博客 页面 5

《写在美国独立日》

0

作者:金米

今天,美国二百五十岁了。白天我生活的社区歌舞升平,等到夜晚时分,烟花再次照亮夜空,人们举杯庆祝独立。今年以来,我查阅最多的历史资料都和美国有关。此时此刻,再次回绕我耳边的,是两百五十年前杰斐逊写下的那句振聋发聩的话:“人人生而平等。”这句话曾穿越大洋,跨越世纪,激励过革命者、废奴主义者、妇女运动者,也激励过无数普通人。许多人未必记得写下它的人是谁,却记得它本身。只是,当那支笔停下的时候,写下这句话的人,仍拥有自己的奴隶。历史往往如此。它并不总是由完人创造,而常常诞生于理想与现实的缝隙之间。而历史,从来不应该是“圣人”的传记,而是体现出凡人与理想的拉锯。杰斐逊没有做到“人人平等”,但他写下的那句话,却活成了后来无数人的武器。废奴运动拿它说话,民权运动拿它说话……今天,仍有人拿它追问美国:为什么还会有歧视?为什么还会有贫富悬殊?为什么还有新的不平等?一句没有兑现的话,反而成了最锋利的尺度。它先审判了写下它的人,又继续审判这个国家。于是,我忍不住想到我的中国。我想,一个国家真正的底气,不是宣称自己没有问题,而是允许人民不断指出问题。不是要求所有人歌颂自己,而是不害怕自己的建国理念被反复检验。争吵并不可怕,分歧也不可怕。可怕的是,没有人再敢发问,使得个人在集体面前失去对抗能力。到最后,所有问题都只剩下一个标准答案,它有个好听的宏大又伟光正的名词:统一。二百五十年过去,美国依然有偏见、有撕裂、有利益集团、有各种各样的不公。但《独立宣言》依然摆在那里。它没有因为让人难堪而被删除,没有因为让人尴尬而被修改,没有因为不断被引用来批评现实而成为禁忌。烟花易冷。

真正留在历史里的,不是庆典,不是口号,而是那句两百五十年前写下的话:人人生而平等。人会背叛自己的理想。而一个国家的高度,恰恰在于,它是否允许人民永远拿着理想,去要求现实。庆典活动,真正留下来的,不是掌声和烟花的绚烂,而是人们还能不能继续追问:我们离那些写在纸上的理想,还有多远?因为人会背叛自己的理想,理想也会反过来审判人。

两百五十年过去,今天的美国仍存在偏见、撕裂和争吵,也仍有人相信自由和平等值得继续完成。我想真正伟大的,从来不是一个人,而是一句话。

而让这句话掷地有声的,是一代代坚守格言的人。一个国家真正值得庆祝的,不一定是完美地做到,或者做好了的一切,而是它曾经写下了一句连自己都还没有做到的话,并允许后人不断拿这句话来要求它。

2026年7月4日夜

编辑:冯仍   校对:冯仍 翻译:沈美花

Written on American Independence Day

Author: Jin Mi

Today, America turns two hundred and fifty years old.

During the day, the community where I live was filled with singing and dancing in a scene of peace and prosperity. As night falls, fireworks light up the night sky once again, and people raise their glasses to celebrate independence. Since the beginning of this year, the historical materials I have consulted the most have all been related to America. At this very moment, echoing in my ears once again is that deafening sentence written by Jefferson two hundred and fifty years ago:

“All men are created equal.”

This phrase once crossed oceans and spanned centuries, inspiring revolutionaries, abolitionists, women’s rights activists, and countless ordinary people. Many might not remember who wrote it, but they remember the phrase itself.

However, when that pen came to a stop, the man who wrote those words still owned his own slaves.

History is often like this. It is not always created by perfect individuals, but is frequently born in the fissures between ideal and reality.

And history should never be a biography of “saints”; rather, it manifests the tug-of-war between ordinary mortals and their ideals. Jefferson failed to achieve “equality for all,” but the phrase he wrote lived on to become a weapon for countless generations that followed.

The abolitionist movement used it to speak out; the civil rights movement used it to speak out… Today, there are still people using it to question America: Why does discrimination still exist? Why is there still a vast gap between the rich and the poor? Why are there new inequalities?

An unfulfilled promise has, conversely, become the sharpest yardstick. It first judged the man who wrote it, and it continues to judge this nation.

Thus, I cannot help but think of my own country, China.

I think the true confidence of a country does not lie in declaring itself free of problems, but in allowing its people to constantly point out problems. It lies not in demanding that everyone sing its praises, but in not being afraid to have its founding principles repeatedly examined.

Quisling and arguments are not terrifying, nor are divisions.

What is terrifying is when no one dares to ask questions anymore, causing the individual to lose the capacity to resist the collective. In the end, all questions are left with only one “standard answer,” which goes by a beautiful, grand, and Weiguangzheng (grand, glorious, and correct) term: Tongyi (Uniformity/Unification).

Two hundred and fifty years have passed, and America still has prejudice, tearing, interest groups, and all kinds of injustices.

Yet, the Declaration of Independence still stands right there.

It has not been deleted because it causes awkwardness; it has not been modified because it causes embarrassment; it has not become a taboo because it is constantly cited to criticize reality.

Fireworks are fleeting.

What truly remains in history are not the celebrations, nor the slogans, but that phrase written two hundred and fifty years ago: All men are created equal.

People may betray their own ideals. But the height of a country lies precisely in whether it allows its people to forever hold onto those ideals to make demands of reality.

What truly remains from celebratory events is not the applause or the brilliance of the fireworks, but whether people can continue to ask: How far are we still from those ideals written on paper? Because while humans may betray their ideals, ideals will, in turn, judge humans.

Two hundred and fifty years have passed. Today’s America still harbors prejudice, tearing, and quarreling, yet there are still those who believe that freedom and equality are worth continuing to fulfill.

I think what is truly great has never been a single person, but a single phrase.

And what makes this phrase resonate with power is generation after generation of people who hold fast to this motto.What a country truly ought to celebrate is not necessarily that it has achieved everything perfectly, or done everything well, but that it once wrote down a phrase that even it itself had not yet achieved, and allowed posterity to constantly use this phrase to hold it accountable.

Night of July 4, 2026

Editor: Feng Reng

Proofreader: Feng Reng

Translator: Shen Meihua

从严防出境到足不出省:数字监控下的格栅化与中国命运的脆断

0

作者:周敏

2026年的中国体制内,正在悄然蔓延着一种令人窒息的物理围城。

过去,人们的目光聚焦于公职人员、高校教师、甚至医护人员被集体收缴护照、限制出境的政治红线。然而,一场更深沉、更密不透风的控制网格,已经悄无声息地在境内铺开。如今,不仅出国成了奢望,体制内人员哪怕是在周末或法定节假日离开工作的城市、跨越省界,乃至前往省会,都必须在数字化人事系统中层层报备、审批。至于“进京”,更是成了一条不可触碰的最高级别敏感红线,非必要绝不批准。

这场从防范外逃向全面禁足的演变,撕开了盛世稳定的面纱,露出了一个处于高度恐慌中的庞大巨兽,正通过压缩个体的空间移动自由,来饮鸩止渴般换取一时的安全。

这种境内出行限制,并不突兀,它是中共在过去的岁月中,将特殊时期的危机控制成功转化为日常驯化的标本。

2015年前后,随着反腐力度的加大,对裸官及涉密人员的护照管控成了常态。此时的控制,有鲜明的指向性和阶层性。然后,真正为全民和全体制内戴上物理枷锁的,是2020至2022年期间建立的数字化防疫网格。那三年里,行程码、健康码、以及“离市报备、离省审批”的连带责任制,每个人已牢牢钉在行政区划的网格里。

防疫的技术硝烟散去后,人们惊讶地发现,这套已经运转成熟的追踪和审批机制并不曾随之解体,它被无缝切换成了“政治纪律”与“安全管理”的一只钢爪。到了2026年的今天,这只钢爪已经深深嵌入日常。基层公务员、教师、公立医院的医生,只要双脚跨过地级市的行政边界,其行踪就会在后台暴露无遗,面临的是轻则通报批评、重则影响仕途的纪律处分。

这本质上是毛时代“单位制”与清“里甲制”的还魂。鲜活的个人沦为了行政单位的数字化财产。

中共牺牲一整个社会的活力,将十四亿人(尤其是作为社会中坚的公职与技术阶层)锁死在各自的行政网格里,背后是现实且自私的政治算计:

首先,是消灭一切跨区串联的火种,维护绝对的局部政治安全。 

北京与各省省会是政治、资源与权力的中心。限制基层人员(主要是接触底层矛盾、握着社会资源的体制内人员)随意进京和省会,能从物理源头上彻底切断潜在的越级反映、群体性聚集、或跨地域维权串联的风险。

其次,通过连坐,逼着中层官僚进行战战兢兢的自我审查。

 

顶层设计了“谁的人出错,追究谁的责”的连带机制,维稳压力自然地转嫁给了基层单位。保住乌纱帽的本能,驱使各个领导们层层加码、宁杀错不放过。这种设计何其狡猾,不劳烦中央频繁下达红头文件,下面的官员为了避责,自发地把绞索越拉越紧。

再次,是高强度的心理驯化。 

当一个人去别处看病、带孩子去邻市探亲、去省会旅游都需要递交申请、解释原因、交代同行者时,他在心理上对组织的顺从和依附会被无限放大。体制内人员的原子化和驯服度来到空前的高度。是的,空前。

然而,历史之演进并不会因为权力的意志而偏转。把自由移动压缩到格栅里的极致统治,正为中国的未来铺设一条通往系统性崩溃之路。

1. 经济内卷枯竭 经济的本质是人、资金和信息的自然流淌。今天,有着很好消费力和投资能力的体制内阶层被禁足,那么旅游、跨省商业和技术交流陷入死水。生产要素怎能匹配优化?资金只能在本地停歇,前来迎接的就是创新能力的窒息与经济活力的干涸。

2. 社会僵尸化 当肉身的移动被卡死,思想的激荡和阶层跨越也随之抱死。整个社会慢慢地万马齐喑,鸦雀无声。没有社会活力的翻腾,没有民间自治的热情,只剩下了一潭死水。

3. 高压下之黑天鹅风险 人们的自由流动,实际上可以稀释很多局部矛盾。当人在本地遭遇体制的压抑或不公,他可以通过前往外地、寻找新的空间来化解痛苦,寻求新生。今天,所有的通道都被焊死了,每个人都被生生按在原地的矛盾旋涡里。

如今,“谁审批谁负责”导致了官僚系统的全面躺平。除了看住下属和惰性维稳,基层官员没了真正解决问题的欲望。放眼看去,一片极致的紧绷。一个微小的局部危机(如地方财政崩塌、突发群体事件),过去可以通过社会的弹性来消化。而在格栅时代,说不定哪天、哪地,就会因系统没了弹性而触发全盘的连锁反应,引来大脆断。

从大历史周期来看,这种对内层层设防、对外紧闭大门的姿态,昭示着中国正在主动放弃融入全球竞争、利用民间活力开疆拓土的路径,退缩为一个内向型、防御姿态的传统集权帝国。

我们正见证着,由极度缺乏安全感、极度恐惧现实而生发的大倒车。统治者用长远国运和全社会生命力为抵押品,去换取眼前几年的物理上的苟且安全。

历史的规律密密地写着:高压的铁幕焊得越紧,烧毁时就越火光冲天。连自己体制内的细胞都无法自由游走时,彰显的哪里是强盛?分明是走向末路前无法掩饰的颤抖。那些被困在栅栏里的肉身暂且沉默着。但历史的清算,早已在微澜死水之下,开始暗流汹涌。

编辑:冯仍   校对:冯仍 翻译:沈美花

From Strict Exit Bans to Not Stepping Out of the Province: Grid-ization Under Digital Surveillance and the Brittle Fracture of China’s Destiny

Author: Zhou Min

Within China’s state system (tizhi nei) in 2026, a suffocating physical siege is quietly spreading.

In the past, people’s attention was focused on the political red lines where civil servants, university teachers, and even medical personnel had their passports collectively confiscated and their international travel restricted. However, a deeper, more impenetrable net of control has now quietly unfurled within the country’s borders. Today, not only has going abroad become a luxury, but employees within the system must also undergo tier-after-tier of reporting and approval in digital personnel systems just to leave their city of employment, cross provincial boundaries, or even travel to their provincial capital during weekends or statutory holidays. As for “entering Beijing,” it has become a top-tier sensitive red line that must not be touched, and is absolutely never approved unless deemed strictly necessary.

This evolution from preventing overseas flight to comprehensive internal confinement tears away the veil of “prosperous stability.” It exposes a massive, deeply panicked leviathan that is attempting to quench its immediate thirst with poison—trading short-term security for the compression of individual freedom of movement.

This domestic travel restriction did not appear out of thin air; it is a specimen of everyday domestication, adapted from the Chinese Communist Party’s past success in transforming crisis control during extraordinary periods into routine governance.

Around 2015, with the intensification of the anti-corruption campaign, passport control over “naked officials” and personnel handling classified information became a norm. At that time, control had clear targets and class specificity. However, what truly placed physical shackles on the entire population and everyone within the state system was the digital epidemic-prevention grid established between 2020 and 2022. During those three years, through the Travel Code, Health Code, and the mutual liability system of “reporting when leaving the city, obtaining approval when leaving the province,” every individual was firmly pinned into the grids of administrative divisions.

After the smoke of epidemic-control technology cleared, people were astonished to find that this maturely functioning tracking and approval mechanism did not dissolve. Instead, it was seamlessly toggled into a steel claw for “political discipline” and “safety management.” By 2026 today, this steel claw has embedded itself deeply into daily life. Grassroots civil servants, teachers, and doctors in public hospitals—the moment their feet cross the administrative boundaries of a prefecture-level city, their movements are fully exposed on the system backend. What awaits them is, at best, a public reprimand, and at worst, disciplinary action affecting their political careers.

In essence, this is the resurrection of the Mao-era “Danwei (work unit) system” and the Qing Dynasty “Lijia system.” Living individuals have degenerated into the digital property of administrative units.

The Party is sacrificing the vitality of an entire society to lock 1.4 billion people—especially the civil servant and technical classes who form the backbone of society—into their respective administrative grids. Behind this lies a realistic and selfish political calculation:

First, it extinguishes all sparks of cross-regional networking to maintain absolute, localized political security.

Beijing and various provincial capitals are the centers of politics, resources, and power. Restricting grassroots personnel (mainly those who interact with grassroots conflicts and hold social resources within the system) from freely entering Beijing and provincial capitals completely severs, at the physical source, the risks of potential higher-level petitions, mass gatherings, or cross-regional rights-defense networking.

Second, through collective liability, it forces mid-level bureaucrats into trembling self-censorship.

The top-level design has instituted a mutual liability mechanism of “whoever is in charge of the person who errs will be held accountable,” naturally transferring the pressure of stability maintenance (weiwen) down to grassroots units. The instinct to save their official posts drives various leaders to implement escalating measures, preferring to over-regulate rather than make a single mistake. How cunning this design is: it requires no frequent red-headed documents from the central authorities; to avoid accountability, lower-level officials voluntarily tighten the noose tighter and tighter themselves.

Third, it enforces high-intensity psychological domestication.

When a person needs to submit an application, explain reasons, and account for their travel companions just to see a doctor elsewhere, take their child to a neighboring city to visit relatives, or travel to the provincial capital, their psychological submissiveness and dependence on the Organization are infinitely magnified. The atomization and docility of personnel within the system have reached an unprecedented height. Yes, unprecedented.

However, the march of history does not pivot according to the will of power. This ultimate rule of compressing free movement into gridded cages is paving a path toward systemic collapse for China’s future.

1. The Inward Squeezing and Depletion of the Economy: The essence of economics is the natural flow of people, capital, and information. Today, the class within the system—which possesses excellent consumption and investment power—is confined. Consequently, tourism, cross-provincial commerce, and technical exchanges sink into stagnant water. How can factors of production be matched and optimized? Capital can only sit idle locally, and what follows is the suffocation of innovation capacity and the drying up of economic vitality.

2. Social Social-Zombification: When the physical movement of flesh and blood is jammed, the clashing of thoughts and social mobility are locked up as well. The entire society gradually falls into a state where “ten thousand horses stand mute” (wanma qiyin—a classic idiom for total suppression of speech), and absolute silence prevails. Without the churning of social vitality and the passion of civic autonomy, nothing remains but a pool of stagnant water.

3. Black Swan Risks Under High Pressure: The free movement of people actually dilutes many localized conflicts. When someone encounters oppression or injustice from the local system, they can dissolve their pain and seek a new life by moving elsewhere and searching for a new space. Today, all channels are welded shut, and everyone is forcibly pinned into the vortex of local conflict at their point of origin.

Nowadays, the principle of “whoever approves is held responsible” has led to the total “lying flat” (tang ping) of the bureaucratic system. Aside from keeping watch over subordinates and engaging in inert stability maintenance, grassroots officials have lost any genuine desire to resolve real problems. Looking out across the landscape, one sees an area of ultimate, taut tension. A tiny, localized crisis (such as a local fiscal collapse or a sudden mass incident) could in the past be digested through social elasticity. But in the era of grid-ization, who knows on what day or in what place a total chain reaction will be triggered because the system has lost all its elasticity—leading to a massive, brittle fracture (da cuiduan).

Viewed from a macro-historical cycle, this posture of setting up tier-upon-tier of internal defenses while tightly shutting the external gates signals that China is actively abandoning the path of integrating into global competition and leveraging civic vitality to expand frontiers. Instead, it is retreating into an inward-looking, defensively postured, traditional centralized empire.

We are witnessing a massive regression born out of an extreme lack of security and an extreme fear of reality.

The rulers are leveraging long-term national destiny and the vitality of the entire society as collateral to exchange for a few years of immediate, physical, and precarious security.

The laws of history are densely written: the tighter the high-pressure iron curtain is welded, the more fiercely it blazes when it burns down. When even the cells within one’s own system cannot roam freely, where is the grandeur and prosperity? It is clearly nothing but an unmaskable trembling before reaching the end of the road. Those physical bodies trapped within the iron bars remain temporarily silent. But the reckoning of history has already begun to surge with dark undercurrents beneath the seemingly placid, dead water.

