波更干净，海底地形图更精确。第二是破冰，允许船体在冰区前后左右机动，甚至原地打转，这是传统螺旋桨推进做不到的。一万米光缆释放系统，加上深潜器布放能力，说明这艘船的主要任务就是把探测设备送到深海，绘制海底地图。六级海况下一米精度定点，是在复杂海况下保证设备下放时缆线不因船体漂移而断裂或扭损。

这每一项能力，在中国都是涉密技术。相关设备的采购，哪怕是个人从海外买回来，进关就要申报详细用途，接受审查。光纤护套、卷放设备、破冰钢板的材料选型，这些东西在中国没有相应批文，根本买不到，更别说装船。

现在问题来了。这37个渔民，作为名义上的投资股东，有权知道船上装了什么、这些设备从哪来、花了多少钱吗？答案是没有，而且绝对不可能有。这些信息本身就是国家机密，让一帮民间股东知道，叫泄密。所以这37个人，不是投资方，是挂名方。他们买的不是股份，是一块招牌。

中国的海洋数据，从1949年就是军事机密

要理解这件事的荒谬程度，必须先说清楚中国对海洋数据的管理逻辑。1949年之后，中国就规定所有海洋资料，包括水温、海浪、海流、海底地形测绘图像，全部属于国家地理机密，由军队管理，具体归属海军。国家海洋局从成立起就是军事化单位，下属的”向阳红”系列科考船是军事编制，船员按军人标准管理，船上佩带武器。后来的“远望”系列，给国防科工委用于航天测控，也是纯军方资产。

中科院有”科学”系列和”实验”系列，同济大学今年刚下水一艘”同济号”。这些大学和研究机构能运营科考船，是因为他们接的是国家项目，有相应资质，每一次出海任务都要向国家海洋局和军队报批。中国没有西方那种模式，就是某个大学教授申请了一个研究鲸鱼的项目，去租一艘船就能出海。你自己弄一个声呐，划着小船去探一探海底地形，第二天就会被请去喝茶，因为这叫间谍行为。

在这个背景下，37个渔民自发集资造了一艘装备远超体制内标准的”民间科考船”，然后要去承接科研院所的”租船任务”。这个逻辑从根本上就站不住脚。科研院所出海，不会去租一艘民间船，他们有自己的船，有资质审批，也没有理由把涉密任务外包给一帮不在体制内的渔民股东。

为什么偏偏要”民间”这两个字

这才是整件事最关键的问题。

这艘船真正的用途，指向北极航道。薄冰区破冰能力不是为了去冬季的极地，而是为了夏末秋初，也就是北极冰层融化最多的时段，也是北极航道最可能通航的时段。全电推进加海底勘测能力，对应的任务是对北极航道进行系统性测绘，绘制潜艇可用的航线图。这件事中国一直在做，雪龙号、极地号都去过北极，但那是专项任务，不是全面测绘。

现在的问题是，如果挂着”向阳红”或”科学”号的字样出现在北极航道，北约会怎么看？整个欧美对中国体制内科研机构的警惕已经今非昔比，连大学的合作项目都要审查，何况一艘军方背景的科考船。就算挂着同济大学的牌子，也会被认定为中国国家意志的延伸。

但如果是一艘“37个爱国渔民自发集资、热爱科学、支持国家”的民间船呢？它在舆论上的防御空间就完全不同了。一旦有人质疑，官方可以说这是民营企业行为，政府管不了，他们是自己把船租出去的，租给了某个对北极渔类感兴趣的项目。这套话说不说得通是另一回事，但它提供了一个外交缓冲，一个能让事情不立刻升级的叙事空间。

这就是”民间”两个字存在的唯一理由。

37个渔民什么都不知道，这才是设计的精妙之处

这37个人，不知道船上装了什么，不知道设备从哪里批来，不知道每次出任务去哪、干什么，也没有权利决定把船租给谁。出任务要国家海洋局批，要军队批，他们的”股东”身份在实际运营里等于零。他们是真的爱党、真的出了钱，但他们挂的是名字，买的是故事，而不是一家公司的实控权。

有人猜测这艘船是去切断别国海底光缆的。这个方向想多了，逻辑上也不成立。切光缆不需要这种精密科考船，一艘普通货轮改装一下，船底挂个拖揽装置，贴着海底一拖就行了，成本低、隐蔽性更强。造这么一艘船的成本和复杂度，远超切缆所需。

这艘船的核心价值，在于它能在其他船不该出现的地方做该做的事，而且出现的时候，身上贴着一张说得过去的平民标签。

渔民是真实的，钱可能也是真实的，爱国情感更是真实的。唯独那个”民间科考”的故事，是假的。

Zhejiang Fishermen “Pool Funds” for Research Vessel: A Fig Leaf, and the Truth It Hides

Author: Tuo Xianrun

Editor: Han Lihua Proofreader: Cheng Xiaoxiao Translator: Ge Bing

Many people online had an immediate sense that something was off when they first saw this news. Thirty-seven Zhejiang fishermen pooled 150 million yuan to build China’s first “private research vessel.” Instinctively, people sense something fishy, yet they can’t quite put their finger on what’s wrong. Most people’s skepticism stops at one question: Where did the fishermen get that much money? An average of 4 million yuan per person—that’s impossible.

This line of questioning is misguided.

Many fishermen on the remote islands of the Zhoushan Archipelago actually do have that kind of money. In those island fishing villages, where people risk their lives at sea year-round, the wealth they’ve accumulated far exceeds what outsiders imagine—their homes, boats, and lifestyle all attest to this. So dismissing the project by claiming “fishermen have no money” simply doesn’t hold water. The story is indeed a hoax, but the deception lies elsewhere—it lies in the ship itself.

A ship that fishermen “can’t afford, shouldn’t understand, and have no say in”

First, let’s look at what this ship is equipped with. All-electric propulsion, icebreaking capability in thin ice zones, dynamic positioning with one-meter accuracy in Sea State 6 conditions, a subsea cable deployment system capable of reaching depths of up to 10,000 meters, and the ability to deploy deep-diving submersibles. Looking at this list of specifications, anyone with expertise in the field can see that this is not a research vessel designed to study fish schools or marine meteorology; it is a vessel specifically built for seabed topography surveys and hydrographic mapping.

All-electric propulsion serves two core purposes on a research vessel. First is noise reduction, which ensures cleaner sonar echoes and more precise seabed topographic maps. Second is icebreaking capability, allowing the hull to maneuver freely in all directions within ice-covered areas—even spinning in place—something traditional propeller propulsion cannot achieve. The 10,000-meter optical cable deployment system, combined with the vessel’s ability to deploy deep-diving submersibles, indicates that its primary mission is to deliver detection equipment to the deep sea and map the seabed. The capability to maintain one-meter positioning accuracy in Sea State 6 ensures that, even in complex sea conditions, the cable does not break or become twisted during equipment deployment due to the vessel’s drift.

Each of these capabilities constitutes classified technology in China. The procurement of related equipment—even if purchased by an individual from overseas—requires a detailed declaration of its intended use upon customs clearance, followed by scrutiny. The material selection for fiber-optic sheaths, cable winches, and ice-breaking steel plates—these items cannot be purchased in China without the appropriate approvals, let alone installed on a vessel.

Now here’s the problem. Do these 37 fishermen, as nominal shareholders, have the right to know what equipment is on board, where it came from, and how much it cost? The answer is no, and it is absolutely impossible for them to know. This information is state-level classified; allowing a group of private shareholders to know it would constitute a breach of security. Therefore, these 37 individuals are not actual investors; they are merely nominal shareholders. What they bought was not equity, but a nameplate.

China’s marine data has been a military secret since 1949

To grasp the absurdity of this situation, we must first clarify China’s logic behind managing marine data. Since 1949, China has stipulated that all marine data—including water temperature, wave conditions, ocean currents, and seabed topographic survey images—constitutes state geographical secrets, managed by the military and specifically under the jurisdiction of the Navy. The State Oceanic Administration has been a militarized entity since its inception. Its “Xiangyanghong” series of research vessels operates under a military organizational structure, with crew members managed according to military standards and armed on board. The later “Yuanwang” series, provided to the State Commission of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense for space tracking and control, is also purely military property.

The Chinese Academy of Sciences operates the “Kexue” and “Shiyan” series, and Tongji University just launched the “Tongji” this year. These universities and research institutions are able to operate research vessels because they are carrying out state-funded projects and possess the necessary qualifications; every voyage must be approved by the State Oceanic Administration and the military. China does not have the Western model where a university professor could simply apply for a whale research project, rent a boat, and set sail. If you were to set up your own sonar and row out in a small boat to survey the seabed, you’d be summoned for a “chat” the very next day, as this would be considered espionage.

Against this backdrop, 37 fishermen spontaneously pooled their funds to build a “civilian research vessel” whose equipment far exceeds the standards of the official system, intending to take on “charter assignments” from research institutes. This logic is fundamentally untenable. Research institutes would not charter a civilian vessel for their expeditions; they have their own ships and the necessary approvals, and there is no reason for them to outsource classified missions to a group of fishermen-shareholders operating outside the official system.

Why the specific use of the term “civilian”?

This is the crux of the entire matter.

The ship’s true purpose points to the Arctic shipping route. Its icebreaking capabilities in thin ice zones are not intended for winter expeditions to the polar regions, but rather for late summer and early fall—the period when Arctic ice melts the most and the Arctic shipping route is most likely to be navigable. All-electric propulsion combined with seabed survey capabilities suggests a mission to systematically map the Arctic shipping route and create navigational charts suitable for submarines. China has been engaged in this work for some time—the Xuelong and Jili have both visited the Arctic—but those were specialized missions, not comprehensive mapping efforts.

The question now is: if a vessel bearing the name “Xiangyanghong” or “Kexue” were to appear in the Arctic shipping lanes, how would NATO view it? The level of wariness toward China’s state-run research institutions across the West has changed dramatically; even university collaboration projects are subject to scrutiny, let alone a research vessel with military ties. Even if it were branded with Tongji University’s name, it would still be perceived as an extension of China’s national will.

But what if it were a “civilian vessel” funded by “37 patriotic fishermen who voluntarily pooled their resources, love science, and support the nation”? Its room for maneuver in the public discourse would be entirely different. Should anyone raise doubts, officials could claim this is a private enterprise initiative beyond government control—that they simply leased the vessel to a project interested in Arctic fisheries. Whether this narrative holds water is another matter, but it provides a diplomatic buffer—a narrative space that prevents the situation from escalating immediately.

This is the sole reason for the existence of the term “civilian.”

The fact that these 37 fishermen know nothing is precisely where the ingenuity of the design lies

These 37 people have no idea what equipment is on board, where the gear came from, where they’re going or what they’re doing on each mission, nor do they have the authority to decide whom to lease the ship to. Missions require approval from the State Oceanic Administration and the military; their “shareholder” status amounts to nothing in actual operations. They genuinely love the Party and have genuinely invested money, but they’re merely lending their names and buying into a narrative—not actual control over the company.

Some speculate that this ship is used to cut other countries’ undersea cables. This line of thinking is far-fetched and logically unsound. Cutting cables doesn’t require such a sophisticated scientific research vessel; a standard cargo ship could be modified with a towing device attached to its hull, skimming along the seabed—a method that’s cheaper and far more covert. The cost and complexity of building a vessel like this far exceed what’s necessary for cable-cutting operations.

