On September 5, 2026, during Lap 7 of the China GT Shanghai round, Car No. 37 and Car No. 33 collided while battling for position and ran off the track, side-impacting the fuel tank area of the No. 91 Ferrari. The fire erupted instantly. British driver Ollie Millroy was trapped inside the cockpit, suffering five broken ribs, a fractured collarbone, a broken hand, and a pulmonary contusion. He later recounted that his memory was a complete blank from thirty seconds before the crash to an hour after. The only thing he remembered was that another person dragged him out of the flames.
The person who stepped into the rescue role—where he never should have had to be—was Dutch driver Loek Hartog. He stopped his car, abandoned his race, and made his first approach, only to be forced back by the searing heat. Turning back, he found a fire extinguisher, suppressed the flames around the cockpit, and pulled Millroy out with his bare hands. The entire rescue took roughly forty-nine seconds. Millroy stated clearly: that he is alive today is entirely thanks to this one man; there was not a marshal in sight, nor was there any fire crew.
In the aftermath, 610 Racing driver Yang Baijie publicly alleged that some rescue personnel dropped their fire extinguishers and fled out of fear; that the ambulance took roughly fifteen minutes to arrive, with reports that the driver was asleep and wouldn’t wake up even when people pounded on the window; and that inside the stewards’ room, before anyone even inquired clearly about the drivers’ safety, responsibility was already being shifted onto the drivers. Although these allegations have yet to be confirmed item-by-item through an independent investigation, the fact that they spread so rapidly demonstrates that the venue had already lost all basic public credibility.
The organizer subsequently offered that most familiar of responses: the event’s setup “met national-level standards,” and it was merely that “fine-grained management requires improvement.” When logistics, rescue efforts, organization, and safety all reveal such glaring vulnerabilities, yet can still be branded “national-level,” the standard itself exposes the problem—what they truly care about is whether the façade can be maintained and whether profits can continue to be reaped. The race and the drivers’ lives are merely props used to sustain this grand illusion.
The recruitment notices and subcontracting stories circulating online form an even more jarring narrative: budgets for safety positions look pristine at the top levels, but after being stripped layer by layer through primary contractors, subcontractors, and labor intermediaries, what reaches the ground are day laborers paid mere dozens of yuan—workers who may never have received trackside fire-safety training. Some accounts mention sixty yuan a day. While this figure currently lacks ironclad evidence like formal contracts or payment vouchers, it is far easier for the public to believe than the official narrative: profits flow upward, risks are offloaded downward, liabilities are shifted outward, and human life is calculated as a cost that can be infinitely diluted. You cannot demand that a day laborer risk their life fighting a ball of burning fuel. They are not fallen heroes; they are mere set dressing purchased to fill out the scene. The entity that truly deserves to be pinned to the pillar of shame is the chain of official seals that turned professional rescue into an outsourced performance, and then wrote off that performance as “meeting standard requirements.”
In the end, TBC Racing announced its permanent withdrawal from China GT.
What this massive fire burned away was not merely a racing car, but the fig leaf long used by the Chinese Communist Party regime to whitewash structural decay and paint a façade of peace. They believed that as long as standards were written into documents, liabilities written into outsourcing contracts, and failures written off as “management details,” the mirage of a prosperous era could remain suspended in midair. But paper “national standards” cannot withstand fire, and a system that treats human life with disregard will ultimately be abandoned by the people.
Editor: Han Lihua Proofreader: Cheng Xiaoxiao Translator: Shen Meihua
The Nature of CCP Law as Seen Through Two Acts: Tools for Ruling and Enslaving the People
By Zhang Lei
Recently, China has successively passed several laws that are set to take effect. In my view, the two most worthy of attention and most closely tied to the vital interests of ordinary people are the National Defense Mobilization Law and the Healthcare Insurance Law.
These two laws appear entirely unrelated—one concerning national defense and the other healthcare—yet when examined together, a common trend emerges: state power is increasingly and more deeply intruding into individual property, social resources, healthcare, information dissemination, and indeed every aspect of citizens’ daily lives.
I. The National Defense Mobilization Law: The Ever-Expanding Mobilization Power of the State
In recent years, along with Xi Jinping’s continuous purges of the military high command, his control over the armed forces has been further consolidated. Against the backdrop of his ambition to unify Taiwan and his constant escalation of tensions across the Taiwan Strait, if a war breaks out in the future, what the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) needs to mobilize will clearly extend far beyond the military alone—it will require the mobilization of society as a whole.
Modern warfare requires vehicles, enterprises, energy, communications, data, transportation, supplies, and vast amounts of social resources. Therefore, to raise wartime mobilization capacity, the state must first expand its mobilization authority within the law.
Consequently, certain changes in the revised National Defense Mobilization Law warrant a high degree of vigilance.
For instance, the circumstances triggering national defense mobilization have been extended from the past emphasis on threats to “national security” to include threats to “national development interests.” While “national security” still possesses relatively defined boundaries, the phrase “development interests” is far broader in meaning and can encompass the economy, trade, energy, supply chains, and even international competition.
Does this mean that in the future, if China enters into severe economic, trade, or strategic conflicts with other countries, these friction points might also be brought under the framework of so-called “threats to national development interests” and serve as a major justification for expanding national defense mobilization?
This is precisely where the need for vigilance lies.
At the same time, the revised law has expanded the past provision concerning the “requisitioning” of civilian resources to include both “expropriation and requisitioning”; additionally, the term previously rendered as “other supplies” has been adjusted to “other resources”.
A shift in just a few words signifies, behind the scenes, an expansion in scope of application.
“Supplies” typically refers to vehicles, equipment, grain, and physical goods, whereas the concept of “resources” is obviously far broader. Enterprise capacity, facilities, land, technology, data, and other social resources capable of serving national defense mobilization could all potentially be brought under its scope.
The new law also further touches upon the collection of data and information required for national defense mobilization, as well as the management of information dissemination during a state of mobilization.