Editor: Feng Reng

Proofreader: Feng Reng

Translator: Shen Meihua

《政治与民主》—第四章专制政体的特征

0
《政治与民主》—第四章专制政体的特征

作者:祝正明

(一) 专制政体的形成

翻开人类的整个发展史,可以说就是一部人类之间的压迫与反压迫、剥削与反剥削的斗争史。每个人都有想为所欲为、凌驾于他人之上的欲望,在人类社会进化的各个阶段,就像在自然界的其它动物群体一样,一直存在着弱肉强食现象,其惨烈不亚于任何物种间的生存竞争。

原始部落内个体体力的较量,产生了部落首领。部落之间的实力竞争,产生了地方领主。领主之间的武装冲突,产生了国王。国王之间征战的结果,产生了皇帝。最终,一个控制地域广泛的国体成立。皇帝统领文武百官,皇亲国戚,将国家划割成若干区域,再分别册封给信得过的大臣和皇室贵族们去镇守;这些大臣皇族再将自己的辖区划分成更小的领地,册封给更小的自己的臣属去统领;官僚依次衍生,权力依次分散,直至将统治势力延伸到村镇、家户;最终形成了封建专制社会典型的权力金字塔结构,在这个金字塔的最下面,是千千万万的平民百姓,最上面,则是君主皇帝一人。

在封建专制社会,政府获得统治权力的手段是暴力,政府维持统治的根本手段仍然是暴力。

封建专制社会是在人类原始部落社会的生产力发展到一定程度后,自然发展演变而成的一种社会制度。当地区间差异较大,原始部落较多,发展不平衡时,对文化的传播、商贸的繁荣、边远落后地区的进步、推动生产力的发展,也曾起到一定的积极作用。 封建专制统治模式是一种维持性的统治模式,长于保守,短于创新。当人们以一种一成不变的方式生活时,统治者尚有充分的经验和精力去应付各类社会问题。当社会进入革新年代,涌现大量前所未闻的新生事物时,由君王一人决定一切的统治模式立即就会表现出其拙劣性,即便君王非常精明能干,廉洁奉公,也会出现既无经验、也无精力时间去应付的状况,由武断决策造成的失误便会屡见不鲜,由怠慢延误造成的损失也会不计其数,呆板的体制将明显制约、阻碍社会的发展。 科学技术大发现和产业革命的出现,将人类社会带进了一个崭新的工业科技时代,人类对自然界的认识和驾驭能力有了突飞猛进的发展,社会结构和生活方式日趋复杂化,专制社会已无能力适应这种发展的需要,对社会的进步起到严重的阻碍作用。我们有必要仔细分析一下这种社会结构的特征和弊病,以使我们能更好地认识它、摆脱它。

(二)专制政体的弊端

专制制度在组织结构上有自我稳定的机制,能够起到基本的维持社会治安的作用,因此,它能够长期存在。 专制政体从社会形态上看有以下五种主要弊端:1. 独断专行 最高统治者个人大权独揽,在国家事务中决定一切、支配一切。社会没有法制,统治者个人的意志就是法律,如果颁布一些法律条文,也完全是以约束百姓,服务于统治者为目的。各级官吏能够自己随意解释法律、执行法律,一个国家有多少个官吏,就有多少种法律。百姓的利益在受到官吏侵害时,束手无策,无处求助,唯一的办法是向上级官僚申诉,但他们只会被打发到一个并无任何实权的接待处,接待官员要么傲气十足,象对待精神病人一样毫不耐烦,要么视受害者为无理纠缠,将他们的材料转交给原来滥用职权制造冤案的官员,于是含冤者受到变本加厉的迫害。

国家没有民选性质的独立立法机关,如果有立法机关,也是依统治者的意志而建立,依附于统治者而存在,统治者可以根据自己的意志随意安排立法机构的组成人员。只有那些能通过组织部门的认真筛选和长期考察、政治上绝对可靠,能自觉地与他们在思想上保持一致的人才有可能进入立法机关。立法机关无异于统治者的举手机器和橡皮图章,不能起到制约统治者的作用,统治者可以随意制订、修改法律。司法机关没有独立地位,同立法机关一样,人员组成由统治者指定,依照统治者的意志行事。

集权统治者掌握着社会的一切权力,掌握着百姓生命的生杀大权,在这样的社会,获取权位是人们获得特权和自由的唯一出路,官场是所有想施展个人能力者的唯一竞技场,想获得更多的权力、财产、自由和个人幸福,唯一的选择就是争取更高的权位,而能否如愿,只取决于是否能获得上司的个人好感,与百姓是否认同毫无关系。因此,这样的社会,是各种野心家、阴谋家和卑鄙小人的天堂,他们竭尽全力地去博取统治者的欢心,奉迎独裁者的嗜好、阿谀贵族们的愚蠢,并忍受其侮辱,他们清楚,以牺牲自己的尊严代价,是唯一有效而廉价地保住和晋升自己职位的手段。独裁者对那些心甘情愿或被迫做奴才的人则司空见惯,长期生活在赞美、笑脸之中,使得他刚愎自用,生活糜烂,他会发现自己的一切都已被他人事先考虑到,尽管他管理着千万人的事情,其实他对这些事情并不了解,因而时常将自己的职权交给下属去行使,使得低级官吏也能够狐假虎威地招摇过市,在平民百姓前面挽回他们的人格,赚取他们溜须拍马的最佳回报。

统治者容不得任何不同意见,任何异议都会使他们感到非常刺耳,不管其内容是否合理,首先就会被认为是对自己的不尊重,是目无领导的表现。在这样的体制下,最大的忌讳,就是顶撞上级,哪怕只有一次,也有可能被永远打入冷宫。因此,那些真正有才干,坚持原则,直言不讳的人,只会遭到傲慢轻蔑的对待,是属于那些最没有资格被任用的人,这样的人要么让位给更会奉迎的政客,要么就是放弃自己的做人的原则。诚实正直,不是一种公认的优点,反而被认为是一种多余的、愚蠢的品性。 是否顺从,是权贵们衡量下属功过的主要标准,品德再差,再无能的人,只要能表示顺从,再有那么一点小聪明,知道能如何取得权贵们的欢心,就能得到提拔,即便是极不称职,照样能终身为官,因此,走运的往往是一些阴谋家或者是骗子。这些人在掌权之后,其无能和专横的本性很快就会暴露无遗,对上是奴隶,对下成了奴隶主,从上往下看,是向日葵似的朵朵笑脸,而从下往上看,却是官吏们丑陋的颈项。 统治者当然也明白下属种种努力的目的是什么,因此,他也时常冷落那些想谋求职位的人,以考验他们是否真的忠诚,有时故意使某些职位保持空缺,使他们长期处于希望和期待之中,以便自己能有效地控制和驯服他们。他知道,当他全部满足了他们的要求,不能再提供新的好处时,他们极有可能把他抛在一边,投靠新的主人。 独裁者对自己的下属没有信任感,他们不相信任何人,他们时常发现自己最信任的人也在对自己撒谎,从而认为一切人都动机不良,心术不正,他们不理解自由一词的含义,一遇到异议就会惊惶失措,时刻提防有人对自己的权位构成威胁。他们畏惧任何形式的民间组织,草木皆兵,随时准备将其掐灭在萌芽之中。他们残酷地对待持不同政见者,将这些人视为最危险的敌人,对其进行肉体折磨、判罚劳教、流放甚至死刑。他们将百姓视为无知愚昧的暴民,保持高度警惕,随时准备动用武装部队,镇压任何规模的集会行动。对被拘捕者,则施以惨无人道的酷刑。 对外,独裁者穷兵黩武,时常由于个人之间的争吵而开战,将国家拖入战争,驱使千千万万的百姓在战场上互相厮杀,将国家巨额资金用于研制杀人武器,而战争的起因,有时仅仅是统治者为了逞强争面子。他们知道,煽动排外情绪,甚至发动战争,是转移国民对国内政治腐败的视线,增强社会凝聚力,加强其个人权力的有效手段,并能方便地给自己戴上民族英雄的桂冠。 在这样的政体下,各级官吏被独裁者的权威所慑服,当独裁者作出错误的决策时,尽管会有许多人发现其错误,却无能力指出矫正,最为荒唐的是,独裁者在酒醉和精神失常的情况下作出的决定,仍然会被当作圣旨得到贯彻执行。 但是,尽管独裁者对百姓充满戒备感,对百姓的疾苦无动于衷,对百姓的呼声毫不关心,他们还不会忘记需要向公众表现自己的温和,在他们心血来潮时,也会跑到穷乡僻壤,在绝对安全的前提下和朴素的村民坐在一起,矫揉造作地摆好架式,让大批随从记者拍摄合影,以显示自己贴近百姓。2. 世袭等级 在这种制度下,人们被统治者按出身划分成各种等级,等级规定人们的生活地点和所能从事的职业,级别是终身的,非作出极大的努力或贡献,经上层统治者同意,任何人也不得改变,有时,甚至死后的埋葬地点也按身份划分了等级。等级具有世袭

《政治与民主》—第四章专制政体的特征

性,下等人出身就是下等人,他们的子孙仍然保持与他们同样的身份,下等人通常没有受过文化教育,或只接受过最基本的一点文化教育,上等人则天生就属于统治阶级,他们出生在统治阶级的家庭里,接受最完备的教育,他们自己也将成为统治阶级的成员。社会最上层的是皇庭贵族,他们终身任职,并把权位传给自己的后代。最下层则是没有任何权利的平民百姓。在这两者之间,存在着一系列不同的等级。每一等级在接受上一等级统治支配的同时,有更多的下一等级的人可供其支配,这使得各级官僚都能感到自己比上不足,比下有余,各有一定的满足感,各有自己的既得利益,他们在维持自己的既得利益的同时,无形中就自动促进了整个社会状态的稳定。 在这种体制中,许多人之所以拥有权力纯粹是由于他们与原先的统治者有血缘关系,实际上,他们并不比被他们统治的人更聪明,更能干。严格的等级制度无情地把每个人固定在一定的位置上,这样做虽容易管理,却是对人才的一种惊人浪费。在这种制度里,出身高贵的庸才往往能得到很好的职位和待遇,而出身低下的人寻求发展,却会受到种种阻碍和限制,他们为了解决温饱而不得不终日操劳,时常为了一些小得可怜的目的而耗尽毕生精力。即便是一个天才,他在事业上获得成功的机会,也比一个出身高贵的庸才要少得多。3.分赃制度 在国家出现初期,如果有一批没有地盘,靠拦路抢劫为生的强盗们的力量发展到一定程度,夺得一块地盘时,他们就会向当地百姓以收取保护费的形式来代替拦路抢劫,并给自己戴上保护者的面具,成为地方势力的一员。地方势力互相争夺地盘时,实际上就是争夺对百姓的控制权,这种控制并不依赖于当地百姓是否同意而存在,只取决于其是否有足够的武力。国家的出现减少了地方势力间频繁的武力冲突,但并没有改变这种统治的性质。 专制政府在经济上对百姓进行肆意掠夺,他们能随意制订税法,强迫百姓缴纳各种高额苛捐杂税,垄断经营高营利行业,动用国库资金营造各种豪华设施供自己享用。在出现财政赤字时,任意印发货币。没有人敢检查他们的财务,更没有人敢给他们的会计建立审查制度,国库就是他们自己的金库,老百姓是他们取之不尽、用之不竭的财源。在他们的内部,各级官僚之间,则按比例进行分赃,合理享用从百姓身上搜刮来的钱财。他们也决不会忘记分出一部分财政收入,供养一支庞大的军队,冠以保卫国家的名义,实则悉心将其私有化,使其只忠于自己,随时用于扑灭来自百姓的反抗。 即便统治阶级中的个别人刚上台时对百姓还有同情心,但是经过这种官场的长期熏染,也会变得昏庸无道,对百姓的疾苦听而不闻、视而不见。因为百姓的拥护并不能提升他们的职位,百姓的唾弃也不会减少他们的报酬,他们与百姓的关系是一种支配与服从的关系,他们没有必要在百姓身上花费过多的精力。决定其职位与前途的,完全是上司对他是否信任。 由于没有常备的监督约束机制,上司的放任自流,使得贪污在各级政府官僚中的普遍存在,官僚们并不会满足于“合理的”利益分配,他们往往巧立名目,向百姓收取各种额外费用,中饱私囊,或者在贿赂面前,为了个人微不足道的好处,损害广大百姓的利益。上司则睁一只眼,闭一只眼,允许下级利用权势捞取好处,以作为对下级进贡的回报。4. 愚民政策

社会的文化教育和传播媒体由政府统一掌管,没有言论自由和新闻出版自由,没有政府的许可,任何出版物也无法出版发行,而愚民政策的实施结果,有时也会愚弄统治者自己。 对于统治集团内部的丑陋现象,统治者封锁消息,不让百姓知道,对于因官员的不负责任或腐败无能造成决策失误,导致百姓或社会财产遭受重大损失时,则捏造事实编造情节,制造假象愚弄百姓;他们内部争权夺利、尔虞我诈,在公众面前则故意表现得相处融融、亲密无间;他们压制不同的思想观念,禁止对其统治模式的不合理之处进行批评;他们高傲自大、排斥外来文化,不接纳其它民族文化的优点;他们脱离国际社会的主流,成为国际大家庭之外的孤家寡人;在国内,他们脱离大众,被政府权威的雾霭所保护,使百姓不了解政治内幕和政策来源。他们以学识渊博的训诫者自居,满口说教民众的大道理,将社会的任何发展均渲染为自己的伟大政绩,对少数愿意为其鼓噪的文人,则施以小恩小惠,以萝卜加大棒的原始方式统治着整个社会。 蒙蔽视听,把人的头脑搞糊涂是任何成功的统治者的一种武器。在没有任何其它信息来源的情况下,愚民政策能成功地向平民百姓列举社会现状的无数优越性和必然性。将社会的一切发展归功在统治者身上,使老百姓表现出带有钦佩心情的服从。对于他们的决策错误和社会上出现的各种问题,他们也总能找到各种大大小小的借口,让他们控制的媒体作出对自己有利的解释。 就这样,他们用一张经过精心规划、编织的很密的网,罩住整个社会,形成一个独立的意识形态,人们只能在这种意识形态的范围内,以政府许可的、一致的方式去思考问题,最有创造精神和最有坚定意志的人也不能冲破这张网,成为社会革新的带头人。 对于那些势单力薄的反对者,在他们的见解尚未见诸报端,个人的能力尚未崭露头角,统治者就会立即给他们当头一棒,将他们置于死地,在残酷的打击下,社会无法产生任何有价值的政见。 久而久之,百姓为各种假象所蒙骗,对各种社会现象产生误解,既不了解自己的社会,也不了解外部世界的真实情况,使得整个社会的民众精神颓废,意志涣散。 一个社会千千万万的民众,被少数统治者用纯粹的恐怖手段所压服,是人类社会最令人厌恶、最让人失望的景象。

在这种封建专制统治下,普通百姓对政府官员的行为不可能有任何发言权,更不用说运用自己的智慧和意志去指导和改变政府的行为,他们只能听命于政府,甚至是眼睁睁地任由政府侵犯自己的权益。任何人,如果关心国家的政治问题,却不可能对其发挥任何影响,反而会有相当的的危险性,使自己无法维持基本的生活,就会对政治问题、对公共事务漠不关心,对政府官员的贪污腐化视而不见,对社会道德的败坏无动于衷,甚至对本街道的规划、卫生、治安也毫无兴趣,认为那都是政府的事。最终,民众只关心自己的生活,将精力放在如何将自己居住的一个狭窄的空间布置的更好,如何在一个拥挤的社会为自己多争取一点微不足道的利益上。他们没有反抗精神,甚至连产生不满的能力都丧失殆尽,对所有的社会问题麻木不仁,没有社会责任感,生活在社会的最底层,变成一群胆小而只会干活的驯服牛羊,任人宰割、奴役,而政府官员则成了他们的牧人。 在这样的社会中,老百姓往往都相信天命。认为自己的处境、遭遇、祸福都是命中注定的,能否做成某件事情,完全取决于自己的运气,认为帝王将相、官僚贵族们天生就是统治者,他们以极其朴素的感情对统治者所返还的并大肆渲染的微不足道的补助感激流涕。而统治者也不会忘记把自己的政权冠以人民的美名,以人民的名义掌权,使其极富欺骗性。 政府实施愚民政策的结果会形成一个统治怪圈:专制政府控制社会的传播媒介制造愚民政策,愚民政策造就了一大批听天由命的百姓,听天由命的百姓继而托持着一个控制一切的专制政府,如图4.1所示,周而复始,恶性循环。政治学上有句话,叫做“有什么样的人民,就有什么样的政府”这句话有道理,理由很简单,因为政府应该是建立在人民的同意之上的。但是,在一个尚未开化的强权专制社会,这句话反过来也成立:“有什么样的政府,就会有什么样的人民。”

专制统治者一手拿着强权镇压的大棒,一手拿着愚民政策的麻醉剂,就能对付任何意志坚强的反抗。只要愚民政策能够充分发挥作用,专制统治就能够长期维持下去。5.固步自封 官僚贵族们习惯于循规蹈矩地按照祖上遗留下来的方式进行统治,因为他们的祖先这样做就过得很好,他们对自己的地位很满足。只有当社会的发展要素或生产力发生变化时,官僚贵族才会显示出自己的无能,他们根本没有能力及时调整自己的组织结构去适应新的形势。统治者都是由老统治者在自己熟悉的几个可靠的近亲中挑选产生,知识观念与老统治者雷同,离不开既得利益集团的范畴。这种领导人的选任方法无法保证继任者能拥有良好的领导素质、知识与才能,也无法保证其能获得政府中其它元老、高官的敬佩与支持,因此,除了第一代领导人之外,继任者都不得不让贵族元老们分享一部分权力。政府中很难会产生强有力的人物,有能力进行政府重组改革,使其适应生产力的发展。 当社会一成不变时,他们尚有一定的能力进行管理,但当社会形态发生变化时,政府便会显得无所适从,内部管理混乱,颁布的政策互相矛盾。内部政治权力斗争的结果,时常是年长的,在官场上富有经验的一批人占据上风,这些人因循守旧,最终使政府变成落后保守、反对变动的反动大本营。 这种社会,当统治者的权力绝对稳固的时候,还比较温和大度,当他们的权力虚弱时,或掌权者变得老态龙钟后,就会变得顽固不化。当统治阶级的生活方式变成一种习惯而固定下来时,他们对变革的偏见和反对就会变得根深蒂固,对他们的生活方式做任何改变都会变得非常危险,甚至遭到歇斯底里的报复,这种社会对待变革的反应,就像一个看见医生就咆哮的精神病病人,不能忍受任何人把手放在他的缺陷上,研究他的疾病,想办法把他的病治好。 在这种统治模式下,由于占统治地位的庞大的既得利益集团的阻碍作用,社会的发展与进步只能呈间歇式,是低效率的。每次变革,只能通过暴力和政变方式更换昏庸无道的政治领导人才能得到实施,从而引发社会动荡,伴随着流血甚至是连年的内部战争,造成整个社会巨大的人、财、物损失。要么,就是整个社会付出漫长的时间代价,等待最高统治者的自然死亡,寄期望于能有一个开明、理智的新领导人上台。然而,可悲的是,在最好的医疗保健条件下,统治者往往长寿,而新的统治者除了年龄之外,思维模式与老的统治者如出一辙。使得那些对社会制度与美好生活抱有幻想的人们,在等待中,不知不觉地度过了自己的青年、中年,迎来了自己的暮年。 专制制度也并非全都无能愚昧,有时专制政府也有文明开化的,当社会在一个开明睿智的领导人统治之下时,社会也会被管理得井然有序,它能创建一些伟大的人力工程,组织起强大的军队,抵御外来入侵,甚至征服周边国家,建起庞大的帝国,尽管这种强大往往并不会比一代人的寿命更持久。 专制统治对于统治者来说,是一种最方便、最自然、最舒服的统治方式。统治者可以为所欲为,充分享受做人的乐趣。即便国家很穷,统治者仍然能享有富国的富人们才能享有的生活方式:享用到最先进的医疗设备、最高级的交通工具、最名贵的食品和用具、最豪华的宫殿。如果说,想为所欲为是人的天性,那么,就人的天性而言,没有一个统治者不愿意以这种方式进行统治,因此,尽管专制政体是一种不公平,不人道、弊端明显的政治模式,仍具有强大的生命力。在人类历史上,曾经有不少先例,民主政体在民众没有充分警觉的情况下,不知不觉地演变成了专制政体。

编辑:黄吉洲 校对:冯仍 翻译:戈冰

Politics and Democracy—Chapter IV: Characteristics of the Autocratic Regime

Author: Zhu Zhengming

(I) The Formation of the Autocratic Regime

If we turn the pages of the entire history of human development, we can say it is a history of struggle between oppression and anti-oppression, exploitation and anti-exploitation among human beings. Everyone possesses the desire to act willfully and to place oneself above others. In each stage of human social evolution, just like in other animal groups within nature, the phenomenon of the weak falling prey to the strong has always existed, and its cruelty is no less than that of the survival competition between any other species.

The contest of individual physical strength within primitive tribes produced tribal chiefs. The competition of strength among tribes produced regional lords. Armed conflicts among lords produced kings. The outcome of wars among kings produced emperors. Ultimately, a state system controlling an expansive territory was established. The emperor led both civil and military officials, as well as royal relatives and imperial kinsmen, dividing the nation into a number of regions, and then separately enfeoffing them to trusted ministers and royal aristocrats to guard and defend. These ministers and royal clansmen then subdivided their own jurisdictions into smaller fiefs, enfeoffing them to their own minor subordinates to rule. Bureaucrats proliferated in succession, and power was decentralized in turn, until the ruling power extended to villages, towns, families, and households. Ultimately, the typical power pyramid structure of a feudal autocratic society was formed. At the very bottom of this pyramid are thousands upon thousands of common citizens, and at the very top is the monarch, the emperor alone.

In a feudal autocratic society, the means by which the government obtains ruling power is violence, and the fundamental means by which the government maintains its rule remains violence. A feudal autocratic society is a social system that naturally developed and evolved after the productivity of human primitive tribal society advanced to a certain degree. When regional differences were quite significant, primitive tribes were numerous, and development was uneven, it once played a certain positive role in the dissemination of culture, the prosperity of commerce and trade, the progress of remote and backward areas, and the promotion of the development of productive forces. The feudal autocratic ruling model is a maintenance-oriented ruling model, strong in conservatism but weak in innovation. When people live in an unyielding, unchanging manner, the rulers still possess sufficient experience and energy to cope with various social problems. When society enters an era of reform and innovation, and a large number of unprecedented, newborn things emerge, the ruling model where everything is decided by the monarch alone immediately reveals its clumsiness. Even if the monarch is exceptionally shrewd, capable, clean, and devoted to public service, a situation will still arise where he has neither the experience nor the energy and time to cope. Consequently, errors caused by arbitrary decision-making will become common occurrences, and losses caused by negligence and delay will be too numerous to count, as the rigid system will visibly constrain and hinder the development of society.