The core value of this vessel lies in its ability to carry out necessary operations in areas where other ships should not be present—all while appearing under a plausible civilian guise.

The fishermen are real, the money may be real, and the patriotic sentiment is certainly real. Only the narrative of “civilian scientific research” is a fabrication.

作者：陀先润

编辑：李晶

校对：孔祥庆

翻译：戈冰

三星近日宣布停止在中国大陆销售电视、冰箱等所有家电产品，仅保留手机业务。这则公告在商业媒体上被解读为市场竞争失利，但真正的故事远不止于此。它揭示的，是一个威权政权如何一步步将自己变成全球资本的禁区，以及跨国企业在主权绑架面前如何艰难求生。

三星家电在中国市场占有率不足0.4%，悄悄退出对财务毫无影响。选择公开宣告，唯一的解释是政治需要。三星必须向华盛顿和布鲁塞尔证明一件事：我们与中共市场的切割是真实的，不是表演。这是在中美科技脱钩持续深化的背景下，一家跨国企业为保住核心资产所做的政治投名状。

三星在华真正的战略资产不是家电，而是西安的闪存芯片工厂，这座工厂贡献了三星九成以上利润来源的关键产能。然而它现在处境极为危险——美国已将三星使用美制设备的许可证改为逐年审查，随时可能叫停；欧美市场对中国制造高科技产品的审查也已延伸至供应链深层，”产地中国”正在成为一个致命标签。三星必须向外界证明，西安厂只是全球供应链的一个加工节点，而非与中共市场深度捆绑的本土存在。家电业务的公开切割，本质上是为西安厂的生存买时间。

更值得警惕的是北京的反应。2026年4月，中共相继出台《工业和供应链安全条例》与《反外国不当域外管辖规定》两份行政法规，明确授权当局在外国企业执行美国断供令时，采取资产冻结、查封乃至强制要求工厂维持运转等反制措施。这不是正常法治国家的监管逻辑，而是威权政体将外资工厂视为可随时充公的人质的制度安排。一旦中美冲突进一步升级，三星西安厂面临被强制接管的风险并非危言耸听，而是有法可依的既定选项。

正是为了对冲这一极端情景，三星已在美国德克萨斯州泰勒市加快建设大型晶圆厂，计划年底全面投产。逻辑很清晰：一旦西安厂被强制接收，三星损失的只是固定资产。核心工艺、管理体系、全球协同网络可以随时撤走，没有三星实时技术支持的尖端工厂，良率会迅速崩塌，对接收方而言不过是一堆无法独立运转的机器。

对比日本企业的做法，更能看清三星今日困境的根源。萨德风波之后，日本政府便通过在华商业协会，有计划、低调地推动日企分批撤离，并给予财政补贴。佳能、尼康以及主要芯片与通讯企业，在被迫站队之前已完成战略撤退。而韩国财阀长期抱有在中美之间左右逢源的幻想，三星如今不得不在市值高峰期用一纸公告争取政治缓冲，本质上是一种代价高昂的被动补救。

三星这次公告，外界看到的是商业宣布，深一层是向欧美投资者的政治表态，再往下则是威权主权与跨国资本之间的极限博弈。中共用法律工具将外资变成人质，用行政手段扭曲市场规则，最终只能加速资本的离场。全球化时代资本自由流动的前提，是法治与产权保障，而这恰恰是中共体制结构性缺失的东西。三星今天的困境，不是一家企业的个案，而是所有仍在押注中国市场的跨国资本迟早要面对的共同命运。

The True Implications of Samsung’s Exit from China’s Home Appliance Market: The Dead End for Multinational Capital Under an Authoritarian Regime

Author: Tuo Xianrun

Editor: Li Jing

Proofreader: Kong Xiangqing

Translator: Ge Bing

Samsung recently announced that it would cease sales of all home appliances, including televisions and refrigerators, in mainland China, retaining only its mobile phone business. Business media have interpreted this announcement as a failure in market competition, but the true story goes far beyond that. It reveals how an authoritarian regime is gradually transforming itself into a no-go zone for global capital, and how multinational corporations struggle to survive in the face of sovereign coercion.

Samsung’s market share for home appliances in China is less than 0.4%, so a quiet exit would have no financial impact. The only explanation for choosing to make a public announcement is political necessity. Samsung must prove one thing to Washington and Brussels: our disengagement from the Chinese market is genuine, not a performance. Against the backdrop of deepening technological decoupling between China and the U.S., this is a political pledge made by a multinational corporation to safeguard its core assets.

Samsung’s true strategic asset in China is not its home appliances, but its flash memory chip factory in Xi’an, which provides the critical production capacity responsible for over 90% of Samsung’s profits. However, it now finds itself in an extremely precarious position—the U.S. has changed the licensing terms for Samsung’s use of American-made equipment to an annual review, meaning it could be suspended at any moment; scrutiny of high-tech products made in China in Western markets has also extended deep into the supply chain, and “Made in China” is becoming a fatal label. Samsung must demonstrate to the outside world that the Xi’an plant is merely a processing node in the global supply chain, rather than a local entity deeply tied to the Chinese market. The public spin-off of the home appliance business is, in essence, a move to buy time for the survival of the Xi’an plant.

Even more alarming is Beijing’s response. In April 2026, the Chinese Communist Party successively issued two administrative regulations: the “Regulations on Industrial and Supply Chain Security” and the “Provisions on Countering Improper Extraterritorial Jurisdiction by Foreign Entities.” These explicitly authorize authorities to take countermeasures—including asset freezes, seizures, and even forcing factories to remain operational—when foreign companies comply with U.S. supply cut-off orders. This is not the regulatory logic of a normal rule-of-law state, but rather an institutional arrangement under an authoritarian regime that treats foreign-invested factories as hostages subject to confiscation at any time. Should Sino-U.S. tensions escalate further, the risk of Samsung’s Xi’an plant facing forced takeover is not alarmist rhetoric, but a legally established option.

It is precisely to hedge against this extreme scenario that Samsung has accelerated construction of a large-scale wafer fab in Taylor, Texas, with plans to begin full-scale production by the end of the year. The logic is clear: should the Xi’an plant be forcibly taken over, Samsung would lose only its fixed assets. Its core processes, management systems, and global coordination networks can be withdrawn at any time. Without Samsung’s real-time technical support, the yield rate at this cutting-edge facility would rapidly collapse, leaving the recipient with nothing more than a pile of machinery incapable of independent operation.

A comparison with the approach taken by Japanese companies sheds further light on the root cause of Samsung’s current predicament. Following the THAAD controversy, the Japanese government, through its business associations in China, systematically and discreetly facilitated the phased withdrawal of Japanese firms, providing financial subsidies. Canon, Nikon, and major chip and telecommunications companies had already completed their strategic retreats before being forced to take sides. Meanwhile, South Korean conglomerates have long harbored the illusion of being able to play both sides between China and the U.S. Samsung is now forced to issue a public announcement at the peak of its market value to seek political breathing room—essentially a costly, reactive measure.

To the outside world, Samsung’s announcement appears to be a business statement; at a deeper level, it is a political declaration to Western investors; and at the core, it represents an extreme power struggle between authoritarian sovereignty and transnational capital. By using legal tools to hold foreign capital hostage and administrative measures to distort market rules, the Chinese Communist Party can only accelerate the exodus of capital. The free flow of capital in the era of globalization is predicated on the rule of law and the protection of property rights—precisely what is structurally lacking in the CCP’s system. Samsung’s current predicament is not an isolated case but a shared fate that all multinational capital still betting on the Chinese market will eventually face.

连载第一部分：

作者：倪世成

编辑：钟然  校对：程筱筱 翻译：周敏

引言：历史有时会在地下缓慢转向 

人们谈论中国民主运动时，总喜欢反复追问同一个问题：为什么几十年过去，它始终难以形成真正稳定而持续的力量。有人把原因归结于高压环境，有人把原因归结于组织松散，也有人把原因归结于人性的复杂。 

但今天，我越来越觉得，也许更重要的问题已经不再是：过去为什么没有成功。而是：一种新的历史条件，是否正在缓慢形成。因为很多今天看起来理所当然的事情，在过去，其实根本无法完成。 

过去的中国民主运动，长期处于一种高度压缩的状态。很多人身在国内；很多组织无法公开存在；很多刊物只能短暂出现；很多讨论刚刚开始，便已经被现实打断。在那样的环境里，能够持续发声，本身就已经非常艰难。 

因此，今天重新回望过去，也许不应该只是轻易用一种后来者的姿态去批评前人。因为很多事情，并不是他们不想做。而是那个时代，没有条件。事实上，过去几十年里，其实一直有人在做这些事情。 

一直有人：办刊物、做论坛、保存历史、翻译文献、建立媒体、维系中文公共讨论空间。很多今天仍然能够被看见的历史记录，本身就是一代代人艰难保存下来的结果。 

只是过去的条件，使这些努力往往难以长期沉淀。很多论坛存在几年便消失。很多刊物，一旦停刊便彻底断裂。很多经验，随着一代人的离开而迅速散失。很多讨论，来不及进入长期公共知识体系，便已经被时间冲走。 

过去的海外中文世界，长期更像一种漂浮状态。零散、脆弱、难以积累。 

但今天，历史正在慢慢发生变化。越来越多中国人开始离开中国，分散到世界各地。有人是为了自由，有人是为了生活，有人是为了下一代，也有人只是无法继续忍受一种越来越封闭的空气。 

而无论原因如何，一个新的现实正在逐渐形成：中国人第一次开始形成一个长期存在、全球分布的海外中文社群。这件事，也许会比很多人今天意识到的更加重要。因为它意味着，过去很多无法长期完成的事情，第一次开始真正拥有现实条件。互联网、数字档案、全球协作、云端出版、视频传播与AI工具，正在慢慢改变组织方式。 

过去，一场活动结束之后，很多资料很快便会散失。今天，却第一次可能被长期保存、分类、整理、归档。过去，一个论坛停办之后，很多讨论也随之消失。今天，却完全可能形成持续十年、二十年的长期知识积累。过去，一个刊物一旦中断，很多思想便会断裂。今天，却开始拥有形成全球协作与长期出版网络的可能。 

因此，今天真正重要的，也许已经不是：“重新发明一切”。而是：如何在过去几十年已经存在的努力之上，建立更长期、更稳定、更系统化的积累。 

因为很多真正重要的变化，在刚开始的时候，往往并不轰动。它不会立刻改变世界。甚至很多时候，外界根本察觉不到它正在发生。 

它更像植物在地下缓慢扩展根系。表面上，也许仍然松散、脆弱、并不成熟。但真正决定未来高度的，往往恰恰是那些在地下不断生长、彼此连接、逐渐深入土壤的部分。 

过去几十年里，其实一直有人在做这些事情。而今天，在新的历史条件下，这些过去分散而脆弱的努力，第一次开始拥有了彼此连接、长期积累与持续深化的可能。这本身，也许就说明：中国民主运动的根系，正在比过去更深地进入土壤。 

