作者：彭小梅

编辑：王梦梦   责任编辑：罗志飞   校对：程筱筱   翻译：彭小梅

我真正理解台湾的价值，不是在书里，也不是在新闻里，而是在这次香港大火、在港人一次次向制度伸手，却只抓住冰冷空气的那些瞬间。我站在洛杉矶自由雕塑公园的壁画《倒下》前，看着香港朋友讲述自己如何渐渐被时代的洪流推向无路可退的深渊。他们说香港的崩塌不是意外，是制度选择。

我听着听着忽然明白：如果台湾也被拖下水，那么华语世界就连“自由曾经存在过”的证据都将消失。

我见过太多让人窒息的真实：封控时焊死的铁门、白纸运动里年轻人被连夜带走、微信里一句正常抱怨都能变成“煽动”、家人朋友习惯性沉默，因为怕出事。人在恐惧里待久了，会忘记自由本来的样子。。

看到台湾电台公开骂政府、立法院吵到桌子都快掀翻、年轻人夜里走在街上不用回头张望……我知道那不是侥幸，那是文明的底气。台湾守住的不是选举，而是华语世界最后一块免于恐惧的土地。

有人说台湾独立是“分裂”。我只想问一句：难道被强迫统一、被消灭制度、被剥夺自由，就不算分裂人的生命尊严吗？台湾若被并吞，不是地图换颜色，而是人民换命运。支持台湾独立，不是反华。相反，它是在保护华语世界，唯一一个仍能证明“华人不是天生顺服专制”的社会形态。

中共最害怕什么？不是美国，不是日本，而是台湾这座活生生的对照组。台湾证明：华人社会依然能有新闻自由；政府可以被监督；权力可以被限制；人民不是统治者的附属品。

台湾不是挑衅中共，台湾的存在本身就足以让中共的全部借口失效。如果制度自信，为什么害怕比较？如果自称优越，为什么不能让人民选择？这就是台湾之所以必须被压下去的原因——不是因为“统一”，而是因为专制无法容忍更成功的自由样本。

我看过父辈一生活在恐惧里；看过朋友因为说真话被威胁；我自己正在庇护路上，为逃离黑暗而奔跑；站在美国的土地上，我无法对台湾说“保持中立”。

中立是特权，被威胁的人没有中立的资格。

我希望台湾：活得自由、活得民主、活得挺直、成为铁幕里的人仍能望见的一束方向光。只要台湾还活着，我们这一代中国人就不会被彻底判死刑。如果台湾倒下，华语世界会陷入同一种声音、同一种历史、同一种真理。那不是统一，那是窒息。

支持台湾，是我这个时代最简单、也最清醒的选择。华人不是天生的奴隶；自由不是西方独有的特权；我们本来可以有另一种未来，只是被强盗抢走了。

如果台湾有一天宣布独立，我会无条件支持。

如果台湾被威胁，我会站在人的一边，而不是权力的一边。

因为那一天——不是分裂的那一天，而是华语世界第一次真正拥有选择的那一天。

我支持台湾。我支持台湾独立。因为我仍然希望，在这个被黑暗吞噬的时代，华语世界至少留下一束光。

Why I Support Taiwan—and Why I Support Taiwan’s Independence

By Peng Xiaomei

Editor: Wang Mengmeng
Executive Editor: Luo Zhifei   Proofreader: Cheng Xiaoxiao   Translator: Peng Xiaomei

Abstract: Taiwan represents the continuing possibility of freedom, accountability, and choice in the Chinese-speaking world. The collapse of Hong Kong made me understand that losing Taiwan would not merely mean a change of color on the map, but a regression of civilization and the disappearance of freedom itself. Supporting Taiwan and its right to choose is not anti-Chinese; it is a defense of human dignity and institutional diversity. As long as Taiwan lives, the light of freedom will not be completely extinguished.

I truly came to understand the value of Taiwan not from books or news reports, but through the Hong Kong fire—and through those moments when Hong Kong people reached out to their system again and again, only to grasp cold, empty air.

I stood before the mural Fallen at the Liberty Sculpture Park in Los Angeles, listening to friends from Hong Kong describe how they were gradually pushed by the tide of history toward a dead end, with no path of retreat. They told me that Hong Kong’s collapse was not an accident, but the result of deliberate institutional choices.