In other words, once a state of national defense mobilization is entered, the state can not only deploy the military, but can also more deeply intervene in and control social resources, enterprise operations, personal property, data, and information dissemination.
Eligible citizens are also legally obligated to undertake national defense service.
The problem lies precisely here: if the state can decide whether to launch a war, expropriate and requisition social resources, and demand that citizens undertake national defense obligations, yet ordinary citizens lack genuine institutional channels to participate in major state decision-making, then so-called “national interests” can easily end up degenerating into a justification for power to demand the compliance of the people.
II. The Healthcare Insurance Law: Continuously Clarified Obligations, Persistently Existing Equity Issues
Now let us look at the Healthcare Insurance Law.
Healthcare insurance is directly relevant to every single family.
As the law further clarifies the responsibility to participate in coverage, an unavoidable question arises: since the state demands that citizens fulfill their obligation to pay healthcare premiums, should it not also assume an equally clear responsibility to guarantee that the healthcare insurance system operates in a fair, transparent, and effective manner?
China is rapidly entering an aging society. At the same time, the “Chief Accelerator” is continuously deviating from modern civilization and turning back the wheels of history, leading to a sustained economic downturn, difficulties in employment and household income, while the number of people requiring long-term use of healthcare insurance and medical services grows ever larger.
This means that the healthcare insurance fund will inevitably bear greater pressure in the future.
However, the reality of the situation is that the healthcare insurance system itself still suffers from no small number of structural contradictions.
First is the issue of transparency and supervision regarding the healthcare insurance fund.
In recent years, local authorities have continuously investigated and handled cases of healthcare insurance fraud, fake medical treatments, kickbacks for pharmaceuticals and medical devices, and medical corruption. In 2024 and 2025 alone, the total amount of recovered healthcare insurance funds reached a scale of over 50 billion yuan.
The more money recovered, on one hand, shows that supervision has been strengthened; on the other hand, it also demonstrates that the problem of irregular use of healthcare insurance funds is by no means an isolated phenomenon.
This naturally brings up a question: with so much having already been uncovered, how much more remains undiscovered?
For ordinary premium payers, what they can see is the annual payment notice, yet it is very difficult for them to truly understand how the healthcare insurance fund is operated, how it is allocated, which institutions receive funds, and who ultimately bears responsibility after irregular usage occurs.
If payment obligations can be forcibly implemented through law, then the openness and transparency of the fund’s operation should likewise become an equally strict legal responsibility.
III. Why Does Healthcare Insurance Still Feature Obvious Stratification?
Another long-standing problem in China’s healthcare insurance system is the disparity in benefits among different demographic groups, regions, and medical institutions. Urban employee healthcare insurance and urban and rural resident healthcare insurance differ in benefits; reimbursement standards vary across different regions; and deductible thresholds alongside reimbursement ratios differ across various tiers of hospitals.
Take the situation most common in rural families like mine as an example: when my parents seek medical treatment at township health centers, the reimbursement ratio is roughly 75%; after entering county-level and municipal-level hospitals, the proportion borne by the individual reaches 65%; but upon reaching large provincial-level hospitals, the proportion we can receive reimbursement for—and thus have to bear—leaves us with at most 55%.
Consequently, a practical dilemma arises: the more severe the illness, the greater the need for better hospitals; yet the higher the level of the hospital, the larger the medical cost the family ultimately has to bear.
For families with limited income, minor illnesses can perhaps still be managed, but when facing genuinely severe illnesses, healthcare insurance is insufficient to relieve the family’s financial pressure.
At the same time, China has long maintained institutional arrangements such as CADRE medical care, special medical guarantees, and so-called “high-cadre wards”.
The medical resources, specialist conditions, and level of coverage that some senior cadres can enjoy are obviously not entirely on the same tier as those of ordinary residents.
Therefore, what is truly worth questioning is not “whether one should participate in healthcare insurance,” but rather: since premium payments emphasize that everyone bears responsibility, why cannot healthcare coverage be more equitable?
It is not difficult for the law to require the people to fulfill obligations; what is genuinely difficult is enabling rights to receive equal protection as well.
IV. Equality on Paper and Rights in Reality
The Constitution of the People’s Republic of China explicitly stipulates: “All citizens of the People’s Republic of China are equal before the law.”
It also stipulates: “The state respects and guarantees human rights.”
These principles themselves are unobjectionable. The real issue lies in whether they can be effectively guaranteed in practice.
Public security organs, courts, commissions for discipline inspection, and letters-and-visits petitioning departments exist throughout China, theoretically establishing a vast administrative, judicial, and supervisory system.
However, in reality, after local problems fail to get resolved, huge numbers of ordinary people still have no choice but to petition layer by layer, or even head to Beijing to seek resolution.
This illustrates a crucially important point: having laws does not equate to having the rule of law; having clauses on rights does not equate to rights being genuinely realized.
V. The Real Issue Is: Whom Does the Law Ultimately Restrain?
The National Defense Mobilization Law and the Healthcare Insurance Law touch upon completely different fields, yet the underlying logic they reflect is remarkably similar: when the state needs society to assume responsibilities, the law tends to prescribe them in increasingly granular detail; whereas when citizens demand constraints on governmental power and the realization of equal rights, the corresponding protections are far less forceful.
Who makes the laws? Who interprets the laws? Who supervises the enforcement of the laws? When those in power break the law, who truly holds them accountable?
If the people can only obey the law, yet lack genuinely effective political institutions through which to change lawmakers, supervise the governing authorities, and restrict public power, then the law can easily end up transforming from a tool for protecting the people into a tool for maintaining the order of power.
Conclusion
The fundamental meaning of the existence of law ought to be the protection of citizens’ rights and the restriction of public power, rather than the continuous expansion of the scope of state control over society.
In my view, the single greatest problem under the CCP’s current political system is precisely the lack of truly independent and effective constraints on power.
