作者：张兴贵

编辑：周志刚   责任编辑：罗志飞   翻译：刘芳

极权体制以其高度集中、全面控制和压迫性治理为特征，历史上曾多次深刻影响人类社会。然而，纵观历史，极权体制的崩溃并非源于人民的直接“推倒”，而是体制内部矛盾积累、自我崩溃的自然终结。这种现象是必然的，是由极权体制的内在逻辑和运行机制所决定的。

一、极权体制的内在矛盾

极权体制是一种高度集中的政治体系，强调对社会、经济、文化乃至个人思想的全面控制。它通常依赖强有力的意识形态、严密的组织结构和暴力机器来维持统治。

1.权力过度集中的结构性缺陷

极权体制的核心是权力的绝对集中，通常由单一领袖或小集团掌控所有关键决策。这种结构在短期内能够高效推动政策实施，但在长期运行中暴露出严重缺陷。权力集中导致决策缺乏多元化视角，容易产生战略失误；缺乏有效的制衡机制使得错误无法被及时纠正，下级为了迎合上意往往放大问题，最终形成恶性循环。

2.意识形态僵化与合法性危机

极权体制通常依赖宏大的意识形态来维系其合法性，如共产主义、纳粹主义或民族主义。然而，意识形态的僵化限制了体制的适应性，使其难以应对外部环境的变化，如全球化和技术进步的冲击。

3.信息封闭与反馈机制缺失

极权体制倾向于控制信息流动，压制异议声音，以维护统治稳定。然而，这种信息封闭导致体制无法及时感知外部变化或内部问题，决策者往往生活在虚假的信息泡沫中；信息封闭还导致政策制定缺乏科学依据，长期积累的错误最终动摇体制根基。

4.经济资源分配的低效性

极权体制通常通过中央计划或资源垄断控制经济，但这种模式往往导致资源分配低效、浪费严重；长期的经济困境侵蚀了体制的物质基础，削弱了其对民众的吸引力。

5.社会控制成本的递增

极权体制通过暴力、监控和宣传维持社会控制，但这种控制的成本随着时间推移不断上升。为了压制异议，体制需要投入越来越多的资源用于秘密警察、宣传机器等，最终导致财政不堪重负。社会控制成本的上升不仅耗尽了财政资源，还进一步疏远了民众，使体制的合法性进一步受损。当控制成本超过体制的承受能力时，崩溃成为必然。

二、极权体制自我腐烂的机制

极权体制的崩溃并非突发事件，而是内部矛盾长期累积、腐烂过程逐渐显现的结果。

1.官僚体系的腐化与低效

极权体制依赖庞大的官僚体系执行政策，但官僚体系的扩张往往伴随着腐败和低效。由于缺乏外部监督和竞争，官僚机构倾向于自我保护、推卸责任，导致政策执行力下降。

2.精英阶层的分裂与背叛

极权体制的稳定性高度依赖统治精英的忠诚，但当内部矛盾加剧时，精英阶层往往出现分裂。部分精英可能因利益受损、意识形态幻灭或对体制前景的悲观而选择背叛。这种分裂往往在关键时刻（如经济危机或外部压力）暴露出来，成为崩溃的催化剂。

3.民众的被动抵抗与信任危机

虽然极权体制的崩溃很少是人民直接“推倒”的结果，但民众的被动抵抗在体制腐烂中起到了重要作用。被动抵抗包括怠工、低效劳动、逃避管制等行为，这些行为虽然不直接对抗体制，却显著削弱了其运行效率。同时，民众的信任危机进一步加剧了体制的困境：当民众不再相信体制的承诺，体制的动员能力大幅下降，最终导致其无法有效应对危机。

这些机制相互作用，形成了一个恶性循环：官僚腐败导致经济低效，经济困境引发社会不满，社会不满加剧控制成本，控制成本的上升进一步削弱经济基础，最终导致精英分裂和体制崩溃。

三、极权体制崩溃的启示

极权体制的自我崩溃机制为现代社会提供了深刻启示：

1.权力制衡的重要性

极权体制的过度集中导致其缺乏自我纠错能力，权力制衡的缺失是其腐烂的根源。相比之下，民主体制通过分权和监督机制，能够在一定程度上缓解内部矛盾，延长体制的寿命。

2.经济效率与社会信任

经济效率是体制合法性的重要基础。极权体制的经济低效往往引发社会不满，最终导致崩溃。现代社会需要通过市场化改革和公平的资源分配，满足民众的物质需求，巩固体制的合法性。

3.信息开放与反馈机制

信息封闭是极权体制的典型特征，但这也使其无法适应快速变化的外部环境。开放的信息流动和有效的反馈机制能够帮助体制及时调整政策。全球化时代，封闭的体制难以抵御外部影响。现代社会需要通过开放合作和国际交流，主动适应外部环境的变化，避免因封闭而导致的崩溃。

极权体制的崩溃为现代社会提供了宝贵启示：权力的傲慢与封闭是体制最大的敌人，而开放、包容与自我纠错才是长治久安的基石。任何政治体系要想长久维系，必须建立有效的权力制衡机制、保持经济活力、开放信息流动并赢得社会信任。

The Mechanism of Totalitarian Self-Collapse

Author: Zhang Xinggui  

Editor: Zhou Zhigang   Managing Editor: Luo Zhifei   Translator: Liu Fang

This article analyzes the inevitable collapse of centralized regimes. The inefficiency of resource allocation leads to a heavy socioeconomic burden; bureaucratic self-preservation results in long-term evasion of responsibility; and declining executive capacity and public distrust further accelerate decay. Characterized by extreme concentration of power, pervasive control, and repressive governance, totalitarian systems have profoundly influenced human history. Yet, their downfall rarely comes from direct popular overthrow but rather from internal contradictions that accumulate until the system collapses under its own weight. This outcome is inevitable—determined by the system’s intrinsic logic and operational mechanism.