As I listened, I suddenly understood: if Taiwan were dragged down as well, the Chinese-speaking world would lose even the proof that “freedom once existed.”

I have witnessed too many suffocating realities: iron doors welded shut during lockdowns; young people taken away overnight during the White Paper Movement; a single ordinary complaint on WeChat turning into “incitement”; families and friends learning to remain silent out of fear of consequences. When people live in fear for too long, they forget what freedom originally looked like.

Then I look at Taiwan—radio hosts openly criticizing the government, legislators shouting so fiercely the desks nearly overturn, young people walking the streets at night without constantly looking over their shoulders—and I know this is not luck. It is the confidence of a functioning civilization. What Taiwan has preserved is not merely elections, but the last piece of land in the Chinese-speaking world that is free from fear.

Some say that Taiwan’s independence is “separatism.” I want to ask one simple question: if forced unification, the destruction of institutions, and the stripping away of freedom do not count as the fragmentation of human dignity, then what does? If Taiwan were annexed, it would not be a change of borders, but a change of fate for its people. Supporting Taiwan’s independence is not anti-Chinese. On the contrary, it protects the only social model in the Chinese-speaking world that still proves one essential truth: that Chinese people are not born to submit to authoritarian rule.

What does the Chinese Communist Party fear most? Not the United States. Not Japan. But Taiwan—a living, breathing control group. Taiwan proves that Chinese societies can have press freedom; that governments can be held accountable; that power can be restrained; and that people are not mere appendages of their rulers.

Taiwan is not provoking the CCP. Taiwan’s very existence is enough to invalidate all of the regime’s excuses. If a system is truly confident, why fear comparison? If it claims superiority, why deny people the right to choose? This is why Taiwan must be suppressed—not for the sake of “unification,” but because authoritarianism cannot tolerate a more successful example of freedom.

I have watched my parents’ generation live their entire lives in fear. I have seen friends threatened for speaking the truth. I myself am on the path of seeking asylum, running to escape darkness. Standing on American soil, I cannot tell Taiwan to “remain neutral.”

Neutrality is a privilege. Those who are under threat do not have the luxury of neutrality.

I hope Taiwan will live freely, live democratically, stand upright, and become a guiding light that people trapped behind the iron curtain can still see. As long as Taiwan lives, our generation of Chinese people will not be completely sentenced to death. If Taiwan falls, the Chinese-speaking world will be reduced to a single voice, a single history, a single so-called truth. That would not be unity—it would be suffocation.

Supporting Taiwan is the simplest and clearest choice of my time. Chinese people are not born slaves. Freedom is not a privilege exclusive to the West. We could have had another future—one that was taken from us by force.

If Taiwan one day declares independence, I will support it unconditionally.If Taiwan is threatened, I will stand on the side of human beings, not power.

Because that day will not be the day of division,but the day the Chinese-speaking world truly gains the right to choose for the first time.

I support Taiwan. I support Taiwan’s independence. Because I still hope that in this era consumed by darkness, the Chinese-speaking world can preserve at least one remaining beam of light.

作者：周敏

编辑：张宇   责任编辑：钟然   校对：王滨   翻译：吕峰

在过去十五年间，中国的县城发生了一场外界几乎看不见的深刻变化:

    一个以身份垄断、权力继承、资源控制为核心的地方等级结构正在迅速固化。

     我们称之为“县城婆罗门阶层”。

    这种阶层化并不是文化遗产，也不是经济自然演化，而是威权体制在基层治理中长期积累的产物。其结果就是：县城的社会活力被抽空，向上通道被封死，年轻人被迫逃离，地方治理陷入了自循环的保守化。这一结构成了中国社会向下沉落的关键推手。

    这个现象可以描述为：县城正固化为一个“身份社会”。中国国务院发展研究中心、北大社科系、清华公共管理学院在过去十年的调查指出，中国70%的人口增长与创新资源正在向大城市集中；县域财政高度依赖上级转移支付；县域公共就业系统（编制内）在当地占30%-50%，远高于城市。在一个经济活力不足、机会稀缺的环境里，县城自然而然走向了“身份决定阶层”。拥有体制内身份=拥有稳定；拥有权力关系=拥有尊严；拥有内部资源=拥有上升通道。普普通通的老百姓则排斥在外部 。挤不进编制=没有未来；没有人脉关系=没有公平机会。循环往复不断固化。县城婆罗门阶层由此而生。