Only when the people possess genuine rights of choice, supervision, and accountability will “all citizens are equal before the law” cease to remain merely on paper.
When the law increasingly emphasizes what the people ought to bear, yet fails to guarantee with equal force that the people can supervise the government and hold power accountable, then so-called “ruling the country according to law” degenerates into “ruling and enslaving the people according to law.”
Editor: Han Lihua Proofreader: Mao Yiwei Translator: Ge Bing
— An Interview with Feng Reng, Associate Editor-in-Chief of The Opposition Party Magazine
Interviewer: Jia Jia
In the long and tortuous history of the Chinese democracy movement, some individuals stand in the spotlight, while others choose to quietly take on the unglamorous, less visible work: compiling source materials, editing text, proofreading historical records, and interviewing eyewitnesses—thereby re-recording names that are easily forgotten and segments of history that risk being buried in oblivion.
Feng Reng currently serves as the Associate Editor-in-Chief of The Opposition Party magazine. From proactively joining the editorial team, to taking charge of proofreading, and eventually entering the editorial board to serve as rotating editor-in-chief, his relationship with The Opposition Party has gradually transformed from an initial hope of “being able to help out a little” into a commitment he hopes to sustain over the long term.
Regarding why he joined the China Democracy Party, why he devoted himself to the editorial work of The Opposition Party magazine, and how he views the mission and future of an overseas democratic publication, Feng Reng has his own reflections.
During the interview, he repeatedly emphasized a key concept—truthfulness.
“We may hold explicit political stances, but the facts must be true. Only criticism grounded in factual foundations possesses genuine power.”
From Personal Reflection to Joining the China Democracy Party
When speaking of his origins with the China Democracy Party, Feng Reng stated that he only truly began coming into contact with the China Democracy Party after arriving in the United States.
While living in China, he consistently held his own thoughts and views on numerous social issues, and had suffered suppression by public security organs for publicly expressing his personal opinions.
After arriving in the United States, he began interacting with more pro-democracy figures and participating in activities related to democracy and human rights.
As his interactions and reflections continuously deepened, he realized with increasing clarity that many of the problems confronting Chinese society ultimately point back to institutional issues.
“I came to recognize more and more that many problems in China are, in the final analysis, institutional problems,” Feng Reng said.
Based on this understanding, on October 17, 2024, he officially joined the China Democracy Party, hoping to genuinely participate in advancing the cause of democracy, freedom, human rights, and the rule of law in China.
For him, this was not a simple choice of identity, but an act taken after long-term personal reflection.
From Proactive Self-Recommendation to Participating in the Relaunch of The Opposition Party
Feng Reng’s involvement with The Opposition Party magazine also stemmed from quite a direct experience.
On June 11, 2025, he proactively recommended himself to Mr. Zhu Yufu, hoping to join the editorial team of The Opposition Party. At that time, the magazine was in a development phase following its relaunch, and he happened to participate in the editorial work for Issue 12.
Initially, Feng Reng was primarily responsible for editing and proofreading work. As his degree of involvement deepened, he later took charge of the proofreading department and entered the editorial board. Starting from Issue 26, he served as the rotating editor-in-chief of The Opposition Party.
From his initial thought of “helping out a little” to gradually assuming greater responsibilities later on, Feng Reng’s understanding of this work also underwent a change.
“At the very beginning, I simply felt that I could help out a little, but after doing it for a long time, I came to feel more and more that the greatest significance of this magazine is to preserve many people, events, and voices that are easily forgotten.”
This is also an important reason why he hopes to sustain this work over the long term.
A magazine may not be able to immediately change reality, but it can leave a record behind.
And for an era that has experienced political suppression, social transformation, and the ups and downs of countless individual destinies, recording itself may perhaps be a form of responsibility.
The Spirit The Opposition Party Most Needs to Carry Forward: Not Being Silent
The Opposition Party was founded in 1998 and is closely connected to the history of the China Democracy Party’s open party formation.
In Feng Reng’s view, the spirit that most needs to be carried forward in relaunching The Opposition Party today is, first and foremost—not being silent.
“The open party formation of the China Democracy Party in 1998 was itself an act of publicly expressing dissenting political views within a highly oppressive environment.”
And today, relaunching The Opposition Party, in his view, does not merely signify restoring a magazine.
“What is more important is to continue adhering to democracy, free expression, and independent thinking.”
However, Feng Reng particularly emphasized that holding explicit political stances does not mean that facts can be ignored.
“We may hold explicit political stances, but the facts must be true. Only criticism built upon facts possesses genuine power.”
For a media outlet with political stances, how to maintain principle between value stances and news truthfulness is a long-standing issue.
Feng Reng believes that while a stance can be distinct, it cannot come at the expense of facts.
Because only truthfulness allows records to withstand the test of time.
“Recording the truth is the core mission of The Opposition Party.”
When asked to summarize the founding principles of The Opposition Party in a few sentences, Feng Reng gave this answer:
“Recording the truth, upholding democracy, focusing on human rights, preserving history, and disseminating ideas.”
Among these keywords, the one he values most is still “truth.”
The Opposition Party seeks to pay attention to and record the development of China’s democracy movement, while also focusing on political prisoners, human rights issues, religious freedom, judicial injustice, and the everyday reality of ordinary Chinese people.
Feng Reng particularly hopes that The Opposition Party will not only serve as a platform for people overseas to discuss Chinese affairs, but also enable more people from within mainland China to tell authentic stories through their own personal experiences.
“Others can write many commentary pieces, but the voices of those who have actually lived through it are difficult to replace.”
Consequently, in selecting content, he has placed increasing emphasis on first-hand source materials and first-person accounts from eyewitnesses and participants.
Whether they are family members of political prisoners, human rights advocates, religious figures, pro-democracy activists, or ordinary Chinese citizens, the stories of their personal experiences can all become vital historical material for understanding Chinese society.
“This content is extremely valuable.”
In Feng Reng’s view, while commentary can offer perspectives, first-person accounts can preserve the most direct memories of an era.