I. The Internal Contradictions of Totalitarianism

Totalitarianism is a highly centralized political system that seeks complete control over society, the economy, culture, and even individual thought. It relies on a powerful ideology, a rigid organizational structure, and a machinery of violence to sustain its rule.

1. Structural Defects of Excessive Power Concentration At its core, totalitarianism rests on absolute concentration of power, often in the hands of a single leader or a small clique. While this can produce short-term efficiency, it eventually reveals fatal flaws. Concentrated power excludes diverse perspectives, increasing the risk of strategic mistakes. Without effective checks and balances, errors go uncorrected, while subordinates exaggerate or distort information to please superiors—creating a vicious cycle.

2. Ideological Rigidity and the Crisis of Legitimacy Such regimes depend on grand ideological narratives—communism, Nazism, nationalism—to justify their legitimacy. Yet rigid ideology undermines adaptability, leaving the regime ill-equipped to respond to global or technological changes.

3. Information Control and Lack of Feedback Totalitarian governments suppress dissent and tightly control information to maintain stability. This information blockade blinds decision-makers to reality, trapping them in echo chambers of false data. As errors accumulate without correction, the system’s foundations weaken.

4. Inefficiency in Resource Allocation Centrally planned or monopolized economies often suffer from inefficiency and waste. Over time, chronic economic stagnation erodes the material base of the regime and diminishes its appeal to the public.

5. Escalating Costs of Social Control Maintaining control through surveillance, propaganda, and coercion becomes increasingly expensive. The resources required for secret police and state media grow unsustainable, draining the treasury and alienating citizens. When the costs of control exceed what the regime can bear, collapse becomes inevitable.

II. The Mechanisms of Internal Decay

Totalitarian collapse is rarely sudden; it is the cumulative result of long-term internal decay.

1. Bureaucratic Corruption and Inefficiency The bureaucratic apparatus expands alongside corruption. Lacking external oversight, officials prioritize self-preservation and avoid accountability, undermining policy enforcement and administrative effectiveness.

2. Elite Division and Betrayal Regime stability depends heavily on elite cohesion. But when internal conflicts intensify, divisions emerge. Disillusioned elites—disadvantaged by policy shifts or disenchanted by ideology—may defect. These fractures often surface in crises such as economic downturns or foreign pressure, acting as catalysts for collapse.

3. Passive Resistance and Public Distrust While citizens seldom directly overthrow totalitarian regimes, their passive resistance—through inefficiency, apathy, or quiet noncompliance—gradually erodes state capacity. As trust in the regime vanishes, its mobilization power diminishes, leaving it incapable of crisis response.

These forces reinforce each other: bureaucratic corruption leads to economic stagnation; economic hardship breeds public discontent; discontent inflates the costs of repression; repression drains economic resources; and resource depletion sparks elite fragmentation—culminating in systemic collapse.

III. Lessons from Totalitarian Collapse

The self-destruction of totalitarianism offers enduring lessons for modern governance:

1. The Necessity of Checks and Balances Excessive concentration of power destroys a system’s self-correcting capacity. Balanced institutions, competition, and accountability mechanisms are essential for resilience.

2. Economic Efficiency and Social Trust Economic performance underpins legitimacy. Sustained inefficiency fosters social unrest. A just, market-oriented economy that meets citizens’ needs strengthens stability.

3. Transparency and Feedback Information openness enables timely policy adjustment. In a globalized world, isolation invites failure. Openness, cooperation, and international engagement are antidotes to systemic stagnation.

Conclusion The collapse of totalitarian regimes teaches that arrogance and isolation are the greatest enemies of power. Enduring stability rests not on repression but on openness, inclusiveness, and self-correction. For any political system to survive, it must institutionalize balance, sustain economic vitality, embrace transparency, and earn the trust of its people.

作者：叶长青（大陆学生）
编辑：李之洋 责任编辑：胡丽莉 校对：熊辩 翻译：彭小梅

吉拉斯出生于黑山的一个农民家庭。18岁考入贝尔格莱德大学，期间接触马克思主义并加入左翼社团，1932年加入南斯拉夫共产党。到1940年代，他已成为中央政治局委员，并在50年代初期被视为铁托的接班人。

1948年，南斯拉夫坚持走自己的“民族社会主义道路”（national path），与苏联在对外政策、意识形态、对斯大林的态度等方面彻底分裂。分裂后，吉拉斯依然信仰社会主义，但他逐渐看到体制内部的腐败与僵化：官僚主义、特权阶层、党内集权、对批评的压制。1953年他出任国家主席，1954年因主张政治自由化而被撤职。1956年，他因公开支持匈牙利事件被捕入狱，期间将《新阶级》手稿秘密送往国外出版，从此成为共产主义世界的异端与思想先驱。

一、思想起源（Origins）

吉拉斯首先追溯共产主义思想的根源。他指出，唯物主义、辩证法、历史决定论等并非马克思主义独有，而是被共产党人“独占化”为一种“唯一科学”，以此为政治统治提供合法性。共产主义运动在现代化当中，将这些哲学原理说成是“唯一科学”以此为政治统治提供正当性。

在实践中，这些理论逐渐被教条化，成为维护制度与权力的工具。

二、革命的性质（Character of the Revolution）

与资产阶级革命不同，共产主义革命不仅夺取政权，还要重塑社会和经济体系。这使得革命政党不仅成为政治力量，也成为社会治理力量。

革命政党在夺权后，变成同时控制政治与社会的“全能力量”，倾向于集中化、排斥异己、消灭多元，以及政治与经济力量的高度融合。革命后的权力结构中往往会剥夺政治多元性、排斥非党派力量，由党对社会进行全面控制。