The great discoveries in science and technology and the emergence of the industrial revolution brought human society into a brand-new era of industrial science and technology. Human understanding and capability to master nature experienced rapid and vigorous development, and social structures and lifestyles became increasingly complex. Autocratic society was no longer capable of adapting to the needs of this development, playing a severe role in obstructing social progress. It is necessary for us to carefully analyze the characteristics and maladies of this social structure, so that we can better understand it and break free from it.

(II) The Disadvantages of the Autocratic Regime

The autocratic system possesses a self-stabilizing mechanism within its organizational structure, capable of playing a basic role in maintaining social public order; therefore, it has been able to exist for a long time. From the perspective of social morphology, the autocratic regime exhibits the following five major disadvantages:

1. Arbitrary and Dictatorial Rule

The supreme ruler monopolizes all major power individually, deciding everything and dominating everything in state affairs. Society lacks the rule of law, and the individual will of the ruler is the law. Even if some legal clauses are promulgated, they are completely aimed at constraining the common people and serving the ruler. Officials at all levels can arbitrarily interpret and execute the law at their own discretion; however many officials a country has, that is how many kinds of laws exist. When the interests of the common people are infringed upon by officials, they are left helpless and have nowhere to turn for help. The sole recourse is to appeal to higher-level bureaucrats, but they will only be dismissed and sent to a reception office that possesses no real power whatsoever. The reception officials are either brimming with arrogance, showing complete impatience as if dealing with a psychiatric patient, or view the victims as making unreasonable disturbances, forwarding their materials back to the very officials who originally abused their power to create the unjust case, whereupon the victimized suffer even more intensified persecution.

The country lacks an independent legislative body of an elected nature. If a legislative body does exist, it is established according to the will of the ruler and exists in dependency upon the ruler, who can arbitrarily arrange the personnel composing the legislative institution based on his own will. Only those who can pass the careful screening and long-term inspection of the organization department, who are absolutely reliable politically, and who can consciously maintain ideological consistency with them, have the possibility of entering the legislative body. The legislative body is no different from a hand-raising machine and rubber stamp for the ruler, failing to play a role in restraining the ruler, who can formulate and amend laws at will. The judicial organs lack independent status; much like the legislative bodies, their personnel composition is designated by the ruler, and they act in accordance with the ruler’s will.

The centralized ruler holds all power within society, possessing the ultimate power of life and death over the lives of the common people. In such a society, acquiring official power and status is the sole way out for people to obtain privileges and freedom, and the officialdom is the only arena for all those who wish to display their personal capabilities. To obtain more power, property, freedom, and personal happiness, the only choice is to strive for a higher official position. Whether one can achieve this desire depends entirely on whether one can secure the personal favor of their superior, having absolutely nothing to do with whether the common people approve or not. Therefore, such a society is a paradise for all kinds of careerists, conspirators, and despicable individuals. They exert all their strength to win the favor of the ruler, catering to the hobbies of the dictator, flattering the foolishness of the aristocrats, and enduring their insults. They understand clearly that sacrificing their own dignity is the only effective and cheap means to preserve and promote their own positions. The dictator grows accustomed to those who willingly or under compulsion act as lackeys; living long among praises and smiling faces renders him obstinate and self-opinionated, leading a dissipated life. He will find that everything of his has already been considered in advance by others. Even though he manages the affairs of millions of people, in truth he does not understand these matters, and thus frequently hands over his official authority to subordinates to exercise. This enables low-level officials to also flaunt their powerful connections and bully others as they swagger through the streets, reclaiming their dignity in front of the common people and earning the optimal return for their obsequious brown-nosing.

The rulers cannot tolerate any differing opinions. Any dissent will sound extremely grating to them; regardless of whether its content is reasonable, it will first and foremost be deemed a lack of respect for themselves and a manifestation of disregarding the leadership. Under such a system, the greatest taboo is to contradict a superior; even if it happens only once, one might be permanently consigned to limbo. Consequently, those who truly possess talent, adhere to principles, and speak bluntly will only receive arrogant and contemptuous treatment, belonging to the category of those who are least qualified to be appointed. Such people must either yield their positions to politicians who are better at fawning, or abandon their own principles of conduct. Honesty and integrity are not recognized as virtues; instead, they are regarded as redundant and foolish character traits.

Whether one is submissive or not serves as the primary standard by which the powerful and wealthy measure the merits and faults of their subordinates. No matter how poor their moral character or how incompetent a person is, as long as they can show submission—and perhaps possess a touch of petty cleverness, knowing how to win the favor of the powerful and wealthy—they can receive promotions. Even if they are utterly incompetent, they can still remain officials for life. Therefore, those who are lucky are often conspirators or swindlers. After gaining power, the incompetent and tyrannical nature of these people is quickly exposed to its fullest. To those above, they are slaves; to those below, they become slave owners. Looking from top to bottom, one sees blossoming, sunflower-like smiling faces; yet looking from bottom to top, one sees only the ugly necks of the officials.

The ruler, of course, also understands what the purpose behind his subordinates’ various efforts is. Therefore, he also frequently gives the cold shoulder to those seeking positions to test whether they are truly loyal, sometimes intentionally leaving certain positions vacant to keep them in a state of hope and anticipation for a long time, so that he can effectively control and tame them. He knows that when he has completely satisfied all their demands and can no longer provide new benefits, they are highly likely to cast him aside and seek refuge with a new master.

The dictator has no sense of trust in his subordinates; they do not trust anyone. They frequently find that even those they trust the most are lying to them, thereby believing that everyone has bad motives and improper intentions. They do not understand the meaning of the word freedom; upon encountering any dissent, they panic and lose their bearings, constantly remaining on guard against anyone posing a threat to their own official power and status. They fear any form of non-governmental organization, seeing every bush and tree as an enemy soldier, and stand ready at any moment to pinch them out in their infancy.

They treat dissidents brutally, viewing these individuals as the most dangerous enemies, subjecting them to physical torture, sentencing them to labor re-education, banishment, or even death. They regard the common people as ignorant and foolish mobs, maintaining a high level of vigilance, and stand ready at any moment to deploy the armed forces to suppress assembly operations of any scale. For those detained and arrested, they inflict cruel and inhumane torture.

Externally, the dictator is militarily aggressive and wages wars of aggression. They frequently go to war over personal squabbles, dragging the country into warfare, driving thousands upon thousands of common citizens to slaughter one another on the battlefield, and spending enormous amounts of state funds on researching and manufacturing killing weapons. The cause of war, at times, is merely for the ruler to flaunt his strength and fight for face. They know that inciting xenophobic sentiments, or even launching a war, is an effective means to divert the citizens’ attention away from domestic political corruption, enhance social cohesion, and strengthen their personal power, while conveniently crowning themselves with the laurels of a national hero.

Under such a regime, officials at all levels are awed and subdued by the dictator’s authority. When the dictator makes an erroneous decision, even though many people will detect its mistake, they lack the capability to point it out and correct it. Most absurd of all, decisions made by the dictator under conditions of drunkenness and mental derangement will still be implemented and executed as if they were imperial edicts.

However, despite the fact that the dictator is filled with a sense of wariness toward the common people, remains indifferent to the hardships of the common people, and is utterly unconcerned with the voice of the common people, they still do not forget the need to display their gentleness to the public. On a whim, they will also travel to remote, impoverished areas and, under the prerequisite of absolute security, sit together with simple villagers, affectedly striking a pose to let a large retinue of accompanying journalists take group photos, so as to show that they are close to the common people.

2. Hereditary Stratification

Under this system, people are divided into various classes and ranks by the rulers based on their family background. These ranks prescribe people’s place of living and the occupations they can engage in. The rank is lifelong; without making tremendous efforts or contributions and receiving the consent of the upper-level rulers, no one is permitted to change it. Sometimes, even the burial location after death is stratified according to status.

《政治与民主》—第四章专制政体的特征

Ranks and classes possess a hereditary nature; those of the lower orders are born as lower-class people, and their descendants continue to maintain the exact same identity as them. Lower-class people typically have received no formal cultural education, or have only received a bit of the most basic cultural education. Upper-class people, on the other hand, naturally belong to the ruling class; they are born into families of the ruling class, receive the most complete education, and they themselves will also become members of the ruling class. At the absolute apex of society are the imperial court aristocrats, who hold office for life and transmit their official positions and power to their own posterities. At the absolute bottom are the common citizens who possess no rights whatsoever. Between these two, there exists a series of different ranks and strata. While each rank accepts the rule and domination of the rank above it, it has a larger population of the rank below available for it to dominate. This makes bureaucrats at all levels feel that though they fall short of those above, they surpass those below, with each possessing a certain sense of satisfaction and their own vested interests. While maintaining their own vested interests, they intangibly and automatically promote the stability of the entire social state.

In this system, the reason why many people possess power is purely due to their blood relationships with the original rulers; in reality, they are neither wiser nor more capable than the people they rule. The rigid hierarchical system ruthlessly fixes every individual into a set position; although doing so makes management easy, it constitutes an astonishing waste of human talent. In this system, mediocrities of noble birth often secure excellent positions and treatment, whereas people of low birth seeking development encounter all kinds of obstacles and restrictions. In order to solve the basic problem of food and clothing, they have no choice but to toil all day long, frequently exhausting their lifelong energy for the sake of some pitifully small objectives. Even for a genius, his chances of achieving success in his career are far fewer than those of a mediocrity of noble birth.

3. The Spoils System

In the early stage of the emergence of states, if the power of a band of robbers who had no territory and lived on highway robbery developed to a certain degree and captured a piece of territory, they would substitute highway robbery by collecting protection fees from the local citizens, while putting on the mask of a protector to become a member of the local forces. When local forces fought each other for territory, they were in fact fighting for the right of control over the common people. This control did not depend on whether the local citizens agreed or not to exist; it depended solely on whether they possessed sufficient military force. The emergence of the state reduced the frequent armed conflicts among local forces, but it did not alter the nature of this rule.

An autocratic government carries out wanton plunder against the common people economically. They can formulate tax laws at will, forcing the citizens to pay all kinds of high and exorbitant taxes and levies, monopolizing the operation of highly profitable industries, and deploying state treasury funds to construct various luxurious facilities for their own enjoyment. When a fiscal deficit occurs, they arbitrarily print and issue currency. No one dares to audit their finances, let alone dares to establish an oversight system for their accountants. The state treasury is their own private vault, and the common people are their inexhaustible and endless source of wealth. Domestically, among the bureaucrats at all levels, the spoils are divided proportionally, rationally enjoying the money and wealth extorted from the common people. They will also by no means forget to allocate a portion of the financial revenue to maintain a massive army. Citing the name of defending the country, in reality they painstakingly privatize it so that it remains loyal only to themselves, ready at any moment to be used to extinguish resistance coming from the common people.

Even if isolated individuals within the ruling class still possess compassion for the common people when they first come to power, after long-term immersion in such an officialdom, they will also become muddle-headed and tyrannical, turning a deaf ear and a blind eye to the hardships of the common people. Because the support of the common people cannot elevate their official positions, and the spurning of the common people will not reduce their remuneration. Their relationship with the common people is one of domination and obedience; they have no need to expend excessive energy on the common people. What decides their positions and futures is entirely whether the superior trusts them.

Due to the lack of a permanent mechanism for supervision and constraint, the laissez-faire attitude of superiors allows corruption to exist ubiquitously among government bureaucrats at all levels. Bureaucrats will not be satisfied with a “rational” distribution of benefits; they frequently invent all sorts of pretexts to collect various extra fees from the common people to line their own pockets, or, when faced with bribes, sacrifice the interests of the broad masses of common people for the sake of their own negligible personal benefits. Superiors turn a blind eye, permitting subordinates to use their power and influence to reap benefits as a return for the subordinates’ tributes.

4. Obscurantist Policy

The cultural education and communication media of society are uniformly controlled by the government. There is no freedom of speech or freedom of the press and publication; without the permission of the government, no publication can be published or distributed. The outcome of implementing this obscurantist policy, at times, also fools the rulers themselves.

Regarding the ugly phenomena within the ruling clique, the rulers block information to prevent the common people from knowing. When policy errors caused by the irresponsibility or corruption and incompetence of officials result in heavy losses to the common people or to social property, they fabricate facts, concoct storylines, and create false impressions to fool the common people. While they internally scramble for power and profit, cheating and outwitting one another, they deliberately present an appearance of getting along harmoniously and sharing close intimacy before the public. They suppress different ideological concepts, forbidding criticism of the unreasonable aspects of their ruling model. They are haughty and conceited, rejecting foreign cultures and failing to accept the merits of other ethnic cultures. They alienate themselves from the mainstream of the international society, becoming a solitary soul outside the international family. Domestically, they detach themselves from the masses, protected by the mist of government authority, keeping the common people ignorant of the political inside story and the sources of policy. They pose as profoundly knowledgeable instructors, their mouths full of grand principles to lecture the populace, portraying any development of society as their own great political achievement. To the few literati who are willing to clamor on their behalf, they dispense small favors and kindnesses, ruling the entire society in the primitive fashion of the carrot and the stick.

Blinding the eyes and ears and muddying people’s minds is a weapon of any successful ruler. In the absence of any other sources of information, the obscurantist policy can successfully enumerate to the common citizens the countless advantages and inevitabilities of the social status quo, attributing all developments of society to the rulers and causing the common people to display an obedience colored by admiration. For their policy errors and various problems arising in society, they can also always find all kinds of big and small excuses, allowing the media they control to produce explanations advantageous to themselves.

In this way, they use a meticulously planned and densely woven net to cover the entire society, forming an independent ideology. People can only think about problems within the scope of this ideology in a government-permitted, uniform manner. Even the most creative spirits and those with the most resolute will cannot break through this net to become leaders of social reform.

As for those isolated and weak opponents, before their insights can appear in the press and before their personal capabilities can show any prominence, the rulers will immediately deal them a head-on blow and crush them to death. Under such brutal crackdowns, society is incapable of producing any valuable political insights.

As time goes on, the common people are deceived by various false appearances and develop misunderstandings toward various social phenomena. Knowing neither their own society nor the true conditions of the outside world, they leave the populace of the entire society spiritually decadent and ideologically demoralized.

That thousands upon thousands of citizens in a society are cowed and subdued by a handful of rulers through pure methods of terror is the most disgusting and disappointing spectacle of human society.

Under this kind of feudal autocratic rule, it is impossible for ordinary people to have any say whatsoever in the behavior of government officials, let alone apply their own wisdom and will to guide and alter the behavior of the government. They can only obey the orders of the government, or even helplessly allow the government to infringe upon their own rights and interests. If anyone who cares about the political issues of the country is unable to exert any influence on them, and instead faces considerable danger that makes it impossible to maintain a basic livelihood, they will become indifferent to political issues and public affairs, turn a blind eye to the corruption of government officials, remain unmoved by the decay of social morals, and even lose all interest in the planning, sanitation, and public security of their own streets, believing those are entirely the government’s business. Ultimately, the citizens care only about their own lives, focusing their energy on how to better arrange the narrow space in which they live, and how to scramble for a bit more negligible interest for themselves in a crowded society. They lack the spirit of resistance, and have even entirely lost the capacity to generate discontent. They are numb to all social problems, possess no sense of social responsibility, and live at the absolute bottom of society—turning into a herd of timid, submissive cattle and sheep that only know how to work, allowing themselves to be slaughtered and enslaved at will, while government officials become their shepherds.

In such a society, the common people often believe in the mandate of heaven and fate. They believe that their situation, encounters, fortunes, and misfortunes are all predestined by fate, and whether one can accomplish a certain thing depends entirely on one’s own luck. They believe that kings, generals, ministers, bureaucrats, and aristocrats are born to be rulers. With extremely simple and pure feelings, they shed tears of gratitude for the negligible subsidies returned and heavily played up by the rulers. Meanwhile, the rulers do not forget to crown their own regime with the beautiful name of “the people,” holding power in the name of the people, which makes it highly deceptive.

The result of the government’s implementation of the obscurantist policy forms a vicious cycle of ruling: the autocratic government controls the communication media of society to manufacture the obscurantist policy; the obscurantist policy creates a vast number of common people who resign themselves to fate; and the common people who resign themselves to fate subsequently support and bear up an all-controlling autocratic government, as shown in Figure 4.1, going round and round in a vicious cycle. There is a saying in political science that goes, “A people get the government they deserve.” This saying has its merit, and the reason is very simple, because a government should be built upon the consent of the people. However, in an uncivilized, powerful, and autocratic society, this saying also holds true in reverse: “A government gets the people it deserves.”

In such a society, the common people often believe in the mandate of heaven and fate. They believe that their situation, encounters, fortunes, and misfortunes are all predestined by fate, and whether one can accomplish a certain thing depends entirely on one’s own luck. They believe that kings, generals, ministers, bureaucrats, and aristocrats are born to be rulers. With extremely simple and pure feelings, they shed tears of gratitude for the negligible subsidies returned and heavily played up by the rulers. Meanwhile, the rulers do not forget to crown their own regime with the beautiful name of “the people,” holding power in the name of the people, which makes it highly deceptive.

The result of the government’s implementation of the obscurantist policy forms a vicious cycle of ruling: the autocratic government controls the communication media of society to manufacture the obscurantist policy; the obscurantist policy creates a vast number of common people who resign themselves to fate; and the common people who resign themselves to fate subsequently support and bear up an all-controlling autocratic government, as shown in Figure 4.1, going round and round in a vicious cycle. There is a saying in political science that goes, “A people get the government they deserve.” This saying has its merit, and the reason is very simple, because a government should be built upon the consent of the people. However, in an uncivilized, powerful, and autocratic society, this saying also holds true in reverse: “A government gets the people it deserves.”

Holding the big stick of powerful crackdowns in one hand and the anesthetic of the obscurantist policy in the other, the autocratic ruler can cope with any strong-willed resistance. As long as the obscurantist policy can fully exert its effects, autocratic rule can be maintained for a long time.

5. Routine-Bound and Stagnant Conservatism

The bureaucrats and aristocrats are accustomed to ruling in a routine and conventional manner according to the ways left behind by their ancestors, because their ancestors lived very well by doing so, and they are well-satisfied with their own positions. Only when the development elements or productive forces of society undergo changes will the bureaucrats and aristocrats reveal their own incompetence; they lack any capability whatsoever to adjust their own organizational structure in a timely fashion to adapt to the new situation. Rulers are all selected and generated by old rulers from among a few reliable close relatives they are familiar with; their knowledge and concepts are identical to those of the old rulers, and they cannot break away from the domain of the vested interest groups. This method of selecting leaders cannot guarantee that successors will possess excellent leadership qualities, knowledge, and talents, nor can it guarantee that they can secure the admiration and support of other veterans and high officials in the government. Therefore, except for the first-generation leaders, successors all have no choice but to let the aristocratic veterans share a portion of the power. It is very difficult for powerful figures to emerge in the government who possess the capability to carry out structural restructuring and reform of the government to make it adapt to the development of productive forces.

When society remains unyielding and unchanging, they still possess a certain capability to conduct management; but when social morphology undergoes changes, the government will appear at a loss as to what to do, with internal management falling into chaos and promulgated policies contradicting one another. As a result of internal political power struggles, a group of older individuals who are rich in officialdom experience frequently gain the upper hand. These individuals follow the beaten track and cling to old customs, ultimately turning the government into a backward, conservative, and reactionary stronghold that opposes change.

In such a society, when the power of the rulers is absolutely secure, they are still relatively mild and magnanimous; when their power becomes weak, or after the holders of power become old and decrepit, they will become stubborn and unconvertible. When the lifestyle of the ruling class becomes a habit and is fixed down, their prejudice and opposition toward change will become deep-rooted. Making any alteration to their lifestyle will become extremely dangerous, even encountering hysterical retaliation. The reaction of such a society toward change is just like a psychiatric patient who roars upon seeing a doctor, unable to tolerate anyone putting a hand on his defects, studying his illness, and thinking of ways to cure his disease.