How does a magazine establish its own standards of truth?
For content involving historical events and major news stories, how is authenticity guaranteed?
Feng Reng believes that the most basic principle is simply this: one must not rely on a single source alone.
“Where primary documents exist, we make every effort to find them; where we can reach the parties involved, we do our utmost to verify directly with them; for news events, we cross-check through multiple sources whenever possible.”
Beyond this, interview audio recordings, transcripts, and relevant documentation should also be preserved as completely as possible.
If a matter cannot be fully verified for the time being, unconfirmed information should not be stated directly as established fact merely for journalistic effect.
“We ought to tell our readers what our sources of information are, rather than writing unconfirmed claims directly as facts.”
For a media outlet that hopes to endure long-term, such principles may not sound extraordinary, yet they are vital.
Because news may soon be forgotten, but the record remains.
And today’s reporting may well become essential material for studying history tomorrow.
From Personal Passion to Institutionalized Operation
Currently, The Opposition Party magazine has established a relatively complete organizational structure, comprising a publisher, deputy publisher, editor-in-chief, deputy editor-in-chief, rotating editor-in-chief, as well as distinct departments for editing, reporting, proofreading, art design, translation, and publicity.
From the moment an article enters the publication office, it generally passes through multiple stages: manuscript submission, editing, proofreading, art layout and page formatting, and finally publication and distribution.
In Feng Reng’s view, an important direction for future development is to further clarify the responsibilities of each stage.
“Who edits, who proofreads, who reviews, and who promotes—all should be clear. Only in this way can the magazine operate stably over the long term.”
This also reflects his fundamental judgment regarding the future path of The Opposition Party: a media outlet cannot forever rely solely on personal enthusiasm to sustain itself.
At present, one of the real difficulties facing the magazine is that many participants are volunteers. Everyone has their own work and family commitments, with limited time to devote to the publication, and professional talent remains relatively scarce.
At the same time, a stable supply of submissions as well as promotion and publicity are also issues that need to be further addressed in the future.
Therefore, Feng Reng hopes to push The Opposition Party away from relying primarily on personal enthusiasm and toward a more stable, institutionalized operation.
“In the future, we also hope that more professional talent in journalism, editing, translation, new media, and international communication will join us.”
Not Just the Voice of One Person, Nor Just a Publication for a Small Circle
Regarding the positioning of The Opposition Party within the overseas Chinese democracy movement, Feng Reng holds a very clear expectation.
“I hope The Opposition Party will not become merely the voice of a single individual, nor a publication reserved for a small circle.”
While The Opposition Party carries the historical background of the China Democracy Party and holds clear value commitments, in Feng Reng’s view, this does not mean it should become a closed platform.
On the contrary, he hopes The Opposition Party can serve as a relatively open public platform.
It can disseminate democratic ideas, record the Chinese democracy movement, and also pay attention to and record what is truly happening in Chinese society.
“I have always felt that what we are doing today is not just publishing a magazine, but also preserving historical materials for the future.”
This statement perhaps reveals another layer of meaning behind the existence of The Opposition Party.
Many interviews, articles, and personal experiences that seem ordinary in the present may, after the settling of time, become vital clues for understanding an era.
And those who were once overlooked may leave behind their names and voices precisely because of an interview or an article.
From a Chinese Magazine to International Communication
Speaking of the future of The Opposition Party, Feng Reng believes that at this stage it remains primarily a Chinese-language magazine.
However, from the perspective of long-term development, he hopes that The Opposition Party can gradually reach beyond the overseas Chinese-speaking community to become a media platform for democracy and human rights with international influence.
Achieving this goal requires, first and foremost, raising its own professional standards.
English translation, fact-checking, citation of sources, image copyright, and professional editing all need to gradually establish more rigorous standards.
Yet in Feng Reng’s view, international communication is not simply translating Chinese articles into English and publishing them on a website.
“We cannot simply translate Chinese into English and post it on a website; rather, we must actively disseminate valuable content to international media, human rights organizations, scholars, and research institutions.”
In the future, he hopes The Opposition Party will not only serve as a window for overseas Chinese to focus on China issues, but also become a reference platform for the international community to understand China’s democracy, human rights, and social reality.
“I hope that one day in the future, when others study issues regarding Chinese democracy, human rights, and society, they will also treat The Opposition Party as an important source of reference.”
This is a long-term goal and a work that requires accumulation over time.
Yet for a magazine that aims to record history, perhaps what matters most has never been how much attention it garners in a short period, but rather how many genuine voices it can preserve within the torrent of time.
Conclusion: Neither Remaining Silent, Nor Forgetting
From joining the China Democracy Party to voluntarily taking part in the editorial team of The Opposition Party; from initially assisting with editing and proofreading to undertaking a greater share of editorial responsibilities, what Feng Reng has experienced is not merely a change in personal identity and duties.
More importantly, his understanding of “recording” has grown increasingly profound.
In the interview, he repeatedly emphasized truth, first-hand material, historical preservation, and institutionalized operation.
This is perhaps the most simple and unpretentious persistence of a media worker: one may hold individual value judgments, but must not abandon respect for facts; one may face real difficulties, but must not cease recording because of them.
“Not remaining silent” is the spirit The Opposition Party hopes to pass down.
And “not forgetting” is perhaps another layer of responsibility for a recorder.
Those voices that were once suppressed, those figures that are easily overlooked, and those events that are currently taking place or have already faded into the past all require someone to listen, to organize, and to preserve.
How far a magazine can go may depend on many practical conditions.
Yet so long as there are still people willing to record, willing to speak the truth, and willing to reserve a place for those voices that might otherwise be forgotten by history, then this persistence itself already holds meaning.