三、“新阶级”的形成（The New Class）

这是全书的核心。吉拉斯在这里正式提出“新阶级”（the new class）的概念。他把新阶级理解为：一群占据党政机关的官僚与管理者，他们通过对国家机器的控制，实际掌握了资源、分配权、特权，是一个新的统治集团。在他看来，这个新阶级既不同于传统资本家阶级（因为他们不以私人资本为基础），也不同于无产阶级，他们以“集体政治控制”作为他们的“财产权形式”。

吉拉斯提出：“新阶级”是由党政官僚与管理者组成的统治集团，他们通过掌控国家机器与资源分配，形成一种新的特权阶层。

他分析新阶级如何通过国家结构获得“所有权”形式的权力（即：控制、支配国家资源的权力），而这个权力结构本身就是一种“财产”。

他们不靠私人资本，而是通过“政治控制”取得“所有权形式的权力”。这种权力本身成为他们的“财产”。结果是，名义上的“全民所有”，实质上变成“新阶级所有”。还阐明这个阶级如何在资源分配、待遇、社会地位上不断积累特权，并与大众逐渐分离。

四、党—国家体制（The Party State）

吉拉斯揭示共产党如何通过党国合一来维系统治。分析共产党如何通过党组织与国家机器合一来巩固其统治，党与国家的界限被淡化或合并，党控制行政、军队、安全、意识形态，国家机构仅成附属。

还讨论党的层级制度、干部任命机制、党对行政、意识形态、军事与安全机构的渗透和监督。他指出，在共产主义国家中，党往往成为国家运作的核心，党的决策几乎主导国家机构的全部运作。在这种体制下，表面上的法律、机构、行政分权常常只是形式，真正权力在党内部和党的核心结构中掌握。

五、经济的教条主义（Dogmatism in the Economy）

计划经济在理想上平等，但在实践中僵化、低效。吉拉斯重点在于分析社会主义经济制度中的僵化性（dogmatism）。他认为计划经济、国有化和集中化管理容易固化为教条体系。

吉拉斯批评经济决策常常以意识形态为依据，而不顾效率、创新、市场信号、需求关系等。

虽然名义上生产资料归“全民所有”，但实际上控制权掌握在新阶级手中。普通民众缺乏参与与监督权。

社会缺乏反馈机制与创新动力，资源浪费普遍。在这种制度里，经济体制缺乏弹性与反馈机制，资源分配常出现失误、浪费、扭曲。

六、思想的专制（Tyranny over the Mind）

在意识形态领域，共产党实行全面控制。吉拉斯探讨了意识形态、宣传、文化、教育等对思想控制的机制。

宣传、教育、媒体、文化都被纳入党的领导。 他指出，在共产制度下，思想自由、言论自由、异议、批判等都受到严格限制，党通过宣传、教育、媒体、文化机构支配公共思想领域。

思想自由、言论自由、批判精神被视为“危险思想”。他分析了“思想工作”（ideological work）如何被制度化为一种权力工具，用来维系统治合法性并削弱异议力量。思想工作成为政治统治的工具，知识分子被监控与驯化。

他还强调，思想控制不仅是宣传灌输，还包括组织、惩戒不合规的思想、监控知识分子等机制。

七、目的与手段（The Aim and the Means）

吉拉斯讨论目的与手段之间的关系以及其在新阶级体制中的扭曲。吉拉斯批判那种“目的正当化一切手段”的逻辑——以“人民利益”“社会主义建设”之名行压制与暴力之实。他批判这样一种逻辑：只要目的被视为“正当”（例如“社会主义”“人民利益”），那么几乎所有手段（包括压制、剥夺权利、操控制度）都可以被合法化。

在这种逻辑下，法治与责任被掏空，权力缺乏约束，体制走向自我封闭。 在他看来，这种“目的正当化手段”的逻辑，是新阶级体制滥用权力、法制失灵、责任缺失的基础。他还指出，在这种体制下，监督与制衡机制被边缘化或虚化，权力几乎无约束。

八、本质（The Essence）

吉拉斯对新阶级制度的结构和矛盾进行更抽象和系统的总结。他总结新阶级制度的核心矛盾：权力越集中，合法性越脆弱；特权越多，体制越不稳。他揭示了新阶级体制的内在矛盾：权力集中化导致合法性危机、特权化、统治不稳、危机脆弱性等。

新阶级倾向维护自身利益，压制异议、控制信息、阻止改革。他认为，新阶级的权力结构具有“自我维护”特征：为了保全自身，它倾向压制异己、控制信息、限制权力更替。

这种自我维护机制最终导致体制僵化与衰败。他指出，制度为了维持自身而变得越来越集权、封闭，不利于内部改革或自我调整。

九、民族共产主义（National Communism）

吉拉斯分析“民族化”的社会主义变体。他关注社会主义/共产主义在不同国家语境下的“民族化”或本土变体。他分析“民族共产主义”（national communism）如何被利用于不同国家保持统治合法性，同时作为一种对苏联模式的调整或抵抗策略。

各国共产党以民族主义包装体制，以维持合法性和独立性。但“民族共产主义”往往只是权力集团的另一种掩饰形式，无法触及体制根本问题。他指出，这种民族化可能给体制一定的合法性、认受性和自主空间，但也可能被用于掩盖统治集团的特权和权力集中。他还展望了不同国家（尤其东欧、南斯拉夫、中东欧）的“民族化”变体可能带来的张力与局限性。