一、真正改变历史的，往往不是瞬间的激情，而是长期积累 

过去很多年里，中国民主运动始终有一种挥之不去的疲惫感。这种疲惫，并不仅仅来自外部压力。很多时候，它更来自一种长期无法积累的感觉。 

一代人付出巨大代价，很多事情却很难真正留下来。一次活动结束，很多内容迅速散失。一个论坛停办，过去几年讨论也随之中断。一个刊物停止出版，很多思想积累便跟着断裂。 

很多时候，人们仿佛总是在重新开始。而这其实是非常消耗人的。因为一个运动如果长期无法形成积累，它就很难真正产生“历史感”。它会不断停留在一种：即时性的状态。今天激烈，明天沉寂。今天聚集，明天散去。 

于是很多人会逐渐产生一种无力感。仿佛一切都只是短暂波动。但如果认真回头观察历史，就会发现：真正能够长期影响世界的力量，往往都拥有一种很强的“积累能力”。 

欧洲启蒙运动之所以能够改变现代世界，并不仅仅因为出现了几位伟大的思想家。更重要的是，它逐渐形成了：出版网络、知识沙龙、长期公共讨论、跨地区思想传播。伏尔泰、卢梭、孟德斯鸠这些名字之所以能够跨越时代，并不是因为他们一时激烈。而是因为他们的思想被不断：出版、传播、争论、引用、整理。最后，慢慢沉淀成一种新的文明结构。 

美国建国时期同样如此。真正让美国制度逐渐稳定下来的，并不仅仅是独立战争本身。更重要的是围绕制度展开的大量长期讨论。例如《联邦党人文集》之所以今天仍然被研究，并不仅仅因为它支持美国宪法。它更重要的意义在于：它把当时围绕联邦制度、司法独立、权力制衡的讨论，真正系统化、文献化了。两百多年后，人们仍然能够通过这些文字，重新进入那个时代的思想现场。因为真正长期影响历史的东西，往往并不是瞬间的口号。而是那些能够被长期保存下来的公共知识。 

东欧剧变时期同样如此。很多后来真正推动社会变化的力量，并不只是街头抗议本身。而是长期存在的：地下出版、知识圈、公共讨论、社会协作网络。波兰“团结工会”后来之所以能够成长为真正影响国家结构的力量，也不仅仅因为一次工人运动。它后来逐渐形成了：出版、教育、长期组织化能力、社会协作网络。 

很多历史经验其实都在说明同一件事：真正成熟的民主运动，并不仅仅依赖激情。它更重要的是：能否逐渐形成自己的：记忆、文献、制度、公共知识、长期协作结构。 

而过去的中国民主运动，长期最缺少的，也许恰恰就是这种：长期积累能力。当然，这并不仅仅是人的问题。很多时候，确实是历史条件限制。过去的环境，很难允许长期公开积累。很多资料甚至保存下来，本身都具有风险。因此，今天真正重要的，也许并不是否定过去。 

恰恰相反。正因为过去几十年里，一直有人艰难地保存这些东西，今天这一代海外中国人，才第一次开始拥有继续深化它们的可能。而这也意味着：今天的中国民主运动，也许终于开始从一种长期“生存状态”，慢慢进入一种新的阶段。这个阶段最重要的问题，已经不再只是：如何继续发声。而是：如何让很多东西真正留下来。 

二、中国民运真正缺少的，也许不是热情，而是“组织记忆” 

而当一个运动开始真正思考“如何留下来”时，它其实已经发生了某种很深的变化。因为这意味着，它开始不再只是关注眼前。而开始思考：十年之后，二十年之后，还能留下些什么。 

很多时候，人们会低估“保存”这件事。总觉得真正重要的是：行动的人、发言的人、组织的人。而记录、整理、归档，似乎只是辅助性的工作。但如果认真观察历史，就会发现：很多真正改变历史的文明，本质上都极其重视：保存。为什么古代中国历代都重修史书？为什么欧洲长期保存大量书信、手稿与档案？为什么美国会长期公开保存总统文献、政治档案与历史记录？ 

因为一个文明真正长期的力量，很多时候恰恰隐藏在这些“看起来不够激烈”的东西里面。它们决定了：一个社会是否具备长期记忆。而没有长期记忆，一个群体就会不断重新归零。过去很多中国民运活动的问题，并不在于缺少激情。而在于：很多思想没有真正留下来。很多经验没有真正传递下去。很多讨论结束之后，思想也跟着消失。于是很多问题不断重复。很多组织一次次重新开始。很多新人进入之后，又只能重新摸索。这其实是一种非常巨大的消耗。 

而今天，也许第一次开始拥有改变这种局面的条件。因为数字化时代真正改变的，并不仅仅是传播速度。更重要的是：它第一次真正改变了“长期保存”的能力。过去，一场活动结束之后，资料很容易散失。今天，却完全可能：数字化归档；多地备份；长期数据库化；全球协作保存；AI辅助整理；长期分类检索。 

过去，一个论坛停办，很多讨论便随之消失。今天，却完全可能形成持续几十年的长期知识积累。过去，一个刊物中断，很多思想便彻底断裂。今天，却可能形成全球化协作出版网络。 

这意味着：中国民主运动第一次真正开始拥有建立“组织记忆”的现实条件。而这种变化，也许比很多短期性的激情更加重要。因为真正能够穿越时间的，往往并不是某一次情绪爆发。而是：被长期保存下来的文明积累。因此，未来真正重要的，也许已经不仅仅是：“办更多活动”。而是：如何建立属于中国民主运动自己的：长期档案体系；长期论坛体系；长期出版体系；长期知识协作网络；长期公共讨论空间。 

很多东西，在今天看起来也许仍然微小、松散、甚至脆弱。但真正重要的变化，往往就是这样开始的。它不会一夜之间成熟。不会立刻改变世界。它更像地下缓慢扩展的根系。表面上，也许仍然看不出什么。但真正决定未来高度的，往往恰恰是那些正在地下不断连接、不断积累、不断深入土壤的部分。 

而今天，也许正是这样的阶段。 

三、中国民运需要建设自己的“民主基础设施” 

很多时候，人们谈论民主运动，仍然习惯于一种非常“事件化”的视角。仿佛一个运动是否成功，主要取决于：有没有一次足够大的抗议；有没有一次震动世界的事件；有没有某个突然出现的历史转折点。 

但真正成熟的文明，很少只是靠一次事件形成的。更多时候，它是一种长期缓慢生长的结果。很多真正重要的东西，在形成初期，甚至并不显眼。大学刚出现的时候，也许只是少数人的讨论空间。早期报刊刚出现的时候，也未必有人意识到它会改变现代政治。很多最初的公共论坛，也往往规模很小。但后来，它们慢慢变成了：知识网络；公共空间；社会协作结构；文明的一部分。 

中国民主运动未来，也许同样会经历这样的过程。 

今天很多东西，看起来仍然分散、粗糙、并不成熟。很多论坛规模不大。很多刊物传播有限。很多讨论仍然停留在摸索阶段。很多组织仍然缺少稳定结构。但也许真正重要的问题，并不是：“为什么它现在还不够强大。” 

而是：它是否已经开始形成一种过去没有的东西。例如：越来越长期存在的中文论坛；越来越稳定的海外中文媒体；越来越完整的数字档案；越来越持续的公共讨论； 越来越强的全球协作能力。这些东西，也许今天仍然远不成熟。但它们本身已经说明：一种新的结构正在形成。而这种变化，很可能不会以一种轰轰烈烈的方式出现。它更像是一种：缓慢生长。 

很多真正重要的历史变化，往往在刚开始时，并不会立刻被意识到。因为它们最初看起来，甚至有些不起眼。但后来，人们才会发现：真正改变未来的，往往不是那些最喧闹的瞬间。而是那些长期缓慢积累下来的东西。 

过去几十年里，中国民主运动很多时候更像一种：不断被打断的历史。很多努力刚刚开始，便已经中断。很多经验来不及沉淀，便已经散失。很多思想甚至还没有形成公共知识体系，就已经消失。 

而今天，也许第一次开始拥有了一种不同的可能。过去那些彼此孤立、彼此分散、难以长期积累的努力，第一次开始拥有了：互相连接、长期保存、持续深化的条件。而这本身，也许就意味着：中国民主运动正在慢慢从一种“瞬间政治”，转向一种真正的“长期建设”。 

这并不意味着未来一定成功。历史从来不会自动前进。很多东西依然可能中断。很多努力依然可能失败。但至少，今天第一次开始出现了一种过去并不存在的历史条件。而真正重要的，也许正是这一点。因为一个文明真正开始成长，很多时候并不是从它最强大的时候开始。而是从它第一次真正开始形成“根系”的时候开始。 

连载第二部分：

作者：倪世成

编辑：钟然 

四、建立记录制度：没有记录，很多事情就会重新归零 

而当一个运动开始形成“根系”之后，它的意义其实就已经开始发生变化。它不再只是一些短暂聚集的人。也不再只是一次又一次彼此分散的行动。它开始慢慢形成一种：能够自我延续的结构。这其实是非常关键的变化。因为过去很多中国民运组织，长期都存在一种很强的“临时性”。很多事情主要依赖少数核心人物维持。一旦某个人离开，疲惫，发生冲突，或者生活发生变化，整个系统就很容易迅速停滞。 

于是很多组织长期陷入一种循环：建立、扩张、内耗、分裂、消失。很多经验也随着一次次循环不断流失。而真正成熟的文明结构，往往并不依赖某一个人长期存在。它更重要的是：能否逐渐形成一种：即使人员变化，很多东西依然能够继续的能力。 

大学为什么能够延续数百年？报纸为什么能够跨越几代编辑？很多政党、研究机构、公共组织为什么能够长期存在？因为真正被保留下来的，并不仅仅是某些个人。而是：制度；文档；传统；协作机制；长期知识体系。 

而过去，中国民主运动长期缺少的，恰恰是这种：“制度化积累能力”。很多东西太依赖个人。很多经验无法真正进入长期公共结构。很多组织缺少：稳定流程；长期档案；协作规范；人员培养机制；知识传承结构。于是很多事情很难真正沉淀下来。 

但今天，也许第一次开始拥有了改变这种局面的条件。因为数字化时代真正改变的，并不仅仅是传播。更重要的是：它开始让长期协作变得可能。过去，一个刊物很难长期维持。今天，却完全可能形成跨国家、跨地区、长期协作的编辑网络。过去，一个论坛很难长期积累。今天，却可能形成持续十年、二十年的长期数据库与思想档案。过去，很多经验只能停留在个人记忆中。今天，却开始拥有形成：长期知识库；长期文档系统；长期组织档案；长期协作平台；的可能。 

而这种变化，也许会比很多人今天意识到的更加深远。因为它意味着：中国民主运动第一次开始拥有从“个人化结构”，逐渐走向“制度化结构”的现实条件。 

而制度化，并不意味着僵化。真正成熟的制度，恰恰是为了：降低对个人的过度依赖。保护后来者能够进入。保护经验能够传承。保护组织不至于一次次重新归零。 

很多时候，人们会误以为：民主只是选举。但真正成熟的民主，其实首先是一种：组织文化。它意味着：规则高于个人；制度高于情绪；长期协作高于短期冲动；知识积累高于瞬间表达。 

