新疆对维吾尔族的镇压已经演变，而非结束

一份罕见的内部证词揭露了中共政权如何掩盖新疆地区的国家暴力行为

作者：Adrian Zenz     

编辑：黄吉洲 校对：孔祥庆 翻译：周敏

根据一位来自中国警察系统内部的前成员的第一手证词揭露，北京并未拆除其在新疆的压制体系，而是对其进行了“调整”。强制性政策仍主导着日常生活，但其运作方式更加隐蔽、更加分散，也因此更难被外界察觉。

这一“调整”体系的设计者是马兴瑞，他于2021年12月接替以强硬政策著称的陈全国，出任新疆党委书记。在陈全国时期，国家依赖高度可见的运动式治理，将大量维吾尔人及其他少数民族族群送入法外拘禁营地。当时的行动由自上而下的拘押指标推动，也为当前短期拘留目标提供了行政先例。

当曾任广东省省长、被视为技术官僚的马兴瑞上任时，外界一度猜测他可能会推动新疆从高度安全化治理转向以经济发展为导向。

多位目击者回忆称，马兴瑞初到新疆时确实带来了一定程度的谨慎乐观。他取消了一些最显眼的警务措施，并暂时放松了部分社会管控。但事实上，他的治理只是将压制从“高可见度”转向“高度隐蔽”。

这些隐蔽压制的具体运作方式，来自张亚博的证词。张是一名汉族公民，2006年进入新疆工作。经过教师生涯后，他于2014年加入警察系统，被派往维吾尔族聚居的和田地区。

在2014年至2016年间，张作为拘留中心的看守，目睹了对维吾尔被拘人员的日常殴打与酷刑，包括将人悬吊于天花板长达24小时。他还目睹一名同事在审讯过程中强奸女性被拘者，并见证有人因虐待而死亡。2017年，在一次为期两周的拘留中心工作中，他看到严重的拥挤状况、“极其恶劣”的环境，以及“频繁发生”的死亡事件。

2016年底至2023年间，张在基层担任村级警察。他负责将“再教育营”释放的维吾尔人转送至拘留所，其中许多人随后被判处长期监禁。张估计，在他所辖区域，至少一半以上被释放人员最终进入监狱。

官方数据也印证了这一大规模“监禁转移”的趋势：2017年至2021年间，有超过50万人被判刑入狱。张还负责监督国家主导的劳动力转移，包括组织维吾尔人群体在警方看守下采摘棉花。

张的证词还显示，实际的拘禁规模可能甚至超过地方领导层的内部估计。2019年，他在和田县再教育总部工作时发现，地方官员经常向上级隐瞒真实拘押人数。在多重政策压力下，基层既执行大规模拘押，又为避免被指责“治理不力”而刻意隐瞒数据。

张估计，在他所在的村庄，大约25%的成年人口曾被送入再教育营（不包括另行送入监狱者）。为掩盖这一行动，2020年初，当局下令销毁所有与再教育营相关的档案。

2023年底，张辞去警职并逃离中国。此后，中国当局指控他“危害国家安全”，冻结其银行账户，并威胁其在国内的家人。

张参与执行的2023年和田地区拘押行动，也与更广泛的区域趋势相吻合。他获取的证词显示，在乌鲁木齐等地，在清零政策结束后，也出现了一波针对年轻维吾尔人的任意拘留潮，特别是在反封控抗议之后。

新疆新一轮压制与中国领导人习近平的政策表述变化相一致。2020年中央新疆工作座谈会上，习近平曾强调新疆政策“取得全面胜利”，突出经济发展。但在2023年8月一次未公开行程中，他则警告“存在隐患”，要求加强安全治理。

为延续大规模拘禁时期所建立的深层恐惧，马兴瑞时期采用了“预防性、轮换式短期拘留”机制。通过短期但持续的拘押，既维持普遍恐惧，又在表面上营造“正常生活”的假象。在这种“稳定”之下，是对民族同化的系统性推进。

张表示，对维吾尔语言、文化与宗教的压制在马上任后仍在持续。到他离职时，当地传统习俗和宗教信仰几乎被消除：诵读《古兰经》、在家祈祷、斋月禁食均被严格禁止；维吾尔干部甚至被强制食用猪肉以示“忠诚”；多数清真寺被拆毁，仅存的一座也全天候看守。

文化抹除还深入教育体系和日常生活。学校禁止使用维吾尔语，新一代正在与自身语言逐渐脱节。

这种文化消解与经济政策密切相关，尤其是国家推动的劳动力转移。官方将其描述为“自愿扶贫”，但张的证词表明，这实际上构成一个大规模的强制劳动与人口工程体系。

在马兴瑞时期，劳动力转移规模显著扩大，从阶段性动员转变为常态化、不可逃避的制度安排。官方数据显示，到2025年，转移规模达340万人次（涉及超过300万人，部分人员一年内被多次转移）。

但与此同时，持续的拘禁与劳动力抽调造成劳动力短缺，基层面临巨大压力，被迫“想方设法完成指标”。村委会与警方利用其权力，对居民施加各种行政骚扰与威胁，迫使其接受工作安排。

拒绝者将面临额外普通话学习、无偿劳动以及频繁上门“走访”。多次拒绝者则会被送入短期拘留设施，在张的话中，被“刻意置于困苦环境中以迫使服从”。

这种对劳动年龄人口的抽取正在掏空农村社会结构。张观察到村庄人口锐减，仅剩老人、病人和儿童。这种人为造成的人口空洞甚至导致无人照看的儿童溺亡，当地不得不发布禁止儿童靠近水域的警告。

官方文件也印证了这一环境。一份2023年的地方指令要求干部“转变农民思想”，以确保劳务转移执行；另一份规划文件则提出扩大跨省转移，并通过“感恩教育”“民族团结教育”将农民转化为产业工人。

张指出，所谓“思想转化”在实际操作中，就是通过威胁、惩罚以及长时间（甚至持续到凌晨两三点）的会议来施压。

这种制度化的强制迁移，体现了新疆治理模式的根本转变：从陈全国时期的显性高压，转向一种长期、无处不在的隐性控制。在政治学上，这意味着从“专制性权力”向“基础设施性权力”的转型。

前者依赖明显的暴力与压制，而后者则依赖国家通过官僚体系深入社会、实施控制的能力。

通过将维稳体系嵌入基层治理，国家从大规模拘禁的公开暴力，转向更隐蔽却更彻底的行政控制。

与此同时，马兴瑞还推动对外贸易大幅增长。官方数据显示，2021至2025年间，新疆对美国、加拿大、英国及欧盟的直接出口增长了465%，其中2024至2025年间增长达71%。

尽管实现了其所称的“高质量发展与高水平安全的良性互动”，马兴瑞仍在2025年7月被突然撤换，并因腐败问题接受调查。

在国际社会难以监测这一“由显转隐”的压制体系之际，像张这样的内部证人打破了“新疆趋于宽松”的假象。压制机制并未结束，而是演化为一种更持久、更深入的结构性控制，导致维吾尔社会的瓦解成为长期现实。

在对“绝对安全”的执念驱动下，这种无止境的社会控制需求，最终为大规模人权灾难的持续提供了条件。

原文链接https://foreignpolicy.com/author/adrian-zenz/

“The Opposition” China Human Rights Watch Briefing No. 24 (April 16, 2026)

The Repression of Uyghurs in Xinjiang Has Evolved, Not Ended

A rare internal testimony reveals how the CCP regime conceals state violence in the Xinjiang region.

Author: Adrian Zenz

Editor: Huang Jizhou Proofreader: Kong Xiangqing Translator: Zhou Min

According to first-hand testimony from a former member of the Chinese police system, Beijing has not dismantled its apparatus of repression in Xinjiang, but has instead “adjusted” it. Coercive policies still dominate daily life, but they operate in a more hidden and decentralized manner, making them increasingly difficult for the outside world to detect.

The architect of this “adjusted” system is Ma Xingrui, who succeeded Chen Quanguo—known for his hardline policies—as the Party Secretary of Xinjiang in December 2021. Under Chen, the state relied on highly visible, campaign-style governance, sending vast numbers of Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities into extrajudicial detention camps. Those actions were driven by top-down detention quotas, which set the administrative precedent for current short-term detention targets.

When Ma Xingrui, a former governor of Guangdong Province regarded as a technocrat, took office, there was initial outside speculation that he might shift Xinjiang from high-security governance toward economic development.

Witnesses recall a degree of cautious optimism upon Ma’s arrival. He removed some of the most conspicuous police measures and temporarily relaxed certain social controls. However, in reality, his governance merely shifted repression from “high visibility” to “high invisibility.”

The specific workings of this concealed repression come from the testimony of Zhang Yabo. A Han Chinese citizen who began working in Xinjiang in 2006, Zhang joined the police force in 2014 after a career in teaching and was stationed in the Uyghur-populated Hotan region.

Between 2014 and 2016, as a detention center guard, Zhang witnessed daily beatings and torture of Uyghur detainees, including individuals suspended from ceilings for up to 24 hours. He also witnessed a colleague rape a female detainee during interrogation and saw deaths resulting from abuse. In 2017, during a two-week stint at a detention center, he observed severe overcrowding, “extremely appalling” environments, and “frequent” deaths.

From late 2016 to 2023, Zhang served as a village-level police officer at the grassroots. He was responsible for transferring Uyghurs released from “re-education camps” to detention houses, many of whom were subsequently sentenced to long prison terms. Zhang estimates that in his jurisdiction, more than half of those released eventually entered the prison system.

Official data corroborates this trend of mass “detention transfer”: between 2017 and 2021, over 500,000 people were sentenced to prison. Zhang was also responsible for supervising state-led labor transfers, including organizing groups of Uyghurs to pick cotton under police watch.

Zhang’s testimony suggests that the actual scale of detention may exceed even the internal estimates of local leadership. In 2019, while working at the Hotan County Re-education Headquarters, he discovered that local officials frequently hid true detention numbers from superiors. Under multifaceted policy pressure, the grassroots both executed mass detentions and deliberately falsified data to avoid accusations of “ineffective governance.”

Zhang estimates that in his village, approximately 25% of the adult population had been sent to re-education camps (excluding those sent directly to prison). To cover up these actions, authorities ordered the destruction of all archives related to re-education camps in early 2020.

Zhang resigned from the police force and fled China in late 2023. Since then, Chinese authorities have accused him of “endangering national security,” frozen his bank accounts, and threatened his family members remaining in the country.

The 2023 detention operations in Hotan that Zhang participated in align with broader regional trends. Testimony he obtained shows that in places like Urumqi, a wave of arbitrary detentions targeting young Uyghurs emerged after the end of the “Zero-COVID” policy, particularly following anti-lockdown protests.

The new round of repression in Xinjiang aligns with shifts in the policy rhetoric of Chinese leader Xi Jinping. At the 2020 Central Symposium on Xinjiang Work, Xi emphasized that Xinjiang policy had “achieved a comprehensive victory,” highlighting economic development. However, during an unannounced visit in August 2023, he warned of “hidden dangers” and demanded strengthened security governance.

To maintain the deep-seated fear established during the era of mass internment, the Ma Xingrui era adopted a mechanism of “preventative, rotating short-term detention.” Through short but continuous detentions, the state maintains pervasive fear while maintaining a surface illusion of “normal life.” Beneath this “stability” lies a systematic push for ethnic assimilation.

Zhang states that the suppression of Uyghur language, culture, and religion continued under Ma. By the time of Zhang’s departure, local traditional customs and religious beliefs had been nearly eradicated: reciting the Quran, praying at home, and fasting during Ramadan were strictly prohibited. Uyghur cadres were even forced to consume pork to demonstrate “loyalty.” Most mosques were demolished, and the few remaining were under 24-hour surveillance.

Cultural erasure has also permeated the education system and daily life. Schools prohibit the use of the Uyghur language, causing the younger generation to gradually lose touch with their own tongue.

This cultural dissolution is closely linked to economic policies, particularly state-mandated labor transfers. While official narratives describe this as “voluntary poverty alleviation,” Zhang’s testimony indicates it actually constitutes a system of mass forced labor and demographic engineering.