Under this ruling model, due to the obstructing effect of the massive vested interest groups occupying the dominant position, the development and progress of society can only occur intermittently and are inefficient. Each change can only be implemented by replacing muddle-headed and tyrannical political leaders through methods of violence and coups, thereby triggering social turmoil, accompanied by bloodshed or even consecutive years of internal wars, causing enormous human, financial, and material losses to the entire society. Alternatively, the entire society pays a long price in time, waiting for the natural death of the supreme ruler, pinning its hopes on the possibility of an enlightened and rational new leader coming to power. Yet, tragically, under the best medical and healthcare conditions, rulers are often long-lived, while the new rulers, except for their age, possess a mode of thinking that is an exact replica of the old rulers. This causes those people who harbor illusions about the social system and a beautiful life to unconsciously pass through their youth and middle age in the midst of waiting, only to usher in their own twilight years.

An autocratic system is not entirely incompetent and ignorant; at times, there are also civilized and enlightened autocratic governments. When society is under the rule of an enlightened and wise leader, it can also be managed in an orderly fashion. It can construct some great human engineering projects, organize powerful armies, resist foreign invasions, and even conquer neighboring countries to establish vast empires—even though this kind of strength often does not endure longer than the lifespan of a single generation.

For the rulers, autocratic rule is the most convenient, natural, and comfortable way of ruling. Rulers can do as they please, fully enjoying the pleasures of being human. Even if the country is very poor, the rulers can still enjoy a lifestyle that only the rich in wealthy countries can afford: access to the most advanced medical equipment, the highest-grade means of transportation, the most precious and expensive food and utensils, and the most luxurious palaces. If wanting to do as one pleases is human nature, then as far as human nature is concerned, no ruler is unwilling to rule in this manner. Therefore, although the autocratic regime is an unfair, inhumane political model with obvious defects, it still possesses a powerful vitality. In human history, there have been quite a few precedents where democratic regimes, under circumstances where the populace lacked sufficient vigilance, unconsciously evolved into autocratic regimes.

Editor: Huang Jizhou Proofreader: Feng Reng Translator: Ge Bing

独立日与自焚者——写在美国独立日

0
独立日与自焚者——写在美国独立日

作者:袁平

今天是美国独立日。这是一个本应值得欢庆的日子。

1776年7月4日,美国《独立宣言》向世界宣告:人人生而平等,生命、自由与追求幸福,是人与生俱来的权利。对于一个经历过专制社会的人来说,自由两个字,从来都不是一句口号,而是无数人用生命换来的东西。

然而,今年的独立日,我却怎么也高兴不起来。

就在两天前,7月2日,一位流亡藏人——洛嘎·让赞(LOGA RANGZEN),在联合国总部前点燃了自己的身体。我已经记不起,这是我所知道的第多少起藏人自焚事件。但每一次听到这样的消息,我都会沉默很久。因为,这不仅仅是一则新闻。

2009年开始,我在四川阿坝州工作、生活了五年多。此后的十几年里,我的人生轨迹几乎一直围绕成都和阿坝州展开。也许是因为我曾是一名NGO志愿者,也许是因为我从事的是文化遗产保护工作,也许只是因为我喜欢与当地人喝酒聊天、真诚相待,所以我有机会听到许多普通人永远不会知道的故事。

这些讲述者中,有参与过镇压工作的体制内人员,也有被镇压者的亲人、朋友和同学。

他们告诉我,他们如何向藏人开枪;告诉我人被打死后的样子;告诉我抓捕后的藏人被押进军营,被扒光衣服,再被关进用螺纹钢焊成的铁笼。那个笼子的高度,只够一个成年人匍匐爬行。他们长期被关在里面,风吹日晒,吃喝拉撒都在笼中完成。

还有人向我讲述,他们如何与军人一起,用枪托砸向那些抬起头来的藏人,又如何站在铁笼上,对着里面的人撒尿,以此羞辱他们。直到今天,这些画面依然停留在我的脑海里。

与此同时,我也听过很多藏族朋友讲述他们亲人、朋友和同学的遭遇。有人因此终身残疾,有人永远失去了生命。

我甚至曾经与一位刚从印度见过第十四世达赖喇嘛的老活佛有过很长时间的交流。他是我一位藏族兄弟的亲叔叔。让我惊讶的是,他能说一口极其标准的普通话。他说:”这普通话,是我在共产党的监狱里坐了十八年牢学会的。

那一刻,我沉默了很久。

2009年以前,我从未真正进入过中国的少数民族地区。直到汶川地震改变了我的人生。

借着志愿者的身份,我走遍了四川、青海许多藏族聚居区,也去过凉山彝族自治州,还曾在新疆一位哈萨克族朋友家生活了一个多月。这些经历,彻底改变了我对中国少数民族处境的理解。

小时候,我生活的城市里,经常能看到推着小车卖葡萄干和羊肉串的新疆商贩,也能看到腰间佩着藏刀、蹲在街边卖藏药的康巴汉子。我偷偷抓过人家的葡萄干,也偷偷摸过康巴汉子的藏刀。他们从来没有因为这些事情对我发过火,总是一脸憨厚地笑着。

后来,一切慢慢变了。

社会上开始不断流传各种关于他们的传闻。有人说藏人一言不合就拔刀。有人说新疆人偷鸡摸狗、横行霸道。甚至还有人说,他们杀了人警察也管不了。慢慢地,人们开始害怕他们、排斥他们。

我在成都武侯祠附近,不止一次看见这样的画面:一位藏人正常走在人行道上,迎面走来的汉族人却主动绕开。而那位藏人什么也没做。我后来才明白,这种恐惧,并不是来自真实的相处,而是来自长期的宣传。因为后来认识了越来越多少数民族朋友,我开始知道另一个完全不同的世界。他们并不是所谓的”无法无天”。恰恰相反。他们很多时候,比普通汉人承受着更加严厉的管理。

新疆朋友告诉我,他们已经很多年不敢在公共场合讲本民族语言。更不敢轻易承认自己的宗教信仰。因为一旦承认,接下来等待他们的,很可能就是无休止的盘问。有人因此失去自由。有人只是因为喝醉酒、因为街头争吵、因为一些外人看来微不足道的小事,就被送进所谓的”学习中心”。在那里,家人甚至不知道他们去了哪里。

我曾经和新疆朋友一起自驾旅行。每经过一个检查站,当地朋友都要下车。查身份证、录指纹、扫虹膜。而作为汉族游客的我,只需要坐在车里等待。每一次,我都觉得极度不舒服。

我终于意识到:同样生活在一个国家里,不同民族的人,所面对的世界竟然完全不同。

很多汉族人把藏区寺院简单理解成”烧香拜佛”。但真正生活在那里以后,我才知道,那远远不是全部。寺院不仅是宗教场所。它还是学校,是医院,是文化中心,也是语言、艺术和历史得以延续的重要地方。许多藏人,就是在那里学会识字。因此,当寺院被限制的时候,被影响的不只是宗教。更是整个民族文化的延续。

前不久公布的新法律第六条写道:”中华民族共同体意识是民族团结之本。国家坚持增进共同性、尊重和包容差异性……”这是一句很好听的话。但是,一个社会是否真正尊重差异,不应该看它写了什么,而应该看它做了什么。

真正的民族团结,不是让所有民族越来越像。而是每一个民族,都能够自由保留自己的语言、文化、信仰与生活方式。

很多人会把洛嘎·让赞的离去称作”自焚”。但在我心里,我始终觉得:他不是死于那一天的火焰。真正一步一步把他逼向火焰的,是长期压迫一个民族文化、宗教、语言和信仰自由的现实。

如果一个人能够自由表达自己的信仰,能够自由传承自己的文化,能够自由生活在自己的土地上,我相信,没有人会选择用这样痛苦的方式结束自己的生命。

所以,每一次藏人自焚,我看到的都不是一个人的死亡。我看到的是一个民族一次又一次向世界发出的呼喊。也是一个人在生命最后一刻,仍然告诉这个世界:

“我们还在。我们没有放弃。”

洛嘎·让赞,我并不认识你。但因为我曾生活在阿坝,曾听过太多藏人的故事,也曾与许多藏族朋友一起生活、工作、喝酒,所以今天,当我看到你的名字时,我知道,这不仅仅是一则新闻。

你的离去,让我再次想起那些我见过、听过、却始终无法忘记的人。

你的火焰,并没有照亮联合国的大楼,却给我带来了一丝光亮和温暖。它提醒我:不要沉默!

继续把自己知道的事情讲出来。哪怕只是让更多的人知道,世界上曾经有这样一个人,为了自己的民族、文化、信仰与尊严,选择燃烧自己。

今天,美国庆祝独立。而我,更愿意把这一天,献给一位为了自由而燃烧自己生命的人。

洛嘎·让赞(LOGA RANGZEN),请安息。

独立日与自焚者——写在美国独立日

愿你的名字不会随着新闻过去而被遗忘。

愿你的牺牲,不只是短暂地照亮天空,而能成为更多人追求自由、尊严与真相的勇气。

我向你致敬。也向所有为了自由、为了信仰、为了民族文化、为了人的尊严而承受苦难的人,致以最深的敬意。愿有一天,没有人再需要用燃烧自己的身体,去告诉世界:自由,本来就属于每一个人。

编辑:张致君    校对:周敏 翻译:沈美花

Independence Day and the Self-Immolator

Written on American Independence Day

Author: Yuan Ping

Today is American Independence Day. It is a day that should originally be worthy of grand celebration.

On July 4, 1776, the American Declaration of Independence proclaimed to the world: all men are created equal, and that life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness are inherent, unalienable rights endowed upon mankind. For someone who has lived through an autocratic society, the word “freedom” has never been a mere slogan; rather, it is something that countless individuals have traded their very lives to attain.

However, on this year’s Independence Day, I find myself completely unable to rejoice.

Just two days ago, on July 2, a Tibetan in exile—Lobga Rangzen—set his own body on fire in front of the United Nations Headquarters. I can no longer remember which number this is among all the Tibetan self-immolation incidents I have come to know. Yet, every single time I hear such news, I fall into a long, profound silence. Because this is far more than just a piece of news.

Beginning in 2009, I worked and lived in the Ngawa (Aba) Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture in Sichuan Province for over five years. In the dozen or so years that followed, the trajectory of my life has unfolded almost entirely around Chengdu and Ngawa. Perhaps because I was once an NGO volunteer, perhaps because I am engaged in cultural heritage preservation, or perhaps simply because I enjoy drinking, chatting, and treating the local people with absolute sincerity, I have had the opportunity to hear many stories that ordinary people will never know.

Among these narrators, there were establishment insiders who once participated in the crackdown operations, as well as the relatives, friends, and classmates of those who were suppressed.

They told me how they fired their weapons at Tibetans; they described what the bodies looked like after being shot dead; they recounted how captured Tibetans were escorted into military compounds, stripped naked, and then locked into iron cages welded together from rebar (threaded steel). The height of those cages was only sufficient for an adult to crawl on all fours. They were confined inside for prolonged periods, exposed to the blistering sun and biting wind, forced to eat, drink, sleep, and relieve themselves entirely within the confines of the cage.

There were others who recounted how they, alongside the soldiers, smashed their rifle butts into any Tibetan who dared to raise their head, and how they stood atop the iron cages, urinating on the people inside to humiliate them. To this very day, these images remain vividly frozen in my mind.

At the same time, I have listened to many Tibetan friends recount the ordeals suffered by their own relatives, friends, and classmates. Some were left permanently disabled, while others lost their lives forever.

I even once had a prolonged, deep conversation with an elderly Tulku (Living Buddha) who had just returned from meeting the 14th Dalai Lama in India. He was the biological uncle of a Tibetan brother of mine. To my astonishment, he spoke extremely flawless and standard Mandarin. He said: “This Mandarin of mine was learned during the eighteen years I spent behind bars in the Communist Party’s prison.”

At that exact moment, I fell into a long silence.

Prior to 2009, I had never truly set foot in China’s ethnic minority regions—until the Wenchuan earthquake completely altered the course of my life.

Leveraging my identity as a volunteer, I traveled across numerous Tibetan-populated areas in Sichuan and Qinghai; I also visited the Liangshan Yi Autonomous Prefecture, and once lived for over a month in the home of a Kazakh friend in Xinjiang. These experiences thoroughly transformed my understanding of the plight faced by ethnic minorities in China.

During my childhood, in the city where I lived, one could frequently see Xinjiang vendors pushing small carts to sell raisins and mutton skewers, or Khampa men with Tibetan knives strapped to their waists, squatting by the roadside selling traditional Tibetan medicine. I used to secretly snatch their raisins and stealthily touch the Khampa men’s knives. They never once lost their temper at me for these antics; they would always smile with pure, honest benevolence.

Later on, everything slowly began to change.

Various rumors about them began to circulate incessantly throughout society. Some said that Tibetans would draw their knives at the slightest disagreement. Others claimed that people from Xinjiang were thieves, scammers, and acted with tyrannical lawlessness. Some even asserted that even if they committed murder, the police could do nothing about it. Gradually, people began to fear them and ostracize them.

Near the Wuhou Temple in Chengdu, I witnessed the following scene on more than one occasion: a Tibetan would be walking completely normally on the sidewalk, yet the Han Chinese walking from the opposite direction would actively veer away to bypass them. Meanwhile, that Tibetan had done absolutely nothing. It was only later that I came to understand that this fear did not stem from real, lived interactions, but rather from protracted propaganda. Because I subsequently came to know more and more ethnic minority friends, I began to discover an entirely different world. They were not so-called “lawless” elements at all. Quite the contrary. In many instances, they bore a system of management far more severe than that imposed on ordinary Han Chinese.

My Xinjiang friends told me that for many years, they have not dared to speak their native language in public spaces. They dared even less to readily admit their religious faith. Because once they admitted it, what awaited them next would very likely be endless, grueling interrogations. Some lost their freedom as a result. Some were sent to the so-called “learning centers” simply because they got drunk, had a minor street altercation, or due to trivial matters that would seem completely insignificant to an outsider. Once there, their families did not even know where they had been taken.

I once went on a road trip with some friends from Xinjiang. Every time we crossed a checkpoint, my local friends had to step out of the vehicle to have their ID cards checked, fingerprints recorded, and irises scanned. Meanwhile, as a Han tourist, I only needed to sit inside the car and wait. Every single time, I felt an acute, profound sense of discomfort.

I finally realized: despite living within the very same country, people of different ethnicities face worlds that are diametrically opposed.

Many Han Chinese simplisticly conceptualize Tibetan monasteries as merely places to “burn incense and worship Buddha.” But only after truly living there did I realize that this is far from the whole truth. A monastery is not just a religious site. It is also a school, a hospital, a cultural hub, and a vital sanctuary where language, art, and history are kept alive and passed down. It is within those walls that many Tibetans learned how to read and write. Therefore, when monasteries are restricted, it is not merely religion that is impacted; it is the very continuity of an entire ethnic culture.

Not long ago, Article 6 of the newly promulgated law stated: “The consciousness of the Chinese nation’s community is the foundation of ethnic unity. The State adheres to enhancing commonality while respecting and accommodating differences…” These are beautiful, pleasant words. However, whether a society genuinely respects differences should not be judged by what it writes, but by what it actually does.

True ethnic unity does not mean forcing all ethnic groups to become more and more identical. Rather, it means that every single ethnic group is granted the complete freedom to preserve its own language, culture, faith, and way of life.

Many people will refer to the departure of Lobga Rangzen as a “self-immolation.” But in my heart, I have always felt that he did not die from the flames of that particular day. What truly pushed him, step by step, toward those flames was the reality of the long-term oppression weighing upon an entire nation’s culture, religion, language, and freedom of belief.

If a person could freely express their faith, freely inherit and pass down their culture, and freely live upon their own ancestral land, I believe that no one would ever choose to terminate their own life in such an excruciatingly painful manner.

Therefore, with every instance of a Tibetan self-immolation, what I see is never merely the death of an individual. What I see is an entire nation crying out to the world, over and over again. It is also a human being, in the final moment of their life, still telling this world:

“We are still here. We have not given up.”

Lobga Rangzen, I did not know you. But because I once lived in Ngawa (Aba), because I have heard all too many stories of Tibetans, and because I have lived, worked, and shared drinks with many Tibetan friends, today, when I see your name, I know with absolute certainty that this is far more than just a piece of news.

Your departure forces me once again to recall those people whom I have seen, whom I have heard of, and whom I can never, ever forget.

Your flames did not illuminate the buildings of the United Nations, yet they brought a shred of light and warmth to me. They serve as a stark reminder: Do not remain silent!

Continue to speak out about the things you know. Even if it is only to let more people know that there once existed such a person in this world, who, for the sake of his own nation, culture, faith, and dignity, chose to set himself ablaze.

Today, America celebrates its independence. As for me, I prefer to dedicate this day to a human being who burned his own life for the sake of freedom.

Lobga Rangzen, please rest in peace.
独立日与自焚者——写在美国独立日

May your name never be forgotten as the news cycle passes.

May your sacrifice be more than just a momentary flash illuminating the night sky; may it transform into the courage for more people to pursue freedom, dignity, and truth.

I salute you. I also extend my deepest, most profound respect to all those who endure suffering for the sake of freedom, for faith, for ethnic culture, and for human dignity. May there come a day when no one ever needs to burn their own body again just to tell the world: freedom, by right, belongs to every single human being.

Editor: Zhang Zhijun Proofreader: Zhou Min Translator: Shen Meihua

党的棋子——中共输出革命秘史

0

作者:陀先润

第二篇:亲儿子的命运——马共与泰共

1961年,马来亚共产党总书记陈平秘密来到北京。

他来的目的很明确:告诉中国同志,马共打不下去了。从二战结束时的一万多人,到现在躲在泰马边境丛林里的不足六百人,打了十几年,什么都没打出来。英国人走了,马来亚独立了,新政府对马共的清剿越来越有效,丛林里的人越来越少,补给越来越难。陈平准备宣布放弃武装斗争,带着剩下的人出来谈判,换一条活路。

接见他的是邓小平。

邓小平告诉他:东南亚的形势即将发生巨变,对共产主义越来越有利,不要改变政策,要继续打下去。

陈平回去了,继续打。

十八年后的1979年,陈平再次被叫去见邓小平。这一次邓小平告诉他:中国不会再支持马共了,你们自己想办法吧。

两次谈话,同一个人,完全相反的指令。两次谈话之间死了多少人,没有人统计过,也没有人在乎。

马共的历史,从诞生的第一天就埋下了悲剧的种子。

1925年,共产国际代表鲍罗廷派了一个助手南下到南洋,在新加坡建立了南洋共产主义支部。这就是马共最早的前身,从第一天起就是中国共产党的海外分支,不是在马来亚土地上自然生长出来的,是被种下去的。1930年,在胡志明的主持下,南洋共产党正式改组为马来亚共产党。党员几乎清一色是华侨,领导层全是华人,建党的钱是中国出的,政治纲领是中国定的。

这个先天条件,后来成了马共无法摆脱的致命伤。马来西亚政府把马共的武装斗争定性为华人对马来人的统治战争,让马共在当地始终无法真正发动群众。你打出去的旗号是共产主义革命,但当地的马来人看到的是一群华人拿着枪要来领导他们,这场仗从政治上就输掉了一半。

但在日本占领马来亚期间,马共一度成为这片土地上最重要的武装力量。英国人给了他们武器,马共组建了马来亚人民抗日军,控制了马来半岛三分之二以上的国土,武装人员超过一万人。那是马共历史上唯一一段真正强大的时光,也是他们距离胜利最近的时候。

然后,一个叫莱特的人出现了。

莱特是越南籍华侨,说自己是共产国际的代表。他进入马共的时候,正是中共和马来亚之间的联络完全中断的那段空档,没有任何人能核实他的身份。他就靠着这个身份,在马共里站稳了脚跟,一路做到总书记。

没有人知道他同时在为法国人、英国人和日本人工作。

1942年2月,马共决定在一个叫黑风洞的地方召开秘密会议,出席的是马共和抗日军的大部分高级将领。日本人提前得到了通知,包围了现场,把所有人杀了个干净。那是马共历史上最惨烈的一次清洗,几乎所有的核心骨干都死在那里。莱特原本应该出席,临时说车子坏了,没能到场。

战后他又以共产国际代表的名义,说服马共把辛苦积攒的武装力量解散了,说要走合法斗争的路线,不要和新的殖民政府正面对抗。马共信了他,把枪交出去了。然后他卷走了党的全部经费,消失了。

1947年,他在泰国曼谷被泰共党员认出来,追上去当街击毙。

莱特死后,马共才开始彻查,发现他当年做的每一件事背后都有出卖的影子。黑风洞的屠杀,武装力量的解散,每一次马共遭受重创,莱特都是最大的受益者。但到了这个时候,人死了,证据没了,一切都只能是推断。