而今天，中国民主运动也许才刚刚开始真正进入这样的阶段。这个阶段，未必轰动。甚至在外界看来，也许仍然显得缓慢、零散、并不成熟。但很多真正重要的历史变化，本来就是这样开始的。它不会立刻开花结果。它更像地下缓慢扩展的根系。安静，缓慢，却在不断深入土壤。 

五、从活动组织，走向真正的思想生产 

而当一个运动开始真正进入“长期建设”阶段之后，它的目标其实也会慢慢发生变化。过去很多时候，人们更容易把民主运动理解成一种：“反抗”。反抗压迫，反抗审查，反抗专制。这种反抗当然重要。因为如果没有人站出来，很多黑暗甚至不会被世界看见。 

但一个成熟的民主运动，最终其实不能只停留在“反对什么”。它还必须开始回答：自己究竟要建设什么。这其实是一个比“反抗”更困难的问题。因为反抗很多时候依赖激情。而建设则需要：耐心、协作、制度、积累、长期主义。 

很多历史上的政治运动，在“反抗阶段”往往非常强大。但一旦进入真正建设阶段，便迅速陷入混乱。因为它们缺少长期制度文化。缺少公共知识积累。缺少组织协作能力。缺少一种真正能够长期运转的公共结构。 

而今天，中国民主运动也许第一次开始真正面对这样的问题。因为过去很长时间里，很多事情首先考虑的是：如何生存。 

但今天，随着越来越多中国人长期生活在海外，一个新的问题开始慢慢浮现：如果未来真的存在一个长期的中文民主公共世界，它应该是什么样子？它是否能够：长期保存历史、长期积累知识、长期培养后来者、长期维持公共讨论、长期形成制度文化、长期形成协作网络。而这些问题，本质上都已经不只是“运动问题”。它们开始接近：文明问题。因为真正成熟的文明，并不仅仅依赖激情。它更重要的是：能否形成一种长期稳定的公共结构。 

很多时候，人们会觉得：论坛、刊物、档案、数据库、长期讨论，这些东西看起来并不“激动人心”。甚至显得缓慢、琐碎。但历史上真正长期影响世界的文明，往往恰恰极其重视这些东西。因为它们知道：真正能够穿越时间的，往往不是一时情绪。而是：那些被长期保存、不断积累、持续传承的公共知识与制度结构。 

为什么今天人们仍然能够研究古希腊？为什么欧洲启蒙运动仍然持续影响现代世界？为什么美国建国时期的思想今天依然能够进入公共讨论？因为它们不仅发生过。更因为它们被：保存、整理、出版、归档、不断重新进入公共知识体系。 

而今天，中国民主运动也许第一次开始真正拥有建立这种长期积累结构的可能。 

这并不意味着未来一定会顺利。很多东西依然可能中断。很多努力依然可能失败。很多组织依然可能分裂。但真正重要的是：一种过去长期不存在的历史条件，正在慢慢形成。过去那些零散、短暂、彼此孤立的努力，第一次开始拥有了：彼此连接、长期积累、持续深化的可能。而这本身，也许就意味着：中国民主运动正在慢慢从一种：“不断重复的短暂抗争”，逐渐走向一种：真正长期的文明建设过程。 

六、制度化，而不是个人化 

很多时候，一个运动在早期阶段，都会不可避免地依赖某些核心人物。这其实并不奇怪。因为在资源有限、环境困难、组织尚未成熟的时候，总需要有人主动承担责任。很多事情，也确实是靠少数人硬撑起来的。但如果一个组织长期无法从：“个人推动”，逐渐转向：“制度运转”，那么它最终往往会变得非常脆弱。 

因为一旦：某个人离开，疲惫，发生冲突，或者现实生活出现变化，很多事情就会迅速停滞。 

过去很多中国民运组织，其实都不同程度存在这样的问题。很多时候，组织本身并没有真正形成稳定机制。很多运行方式，仍然主要依赖：熟人关系、个人信任、临时协调、个体经验。于是组织很容易陷入：内耗、分裂、不信任、长期重复同样的问题。而更深层的问题在于：很多新人很难真正进入。因为很多东西：没有流程，没有制度，没有公开协作机制，没有长期知识传承。于是组织内部，很容易逐渐形成一种：“个人中心化”的结构。而这其实与民主本身的精神，是存在矛盾的。 

因为真正成熟的民主组织，最重要的一点，恰恰是：制度高于个人。这里所说的制度，并不是一种冷冰冰的官僚结构。也不是为了压制个体。恰恰相反：真正成熟的制度，本质上是为了：保护个体。 

因为当很多事情：有公开规则；有透明流程；有明确分工；有长期文档；有协作规范；那么组织内部，对人的依赖就会下降。很多事情，不再只能依靠少数核心人物硬撑。新人也更容易进入。经验也更容易传承。组织也更容易长期稳定。 

例如，一个论坛如何长期运行。谁负责主持、谁负责记录、谁负责摄影、谁负责整理、谁负责发布、谁负责长期归档。如果这些事情逐渐形成：文档、流程、SOP、长期协作规范那么后来的人，就能够不断接续。而不是每一次都重新摸索。 

再例如，一个刊物如何长期运转。如果完全依赖某个主编个人，那么一旦这个人停下来，整个系统就可能迅速停滞。

但如果逐渐形成：编辑制度、校对机制、作者协作网络、长期文档管理、资料归档机制， 那么刊物就开始真正拥有长期生命力。 

真正成熟的组织，并不是没有核心人物。 而是： 即使人员变化，很多东西依然能够继续。因为真正被保留下来的，已经不只是某个人。而是：规则、制度、协作网络、组织记忆、长期知识体系。这也是为什么，现代社会中真正强大的组织，往往都极其重视：流程、文档、制度、长期协作机制。 

因为它们知道：一个组织真正的稳定性，并不来自某个人永远存在。而来自：当个人变化时，整个系统依然能够继续运转。 

而中国民主运动未来，也许同样需要逐渐建立这种意识。因为民主本身，其实不仅仅是一种政治口号。它更是一种：组织文化。如果一个组织内部，无法长期建立：透明机制、协作机制、长期制度、知识传承，那么它很难真正成长为成熟的民主组织。 

因此，未来中国民运真正重要的方向之一，也许并不是继续强化：“谁更重要”。而是逐渐建立：更稳定的制度、更长期的协作、更公开的流程、 更可传承的组织结构。因为真正强大的组织，最终不是忠于某一个人。而是忠于：规则、制度、协作、长期公共目标。而这，也许才是真正现代民主组织最深层的根基。 

七、像写代码一样，不断迭代民运 

很多时候，人们会把民主运动理解成一种激情驱动的事情。仿佛只要：情绪足够强烈，口号足够响亮，态度足够坚定，很多问题自然就会解决。但现实往往不是这样。真正长期有效的组织，很少是“一次性完成”的。它们更像一种持续迭代的工程。 

这一点，其实很像现代软件开发。没有哪个大型系统，一开始就是完美的。 

很多系统：从 v1.0 开始；不断发现问题；不断修复漏洞；不断优化流程；不断升级结构；最后才逐渐成熟。 

而中国民主运动未来，也许同样需要建立这种：长期迭代思维。过去很多时候，一场活动结束之后，事情也就结束了。但未来更重要的，也许是：活动之后，是否真正进入：总结、分析、复盘、优化、升级。 

例如，一次论坛效果不好。过去可能只是：“这次没办好。”然后结束。但如果采用长期迭代思维，问题就会变成：为什么讨论不够深入；为什么记录不完整；为什么互动不足；为什么新人参与困难；为什么资料整理太慢；为什么传播效果有限。然后下一次继续优化。 

这其实已经开始进入一种：工程化组织思维。很多真正成熟的团队，其实都是这样运转的。它们并不是靠一次伟大的爆发。而是靠：无数次细节优化。 

例如：宣传方式升级；协作工具升级；档案系统升级；论坛流程升级；媒体传播升级；数据整理升级；培训机制升级；安全机制升级。这些东西，平时看起来很细。甚至不够“激动人心”。但长期积累下来，会彻底改变一个组织的能力。 

过去很多中国民运组织长期存在的问题，恰恰是：很多事情缺少长期迭代。很多经验没有沉淀。很多问题不断重复。很多组织长期停留在一种：“临时状态”。

而现代社会真正强大的系统，几乎都具备一种能力：持续优化自己。这一点，其实不仅适用于技术系统。也适用于：组织、媒体、出版、公共讨论、民主运动本身。甚至未来，中国民主运动完全可以逐渐形成一种：自己的“组织工程文化”。 

例如：每次活动之后：自动归档、自动整理、自动建立数据库、自动分类标签、自动同步资料、自动生成长期索引。AI时代，很多过去需要大量人力才能完成的事情，今天第一次开始变得现实。 

过去，一个大型活动之后，光是整理资料，可能就足以耗费大量时间。今天，却完全可能通过技术手段，大幅降低长期积累成本。而这，也意味着一种新的可能。未来的中国民主运动，也许不再只是传统意义上的：“政治组织”。它甚至可能逐渐演变成一种：长期协作网络。它的力量，也许不只来自某个中心。而来自：大量持续积累的：文献；档案；数据；论坛；出版；协作节点；长期知识生产。 

真正重要的，也许已经不只是：“办成一次活动。”而是：整个系统，是否比过去更成熟了一点。如果每一次活动之后：记录多一点；流程清晰一点；协作顺一点；文档完整一点；思想深入一点；新人更容易进入一点；那么长期下来，整个运动就会逐渐形成真正的积累。而这，也许才是未来中国民主运动真正需要建立的东西： 

一种能够长期自我优化、自我积累、自我进化的能力。很多时候，一个文明真正强大的地方，并不在于它从不犯错。而在于：它是否具备不断修正自己的能力。 

连载第三部分：

作者：倪世成

编辑：钟然 

八、从“流亡政治”走向“文明建设” 

过去很多年里，海外中国民运往往长期处于一种“流亡政治”的状态。很多人离开中国之后，首先面对的是：生存、身份、安全、重新开始生活。而政治表达本身，也更多围绕：抗议、揭露、声援、对抗。这些当然重要。因为如果没有这些声音，很多压迫甚至不会被世界看见。 

但今天，随着越来越多中国人长期生活在海外，一个新的问题也开始慢慢浮现：海外中国人，是否能够真正建立属于自己的长期公共空间？过去很长时间里，海外中文世界始终存在一种很强的漂浮感。很多论坛存在几年便消失。很多媒体因为资金、人事或内部冲突迅速瓦解。很多讨论长期停留在碎片化状态。很多经验没有真正代际传承。很多时候，人们仍然更习惯于：“临时聚集”。而不是：长期建设。 

但今天，也许第一次开始拥有了不同的条件。因为今天的海外中国人，已经不再只是少量短暂停留的流亡者。而开始逐渐形成：长期存在的全球中文社群。而这意味着，中国民主运动未来，也许不应长期停留在：“流亡政治”的阶段。 

而应该逐渐进入：文明建设。所谓文明建设，并不是一个空洞的大词。 

它其实意味着：开始真正长期建设：中文公共空间、中文知识体系、中文档案体系、中文出版体系、中文思想平台、中文协作网络、中文制度文化。过去很多时候，海外中文世界长期缺少的，并不是声音。而是：稳定性。 