Under Ma Xingrui, the scale of labor transfers expanded significantly, evolving from episodic mobilization into a normalized, unavoidable institutional arrangement. Official data shows that by 2025, the scale of transfers reached 3.4 million person-times (involving over 3 million people, some transferred multiple times a year).

Simultaneously, continuous detentions and labor extractions caused labor shortages, placing immense pressure on grassroots officials who were forced to “find any means necessary to complete quotas.” Village committees and police used their power to subject residents to administrative harassment and threats to force acceptance of work assignments.

Those who refuse face additional Mandarin language study, unpaid labor, and frequent “home visits.” Repeat refusers are sent to short-term detention facilities, which, in Zhang’s words, are “deliberately placed in hardships to coerce compliance.”

This extraction of the working-age population is hollowing out rural social structures. Zhang observed a sharp decline in village populations, leaving only the elderly, the sick, and children. This man-made demographic void even led to the drowning of unsupervised children, prompting local authorities to issue warnings against children approaching bodies of water.

Official documents also reflect this environment. A 2023 local directive required cadres to “transform the thoughts of farmers” to ensure the execution of labor transfers; another planning document proposed expanding inter-provincial transfers and transforming farmers into industrial workers through “gratitude education” and “ethnic unity education.”

Zhang noted that “thought transformation” in practice meant applying pressure through threats, punishments, and marathon meetings that often lasted until 2 or 3 AM.

This institutionalized forced migration embodies a fundamental shift in Xinjiang’s governance model: from the explicit high-pressure tactics of the Chen Quanguo era to a long-term, ubiquitous form of implicit control. In political science terms, this represents a transition from “despotic power” to “infrastructural power.”

The former relies on overt violence and repression, while the latter relies on the state’s ability to permeate society and implement control through bureaucratic systems. By embedding the stability-maintenance apparatus into grassroots governance, the state has pivoted from the public violence of mass internment to a more concealed yet more totalizing administrative control.

Meanwhile, Ma Xingrui also oversaw a significant surge in foreign trade. Official data shows that between 2021 and 2025, Xinjiang’s direct exports to the US, Canada, the UK, and the EU grew by 465%, with a 71% increase between 2024 and 2025 alone.

Despite achieving what he termed a “positive interaction between high-quality development and high-level security,” Ma Xingrui was abruptly replaced in July 2025 and placed under investigation for corruption.

As the international community struggles to monitor this “visible to invisible” system of repression, internal witnesses like Zhang shatter the illusion that Xinjiang is trending toward leniency. The repressive mechanisms have not ended; they have evolved into a more enduring, deeper structural control, making the disintegration of Uyghur society a long-term reality.

Driven by an obsession with “absolute security,” this endless demand for social control ultimately sustains the conditions for ongoing mass human rights disasters.

Original Link: https://foreignpolicy.com/author/adrian-zenz/

第787次茉莉花行动

主题：声援程方维—-抗议中共跨国鎮压

活动时间：2026年4月25日15:00（周六）

活动地点：洛杉矶中领馆

地址：443 Shatto Place, Los Angeles, CA 90020

程方维是一名充满良知的汉族青年，拥抱不同的信仰，在海外自由的土地上，为遭遇系统性迫害的新疆少数民族同胞公开发声。

没有公开审判，没有判决书，只有黑箱操作下长达六年的重刑，以及一项莫须有的“分裂国家罪”。

那些真正分裂国家的，是建起高墙、制造仇恨与隔离的强权；而不是一个试图保护父母、声援弱势群体的年轻学子。

今天，我们站在这里，向世界发声：

停止跨国镇压，保障海外华人与留学生的基本人权！

停止秘密审判，立刻无罪释放程方维！

抗议株连家属，还人民以自由与尊严！

关闭再教育集中营，停止对维吾尔等少数民族的系统性迫害！

活动发起：张致君 马群 

活动策划：姜俊良 张致君

活动主持人：郑洲 吕聪

摄影摄像：陀先润

义工负责人：郑洲

秩序维护义工：张磊 周富权 李铁

媒体联络：张致君

新闻发布：马群

活动现场负责人：倪世成 卓皓然

发言人：姜俊良

记者：林小龙 编辑：张致君 责任编辑：朱虞夫 资料整理：邢志远 翻译：周敏

高智晟，中国人权律师，曾被外界誉为“中国最勇敢的律师之一”。

他出生贫寒，靠着自学一步步走上法律道路，通过司法考试后，在北京创办律师事务所，很快在业内崭露头角。那时的他，拥有令人羡慕的事业前景，也完全可以像许多成功律师一样，在商业案件与现实秩序之间找到一个安全、体面的立足点。

但高智晟没有这样选择。

随着执业深入，他接触到越来越多普通人无力发声、也无人愿意接手的案件：弱势群体的维权、宗教信仰者的处境、政治异议者的申诉。这些案件往往不只是法律问题，更意味着触碰权力最敏感的边界。在中国多数律师迫于政治压力，对敏感案件避之不及，而他却一步步走了进去。

2000年代初的中国，正沉浸在经济高速增长的叙事之中。高楼拔地而起，资本涌动，世界也开始越来越多地将目光投向这个正在崛起的大国。在那样一个普遍歌颂“发展”与“稳定”的年代，高智晟选择走向另一条路：他没有停留在繁荣表象之中，而是进入制度最幽暗的边缘地带，去触碰那些不被允许触碰的问题，去凝视那些被刻意遮蔽的人。

为受迫害的法轮功学员伸冤成为他人生真正的转折点。

2004年底开始，他连续三次向胡锦涛、温家宝为代表的中国最高层发出公开信，揭露针对法轮功学员的系统性迫害，并呼吁立即停止相关行动。这些信件措辞直接、内容尖锐，既带有法律人的理性，也带有一种几近孤绝的道德勇气。它们迅速引发国际社会的强烈关注，也让高智晟从一名执业律师，转变为当局重点打压和清除的对象。

从那之后，他的人生轨迹被彻底改写。

他的律师执照被吊销，律师事务所被关闭，原本建立起来的职业生涯被强行中断。他本人则陷入长期的拘押、软禁、监控与强迫失踪之中。与许多政治案件不同，高智晟所遭遇的，并不是一次明确的审判、一段清晰的刑期，然后一切结束；相反，他面对的是一种更为模糊、也更令人窒息的状态——反复发生的“消失”。长时间里，外界无法得知他的确切处境，也无法确认他是否安全。即便偶尔获释，也只是短暂回到公众视野，不久之后便再次进入同样的循环。这样的命运，不是单纯的惩罚，而是一种持续性的摧毁：它不只是剥夺人的自由，更是要摧毁一个人稳定生活，摧毁他与社会、与家人、与公共记忆之间的连接。

关于他在拘押期间究竟经历了什么，外界至今仍难以获得完整而权威的答案。人们只能通过极少数流出的描述，拼接出一个令人不寒而栗的轮廓：长期隔离、严密监控、持续施压，以及那些始终难以被完全证实、却又从未真正消散的酷刑指控。正是这种“无法被证实”的状态，构成了另一种意义上的恐惧——因为它让暴力不必公开，也不必承担解释。

2017年，高智晟再次失踪。

自那以后，关于他的下落，始终缺乏公开、明确、可信的信息。多年过去，一个曾在中国法律界公开执业、曾以文字和行动震动国际社会的人，就这样在中共制度深处被“抽离”出公众视野，仿佛一个名字仍在流传，但一个具体的人却被有意从现实中抹去。

从个人命运的角度去看，这是一个律师职业道路的悲剧性终结：一个本有才华、有理想、有影响力的人，被权力机器层层碾压，最终归于沉寂。

把他的经历放到更大的时代语境中来看，它显然不止于个人悲剧，而是制度性现象的缩影。

2026年在美国加州雕塑公园，一座以高智晟的雕像落成。人们在现场集会、发言，而高智晟律师本人依然被囚禁在中国。

《在野党》杂志社有幸采访到高智晟律师的家属——耿和女士。

问：耿和老师，如今在很多人眼中，高智晟律师已经不仅仅是一个具体的人物，更像是一种象征。那么，在家庭里、在您的心中，他究竟是一个什么样的人？

耿：在我心里，他是一个非常善良、幽默，而且极有智慧的人。真的，我觉得没有人能像他那样。他还很会唱歌，而且唱得特别好听。

如果要说他的为人，我会说，他特别善良，也特别正直。正是这些品行，这么多年来一直深深影响着我们一家人。

我想跟大家分享一件小事。2005年3月，高智晟的母亲去世了，去世时才67岁。自那以后，他每年回陕北老家，无论是一年回去一次、两次，还是三次，每次回去，他都会专门去看望村里70岁以上的老人，并给每位老人送上20块钱。虽然钱不多，但那份心意非常珍贵。

在我看来，这不仅仅是一点物质上的表达，更体现了他内心深处的善良、体贴和对长者的尊重，也代表着一种非常可贵的中国传统美德。

问：作为家属，您第一次真正意识到他所做的这些事情会带来危险，是在什么时候？

耿：应该就是在2006年。那年8月15日他被抓捕之后，我们家就一直处在警方的严密监控之下，家门口有人跟踪，家里也住进了警察。也是从那个时候开始，我才真正意识到，他所做的这一切，已经不仅仅是承受压力，而是随时可能付出自由甚至更沉重的代价。

其实在那之前，我从来没有想过他会被抓捕。虽然我们已经能感觉到外部的压力越来越大，但我没有想到，事情最终会发展到那一步。

问：当高智晟律师面临的政治风险越来越明显的时候，您和他之间有没有发生过思想上的争执？

耿：我和他之间没有过这样的争执。因为在我们家里，我更多是负责家庭这一边，他主外。在国内的时候，他也很少跟我讲这些事情，很多事他都是自己在承担。

问：高智晟律师失踪以后，对您来说，这意味着什么？是一种突如其来的恐惧，还是一种漫长而持续的消耗？

耿：最开始的时候，其实我们总还是抱着一点希望。因为有时候他会消失三天、两天，我们就会想，也许再等一等，他就回来了。我甚至会拿着给他准备的钱，心里想着，他大概还是抱着“我明天就能回来”的念头离开的。

可是后来，等待的时间越来越长。原本以为只是几天，结果变成了两个月、几个月，最后变成一种看不到尽头的等待。那种感觉，不只是恐惧，更是一种无止境的消耗。你一直在期盼，一直在等，一直在盼着会不会突然有一点关于他的消息。

到后来，我几乎像看天气预报一样，时刻关注外界的变化，总觉得是不是国家发生了什么大事，是不是哪一天，就会传来一点关于他的消息。就是这样，在盼望和失望之间，一天天熬着，整整盼了八年零八个月。

问：这些年里，支撑您一路走下来的，主要是什么？是一种什么样的信念？

耿：这些年来，我一直都在往前走，也一直在不断调整自己。我也一直在学习，慢慢让自己变得更坚强一些。我觉得，最重要的是先把自己调整好，把当下的日子过好，把眼前的每一天过稳。只有先把自己撑住，才能继续走下去。

问：耿和老师，您有没有什么话，是一直想对高智晟说，却始终没有机会说出口的？

耿：其实，我常常也会想这个问题。但到了今天，我觉得自己最想的，已经不只是说一句什么话，而是如果每天还有一点时间、还有一点力量，我们还能为他做些什么。

因为这样的分离，已经持续了17年。到了今天，我们能做的，好像已经不只是等待，而是继续坚持，继续想办法营救他。某种程度上说，我们现在更像是同在一个战壕里的战士，仍然在为把他救出来而努力。

问：今天，我们在美国加州的这座雕塑公园里，看到了这座关于高智晟的雕像。对您来说，它意味着什么？ 

耿：这座雕塑从开始筹备、制作到现在，已经快一年的时间了。它承载的不只是我们全家的希望，也承载着陈维明老师的心血和希望。我们都希望，能够借由这样的方式，让更多人知道高智晟，关注高智晟，也希望有一天，我们能够真正迎来一个好的结果。

说实话，我今天是发自内心地感动。你看，今天现场来了这么多认识的、不认识的人，大家都愿意来到自由雕塑公园，愿意为高智晟律师的雕塑落成仪式伸出援手，愿意关注这件事。我们真的非常希望高智晟被囚禁、被失踪的日子能够尽快结束。