马共用了整整十年,才从莱特造成的破坏里重新站起来。这十年里,一个外来的间谍把马共掏空了,这件事本身就说明了马共的根本问题:它没有真正扎进马来亚土地里的根基,离开北京的指挥和保护,它就是一盘散沙。

莱特走了之后,马共真正的终结者出现了。这个人不是英国军队,不是马来西亚政府,而是一个叫李光耀的年轻律师。

1950年代初,李光耀从英国剑桥留学回来,回到新加坡开始执业。他主动找上了马共的外围组织,找上了各个左翼工会和劳工团体,说要帮他们打官司,免费提供法律援助。他在这些组织里混得如鱼得水,很快成了新加坡左翼圈子里人脉最广的人。

然后他提出了一个建议:成立一个合法的政党,叫人民行动党,用议会选举的方式来争取政权。他的理由很充分——马共是非法组织,进不了议会,只能在丛林里打游击,而打游击已经证明行不通了,不如走合法路线,把力量引入体制内。马共的人觉得这个思路有道理,开始全力支持他,帮他拉票,帮他组织工人和学生,把他的人气一点一点做起来。

1959年,人民行动党赢得新加坡大选,李光耀成为新加坡自治邦首席部长。

权力到手之后,李光耀开始动手。

他动手的方式是一个一个来的,不是一刀切,而是精准打击。首先是马共背景的人,凡是有组织关系的,全部逮捕,关进监狱,不经审判,无限期关押。有人一关就是十几年,有人关到白发苍苍,有人关到死在狱中。内部安全法给了他这个权力,不需要证据,不需要法庭,一纸命令就够了。

然后是中共南方情报系统派来的人,也就是那批以学者、教师、报人身份出现的地下工作者。这批人他没有关,而是礼送出境,客客气气地把你送走,走之前甚至还给你道别。南洋大学是当时中共在马来亚最重要的教育和培训基地,李光耀直接把它关掉,说是要合并到新加坡大学,理由冠冕堂皇,没有人能当面反驳。

最后是那些曾经帮他竞选、帮他拉票、把他送进议会的左翼同僚。这些人里有他的战友,有他的朋友,有在最艰难的时候站出来支持他的人。他把他们一个一个送进监狱,用的罪名是勾结共产党,威胁国家安全。其中有人在狱中待了将近三十年,出来的时候已经是老人。

李光耀后来被很多人称为华人世界里难得的政治天才。这个评价大概是对的。但天才的代价,是由那些帮过他的人用一生来承担的。马共和左翼力量把他送进了议会,他用他们的尸体巩固了自己的权力,然后建立了一个在华人世界里独一无二的高效威权体制。

新加坡的马共,就这样被彻底消灭了。

失去了新加坡的马共,退回到马来半岛的丛林里继续打。但他们面对的是一个根本无法解决的困境:领导层是华人,在一个马来人占多数的国家搞武装革命,永远都会被定性为外来势力入侵。他们在丛林里坚持,坚持了一年又一年,人越来越少,补给越来越困难,和外部世界的联系越来越薄弱。

丛林里的生活是什么样的,很少有人描述过。那些在里面待了几十年的人,大部分没有留下文字。偶尔有人回忆,讲的是常年潮湿的丛林、腐烂的树叶、永远不够吃的食物、时刻警惕的神经。他们结婚、生子、老去,在那片丛林里过完了自己最好的年华。他们的孩子在丛林里出生,有些孩子从来没有见过外面的世界。

这一切,都是因为1961年邓小平那句”要继续打下去”。

1979年,邓小平访问新加坡。李光耀当面告诉他:你要和东盟国家搞好关系,就必须停止支持东南亚的共产党。邓小平答应了,然后找来陈平,告诉他中国不再支持马共。

中国在湖南益阳给马共建立的秘密基地关掉了,马来西亚之声广播电台停播了,武器供应和经费全部切断。马共在中国培训的干部被遣返,那些在中国待了多年、学会了一口普通话的马共干部,一夜之间发现自己无处可去。

又撑了十年,1989年,马共终于走到了尽头。

在泰国政府的见证下,马共和马来西亚政府签署了和平协议。马共宣布解散,成员放下武器,向马来西亚最高元首宣誓效忠。作为交换,马来西亚政府承诺不追究法律责任,愿意回国的发一笔补偿金安置,留在泰国的划出几块土地让他们居住。

解散时大约还有一千多人,是当年一万多人的零头。

一部分人回了马来西亚,领了钱,找个地方过日子,从此不提过去的事。另一部分留在了泰南边境,住进了泰国政府划出来的几个村子。这几个村子后来被冠以一位泰国公主的名字,改造成了旅游景点,叫朱拉彭公主村,一共四个村。游客去那里喝咖啡、拍照,买当地人做的土产纪念品,脚下的土地曾经埋过什么,没有人告诉他们,他们也不会问。

陈平想回马来西亚,被政府拒绝了。他在泰国等了很多年,2013年在曼谷去世,终究没能回家。他第一次去北京见邓小平的时候四十岁,死的时候八十八岁。这四十八年,他把自己最好的岁月全部交给了一场注定失败的战争,而这场战争打多久、打到什么程度,从来都不是他能决定的。

泰共的故事和马共高度相似,只是结局更加诡异。

泰共比马共还要纯正。1926年由中共南洋支部直接建立,1942年正式建党,第一任总书记李启新是中共党员,后来回国当了新华社香港分社的副社长。新华社香港分社在那个年代是什么,明白的人都明白——它是中共情报和统战系统在香港的核心机构,以新闻机构为掩护,实际上做的是情报工作。泰共的第一任总书记,本身就是情报系统的人。这样的党,和中共之间是什么关系,不言而喻。

1960年中苏关系破裂,全球共产党被迫表态站队,泰共是东南亚第一个公开支持中国的共产党。不需要讨论,不需要考虑,因为他们就是中共系统的一部分。1962年,中国在云南建立了泰国人民之声广播电台,开始对泰国进行革命宣传。1965年,泰共正式开始武装斗争,中国提供培训、武器和经费,全力支持。

泰共打了十年,稳扎稳打,在泰国北部和东北部的山区建立了相当稳固的根据地。1976年是他们历史上最高光的时刻。那一年泰国发生军事政变,曼谷的大学里爆发了大规模的学生运动,军队镇压,死了很多人。大批学生和知识分子逃进丛林,加入泰共。武装力量从几千人急速膨胀到八千人,控制区域波及泰国将近一半的省份。泰国政府一度非常紧张,认为革命真的要来了。

但1979年,一切在几个月之内就结束了。

中国决定联合泰国共同对抗越南,不能再维持对泰共的支持。泰国人民之声电台停播,所有援助切断。老挝在越南的压力下,把境内的泰共武装全部驱逐出境,泰共失去了最重要的后方基地。没有了援助,没有了退路,泰共迅速瓦解。大部分成员接受政府招安,陆续走出丛林。到1991年,武装力量全部消失。

但有一件事始终是个谜。

泰共1976年之前的领导层几乎全是华人,是中共直接培养或派遣过去的干部。这批人在泰共解散之后,泰国政府没有通缉他们,没有审判他们,连一纸大赦令都没有发,就好像这些人从来不存在一样。他们去了哪里,没有任何公开记录。泰国政府不说,中国政府也不说,双方之间有一种心照不宣的默契,这件事被压在水面以下,从此再没有浮起来。

在中共输出革命的历史里,消失是最好的结局。它意味着你回来之后仍然是自己人,仍然可以在体制内得到妥善安置。那些留下名字的,反而是真正被抛弃的人。陈平留下了名字,所以他死在泰国。泰共的华人领导层没有留下名字,所以他们安静地回来了,从历史记录里消失,在另一个地方重新开始。

马共打了六十四年,从1925年建党到1989年解散。泰共打了二十五年,从1965年到1991年。这两个中共最忠诚的亲儿子,一生都在按照北京的指令行事。北京说打,他们打。北京说停,他们停。他们从来没有真正独立过,从来没有根据自己的判断做过一个重要决定。

最后,马共的普通战士老死在异国他乡改造成旅游景点的村子里,泰共的华人领导层悄无声息地消失在历史记录里,那些在丛林里死去的人,连名字都没有留下。

棋子就是棋子,用完了就该收起来。至于棋子自己怎么想,从来不在棋手的考虑之内。

编辑:李晶 校对:周敏 翻译:戈冰

The Party’s Pawns: A Secret History of the CCP’s Export of Revolution

Author: Tuo Xianrun

Part II: The Fate of the Biological Son—The Communist Party of Malaya and the Communist Party of Thailand

In 1961, Chin Peng, the Secretary-General of the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM), secretly arrived in Beijing.

The purpose of his visit was very clear: to tell the Chinese comrades that the CPM could no longer keep fighting. From a force of over 10,000 at the end of World War II, they had dwindled to fewer than 600 men hiding out in the jungles along the Thailand-Malaya border. They had fought for over a decade, yet had achieved absolutely nothing. The British had left, Malaya had achieved independence, and the new government’s counter-insurgency campaigns against the CPM were becoming increasingly effective. The number of people in the jungle grew fewer by the day, and securing supplies became harder and harder. Chin Peng was prepared to announce the abandonment of armed struggle and lead the remaining men out to negotiate, in order to trade their weapons for a path to survival.

The person who received him was Deng Xiaoping.

Deng Xiaoping told him: The situation in Southeast Asia is on the verge of a massive shift, becoming increasingly favorable to communism; do not alter your policies, and you must keep fighting on.

Chin Peng went back and kept fighting.

Eighteen years later, in 1979, Chin Peng was summoned once again to meet with Deng Xiaoping. This time, Deng Xiaoping told him: China will no longer support the CPM; you will have to find your own way.

Two conversations, with the exact same person, yielding entirely opposite directives. No one has ever tallied how many people died between these two conversations, and no one cared.

The history of the CPM was planted with the seeds of tragedy from its very first day.

In 1925, Borodin, a representative of the Communist International, dispatched an assistant southward to the South Seas (Nanyang), establishing the Nanyang Communist Branch in Singapore. This was the earliest predecessor of the CPM. From day one, it was an overseas branch of the Chinese Communist Party; it did not grow naturally from the soil of Malaya, but was planted there. In 1930, under the stewardship of Ho Chi Minh, the Nanyang Communist Party was formally reorganized into the Communist Party of Malaya. The party members were almost exclusively overseas Chinese, the leadership was entirely Chinese, the funding for building the party came from China, and the political program was dictated by China.

This congenital condition later became a fatal weakness that the CPM could never escape. The Malaysian government framed the CPM’s armed struggle as a war of Chinese domination over the Malays, making it impossible for the CPM to ever truly mobilize the local masses. The banner you flew was that of communist revolution, but the local Malays saw only a group of Chinese wielding guns coming to rule over them; politically, this war was already half-lost from the start.

Yet, during the Japanese occupation of Malaya, the CPM briefly became the most critical armed force on this land. The British provided them with weapons, and the CPM formed the Malayan Peoples’ Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA), which controlled over two-thirds of the territory on the Malay Peninsula, with armed personnel exceeding 10,000. That was the only period in the history of the CPM where they were truly powerful, and it was also the closest they ever came to victory.

Then, a man named Lai Teck appeared.

Lai Teck was an overseas Chinese of Vietnamese nationality who claimed to be a representative of the Communist International. When he entered the CPM, it happened to be during a hiatus when all communication between the Chinese Communist Party and Malaya had been completely severed, so absolutely no one could verify his identity. Relying on this status, he established a firm foothold within the CPM and made his way all the way up to Secretary-General.

No one knew that he was simultaneously working for the French, the British, and the Japanese.

In February 1942, the CPM decided to convene a secret meeting at a place called Batu Caves, attended by most of the high-ranking commanders of the CPM and the Anti-Japanese Army. The Japanese received advance notice, surrounded the site, and slaughtered everyone down to the last man. That was the most tragic and horrific purge in the history of the CPM, where virtually all of its core backbone died. Lai Teck was originally supposed to attend, but at the last minute claimed his car had broken down and failed to show up.

After the war, once again in the name of a Communist International representative, he persuaded the CPM to disband the armed forces they had painstakingly built up, saying they should pursue the path of legal struggle and avoid direct confrontation with the new colonial government. The CPM believed him and handed over their guns. Then, he absconded with all of the party’s funds and vanished.

In 1947, he was recognized in Bangkok, Thailand, by members of the Communist Party of Thailand, who pursued him and shot him dead right on the street.

Only after Lai Teck’s death did the CPM begin a thorough investigation, discovering that behind every single thing he had done back then lay the shadow of betrayal. The massacre at Batu Caves, the disbanding of the armed forces—every time the CPM suffered a heavy blow, Lai Teck was the biggest beneficiary. But by this time, the man was dead, the evidence was gone, and everything could only be a matter of inference.

It took the CPM a full decade just to stand back up from the destruction caused by Lai Teck. During these ten years, a foreign spy had hollowed out the CPM, a fact which in itself illustrated the fundamental problem of the CPM: it lacked roots truly dug into the soil of Malaya; stripped of Beijing’s command and protection, it was nothing more than a heap of loose sand.

After Lai Teck was gone, the true terminator of the CPM emerged. This person was not the British military, nor was it the Malaysian government, but a young lawyer named Lee Kuan Yew.

In the early 1950s, Lee Kuan Yew returned from studying at Cambridge in the United Kingdom and began practicing law in Singapore. He took the initiative to approach the front organizations of the CPM, as well as various left-wing trade unions and labor groups, offering to help them fight lawsuits and providing free legal aid. He moved like a fish in water within these organizations, quickly becoming the person with the most extensive network of contacts in Singapore’s left-wing circles.

Then he put forward a proposal: to establish a legal political party called the People’s Action Party (PAP), and to strive for political power through parliamentary elections. His reasoning was solid—the CPM was an illegal organization that could not enter parliament and could only fight guerrilla warfare in the jungles, and guerrilla warfare had already proven to be unviable. It would be better, he argued, to take the legal route and channel their strength into the system. The people of the CPM felt that this line of thinking made sense, so they began to support him with all their might, helping him canvass votes, helping him organize workers and students, and building up his popularity bit by bit.

In 1959, the People’s Action Party won the Singapore general election, and Lee Kuan Yew became the Prime Minister of the State of Singapore.

Once political power was in his hands, Lee Kuan Yew began to take action.

The way he took action was one by one; it was not a blanket sweep, but rather precision strikes. First were those with a CPM background—anyone with organizational ties was arrested across the board and thrown into prison, detained indefinitely without trial. Some were locked up for over a decade, some were detained until their hair turned white, and some were detained until they died in prison. The Internal Security Act gave him this power; no evidence was required, no court of law was needed, a single piece of written order was enough.

Next were the people dispatched by the Chinese Communist Party’s southern intelligence system, which was that group of underground workers appearing in the capacities of scholars, teachers, and journalists. This group of people he did not imprison; instead, he politely deported them, seeing them off with utmost courtesy, even bidding them farewell before they left. Nanyang University was at that time the most important education and training base for the Chinese Communist Party in Malaya; Lee Kuan Yew shut it down directly, claiming it was to be merged into the University of Singapore, offering a high-sounding rationale that no one could refute to his face.

Finally, there were those left-wing colleagues who had once helped him campaign, helped him canvass votes, and sent him into parliament. Among these people were his comrades-in-arms, his friends, and those who had stood up to support him in his darkest hours. He sent them into prison one by one under the charges of colluding with the Communist Party and threatening national security. Some of them stayed in prison for nearly thirty years, and were already old men by the time they came out.

Lee Kuan Yew was later hailed by many as a rare political genius in the ethnic Chinese world. This assessment is probably correct. But the price of genius was borne with their entire lives by those who had helped him. The CPM and the left-wing forces sent him into parliament, and he used their corpses to consolidate his own power, subsequently establishing an efficient authoritarian system unique in the ethnic Chinese world.

The CPM in Singapore was thus completely wiped out.

Having lost Singapore, the CPM retreated into the jungles of the Malay Peninsula to keep fighting. But they faced a dilemma that was fundamentally unresolvable: the leadership was Chinese, and waging an armed revolution in a Malay-majority country would forever be framed as an invasion by foreign forces. They persisted in the jungles, persisting year after year; their numbers grew fewer and fewer, supplies became increasingly difficult, and their connections to the outside world grew weaker and weaker.

What life in the jungle was like has rarely been described. Most of those who stayed inside for decades left no written records. Occasionally, someone would reminisce, speaking of the perennially damp jungle, decaying leaves, food that was never enough, and nerves that were constantly on high alert. They married, bore children, and grew old, spending the best years of their lives inside that jungle. Their children were born in the jungle, and some of these children had never even seen the outside world.

All of this was because of Deng Xiaoping’s phrase back in 1961: “you must keep fighting on.”

In 1979, Deng Xiaoping visited Singapore. Lee Kuan Yew told him to his face: If you want to build good relations with ASEAN countries, you must stop supporting the communist parties in Southeast Asia. Deng Xiaoping agreed, and then summoned Chin Peng, telling him that China would no longer support the CPM.

The secret base that China had established for the CPM in Yiyang, Hunan was shut down, the Voice of the Malayan Revolution radio station ceased broadcasting, and all weapon supplies and funding were completely cut off. CPM cadres who had been trained in China were repatriated; those CPM cadres who had spent many years in China and learned to speak fluent Mandarin discovered overnight that they had nowhere to go.

Having endured for another ten years, in 1989, the CPM finally reached the end of the line.

Under the witness of the Thai government, the CPM and the Malaysian government signed a peace agreement. The CPM announced its dissolution, its members laid down their arms, and swore allegiance to the Yang di-Pertuan Agong (Supreme Head of State) of Malaysia. In exchange, the Malaysian government promised not to pursue legal liability, offered a sum of resettlement compensation to those willing to return to the country, and allocated several plots of land for those staying in Thailand to reside on.

At the time of dissolution, there were still about 1,000-odd people left, a mere fraction of the original 10,000-plus force.

One part of the population returned to Malaysia, collected their money, found a place to live out their days, and never mentioned the past again. The other part remained at the border of southern Thailand, moving into several villages allocated by the Thai government. These villages were later bestowed with the name of a Thai princess and transformed into tourist attractions called the Princess Chulabhorn Villages, totaling four villages. Tourists go there to drink coffee, take photos, and buy local souvenirs made by the residents; no one tells them what was once buried in the soil beneath their feet, nor would they ask.

Chin Peng wanted to return to Malaysia, but was rejected by the government. He waited in Thailand for many years and passed away in Bangkok in 2013, ultimately failing to return home. He was forty years old when he went to Beijing to meet Deng Xiaoping for the first time, and eighty-eight when he died. Throughout these forty-eight years, he handed over the best years of his life entirely to a war destined to fail, and how long this war would be fought, or to what extent it would be waged, was never something he could decide.

The story of the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) is highly similar to that of the CPM, only its ending is even more bizarre.

The CPT was even more pure-bred than the CPM. It was directly established by the Nanyang Branch of the Chinese Communist Party in 1926, and formally founded as a party in 1942. Its first Secretary-General, Li Qixin, was a CCP member who later returned to China to serve as the Deputy Director of the Xinhua News Agency Hong Kong Branch. What the Xinhua News Agency Hong Kong Branch was during that era is perfectly understood by anyone in the know—it was the core agency of the CCP’s intelligence and united front system in Hong Kong, operating under the cover of a news organization while actually carrying out intelligence work. The CPT’s first Secretary-General was himself a man of the intelligence system. What kind of relationship such a party shared with the CCP goes without saying.

In 1960, the Sino-Soviet split occurred, and communist parties worldwide were forced to declare their stance and choose a side; the CPT was the first communist party in Southeast Asia to openly support China. No discussion was needed, and no consideration was required, because they were simply a part of the CCP system. In 1962, China established the Voice of the People of Thailand radio station in Yunnan and began broadcasting revolutionary propaganda to Thailand. In 1965, the CPT formally commenced its armed struggle, with China providing training, weapons, and funds in full support.

The CPT fought for ten years, advancing steadily and building quite stable base areas in the mountainous regions of northern and northeastern Thailand. The year 1976 was the highest highlight of their history. That year, a military coup occurred in Thailand, and a large-scale student movement erupted in the universities of Bangkok; the military suppressed it, and many people died. Large numbers of students and intellectuals fled into the jungles to join the CPT. The armed forces rapidly swelled from a few thousand to 8,000 men, and their controlled areas expanded to affect nearly half of Thailand’s provinces. The Thai government was highly tense for a time, believing that the revolution was truly coming.