    那么，权力为什么可以在县城得到“继承”？

    中国的县域治理研究显示，约有2100个县级行政单位，它们呈现出一种典型结构：

    政法系统（公安、法院、检察院）本地化倾向极强；

    教育、卫健、住建等系统普遍存在“熟人化招聘、内部消化”现象；

    事业单位、国企和城投公司吸纳当地最优质的稳定收入岗位。

    在这样一个结构里，权力具有了三个特征。

    一、家族化倾向

    大量地方研究成果指出，县域事业单位与体制岗位存在明显的“家族集中性”。乡镇到县级的权力系统存在“科长-局长-书记”的关系链条。婚姻成为阶层内部的再结合机制，也就是说，体制内的通婚率高。这就意味着，县城的权力并不是公开竞争，而是继承、嫁接和血缘化。

    二、执法权力高度集中

    县城有三大权力：行政权，执法权，资源分配权。而这些往往由同一批人、同一套关系网掌握。在缺乏监督体系的环境中，这种体系天然形成了资源闭环。因此，一个县城的经济结构再怎么变化，其权力结构却几乎不会变化！

    三、资源配置由“权力逻辑”支配，而非市场逻辑。县城资源包括：老师编制、医院岗位、工程项目、国企招聘、土地指标和城市建设预算等。调查指出，这些资源在县城中往往由不到10%的人掌控分配权。而这10%的人，形成了现实中的县城婆罗门。

那么，县城婆罗门阶层为何会阻断社会流动？我们可以大概分析一下。首先是，教育机会被体制化。县域教育财政中，目前80%以上用于人员支出，几乎没有空间进行真正的教育质量改善。而老师岗位是高度体制化的，优质岗位由关系网分配。这就造成了普通家庭的孩子无法获得优质教育，体制家庭的孩子却能享受教育资源的倾斜。教育成了阶层固化的关键环节。其次，所有的经济机会被压缩为“体制内 VS 体制外”。县城缺乏产业，但体制岗位十分稳定，这形成了极端结构。体制内：铁饭碗+地位+资源，体制外：低工资+无机会+无保障。在县城里，体制内平均工资是体制外的2-4倍，体制外劳动者的社保缴纳率远远低于大城市水平。县城私营经济一年比一年差，对本地就业的吸纳能力持续下滑。而这一切意味着：体制就是命运。

中国有句古话叫“识时务者为俊杰”。普通家庭的年轻人看不到希望，便会选择远走大城市。十几年间年轻人口净流出率超过30%。部分县城18-35岁人口占比跌到15%以下。这是一个可怕的数字，但是实际情况可能是比统计数据更加糟糕的。年轻人代表的是创新变革与改天换日的勇气，他们走了之后，身后的县城便愈加陷入保守结构，和对外来竞争的恐惧。县城进一步陷入“老龄化-保守化-权力固化”，形成了一个东亚等级社会。

    那么这个现象的根本原因是什么呢？那就是，威权体制是不会允许一个开放的县城存在的。县城婆罗门阶层之所以形成，并不是地方官员个别腐败，而是整个制度结构决定的！首先，也是最重要的：权力不透明。在没有透明预算、没有自治、没有独立媒体的环境里，权力者天然优先满足自己及自己的人。而普通人无处申诉，没有渠道监督。中国的制度决定了资源永远向上、向内流动，而不会向社会扩散。第二是，社会组织受限，公民（实际上只是居民）无法参与治理。在健康的民主国家里，县城往往是地方自治的基础单位，是NGO、公民组织活跃的场所，是媒体定期监督的对象。但是在中国，自治是被行政化的，社会组织被审批牢牢控制，公民参与和舆论监督都压缩到极小。结果就是只有权力能决定县城的走向。最后一点，威权结构让县城必须维稳。县城要对上负责，而不是对下、对人民负责。地方官员的首要目标不是发展，而是不出事，不给上级添麻烦，不发生“政治风险”。于是一个怪象出现了：创新被怀疑，活力被压制，社会被降级。权力需要“稳定”来证明自己合理（尽管谁都知道这个“稳定”是波涛汹涌的表象）。这正是县城婆罗门阶层最坚固的土壤。