十、今日世界（The Present-Day World）

在最后一章里，吉拉斯将目光投向全球。将他的分析置于更广阔的国际与时代背景中，讨论共产主义体系在当时世界（20世纪中叶）所面对的挑战、危机与可能的发展。

他考察社会主义国家在全球政治中的竞争、合法性危机、制度疲弱以及新阶级体系所面临的内外压力。他看到社会主义国家在冷战中的危机：合法性削弱、经济停滞、思想封闭。

他认为，如果体制无法开放与自我修复，终将走向崩溃。他对未来的可能路径（改革、瓦解、替代）做出思考，同时指出新阶级体制在国际冷战格局中的弱点。

🕊 结语

吉拉斯在良知与权力之间，选择了良知。他本可享有权力与荣耀，却选择揭露体制的真相，付出自由的代价。

像所有敢于对抗权力、坚持真理的思想者一样，他让世界更接近自由与清醒。

正因有这样的灵魂，人类社会才得以不断前行。

我们应该铭记吉拉斯这些选择良心的英雄，他们不该被遗忘，正是因为有了他们的存在，才推动了人类社会的进步。

“The New Class”: The Emerging Ruling Group Under Communist Regimes

By Changqing Ye (Mainland Student)
Edited by Zhiyang Li, Proofread by Lili Hu and Bian Xiong Translated by Xiaomei Peng

Milovan Djilas was born into a peasant family in Montenegro. At 18, he entered the University of Belgrade, where he came into contact with Marxism and joined left-wing student circles. In 1932, he became a member of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. By the 1940s, he had risen to the Politburo, and by the early 1950s, he was widely regarded as Tito’s successor.

In 1948, Yugoslavia insisted on pursuing its own national path of socialism, breaking with the Soviet Union completely over foreign policy, ideology, and attitudes toward Stalin. Even after the split, Djilas remained a believer in socialism. Yet over time, he saw the corruption, rigidity, and hypocrisy within the system: bureaucratism, privilege, centralization, and suppression of dissent. In 1953, he became President of the State, but a year later was dismissed for advocating political liberalization. In 1956, he was imprisoned for openly supporting the Hungarian uprising. While in prison, he secretly sent the manuscript of The New Class abroad for publication, thus becoming an ideological heretic and a moral pioneer in the communist world.

I. Origins

Djilas traced the philosophical roots of communism. He argued that materialism, dialectics, and historical determinism were not unique to Marxism, but the Communists monopolized these ideas, branding them as the only science to legitimize their political rule.

In practice, these philosophical doctrines became dogmas—tools for defending the system and consolidating power.

II. The Character of the Revolution

Unlike bourgeois revolutions, communist revolutions did not merely seize political power—they sought to reshape the entire social and economic structure. Thus, the revolutionary party became not only a political force but also the central administrative and social power.

After seizing power, the revolutionary party evolved into an all-encompassing authority that controlled both politics and society. It tended toward centralization, exclusion of pluralism, and the fusion of political and economic power. Political diversity was abolished, and non-party forces were marginalized or eliminated.

III. The Formation of the “New Class”

This is the core of The New Class. Djilas defined the “new class” as a group of bureaucrats and administrators occupying positions in the party and state apparatus, who, through their control of the machinery of power, had become a new ruling stratum.

This class differed from both the bourgeoisie and the proletariat:they did not own private capital but instead possessed collective political control, which functioned as a new form of property.

The “new class,” through its command of the state, exercised ownership-like power over national resources. This control—though officially justified as “public ownership”—became, in substance, the property of the new class.

Djilas showed how this group accumulated privilege through resource distribution, material benefits, and social hierarchy, gradually distancing itself from the ordinary people in whose name it ruled.

IV. The Party–State System

Djilas exposed how communist parties maintained their dominance through the fusion of party and state. The party and government apparatus became inseparable: the party controlled the administration, the military, security, and ideology, reducing the state to a mere subsidiary organ.

He analyzed the hierarchy of the party structure, the system of cadre appointment, and the pervasive penetration of the party into all state institutions. Under such a system, legal institutions and administrative divisions were often mere façades—the real power resided in the inner core of the party.

V. Dogmatism in the Economy

In theory, planned economies were built on equality; in practice, they became rigid and inefficient. Djilas criticized the socialist economy for its dogmatism: economic decisions were made according to ideological correctness rather than practical effectiveness.

While ownership of the means of production was nominally “public,” control was monopolized by the new class. Ordinary citizens had no right of participation or oversight. Lacking feedback and innovation, socialist economies suffered from waste, distortion, and stagnation.

VI. Tyranny over the Mind

In the realm of ideology, the Communist Party exercised total control. Djilas explored the mechanisms through which ideology, propaganda, culture, and education were used to dominate human thought.

Propaganda, education, media, and the arts were all brought under the Party’s leadership. He observed that under the communist system, freedom of thought, freedom of speech, dissent, and critical inquiry were all strictly suppressed. Through its control of propaganda, education, cultural institutions, and the press, the Party dominated the entire sphere of public consciousness.

Freedom of thought, freedom of expression, and the spirit of criticism were labeled as dangerous ideas. Djilas analyzed how “ideological work” was institutionalized as an instrument of power—used to sustain political legitimacy and to weaken the forces of dissent. Ideological work thus became a tool of political domination; intellectuals were monitored, disciplined, and domesticated.

He further emphasized that thought control was not limited to propaganda or indoctrination. It also involved organizational mechanisms for punishing nonconforming ideas and systematic surveillance of the intellectual class.In this way, the regime sought not only to shape people’s words, but to regulate the very process of thinking itself.

VII. The Aim and the Means

Djilas explored how communist regimes distorted the relationship between ends and means. He condemned the logic that “the ends justify the means”—that any act, no matter how repressive or violent, could be justified in the name of “the people’s interest” or “socialist construction.”

This moral inversion hollowed out the rule of law and accountability. Power became unrestrained; systems turned inward and self-serving. Under such reasoning, supervision and checks were rendered meaningless, and despotism became self-perpetuating.