我们更希望，有一天高智晟能够重新回到公众面前，重新回到家人面前，也希望有一天，他能够亲眼看到这座雕像。

问：您觉得，如果高智晟本人今天站在这里，看到这座雕像，他会说些什么？

耿：其实，我也不知道他会说些什么。但我觉得，这座雕塑所代表的，已经不仅仅是高智晟个人。它承载的是一个真相，也是一种揭露。它让人看到，在暴政之下，一个因为说真话、因为坚持良知而遭受迫害的人，究竟经历了什么。

我觉得，高智晟的雕像就像一面镜子。透过这座雕塑，人们看到的不只是一个人的遭遇，更能看到中共暴政本身的丑陋和残酷。

在加州自由雕塑公园里，高智晟律师的雕像静静矗立。它沉默无声，却仿佛始终在传递着某种讯息:即使身处黑暗，人依然会抬起头，去寻找光的方向。

对于耿和来说，时间从来不是简单地流逝。它被分解为漫长的等待、反复的回忆，以及日复一日的坚持。

这些片段拼凑出了一种更为具体、也更为沉重的现实。而在这样的现实之中，仍有一些问题，至今没有答案。

但也许，正如那尊雕像所隐含的意义：人未必总能改变自己的处境，却仍然可以选择——在黑暗中，仰望星空。

编者按：

高智晟律师的被中共当局“失踪”的案件中，我们看到的是一种持续性的权力运作方式：惩罚并不以法律程序的终结为终点，甚至很多时候，真正沉重的打压发生在法律程序之外。行政权力、国保体系、社会控制、信息封锁、职业剥夺、人格污名化——这些机制交错运作，使一个人即便在形式上“服完刑”或“结束处理”，其身份、权利与行动空间，仍然被随时重新定义、重新限制、重新剥夺，乃至强制失踪。

高智晟的失踪，绝不只是针对他个人的迫害，更是中共当局向所有仍试图在制度框架内争取权利、推动改变、坚守原则的人发出的一种威胁与警告。

而这，也正是“高智晟”这个名字之所以重要的原因。

他的意义，早已超出一个律师的职业范畴，也超出一桩个案本身的范围。他是一个时代留下的注脚：当法律不再是限制权力的工具，而逐渐成为权力运作的一部分；当程序不能保证正义，反而可能被用来包装压制；当一个以法律为武器的人，最终被法律与法律之外的力量共同吞没——那么，人们就不得不重新追问那个最根本的问题：

当法律本身成为权力的一部分时，个体还能在多大程度上依赖它来保护自己？

对于这个问题，高智晟用自己的一生，提出了一个极其沉重的诘问。而遗憾的是，直到今天，这个问题依然没有答案。

The Seventeenth Year of Waiting for Gao Zhisheng

Reporter: Lin Xiaolong Editor: Zhang Zhijun
Executive Editor: Zhu Yufu Data Compilation: Xing Zhiyuan Translator: Zhou Min

Gao Zhisheng, a Chinese human rights lawyer, was once hailed by the outside world as “one of China’s bravest lawyers.”

He was born into poverty and stepped onto the legal path step by step through self-study. After passing the judicial examination, he founded a law firm in Beijing and quickly rose to prominence in the industry. At that time, he possessed enviable career prospects and could have completely found a safe, decent foothold between commercial cases and the realistic order, just like many successful lawyers.

But Gao Zhisheng did not choose this.

As his practice deepened, he came into contact with more and more cases where ordinary people were powerless to speak out and no one was willing to take them on: the rights protection of vulnerable groups, the situation of religious believers, and the appeals of political dissidents. These cases were often not just legal issues, but meant touching the most sensitive boundaries of power. While most lawyers in China, under political pressure, avoided sensitive cases, he walked into them step by step.

China in the early 2000s was immersed in the narrative of high-speed economic growth. High-rise buildings rose from the ground, capital surged, and the world began to cast its gaze more and more toward this rising major power. In an era that generally praised “development” and “stability,” Gao Zhisheng chose to walk another path: he did not stay within the superficial appearance of prosperity, but instead entered the darkest peripheral zones of the system to touch those issues that were not allowed to be touched, and to gaze at those people who were deliberately obscured.

Seeking justice for persecuted Falun Gong practitioners became the true turning point of his life.

Starting from the end of 2004, he sent three consecutive open letters to China’s highest leadership, represented by Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao, exposing the systematic persecution of Falun Gong practitioners and calling for an immediate end to related actions. These letters were direct in phrasing and sharp in content, carrying both the rationality of a legal professional and a nearly desolate moral courage. They quickly triggered strong attention from the international community and caused Gao Zhisheng to transform from a practicing lawyer into a key target for suppression and elimination by the authorities.

From then on, the trajectory of his life was completely rewritten.

His law license was revoked, his law firm was closed, and his established professional career was forcibly interrupted. He himself fell into long-term detention, house arrest, surveillance, and enforced disappearance. Unlike many political cases, what Gao Zhisheng encountered was not a clear trial and a clear prison term after which everything ended; on the contrary, he faced a more blurred and suffocating state—repeated “disappearances.” For long periods, the outside world could not know his exact situation or confirm whether he was safe. Even if occasionally released, it was only a brief return to public view before entering the same cycle again soon after. Such a fate is not simple punishment, but a continuous destruction: it does not just deprive a person of freedom, but aims to destroy a person’s stable life and destroy the connection between him and society, his family, and public memory.

As to what exactly he experienced during his detention, the outside world still finds it difficult to obtain a complete and authoritative answer. People can only piece together a spine-chilling outline through a very few leaked descriptions: long-term isolation, close surveillance, continuous pressure, and those allegations of torture that have always been difficult to fully confirm yet have never truly dissipated. It is precisely this “unconfirmable” state that constitutes another kind of fear—because it allows violence to not be public and to not bear the burden of explanation.

In 2017, Gao Zhisheng disappeared again.

Since then, there has been a consistent lack of public, clear, and credible information regarding his whereabouts. Many years have passed, and a person who once publicly practiced in the Chinese legal circle and shook the international community with his words and actions has thus been “extracted” from public view deep within the CCP system, as if a name is still circulating, but a specific person has been intentionally erased from reality.

Viewed from the perspective of personal fate, this is the tragic end of a lawyer’s career path: a person who originally had talent, ideals, and influence was crushed layer by layer by the power machine and finally returned to silence.

Putting his experience into a larger historical context, it is clearly more than an individual tragedy; it is a microcosm of a systemic phenomenon.

At the end of 2026, a statue of Gao Zhisheng was unveiled in the Liberty Sculpture Park in California, USA. People gathered and spoke at the scene, while Lawyer Gao Zhisheng himself remains imprisoned in China.

Opposition Party magazine had the honor of interviewing Lawyer Gao Zhisheng’s family member—Ms. Geng He.

Q: Ms. Geng He, today in the eyes of many, Lawyer Gao Zhisheng is no longer just a specific figure, but more like a symbol. In the family and in your heart, what kind of person is he exactly?

Geng: In my heart, he is a very kind, humorous, and extremely wise person. Truly, I feel no one can be like him. He is also very good at singing, and he sings particularly beautifully.

If I were to speak of his character, I would say he is exceptionally kind and exceptionally upright. It is precisely these qualities that have deeply influenced our whole family for all these years.

I want to share a small story with everyone. In March 2005, Gao Zhisheng’s mother passed away; she was only 67 when she died. Since then, every time he went back to his old home in Northern Shaanxi—whether he went back once, twice, or three times a year—every time he returned, he would specifically go to visit the elderly in the village over 70 years old and give each elderly person 20 yuan. Although it wasn’t much money, that sentiment was very precious.

In my view, this is not just a small material expression, but it reflects the kindness, thoughtfulness, and respect for elders deep in his heart, and represents a very valuable traditional Chinese virtue.

Q: As a family member, when did you first truly realize that the things he was doing would bring danger?

Geng: It should have been in 2006. After he was arrested on August 15 of that year, our home was under close surveillance by the police; there were people tailing us at the door, and police moved into the house. It was also from that time that I truly realized that everything he was doing was no longer just about enduring pressure, but that he might pay the price of his freedom or even a heavier price at any time.

Actually, before that, I never thought he would be arrested. Although we could already feel the external pressure growing, I did not expect that things would eventually develop to that point.

Q: When the political risks faced by Lawyer Gao Zhisheng became more and more obvious, were there any ideological disputes between you and him?

Geng: There were no such disputes between him and me. Because in our home, I was more responsible for the family side, and he handled the outside. When we were in China, he rarely spoke to me about these things; he bore many things by himself.

Q: After Lawyer Gao Zhisheng disappeared, what did this mean to you? Was it a sudden fear, or a long and continuous exhaustion?

Geng: At the very beginning, we actually always held on to a bit of hope. Because sometimes he would disappear for three days or two days, and we would think, maybe if we wait a little longer, he will come back. I would even hold the money I prepared for him, thinking in my heart that he probably left with the thought that “I can come back tomorrow.”

But later, the waiting time became longer and longer. What I originally thought was just a few days turned into two months, several months, and finally became a kind of wait with no end in sight. That feeling is not just fear, but an endless exhaustion. You are constantly hoping, constantly waiting, constantly looking forward to whether there will suddenly be a little news about him.

Later on, I almost watched the changes in the outside world like watching a weather forecast, always thinking whether some major event had happened in the country, whether one day, a little news about him would come. Just like that, between hope and disappointment, enduring day by day, I waited for a full eight years and eight months.

Q: Over these years, what has mainly sustained you to keep going? What kind of belief is it?

Geng: Over these years, I have always been moving forward and constantly adjusting myself. I have also been learning, slowly letting myself become a bit stronger. I feel the most important thing is to first adjust myself well, live the current days well, and stabilize each day before me. Only by supporting yourself first can you continue to walk on.

Q: Ms. Geng He, is there anything you have always wanted to say to Gao Zhisheng but have never had the chance to say out loud?

Geng: Actually, I often think about this question too. But today, I feel that what I want most is no longer just to say a certain sentence, but if there is still a little time and a little strength every day, what more can we do for him.

Because this separation has lasted for 17 years. Today, what we can do seems to be no longer just waiting, but continuing to persist, continuing to find ways to rescue him. To some extent, we are now more like soldiers in the same trench, still working hard to get him out.

Q: Today, in this sculpture park in California, USA, we see this statue of Gao Zhisheng. What does it mean to you?

Geng: This sculpture has taken nearly a year from the beginning of preparation and production until now. It carries not only the hopes of our whole family but also the hard work and hope of Teacher Chen Weiming. We all hope that through this method, more people can know about Gao Zhisheng and pay attention to Gao Zhisheng, and we also hope that one day, we can truly welcome a good result.

To tell the truth, I am moved from the bottom of my heart today. Look, so many people I know and don’t know came to the scene today; everyone is willing to come to the Liberty Sculpture Park, willing to lend a hand for the unveiling ceremony of Lawyer Gao Zhisheng’s statue, and willing to pay attention to this matter. We really hope that the days of Gao Zhisheng being imprisoned and disappeared can end as soon as possible.

We hope even more that one day Gao Zhisheng can return to the public again, return to his family again, and hope that one day, he can see this statue with his own eyes.

Q: If Gao Zhisheng himself were standing here today and saw this statue, what do you think he would say?

Geng: Actually, I don’t know what he would say either. But I feel that what this sculpture represents is no longer just Gao Zhisheng as an individual. It carries a truth and is also an exposure. It lets people see what a person who suffered persecution for speaking the truth and for persisting in conscience actually went through under tyranny.

I feel that Gao Zhisheng’s statue is like a mirror. Through this sculpture, people see not just one person’s encounter, but can see even more the ugliness and cruelty of the CCP tyranny itself.

In the California Liberty Sculpture Park, Lawyer Gao Zhisheng’s statue stands quietly.

It is silent, yet it seems to be constantly transmitting a message: even when in darkness, people will still lift their heads to look for the direction of the light.

For Geng He, time never simply flows by. It is decomposed into long waiting, repeated memories, and day-after-day persistence.

These fragments piece together a more concrete and heavier reality. And within such a reality, there are still some questions that have no answers to this day.