    县城婆罗门阶层的问题不是地方问题，而是威权结构问题。它的根源在于权力不受监督、资源不公开透明、社会组织无法成长、公民（其实是居民）参与被最小化、以及媒体不能独立监督。要走出阶层固化陷阱，必须从制度层面改变权力逻辑。要建立真正的地方自治，公开预算和公共资源分配，建立独立的媒体与审计机制，鼓励公民社会和公共监督，让权力回到人民的问责之下。开放、透明、民主是唯一解药。

    一个国家的现代化，不是大城市的高楼与高科技决定的，而是县城的公平与自由决定的。

    县城能自由呼吸的那一天，中国才真正拥有未来。

Zhou Min: County-Town Brahmins — The Solidification of China’s Grassroots Power Structure

Abstract:From the perspectives of the political–legal system, education, and employment, the author analyzes the rise of a “Brahmin class” within China’s county towns. By examining the development of small counties, the article reveals the nature of authoritarian rule under the Chinese Communist Party at the grassroots level.

Author: Zhou Min

Editor: Zhang Yu Managing Editor: Zhong Ran Proofreader: Wang Bin Translator:Lyu Feng

Over the past fifteen years, China’s county towns have undergone a profound transformation that has largely escaped public attention:

A local hierarchical structure centered on identity monopoly, power inheritance, and resource control has rapidly solidified.

We may call this structure the “county-town Brahmin class.”

This form of stratification is neither a cultural legacy nor the result of natural economic evolution. Rather, it is the cumulative product of long-term authoritarian governance at the grassroots level. The consequences are stark: social vitality in county towns has been drained, upward mobility channels have been blocked, young people are forced to leave, and local governance has sunk into a self-reinforcing conservatism. This structure has become a key driver of China’s broader social downward drift.

The phenomenon can be described as follows: county towns are hardening into “identity-based societies.” Surveys over the past decade by the Development Research Center of the State Council, the Department of Sociology at Peking University, and the School of Public Policy and Management at Tsinghua University indicate that around 70% of population growth and innovative resources are concentrating in large cities; county-level finances are highly dependent on upper-level transfer payments; and public employment systems (positions within the state apparatus) account for 30–50% of local employment—far higher than in cities.

In an environment lacking economic dynamism and rich opportunities, county towns naturally evolve toward a system in which identity determines class. Possessing an institutional position means stability; possessing power connections means dignity; possessing internal resources means access to upward mobility. Ordinary people are excluded from this system. Failing to enter the state establishment means no future; lacking personal connections means no fair opportunity. This cycle continually reinforces itself, giving rise to the county-town Brahmin class.

Why, then, is power able to be “inherited” within county towns?

Research on county-level governance in China shows that among roughly 2,100 county-level administrative units, a typical structure prevails:

The political–legal system (public security, courts, procuratorates) is highly localized;

Education, healthcare, housing, and urban development systems commonly exhibit “acquaintance-based recruitment” and internal absorption;

Public institutions, state-owned enterprises, and urban investment companies absorb the most stable and best-paid local jobs.

Within this structure, power takes on three defining characteristics.

First, a tendency toward familialization.A large body of local research indicates a pronounced “family concentration” in county-level public institutions and state positions. From townships to county governments, power networks often follow chains such as “section chief–bureau director–party secretary.” Marriage functions as an internal mechanism of class recombination; in other words, intermarriage rates within the system are high. County-town power is therefore not the result of open competition, but of inheritance, grafting, and bloodline consolidation.

Second, a high concentration of enforcement power.County towns revolve around three core powers: administrative authority, law-enforcement authority, and resource-allocation authority. These are often held by the same group of people within the same relational network. In the absence of effective oversight, this structure naturally forms a closed resource loop. As a result, no matter how much a county’s economic structure changes, its power structure remains largely unchanged.