Editor: Han Lihua Proofreader: Mao Yiwei Translator: Ge Bing
From Mainland Trains to Overseas Newspapers: Two “Zero-Distance” Encounters Allowed Me to See Truthfulness, Compassion, and Forbearance Clearly
By Wang Lijun
In real life, hearing from others is unreliable, whereas seeing for oneself is real. Over many years, official propaganda and real-world impressions have often been starkly different. As for me, what genuinely touched and shocked me were my personal experiences from two “zero-distance” encounters with Falun Gong practitioners in my life. These two chance meetings, spanning more than a decade, completely overturned my past perceptions and allowed me to truly feel the power of “Truthfulness, Compassion, and Forbearance.”
The first encounter occurred in the autumn of 2007. At that time, I was taking the K279 green-skin train from Beijing bound for Shiyan, Hubei, staying in a lower berth of a soft-sleeper compartment. After the compartment door opened, two serious-looking men walked in. One of them introduced himself as the chief of the Public Security Section of the Xiangfan Municipal Public Security Bureau in Hubei Province, and mentioned that his trip to Beijing was to execute an “intercepting petitioners” mission to bring back a train conductor from Xiangfan City who intended to petition in Beijing—a Falun Gong practitioner.
Curiously, I asked him: “Beijing is so vast, how could you possibly find him?”
This public security section chief uttered a sentence that remains unforgettable to me to this day:
“Falun Gong practitioners are very easy to find, because people who practice Falun Gong will never tell a lie. When you see him, ask him whether he is Falun Gong. If he says yes, then he definitely is; if he says no, then he is not.”
What surprised me even more was that this section chief even candidly admitted that his own wife practiced Falun Gong. He said his wife was the daughter of the Public Security Bureau’s political commissar, and had previously suffered from hyperthyroidism, possessing an extremely violent temper, even resorting to scratching blood tracks across his face at the slightest provocation. However, ever since his wife practiced Falun Gong, she became a completely changed person, cooking meals, doing laundry every day, bearing hardship without complaint, and acting gentle and thoughtful, “having undergone a complete metamorphosis—I think Falun Gong is truly good.”
When mealtime arrived, the section chief wanted to go to the dining car with me to eat, leaving that young practitioner alone in the compartment. I asked him: “Aren’t you worried he will run away?” The section chief answered with absolute certainty: “He won’t run. As long as he promises me he will wait there, Falun Gong practitioners are so honest; they keep their word, they don’t lie—Truthfulness, Compassion, and Forbearance!”
On that train journey, the public security officer’s trust in the practitioner’s refusal to lie, along with the dramatic transformation Falun Gong brought to a family, planted a deep and authentic impression of “Truthfulness, Compassion, and Forbearance” in my heart.
Thirteen years later, around 2020, I attended a petroleum equipment exhibition in Houston, United States, and stayed at a friend’s house. During that period, my friend’s wife took me to visit the local Epoch Times newspaper office. Inside the newspaper office, many young people were busily at work in various rooms, intensely and efficiently. When I learned that many of them were volunteer workers without any pay, I felt immensely astonished.
Later, this lady and her family came to stay temporarily at my home in Los Angeles, giving me the opportunity to understand her more deeply. She held a master’s degree from Canada, and her husband was also a master’s graduate; their speech and demeanor were exceptionally well-mannered, and when she practiced the exercises early every morning, she never disturbed others. She shared her story with me: Ten years ago, right after giving birth to her child in Canada, she suddenly contracted a strange illness that was difficult to diagnose, leaving her unable to work or manage household chores, casting the entire family into hardship. Upon her mother’s suggestion, she tried practicing the exercises, and in just three months, her body completely recovered.
After regaining her health, she not only enjoyed a happy and fulfilling life, but also chose to spend her spare time writing articles and soliciting advertisements for The Epoch Times, spreading the truth of “Truthfulness, Compassion, and Forbearance” to more people.
These two “zero-distance” encounters, spanning many years, not only allowed me to witness the miraculous power of dispelling illness and staying fit, but also enabled me to see the honest, kind, and selfless character of Falun Gong practitioners.
I could not help asking myself: With such a good practice, why don’t I practice it?
Now that I am getting older and my health is not very good, the thought of cultivation has also emerged in my heart. If kind-hearted people across the whole society all come to practice “Truthfulness, Compassion, and Forbearance,” then this society will move toward civilization, freedom, and justice, while all evil will have no place to survive.
Editor: Zhang Zhijun Proofreader: Xiong Bian Translator: Ge Bing
The Live Organ Assembly Line and Black Market Truth Behind High Walls
By Wang Lijun
As a witness to history and a participant during a specific period, I am acutely aware of those unknown secrets inside high walls and deep compounds. The following is compiled based on authentic first-person testimonies and core first-hand leads. These materials tear open the dark curtain of collusion between the medical sector, the judiciary, and specific privileged classes, revealing a human-destroying live organ assembly line. History will ultimately judge evil, and the truth should not be buried.
For a long time, allegations regarding abnormal organ transplants under specific contexts have been commonplace. A series of first-person oral materials originating from insiders once again outline, in extremely detailed fashion, an underground organ supply chain that assembled local prisons, Armed Police escorts, top military and police hospitals, and black market intermediaries. These case details not only involve massive financial transactions, but also point to an extreme disregard for the right to life.
According to core testimony, the whistleblower came into contact with a special patient at Beijing 309 Hospital and 301 Hospital. The spouse of this patient served as the director of the Legal Affairs Office within the Legal Section of a certain procuratorate; it was precisely due to this special connection that a glimpse into the astonishing operational network behind the scenes was made possible. The testimony pointed out that relevant departments once urgently transferred 20 prisoners serving suspended death sentences from Hulin Prison in Heilongjiang Province, secretly escorting them overnight to Beijing 301 Hospital. Under Armed Police escort, blood was drawn from these prisoners one by one for gene and blood type matching. Shockingly, the patient completed the transplant under the extremely high probability of having “all five indicators successfully matched.”