But perhaps, just as the meaning implied by that statue: humans may not always be able to change their circumstances, yet they can still choose—to look up at the stars in the dark.

Editor’s Note: In the case of Lawyer Gao Zhisheng being “disappeared” by the CCP authorities, what we see is a continuous mode of power operation: punishment does not end with the conclusion of legal procedures; in fact, many times, the truly heavy suppression occurs outside of legal procedures. Administrative power, the domestic security (Guobao) system, social control, information blockade, professional deprivation, and character stigmatization—these mechanisms operate interchangeably, so that even if a person has formally “served their sentence” or “ended processing,” their identity, rights, and space for action are still redefined, restricted, and deprived again at any time, even resulting in enforced disappearance.

Gao Zhisheng’s disappearance is absolutely not just persecution directed at him personally, but is a threat and warning issued by the CCP authorities to all who still attempt to strive for rights, promote change, and uphold principles within the institutional framework.

And this is precisely the reason why the name “Gao Zhisheng” is important.

His significance has long exceeded the professional scope of a lawyer and exceeded the scope of a single case itself. He is a footnote left by an era: when law is no longer a tool to limit power but gradually becomes a part of power operation; when procedures cannot guarantee justice but may instead be used to package suppression; when a person who uses the law as a weapon is ultimately swallowed by the law and forces outside the law together—then, people have to re-ask that most fundamental question:

When the law itself becomes a part of power, to what extent can an individual still rely on it to protect themselves?

Regarding this question, Gao Zhisheng, with his own life, put forward an extremely heavy interrogation.

And unfortunately, until today, this question still has no answer.

—— 從鄭麗文訪中看台灣的安全迷思

作者：趙紀森 编辑：周志刚 校对：王滨 翻译：彭小梅

在兩岸關係持續緊張的情況下，任何與中國的接觸，都難以被視為單純交流。鄭麗文的訪中，引發了明顯分歧。有人認為這是務實溝通的嘗試，也有人質疑這樣的判斷過於樂觀，甚至可能傳遞錯誤訊號。

爭議尚未平息，她已在上海落地，並受到高規格接待。同時，她的公開發言也將台灣的選擇描繪為和平與繁榮，或戰爭與毀滅之間的對立。這樣的說法，讓原本屬於政策層面的討論，迅速轉向更強烈的政治敘事。

回到問題本身，關鍵或許不在於要不要對話，而在於對話是建立在什麼樣的現實判斷之上。

在官方互動受限的情況下，非執政政治人物的交流，確實可能在某種程度上降低誤判風險。國際政治中，維持最低限度的接觸，本來就是避免衝突升高的一種手段。因此，把所有交流一概視為錯誤，並不符合現實。

但對話從來不是安全本身。它只是一種工具，而且效果高度依賴條件。如果缺乏對等的實力基礎，也缺乏基本信任，對話往往難以轉化為實質保障。

這也是台灣社會普遍存在疑慮的原因。對於共產黨的長期戰略，多數人並不抱持信任，這並非單純情緒，而是來自過往經驗與現實觀察。在權力明顯不對等的情況下，單方面釋放善意，很可能得不到對等回應，甚至被轉化為對方的政治敘事資源。

此次訪問所呈現的高規格接待，本身也值得注意。在不對等關係中，禮遇往往不只是禮遇，同時具有明確的政治訊號。這使得相關行動的效果，不能只從表面來理解。

如果將這一爭議放入政黨競爭的背景，也更容易看出差異所在。國民黨傾向透過降低對抗與恢復交流來爭取空間，民進黨則強調防衛能力與國際合作，將嚇阻視為穩定的基礎。

這兩種路線之間，與其說是立場對立，不如說是風險排序的不同。一種更擔心衝突升高，另一種更擔心被誤判為缺乏決心。在權力不對等的條件下，後者的顧慮往往更直接影響安全。

鄭麗文的主張，確實回應了一部分人對戰爭風險的焦慮。但她在公開場合所採用的說法，也呈現出另一個問題。當複雜的安全議題被簡化為單一選項時，反而容易讓判斷失去精準度。

兩岸關係從來不是簡單的選擇題，而是一個充滿不確定性與權衡的結構。如果將不同路線理解為和平與毀滅之間的對立，不僅難以促進理性討論，也可能進一步加深社會分裂。

更重要的是，這樣的論述背後，隱含著對現實條件較為樂觀的判斷。在缺乏對等籌碼的情況下，對話本身難以轉化為穩定保障；若同時過度強調衝突的不可承受性，甚至可能在無意中影響社會對防衛的認知。

鄭麗文的訪中，不需要用情緒去否定，但也不應被過度理想化。理解其出發點並不困難，真正需要討論的，是這樣的路徑在現實條件下是否可行。

對話可以存在，但不能被高估。

在缺乏實力與清晰底線的情況下，對話未必降低風險，反而可能成為風險的一部分。

Equality Dialogue, or Misjudgment?— Viewing Taiwan’s Security Misperceptions Through Cheng Li-wen’s Visit to China

Author: Zhao Jisen Editor: Zhou Zhigang Proofreader: Wang Bin Translator: Peng Xiaomei

Abstract: Under conditions of asymmetry in cross-strait power and lack of trust, dialogue does not necessarily provide substantive security guarantees and may instead introduce risks.

Amid continued tensions in cross-strait relations, any engagement with China can hardly be regarded as a simple exchange. Cheng Li-wen’s visit to China has triggered clear divisions. Some view it as an attempt at pragmatic communication, while others question whether such judgment is overly optimistic, or even potentially conveys the wrong signals.

Before the controversy had subsided, she had already landed in Shanghai and received high-level reception. At the same time, her public remarks framed Taiwan’s choices as a dichotomy between peace and prosperity, or war and destruction. Such statements quickly shifted what was originally a policy-level discussion into a more intense political narrative.

Returning to the core issue, the key may not be whether to engage in dialogue, but on what kind of assessment of reality that dialogue is based.

Under conditions where official interactions are limited, exchanges by non-ruling political figures may indeed, to some extent, reduce the risk of misjudgment. In international politics, maintaining a minimum level of contact is itself a means of preventing escalation of conflict. Therefore, categorically viewing all exchanges as wrong does not align with reality.

However, dialogue has never been security itself. It is merely a tool, and its effectiveness is highly dependent on conditions. If there is a lack of equal strength and a lack of basic trust, dialogue often cannot be transformed into substantive guarantees.

This is also the reason why doubts are widely present in Taiwanese society. Most people do not hold trust toward the long-term strategy of the Communist Party; this is not merely an emotional reaction but stems from experience and real-world observation. Under conditions of clear power asymmetry, unilateral goodwill is likely not to receive an equal response and may even be converted into political narrative resources for the other side.

The high-level reception presented during this visit itself also deserves attention. In unequal relationships, courtesy is often not merely courtesy but also carries clear political signals. This makes the effects of such actions impossible to understand only at the surface level.

If this controversy is placed within the context of party competition, the differences become easier to see. The Kuomintang tends to seek space by reducing confrontation and restoring exchanges, while the Democratic Progressive Party emphasizes defense capabilities and international cooperation, viewing deterrence as the foundation of stability.

Between these two approaches, rather than being a simple opposition of positions, it is more a difference in the ordering of risks. One side is more concerned about the escalation of conflict, while the other is more concerned about being misjudged as lacking resolve. Under conditions of power asymmetry, the latter concern often more directly affects security.

Cheng Li-wen’s position does respond to a portion of public anxiety about the risk of war. However, the way she frames the issue in public also reveals another problem. When complex security issues are simplified into a single-choice option, it instead makes judgment lose precision.

Cross-strait relations have never been a simple multiple-choice question, but a structure full of uncertainty and trade-offs. If different approaches are understood as a dichotomy between peace and destruction, it not only fails to promote rational discussion, but may further deepen social division.

More importantly, behind such discourse lies a relatively optimistic assessment of real conditions. In the absence of equal bargaining power, dialogue itself is difficult to transform into stable guarantees; if, at the same time, the unbearable nature of conflict is overemphasized, it may even unintentionally affect society’s understanding of defense.

Cheng Li-wen’s visit to China does not need to be rejected emotionally, but it also should not be overly idealized. It is not difficult to understand its starting point; what truly needs discussion is whether such a path is feasible under real conditions.

Dialogue can exist, but it must not be overestimated.Under conditions lacking strength and clear bottom lines, dialogue may not reduce risk but may instead become part of the risk itself.

作者：张善城

编辑：胡丽莉 校对：熊辩 翻译：彭小梅

今天，我站在旧金山中国领事馆前，公开表态：

任何替中共站台、为习近平背书的行为，都是对自由的背叛。

台湾不属于中共。

台湾的未来，只属于2300万台湾人民。

中共没有选票，没有合法性，

更没有资格用导弹和军舰决定台湾的命运。

所谓“武统”，本质就是侵略战争。

我支持台湾独立。

我支持民主对抗专制。

民主火炬永不灭。

自由自然属于向往自由的人。

Support the Independence of the Taiwanese People

Author: Zhang ShanchengEditor: Hu Lili Proofreader: Xiong Bian Translator: Peng Xiaomei

Today, I stand in front of the Chinese Consulate in San Francisco and publicly state:

Any act of standing with the Chinese Communist Party or endorsing Xi Jinping is a betrayal of freedom.

Taiwan does not belong to the Chinese Communist Party.Taiwan’s future belongs only to the 23 million people of Taiwan.

The Chinese Communist Party has no votes, no legitimacy,and even less the qualification to decide Taiwan’s fate with missiles and warships.

The so-called “military unification” is, in essence, a war of aggression.

I support Taiwan independence.I support democracy in opposition to authoritarianism.

The torch of democracy will never be extinguished.Freedom naturally belongs to those who long for it.

作者：易勇
编辑：钟然 校对：熊辩 翻译：彭小梅

 长期以来，中共叙事将中国的经济成就归功于其政权领导。通过对东亚文化底层逻辑的深度剖析，中国人的竞争力源于几千年极端环境筛选出的“生存基因”与“延迟满足”能力。对比日、韩、台、新等东亚经济体的成功，揭示了中国大陆经济腾飞的真相，并非制度神话，而是民间力量在政权权力稍作松绑后的自我修复与爆发。

观察整个东亚文化圈，日本在废墟上仅用20余年便跃居世界第二大经济体；韩国、台湾与新加坡在缺乏资源的前提下稳居发达行列。这些地区从未经历过共产主义的教条统治，却同样实现了跨越式的腾飞。

究其根本，东亚文明真正的核心竞争力在于一种被极端历史环境筛选出的“生存优势”。华夏大地在两千多年间经历了密集的战乱、屠杀与大饥荒，这种残酷的自然选择，使得活下来的族群骨子里刻着极强的耐受力和“延迟满足”的能力，为了长远目标，可以忍受当下极端枯燥、高压和艰辛。这种特质，才是中国人在现代工业体系中无往不利的“核动力”。这种力量早在政党诞生前就已存在于我们的血脉中，它不是权力的恩赐，而是祖先用血汗拼杀出的生命本能。

中共常吹嘘1978年后的经济成就，却刻意回避了前三十年的荒诞与残酷。在那段黑暗时期，政权通过政治运动打断了中国人的腿，禁锢了百姓的双手。

1978年后的所谓“崛起”，本质上根本不是什么“制度神话”，而是这个政权终于在崩溃边缘意识到，只要不再折腾，只要松开枷锁，让中国人融入全球化分工，中国人民就能凭借自发的勤勉养活自己。这就像是一个劫匪在打断你的腿后送你一副拐杖，然后每天在你耳边宣称，没有我，你就无法走路。中国人民的成功，完全是由于他们巨大的吃苦耐劳能力抵消了制度性阻碍。如果同样的文化土壤配合自由、法治的制度，产出的能量绝非今日所能比拟。

讽刺的现实在于，在所有以华裔为主的经济体中，中国大陆的人均GDP依然处于落后位置。新加坡的人均产出是大陆的数倍；港澳台的富足也是不争的事实。同样的文化基因，为何在所谓“先进制度”下，百姓却要承受全球最长的工时、最薄弱的福利和最沉重的税收负担？       

真相是中共的宣传掩盖了其掠夺性的本质。他们利用中国人的忍耐力，将劳动力压榨到极致，却将创造的财富挥霍在维稳、大撒币和权力寻租上。他们不仅掠夺了财富，更试图掠夺“解释权”，把中国人的坚韧说成是他们的教化，把中国人的成功说成是他们的功劳。

拆穿这个“没党就没饭吃”的自卑骗局，中国人的成功，是几千年苦难筛选出的基因力量，是每一个在工位流汗、在烈日下奔波的普通人挣来的。

历史已经证明，没有那个政权，东亚人照样能惊艳世界。认清这一点，不仅是为了戳破谎言，更是为了让每一个中国人拿回属于自己的，本就不该被窃取的尊严。

Tearing Away the Fig Leaf of “Institutional Superiority”: Who Is Harvesting the Sweat of the Chinese People?