今天一个平台出现，明天又消失。今天一个论坛热闹，几年后资料全部失踪。很多思想，没有真正沉淀下来。很多经验，没有真正传递下去。 

而一个成熟文明最重要的能力之一，恰恰是：长期积累。一个文明是否成熟，很多时候看的并不是：它有没有瞬间的激情。而是：它能不能长期保存自己的：记忆、思想、文献、经验、制度、公共知识。 

为什么古代中国重修史书？为什么欧洲保存大量书信、手稿与档案？为什么美国大量公开总统档案、政治文献与历史记录？因为真正成熟的文明都知道：如果没有长期记忆，一个社会就会不断重新归零。 

而过去，中国民主运动长期缺少的，恰恰就是这种：长期文明积累能力。很多事情刚刚开始，便已经中断。很多经验刚刚形成，便已经散失。很多思想甚至还来不及进入公共知识体系，就已经被时间冲走。但今天，情况开始第一次发生变化。互联网、数字化、全球协作与长期海外社群的形成，正在慢慢改变这一切。 

今天完全可能逐渐形成：长期论坛、长期文库、长期数据库、长期出版网络、长期公共讨论空间、长期中文知识协作体系。而这些东西，也许比很多人今天意识到的更加重要。

因为真正改变未来的，往往不仅仅是一次巨大的爆发。更是：长期而缓慢的建设。很多东西，在当下看起来并不耀眼。甚至显得缓慢、琐碎、不够“激动人心”。但几十年之后，人们真正能够看到的，往往恰恰是这些：看似不起眼，却持续积累的东西。未来的人回头看这一代海外中国人时，不应该只能看到：零散的视频、碎片化的口号、短暂的情绪。而应该能够看到：一个正在逐渐形成中的：中文公共思想空间、中文民主知识体系、中文长期协作网络、 中文制度化建设过程。 

而这，也许才是真正具有历史意义的事情。 

因为真正能够改变历史的，往往不仅是反抗。更是建设。真正成熟的民主运动，最终也不仅仅只是：“反对什么。”它更重要的是：它是否开始建设未来。也许今天这一代海外中国人，第一次真正拥有了这样的历史条件。 

结语：真正能够留下来的，往往不是激情，而是建设 

很多时候，人们谈论民主运动，总习惯于关注那些最激烈、最耀眼的时刻。例如：一次大型抗议；一次广场集会；一次震动世界的演讲。这些当然重要。 

因为很多历史转折，本身就离不开公开表达。但如果认真回头观察历史，就会发现：真正能够长期改变社会的力量，往往并不仅仅来自这些瞬间。 

更来自那些：缓慢、长期、持续、甚至并不耀眼的建设。很多文明真正重要的部分，往往都不是一夜之间形成的。而是在一代又一代人的积累中，慢慢生长出来的。大学如此；出版体系如此；档案馆如此；现代制度如此；公共知识体系同样如此。它们真正强大的地方，并不是瞬间爆发。而是：能够长期积累。

过去很多年里，中国民主运动长期处于一种高度压缩的环境之中。很多时候，人们首先考虑的是：如何生存。在那样的条件下，能够持续发声，本身就已经非常艰难。 

因此，今天重新回望过去，也许不应该只是简单批评前人。因为很多事情，并不是他们不想做。而是那个时代，没有条件。事实上，过去几十年里，其实一直有人在做这些事情。 

一直有人：办刊物、做论坛、保存历史、翻译文献、建立媒体、维系中文公共讨论空间。很多今天仍然能够被看见的历史记录，本身就是一代代人艰难保存下来的结果。 

而今天，在新的历史条件下，这些过去分散而脆弱的努力，第一次开始拥有了：彼此连接、长期积累、持续深化的可能。而这本身，也许就说明：中国民主运动的根系，正在比过去更深地进入土壤。全球化流散的海外中国社群；互联网与数字化工具；长期公开讨论空间；全球协作网络；这些东西，第一次开始让很多过去无法长期完成的事情，真正拥有了现实可能。 

因此，中国民主运动未来真正重要的问题，也许已经不再只是：如何继续进行一次又一次短暂的表达。而是：如何开始建立一种能够长期积累、长期协作、长期传承的中文民主公共世界。它需要：档案、论坛、编辑部、出版、数据库、长期知识生产、长期制度建设、一代又一代人的持续协作。 

很多东西，也许不会立刻产生巨大影响。甚至在当下看来，显得缓慢、琐碎、不够“激动人心”。但真正能够穿越时间的，往往恰恰是这些：看似缓慢，却持续积累的东西。

未来几十年后，人们回头看这一代海外中国人时，不应该只能看到：零散的视频、碎片化的口号、短暂的情绪。而应该能够看到：一个正在逐渐形成中的：中文公共思想空间、中文民主知识体系、中文长期协作网络、中文制度化建设过程。 

因为真正成熟的民主运动，最终不只是敢于反抗。更重要的是：它是否开始建设未来。很多真正重要的变化，在刚开始的时候，往往并不轰动。它不会立刻改变世界。甚至很多时候，外界根本察觉不到它正在发生。它更像植物在地下缓慢扩展根系。表面上，也许仍然松散、脆弱、并不成熟。但真正决定未来高度的，往往恰恰是那些在地下不断生长、彼此连接、逐渐深入土壤的部分。而也许今天，中国民主运动真正重要的变化，恰恰正在这里发生。 

Building the Foundations of the Chinese Democracy Movement

— Reinterpreting “Construction” in the Era of Globalized Diaspora

Part 1 of the Series

Author: Ni Shicheng

Editor: Zhong Ran Proofreader: Cheng Xiaoxiao Translator: Zhou Min

Abstract: Discusses the long-standing issues of insufficient accumulation and organizational rupture faced by the Chinese democracy movement. It proposes the concepts of “organizational memory” and “democratic infrastructure,” emphasizing a shift from event-based actions to long-term structural construction, laying the theoretical foundation for subsequent methodological developments.

Introduction: History Sometimes Turns Slowly Underground When people talk about the Chinese democracy movement, they always like to repeatedly ask the same question: Why, after several decades, has it consistently struggled to form a truly stable and sustained force? Some attribute the reason to the high-pressure environment, some to loose organization, and others to the complexity of human nature.

But today, I increasingly feel that perhaps the more important question is no longer: Why did it not succeed in the past? Rather, it is: Is a new historical condition slowly forming? Because many things that seem natural today were, in the past, actually impossible to complete.

The Chinese democracy movement of the past was in a state of high compression for a long time. Many people were inside the country; many organizations could not exist publicly; many publications could only appear briefly; many discussions had just begun before being interrupted by reality. In such an environment, being able to continue speaking out was itself extremely difficult.

Therefore, looking back today, perhaps we should not merely criticize our predecessors from the posture of a latecomer. Because many things were not because they didn’t want to do them, but because that era lacked the conditions. In fact, over the past few decades, there have always been people doing these things.

There have always been people: running publications, organizing forums, preserving history, translating documents, establishing media, and maintaining a space for Chinese public discussion. Many historical records that can still be seen today are the results of generations of people painstakingly preserving them.

However, the conditions of the past often made it difficult for these efforts to settle over the long term. Many forums existed for a few years and then vanished. Many publications suffered a complete rupture once they stopped printing. Many experiences were rapidly lost with the departure of a generation. Many discussions were washed away by time before they could enter a long-term public knowledge system.

In the past, the overseas Chinese world was more like a floating state—fragmented, fragile, and difficult to accumulate.

But today, history is slowly changing. More and more Chinese people are beginning to leave China and disperse to all parts of the world. Some are for freedom, some for livelihood, some for the next generation, and some simply because they can no longer endure an increasingly closed atmosphere.

Regardless of the reason, a new reality is gradually forming: for the first time, Chinese people are beginning to form a long-term, globally distributed overseas Chinese community. This matter might be more important than many people realize today. Because it means that many things that could not be completed in the long term in the past are, for the first time, beginning to possess real-world conditions. The Internet, digital archives, global collaboration, cloud publishing, video communication, and AI tools are slowly changing the way of organization.

In the past, after an event ended, many materials would quickly disperse. Today, for the first time, it is possible for them to be preserved, categorized, organized, and archived over the long term. In the past, after a forum stopped operating, many discussions vanished with it. Today, it is entirely possible to form a long-term accumulation of knowledge spanning ten or twenty years. In the past, once a publication was interrupted, many thoughts would break. Today, the possibility of forming global collaboration and long-term publishing networks has begun to emerge.

Therefore, what is truly important today may no longer be “reinventing everything.” Instead, it is: how to establish more long-term, stable, and systematized accumulation upon the efforts that have already existed over the past decades.

Because many truly important changes are often not sensational at the beginning. They do not change the world immediately. Even many times, the outside world cannot detect that they are happening at all.

It is more like plants slowly extending their root systems underground. On the surface, it may still look loose, fragile, and immature. But what truly determines the height of the future is often precisely those parts that are continuously growing, connecting to each other, and gradually deepening into the soil underground.

In the past few decades, there have actually always been people doing these things. And today, under new historical conditions, these previously scattered and fragile efforts have, for the first time, begun to possess the possibility of mutual connection, long-term accumulation, and continuous deepening. This itself perhaps indicates that the roots of the Chinese democracy movement are entering the soil more deeply than in the past.

I. What Truly Changes History is Often Not Instant Passion, but Long-Term Accumulation For many years in the past, the Chinese democracy movement has always had a lingering sense of fatigue. This fatigue does not only come from external pressure. Many times, it comes from a sense of being unable to accumulate over the long term.

One generation pays a huge price, yet many things are difficult to truly leave behind. Once an activity ends, much of the content quickly disperses. Once a forum stops, the discussions of the past few years are also interrupted. Once a publication stops printing, much of the accumulated thought breaks along with it.

Many times, people seem to always be starting over. And this is actually very draining. Because if a movement cannot form accumulation over the long term, it is difficult for it to truly generate a “sense of history.” It will continuously remain in a state of “immediacy”—intense today, silent tomorrow; gathering today, dispersing tomorrow.

Consequently, many people gradually develop a sense of powerlessness, as if everything is just a transient fluctuation. But if one observes history carefully, one will find that forces truly capable of influencing the world over the long term often possess a strong “ability to accumulate.”

The reason the European Enlightenment could change the modern world was not just because a few great thinkers appeared. More importantly, it gradually formed: publishing networks, intellectual salons, long-term public discussions, and cross-regional dissemination of ideas. The names Voltaire, Rousseau, and Montesquieu can span eras not because they were momentarily intense, but because their thoughts were continuously published, disseminated, debated, cited, and organized. Finally, they slowly settled into a new structure of civilization.

The same was true for the founding period of the United States. What truly allowed the American system to stabilize gradually was not just the Revolutionary War itself. More important were the large-scale, long-term discussions surrounding the system. For example, The Federalist Papers are still studied today not just because they supported the U.S. Constitution. Their more important significance lies in the fact that they truly systematized and documented the discussions of that time surrounding the federal system, judicial independence, and checks and balances. Two hundred years later, people can still re-enter the intellectual scene of that era through these writings. Because things that truly influence history over the long term are often not instant slogans, but public knowledge that can be preserved for a long time.