Behind this highly efficient “live matching” lay assembly-line group surgeries. Relaying what was recounted, the whistleblower stated that over 40 operating rooms at 301 Hospital were working simultaneously at the time, and organs were harvested from the 20 prisoners while they were in a living state. Organs that were not used on the spot were swiftly airlifted by plane to places such as Shanghai and Guangzhou for sale. It is estimated that the sales from this batch of death row prisoners’ organs alone involved amounts as high as tens of millions or even possibly hundreds of millions of yuan, while the involved military hospital even waived all medical fees for this privileged patient.
Apart from large-scale inter-provincial transfers, another personal account from a retired doctor at Dongfeng General Hospital in Shiyan City, Hubei Province, directly reconstructed the bloody cruelty of the organ harvesting site. This doctor had once been dispatched to the scene of an execution by firing squad to assist in organ retrieval, an experience that is hair-raising. Prior to the execution, the hospital conducted deep communication with the procuratorate and the court, explicitly requesting that the executioners not shoot to kill directly, but rather “aim slightly off from the vital organs, shooting the lungs to knock them unconscious,” thereby ensuring that the organs possessed the highest biological activity when harvested.
This accurate, direct gunshot intentionally bypassing vital organs led directly to a tragedy of remaining conscious inside the ambulance. The critically injured prisoner, who was not dead, was rapidly dragged onto an ambulance waiting nearby, where, without standard disinfection and anesthesia, doctors cut open the clothes directly to prepare for surgery. At this point, the prisoner suddenly regained consciousness in extreme agony and sat up, frantically questioning the medical personnel. However, the judicial police officer alongside directly used a gun butt to violently strike him unconscious, after which the doctors, under urging, grabbed “scalpels and spoons” to begin forcefully harvesting the organs required by various departments. This doctor was not the lead surgeon; the entire experience caused severe mental trauma, preventing any further participation in any such sites thereafter, and the doctor is now retired.
Beyond domestic covert operations, the testimonies also reveal the black market price quotes extending overseas from this industry chain, as well as the absolute advantage of the privileged class in resource allocation. The whistleblower once inquired about domestic organ transplant channels on behalf of an American wealthy friend. A leadership figure at a domestic hospital directly quoted a price of 1 million RMB over the phone and arrogantly declared, “If that’s not enough, money can still be added.” Once the funds were in place, feedback came within just two days stating, “One has already been found in the detention center; the person is right now in the detention center, ready to be slaughtered fresh whenever requested,” treating human lives entirely as commodities supplied on demand.
This black market of “fresh” organs supplied on demand further highlights the absolute monopoly over medical resources held by privileged officials. The testimony ultimately contrasts the hardship faced by an ordinary person seeking a kidney transplant with the ease experienced by system officials. A certain “very minor official,” relying on official convenience and network contacts, successively procured three kidney transplant surgeries for their mother (the first kidney transplant lasted ten years, the second lasted three years, and the third lasted only one year). For an ordinary person, getting a single kidney transplant is as difficult as scaling the heavens, whereas officials within the system can continuously obtain organs as effortlessly as reaching into a bag to grab something.
These leaked written records are not merely cold, cobbled-together individual cases, but interrogations of natural justice and human conscience. From Heilongjiang to Beijing, from detention centers to operating tables, when supervisory and judicial powers belonging to the state apparatus, together with medical institutions meant to save lives, become fully commercialized and industrialized, what breeds is a massive evil transcending the bottom line of human civilization. Just as the whistleblower lamented at the end of the text: “Hearing this news was deeply shocking… these people are far too inhumane.” The ledger of history will ultimately be settled, and the light of truth will surely illuminate every corner of darkness behind high walls.
Editor: Zhang Zhijun Proofreader: Wang Bin Translator: Ge Bing
Without Judicial Independence, “Sweeping Away Black and Evil Forces” May Ultimately Sweep Away the Rule of Law
By Feng Reng
In 2026, China launched another round of “sweeping away black and evil forces.”
According to information published by official sources, this round—in addition to continuing to crack down on traditional black and evil forces such as so-called “village tyrants,” “township tyrants,” “mine tyrants,” and “market tyrants”—has also included within its scope of key targets practices like “soft-violence debt collection,” “malicious compensation claims,” “public-opinion extortion,” “labor-dispute fraud,” and “cyberbullying.” Various localities subsequently began concentrated operations to make arrests, pull in the net, and announce achievements in battle, as a familiar “special struggle” once again unfolded across the board.
Whenever I see news like this, I never join in the applause.
It is not because I oppose cracking down on organized crime.
Those who genuinely oppress and bully common people, extort, collect debts with violence, or force transactions should, of course, be subjected to legal sanctions. Any normal society must crack down on these crimes.
What worries me is another matter: why must criminal offenses that ought to be handled by judicial organs in accordance with existing laws always turn into one grand, momentum-driven political campaign after another?
In a system where the judiciary cannot be genuinely independent, and where the public security organs, procuratorates, and courts are all subject to the leadership of political power, I find it hard to believe that this kind of top-down “special struggle” will ultimately land only precisely upon genuine gang and evil criminals.
History has told us time and again that once a campaign begins, there will be quotas, there will be pressure, there will be tier-by-tier implementation, and there will also be people who expand the scope of crackdown in order to fulfill their tasks.
Thus, what first comes to my mind is not “how many more people have been arrested,” but rather: among those arrested, how many genuinely belong to black and evil forces? And could there be people who, due to economic disputes, labor disputes, private lending, normal rights-defense activities, or even having offended local authorities, are pushed step by step into so-called “organized and evil crime” cases?
Genuine rule of law is actually not that complicated.
If someone commits murder, handle it according to the crime of intentional homicide; if extortion, handle it according to the crime of extortion; if illegal detention, handle it according to the crime of illegal detention; as for violent debt collection and forced transactions, there are likewise corresponding laws.
Whether a person has committed a crime should depend on the evidence.
What crime it constitutes should depend on the law.
How many years one is sentenced to should be adjudicated by the court according to the law.
If the evidence is insufficient, one should not be convicted.