VIII. The Essence

Djilas provided a more abstract and systematic summary of the structure and contradictions of the new-class system. He identified its central paradox: the more concentrated the power, the weaker its legitimacy; the greater the privilege, the more unstable the regime. He revealed the internal contradictions of the new-class order— that political centralization inevitably breeds a crisis of legitimacy, that privilege produces fragility rather than strength, and that the system’s very success in consolidating power becomes the seed of its decline.

The new class, by its nature, seeks above all to preserve its own interests. It suppresses dissent, monopolizes information, and obstructs reform. Djilas argued that the power structure of this class possesses a built-in self-preserving character: to safeguard itself, it instinctively moves to silence opposition, control information, and restrict the rotation of power.

This mechanism of self-preservation ultimately leads to stagnation and decay. The system, in its effort to perpetuate itself, becomes increasingly centralized and closed, thereby losing the capacity for reform or self-correction. In the end, what began as a revolution of liberation turns into a structure of confinement.

IX. National Communism

Djilas analyzes the “nationalization” of socialist variants. He focuses on how socialism or communism becomes “nationalized” or localized within different national contexts. He examines how national communism has been used by various countries to maintain regime legitimacy while simultaneously serving as an adjustment to—or resistance against—the Soviet model.

Communist parties in different nations often wrapped their systems in nationalism to preserve both legitimacy and independence. However, Djilas points out that national communism frequently functions merely as another disguise for the ruling elite, unable to address the system’s fundamental flaws. He notes that this nationalization may grant the regime a degree of legitimacy, acceptance, and autonomy, yet it can also be exploited to conceal the privileges and concentration of power within the ruling class. Finally, he considers the tensions and limitations that such nationalized variants may produce in different regions—especially in Eastern Europe, Yugoslavia, and Central and Eastern Europe.

X. The Present-Day World

In the final chapter, Djilas turned his gaze to the global stage. He placed his analysis within a broader historical and international context, exploring the challenges, crises, and potential futures faced by communist systems in the mid-twentieth century.

He examined the political competition, crises of legitimacy, institutional weakness, and internal and external pressures confronting socialist states. Djilas observed that during the Cold War, communist regimes were already showing deep structural fatigue: their legitimacy was eroding, their economies stagnating, and their intellectual life closing in on itself.

He warned that any system unable to open itself or renew from within would inevitably collapse. Djilas contemplated the possible paths ahead—reform, disintegration, or complete replacement—and underscored the inherent fragility of the new-class structure within the global Cold War order.

Epilogue

Between conscience and power, Djilas chose conscience. He could have lived in privilege and glory, yet he chose to expose the truth—and paid the price with his freedom.

Like all thinkers who dared to confront tyranny and stand by truth, he brought the world closer to freedom and clarity. It is because of such souls that human civilization continues to move forward.

We must remember these heroes of conscience. They should never be forgotten, for it is through their courage and sacrifice that the progress of humanity endures.

作者：何愚 翻译：彭小梅

家乡的堡子
就像簸箕中的田螺
有时盘旋在山顶
有时坐落在水泉的上头

小时候
它是我心中的王国
高大的城墙上
站满了卫兵

如今
它已把我忘了
就像城市忘记了战败的国王

如今
我已失去了它
我要为它做一次隆重的葬礼

何愚 寫於 4 ／2 ／2020

My Hometown’s Fort

Author: He Yu. Translator: Peng Xiaomei

The fort of my hometown
is like a snail in a winnowing pan—
sometimes winding atop the hills,
sometimes sitting above a spring.

In childhood,
it was my kingdom;
the tall city walls
were crowded with guards.

Now,
it has forgotten me,
just as a city forgets
its fallen king.

Now,
I have lost it too.
I want to hold a grand funeral
for it once more.

by Yu He April 2, 2020

作者：时机 2025年10月12日
编辑：钟然 责任编辑：罗志飞 翻译：刘芳

第二次世界大战中,美国弹压下日本,使日本无条件投降；接着,是四国占领德国。苏联占东德,法国占鲁尔地区,英国占一部分,美国占一部分。美国不是将德占区的德国人往死里整,他们知道：共产主义是要把红旗插遍全世界,是要消灭资本主义制度。 而美园是要拯救自由世界,拯救资本主义制度。美国每天用军用飞机运送一千多吨物资到占领区,当时抓经济的是艾哈德,总理是阿登纳,两人配合默契,他们搞的是市场经济,也就是资本主义。市场经济能调动一切人的积极性,德国人很争气,1990年10月3日就全德统一了。当德国还在恢复元气的过程中,他们就知道教育的重要性,当各行各业没涨工资的时候,教师队伍却连涨几级工资,使各行各业无数优秀的人才涌入到教师队伍,见《第四帝国》一书,这就奠定了德国工业的强大基础。德国的领土面积只有35万多平方千米,人口有近9000万人。他们生活得既尊严又幸福。他们没有绝对贫困者,他们实行的是高税收制,即所谓的“劫富济贫”。

例如：你每月的收入是5875欧元,你要缴纳42%的税,你本身还有3355.3欧元,另外上公立学校不要钱,医疗不要钱,他们许多人是租房,因为租房很便宜。他们的福利很诱人。

所谓贫困者的日收入为160欧元(约合人民币1200元),高收入者日收入366.69欧元(约合人民币2750.175元),两者相差只2.29倍。而中国的地铁零时工每月只有2500元,还不包吃住,

除去4天休息,每天只有96元,合每小时12元。扫地的环卫工(农民工)也一样。工资太低,使中国正常男人3～4千万人或4~5千万人找不到老婆,因贫困而每天自杀者不知有多少？这只是中德的一个对比。

朝鲜战争,是北韩金日成首先挑起的,如果不是美国为首带领16国拯救南韩,南韩便没有今日之富强。南北韩最终还是以三八线分界。当年美国放出狠话：朝鲜若不仍依三八线划界的话,美国就要动用核武器,中共看美国要动真格的了,也不敢强抗,只得乖乖的还是依原先的三八线划界。