Author: Yi Yong Editor: Zhong Ran Proofreader: Xiong Bian Translator: Peng Xiaomei

Abstract: China’s economic achievements stem from the endurance and capacity for delayed gratification embedded in East Asian culture, rather than from institutional superiority. The so-called “rise” is in fact the release of popular forces after partial loosening, while the regime conceals its predatory nature and monopolizes the power of interpretation.

For a long time, the Chinese Communist Party’s narrative has attributed China’s economic achievements to its political leadership. Through an in-depth analysis of the underlying logic of East Asian culture, the competitiveness of Chinese people originates from “survival genes” and the capacity for “delayed gratification” shaped by thousands of years of extreme environmental selection. By comparing the successes of East Asian economies such as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore, the truth behind the economic takeoff of mainland China is revealed: it is not an institutional myth, but rather the self-repair and eruption of popular forces after a slight loosening of state power.

Looking across the entire East Asian cultural sphere, Japan rose to become the world’s second-largest economy in just over twenty years from the ruins; South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore, despite lacking resources, have firmly ranked among developed economies. These regions have never experienced the doctrinaire rule of communism, yet they have achieved similar leapfrog development.

At its root, the true core competitiveness of East Asian civilization lies in a “survival advantage” shaped by extreme historical conditions. Over more than two thousand years, the Chinese land has experienced dense warfare, massacres, and great famines. This harsh natural selection has left the surviving populations with deep-seated endurance and the ability for “delayed gratification”—the capacity to endure extreme monotony, high pressure, and hardship in the present for long-term goals. This trait is the “nuclear power” that allows Chinese people to thrive within the modern industrial system. This force existed in our blood long before the birth of any political party; it is not a gift of power, but a life instinct forged through the blood and sweat of our ancestors.

The Chinese Communist Party often boasts about the economic achievements after 1978 yet deliberately avoids the absurdity and cruelty of the preceding thirty years. During that dark period, the regime crippled the Chinese people’s legs and bound their hands through political campaigns.

The so-called “rise” after 1978 is essentially not an “institutional myth” at all, but rather that this regime, on the verge of collapse, finally realized that as long as it stopped tormenting society, loosened its shackles, and allowed Chinese people to integrate into the global division of labor, the Chinese people could sustain themselves through their own diligence. It is like a robber who breaks your legs and then hands you a pair of crutches, while proclaiming every day that without him, you would not be able to walk. The success of the Chinese people is entirely due to their immense capacity for hardship, which offsets institutional obstacles. If the same cultural foundation were paired with a system of freedom and rule of law, the energy produced would be far beyond what we see today.

The ironic reality is that among all economies dominated by ethnic Chinese populations, mainland China still lags in per capita GDP. Singapore’s per capita output is several times that of the mainland; the prosperity of Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan is also an undeniable fact. With the same cultural foundation, why must ordinary people under the so-called “advanced system” endure the world’s longest working hours, the weakest welfare, and the heaviest tax burdens?

The truth is that the Chinese Communist Party’s propaganda conceals its predatory nature. They exploit the endurance of the Chinese people, pushing labor to the extreme, while squandering the wealth created on stability maintenance, indiscriminate spending, and rent-seeking tied to power. They not only plunder wealth but also attempt to seize the “right to interpretation,” portraying the resilience of the Chinese people as their own cultivation, and the success of the Chinese people as their own achievement.

To expose this inferiority-driven illusion that “without the Party, there would be no food to eat,” the success of the Chinese people is the genetic strength forged through thousands of years of hardship, earned by every ordinary person who sweats at their workstation and toils under the blazing sun.

History has already proven that without that regime, East Asians can still astonish the world. Recognizing this is not only to pierce through falsehoods, but also to allow every Chinese person to reclaim the dignity that rightfully belongs to them and should never have been taken away.

编辑：胡丽莉 校对：熊辩 翻译：周敏

浙江省杭州市中级人民法院刑事判决书

[1998]杭法刑初字第183号

公诉机关：浙江省杭州市人民检察院

被告人王有才，1966年6月29日出生，汉族，浙江省淳安县人，无业，住浙江省杭州市西湖区翠苑区14幢2单元401室。一九九０年十二月因犯反革命宣传煽动罪被北京市中级人民法院判处有期徒刑四年，剥夺政治权利一年；后被北京市高级人民法院改判有期徒刑三年，剥夺政治权利一年。一九九一年十一月被假释，一九九八年七月十日被刑事拘留，同年八月七日被逮捕，同月三十日被监视居住，同年十一月三十日被逮捕，现押浙江省公安厅看守所。

浙江省杭州市人民检察院以被告人王有才煽动颠覆国家政权罪，于一九九八年十二月五日向本院提起公诉。本院依法组成合议庭，公开开庭对本案进行了审理。浙江省杭州市人民检察院检察员荣华、代理检察员张哲峰出庭支持公诉。被告人王有才到庭参加诉讼，本案经合议庭评议，审判委员会进行了讨论并作出决定，现已审理终结。

       浙江省杭州市人民检察院指控被告人王有才于一九九八年六月结伙他人商议成立“中国民主党”，决定率先在浙江省成立“中国民主党浙江筹备委员会”，拟定了公然诽谤、诬蔑我国国家政权和社会主义制度的“中国民主党章程（草案）”和“中国民主党浙江筹备委员会成立公开宣言”。王有才通过国际互联网将上述“章程”及“宣言”向美国、香港等地组织及个人发送了十八份电子邮件。按照事先商定，由其同伙将“中国民主党浙江筹备委员会成立公开宣言”印刷并在杭州市的上城区房管局城南房管站及采荷路与凯旋路交叉口一带进行散发。同年七月，被告人王有才分别通知他人于七月十一日在杭州以“喝茶”形式聚会，准备继续讨论成立“中国民主党”事宜，后被公安机关查获而未逞。同年十一月，被告人王有才被监视居住期间，在杭州市与境外敌对组织成员会面商谈并接受1000美元。此外，同年五月和九月，被告人王有才还分别接受境外敌对组织成员资助的人民币4000元、300美元。公诉机关认为，被告人王有才的行为已构成煽动颠覆国家政权罪，且系累犯，应依法严惩。

被告人王有才对所控的事实供认不讳，但辩解其行为仅针对现实社会现象，与煽动颠覆国家政权无关，故其行为不构成犯罪。

经开庭审理查明：被告人王有才以颠覆国家政权，推翻社会主义制度为目的，积极进行组建非法政党的活动，一九九八年六月，被告人王有才纠集祝正明、吴义龙（均另行处理）在杭州市原杭州大学草坪上就王有才提出的成立政党一事进行商议，决定将政党定名为“中国民主党”，率先在浙江省成立“中国民主党浙江筹备委员会”，并各自拟写该党章程。

同年六月二十四日晚，被告人王有才与祝正明、吴义龙及王东海、林辉等人（均另行处理）在祝正明家讨论并拟定了“中国民主党章程（草案）”（以下简称“章程）和”中国民主党浙江筹备委员会成立公开宣言（以下简称“宣言”），诬蔑攻击国家政权和社会主义制度是“封建专制”“政治独裁”和“强权暴政”等，明确提出“获取政治权利、修改宪法、废除一党专政”，“建立宪政民主政治体制，建立政治分权机制”等等，并商定将上述两文公开散发，同时王有才等人分别就联络、宣传、协商等具体行动进行了分工。

同年六月二十五日上午，被告人王有才通过国际互联网向美国、香港等地的组织及个人发送载有“章程”、“宣言”内容的电子邮件十八份，并要求接收方广为传播。同月三十日上午，按商定由其同伙朱虞夫（另行处理）携带“宣言”印刷件在杭州市上城区房管局城南房管站秋涛南苑物业管理办公室及杭州市采荷路与凯旋路交叉口一带进行散发。

同年七月四日、五日，被告人王有才又分别通知祝正明、王东海等人于七月十一日在杭州以“喝茶”形式聚会，并要求各人尽可能联络其他人员参加，继续讨论“中国民主党”的成立事宜。经联络，林辉等人赶至杭州，准备聚会。后因被公安机关及时查获而未得逞。

    同年十一月，被告人王有才在涉嫌危害国家安全被杭州市公安局监视居住期间，违反法律规定在杭州市与境外敌对组织的成员会面，就成立“中国民主党”筹备会等有关情况进行了介绍和交流，并接受资助的经费1000美元。此外，被告人王有才还于同年五月、九月分别接受境外敌对组织成员所资助的经费人民币4000元和300美元。

上述事实，有下列证明经庭审质证予以证实：

１、祝正明、吴义龙证言证明：一九九八年六月与王有才商议成立政党并决定在浙江省率先成立“中国民主党浙江筹备委员会”；

２、祝正明、吴义龙、王东海、林辉证言证明：一九九八年六月二十四日与王有才在祝家共同讨论修改、定稿“章程”、“宣言”并决定公开散发；王东海证言还证实当晚进行了具体分工；公安机关从王有才、祝正明、朱虞夫家中搜查到的“章程”、“宣言”等打印件、印刷件、底稿、电脑文档等书证在案；“宣言”打印件上园珠笔修改的笔迹经鉴定系王有才所写；

３、公安机关于一九九八年六月二十六日在国际互联网公开结点上的浏览发现“章程”、“宣言”已发往境外的证明材料；对王有才住处查获的“东芝Satellite Pro 430 CDT”笔记本电脑中的“发件箱”（NETSCAPE MAIL）检查证实，一九九八年六月二十五日上午，该电脑通过国际互联网向境外发送了载有“章程”、“宣言”内容的电子邮件十八份的鉴定书；胡江霞证言证明该笔记本电脑系其从单位借用，其曾将单位专门配置的网址告诉过王有才；

４、祝正明证言证明：一九九八年六月二十九日，据与王有才商定，其将“宣言”交朱虞夫散发；包建林、袁伯庭、俞水华证言证明朱虞夫在秋涛南苑物业管理办公室向其分发“宣言”；洪照娣、徐水英证言证明目击被公安机关抓获的朱虞夫在凯旋路一带散发传单；公安机关从散发现场提取的“宣言”，经鉴定与朱虞夫、祝正明家中查获的“宣言”内容一致，并系同一版本；朱虞夫的证言与上述证据证实的情况相符；

５、祝正明、王东海证言证明王有才定于七月十一日聚会讨论“中国民主党”事宜，并被要求分别通知其他人员来参加；林辉证言证明其按通知来杭准备聚会；

６、公安机关从王有才身上搜得的美元及从王有才住处搜获的邮政汇款通知、美元定期存单及敌对组织成员发给王月才有关资助王的电子邮件在案；

７、被告人王有才对上述事实供认不讳，所供与上述证据证实的情况相符。

上述证据，本院予以确认，本案事实清楚，证据确实、充分。

本院认为：被告人王有才组织、策划颠覆国家政权，推翻社会主义制度，其行为已构成颠覆国家政权罪，且罪行重大，被告人王有才在进行颠覆国家政权的活动中，与境外组织相勾结，接受资助；其曾因危害国家安全被判刑，现又再犯危害国家安全罪，系累犯，均应依法从重处罚。公诉机关指控事实成立，但指控罪名不当，应予纠正，被告人王有才提出其不构成犯罪的辩解，经查与事实与法律均不相符，故本院不予采纳。据此，依照《中华人民共和国刑法》第一百零五条第一款、第一百零六条、第六十六条、第五十六条第一款、第五十五条第一款，第六十四条之规定，判决如下：

一、被告人王有才犯颠覆国家政权罪，判处有期徒刑十一年，剥夺政治权利三年；

二、被告人王有才违法所得的1300美元(其中300美元系被冻结在中国银行杭州市高新技术开发区支行户名为“胡江霞”的“定期一本通”内的存款，帐号： 4531711006500900003575)，予以追缴。

如不服本判决，可于接到判决书的次日起十日内，通过本院或直接向浙江省高级人民法院提出上诉。书面上诉的，应交上诉状正本一份，副本二份。

审判长 刘舒海

审判员 孙 伟

审判员 何 敏

一九九八年十二月二十日

本件与原本核对无异

书记员 冯 菁

Criminal Judgment of the Hangzhou Municipal Intermediate People’s Court, Zhejiang Province

Editor: Hu Lili Proofreader: Xiong Bian Translator: Zhou Min

[1998] Hang Fa Xing Chu Zi No. 183

Public Prosecution Organ: People’s Procuratorate of Hangzhou City, Zhejiang Province.