But in 1979, everything was over within a matter of a few months.

China decided to unite with Thailand to jointly confront Vietnam, and could no longer maintain its support for the CPT. The Voice of the People of Thailand radio station ceased broadcasting, and all aid was cut off. Under pressure from Vietnam, Laos expelled all CPT armed forces within its borders, causing the CPT to lose its most vital rear base. Without aid and without a path of retreat, the CPT disintegrated rapidly. Most members accepted the government’s offer of amnesty and left the jungles one after another. By 1991, the armed forces had completely vanished.

Yet, one matter has remained a mystery from beginning to end.

The leadership of the CPT prior to 1976 was almost entirely composed of ethnic Chinese, who were cadres directly trained or dispatched by the CCP. After the CPT dissolved, the Thai government did not place these people on wanted lists, did not put them on trial, and did not even issue a single amnesty decree, acting as if these individuals had never existed. Where they went has no public record whatsoever. The Thai government does not speak of it, and the Chinese government does not speak of it either; there is a tacit understanding between the two sides, and this matter was pressed beneath the surface of the water, never to float up again.

In the history of the CCP exporting revolution, vanishing is the best outcome. It means that after you return, you are still one of our own, and you can still be properly settled within the system. Those who left behind their names, conversely, are the ones who were truly abandoned. Chin Peng left behind his name, so he died in Thailand. The ethnic Chinese leadership of the CPT did not leave behind their names, so they returned quietly, vanishing from historical records to start anew in another place.

The CPM fought for sixty-four years, from its party founding in 1925 to its dissolution in 1989. The CPT fought for twenty-five years, from 1965 to 1991. These two most loyal, biological sons of the CCP spent their entire lives acting in accordance with Beijing’s directives. When Beijing said fight, they fought. When Beijing said stop, they stopped. They were never truly independent, and they never made a single major decision based on their own judgment.

In the end, the ordinary soldiers of the CPM grew old and died in foreign villages that had been transformed into tourist attractions, the ethnic Chinese leadership of the CPT quietly vanished from historical records, and those who died in the jungles did not even leave behind their names.

Chess pieces are just chess pieces; when they are used up, they ought to be put away. As for what the chess pieces themselves think, it is never within the consideration of the chess player.

Editor: Li Jing Proofreader: Zhou Min Translator: Ge Bing

党的棋子——中共输出革命秘史

0

作者:陀先润  

第一篇:幕后那只手

1969年的缅甸北部,一批中国年轻人正在哭着往山上跑。

他们背着弹药,没有枪。任务是把弹药送进山顶的坑道,给里面坚守的战友。从集结地到山脚下大约一公里,美军的炮火把这一公里变成了一条死亡走廊。一个亲历者后来回忆,他用高倍望远镜看着一百多人冲出去,炮火散去之后,进入坑道的只有三个人。第二天,又是一批人哭着往上冲。

这些人是中国的红卫兵,是文革武斗中的失败派系。有人悄悄告诉他们,去缅甸打仗,政治污点可以一笔勾销,打完仗回来算参加革命,一切既往不咎。于是他们跨过边境,加入了缅甸共产党的游击队。最多的时候,有一万多中国人在缅北的丛林里打仗。

没有人告诉他们,在缅共内部有一条秘密指令:这批中国人要被放在战斗第一线,逐渐消耗掉。

他们不是战士,他们是炮灰。而决定他们命运的那个人,坐在北京的办公室里,从来没有去过缅甸。

同一时期,在大半个地球之外的约旦,一批巴勒斯坦游击队员被约旦军队俘虏。约旦国王侯赛因下令,把其中一批人单独关押,不和其他俘虏关在一起。这批人不是巴勒斯坦人,也不是约旦人,他们是中国人,是混在巴勒斯坦法塔赫武装里的中国军事顾问。

他们在沙漠里教阿拉伯人打仗,教的是毛泽东思想,教的是农村包围城市,教的是如何建立基层群众组织。这件事后来被压了下来,约旦政府和中国政府都不想把它弄大,于是这批人悄悄被遣返,这段历史从公开记录里消失了。

再往北,在纽约的法拉盛,华人社区里流传着一条不成文的规矩:中国派来的情报人员如果出了麻烦,只要跑进法拉盛,就能安全换身份或者离开美国。这个规矩不是最近才有的,它的根基从1930年代就开始建立,经过几十年的经营,法拉盛已经是一个任何外部力量都很难渗透进去的安全区。

在日本,一个叫重信房子的女人在2000年被捕时,护照上有二十多次进入中国的记录,在北京居住的时间加起来将近两年。她是日本赤军的领袖,一个在中东活动了几十年的恐怖组织的核心人物。日本警视厅认为,日本赤军在中国有一个秘密基地。中国政府没有承认,也没有否认。

缅北丛林里哭着冲锋的中国知青,约旦监狱里被单独关押的中国顾问,纽约唐人街深处的秘密网络,在北京有据可查的日本恐怖分子。这些故事发生在不同的国家,不同的年代,表面上毫无关联。但它们背后有同一只手在操控。

这只手,叫中联部。

中联部的全称是中国共产党中央对外联络部,1951年正式成立。它的官方定义是负责与各国政党开展交流合作的机构,听起来像是个专门接待外宾、互赠礼品、发表联合声明的礼宾部门。2024年,德国宪法保卫局向联邦议院正式发出警告,称中联部是一个情报组织,要求德国政界人士提高警惕。这个警告发出的时候,中联部已经存在了七十多年。德国人花了二十年才搞清楚对手是谁。

这不是德国人笨,是这个机构本来就不想让你知道它是什么。

中联部最核心的功能从来不是联络,而是渗透。它在东南亚孵化并控制了多个共产党,在中东扶持武装组织,在美国建立秘密基地网络,在日本培植极左势力。它用过的工具包括枪支弹药、秘密电台、假护照、政治顾问、帮派组织和选举干预。它做这一切,从来不以中国政府的名义出现。

要理解中联部是什么,可以看一个具体的人。

孙海燕,中联部前副部长,曾任中国驻新加坡大使。1990年进入北京大学法学院,军训期间入党,政审干净。这个时间节点很重要——1989年天安门事件之后,国家安全系统和情报系统开始大规模从当年入学的名校学生中招募人员,挑选标准是背景干净、政治可靠。孙海燕是那几届被招募的人之一,很可能在大学期间就已经进入了情报系统。

1995年本科毕业后,她公派赴日本攻读法学硕士。那个年代能够公派出国的人,要么家庭背景过硬,要么已经和某个系统建立了关系。她1997年回国,直接进入中联部,第一个岗位是政策研究室。研究室是中联部的情报分析核心,对外可以挂学者头衔,实际上生产的是供高层阅读的战略情报报告。她在这里一路做到副主任,然后转任中联部一局副局长、局长。

中联部一局负责的是南亚和东南亚的政党运动,也就是马来西亚共产党、泰国共产党、缅甸共产党这些组织的总负责部门。换句话说,孙海燕从情报分析起步,最终成为情报行动的具体负责人。后来她去新加坡当大使,是为了给自己的履历做一层包装——副部级以上的官员需要公开履历,如果简历上全是中联部的各局各处,太过扎眼,挂一段大使经历,对外就成了外交系统出身的人。

这种包装不是孙海燕一个人的做法,而是整个系统的惯例。

与孙海燕形成对比的是刘建超。他是正宗的外交部系统出身,后来被调入中联部担任部长。他高调访美、会见布林肯,以中联部部长的身份做外交部长该做的事,在中联部内部是严重越界。外交是台面上的事,中联部做的是台面下的事,两套系统的逻辑完全不同。刘建超搞不懂这个区别,或者说他根本不在乎,因为他的目标是接任王毅的外事办主任位置,中联部不过是一个跳板。这是他后来出事的根本原因。

一个从大学时代就被招募、在系统内部成长了三十年的情报官员,和一个空降进来走过场的外交系统官员,在同一个机构里,活在完全不同的世界。这个对比,本身就说明了中联部是什么。

中联部在1971年成立了内部研究组,后来扩展为研究室,对外可以挂教授、学者的头衔,实际上是战略情报和政党情报的分析中心。到了九十年代,研究室的部分成果开始对外发行,就是现在还存在的《当代世界》杂志。这是冰山一角,水面以下的东西,从来不对外公开。

2003年到2004年间,中联部经历了一次大规模重建。这次重建不是换人,而是换功能。工作重心从政党交流和情报分析,开始向情报收集乃至情报行动方向转移。配合当时启动的大外宣工程,中联部开始系统性地介入各国议会政党,扶持小党,安插人员,干预选举。德国人后来花了二十年才意识到的事情,正是从这个阶段开始的。

在中联部的内部逻辑里,它扶持的那些组织和人员都是棋子。棋子有用的时候,给钱给枪给顾问。棋子没用的时候,一个电话通知停止援助,然后假装从来不认识。缅北丛林里哭着冲锋的中国年轻人,马来西亚丛林里打了四十年的华人游击队,约旦监狱里的中国顾问,中东沙漠里流亡的日本赤军——他们都以为自己在为某种理想战斗。他们不知道,在北京的某间办公室里,有人随时可以决定他们的命运,就像扔掉一颗用过的棋子一样简单。

这个系列,就是要把这只手背后的故事,一件一件讲清楚。

编辑:李晶    校对:周敏 翻译:沈美花

The Party’s Pawns: A Secret History of the CCP’s Export of Revolution

Author: Tuo Xianrun

Part I: The Hand Behind the Curtain

In northern Burma in 1969, a group of young Chinese people were running up a mountain in tears.

They carried ammunition but had no guns. Their mission was to deliver the ammunition to the tunnels at the top of the mountain for the comrades holding out inside. From the staging area to the foot of the mountain was about one kilometer; American artillery fire had turned this kilometer into a corridor of death. A survivor later recalled using high-powered binoculars to watch more than a hundred people charge out—after the artillery smoke cleared, only three people made it into the tunnels. The next day, another group of people charged upward in tears.

These people were Chinese Red Guards, members of the defeated factions from the factional violent clashes of the Cultural Revolution. Someone had quietly told them that if they went to Burma to fight, their political stains could be wiped clean with a single stroke; returning after the war would count as participating in the revolution, and everything in the past would be forgiven. Thus, they crossed the border and joined the guerrilla forces of the Communist Party of Burma (CPB). At the peak, there were more than 10,000 Chinese people fighting in the jungles of northern Burma.

No one told them that within the CPB, there was a secret directive: this group of Chinese was to be placed on the front lines of combat to be gradually consumed.

They were not soldiers; they were cannon fodder. And the person who decided their fate sat in an office in Beijing, having never once set foot in Burma.

During the same period, half a globe away in Jordan, a group of Palestinian guerrilla fighters was captured by the Jordanian army. King Hussein of Jordan ordered that a specific group among them be isolated and detained separately from the other prisoners. This group consisted neither of Palestinians nor Jordanians; they were Chinese—military advisors blended into the Palestinian Fatah armed forces.

They taught Arabs how to fight in the desert, teaching Mao Zedong Thought, teaching “encircling the cities from the countryside,” and teaching how to establish grassroots mass organizations. This incident was later suppressed; both the Jordanian government and the Chinese government did not want to blow it out of proportion. Consequently, this group was quietly repatriated, and this piece of history vanished from public records.

Further north, in Flushing, New York, an unwritten rule circulated within the Chinese community: if intelligence personnel sent from China got into trouble, as long as they ran into Flushing, they could safely change their identities or leave the United States. This rule is not recent; its foundations began to be established in the 1930s. After decades of management, Flushing had become a safe zone that any external force found very difficult to penetrate.

In Japan, when a woman named Fusako Shigenobu was arrested in 2000, her passport contained records of entering China more than twenty times, and her total cumulative time living in Beijing was nearly two years. She was the leader of the Japanese Red Army, a core figure in a terrorist organization that had operated in the Middle East for decades. The Japanese Metropolitan Police Department believed that the Japanese Red Army maintained a secret base in China. The Chinese government neither admitted nor denied this.

The Chinese sent-down youth charging in tears through the jungles of northern Burma, the Chinese advisors isolated in Jordanian prisons, the secret networks deep within New York’s Chinatown, and the Japanese terrorists with verifiable records in Beijing—these stories took place in different countries and different eras, seemingly completely unrelated. Yet, behind them, the exact same hand was pulling the strings.

This hand is called the ILD (International Liaison Department).

The full name of the ILD is the International Liaison Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, formally established in 1951. Its official definition is an institution responsible for conducting exchanges and cooperation with political parties of various countries, making it sound like a protocol department dedicated to receiving foreign guests, exchanging gifts, and issuing joint statements. In 2024, the German Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV) issued a formal warning to the Bundestag, stating that the ILD is an intelligence organization and urging German politicians to heighten their vigilance. When this warning was issued, the ILD had already existed for more than seventy years. It took the Germans twenty years to figure out who their opponent was.

This was not because the Germans were stupid, but because this institution inherently did not want you to know what it was.

The most core function of the ILD has never been “liaison,” but rather penetration. It incubated and controlled multiple communist parties in Southeast Asia, supported armed organizations in the Middle East, established secret base networks in the United States, and cultivated far-left forces in Japan. The tools it utilized included firearms and ammunition, clandestine radio stations, fake passports, political advisors, gang organizations, and election interference. It did all of this without ever appearing in the name of the Chinese government.

To understand what the ILD is, one can look at a specific individual.

Sun Haiyan, a former Vice Minister of the ILD, once served as China’s Ambassador to Singapore. In 1990, she entered the Peking University Law School, joining the Party during her mandatory military training period, having a clean political background check. This time node is highly critical—after the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989, the national security and intelligence systems began large-scale recruitment of students who entered prestigious universities that year, with selection criteria requiring a clean background and political reliability. Sun Haiyan was among those recruited from those cohorts, very likely entering the intelligence system during her university years.

After graduating with her bachelor’s degree in 1995, she went to Japan on a government sponsorship to pursue a master’s degree in law. In that era, people who could secure government sponsorship to go abroad either had exceptionally strong family backgrounds or had already established a relationship with a particular system. Returning to China in 1997, she directly entered the ILD, with her first post being in the Policy Research Office. The Research Office is the core of intelligence analysis within the ILD; externally it can use the title of “scholars,” but in reality, it produces strategic intelligence reports for top-level reading. She rose through the ranks here to become Deputy Director, and was subsequently transferred to serve as Deputy Director-General and then Director-General of the First Bureau of the ILD.

The First Bureau of the ILD is responsible for party movements in South and Southeast Asia—meaning it is the overall management department for organizations like the Communist Party of Malaya, the Communist Party of Thailand, and the Communist Party of Burma. In other words, Sun Haiyan started from intelligence analysis and ultimately became the concrete head of intelligence operations. Her later appointment as Ambassador to Singapore was to add a layer of packaging to her resume—officials at or above the vice-ministerial level require public resumes. If a resume is entirely composed of various bureaus and offices of the ILD, it appears too conspicuous; attaching a stint as an ambassador makes her appear externally as someone from the foreign affairs system.

This kind of packaging is not Sun Haiyan’s practice alone, but a conventional practice across the entire system.

Contrasting with Sun Haiyan is Liu Jianchao.He emerged from the authentic Ministry of Foreign Affairs system and was later transferred to the ILD to serve as Minister. He visited the United States in a high-profile manner and met with Antony Blinken, performing duties meant for a Foreign Minister in his capacity as ILD Minister, which constituted a severe overstepping of boundaries within the ILD. Diplomacy is a matter above the table, whereas the ILD handles matters below the table; the logic of the two systems is completely different. Liu Jianchao failed to comprehend this distinction, or rather, he simply did not care, because his goal was to succeed Wang Yi as the Director of the Office of the Central Foreign Affairs Commission, and the ILD was merely a stepping stone. This was the root cause of his subsequent downfall.

An intelligence official recruited since university days who grew within the system for thirty years, and a foreign affairs system official parachuted in just to pass through—living under the roof of the same institution, they inhabited completely different worlds. This contrast, in and of itself, explains what the ILD is.

In 1971, the ILD established an internal research group, which later expanded into the Research Office. Externally, staff could hold titles like professors and scholars, but in reality, it served as an analysis center for strategic and political party intelligence. By the 1990s, some outputs of the Research Office began to be distributed externally, which is the still-existing Contemporary World magazine. This is merely the tip of the iceberg; what lies beneath the surface has never been disclosed to the public.

Between 2003 and 2004, the ILD underwent a large-scale restructuring. This restructuring was not a change of personnel, but a shift in function. The focus of its work began to pivot from political party exchanges and intelligence analysis toward intelligence collection and even intelligence operations. In coordination with the “Grand External Propaganda Project” launched at that time, the ILD began systematically intervening in foreign parliamentary political parties, nurturing minor parties, embedding personnel, and interfering in elections. The development that the Germans took twenty years to realize began precisely during this phase.

Within the internal logic of the ILD, the organizations and personnel it nurtures are all pawns. When a pawn is useful, it is given money, guns, and advisors. When a pawn is no longer useful, a phone call is placed to terminate aid, followed by a pretense of never having known them. The young Chinese charging in tears through the jungles of northern Burma, the ethnic Chinese guerrillas who fought for forty years in the Malaysian jungles, the Chinese advisors in Jordanian prisons, and the exiled Japanese Red Army in the Middle Eastern deserts—they all believed they were fighting for some ideal. They did not know that in a certain office in Beijing, someone could decide their fate at any moment, as easily as discarding a used pawn.

This series aims to clarify the stories behind this hand, piece by piece.

Editor: Li Jing Proofreader: Zhou Min Translator: Shen Meihua

探望被精神病拘禁三年的访民李小生,我却遭到围殴

0

作者:陆建荣

江苏泰兴黄坍村,小生维权终落难。虎狼环伺奸计毒,精神病院关三年。母亲病故终得出,丧事未完欲收监。鹰犬爪牙紧身随,围殴建荣防外援,一个耳光加拳脚,退伍军人淫威显,报警只抓报警人,公安四年不立案。次次反映虚假了,民声渠道全空转。 江苏省泰兴市黄桥镇殷坍村访民李小生被精神病非法拘禁三年。2022年9月13日,我得知李小生母亲过世,李小生被准许回家治丧。作为之前的好友,我也去黄桥镇小殷家桥西侧李小生妹妹家出席哀悼仪式,顺便了解一下李小生目前的情况。

刚开始跟李小生交流时,他说不认识我,后来我起身出门,让他到院子外面走走,他说外面有人,我说有人也不可能限制你自由走动的权利,你不出去走走怎么知道。于是我们一起走到院子外面的路上说了几句话。不一会儿就有一个60岁左右的中年妇女过来问我是什么人(后查明此人为原黄坍村书记黄兰珍),并一下子喊来四五个人说我是来带李小生走的,要看着我,不让我走,并打了电话给他们一个领头的人。

这三五个人开始对我进行语言上来挑衅和侮辱,因为对这些人根本没有任何道理可讲,我只说了一句“愚昧”,他们就说我骂他们。后来那个领头的人来了(后查明此人为黄坍村二十组六号村民黄正国),冲过来就打了我一个耳光。然后五六个人对我拳脚相加,有人揪我的头发,有人用拳头打,有人用脚踢,把我打倒在地。他们一边打还一边说“怎么不经打”。

我被打的时候引起了多人围观,然后他们就把我往人少的地方拖。李小生的大妹妹看到我被围殴没有出面阻止,反而把李小生拉进屋里去了。这也是被他们平时的邪恶吓破了胆。虽然这次围殴对我们身体上没有造成太大伤害,但对我人格的侮辱和精神的损伤是极大的。现场也有人对黄正国一帮人的野蛮行为进行谴责,但无法制止他们嚣张的气焰。于是我打电话报警。他们见我报警说打电话正好,好像警察跟他们是一伙的似的。过了一会儿,110来了,他们简单了解了情况以后就有一个警员拉着我的衣服.好像生怕我跑了似的,并让我上警车去派出所处理。我当时向出警人员提出异议:为什么只带我走,打人的人不带走?出警人员敷衍说他们自己开车去。我说他们为什么可以开车去,而我不可以开车去?后来就被出警人员强行推上了车,在车上他们想收走我的手机。我感觉黄桥派出所动机不纯,虽然手机里什么都没有,我还是把手机扳断了。

在派出所一直被派出所关在审训室直到晚上12点才放我出来,至始至终也没有看到那帮非法监视及打人的人去派出所。

因为我没有手机也没有零钱,所以派出所的人就把我送回事发地去取车,我事先就估计在如此野蛮的地方,他们可能对我放在附近的车进行破坏。到达现场我查了一下,果然两个前轮车胎被他们放气了。在陪同民警帮助下,又折腾了一个多小时,喊来了汽车修理车花了150块钱,充好了气才回家。经过多次不间断的线上信访及公安局线下信访投诉,终于等来了黄桥派出所的回复,让我配合民警调查并提交相关证据。因为当时没有影像资料,所以取证环节相对困难,唯一的取证途径只有走访附近的居民。 走访中虽然附近的居民都听到或看到当时发生的群殴事件,但无一例外都不敢作证,也包括李小生的三个妹妹。走访时又听到附近居民反映,那天派出所把我带走后,他们让人把李小生再送到精神病院去。此时有附近居民开始反抗,有人拿起手机拍照,并高喊难道我们殷坍村都没有人了吗?然后其他村民纷纷响应,最后现任村支书也加入反对行列,最终把那些来带李小生的人赶走。被走访的村民纷纷感叹,如果当时李小生被带走的话,根本不可能活到现在! 四年来,我持续向有关部门反映自己遭围殴一事,但案件始终没有得到立案处理,多次投诉也未获得令人信服的结果。 对于普通公民而言,当依法报警、依法投诉、依法反映问题都难以获得公正回应时,人们最担心的不仅是一件案件的处理结果,更是法律应有的公平与公信力能否真正得到维护。

编辑:李晶  校对:周敏 翻译:沈美花

Visiting Li Xiaosheng, a Petitioner Detained in a Mental Hospital for Three Years, I Was Instead Gang-Beaten

Author: Lu Jianrong

Abstract: A true record of persecution suffered under the Communist Party, exposing the anti-human nature of the Communist Party.