Third, resource allocation governed by power logic rather than market logic.County-level resources include teaching posts, hospital positions, construction projects, state-owned enterprise recruitment, land quotas, and urban development budgets. Studies indicate that fewer than 10% of individuals control the allocation of these resources. This 10% constitutes the de facto county-town Brahmin class.

Why does this class block social mobility? Several mechanisms are evident. First, educational opportunity becomes institutionalized. Over 80% of county-level education budgets are currently spent on personnel costs, leaving little room for genuine improvements in educational quality. Teaching positions are highly institutionalized, and desirable posts are distributed through relational networks. As a result, children from ordinary families are unable to access quality education, while children from institutional families benefit from systematic advantages. Education thus becomes a key mechanism of class consolidation.

Second, economic opportunities are compressed into a binary of “inside the system versus outside the system.” County towns lack diversified industries, yet institutional positions remain highly stable, producing an extreme structural divide. Inside the system: iron rice bowl, social status, and access to resources. Outside the system: low wages, few opportunities, and weak social security. In county towns, average wages inside the system are two to four times those outside it, and social-security participation rates among non-institutional workers are far below those in large cities. The private economy in county towns deteriorates year by year, with declining capacity to absorb local labor. All of this sends a single message: the system determines destiny.

There is a Chinese saying: “Those who understand the times are heroes.” Young people from ordinary families see no future and therefore choose to leave for big cities. Over the past decade, net youth out-migration rates have exceeded 30%. In some county towns, the proportion of residents aged 18–35 has fallen below 15%. This is an alarming figure, and the reality may be even worse than official statistics suggest. Young people embody innovation, change, and the courage to reshape society. Once they leave, county towns sink deeper into conservatism and fear of external competition, further locking themselves into a cycle of aging, rigidity, and power consolidation—forming a distinctly East Asian hierarchical society.

What, then, is the root cause of this phenomenon? The answer is that an authoritarian system does not permit the existence of open county towns. The formation of the county-town Brahmin class is not the result of isolated local corruption, but of the institutional structure as a whole.

First and most fundamentally, power lacks transparency. In the absence of transparent budgets, local autonomy, and independent media, those in power naturally prioritize themselves and their networks. Ordinary people have no effective channels for redress or oversight. China’s institutional design ensures that resources flow upward and inward, rather than outward to society.

Second, social organizations are constrained, and citizens (in practice, merely “residents”) cannot meaningfully participate in governance. In healthy democracies, county towns are foundational units of local self-government, vibrant arenas for NGOs, civic organizations, and regular media oversight. In China, however, self-governance is administrative in nature, social organizations are tightly controlled through approval mechanisms, and civic participation and public scrutiny are reduced to a minimum. The result is that only power determines the direction of county towns.

Finally, authoritarian structures require county towns to prioritize “stability maintenance.” Local governments are accountable upward, not downward to the people. Officials’ primary objective is not development, but avoiding incidents, avoiding trouble for superiors, and preventing “political risks.” A paradox emerges: innovation is viewed with suspicion, vitality is suppressed, and society is downgraded. Power requires “stability” to justify itself, even though everyone knows this stability is merely a turbulent façade. This is the most fertile soil for the county-town Brahmin class.

The problem of the county-town Brahmin class is not a local issue, but a systemic one rooted in authoritarian governance. Its causes lie in unchecked power, opaque resource allocation, stunted social organizations, minimized civic participation, and the absence of independent media oversight. Escaping the trap of class solidification requires institutional change: genuine local self-government, transparent budgets and public resource allocation, independent media and auditing mechanisms, and the encouragement of civil society and public oversight—bringing power back under popular accountability. Openness, transparency, and democracy are the only remedies.

A nation’s modernization is not determined by skyscrapers and advanced technology in major cities, but by fairness and freedom in its county towns.

Only when county towns can breathe freely will China truly have a future.