Defendant Wang Youcai, born on June 29, 1966, Han nationality, native of Chun’an County, Zhejiang Province, unemployed, residing at Room 401, Unit 2, Building 14, Cuiyuan District, Xihu District, Hangzhou City, Zhejiang Province. In December 1990, he was sentenced to four years of fixed-term imprisonment and one year of deprivation of political rights by the Beijing Municipal Intermediate People’s Court for the crime of counter-revolutionary propaganda and incitement; later, the Beijing Municipal Higher People’s Court changed the sentence to three years of fixed-term imprisonment and one year of deprivation of political rights. He was released on parole in November 1991. He was criminally detained on July 10, 1998, arrested on August 7 of the same year, placed under residential surveillance on the 30th of the same month, and arrested again on November 30 of the same year. He is currently held in the Detention Center of the Zhejiang Provincial Public Security Department.

The People’s Procuratorate of Hangzhou City, Zhejiang Province, initiated a public prosecution against the defendant Wang Youcai for the crime of inciting subversion of state power to this Court on December 5, 1998. This Court formed a collegial bench according to law and conducted a public trial of this case. Procurator Rong Hua and Acting Procurator Zhang Zhefeng of the People’s Procuratorate of Hangzhou City, Zhejiang Province, appeared in court to support the public prosecution. The defendant Wang Youcai appeared in court to participate in the proceedings. Following deliberation by the collegial bench and discussion/decision by the Judicial Committee, the trial of this case is now concluded.

The People’s Procuratorate of Hangzhou City, Zhejiang Province, charges that in June 1998, the defendant Wang Youcai colluded with others to discuss the establishment of the “China Democracy Party,” deciding to take the lead in establishing the “Zhejiang Preparatory Committee of the China Democracy Party” in Zhejiang Province. They drafted the “Constitution of the China Democracy Party (Draft)” and the “Declaration of the Establishment of the Zhejiang Preparatory Committee of the China Democracy Party,” which publicly slandered and vilified our country’s state power and the socialist system. Wang Youcai sent eighteen emails containing the aforementioned “Constitution” and “Declaration” to organizations and individuals in the United States, Hong Kong, and other places via the international Internet. According to a prior agreement, his accomplices printed and distributed the “Declaration of the Establishment of the Zhejiang Preparatory Committee of the China Democracy Party” in the vicinity of the Chengnan Housing Management Station of the Shangcheng District Housing Bureau in Hangzhou and the intersection of Caihe Road and Kaixuan Road. In July of the same year, the defendant Wang Youcai respectively notified others to gather in the form of “drinking tea” in Hangzhou on July 11, preparing to continue discussing the establishment of the “China Democracy Party,” which was later discovered by public security organs and failed. In November of the same year, while the defendant Wang Youcai was under residential surveillance, he met and discussed with members of overseas hostile organizations in Hangzhou and accepted 1,000 US dollars. In addition, in May and September of the same year, the defendant Wang Youcai respectively accepted 4,000 RMB and 300 US dollars in funding from members of overseas hostile organizations. The public prosecution organ believes that the behavior of the defendant Wang Youcai has constituted the crime of inciting subversion of state power, and as he is a recidivist, he should be severely punished according to law.

The defendant Wang Youcai confessed to the charged facts without reservation but defended that his actions were only directed at actual social phenomena and had nothing to do with inciting the subversion of state power, therefore his actions did not constitute a crime.

It has been found through the trial: With the purpose of subverting state power and overthrowing the socialist system, the defendant Wang Youcai actively carried out activities to organize an illegal political party. In June 1998, the defendant Wang Youcai gathered Zhu Zhengming and Wu Yilong (both handled separately) on the lawn of the former Hangzhou University in Hangzhou to discuss the establishment of a political party proposed by Wang Youcai. They decided to name the party the “China Democracy Party,” take the lead in establishing the “Zhejiang Preparatory Committee of the China Democracy Party” in Zhejiang Province, and each draft the constitution of said party.

On the evening of June 24 of the same year, the defendant Wang Youcai, along with Zhu Zhengming, Wu Yilong, Wang Donghai, Lin Hui, and others (all handled separately), discussed and drafted the “Constitution of the China Democracy Party (Draft)” (hereinafter referred to as the “Constitution”) and the “Declaration of the Establishment of the Zhejiang Preparatory Committee of the China Democracy Party” (hereinafter referred to as the “Declaration”) at Zhu Zhengming’s home. They vilified and attacked the state power and the socialist system as “feudal autocracy,” “political dictatorship,” and “power tyranny,” and explicitly proposed “obtaining political rights, amending the Constitution, abolishing the one-party dictatorship,” “establishing a constitutional democratic political system, establishing a political power-sharing mechanism,” etc. They agreed to publicly distribute the two aforementioned documents, and at the same time, Wang Youcai and others respectively divided specific tasks regarding communication, propaganda, and consultation.

On the morning of June 25 of the same year, the defendant Wang Youcai sent eighteen emails containing the contents of the “Constitution” and “Declaration” to organizations and individuals in the United States, Hong Kong, and other places through the international Internet, and requested the recipients to disseminate them widely. On the morning of the 30th of the same month, as agreed, his accomplice Zhu Yufu (handled separately) carried printed copies of the “Declaration” and distributed them in the vicinity of the Qiutao Nanyuan Property Management Office of the Chengnan Housing Management Station of the Shangcheng District Housing Bureau in Hangzhou and the intersection of Caihe Road and Kaixuan Road in Hangzhou.

On July 4 and 5 of the same year, the defendant Wang Youcai respectively notified Zhu Zhengming, Wang Donghai, and others to gather in the form of “drinking tea” in Hangzhou on July 11, and requested each person to contact other personnel to participate as much as possible to continue discussing the establishment of the “China Democracy Party.” Through these contacts, Lin Hui and others rushed to Hangzhou to prepare for the gathering. This did not succeed as it was discovered in time by public security organs.

In November of the same year, while the defendant Wang Youcai was under residential surveillance by the Hangzhou Municipal Public Security Bureau on suspicion of endangering national security, he violated legal regulations to meet with members of overseas hostile organizations in Hangzhou, introduced and exchanged information regarding the establishment of the preparatory committee of the “China Democracy Party,” and accepted 1,000 US dollars in funding. In addition, the defendant Wang Youcai also respectively accepted funding of 4,000 RMB and 300 US dollars from members of overseas hostile organizations in May and September of the same year.

The above facts are confirmed by the following evidence verified through court cross-examination:

1. Testimony of Zhu Zhengming and Wu Yilong proves: In June 1998, they discussed the establishment of a political party with Wang Youcai and decided to take the lead in establishing the “Zhejiang Preparatory Committee of the China Democracy Party” in Zhejiang Province;

2. Testimony of Zhu Zhengming, Wu Yilong, Wang Donghai, and Lin Hui proves: On June 24, 1998, they discussed, revised, and finalized the “Constitution” and “Declaration” together with Wang Youcai at Zhu’s home and decided on public distribution; the testimony of Wang Donghai also confirms that specific labor division was carried out that night; documentary evidence such as printed copies, printed materials, drafts, and computer documents of the “Constitution” and “Declaration” searched by public security organs from the homes of Wang Youcai, Zhu Zhengming, and Zhu Yufu are on file; the handwriting of ballpoint pen revisions on the printed copy of the “Declaration” was appraised as being written by Wang Youcai;

3. Certifying materials of the public security organs’ discovery on June 26, 1998, through browsing international Internet public nodes that the “Constitution” and “Declaration” had been sent overseas; an appraisal report from the inspection of the “Sent” folder (NETSCAPE MAIL) in the “Toshiba Satellite Pro 430 CDT” laptop seized from Wang Youcai’s residence confirming that on the morning of June 25, 1998, the computer sent eighteen emails containing the “Constitution” and “Declaration” to overseas destinations; the testimony of Hu Jiangxia proves that the laptop was borrowed from her workplace and she had told Wang Youcai the specific web address configured by the workplace;

4. Testimony of Zhu Zhengming proves: On June 29, 1998, as agreed with Wang Youcai, he gave the “Declaration” to Zhu Yufu for distribution; testimony of Bao Jianlin, Yuan Boting, and Yu Shuihua proves that Zhu Yufu distributed the “Declaration” to them at the Qiutao Nanyuan Property Management Office; testimony of Hong Zhaodi and Xu Shuiying proves they witnessed Zhu Yufu, who was caught by public security organs, distributing leaflets in the Kaixuan Road area; the “Declaration” extracted from the distribution site was appraised to be identical in content and version to the “Declaration” found in the homes of Zhu Yufu and Zhu Zhengming; the testimony of Zhu Yufu is consistent with the circumstances proven by the above evidence;

5. Testimony of Zhu Zhengming and Wang Donghai proves that Wang Youcai scheduled a gathering on July 11 to discuss “China Democracy Party” matters and requested that they respectively notify other personnel to attend; the testimony of Lin Hui proves he came to Hangzhou to prepare for the gathering as notified;

6. The US dollars seized from Wang Youcai’s person and the postal remittance notices, US dollar fixed-term certificates of deposit, and emails sent by members of hostile organizations to Wang Youcai regarding funding for Wang, which were seized from Wang Youcai’s residence, are on file;

7. The defendant Wang Youcai confessed to the above facts without reservation, and his confession is consistent with the circumstances proven by the above evidence.

The above evidence is confirmed by this Court. The facts of this case are clear, and the evidence is reliable and sufficient.

This Court believes: The defendant Wang Youcai organized and plotted to subvert state power and overthrow the socialist system. His behavior has constituted the crime of subverting state power, and the crime is grave. During the activities of subverting state power, the defendant Wang Youcai colluded with overseas organizations and accepted funding; he had been sentenced for endangering national security and has now committed a crime of endangering national security again, making him a recidivist. Both circumstances warrant heavier punishment according to law. The facts charged by the public prosecution organ are established, but the charged charge was inappropriate and should be corrected. The defense raised by the defendant Wang Youcai that his behavior does not constitute a crime is found to be inconsistent with the facts and the law upon investigation, and therefore this Court does not adopt it. Accordingly, in accordance with the provisions of Article 105 Paragraph 1, Article 106, Article 66, Article 56 Paragraph 1, Article 55 Paragraph 1, and Article 64 of the Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China, the judgment is as follows:

1.The defendant Wang Youcai is convicted of the crime of subverting state power and is sentenced to eleven years of fixed-term imprisonment and three years of deprivation of political rights;

2.The illegal gains of 1,300 US dollars of the defendant Wang Youcai (of which 300 US dollars were frozen in the “Fixed-term All-in-one” deposit under the name of “Hu Jiangxia” at the Hangzhou High-tech Development Zone Branch of the Bank of China, Account No: 4531711006500900003575) shall be recovered.

If you disagree with this judgment, you may, within ten days from the day after receiving the judgment, submit an appeal through this Court or directly to the Higher People’s Court of Zhejiang Province. For a written appeal, the original appeal petition and two copies shall be submitted.