Yet the mindset of a “special struggle” is completely different. It often first establishes a political mission, which is then deployed by the central government, implemented by local authorities, carried out through concentrated action, and supervised by designated placement on warning lists, ultimately leading to the continuous publication of how many “gangs were eliminated,” how many “suspects were captured,” and how many “cases were solved.”
When the judiciary begins to measure itself by “battle fruits,” I automatically become vigilant.
Because what the judiciary least ought to pursue is precisely numbers.
The task of the court is not that the more convictions handed down, the better; nor is the task of public security that the more arrests made, the better. A mature judicial system should, first and foremost, ensure that an innocent person is not mistakenly sent to prison because of a campaign.
Over these years, China’s judicial organs themselves have repeatedly emphasized that “if it is black or evil, not one shall be missed; if it is not black or evil, not one shall be fabricated to pad the numbers,” and have on numerous occasions required that there be no “exaggerated designation.”
Why does this kind of language need to be emphasized over and over again?
Because the danger of “padding numbers” and “exaggerated designation” has always existed.
What makes me particularly vigilant this time around is that the definition of “black and evil” is further extending from traditional violent crime.
For instance, “malicious compensation claims,” “public-opinion extortion,” “labor-dispute fraud,” and “cyberbullying.”
These concepts all sound like they have targets that need to be cracked down on. Indeed, there are people who make use of complaints to extort enterprises, people who deliberately generate public opinion to extract money, and people who organize cyberbullying.
Those who commit real crimes should, of course, be handled in accordance with the law.
But the problem lies in the fact that these concepts, at the same time, sit right on the periphery of a vast amount of normal social activity.
What is meant by “malicious compensation claims,” and what is meant by consumers claiming compensation in accordance with the law?
What is meant by “labor-dispute fraud,” and what is meant by workers recovering unpaid wages in accordance with the law?
What is meant by “public-opinion extortion,” and what is meant by journalists, self-media, or ordinary citizens exposing problems of enterprises and local governments?
What is meant by “cyberbullying,” and what, on the other hand, is merely a citizen expressing sharp criticism of the government, officials, or public events?
If legal boundaries are clear enough and the judiciary is genuinely independent, these questions are not impossible to resolve.
However, once the entity ultimately interpreting these boundaries remains a system lacking independent trial and constraints on power, the problem becomes entirely different.
A worker demanding unpaid wages can be framed as engaging in “malicious rights-defense”; a consumer filing long-term complaints can be framed as making “malicious compensation claims”; and a self-media account exposing a local scandal may also be suspected of committing “public-opinion extortion.”
What truly causes me anxiety is precisely this increasingly expansive room for interpretation.
Once power gains a pocket wide enough, what kind of people ultimately get shoved inside often ceases to be merely a legal question.
Private enterprises in particular should remain vigilant about this.
In recent years, one of the things Chinese entrepreneurs have feared most is the criminalization of ordinary economic disputes.
What was originally a failed business cooperation may ultimately turn into contract fraud; what was originally a shareholder dispute may ultimately turn into a criminal case; what was originally a capital dispute between enterprises is ultimately intervened in by the public security organ.
And once an enterprise is tagged with the label of “involvement in organized crime,” the consequences often far exceed those of an ordinary criminal case.
The boss may be detained for a long period, corporate accounts frozen, assets seized, and property confiscated; a company operated for many years may even disappear altogether as a result.
In recent years, while Chinese officialdom has repeatedly emphasized protecting the private economy and safeguarding entrepreneurs’ property rights, it has at the same time continuously launched various special rectification campaigns. This precisely demonstrates that what private enterprises truly lack is not a few slogans about “supporting the private economy,” but rather a most fundamental sense of institutional security.
What an entrepreneur truly needs to know is this:
As long as I have not violated the law, my enterprise will not be targeted simply because I offended a certain official; my property will not suddenly lose protection because of a political campaign; my commercial disputes will not turn into criminal cases because of local power intervention.
This kind of security cannot be provided by propaganda.
It cannot be provided by leaders’ speeches either.
Only an independent judiciary can provide it.
There is another question that can never be bypassed.
China has been sweeping away black and evil forces for so many years; why does it still need to keep sweeping without end?
Starting in 2018, the nationwide special struggle to “sweep away black and evil forces” was launched; later, it was announced that “sweeping away black and evil forces would be normalized”; and now, the “deepening of the special struggle to sweep away black and evil forces” is underway once again.
If organized crime really has been swept clean round after round, yet constantly reappears without end, then what is truly worth asking is not merely “how many more organized crime figures have not yet been caught,” but rather:
Why are these black and evil forces able to exist over the long term?
If a local “village tyrant,” “mine tyrant,” or “market tyrant” lacks the protection of local power behind them, can they really run rampant for ten or twenty years?
If a criminal gang long monopolizes markets, collects debts through violence, and oppresses common people, yet remains untouched by anyone, who exactly is standing behind it?
Chinese officials themselves also admit that sweeping away black and evil forces must “shatter the umbrellas and break the networks”—that is, investigate the “protective umbrellas” behind the black and evil forces.
This actually concedes a crucial point: black and evil forces in many places have never been as simple as a few thugs doing evil on their own.
What is truly terrifying is the union of black and evil forces with public power.
A few thugs bullying common citizens is bad enough; if standing behind those thugs are police, officials, and local interest groups, then what ordinary people face is no longer just a criminal gang, but an entire network of power.
If Zhang San is taken down today, Li Si will still emerge tomorrow.
Because the soil that produces Zhang San and Li Si has undergone no fundamental change.
Therefore, a question far more important than “how many organized crime members were caught this time” should be:
Who allowed these black and evil forces to grow in the first place?
Who provided them with protection?
And who bestowed upon those “protective umbrellas” such immense and unconstrained power?
This is the root of the problem.
It is also why I have always maintained that what China truly needs is not one round of “sweeping away black and evil forces” after another, but judicial independence.