The same was true during the period of drastic changes in Eastern Europe. Many forces that later truly pushed for social change were not just the street protests themselves, but the long-existing: underground publishing, intellectual circles, public discussions, and social collaboration networks. The reason the Polish “Solidarity” union could later grow into a force that truly influenced the national structure was also not just because of a single workers’ movement. It later gradually formed: publishing, education, long-term organizational capability, and social collaboration networks.

Many historical experiences are actually illustrating the same thing: A truly mature democracy movement does not rely solely on passion. What is more important is whether it can gradually form its own: memory, literature, institutions, public knowledge, and long-term collaborative structures.

And what the Chinese democracy movement lacked most in the past was perhaps precisely this “long-term accumulation capability.” Of course, this is not just a problem of the people. Many times, it was indeed limited by historical conditions. The past environment hardly allowed for long-term public accumulation. Even preserving materials itself carried risks. Therefore, what is truly important today is perhaps not to negate the past.

Quite the opposite. Precisely because people have painstakingly preserved these things over the past decades, this generation of overseas Chinese has, for the first time, begun to possess the possibility of continuing to deepen them. And this also means that the Chinese democracy movement may have finally begun to move from a long-term “state of survival” into a new stage. The most important question in this stage is no longer just how to continue speaking out, but: how to make many things truly stay behind.

II. What the Chinese Democracy Movement Truly Lacks May Not Be Enthusiasm, but “Organizational Memory” When a movement truly begins to think about “how to stay behind,” it has actually undergone a very deep change. Because this means it is no longer just focused on the present, but begins to think about: What can still be left behind ten years or twenty years from now?

Many times, people underestimate the act of “preservation.” They always feel that what truly matters are the people who act, the people who speak, and the people who organize. Recording, organizing, and archiving seem to be only auxiliary work. But if one observes history carefully, one will find that many civilizations that truly changed history essentially attached extreme importance to “preservation.” Why did every dynasty in ancient China compile history books? Why has Europe preserved a large number of letters, manuscripts, and archives for a long time? Why does the United States publicly preserve presidential documents, political archives, and historical records for the long term?

Because the truly long-term power of a civilization is often hidden in these “seemingly not intense enough” things. They determine whether a society possesses long-term memory. And without long-term memory, a group will constantly return to zero. The problem with many past Chinese democracy movement activities was not a lack of passion, but that many thoughts did not truly stay behind. Many experiences were not truly passed down. After many discussions ended, the thoughts disappeared with them. Thus, many problems repeatedly occurred. Many organizations started over time and again. After many newcomers entered, they could only grope their way through once more. This is actually a very huge drain.

And today, for the first time, the conditions for changing this situation have begun to exist. Because what the digital age has truly changed is not just the speed of transmission; more importantly, it has truly changed the “capability for long-term preservation.” In the past, after an activity ended, materials were easily dispersed. Today, it is entirely possible: digital archiving, multi-location backups, long-term database creation, global collaborative preservation, AI-assisted organization, and long-term categorized retrieval.

In the past, once a forum stopped, many discussions disappeared. Today, it is entirely possible to form long-term knowledge accumulation for decades. In the past, once a publication was interrupted, many thoughts suffered a complete break. Today, it is possible to form a global collaborative publishing network.

This means: the Chinese democracy movement has truly begun to possess the realistic conditions for establishing “organizational memory.” And this change is perhaps more important than many short-term passions. Because what truly can traverse time is often not a single emotional outburst, but the accumulation of civilization preserved over the long term. Therefore, what is truly important in the future may no longer be “organizing more activities,” but: how to establish the Chinese democracy movement’s own long-term archive system, long-term forum system, long-term publishing system, long-term knowledge collaboration network, and long-term public discussion space.

Many things may still look tiny, loose, or even fragile today. But truly important changes often begin like this. It will not mature overnight. It will not change the world immediately. It is more like root systems slowly extending underground. On the surface, one might still see nothing. But what truly determines the height of the future is often precisely those parts that are continuously connecting, accumulating, and deepening into the soil underground.

And today is perhaps such a stage.

III. The Chinese Democracy Movement Needs to Build Its Own “Democratic Infrastructure” Many times, when people talk about the democracy movement, they are still accustomed to a very “event-based” perspective—as if whether a movement is successful primarily depends on whether there is a large enough protest, whether there is an event that shocks the world, or whether there is a sudden historical turning point.

But truly mature civilizations are rarely formed solely by a single event. More often, they are the result of long-term, slow growth. Many truly important things are not even prominent in their early stages of formation. When universities first appeared, they might have been just discussion spaces for a few people. When early newspapers first appeared, no one necessarily realized they would change modern politics. Many initial public forums were also often small in scale. But later, they slowly became: knowledge networks, public spaces, social collaboration structures, and a part of civilization.

The future of the Chinese democracy movement will perhaps undergo the same process.

Today, many things still look scattered, crude, and immature. Many forums are small in scale. Many publications have limited reach. Many discussions still remain at the groping stage. Many organizations still lack stable structures. But perhaps the truly important question is not: “Why is it not powerful enough yet?”

Rather, it is: Is it already beginning to form something that did not exist in the past? For example: increasingly long-term Chinese forums; increasingly stable overseas Chinese media; increasingly complete digital archives; increasingly sustained public discussions; and increasingly strong global collaborative capabilities. These things may still be far from mature today. But they themselves already indicate that a new structure is forming. And this change is likely not to appear in a grandiose manner. It is more like a “slow growth.”

Many truly important historical changes are often not immediately realized when they first begin. Because they look even a bit unremarkable at first. But later, people will find that what truly changes the future is often not those most noisy moments, but those things accumulated slowly over the long term.

In the past few decades, the Chinese democracy movement has often been like a “history continuously interrupted.” Many efforts had just begun before they were interrupted. Many experiences had no time to settle before they were dispersed. Many thoughts had not even formed a public knowledge system before they disappeared.

And today, for the first time, a different possibility has begun to exist. Those previously isolated, scattered efforts that were difficult to accumulate over the long term have, for the first time, begun to possess the conditions for mutual connection, long-term preservation, and continuous deepening. And this itself perhaps means: the Chinese democracy movement is slowly turning from a “momentary politics” toward a true “long-term construction.”

This does not mean the future will certainly succeed. History never advances automatically. Many things may still be interrupted. Many efforts may still fail. But at least, for the first time, a historical condition that did not exist in the past has begun to emerge. And what is truly important is perhaps exactly this point. Because a civilization truly begins to grow often not when it is at its strongest, but when it truly begins to form “roots” for the first time.

Part 2 of the Series Author: Ni Shicheng Editor: Zhong Ran Abstract: Systematically proposes an organizational path for the democracy movement, including recording systems, thought production, institutional construction, and continuous iteration mechanisms. It emphasizes shifting from individual reliance to structural operation, building a sustainable, replicable, and self-optimizing organizational system.

IV. Establishing a Recording System: Without Records, Many Things Will Return to Zero Once a movement begins to form “roots,” its significance actually begins to change. It is no longer just some people gathering briefly. It is no longer just one scattered action after another. It begins to slowly form a structure that can sustain itself. This is actually a very critical change. Because many past Chinese democracy movement organizations possessed a strong “temporary nature” for a long time. Many things relied primarily on a few core figures to maintain. Once a certain person leaves, becomes fatigued, encounters conflict, or their life changes, the entire system easily stalls rapidly.

Thus, many organizations fall into a long-term cycle: establishment, expansion, internal friction, split, disappearance. Many experiences are also continuously lost with each cycle. However, truly mature civilization structures often do not rely on one person to exist for the long term. What is more important is whether it can gradually form an ability for many things to continue even if personnel change.

Why can universities last for hundreds of years? Why can newspapers span several generations of editors? Why can many political parties, research institutions, and public organizations exist for the long term? Because what truly is preserved is not just certain individuals, but: institutions, documents, traditions, collaborative mechanisms, and long-term knowledge systems.

And in the past, what the Chinese democracy movement lacked for a long time was precisely this “institutionalized accumulation capability.” Many things were too dependent on individuals. Many experiences could not truly enter a long-term public structure. Many organizations lacked: stable processes, long-term archives, collaboration standards, personnel training mechanisms, and knowledge inheritance structures. Thus, it was difficult for many things to truly settle.

But today, for the first time, the conditions for changing this situation have begun to exist. Because what the digital age has truly changed is not just communication. More importantly: it has begun to make long-term collaboration possible. In the past, it was difficult to maintain a publication for the long term. Today, it is entirely possible to form a cross-country, cross-regional, long-term collaborative editorial network. In the past, it was difficult for a forum to accumulate for the long term. Today, it is possible to form long-term databases and intellectual archives spanning ten or twenty years. In the past, many experiences could only remain in personal memory. Today, the possibility of forming long-term knowledge bases, long-term document systems, long-term organizational archives, and long-term collaborative platforms has begun to exist.

And this change is perhaps more far-reaching than many realize today. Because it means: the Chinese democracy movement, for the first time, begins to possess the realistic conditions to move from an “individualized structure” toward an “institutionalized structure.”

And institutionalization does not mean stagnation. Truly mature institutions are precisely meant to: reduce excessive reliance on individuals, protect the entry of newcomers, protect the inheritance of experience, and protect the organization from returning to zero time and again.

Many times, people mistakenly think that democracy is only about elections. But truly mature democracy is, in fact, first an “organizational culture.” It means: rules are higher than individuals; institutions are higher than emotions; long-term collaboration is higher than short-term impulses; and knowledge accumulation is higher than momentary expression.

And today, the Chinese democracy movement may have only just begun to truly enter such a stage. This stage may not be sensational. Even to outsiders, it may still appear slow, scattered, and immature. But many truly important historical changes start exactly like this. It will not blossom and bear fruit immediately. It is more like root systems slowly extending underground—quiet, slow, yet continuously deepening into the soil.

V. From Event Organization Toward True Thought Production When a movement truly enters the “long-term construction” stage, its goals will also slowly change. In the past, people were more likely to understand the democracy movement as a kind of “resistance”—resisting oppression, resisting censorship, and resisting autocracy. This resistance is, of course, important. Because if no one stands up, much of the darkness will not even be seen by the world.

But a mature democracy movement ultimately cannot stop at only “opposing something.” It must also begin to answer: What exactly is it going to build? This is actually a more difficult question than “resistance.” Because resistance often relies on passion, while construction requires: patience, collaboration, institutions, accumulation, and long-termism.

Many political movements in history were often very powerful in the “resistance stage.” But once they entered the true construction stage, they rapidly fell into chaos. Because they lacked long-term institutional culture, lacked public knowledge accumulation, lacked organizational collaboration capability, and lacked a public structure that could truly operate for the long term.

And today, the Chinese democracy movement may be truly facing such questions for the first time. Because for a long time in the past, the first consideration for many things was how to survive.

But today, as more and more Chinese people live overseas for the long term, a new question is slowly surfacing: If there truly exists a long-term Chinese democratic public world in the future, what should it look like? Can it: preserve history for the long term, accumulate knowledge for the long term, train newcomers for the long term, maintain public discussions for the long term, form institutional culture for the long term, and form collaborative networks for the long term? These questions, essentially, are no longer just “movement questions.” They are beginning to approach “civilization questions.” Because truly mature civilizations do not rely solely on passion. What is more important is whether they can form a long-term, stable public structure.