In Huangtan Village, Taixing, Jiangsu, Xiaosheng defended his rights but ultimately fell into disaster. Surrounded by tigers and wolves with poisonous, treacherous schemes, he was locked in a mental hospital for three years. Released only because his mother passed away, they sought to detain him again before the funeral even concluded. Hawks, hounds, claws, and fangs followed closely at his heels, gang-beating Jianrong to prevent outside aid. With a slap to the face, punches, and kicks, the demobilized soldier displayed his tyrannical abuse. Calling the police resulted only in the caller being detained, and the public security Bureau has refused to file a case for four years. Time after time, reports were falsely resolved, and all channels for the voice of the people completely spun in a void.

Li Xiaosheng, a petitioner from Yintan Village, Huangqiao Town, Taixing City, Jiangsu Province, was illegally detained under the guise of mental illness for three years. On September 13, 2022, I learned that Li Xiaosheng’s mother had passed away and that Li Xiaosheng was permitted to return home to arrange the funeral. As a former close friend, I also went to the home of Li Xiaosheng’s younger sister, located on the west side of Xiaoyinjia Bridge in Huangqiao Town, to attend the mourning ceremony and, in the process, understand Li Xiaosheng’s current situation.

When I first began to converse with Li Xiaosheng, he said he did not recognize me. Later, I stood up to go outside and asked him to walk with me out into the courtyard. He said there were people outside. I replied that even if there were people, they could not restrict his right to move about freely, and asked how he would know without going out to take a walk. Thus, we walked together to the road outside the courtyard and spoke a few words. Shortly afterward, a middle-aged woman around 60 years old approached and asked who I was (it was later verified that this person was Huang Lanzhen, the former Party Secretary of Huangtan Village). She immediately called over four or five people, claiming I was there to take Li Xiaosheng away, and stated they needed to watch me and not let me leave. She also made a phone call to their leader.

These three to five people began to verbally provoke and insult me. Because there was absolutely no reasoning with such people, I merely said one word, “ignorant,” and they claimed I was cursing them. Later, their leader arrived (it was later verified that this person was Huang Zhengguo, a villager from Household No. 6, Group 20 of Huangtan Village). He rushed over and immediately slapped me across the face. Then, five or six people rained punches and kicks upon me; some grabbed my hair, some struck me with fists, and others kicked me, beating me to the ground. While they were beating me, they even said, “How can he be so incapable of taking a beating?”

The beating drew a crowd of onlookers, so they dragged me to a less populated spot. Li Xiaosheng’s eldest younger sister saw me being gang-beaten but did not step forward to stop it; instead, she pulled Li Xiaosheng into the house. This was also because her courage had been completely broken by their usual wickedness. Although this gang-beating did not cause extreme injury to our physical bodies, the insult to my dignity and the psychological damage were immense. Some people at the scene condemned the savage behavior of Huang Zhengguo and his gang, but they could not halt their arrogant aura. Consequently, I called the police. Seeing me call the police, they said making the call was just fine, as if the police were in league with them. After a while, the 110 emergency police arrived. After briefly assessing the situation, an officer grabbed my clothes, seemingly terrified that I might run away, and told me to get into the police cruiser to go to the police station for processing. I raised an objection to the responding officers at the time: Why are you only taking me away while the people who beat me are not being taken? The responding officers evasively claimed that those individuals would drive themselves there. I asked why they were allowed to drive themselves while I was not allowed to drive myself? Later, I was forcibly shoved into the vehicle by the responding officers. Inside the car, they attempted to confiscate my mobile phone. Feeling that the Huangqiao Police Station had impure motives, and even though there was nothing on the phone, I snapped the phone in half.

At the police station, I was locked inside an interrogation room until 12:00 midnight before being released. From beginning to end, I never saw that gang of individuals who carried out the illegal surveillance and beating appear at the police station.

Because I had no phone and no spare change, the personnel from the police station drove me back to the scene of the incident to retrieve my vehicle.I had anticipated beforehand that in such a savage place, they might sabotage the car I left nearby. Upon arriving at the scene, I checked and found that, as expected, the two front tires had been deflated by them. With the assistance of the accompanying police officer, after tossing about for over an hour, a car repair vehicle was called, costing 150 yuan to inflate the tires before I could return home. After numerous uninterrupted online petitions and offline complaints to the Public Security Bureau, a response from the Huangqiao Police Station finally arrived, asking me to cooperate with the police investigation and submit relevant evidence. Because there was no video or photographic material at the time, the evidence collection phase was relatively difficult; the only avenue for gathering evidence was to visit nearby residents.

During the visits, although the nearby residents had all heard or seen the gang-beating incident occur at the time, without exception, none dared to bear witness, including Li Xiaosheng’s three younger sisters. During these visits, I also heard reflections from nearby residents that after the police station took me away that day, those people intended to send Li Xiaosheng back to the mental hospital. At that moment, nearby residents began to resist; someone picked up a mobile phone to take photos and shouted loudly, “Can it be that there is no one left in our Yintan Village?” Then other villagers responded one after another. Finally, the current Village Party Secretary also joined the ranks of opposition, ultimately driving away the people who had come to take Li Xiaosheng. The residents who were visited sighed one after another, noting that if Li Xiaosheng had been taken away at that time, it would have been completely impossible for him to survive to this day!

For four years, I have continuously reported the matter of my being gang-beaten to the relevant departments, but the case has never been formally filed or processed, and multiple complaints have failed to yield a convincing result.

For ordinary citizens, when legally reporting to the police, legally filing complaints, and legally reporting problems all fail to obtain a just response, what people worry about most is not merely the outcome of a single case’s handling, but whether the fairness and public credibility that the law ought to possess can truly be maintained.

Editor: Li Jing Proofreader: Zhou Min Translator: Shen Meihua

从李斯的仓中鼠,看懂环境决定论

0

作者:概率鹿梦

民国有一件事,今天很多人听了会觉得反常识。

上海的工人,北京的人力车夫,一星期反而能吃上几顿肉。可关中那些家里有地的地主,平时吃的却很差,也就过年吃上点肉,平时连油泼面都没法天天吃。

美国学者史谦德在《北京的人力车夫:1920年代的市民与政治》里写过一个细节。

一个从河北逃难到北京的地主婆,住在西城小院里,有一天掀开隔壁人力车夫家的锅盖,看到的是白面馒头,韭菜炒鸡蛋,凉拌黄瓜,上还浇了蒜末和香油。她当场就愣住了。因为在她原来的认知里,自己家有二百亩地,照理说应该比这种连一垄地都没有的人过得体面。可现实恰恰相反。她家一年到头粗粮掺着吃,对方却能经常吃到白面。

书里还提到,北京的人力车夫一星期至少能见几次荤腥。未必是什么大鱼大肉,可能只是下水,可能只是几片肉,但至少不是长期不沾肉味。反过来看山河四省不少地主,真正吃肉往往要等到年节,平时连白面都舍不得敞开吃。

民国没有现代意义上的冷链,没有成熟的仓储系统,也没有今天这种可以把物资高效率铺到全国的物流网络。北京、上海这样的大城市,物资天然汇集,交易更密,流通更快,哪怕只是从城市缝隙里漏出来的资源,也足够让底层人分到一点油水。

可在中原和关中,哪怕你是地主,也只是守着土地。土地能产主粮,不代表能自动变成丰富的副食。当地没有足够发达的交换网络,也没有那么强的商品供给,地主也不会轻易拿好地去大规模养猪养鸡,顶多散养几只,图个过年应景。结果就是,账面上看有地,有产出,有身份,实际吃的并不好。

所以很多人对旧中国的想象是错的。他们总以为地主一定顿顿细粮,城里苦力一定食不果腹。

为什么造成这种现象?

中原地区的地主,手里虽然有地,但所处的社会结构、流通效率、物资丰裕程度,根本不是一个级别。他拥有的是局部优势,不是系统优势。局部优势一旦离开大环境托举,含金量会迅速缩水。

大城市具有财富溢出效应,我举个现代的例子,香港,别看香港房价非常贵,但是香港收入很高,购买力就强,他们来内地旅游,买内地的商品,购买内地的服务,反而性价比特别高。200块钱如果放在山东的小县城,可能非常值钱了,能从山东大集上吃一周。但在香港也就是一顿晚饭。

同理,北京那些土著,卖一套房子就顶我们济南人奋斗一辈子的,这也是李斯那句仓中鼠和厕中鼠真正厉害的地方。

李斯两千多年前看见厕所里的老鼠和粮仓里的老鼠,突然明白了这个道理。老鼠还是那只老鼠,差别却大得离谱。住在厕所里的,只吃污秽,天天吃不饱还提心吊胆,见到人和狗就乱窜。住在粮仓里的,吃积粟,躲在大屋之下,没有惊扰,没有饥寒。于是李斯说,人之贤不肖譬如鼠矣,在所自处耳。

这句话很多人都听过,它直接戳破了一个现实:人与人之间巨大的差距,常常不是从能力开始拉开的,而是从环境开始拉开的。你站在厕所边上,再聪明,也要先为活着发愁。你待在粮仓里,哪怕本事没大到惊天动地,也更容易活得体面。

平台不一样,看到的世界不一样,能分到的资源也不一样。你以为地主一定比车夫过得好,恰恰说明你低估了环境对人的塑造,也高估了有产者这三个字的含金量。

所以李斯后来做的第一件大事,不是苦练能力,不是原地熬资历,而是换地方。他离开楚国,去了秦国。他知道继续待在原来的环境里,天花板早就写好了。一个人最怕的,不是眼下吃苦,是真把低处当成了命运,把困局当成了理所应当,把那些消耗当成了成长。

很多人读历史,总喜欢赞叹成功者的才能。李斯有才能,这没问题,但真正让他翻身的那一步,是先看懂了环境。这个判断比很多所谓努力都重要。方向错了,勤奋只会把人更快送进死胡同,让人撞南墙。位置不够好,能力会被压成生存工具,根本长不成资本。资源薄,机会少,规则坏,人再硬,也很难把自己从泥里拔出来。

贫穷并不只是财富的多寡,贫穷首先是一种资源匮乏的处境。你处在一个资源稀薄的地方,周围没有高质量的信息,没有成熟的分工,没有稳定的信用,没有足够大的市场,你就算比别人更勤快,也只能在小池塘里扑腾。你看到的天花板,很可能不是你的能力上限,是环境先把上限封死了。

说到底,贫穷有三层。

第一层最浅,叫缺钱。这个谁都看得见。

第二层更深,叫缺资源。你想做点事,找不到人合作,找不到渠道,找不到信息,找不到更大的盘子。

第三层最致命,叫待错环境却不自知。很多人一辈子困在第三层。他们很努力,也很能吃苦,也愿意忍,但始终没有离开那个不断消耗他的环境。最后能力没有被放大,时间被浪费了。

这也是为什么有些人换个城市,命运就松动了。有些人换个行业,收入结构立刻变了。有些人进入更高一级的平台,原来不值钱的本事忽然就值钱了。外人看着像逆袭,其实没那么玄妙,无非是从厕中鼠挪到了仓中鼠旁边。人还是那个人,能量却完全不同。因为平台会给能力定价,环境会给努力结算,系统会决定你一分力气能换来多少回报。

很多穷人最大的问题,不在于不努力,在于对贫穷的理解太道德化了。他们总觉得穷是自己不够拼,不够狠,不够能熬。于是拼命打磨自己,咬牙忍耐,逼着自己继续适应烂环境。最后发现自己越来越累,处境没什么变化。原因很简单,你在错误的地方自我加压,只会让系统更高效地榨干你,就是一句俗话:你越能干活,干的活就会越多。一个人长期待在低势能环境里,连痛苦都会被合理化,他会把本该逃离的地方,当成修行之地。

什么天将降大任于斯人也,什么一切都是最好的安排,这都是把痛苦合理化,自我安慰,然后继续接受生活的鞭打。

李斯厉害就厉害在这里。他没有歌颂苦难,也没有美化出身。他看了一眼老鼠,就把很多人一生都没想通的问题想明白了。你活在井里,你必然认为世界就那么大。

当然,环境重要,不等于能力无用。能力依然重要,只是它的发挥有前提。你至少得先进入一个让能力有机会沉淀、有机会交换、有机会增值的地方。否则能力会退化成廉价劳动力,见识会退化成生存经验,聪明也只够用来规避风险。

很多人喜欢讲逆天改命,听着热血。可绝大多数普通人的命运变化,没有那么戏剧化,也没有那么传奇。真正有效的一步,通常很朴素,就是先离开那个把你越待越穷的地方。离开一套坏规则,离开一个低密度市场,离开一群只会拉你向左的人,离开一个看似能活却很难积累的系统。这个动作,往往比埋头苦干重要得多。

所以,两千年前李斯看透的是贫穷的底层结构。穷,不只是口袋里少了几个钱。穷,是你身边没有粮仓,头顶没有屋檐,背后没有系统。

很多人一生都在证明自己能吃苦。其实真正重要的,是别总待在只能吃苦的地方。

编辑:李晶 校对:周敏 翻译:戈冰

Understanding Environmental Determinism from Li Si’s Granary Rats

Author: Gailu Lumeng (Probability Deer Dream)

Abstract: Reflecting on the survival dilemma faced by today’s Chinese people under the tyranny of the Communist Party from a historical story.

There was an event during the Republic of China era that many people today would find counterintuitive upon hearing it.

Workers in Shanghai and rickshaw pullers in Beijing could, on the contrary, afford to eat meat several times a week. Yet landlords in Guanzhong who owned land in their hometowns usually ate very poorly, only getting to eat a bit of meat during the Chinese New Year, and they could not even afford to eat oil-splashed noodles every day in their ordinary lives.

The American scholar David Strand, in his book Rickshaw Beijing: City People and Politics in the 1920s, wrote about a specific detail.

A landlord’s wife who had fled from Hebei to Beijing as a refugee was living in a small courtyard in the West City district. One day, she lifted the pot lid at the home of her neighbor, a rickshaw puller, and saw white flour mantou (steamed buns), stir-fried eggs with garlic chives, and cold tossed cucumbers drizzled with minced garlic and sesame oil. She froze on the spot. Because in her original perception, her family owned two hundred mu of land, and logically speaking, she should have lived more decently than someone like this who did not even own a single ridge of land. Yet the reality was exactly the opposite. Her family ate coarse grains mixed into their diet all year round, while the counterpart could frequently eat white flour.

The book also mentioned that rickshaw pullers in Beijing could see meat at least a few times a week. It was not necessarily major dishes of fish or meat; it might just be offal, or perhaps just a few slices of meat, but at least they were not going without the taste of meat for long periods. Looking conversely at many landlords in the “Four Mountain-and-River Provinces” (Shanxi, Shandong, Henan, and Hebei), truly eating meat often required waiting until the year-end festivals, and normally they could not even bring themselves to eat white flour without restraint.

During the Republic of China era, there was no cold chain in the modern sense, no mature warehousing system, and no logistics network like today’s that can distribute goods and materials to the entire country with high efficiency. In large cities like Beijing and Shanghai, resources naturally converged, transactions were denser, and circulation was faster; even if it was just the resources leaking from the cracks of the city, it was enough for the people at the bottom to get a share of the grease.

However, in the Central Plains and Guanzhong, even if you were a landlord, you were merely guarding the land. That land could produce staple grains, but that did not mean it could automatically turn into an abundance of non-staple foods. The local area lacked a sufficiently developed exchange network and did not have such strong commodity supplies. Landlords would not easily use good land to raise pigs and chickens on a large scale either; at most, they would raise a few free-range ones just to fit the festive atmosphere of the Chinese New Year. The result was that while on paper they had land, output, and status, in reality, they ate poorly.

Therefore, many people’s imagination of old China is wrong. They always assume that landlords must have eaten fine grains at every meal, while urban coolies must have suffered from starvation.

Why did this phenomenon occur?

Although landlords in the Central Plains region had land in their hands, the social structure, circulation efficiency, and degree of material abundance in which they were situated were simply not on the same level. What he possessed was a local advantage, not a systemic advantage. Once a local advantage leaves the support of the macro-environment, its value will rapidly shrink.

Large cities possess a wealth spillover effect. To give a modern example: Hong Kong. Do not look at how expensive housing prices are in Hong Kong; because incomes in Hong Kong are very high, their purchasing power is strong. When they come to the Mainland to travel, buy Mainland commodities, and purchase Mainland services, it conversely feels like an especially high value for money. If 200 yuan is placed in a small county seat in Shandong, it might be extremely valuable, enough to eat from a Shandong country market for a week. But in Hong Kong, it is just a single dinner.

By the same token, for those Beijing natives, selling a single house is equivalent to what we Jinan people struggle for a lifetime to achieve. This is also where the true brilliance of Li Si’s line about the granary rats and toilet rats lies.

More than two thousand years ago, when Li Si saw the rats in the toilet and the rats in the granary, he suddenly understood this truth. A rat was still that same rat, yet the difference was ridiculously vast. Those living in the toilet ate only filth, never filling their bellies day after day while remaining on tenterhooks, scurrying about whenever they saw humans and dogs. Those living in the granary ate accumulated grain, hid beneath great roofs, experiencing no disturbances, no hunger, and no cold. Thereupon, Li Si said: “Whether a person is worthy or unworthy is just like these rats; it simply depends on where one chooses to place oneself.”

Many people have heard this sentence, and it directly punctures a reality: the massive gap between people often does not start widening from capability, but starts widening from environment. If you stand by the side of a toilet, no matter how clever you are, you must first worry about staying alive. If you stay inside a granary, even if your skills are not earth-shatteringly great, it is much easier to live decently.

When the platform is different, the world you see is different, and the resources you can be allocated are also different. Your assumption that a landlord must live better than a rickshaw puller precisely shows that you underestimate the shaping of humans by the environment, and also overestimate the value of the three words “the propertied class.”

Therefore, the first major thing Li Si did later on was not to practice his capabilities painstakingly, nor to stay put and build up seniority, but to change locations. He left the State of Chu and went to the State of Qin. He knew that if he continued to stay in his original environment, the ceiling had already been written long ago. What a person fears most is not suffering at the moment, but truly mistaking the low ground for fate, treating a dilemma as a matter of course, and mistaking those depletions for growth.

When reading history, many people always like to marvel at the talent of winners. Li Si had talent, and there is no question about that, but the step that truly allowed him to turn his life around was first understanding the environment. This judgment is more important than many instances of so-called hard work. If the direction is wrong, diligence will only send a person into a dead end faster, causing them to run into a brick wall. If the position is not good enough, capability will be compressed into a mere survival tool and cannot grow into capital at all. When resources are thin, opportunities are scarce, and rules are bad, no matter how tough a person is, it is very difficult to pull oneself out of the mud.