Presiding Judge: Liu Shuhai Judge: Sun Wei Judge: He Min

December 20, 1998 This copy is verified to be identical to the original. Court Clerk: Feng Jing

攝影記者：關永傑
編輯：鍾然 校对：熊辩 翻译：周敏

2026年4月12日下午，中國民主黨成員在中國駐舊金山總領事館門前舉行集會，聲援民主台灣，反對中共對台灣的軍事威脅與政治施壓，並譴責國民黨主席鄭麗文出訪大陸親共賣台。儘管活動開始時風雨交加，現場參與者仍堅持完成全部活動流程。

活動發起人之一、中國民主黨黨員陳森鋒表示，此次活動是在與台灣知名反共人士「八炯」交流後共同推動。他介紹，對方從台灣社會的角度提供了一些建議。他表示，作為從中國大陸出來的人，對中共體制有切身認識，不希望台灣現有的民主制度遭到破壞，並認為台灣在華語社會中具有重要示範意義。

中國民主黨舊金山黨部秘書長鄭雲在發言中指出，台灣是一個擁有選舉制度、言論自由和公民權利的社會，這些制度性成果值得被維護。她表示，中共近年來透過軍事行動、政治施壓及壓縮國際空間，對台灣形成持續壓力。她強調，應清晰表達立場，反對威脅行為，並重申台灣的未來應由台灣人民自主決定。

黨員郭志軍表示，中共對台灣的影響不僅體現在軍事層面，也包括政治、經濟以及資訊領域。中共不僅對中國人民進行資訊管控，還長期對全球民主國家進行「紅色滲透」。他提到社交媒體在輿論影響中的作用，認為相關手段正在改變社會討論環境，並呼籲台灣方面保持警惕。

黨員李栩指出，台灣的民主制度是長期發展的結果，這一成果來之不易，在外部壓力下更需要保持穩定與信心。

黨員衛仁喜表示，台灣在現實環境中面臨多方面挑戰，只有2300萬人口的台灣，要面對被中共裹挾的14億人口的大陸，處境十分艱難，更令人擔憂的是還存在來自內部的壓力與分歧，但仍需堅定信心，讓民主制度持續存在並發展。

黨員李凱認為，支持台灣不僅涉及地緣問題，也關係到自由與選擇權，應反對任何形式的外部干預，台灣的命運只能由台灣人民決定。

黨員盧占強從制度角度分析安全問題，指出台灣真正的安全不僅在於軍事裝備，區域和平除了依賴軍事平衡，也取決於治理結構與權力約束。他認為，一個走向文明、擁抱民主的中國，才是台灣走向長久和平的根本保障，也是兩岸人民共同的尊嚴所在。

黨員何聰回顧歷史經驗，認為過往教訓值得關注，並對國共關係提出批評。他表示，推動制度轉型、建立民主政體，才是中國與台灣未來發展的重要方向。

黨員劉靜濤表示，台灣的民主就是一面照妖鏡，中共懼怕站在這面鏡子面前，戳穿中共“統一”的謊言，不能讓台灣民主之光熄滅，讓這道光照遍大陸各地，中國總有一天會實現民主自由。

黨員李樹青認為，台灣的現狀對部分中國民眾具有啓發意義。事實證明，在絕對權力下，沒有任何真相能存活，我們不能去支持甘當中共“花瓶黨”在我們的民主世界存在！台灣是我們中國人民追求民主和自由的燈塔，守護台灣，保持台灣和平是我們每個愛好民主普世價值觀的人民的責任。

黨員張善城指出，制度差異是當前矛盾的重要背景之一，如果國民黨覺得靠讓步能換來平安，那完全是政治上的天真，退掉的不僅是地盤，而是保護自由的底線。台灣的民主是文明的火種，是未來的希望，一旦這盞燈被吹滅，整個民族將再次掉進權力只手遮天的黑洞。

此外，邢貴、吳志創、周忠玉、周小俊等黨員及灣區民主運動人士袁強也在現場發言，表達對台灣議題的關注與看法。

在今天眾多發言者當中，有幾位對於國民黨目前的墮落深感憤慨，並喊出“國民黨滾出台灣”的口號。對於這些激憤的情緒，鄭雲特作了補充發言，她也表示對國民黨選出一個如此親共的主席感到難過，但不能一竹竿打落一船人，灣區也有很多國民黨黨員，比如五洲洪門致公總堂的盟長趙炳賢，就是有著堅定立場的反共人士。

活動中還有一個播放影片環節，現場播放了國民黨主席鄭麗文學生時期的一段演講影片，鄭麗文早期主張台灣獨立與民族解放，她強烈抨擊國民黨為“外來政權”，號召推翻其威權統治，建立獨立的“台灣國”，展現出極其激進的反共與反核本土立場。而另一段影片則涉及台灣網紅“館長”陳之漢早年的相關言論，引發了現場討論，他的立場轉變體現了流量至上的網紅邏輯，從早期的激進批判中國共產黨到如今訪問大陸為中共站台叫好，其言行往往隨政治風向與商業利益搖擺，這種“發卡彎”式變臉，既反映了其個人信念的缺失，也揭示了他在利益驅動下的投機本質。

活動最後，與會者進行象徵性表達行動，手撕印有「中共非法政權」字樣的紙張，並集體高喊口號，表達對相關議題的立場與訴求：

維護世界和平！

捍衛民主台灣！

聲援台灣！

反對侵略！

停止軍演！

停止威脅！

拒絕出賣！

守護台灣！

隨後，現場多次重複呼喊：

台灣的未來——誰決定？

台灣人民！

再來一次——誰決定？

台灣人民！

在持續的風雨中，參與者衣物被打濕，但活動仍在有序氛圍中結束。多位參與者表示，此類行動旨在表達對民主制度與地區和平的關注，並強調台灣安全在當前局勢中的重要性。

Support Democratic Taiwan, Condemn the KMT Chairperson’s Pro-CCP and Taiwan-Betraying Trip

Photojournalist: Guan Yongjie
Editor: Zhong Ran Proofreader: Xiong Bian Translator: Zhou Min

Summary: Members of the China Democracy Party in the Bay Area gathered in front of the Consulate General of the People’s Republic of China in San Francisco to support Taiwan’s democracy, oppose CCP pressure and military threats, and pay attention to the cross-strait situation and the fact that Taiwan’s future is decided independently by its people.

On the afternoon of April 12, 2026, members of the China Democracy Party held a rally in front of the Consulate General of the People’s Republic of China in San Francisco to support democratic Taiwan, oppose the CCP’s military threats and political pressure against Taiwan, and condemn Kuomintang (KMT) Chairperson Zheng Liwen’s visit to the Mainland as pro-CCP and betraying Taiwan. Despite the wind and rain at the start of the event, participants on-site persisted in completing the entire activity process.

Chen Senfeng, one of the event organizers and a member of the China Democracy Party, stated that this activity was jointly promoted after an exchange with the well-known Taiwanese anti-communist figure “Ba Jiong.” He explained that the other party provided some suggestions from the perspective of Taiwanese society. He expressed that, as someone from Mainland China who has a personal understanding of the CCP system, he does not want Taiwan’s existing democratic system to be destroyed, and believes that Taiwan serves as an important demonstration model in the Chinese-speaking world.

Zheng Yun, Secretary-General of the San Francisco Branch of the China Democracy Party, pointed out in her speech that Taiwan is a society with an electoral system, freedom of speech, and civil rights; these institutional achievements deserve to be maintained. She stated that in recent years, the CCP has formed continuous pressure on Taiwan through military actions, political pressure, and the compression of international space. She emphasized that positions should be expressed clearly to oppose threatening behavior, and reiterated that Taiwan’s future should be decided independently by the Taiwanese people.

Member Guo Zhijun stated that the CCP’s influence on Taiwan is reflected not only at the military level but also includes the political, economic, and information fields. The CCP not only carries out information control over the Chinese people but has also long conducted “Red Infiltration” against democratic countries globally. He mentioned the role of social media in influencing public opinion, believing that relevant methods are changing the social discussion environment, and called on the Taiwan side to remain vigilant.

Member Li Xu pointed out that Taiwan’s democratic system is the result of long-term development; this achievement was not easily won and requires maintaining stability and confidence even more under external pressure.

Member Wei Renxi stated that Taiwan faces challenges from many aspects in the current environment. Taiwan, with a population of only 23 million, must face a Mainland of 1.4 billion people coerced by the CCP, making its situation extremely difficult. What is even more worrying is the existence of internal pressure and divisions, yet it is still necessary to remain firm in confidence to let the democratic system continue to exist and develop.

Member Li Kai believes that supporting Taiwan involves not only geopolitical issues but also relates to freedom and the right to choose; any form of external interference should be opposed, and Taiwan’s fate can only be decided by the Taiwanese people.

Member Lu Zhanqiang analyzed security issues from an institutional perspective, pointing out that Taiwan’s true security lies not only in military equipment. Regional peace, besides depending on military balance, also depends on governance structures and power constraints. He believes that a China that moves toward civilization and embraces democracy is the fundamental guarantee for Taiwan to move toward long-term peace, and where the common dignity of the people on both sides of the strait lies.

Member He Cong reviewed historical experiences, believing that past lessons deserve attention, and offered criticism of KMT-CCP relations. He stated that promoting institutional transformation and establishing a democratic polity is the important direction for the future development of China and Taiwan.

Member Liu Jingtao stated that Taiwan’s democracy is a “monster-revealing mirror” (Zhao Yao Jing). The CCP fears standing in front of this mirror, which exposes the CCP’s lies of “unification.” We cannot let the light of Taiwan’s democracy be extinguished; let this light shine across all parts of the Mainland. China will one day achieve democracy and freedom.

Member Li Shuqing believes that Taiwan’s current status has enlightening significance for some Chinese people. Facts prove that under absolute power, no truth can survive. We cannot support the existence of “vase parties” that willingly serve the CCP in our democratic world! Taiwan is the lighthouse for us Chinese people in the pursuit of democracy and freedom. Guarding Taiwan and maintaining peace in Taiwan is the responsibility of every person who loves democratic universal values.

Member Zhang Shancheng pointed out that institutional difference is one of the important backgrounds of current contradictions. If the KMT feels that peace can be exchanged for through concessions, that is complete political naivety; what is retreated from is not just territory, but the bottom line of protecting freedom. Taiwan’s democracy is the spark of civilization and the hope for the future. Once this lamp is blown out, the entire nation will once again fall into the black hole where power covers the sky with one hand.

In addition, members Xing Gui, Wu Zhichuang, Zhou Zhongyu, Zhou Xiaojun, and Bay Area democracy activist Yuan Qiang also spoke at the scene, expressing their concerns and views on Taiwan issues.

Among the many speakers today, several felt deeply indignant about the current degradation of the KMT and shouted the slogan “KMT get out of Taiwan.” Regarding these agitated emotions, Zheng Yun made a supplementary speech. She also expressed sadness over the KMT electing such a pro-CCP chairperson, but said one cannot beat a whole boat of people with one pole (generalize). There are also many KMT members in the Bay Area; for example, Zhao Bingxian, the leader of the Wuzhou Hongmen Zhigong Tang, is an anti-communist person with a firm stance.

There was also a video screening segment during the event. A video of KMT Chairperson Zheng Liwen’s speech during her student days was played. In her early years, Zheng Liwen advocated for Taiwan’s independence and national liberation. She strongly attacked the KMT as an “alien regime” and called for the overthrow of its authoritarian rule to establish an independent “Republic of Taiwan,” showing an extremely radical anti-communist and anti-nuclear localist stance. Another video involved relevant early remarks by the Taiwanese internet celebrity “Genghua” Chen Zhihan, which sparked discussion on-site. His shift in stance reflects the logic of “traffic-first” internet celebrities; from early radical criticism of the Chinese Communist Party to now visiting the Mainland to stand for and cheer for the CCP, his words and deeds often sway with political winds and commercial interests. This “hairpin turn” style of face-changing reflects both the lack of his personal conviction and reveals his opportunistic nature driven by interests.

At the end of the activity, participants carried out a symbolic expressive action, hand-tearing paper printed with the words “CCP Illegal Regime” and collectively shouting slogans to express their positions and demands on relevant issues:

Maintain world peace!

Defend democratic Taiwan!

Support Taiwan!

Oppose aggression!

Stop military exercises!

Stop threats!

Refuse betrayal!

Guard Taiwan!