读X重要文章心得体会

（本刊荣誉主编供稿）

编辑：冯仍   责任编辑：罗志飞   校对：程筱筱   翻译：刘芳

12月1日出版的第23期《求是》杂志发表了x的重要文章《推进党的自我革命要做到“五个进一步到位”》。所有官媒都在头版头条做了介绍，我只对文中几点谈些学习体会。

习文强调，自我革命是我们党跳出治乱兴衰历史周期率的第二个答案。

查老头学习体会：

1945年7月著名教育家黄×炎x培以国民参政员身份访问延安，在窑洞里黄问毛，中共如何跳出“其兴也勃焉，其亡也忽焉”的中国史上治乱兴衰循环反复的历史周期率。毛×泽×东略作沉思后答：“我们已经找到了新路，我们能跳出这个周期率，这条新路就是民主，走群众路线。只有让人民来监督政府，政府才不敢松懈，只有人人起来负责，才不会人亡政息。”

现世界多数国家的民主制度內涵是以多党竞选、三权分立、新闻自由、法律至上、军队国家化、保障公民人权来制约权力者。毛反对这些，他靠的是个人无上权威和不断的无序无法的群众运动，显然他失败了。

m的“窑洞对”为跳出历史周期率的第一方案，现提出“自我革命”为第二方案。×文提出要“刀刃向内““刮骨疗毒““霹雳手段决不能少”，决心极大，令人佩服。但m时代也讲“自我革命”，m 提出著名的警惕“糖衣炮弹”论。建国初即全国开展三反整风运动，枪毙了革命功臣、天津负责干部腐败分子刘x青x山、张x子x善，有23.8万名党内异己分子和贪腐分子受到刑事处理，文革前又大搞“四清”运动。可由于外部制约体制设计的原因，一个脱离群众的特权阶层还是出现了。

现在市场经济出现大规模权力与资本结合现象，在外部制度设计不变前提下，现在进行“自我革命”如何保证毛“自我革命”失败的历史不会重演呢？

习文讲，“党员干部要时刻牢记，我们一切权力都是人民赋予的……”

世界多数国家是在多党竞选中，选民用选票将权力赋予某个党。当然，也可以用选票剥夺某个执政党的权力，赋于别的党。我的问题是，我国宪定共产党是永远的执政党，选民没有选择别的党执政的权利（公民也没有成立新党的权利），那这个“我们一切权力都是人民赋予的”是如何“赋予”的呢？

如果每级掌权者的权力都是上级赋予的，那掌权者就只会对上负责，不对下（选民）负责，那习文中谴责的“利益集团、权势团体、特权阶层”怎能不出现？

习文讲，党员干部要“乐于接受党组织教育和各方面监督““要把党內监督和人民监督结合起来”“腐败突出表现是以权涉私…要通过持续努力，真正把权力关进制度的笼子”。

查老头学习体会：

X这几段话讲的好！人民监督应以法律保障，我呼吁全国人大要立《网络言x论x自x由法》，坚决打击那些随意封文封号封群、“被喝茶”的乱象。要立《保护公民监督政府法》，坚决打击那些以“攻击XXX”为名用“寻x衅×滋×事”、“煽×动×颠x覆”等罪名任意截访、拘押、判刑的乱象。

要立《新闻法》、《结社法》，落实宪法第三十五条中的公民出版、结社自由，这些政治自由人×权正是人民监督权力的手段、反腐的“防火墙”。

要立《官员财产公开法》，全球已有30个国家立法要求官员财产向社会全面公开，这为社会监督提供了公开透明的条件。

《中国共产党纪律检查委员会工作条例》第七条规定：党中央纪律检查委员会与国家监察委员会合署办公，地方各级党纪委与政府监委实行一套工作机构、两个机关名称的合署办公。我建议：修改此条例，纪委监委分开，给监委依法监察执政党内干部腐败的独立性，其重大意义不言自明。

2025/12/6 北京（103）

Elder Cha Talks About Current Affairs

Reflections on Reading Important Articles on X

(Contribution by the Journal’s Honorary Editor-in-Chief)

Editor: Feng Reng Executive Editor: Luo Zhifei Proofreader: Cheng Xiaoxiao Translator: Liu Fang

The 23rd issue of Qiushi magazine, published on December 1, carried an important article by x titled “Advancing the Party’s Self-Revolution Must Achieve ‘Five Further Improvements in Place.’” All official media placed it on their front pages and headlines. I would like to share only a few of my own reflections on several points in the article.

Xi’s article emphasizes that self-revolution is the Party’s second answer to escaping the historical cycle of rise and decline, order and chaos.