Many times, people will feel that forums, publications, archives, databases, and long-term discussions seem not “exciting.” They even appear slow and trivial. But the civilizations that truly influenced the world over the long term in history often attached extreme importance precisely to these things. Because they knew: what truly can traverse time is often not a momentary emotion, but: those public knowledges and institutional structures that are preserved for the long term, continuously accumulated, and sustained through inheritance.

Why can people still study ancient Greece today? Why does the European Enlightenment continue to influence the modern world? Why can the thoughts from the founding period of the United States still enter public discussion today? Because they not only happened, but more importantly, they were: preserved, organized, published, archived, and continuously re-entered into the public knowledge system.

And today, for the first time, the Chinese democracy movement may truly possess the possibility of establishing such a long-term accumulation structure.

This does not mean the future will necessarily be smooth. Many things may still be interrupted. Many efforts may still fail. Many organizations may still split. But what is truly important is: a historical condition that did not exist for a long time in the past is slowly forming. Those scattered, brief, and mutually isolated efforts have, for the first time, begun to possess the possibility of mutual connection, long-term accumulation, and continuous deepening. And this itself perhaps means: the Chinese democracy movement is slowly moving from a “repeated momentary struggle” toward a truly long-term process of civilizational construction.

VI. Institutionalization, Not Individualization Many times, in its early stages, a movement will inevitably rely on certain core figures. This is actually not surprising. When resources are limited, the environment is difficult, and the organization is not yet mature, someone always needs to take the initiative to bear responsibility. Many things are indeed propped up by a few people. But if an organization cannot gradually shift from “individual-driven” to “institutional operation” over the long term, then it will ultimately become very fragile.

Because once a certain person leaves, becomes fatigued, encounters conflict, or changes occur in real life, many things will rapidly stall.

In the past, many Chinese democracy movement organizations actually possessed such problems to varying degrees. Many times, the organization itself did not truly form a stable mechanism. Many ways of operation still primarily relied on: acquaintance relationships, personal trust, temporary coordination, and individual experience. Consequently, the organization easily falls into: internal friction, splits, distrust, and long-term repetition of the same problems. A deeper problem is that many newcomers struggle to truly enter. Because many things have: no process, no system, no public collaborative mechanism, and no long-term knowledge inheritance. Thus, within the organization, it is easy to gradually form a “person-centric” structure. And this is actually in contradiction with the spirit of democracy itself.

Because in a truly mature democratic organization, the most important point is precisely: institutions are higher than individuals. The “institution” mentioned here is not a cold bureaucratic structure. Nor is it for the purpose of suppressing individuals. On the contrary: truly mature institutions are essentially for the purpose of protecting individuals.

Because when many things have: public rules, transparent processes, clear division of labor, long-term documentation, and collaborative standards, then the organization’s reliance on individuals will decrease. Many things no longer rely solely on a few core figures to be propped up. Newcomers can enter more easily. Experience can be inherited more easily. The organization can be more stable for the long term.

For example, how a forum operates over the long term: who is responsible for presiding, who for recording, who for photography, who for organizing, who for publishing, and who for long-term archiving. If these things gradually form: documentation, processes, SOPs, and long-term collaboration standards, then those who come later can continuously take over, rather than starting over from scratch every time.

Another example is how a publication operates over the long term. If it relies entirely on a single editor-in-chief, then once this person stops, the entire system might rapidly stall. But if it gradually forms: an editorial system, a proofreading mechanism, an author collaboration network, long-term document management, and a material archiving mechanism, then the publication begins to truly possess long-term vitality.

A truly mature organization is not without core figures. Rather, it is: even if personnel change, many things can still continue. Because what is truly preserved is no longer just a certain person, but: rules, institutions, collaborative networks, organizational memory, and long-term knowledge systems. This is also why truly powerful organizations in modern society often attach extreme importance to: processes, documentation, institutions, and long-term collaborative mechanisms.

Because they know: the true stability of an organization does not come from a certain person existing forever, but from: when individuals change, the entire system can still continue to function.

And in the future, the Chinese democracy movement perhaps also needs to gradually establish this awareness. Because democracy itself is actually not just a political slogan; it is more an organizational culture. If an organization cannot establish: transparent mechanisms, collaborative mechanisms, long-term institutions, and knowledge inheritance within itself over the long term, then it will be difficult for it to truly grow into a mature democratic organization.

Therefore, one of the truly important directions for the Chinese democracy movement in the future is perhaps not to continue strengthening “who is more important,” but to gradually establish: more stable institutions, more long-term collaboration, more public processes, and more inheritable organizational structures. Because a truly powerful organization is ultimately not loyal to a certain person, but loyal to: rules, institutions, collaboration, and long-term public goals. And this is perhaps the deepest foundation of a truly modern democratic organization.

VII. Iterating the Democracy Movement Like Writing Code Many times, people understand the democracy movement as something driven by passion—as if as long as the emotions are strong enough, the slogans are loud enough, and the attitude is firm enough, many problems will naturally be solved. But reality is often not like this. Truly effective long-term organizations are rarely “completed in one go.” They are more like a project of continuous iteration.

This point is actually very similar to modern software development. No large system is perfect from the beginning. Many systems: start from v1.0; continuously discover problems; continuously fix bugs; continuously optimize processes; and continuously upgrade structures, finally gradually becoming mature.

And in the future, the Chinese democracy movement perhaps also needs to establish this “long-term iteration thinking.” In the past, many times, once an activity ended, the matter also ended. But in the future, what is more important might be: after the activity, whether it truly enters into: summary, analysis, review, optimization, and upgrading.

For example, a forum’s effect was not good. In the past, it might just be: “It wasn’t handled well this time,” and then it ends. But if long-term iteration thinking is adopted, the questions would become: Why was the discussion not deep enough? Why was the record incomplete? Why was the interaction insufficient? Why was it difficult for newcomers to participate? Why was the organization of materials too slow? Why was the dissemination effect limited? And then, continue to optimize the next time.

This actually begins to enter a kind of “engineering organizational thinking.” Many truly mature teams actually operate this way. They do not rely on a single great outburst, but on: countless detail optimizations.

For example: upgrading publicity methods, upgrading collaboration tools, upgrading archive systems, upgrading forum processes, upgrading media dissemination, upgrading data organization, upgrading training mechanisms, and upgrading security mechanisms. These things usually look very minute, and even not “exciting” enough. But accumulated over the long term, they will completely change an organization’s capability.

A long-standing problem for many past Chinese democracy movement organizations is exactly: many things lack long-term iteration. Many experiences were not settled. Many problems were repeatedly occurred. Many organizations remained in a “temporary state” for a long time.

And truly powerful systems in modern society almost all possess one capability: continuously optimizing themselves. This point actually applies not only to technical systems but also to: organizations, media, publishing, public discussion, and the democracy movement itself. In the future, the Chinese democracy movement could even gradually form its own “organizational engineering culture.”

For example, after every activity: automatically archiving, automatically organizing, automatically establishing databases, automatically categorizing labels, automatically syncing materials, and automatically generating long-term indexes. In the AI era, many things that required a large amount of human labor to complete in the past are, for the first time, becoming realistic.

In the past, after a large-scale activity, merely organizing the materials might have been enough to consume a huge amount of time. Today, it is entirely possible to drastically reduce the cost of long-term accumulation through technical means. And this also means a new possibility. The future Chinese democracy movement may no longer be a “political organization” in the traditional sense; it may even gradually evolve into a long-term collaborative network. Its power may not only come from a single center, but from: a large amount of continuously accumulated literature, archives, data, forums, publications, collaborative nodes, and long-term knowledge production.

What is truly important may no longer be “successfully organizing one activity,” but: whether the entire system has become a bit more mature than in the past. If after every activity: the records are a bit more, the process is a bit clearer, the collaboration is a bit smoother, the documentation is a bit more complete, the thoughts are a bit deeper, and it’s a bit easier for newcomers to enter, then over the long term, the entire movement will gradually form true accumulation. And this is perhaps what the Chinese democracy movement truly needs to establish in the future: an ability to perform long-term self-optimization, self-accumulation, and self-evolution.

Many times, where a civilization is truly powerful is not that it never makes mistakes, but that: it possesses the capability to continuously correct itself.

Part 3 of the Series Author: Ni Shicheng Editor: Zhong Ran Abstract: Elevates the discussion to the level of civilization, pointing out that the overseas Chinese community is moving from exile politics toward long-term civilizational construction. It emphasizes forming a sustainable Chinese democratic public world and a historical structural transformation through the accumulation of knowledge, institutions, and public space.

VIII. Moving from “Exile Politics” Toward “Civilizational Construction” For many years in the past, the overseas Chinese democracy movement was often in a state of “exile politics” for a long time. After many people left China, what they first faced was: survival, identity, security, and restarting life. And political expression itself centered more around: protesting, exposing, supporting, and confronting. These are, of course, important. Because without these voices, much of the oppression would not even be seen by the world.

But today, as more and more Chinese people live overseas for the long term, a new question is also slowly surfacing: Can overseas Chinese truly establish their own long-term public space? For a long time, the overseas Chinese world has always had a strong sense of floating. Many forums existed for a few years and then vanished. Many media outlets rapidly disintegrated due to funding, personnel, or internal conflicts. Many discussions remained in a fragmented state for a long time. Many experiences did not truly undergo intergenerational inheritance. Many times, people were still more accustomed to “temporary gathering” rather than “long-term construction.”

But today, for the first time, different conditions have begun to exist. Because today’s overseas Chinese are no longer just a small number of exiles staying briefly, but have begun to gradually form: long-term existing global Chinese communities. And this means that the future of the Chinese democracy movement should perhaps not remain in the stage of “exile politics” for a long term.

Instead, it should gradually enter civilizational construction. So-called civilizational construction is not an empty, grand term. It actually means: beginning to truly build over the long term: Chinese public space, Chinese knowledge systems, Chinese archive systems, Chinese publishing systems, Chinese intellectual platforms, Chinese collaborative networks, and Chinese institutional culture. For a long time in the past, what the overseas Chinese world lacked was not voices, but stability.

Today a platform appears, and tomorrow it vanishes. Today a forum is lively, and a few years later all the materials are missing. Many thoughts have not truly settled. Many experiences have not truly been passed down.

And one of the most important capabilities of a mature civilization is precisely: long-term accumulation. Whether a civilization is mature or not is often judged not by whether it has momentary passion, but by whether it can preserve its own memory, thoughts, literature, experience, institutions, and public knowledge over the long term.

Why did ancient China compile history books? Why does Europe preserve a large number of letters, manuscripts, and archives? Why does the United States publicly release a large amount of presidential archives, political documents, and historical records? Because truly mature civilizations all know: if there is no long-term memory, a society will constantly return to zero.

And in the past, what the Chinese democracy movement lacked for a long time was precisely this “long-term civilizational accumulation capability.” Many things had just begun before they were interrupted. Many experiences had just formed before they were dispersed. Many thoughts had no time to enter the public knowledge system before they were washed away by time. But today, the situation has begun to change for the first time. The Internet, digitization, global collaboration, and the formation of long-term overseas communities are slowly changing all of this.