Subsequently, the scene repeated the shouts several times:

The future of Taiwan—who decides?

The Taiwanese people!

One more time—who decides?

The Taiwanese people!

In the continuous wind and rain, the participants’ clothes were soaked, but the activity ended in an orderly atmosphere. Multiple participants stated that such actions aim to express concern for democratic systems and regional peace and emphasize the importance of Taiwan’s security in the current situation.

作者：王小光
编辑：周志刚 校对：周敏 翻译：戈冰

当“稳定”需要被反复表演：从“习郑会”看当代政治沟通的困境

在当下的政治语境中，每一次高层会晤都不仅仅是一次会面，更是一种被精心设计的“表达行为”。近期举行的“习郑会”，正是这样一个典型样本。镜头、通稿、措辞和节奏，无不显示出高度的程式化与可控性。习近平在这样的场景中出现，既是参与者，也是整个叙事体系的核心象征。

从表面上来看，这类会晤承载着明确功能：对内稳定预期，对外释放信号。在经济承压、国际环境复杂的背景下，通过高规格会谈来展示“沟通仍在进行”“局势依然可控”，无疑具有某种现实意义。然而，当这种表达逐渐演变为一种固定模式时，它本身也开始暴露出越来越明显的局限。

首先值得注意的，是这类会晤在信息层面的高度抽象化。公开内容通常围绕“合作”“发展”“共识”等宏大叙述展开，语言稳健而谨慎，却极少触及具体政策路径、执行难点或潜在分歧。这种表达方式在形式上避免了风险，在效果上却降低了信息密度。对于需要判断趋势的市场与观察者而言，这种“高概括、低细节”的沟通，越来越难以提供足够的参考价值。

更进一步看，这种抽象化表达实际上构建了一种特殊的“安全语言体系”。在这一体系中，所有可能引发不确定性的内容都被有意弱化甚至排除，而留下的，是一套几乎可以适用于任何情境的通用表述。问题在于，当语言可以脱离具体情境而成立时，它也就失去了对现实的解释力。换句话说，当每一次会晤听起来都相似时，它所能传递的信息就越来越有限。

与此同时，这种沟通模式还带来了一个更具讽刺意味的后果：本应用于降低不确定性的表达，反而在某种程度上放大了不确定性。由于缺乏具体信息，外界只能依赖有限线索进行推测，各种解读由此层出不穷。在信息不对称的情况下，解释空间越大，分歧也就越多，最终形成一种“越强调稳定，越难以被相信”的悖论。

这种悖论，在“习郑会”中体现得尤为明显。如果一个体系的运行确实稳健，那么稳定本应是一种无需反复强调的自然状态。然而，当“稳定”需要通过频繁的高层会晤、统一的语言表达以及密集的信号释放来维持时，它就从一种客观结果，转变为一种需要不断被生产的“政治产品”。而任何需要持续生产的东西，都不可避免地面临边际效应递减的问题。

从这个角度来看，“习郑会”的意义，或许并不在于它说了什么，而在于它为何必须被举行。它所回应的，并非单一问题，而是一种更广泛的信心波动：经济预期的不确定、外部环境的复杂变化，以及内部政策节奏的调整所带来的压力。在这些因素叠加之下，单次会晤所能承担的功能被不断放大，但其实际能力却并未相应提升。

更深层的原因，则可以从决策与表达之间的关系中找到线索。在一个决策趋于集中的体系中，信息往往沿着自上而下的路径被筛选与重构。最终呈现出来的，不是多元意见的交汇过程，而是经过整理后的“统一结论”。这种模式在提升执行效率的同时，也压缩了外界理解决策逻辑的空间。

问题在于，在高度复杂的现实环境中，外界对信息的需求已经不再局限于“结论是什么”，而是进一步延伸到“结论如何形成”“是否存在不同意见”“体系是否具备纠错能力”。当这些信息缺位时，即便结论本身再明确，也难以完全消除疑问。

由此带来的结果，是一种微妙但持续的信任消耗。它并不会以剧烈的方式表现出来，而是以更隐蔽的形式逐渐累积：市场反应更加谨慎，外部观察更加保留，内部预期更加分化。在这样的背景下，单次会晤的象征意义不断上升，但其实际影响力却在缓慢下降。

从传播学的角度看，这也可以被理解为一种“信号通胀”。当信号被过度使用时，其边际价值必然下降。最初，一次高层会晤可能足以引发广泛解读；但当类似信号频繁出现且内容高度同质化时，外界对其的敏感度与信任度都会随之降低。最终，它可能仍然是必要的，但已不再具有决定性。

因此，与其将“习郑会”视为某种转折点，不如将其理解为一种持续状态的体现。它反映的，不是某一项具体政策的变化，而是一整套沟通机制在当前环境下面临的适应压力。在这一压力之下，形式与内容之间的张力愈发明显：形式需要保持稳定与权威，内容却必须面对不断变化的现实。

这种张力如果长期存在，便会产生一个耐人寻味的结果——形式逐渐独立于内容而存在。会晤继续举行，语言继续重复，结构继续维持，但其与现实之间的联系却在逐步松动。到那时，会晤的主要功能，或许不再是推动问题解决，而是确认体系本身仍在运转。

这或许正是“习郑会”最值得关注的地方。它不仅是一场具体的政治活动，更像是一面镜子，映射出当代政治沟通在复杂环境中的某种困境：既需要控制不确定性，又难以提供足够信息；既追求表达的一致性，又必须面对现实的多样性。

在这样的背景下，真正决定外界判断的，往往不再是会晤本身，而是会晤之后的行动。如果信号能够转化为具体、连贯且可验证的政策路径，那么其影响仍有可能延续；反之，如果表达与行动之间持续存在落差，那么再精致的沟通形式，也难以长期维持其说服力。

归根结底，政治沟通的有效性，并不取决于表达本身的完美程度，而取决于它与现实之间的契合程度。当“稳定”更多依赖于被展示，而不是被感知时，这种差距终究会显现出来。而“习郑会”所呈现的，正是这一差距正在被逐步放大的过程。

The Xi-Zheng Meeting: A Carefully Orchestrated Diplomatic Performance

Author: Wang Xiaoguang
Editor: Zhou Zhigang Proofreader: Zhou Min Translator: Ge Bing

Abstract: The “Xi-Zheng Meeting” was primarily intended to send a message of stability; however, due to the abstract nature of its messaging and the lack of concrete substance, it ultimately lacked persuasiveness. Over time, the primary function of the meeting began to shift: it was no longer about driving solutions to problems, but rather about confirming that the system itself was still functioning.

When “Stability” Must Be Repeatedly Performed: The Dilemma of Contemporary Political Communication as Seen Through the “Xi-Cheng Meeting”

In the current political context, every high-level meeting is not merely a gathering but a carefully designed “act of expression.” The recent “Xi-Cheng Meeting” is a prime example of this. The camera angles, press releases, wording, and timing all demonstrate a high degree of ritualization and controllability. In such settings, Xi Jinping appears not only as a participant but also as the central symbol of the entire narrative system.

On the surface, these meetings serve a clear purpose: to stabilize domestic expectations and send signals to the outside world. Against a backdrop of economic pressures and a complex international environment, using high-level talks to demonstrate that “communication is still ongoing” and “the situation remains under control” undoubtedly holds practical significance. However, as this form of communication gradually evolves into a fixed pattern, it begins to reveal increasingly obvious limitations.

First and foremost, it is worth noting the high degree of abstraction in the information conveyed during these meetings. Public statements typically revolve around grand narratives such as “cooperation,” “development,” and “consensus,” employing language that is steady and cautious, yet rarely touching upon specific policy pathways, implementation challenges, or potential disagreements. While this approach avoids risks in form, it reduces the density of information in effect. For markets and observers seeking to gauge trends, this “highly generalized, low-detail” communication is increasingly unable to provide sufficient reference value.

Looking further, this abstract expression actually constructs a special “system of safe language.” Within this system, all content that might trigger uncertainty is intentionally downplayed or even excluded, leaving behind a set of generic statements that can apply to almost any situation. The problem is that when language can stand on its own without reference to a specific context, it loses its ability to explain reality. In other words, when every meeting sounds the same, the information it conveys becomes increasingly limited.

At the same time, this communication model leads to an even more ironic consequence: expressions intended to reduce uncertainty actually amplify it to some extent. Due to the lack of concrete information, the outside world can only rely on limited clues to speculate, giving rise to a multitude of interpretations. In situations of information asymmetry, the greater the room for interpretation, the more disagreements arise, ultimately creating a paradox where “the more stability is emphasized, the harder it is to be believed.”

This paradox is particularly evident in the “Xi-Cheng Meeting.” If a system truly operates robustly, stability should be a natural state that requires no repeated emphasis. However, when “stability” must be maintained through frequent high-level meetings, unified language, and intensive signaling, it transforms from an objective outcome into a “political product” that must be constantly manufactured. And anything that requires continuous production inevitably faces the problem of diminishing marginal returns.

From this perspective, the significance of the “Xi-Cheng meeting” may not lie in what was said, but in why it had to be held. It responds not to a single issue, but to a broader fluctuation in confidence: the uncertainty of economic expectations, the complex changes in the external environment, and the pressure resulting from adjustments to the pace of domestic policy. Under the compounding effect of these factors, the functions expected of a single meeting are constantly magnified, yet its actual capacity has not increased accordingly.

A deeper explanation can be found in the relationship between decision-making and communication. In a system where decision-making tends to be centralized, information is often filtered and restructured along a top-down path. What is ultimately presented is not a process of converging diverse opinions, but a “unified conclusion” that has been organized and refined. While this model enhances execution efficiency, it also limits the outside world’s ability to understand the logic behind decisions.

The problem is that, in a highly complex real-world environment, the outside world’s demand for information is no longer limited to “what the conclusion is,” but extends further to “how the conclusion was formed,” “whether there were dissenting opinions,” and “whether the system possesses the ability to correct errors.” When this information is missing, even the clearest conclusion cannot fully dispel doubts.

The result is a subtle yet persistent erosion of trust. This does not manifest in dramatic ways, but rather accumulates gradually in more subtle forms: market reactions become more cautious, external observers grow more reserved, and internal expectations become increasingly divided. Against this backdrop, the symbolic significance of individual meetings continues to rise, while their actual influence slowly declines.

From a communication studies perspective, this can also be understood as a form of “signal inflation.” When signals are overused, their marginal value inevitably declines. Initially, a single high-level meeting might be enough to spark widespread interpretation; but when similar signals appear frequently and their content is highly homogeneous, the outside world’s sensitivity to and trust in them both diminish. Ultimately, such meetings may still be necessary, but they no longer hold decisive weight.

Therefore, rather than viewing the “Xi-Zheng meeting” as a turning point, it is better understood as an embodiment of an ongoing state. It reflects not a change in any specific policy, but the adaptive pressures faced by an entire communication mechanism in the current environment. Under this pressure, the tension between form and content becomes increasingly apparent: form must maintain stability and authority, while content must confront an ever-changing reality.

If this tension persists over the long term, it will produce an intriguing outcome—form will gradually exist independently of content. Meetings will continue to be held, language will continue to be repeated, and structures will continue to be maintained, yet their connection to reality will gradually weaken. By then, the primary function of such meetings may no longer be to advance problem-solving, but rather to confirm that the system itself is still functioning.

This is perhaps the most noteworthy aspect of the “Xi-Zheng Meeting.” It is not merely a specific political event, but rather a mirror reflecting a certain dilemma in contemporary political communication within a complex environment: the need to control uncertainty while struggling to provide sufficient information; the pursuit of consistency in expression while having to confront the diversity of reality.

Against this backdrop, what truly shapes external assessments is often not the meeting itself, but the actions that follow. If the signals can be translated into concrete, coherent, and verifiable policy pathways, their impact may endure; conversely, if a persistent gap remains between rhetoric and action, even the most sophisticated forms of communication will struggle to maintain their persuasive power over the long term.

Ultimately, the effectiveness of political communication does not depend on the perfection of the expression itself, but on how well it aligns with reality. When “stability” relies more on being displayed than on being perceived, this gap will inevitably become apparent. What the “Xi-Cheng Meeting” has revealed is precisely the process by which this gap is gradually widening.