Poverty is not merely the amount of wealth one possesses; poverty is, first and foremost, a situation of resource scarcity. When you are in a place where resources are thin, where there is no high-quality information, no mature division of labor, no stable credit, and no sufficiently large market around you, even if you are more diligent than others, you can only splash around in a small pond. The ceiling you see is, in all probability, not the upper limit of your capability, but rather the upper limit that the environment has sealed off in advance.

In the final analysis, there are three layers to poverty.

The first layer is the shallowest, called lacking money. Everyone can see this.

The second layer runs deeper, called lacking resources. You want to get something done, but you cannot find people to cooperate with, cannot find channels, cannot find information, and cannot find a larger plate.

The third layer is the most fatal, called staying in the wrong environment without realizing it. Many people are trapped in this third layer for their entire lives. They work very hard, can endure hardships, and are willing to tolerate things, but they never leave that environment which continuously depletes them. In the end, their capabilities are not magnified, and their time is wasted.

This is also why for some people, once they switch to a different city, their destiny begins to loosen up. For some people, once they change industries, their income structure changes immediately. For some people, once they enter a higher-level platform, the skills that were originally worthless suddenly become valuable. To outsiders, it looks like a counterattack against all odds, but in reality, it is not that mysterious—it is nothing more than moving from being a toilet rat to sitting beside a granary rat. The person is still that same person, yet the energy is completely different. Because the platform will price your capability, the environment will settle the accounts for your hard work, and the system will determine how much return a single unit of your effort can bring back.

The biggest problem for many poor people does not lie in their lack of hard work, but in the fact that their understanding of poverty is overly moralized. They always feel that being poor is because they themselves are not driven enough, not ruthless enough, and not resilient enough to endure. Consequently, they desperately polish themselves, grit their teeth to endure, and force themselves to continue adapting to a rotten environment. In the end, they discover that they are getting tireder and tireder, while their situation sees no change. The reason is simple: when you apply pressure on yourself in the wrong place, it will only cause the system to drain you more efficiently, which aligns with the common saying: the more capable you are at doing work, the more work you will get to do. When a person stays in a low-potential-energy environment for a long time, even suffering will be rationalized; he will mistake a place he should have escaped from for a place of spiritual cultivation.

Sayings like “when Heaven is about to place a great responsibility on a person…” or “everything is the best arrangement”—these are all just rationalizing suffering, comforting oneself, and then continuing to accept the whipping of life.

This is precisely where Li Si was brilliant. He did not sing praises of hardships, nor did he beautify his background. He took one look at the rats and understood the problem that many people fail to figure out in a lifetime. When you live inside a well, you will inevitably believe that the world is only that big.

Of course, the importance of environment does not mean capability is useless. Capability remains important, but its utilization requires a prerequisite. You must at least first enter a place that gives capability an opportunity to accumulate, an opportunity to be exchanged, and an opportunity to add value. Otherwise, capability will degenerate into cheap labor, insight will degenerate into survival experience, and cleverness will only be enough to evade risks.

Many people like to talk about changing one’s destiny against Heaven’s will, which sounds passionate. Yet the changes in destiny for the vast majority of ordinary people are not that dramatic, nor are they that legendary. The truly effective step is usually very simple, which is to first leave that place which makes you poorer the longer you stay. Leave a set of bad rules, leave a low-density market, leave a group of people who only pull you to the left, and leave a system that seems to allow you to survive but makes it very difficult to accumulate. This action is often far more important than burying one’s head in hard work.

Therefore, what Li Si saw through two thousand years ago was the underlying structure of poverty. Being poor is not just having a few less coins in your pocket. Being poor means there is no granary by your side, no roof over your head, and no system behind your back.

Many people spend their entire lives proving that they can endure hardships. In reality, what is truly important is to not always stay in a place where you can only endure hardships.

Editor: Li Jing Proofreader: Zhou Min Translator: Ge Bing

清算中共百年暴政,迎回属于人民的尊严与自由

0
清算中共百年暴政,迎回属于人民的尊严与自由

作者:刘乐园

在所谓“七一建党节”即将到来之际,我们不应随中共的宣传机器一起歌功颂德,而应翻开一张跨越百年的历史账单,严肃清算这个极权政党给中华民族、给中国人民、给无数家庭带来的深重灾难。

中共的历史,从来不是一部所谓“解放人民”的历史,而是一部以谎言夺权、以暴力治国、以恐惧奴役人民的血泪史。从土地改革中的暴力斗争,到反右运动中对知识分子的整肃;从大跃进造成的大饥荒,到文化大革命中对人性、家庭、文化和信仰的摧毁;从“六四”天安门广场上的坦克碾压,到对法轮功、家庭教会、维权律师、异议人士和普通上访民众的持续迫害,中共统治下的中国,充满了无数被掩盖的冤魂与苦难。

更令人唏嘘的是,当年那些起义、投诚或被整编的原国民党官兵,也未能善终。不少原国民党官兵在整编后被编入部队,在当时的政治和军事体制下几乎没有选择,只能参加朝鲜战争,并在战场上付出了生命代价;一些幸存者在战争结束后又经历了后续政治运动和清查,而朝鲜战场上部分投降后选择返回中国大陆的国军官兵,也被中共视为叛徒对待。历史证明,所谓的“既往不咎”不过是一句空话,留下的只有一次又一次对人的利用与政治清算。

这个政权最可怕之处,不只是它制造灾难,更是它不允许人民记住灾难;不只是它伤害人民,更是它逼迫人民感谢伤害者。它用教科书篡改历史,用媒体封锁真相,用监控和警察压制声音,用恐惧让人沉默。一个拥有五千年文明的古老民族,被它强行关进一党专政的精神牢笼之中。

改革开放一度让许多人误以为中国会逐步走向开放与法治,但近年来,言论管控不断加强,社会控制持续收紧,个人自由进一步受到限制,极权体制不仅没有退出历史舞台,反而以新的形式不断强化。

今天的中国,表面的繁荣正在迅速破灭。青年失业,中年负债,老人养老无依;房地产烂尾,民营企业凋零,普通家庭一生积蓄被掏空。地方财政枯竭后,各种罚款、收费、盘剥层出不穷。所谓“为人民服务”,早已变成权贵阶层对人民最后一点血汗的榨取。

更令人愤怒的是,当人民遭受不公时,体制并不保护受害者,反而保护作恶者。农民失地无人管,工人讨薪被打压,上访者被截访,信仰者被监控,敢说真话的人被威胁、拘押甚至判刑。在中共统治下,法律不是保护人民的盾牌,而是打压人民的工具。

我之所以站出来发声,是因为我深知,一个没有言论自由、没有信仰自由、没有司法独立的国家,普通人随时都可能成为下一个受害者。今天被迫害的是别人,明天就可能轮到自己。沉默不能换来安全,退让也不能换来自由。只有越来越多的人站出来揭露真相,极权的高墙才会出现裂缝。

我们在海外发声,不是为了仇恨,而是为了公义;不是为了制造对立,而是为了让历史真相不再被掩埋。我们要告诉世界:中共不等于中国,中共更不代表中国人民。真正的中国,是那些在苦难中仍然坚守良知的人,是那些不愿向谎言低头的人,是那些渴望自由、尊严和信仰权利的普通百姓。

百年暴政,必须清算;百年谎言,必须揭穿;百年血债,必须被历史审判。中共靠谎言起家,靠暴力维持,靠恐惧统治,但没有任何独裁政权能够永远站在人民的头上。高墙再厚,也挡不住人心觉醒;黑夜再长,也终将迎来黎明。

我们相信,真正属于中国人民的那一天终会到来。那一天,人民不再因说真话而恐惧,不再因信仰而被迫害,不再因追求公义而被威胁。那一天,中国将摆脱一党专制的阴影,重新迎回属于人民的尊严、自由与光明。

清算中共百年暴政,迎回属于人民的尊严与自由

编辑:黄吉洲 校对:程筱筱 翻译:戈冰

Liquidating the Century of Tyranny of the Chinese Communist Party, Welcoming Back the Dignity and Freedom Belonging to the People

Author: Liu Leyuan

On the eve of the approaching so-called “July 1st Party Founding Day,” we should not sing praises along with the Chinese Communist Party’s propaganda machine, but should instead open a historical ledger spanning a century to seriously liquidate the profound disasters this totalitarian party has brought upon the Chinese nation, the Chinese people, and countless families.

The history of the Chinese Communist Party has never been a history of the so-called “liberation of the people,” but is a history of blood and tears characterized by seizing power through lies, governing the country through violence, and enslaving the people through fear. From the violent struggles during the Land Reform to the rectification of intellectuals in the Anti-Rightist Movement; from the Great Famine caused by the Great Leap Forward to the destruction of human nature, family, culture, and faith during the Cultural Revolution; from the crushing of tanks on Tiananmen Square during “June Fourth” to the continuous persecution of Falun Gong, house churches, human rights lawyers, dissidents, and ordinary petitioning citizens, China under the rule of the Chinese Communist Party is filled with countless covered-up aggrieved souls and suffering.

What is even more lamentable is that those former Nationalist Party (Kuomintang) officers and soldiers who revolted, surrendered, or were reorganized back then also failed to meet a good end. Many former Nationalist officers and soldiers were incorporated into units after reorganization, having almost no choice under the political and military systems of the time but to participate in the Korean War, and paid the price of their lives on the battlefield; some survivors experienced subsequent political movements and investigations after the war ended, while a portion of the Nationalist soldiers on the Korean battlefield who chose to return to Mainland China after surrendering were also treated as traitors by the Chinese Communist Party. History has proven that the so-called “let bygones be bygones” was nothing but an empty promise, leaving behind only the repeated exploitation of people and political liquidations.

The most terrifying aspect of this regime is not only that it creates disasters, but more so that it does not allow the people to remember the disasters; it is not only that it harms the people, but more so that it forces the people to thank the harmer. It uses textbooks to falsify history, media to block the truth, surveillance and police to suppress voices, and fear to make people silent. An ancient nation possessing five thousand years of civilization has been forcibly locked by it inside the spiritual cage of a one-party dictatorship.

The Reform and Opening Up once mistakenly led many people to believe that China would gradually move toward openness and the rule of law, but in recent years, control over speech has been continuously tightened, social control has persistently constricted, and personal freedom has been further restricted; the totalitarian system has not only failed to exit the stage of history, but is instead continuously reinforcing itself in new forms.

In today’s China, the superficial prosperity is rapidly collapsing. The youth are unemployed, the middle-aged are debt-ridden, and the elderly are left without support in their old age; real estate projects are left unfinished, private enterprises are withering away, and the lifelong savings of ordinary families are being hollowed out. Following the depletion of local government finances, various fines, fees, and extortions are emerging one after another. The so-called “serving the people” has long since turned into the ruling elite’s extraction of the very last bit of the people’s blood and sweat.

What enrages people even more is that when the people suffer injustice, the system does not protect the victims, but instead protects the perpetrators. Farmers lose their land with no one looking after them, workers face suppression when demanding their back pay, petitioners are intercepted, believers are monitored, and people who dare to speak the truth are threatened, detained, or even sentenced. Under the rule of the Chinese Communist Party, the law is not a shield to protect the people, but a tool to suppress them.

The reason I stand up to voice my opinion is because I know full well that in a country without freedom of speech, without freedom of belief, and without judicial independence, ordinary people can become the next victim at any moment. Today, those being persecuted are others; tomorrow, it could be oneself. Silence cannot trade for safety, and backing down cannot trade for freedom. Only when more and more people stand up to expose the truth will cracks appear in the high walls of totalitarianism.

We raise our voices overseas not for hatred, but for justice; not to create antagonism, but to ensure that historical truth is no longer buried. We want to tell the world: the Chinese Communist Party does not equal China, and the Chinese Communist Party certainly does not represent the Chinese people. The true China consists of those who still hold fast to their conscience amidst suffering, those who refuse to bow their heads to lies, and the ordinary folks who long for freedom, dignity, and the right to faith.

The century of tyranny must be liquidated; the century of lies must be exposed; the century of blood debts must be judged by history. The Chinese Communist Party started its journey by relying on lies, maintains itself by relying on violence, and rules by relying on fear, but no dictatorial regime can stand over the heads of the people forever. No matter how thick the high walls are, they cannot block the awakening of the people’s hearts; no matter how long the dark night is, it will ultimately welcome the dawn.

We believe that the day truly belonging to the Chinese people will eventually arrive. On that day, the people will no longer fear because of speaking the truth, will no longer be persecuted because of their faith, and will no longer be threatened because of pursuing justice. On that day, China will shake off the shadow of the one-party dictatorship and welcome back the dignity, freedom, and light belonging to the people.

清算中共百年暴政,迎回属于人民的尊严与自由

Editor: Huang Jizhou Proofreader: Cheng Xiaoxiao Translator: Ge Bing

Lobga Rangzen 自焚前的遗言-图伯特的责任与团结

0
Lobga Rangzen 自焚前的遗言-图伯特的责任与团结

作者:Lobga Rangzen

中文翻译整理:华语青年挺藏会

Lobga Rangzen 自焚前的遗言-图伯特的责任与团结

自焚者 Lobga Rangzen 于行动前,在自家车库留下遗嘱,并在自己的脸书上发表。 Rangzen 是他自己选的名字,是藏语「独立」「 自由」之意。

以下为其遗嘱内容整理 (听译): 我们在国外举办任何活动,都是为了抗议中共对境内藏地的高压政策,反抗中国对藏地藏人的统治。今天,我想说几句话。 对图伯特境内的藏人,我没有什么可以多说的,因为他们一直冒着生命危险,以最大的勇气,为拯救图伯特的语言、文化与尊严,不断努力。因此,我没有什么资格再对他们说什么。 我今天主要是想对流亡藏人说四点:

第一,流亡藏人不能忘记自己的责任。 我们在流亡当中,享受着自由民主的生活。这样的自由民主,是尊者达赖喇嘛给予我们的。尊者让我们拥有自由,并不是要让我们自己内耗,也不是要让我们用民主自由之名,在内部彼此斗争。 我们每一个人都应该为图伯特的自由发声,为图伯特的未来想办法。尊者达赖喇嘛曾经说过,生活在国外的藏人,不要因为自己有了房子、有了车子,就感到满足,因为图伯特境内的藏人仍然生活在苦难之中。

第二,我们要明白,藏人的苦难,是因为我们失去了自己的国家。 尊者达赖喇嘛是世界的和平导师,他为所有众生的和平与幸福奔波,所以他不会把话说得太多、太重。但是我们自己要明白:为什么图伯特境内的藏人没有任何自由?为什么我们的民族面临被消灭的危机?为什么我们连供奉尊者达赖喇嘛法相的权利都没有?这都是因为我们失去了自己的国家,失去了自己的自由。很多人说我们没有国家,不是的,我们有国家,只是我们的国家被中国占领了。

第三,流亡藏人不要再分地域、教派,而要真正团结起来。 中共打压藏人时,并不会区分你是康巴人、安多人,还是卫藏人;也不会区分你属于哪一个教派。他们同样打压所有藏人,也同样破坏所有宗教。所以,我们在外的藏人,真的不应该再分什么康巴、安多、卫藏,也不应该再分各个教派。我们每一个人都应该团结起来,为恢复藏人的自由、为藏民族的独立,做出更多努力。

第四,不要因为我的行动而停止应该去做的事;真正的哀悼,是继续为图伯特奋斗。 如果这一次我要做一个大的行动、一个引起轰动的行动,我双手合十请求大家:不要因为这件事,而停止我们现在正在做的事情。我们现在做的,是为了保存自己的语言与文化。所以,该跳舞的还是要跳舞,该唱歌的还是要唱歌。因为这些都是为了让年轻一代的藏人,能够接受并传承自己的语言与文化。 特别是现在,我们即将迎来尊者达赖喇嘛九十一岁华诞。我希望全球各地的藏人,都要盛大举办尊者的祝寿活动。这些都非常重要。我们不要因为一个人的行动,就只停留在悲哀或默哀之中。

我们真正需要悲哀、需要默哀的,是我们失去了自己的国家。我们每一个人都应该为此发起更大的行动。 我今天要做这个行动,不是因为我缺乏衣食住行,不是因为我没有吃的、没有穿的、没有住的,也不是为了我个人的生活问题。这一切,是为了图伯特的独立,为了图伯特的抗争。 因此,我双手合十请求大家:如果你们真的要哀悼我,请按照我在这里所说的愿望去做。希望每一个人都为图伯特的事情继续努力,继续奋斗。最后,我想说:图伯特民族的独立万岁!博嘉洛(图伯特必胜) !!!!

编辑:黄吉洲 校对:程筱筱 翻译:戈冰

Lobga Rangzen’s Last Words Before Self-Immolation—The Responsibility and Unity of Tibet

Author: Lobga Rangzen

Chinese Translation and Compilation: Chinese Youth Supporting Tibet Association

Lobga Rangzen 自焚前的遗言-图伯特的责任与团结

Before his action, the self-immolator Lobga Rangzen left a testament in his own garage and published it on his Facebook page. Rangzen is a name he chose for himself, which means “independence” and “freedom” in Tibetan.

The following is the compiled content of his testament (transcribed from audio translation): Any activity we organize abroad is to protest the Chinese Communist Party’s high-pressure policies inside Tibet and to resist China’s rule over Tibet and the Tibetan people. Today, I want to say a few words. To the Tibetans inside Tibet, I have nothing more to say, because they have always been risking their lives, with the greatest courage, making continuous efforts to save Tibet’s language, culture, and dignity. Therefore, I am not qualified to say anything more to them. Today, I mainly want to say four points to the exiled Tibetans:

First, exiled Tibetans must not forget their responsibility. In exile, we enjoy a life of freedom and democracy. This kind of freedom and democracy was given to us by His Holiness the Dalai Lama. His Holiness allowed us to have freedom, not for us to exhaust ourselves through internal friction, nor for us to fight against each other internally under the name of democracy and freedom. Every single one of us should speak out for the freedom of Tibet and find ways for the future of Tibet. His Holiness the Dalai Lama once said that Tibetans living abroad should not feel satisfied just because they have a house and a car, because Tibetans inside Tibet are still living in suffering.

Second, we must understand that the suffering of Tibetans is because we lost our own country. His Holiness the Dalai Lama is a global teacher of peace; he travels for the peace and happiness of all sentient beings, so he does not speak too forcefully or harshly. But we ourselves must understand: Why do Tibetans inside Tibet have no freedom at all? Why is our nation facing a crisis of being eradicated? Why do we not even have the right to revere and display the portrait of His Holiness the Dalai Lama? This is all because we lost our own country and lost our own freedom. Many people say we do not have a country; that is not true—we have a country, it is just that our country has been occupied by China.

Third, exiled Tibetans must stop dividing themselves by regions or sects, and instead truly unite. When the Chinese Communist Party suppresses Tibetans, it does not differentiate whether you are Khampa, Amdo, or U-Tsang, nor does it differentiate which sect you belong to. They suppress all Tibetans equally, and they destroy all religions equally. Therefore, we Tibetans abroad really should no longer differentiate among Khampa, Amdo, and U-Tsang, nor should we divide ourselves by various sects. Every single one of us should unite and make greater efforts to restore the freedom of Tibetans and for the independence of the Tibetan nation.

Fourth, do not stop doing what ought to be done because of my action; true mourning means continuing to struggle for Tibet. If this time I am to undertake a major action, a sensational action, I press my palms together and beg everyone: do not stop what we are currently doing because of this matter. What we are doing now is to preserve our own language and culture. Therefore, those who should dance must still dance, and those who should sing must still sing. Because all of these are for the purpose of enabling the younger generation of Tibetans to accept and inherit their own language and culture. Especially now, we are about to welcome the 91st birthday of His Holiness the Dalai Lama. I hope that Tibetans all over the world will grandly hold birthday celebrations for His Holiness. All of these are extremely important. We must not remain frozen only in sorrow or moments of silence just because of one person’s action.

What we truly need to feel sorrow for, and what truly requires a moment of silence, is that we have lost our own country. Every single one of us should launch greater actions for this cause. My undertaking of this action today is not because I lack food, clothing, housing, or transportation, not because I have nothing to eat, nothing to wear, or nowhere to live, and it is not for my personal livelihood issues either. All of this is for the independence of Tibet, and for the resistance of Tibet. Therefore, I press my palms together and beg everyone: if you truly want to mourn me, please act according to the wishes I have stated here. I hope everyone will continue to work hard and continue to struggle for the cause of Tibet. Finally, I want to say: Long live the independence of the Tibetan nation! Bhö Gyalo (Victory to Tibet)!!!!

Editor: Huang Jizhou Proofreader: Cheng Xiaoxiao Translator: Ge Bing