Today, it is entirely possible to gradually form: long-term forums, long-term libraries, long-term databases, long-term publishing networks, long-term public discussion spaces, and long-term Chinese knowledge collaboration systems. And these things are perhaps more important than many realize today. Because what truly changes the future is often not just a single huge outburst, but long-term and slow construction. Many things do not look dazzling in the present, and even appear slow, trivial, and not “exciting” enough. But decades later, what people can truly see is often precisely these things that seemed unremarkable yet accumulated continuously.

When people in the future look back at this generation of overseas Chinese, they should not only be able to see: scattered videos, fragmented slogans, and brief emotions. Instead, they should be able to see a gradually forming: Chinese public intellectual space, Chinese democratic knowledge system, Chinese long-term collaborative network, and Chinese institutionalized construction process.

And this is perhaps the truly historically significant matter. Because what truly can change history is often not only resistance, but construction. A truly mature democracy movement ultimately is not just about “opposing something”; more importantly, it is whether it has begun to build the future. Perhaps this generation of overseas Chinese today possesses such historical conditions for the first time.

Conclusion: What Truly Can Stay Behind is Often Not Passion, but Construction Many times, when people talk about the democracy movement, they are accustomed to focusing on the most intense and dazzling moments—for example, a large-scale protest, a square gathering, or a world-shaking speech. These are, of course, important. Because many historical turnings themselves are inseparable from public expression. But if one observes history carefully, one will find that: the forces that can truly change society for the long term often do not come solely from these moments.

Instead, they come from those slow, long-term, continuous, and even not dazzling constructions. Many truly important parts of a civilization are often not formed overnight, but grow slowly through the accumulation of generation after generation. This is true for universities, for publishing systems, for archives, for modern institutions, and for public knowledge systems. Where they are truly powerful is not a momentary outburst, but their ability to accumulate for the long term.

For many years in the past, the Chinese democracy movement was in a state of high compression for a long time. Many times, the first consideration for people was how to survive. In such conditions, being able to continue speaking out was itself extremely difficult.

Therefore, looking back today, perhaps we should not simply criticize our predecessors. Because many things were not because they didn’t want to do them, but because that era lacked the conditions. In fact, over the past few decades, there have actually always been people doing these things.

There have always been people: running publications, organizing forums, preserving history, translating documents, establishing media, and maintaining a space for Chinese public discussion. Many historical records that can still be seen today are the results of generations of people painstakingly preserving them.

And today, under new historical conditions, these previously scattered and fragile efforts have, for the first time, begun to possess the possibility of mutual connection, long-term accumulation, and continuous deepening. And this itself perhaps indicates that the roots of the Chinese democracy movement are entering the soil more deeply than in the past. The globally dispersed overseas Chinese community, Internet and digital tools, long-term public discussion spaces, and global collaborative networks—these things, for the first time, have made many matters that were impossible to complete in the long term in the past truly possess realistic possibility.

Therefore, the truly important question for the Chinese democracy movement in the future may no longer be how to continue performing one brief expression after another. Instead, it is: how to start establishing a Chinese democratic public world that can perform long-term accumulation, long-term collaboration, and long-term inheritance. It needs: archives, forums, editorial departments, publishing, databases, long-term knowledge production, long-term institutional construction, and continuous collaboration from generation after generation.

Many things may not produce a huge influence immediately. They may even appear slow, trivial, and not “exciting” enough in the present. But what truly can traverse time is often precisely these: seemingly slow yet continuously accumulating things.

Decades in the future, when people look back at this generation of overseas Chinese, they should not only be able to see: scattered videos, fragmented slogans, and brief emotions. Instead, they should be able to see a gradually forming: Chinese public intellectual space, Chinese democratic knowledge system, Chinese long-term collaborative network, and Chinese institutionalized construction process.

Because a truly mature democracy movement is ultimately not just about daring to resist. More importantly: it is whether it has begun to build the future. Many truly important changes are often not sensational at the beginning. They do not change the world immediately. Even many times, the outside world cannot detect that they are happening at all. It is more like plants slowly extending their root systems underground. On the surface, it may still look loose, fragile, and immature. But what truly determines the height of the future is often precisely those parts that are continuously growing, connecting, and deepening into the soil underground. And perhaps today, the truly important change of the Chinese democracy movement is precisely happening here.

文：杨大鹏

编辑：钟然 校对：孔祥庆 翻译：周敏

来到美国之后，最让我震撼的，并不是高楼，不是收入，也不是所谓的“自由空气”，而是这里对于儿童的保护。在美国，孩子摔伤了、被虐待了、长期情绪异常，学校、医院、邻居甚至路人都有可能报警。老师发现孩子状态不对，可以直接启动调查；父母如果长期家暴、精神虐待孩子，甚至可能失去监护权。因为在这里，孩子首先被视为“独立的人”，而不是某个家庭的私有财产，更不是维稳机器下可以被牺牲的数字。

可当我再回头看中国这些年的事情，我只觉得愤怒、窒息、甚至后背发凉。“小诺曦”事件，一个孩子遭受长期虐待，浑身伤痕累累，让无数人心碎。还有近期河南初中生“被死亡”事件，一个年轻生命突然离世，舆论质疑重重，家属哭喊无门，网络声音不断被压制。每一次类似事件出现，评论区都会有人说：“别发了，小心封号。”“别讨论了，马上删帖。”“再说账号没了。”什么时候开始，一个社会连为孩子发声，都变成了一件危险的事情？最可怕的不是悲剧本身，而是悲剧发生之后，很多人第一反应不是追问真相，而是沉默、害怕、删帖、捂嘴。因为在这个体制下，“稳定”永远高于真相。他们可以高喊“一切为了孩子”，却可以让毒奶粉流入市场；他们可以宣传“祖国的花朵”，却让校园霸凌、虐童、少年离奇死亡事件一次次不了了之；他们可以天天谈“正能量”，却容不下普通人为受害儿童说一句公道话。

一个真正文明的国家，最优先保护的，永远应该是孩子。

因为孩子没有反抗能力，没有社会资源，没有话语权。他们只能依赖制度、法律和社会良知去保护自己。可在中国，很多孩子从出生开始，就已经活在巨大的压迫里。高压教育、服从教育、打压式成长、唯成绩论，孩子不是被当作独立生命培养，而更像是被当成“工具人”制造。很多孩子从小被灌输：“不要质疑老师”，“不要惹事”，“不要乱说话”，“吃亏是福”。他们被要求听话，却没人教他们如何保护自己。而当真正的悲剧发生时，很多家庭才发现，自己面对的根本不是一个愿意保护孩子的体系，而是一堵冰冷、沉默、互相推诿的高墙。最令人绝望的是，很多中国人已经对这种事情逐渐麻木。有人觉得：“反正改变不了。”有人觉得：“不要谈政治。”还有人觉得：“事情过去就算了。”

可如果连孩子都没人愿意保护，如果连下一代遭遇不公都没人敢发声，那这个社会未来还剩下什么？我越来越觉得，一个国家最真实的文明程度，不是看它有多少高楼，不是看GDP有多高，而是看它如何对待最弱小的人。孩子是否被保护，女性是否有尊严，普通人是否敢说真话，这才是真正衡量一个社会良知的标准。我们这一代人，也许已经经历了太多沉默、压抑和恐惧。但至少，我们不能让下一代继续生活在“不要说”、“不要问”、“不要管”的环境里。因为今天沉默的人，明天可能就轮到自己的孩子。为孩子发声，不是“制造对立”。而是一个人最基本的良知。

Who Speaks for China’s “Silenced” Children?

Author: Yang Dapeng

Editor: Zhong Ran Proofreader: Kong Xiangqing Translator: Zhou Min

Abstract: Issues of children’s rights protection and social silence coexist in China. In a high-pressure environment, children are prone to neglect and harm, and related incidents are often accompanied by restricted public opinion. The degree of social civilization is reflected in the protection of vulnerable groups and the space provided for them to have a voice.

After coming to the United States, what shocked me the most was not the tall buildings, nor the income, nor the so-called “air of freedom,” but the protection of children here. In America, if a child is injured from a fall, is abused, or exhibits long-term emotional abnormalities, schools, hospitals, neighbors, and even passersby are likely to call the police. If a teacher notices a child is in a wrong state, they can directly initiate an investigation; if parents engage in long-term domestic violence or mental abuse of a child, they might even lose custody. Because here, a child is first regarded as an “independent person,” rather than the private property of a certain family, and certainly not a sacrificial digit under the machine of stability maintenance.

But when I look back at the events in China over these years, I only feel anger, suffocation, and even a chill down my spine. The “Little Nuoxi” incident, where a child suffered long-term abuse and was covered in scars, broke the hearts of countless people. There is also the recent case of the junior high school student in Henan who “was died,” where a young life suddenly passed away, public opinion was filled with heavy doubts, the family members cried out with no recourse, and online voices were continuously suppressed. Every time a similar incident occurs, someone in the comment section will say: “Stop posting, watch out for your account being banned.” “Stop discussing, the post will be deleted soon.” “If you say more, the account will be gone.”

Since when did speaking up for children in a society become a dangerous thing? The most terrifying thing is not the tragedy itself, but that after the tragedy occurs, many people’s first reaction is not to pursue the truth, but silence, fear, deleting posts, and gagging. Because under this system, “stability” always ranks higher than the truth. They can shout “everything for the children” while allowing tainted milk powder to flow into the market; they can promote “the flowers of the motherland” while letting school bullying, child abuse, and the bizarre deaths of teenagers end in nothing time after time; they can talk about “positive energy” every day while having no room for ordinary people to say a word of justice for victimized children.

A truly civilized country should always prioritize the protection of children above all else.

Because children have no ability to resist, no social resources, and no right to speak. They can only rely on the system, the law, and social conscience to protect themselves. But in China, many children have been living under immense oppression since the moment they were born. High-pressure education, obedience education, suppressive growth, and the “grades-only” theory—children are not cultivated as independent lives, but rather manufactured as “tool people.” Many children are instilled from a young age with: “Don’t question the teacher,” “Don’t cause trouble,” “Don’t speak out of turn,” “To suffer a loss is a blessing.” They are required to be obedient, but no one teaches them how to protect themselves.

When a real tragedy occurs, many families discover that what they are facing is not a system willing to protect children at all, but a cold, silent high wall of mutual buck-passing. The most desperate part is that many Chinese people have gradually become numb to these things. Some feel: “It can’t be changed anyway.” Some feel: “Don’t talk about politics.” And others feel: “Once the matter is passed, let it be.”

But if no one is willing to protect even the children, if no one dares to speak up even when the next generation encounters injustice, then what is left for the future of this society? I feel more and more that the truest degree of civilization in a country is not seen in how many tall buildings it has, or how high its GDP is, but in how it treats its weakest people. Whether children are protected, whether women have dignity, and whether ordinary people dare to tell the truth—these are the true standards for measuring the conscience of a society.

Our generation may have already experienced too much silence, suppression, and fear. But at the very least, we cannot let the next generation continue to live in an environment of “don’t say,” “don’t ask,” and “don’t care.” Because those who are silent today, it may be their own children’s turn tomorrow. Speaking up for children is not “creating confrontation.” It is the most basic conscience of a human being.