美国是个开放型的国家,在韩战中,日本趁机崛起,也迅速成了一个发达的工业国家。

美国的华盛顿总统开创了不连任三任总统的好先例。

林肯总统为了拯救南部的黑人奴隶,发表了《解放宣言》。现在,全世界的国家都向美国看齐,美国成了世界民主的灯塔,只有少数十几个国家搞独裁专制,独裁专制国家是不得人心的,必定会消亡。

The United States Is the Beacon of Democracy in the World

Author: SHI Ji October 12, 2025
Editor: ZHONG Ran Executive Editor: LUO Zhifei Translator: LIU Fang

During World War II, the United States suppressed Japan and forced its unconditional surrender; afterward, Germany was occupied by four powers. The Soviet Union held East Germany, France the Ruhr, Britain a portion, and the United States a portion. In the U.S. zone, America did not torment the Germans to death; it understood that communism aimed to plant the red flag across the world and to eliminate the capitalist system, whereas the United States sought to save the free world and preserve capitalism. The U.S. flew over a thousand tons of supplies daily by military aircraft into its occupation zone. At that time Ludwig Erhard was in charge of the economy and Chancellor Konrad Adenauer worked seamlessly with him; what they pursued was a market economy—that is, capitalism. A market economy can mobilize everyone’s initiative, and the Germans rose to the occasion; by October 3, 1990, Germany achieved national reunification. Even while Germany was still recovering, they already recognized the importance of education: when wages in many sectors had not increased, teachers received several consecutive raises, drawing countless outstanding talents from various fields into education (see the book The Fourth Empire). This laid the strong foundation for Germany’s industry. Germany’s territory is just over 350,000 square kilometers with nearly 90 million people. They live with both dignity and happiness. There is no absolute poverty; they practice a high-tax system—the so-called “taking from the rich to aid the poor.”

For example: if your monthly income is 5,875 euros, you pay 42% in taxes and still retain 3,355.3 euros. In addition, public schooling costs nothing, medical care costs nothing, and many people rent housing because renting is inexpensive. Their social benefits are very attractive.

The so-called poor have a daily income of 160 euros (about 1,200 RMB), while high-income earners make 366.69 euros per day (about 2,750.175 RMB)—a gap of only 2.29 times. By contrast, temporary subway workers in China earn only 2,500 RMB per month, with no room and board included.

Subtracting four days of rest, that is only 96 RMB per day, or 12 RMB per hour. The same is true for street-sweeping sanitation workers (migrant workers). Wages are so low that 30–40 million, or even 40–50 million, ordinary Chinese men cannot find a wife; how many take their own lives daily due to poverty is unknown. This is just one comparison between China and Germany.

The Korean War was first provoked by North Korea’s Kim Il-sung. Had the United States not led sixteen nations to rescue South Korea, the South would not enjoy today’s prosperity and strength. In the end the two Koreas remained divided along the 38th parallel. Back then, the United States issued a harsh warning: if Korea did not continue to demarcate along the 38th parallel, America would use nuclear weapons. Seeing that the U.S. meant business, the Chinese Communist regime did not dare to resist forcefully and had to submit to the original 38th-parallel demarcation.

The United States is an open country; during the Korean War, Japan seized the opportunity to rise and swiftly became a developed industrial nation.

President George Washington of the United States set a good precedent by not seeking a third term.

President Abraham Lincoln, to save Black slaves in the South, issued the Emancipation Proclamation. Today, nations around the world look to the United States; America has become the beacon of democracy in the world. Only a small dozen or so countries still practice dictatorship and despotism—regimes that win no popular support and are destined to perish.