Elder Cha’s reflections:

In July 1945, the well-known educator Huang Yanpei, visiting Yan’an as a member of the National Political Council, asked Mao Zedong in a cave dwelling how the Chinese Communist Party could escape the recurring historical cycle described as “its rise is sudden and vigorous, its fall equally sudden.” After brief reflection, Mao replied: “We have already found a new path. We can escape this cycle. This new path is democracy, following the mass line. Only by letting the people supervise the government will the government dare not slacken; only when everyone takes responsibility will governance not collapse with the death of one individual.”

In most countries today, the substance of democratic systems lies in multi-party competition, separation of powers, freedom of the press, the rule of law, the nationalization of the military, and the protection of civil rights—all mechanisms to restrain those in power. Mao opposed these. He relied instead on supreme personal authority and continuous, disorderly mass movements unconstrained by law. Clearly, m’s “cave dialogue” was the first proposed solution for escaping the historical cycle; the current proposal of “self-revolution” is presented as the second. X’s article calls for “turning the blade inward,” “scraping poison from the bone,” and insists that “thunderous measures must not be lacking.” The determination is immense and admirable. Yet Mao’s era also spoke of “self-revolution.” Mao famously warned against “sugar-coated bullets.” Soon after the founding of the PRC, the nationwide Three-Anti campaign was launched; revolutionary veterans and corrupt officials such as Liu Qingqing and Zhang Zishan in Tianjin were executed, and 238,000 Party dissidents and corrupt elements were subjected to criminal punishment. Before the Cultural Revolution, the “Four Cleanups” campaign was carried out again. Yet due to flaws in external institutional constraints, a privileged class detached from the masses still emerged.

Today, under a market economy, large-scale collusion between power and capital has appeared. Without changes to external institutional design, how can a new round of “self-revolution” ensure that the historical failure of Mao’s “self-revolution” will not be repeated?

Xi’s article states: “Party members and cadres must always remember that all our power is granted by the people…”

In most countries, power is granted through multi-party elections, with voters using ballots to authorize a party to govern—and also to strip a ruling party of power and give it to another. My question is this: when our Constitution stipulates that the Communist Party is the permanent ruling party, and voters have no right to choose another party to govern (nor do citizens have the right to form new parties), how exactly is this power “granted by the people”?

If the power of officials at every level is granted only by their superiors, then those in power will be accountable only upward, not downward to voters. In that case, how could the “interest groups, power blocs, and privileged strata” condemned in X’s article fail to emerge?

Xi’s article also states that Party members and cadres should be “willing to accept education from Party organizations and supervision from all sides,” that “Party supervision and public supervision should be combined,” and that “the prominent manifestation of corruption is the misuse of power for private gain… power must truly be locked into the cage of institutions through sustained effort.”

Elder Cha’s reflections:

These passages are well said! Public supervision must be protected by law. I call on the National People’s Congress to enact a Law on Freedom of Online Speech, to resolutely curb the chaos of arbitrary content deletions, account bans, group shutdowns, and being “summoned for tea.” A Law on Protecting Citizens’ Supervision of Government should be enacted to resolutely curb the abuse of charges such as “attacking XXX,” “picking quarrels and provoking trouble,” or “inciting subversion” to arbitrarily intercept petitioners, detain them, and sentence them.

A Press Law and a Law on Associations should be enacted to implement Article 35 of the Constitution, which guarantees citizens’ freedoms of publication and association. These political freedoms and human rights are precisely the means by which the people supervise power and serve as a “firewall” against corruption.

A Law on the Disclosure of Officials’ Assets should be enacted. Globally, more than thirty countries already require by law that officials’ assets be fully disclosed to society, providing transparent conditions for public oversight.

Article 7 of the Regulations on the Work of the Communist Party of China Discipline Inspection Committees stipulates that the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and the National Supervisory Commission share offices, and that local Party discipline inspection commissions and government supervisory commissions operate as “one set of institutions with two names.” I propose revising this regulation to separate the discipline inspection commissions from the supervisory commissions, granting the latter independence to lawfully supervise corruption among ruling-party officials. The significance of this reform speaks for itself.

December 6, 2025, Beijing (103)