姓名 金额（USD）

ANG ZHU $100.00

CHANGBING YANG 杨长兵 $200.00

CONGLING LI 李聪玲 $200.00

CUNZHU ZHENG 郑存柱 $1,500.00

DONGLIANG SHEN $120.00

FEIHZOU MENG 孟飞舟 $50.00

FENG LU 吕峰 $150.00

FUDE LI 黎富德 $50.00

GANG ZHENG 郑刚 $50.00

GUANGMANG LI 李光芒 $300.00

HAINING HU 胡海宁 $100.00

HAOWEI SHI 史浩伟 $300.00

HUAN ZHAO 赵欢 $100.00

HUIWEN LU 鲁慧文 $100.00

JIANWEI LI 李建伟 $300.00

JIANXUN LI 李建寻 $100.00

JIE ZHAO 赵杰 $100.00

JIEXIAO WEI 韦洁筱 $50.00

JINBIAO LAI 来金彪 $1,000.00

JINBO CHEN 陈锦波 $100.00

JINGHUI CHEN 辰景辉 $4,000.00

JIZHOU HUANG 黄吉州 $100.00

JUE YUAN 袁崛 $100.00

JUNHONG ZHOU 周君红 $100.00

LINGYAN XIAO 肖玲燕 $50.00

LINLI XIAO 肖琳丽 $50.00

LUJUN QUAN 权录军 $100.00

MIN ZHENG 郑敏 $89.64

MING GAO 高明 $100.00

QIANKUN LU 陆乾坤 $111.25

QINGMEI SHI 史庆梅 $700.00

QUNLAN ZENG 曾群兰 $189.64

RAN ZHONG 钟然 $100.00

RENG FENG 冯仍 $100.00

RONGHUA PAN 潘荣华 $1,000.00

RONGXIN ZHANG 张荣鑫 $200.00

SHAOHAI LAO 劳绍海 $50.00

SIBO HUANG 黄思博 $50.00

TING CHEN 陈婷 $66.00

WEI ZHENG 郑伟 $89.64

WENJUN XIAN 鲜文君 $150.00

XIAOGUANG WANG 王晓光 $200.00

XIAOYAN ZHU 朱晓砚 $100.00

XINHU LU 卢新虎 $100.00

XINNAN CHEN 陈信男 $100.00

YANGYANG LIU 刘洋洋 $100.00

YU HE 何愚 $400.00

YU KANG 康余 $100.00

YUNHUI GE $100.00

YUREN LI 李裕仁 $300.00

ZHIFEI LUO 罗志飞 $400.00

ZHIJUN ZHANG 张致君 $100.00

ZIRU WU 吴字儒 $20.00

ZUNFU WANG 王尊福 $120.00

无名氏 $100.00

陈先生 $5,000.00

——浅谈政治制度是经济制度的基因

作者：鲁慧文
编辑：李之洋 责任编辑：罗志飞 校对：熊辩

2025年中国国庆黄金周到今天就结束了，这大概是自从有了“黄金周”这种说法以来，第一次反差如此强烈的国庆节——出行人次是近年来新高，经济收益却创下新低。从全年经济高峰期的“黄金周”直接跌入谷底，来得十分突然，没有任何征兆。无论是商家、国家、媒体，还是整个旅游行业，都被打得措手不及，毫无应对之力。

全国各大旅游城市依照惯例在黄金周上调酒店房价，这也是历年的常规操作。景区也提前做好准备，整个旅游行业都计划趁此机会“开门迎客”，狠狠挣一笔，把上半年经济低迷的损失趁热弥补回来。然而，大家都扑了个空。今年的游客像是商量好了一样——“趁机涨价的酒店？那就让它空着吧。”于是满街都是帐篷，一眼望去像加沙难民营，连成一片。景区门票超过20元的就不进去了，在大门口打卡拍照就算完事；饭店也不去了，要么泡面，要么点个便宜外卖。总之，大家像是达成了共识：绝对不掏钱。而在这种“不约而同”的行为背后，我看到了一丝希望——那就是，越来越多的人清醒过来了。

这种“躺平式”或者“对抗式”旅行模式，今后也将更多体现在普通民众日常生活的方方面面。这背后，反映的是政治制度与经济制度之间深层次的逻辑关系。虽然许多普通人未必能清晰地表达出来，但人是有感知的生物。如今在中国社会，哪怕是最普通的老百姓，也已经感觉到经济不会再上行了——大白话说，就是“没有希望了”。

这种“没有希望”的悲观情绪，正蔓延到社会的每一个角落。人们开始抛售房产（北京十几万元一平米的房子近期甚至有一折出售的），开始不结婚（越来越多的年轻人说“就到我这一代吧”），不生孩子，不卷孩子，不追求上大学（拿到录取通知书却选择不去读的人数比往年更多），不去电影院（今年黄金周电影院异常冷清）。越来越多的人觉得拼多多都贵了，越来越多的人被列入失信名单，一种深沉的绝望笼罩着整个社会。一个信仰来生的民族，如今却苦笑着说：“下辈子我不来了。”

有学者表示，中国经济目前已经回到了1999年的水平，而这还远未到谷底。这无疑是个悲伤的消息。但中国经济的衰退，是无法阻挡、也无法逆转的。这艘建立在全民廉价劳动力基础上的经济巨轮，就像当年的泰坦尼克号——人们只能在惊恐中亲眼看着它坠入深海。

中国经济走到今天的地步，表面上看，是习近平领导无能，中国与美国经济脱钩、外企撤出、青年失业等多重因素造成的（这些当然是助推器），但更深层的原因在于政治制度的“基因”决定了结果。它并非一个错误的经济方案，也不是某个班子方向不对，而是从制度的基因上就注定了短寿。政治制度，是经济制度的基因。

当今世界主要存在两种政治制度：一种是民主制度（目前世界主要发达国家普遍采用），另一种是集权制度，也就是人们常说的独裁或中央集权制。政治制度的核心，其实就是社会资源如何分配的机制。民主国家的政治制度保障财产私有，强调公平分配社会经济成果，建立在民主、人权与相对公平的基础上运作。而独裁国家则是压榨型制度，每一层都尽可能吸走下层的经济收益，层层盘剥，最终使全民经济成果集中到最上层，也就是人们常说的“2%的人拿走98%的财富，98%的人分享剩下的2%”。上层只给下层留下一点“续命钱”，确保他们活着继续为上层创造更多经济价值。

这种制度自古如此。古代有“普天之下，莫非王土”，全国土地、经济、粮食、珠宝，皆归统治者所有。这种中央集权制度自秦朝延续至今。结合现代高科技，中共更是集历代之大成，通过人口红利、极低的劳动报酬和极长的工时，使中国成为全球第二大经济体。然而，中共的分配制度又将最大量的经济收益聚敛于自身，只留下一点生存口粮给底层劳工延续生命。再辅以宏大叙事，让世界看到一个“繁荣的中国”，也让几代人相信“中国会越来越好”。于是人们吃苦耐劳，发明了“996”“007”，拼命读书、拼命工作，相信“爱拼才会赢”“明天会更好”。

然而，当这种压榨型集权制度发展到极致，必然更加变本加厉。疫情之后，中国底层经济被彻底抽空，甚至连维持生存的口粮也被夺走。人们终于意识到——原来不是越努力越幸运。原来那些上层社会的人可以不上班领工资，公务员坐牢也有工资，烟草局退休职工月退休金高达一万九，是普通人工资的数倍；原来自己交的社保是养别人的父母；原来大学毕业要去送外卖；原来“那茜”200分就能特招进名校；原来国有单位是家族世袭……越来越多的事实让老百姓明白，自己只是牛马，社会的财富与自己无关。

于是人们不再看新闻联播，不再相信国家通报，看清自己的生命、财产、工作都可随时被剥夺，看到法律的虚无，看到正义的失声——他们失望了，然后绝望了。

是的，这不是一两次经济政策失误的结果。底层的命运早已刻在中共集权的政治制度里。统治者攫取社会最多的财富，盛世时给底层留一口气；乱世或衰退时，连口粮也不留。这就是这种制度的本质。别忘了，在所谓“自然灾害时期”，全国饿死四千多万人，而毛泽东每日仍有红烧肉。

人们必须明白：想要活命，想要生存权，必须废除这种压榨型政治制度，推翻中共专制体制，推翻中央集权，让人民重新掌握生路。

2025 Sees China’s Poorest “Golden Week” in Recent Years

— On How the Political System Is the Genetic Code of the Economic System

Author: Lu Huiwen 
Editor: Li Zhiyang Executive Editor: Luo Zhifei Proofreader: Xiong Bian Translator: Liu Fang

The 2025 National Day “Golden Week” in China has just ended, and this is perhaps the first time since the term “Golden Week” was coined that the contrast has been so stark—record-high travel numbers, yet record-low economic returns. What should have been the annual economic peak suddenly plunged into the trough, without any warning. Businesses, the state, the media, and the entire tourism industry were caught completely off guard, unable to respond.

As usual, hotels across major tourist cities raised prices during the Golden Week—standard practice for years. Scenic spots also prepared in advance, expecting to “open their doors wide” and earn big, making up for the economic slump earlier in the year. Yet everyone miscalculated. This year’s tourists seemed to have silently agreed: “Hotels raising prices? Then let them stay empty.” Streets were full of tents—stretching like refugee camps in Gaza. Tickets costing over 20 yuan? No one went in—just taking photos at the gate was enough. Restaurants were deserted—people either ate instant noodles or ordered cheap takeout. It’s as if everyone reached an unspoken agreement: spend nothing. And behind this “collective refusal” lies a glimmer of hope: more and more people are waking up.

This kind of “lying-flat” or “resistive” travel will increasingly reflect itself in every aspect of ordinary life. Behind it lies the deep logic connecting the political system and the economic system. Many may not be able to articulate it clearly, but people can feel it. Even the most ordinary Chinese citizens now sense that the economy will not rise again—in plain terms, “there is no hope.”

That sense of hopelessness is spreading across every corner of society. People are selling off their properties (in Beijing, apartments once selling for hundreds of thousands of yuan per square meter are now going for 10% of that). They are not getting married (“It ends with my generation,” many young people say). They are not having children. They are not forcing their kids to compete. Some who receive university admission letters choose not to enroll. Cinemas are empty this holiday season. More people think even Pinduoduo is expensive. More people are on credit blacklists. A deep despair covers the nation. A people who once believed in the afterlife now wryly say: “I’m not coming back in my next life.”

Scholars have noted that China’s economy has now fallen back to the level of 1999—and this is still not the bottom. It is a sad reality. But China’s economic decline is both irreversible and inevitable. The economic giant built on cheap labor is like the Titanic—people can only watch in horror as it sinks into the abyss.

On the surface, China’s current collapse appears to be caused by Xi Jinping’s incompetence, the decoupling from the U.S., the withdrawal of foreign companies, and massive youth unemployment (which all played a part), but the deeper cause lies in the genetic code of the political system. It is not merely a failed economic plan or a misguided administration—it is that the system itself was born to die young. The political system is the genetic code of the economic system.

Today’s world has two main political systems: Democracy (used by most developed countries), and Authoritarianism (centralized dictatorship). At its core, a political system determines how resources are distributed. Democratic systems protect private property, emphasize fair distribution of economic gains, and operate on democracy, human rights, and relative fairness. Authoritarian systems, on the other hand, are extractive: each level of power drains wealth from the level below it—layer upon layer of exploitation—until most of the national wealth accumulates at the top. As the saying goes: “2% of people own 98% of the wealth, while 98% of people share the remaining 2%.” The top leaves the bottom only enough “survival money” to keep them alive and productive.

This has always been the nature of such regimes. In ancient China, “All under heaven belongs to the emperor”—land, wealth, grain, and jewels all belonged to the ruler. This centralized authoritarianism has continued since the Qin dynasty. In modern times, with advanced technology, the CCP has perfected this ancient model. Through its vast population, ultra-low wages, and extremely long working hours, it turned China into the world’s second-largest economy. Yet the Party’s distribution mechanism concentrated nearly all wealth in its own hands, leaving workers only subsistence crumbs to stay alive. With grand propaganda, it made the world see a “prosperous China” and made generations believe “China is rising.” So people worked tirelessly—believing “hard work brings fortune” and “tomorrow will be better.”

But when an extractive authoritarian system reaches its limit, it becomes even more ruthless. After COVID, China’s grassroots economy was drained dry—even basic survival rations were taken away. People finally realized: hard work doesn’t lead to luck. They saw that elites could get paid without working, that jailed officials still received salaries, that tobacco bureau retirees get 19,000 yuan monthly pensions (several times a normal worker’s pay); they realized their social security contributions were feeding others’ parents; that university graduates now deliver takeout; that “Na Qian” could enter elite universities with 200 points; that state-owned enterprises are inherited like family property. More and more people have awakened to the truth: They are just oxen and horses. The nation’s wealth has nothing to do with them.

People stopped watching state news, stopped believing official statements. They saw their life, property, and jobs could be seized anytime. They saw laws as empty words, justice as voiceless. They lost faith—then they lost hope.

Indeed, this is not the result of a few bad economic policies. The fate of the working class has long been encoded in the CCP’s centralized political system. The rulers seize the nation’s wealth, leaving crumbs in good times; in decline, they take even those crumbs away. That is the nature of the system. Never forget: during the so-called “natural disaster years,” over 40 million starved, while Mao still had his daily portion of braised pork.

People must understand: To survive—to live as human beings—they must abolish this exploitative political structure, overthrow the CCP’s authoritarian regime, and dismantle centralization, so that the people can once again take hold of their own means of living.