The judicial independence I understand is actually very simple.
Police investigate cases based solely on facts and the law, prosecutors decide whether to indict according to the law, lawyers are genuinely able to defend the accused, and judges do not need to listen to the opinions of the Party committee, the Political and Legal Affairs Commission, or any particular leader regarding a specific case.
If evidence is insufficient, the verdict is not guilty.
Evidence obtained through confession under torture cannot be used.
If a case is mishandled, accountability must be pursued.
If detention is unlawful, compensation must be paid.
Private property is protected by law.
An ordinary worker, an entrepreneur, a government official, a Party member, and a critic of the government should all be subject to the very same rules before the exact same law.
Only thus can it be called the rule of law.
Genuine judicial independence can not only strike at organized crime on the streets, but more importantly, it can constrain those who possess power far greater than any gang.
A criminal gang may perhaps harm dozens or hundreds of people.
However, if an unmonitored state power does evil, how many people can it harm?
This is precisely what any society truly ought to be vigilant against.
Therefore, I am not opposed to “sweeping away black forces.”
What I oppose is allowing power to acquire increasingly expansive rights of interpretation, arrest, and asset disposal in the name of sweeping away black forces.
Nor have I ever believed that the more people arrested, the more a country embodies the rule of law.
Quite the contrary.
A society that truly respects the rule of law should be exceptionally cautious when the state apparatus decides to arrest a person, sentence a person to ten or twenty years, or confiscate a family’s property.
Because to a public security organ, this may merely be a case serial number.
Yet to an innocent person and their family, it may very well be an entire lifetime.
So whenever a new round of “sweeping away black and evil forces” begins, I do not applaud simply because a certain number of “battle fruits” have been announced.
What I care about more is whether those who were arrested genuinely received a fair trial, whether defense attorneys were able to mount a proper defense, whether the evidence can withstand public scrutiny, and whether the frozen and confiscated property truly constituted proceeds of crime.
A judicial system with genuine credibility should not demand that the people first trust the government and only then trust the verdict.
It should lay the evidence out in the open sun, place the trial before the public, and allow people to trust the verdict because of the justice of the judiciary itself.
Sweeping away black and evil forces cannot replace the rule of law.
Nor can political campaigns replace the judiciary.
If one day China genuinely establishes judicial independence, procedural justice, checks and balances on power, and reliable protection of private property rights, perhaps there will be no need at all for grand, dynamic campaigns of “sweeping away black and evil forces” time and time again.
processing everyday affairs, the law is always there.
If organized criminals commit a crime, handle it according to the law.
If entrepreneurs commit a crime, handle it according to the law.
If officials commit a crime, handle it according to the law as well.
When powerholders violate the law, they likewise cannot be an exception.
There is no need for political campaigns, no need to fulfill quotas, and no need to first ask what a person’s identity is or which side they stand on.
Before the law, no one possesses privilege.
That is the true society under the rule of law worth looking forward to.
Until that day arrives, I will not easily applaud any grand, momentum-driven campaign to “sweep away black and evil forces.”
Because in a legal system that first and foremost fails to constrain power, what is ultimately most easily “swept away” may not be black and evil forces.
It is the rule of law itself.
Editor: Li Jing Proofreader: Xiong Bian Translator: Ge Bing
Chen Shuqing Receives Written Response Nearly Four Months After Filing Pension Rights Lawsuit
Author: Chen Shuqing
In the case of plaintiff Chen Shuqing suing the Hangzhou Gongshu District Human Resources and Social Security Bureau and the Hangzhou Gongshu District People’s Government regarding “Administrative Confirmation and Administrative Review” over Chen Shuqing’s pension eligibility and verified effective contribution period, after nearly four months of twists and turns, on September 2, 2026, a formal written response of case acceptance was finally received from the Hangzhou Gongshu District People’s Court. As to how difficult it is to get a case filed, one might review the timeline as follows:
On May 12, 2026, the plaintiff Chen Shuqing sent the Complaint to the Gongshu District People’s Court via Postal Express Mail (EMS). Postal tracking records show it was [Signed by Unit Mailroom] at 09:02 AM on May 13, 2026. Subsequently, I went three times to inquire about the case filing status at the Gongshu District People’s Court of Hangzhou City, located at No. 109 Xiangjisi East Road in this city—at around 9:00 AM on May 26, 2026, around 9:15 AM on June 9, and around 9:00 AM on June 25. Furthermore, at around 9:30 AM on June 9 and around 2:45 PM on June 26, I respectively called 89508823—the filing supervision telephone number provided to me by the administrative case filing window—to inquire about the case filing status. On each occasion, the response was that they had not received it and told me to wait. Feeling that this situation was highly abnormal, plaintiff Chen Shuqing questioned whether the court was also playing “lying flat” [slacking off]. The window staff member then revealed that the case might be relatively complex and told me to wait further, saying I would be notified promptly once there was news.
At around 9:40 AM on July 14, 2026—more than two months after submitting the complaint—Chen Shuqing again went to the administrative filing window of the Gongshu District People’s Court to inquire. The window staff member first asked me to wait, came out about 5 minutes later, and sequentially called two security guards to delete, right in front of me, audio recording entries on my mobile phone that they suspected were made while I was undergoing the case filing process. She explicitly informed me that audio recording, video recording, and photography are strictly prohibited at the case filing window. I thought that in any place where audio recording, video recording, and photography are strictly prohibited, once a dispute arises over the facts occurring on site, the burden of proof should be inverted, placing the burden of proof on the party that strictly prohibits recording while covering the area with its own surveillance cameras. Therefore, I allowed them to delete the records on my mobile phone that they deemed should be deleted, and said loudly to a security guard wearing an enforcement recorder on his chest who was deleting my phone records: “The audio records inside are objective facts, you should not delete them; I hope you will not destroy evidence just to renege.” The security guard smiled and said, “We delete them according to regulations, the court will not renege.” After they deleted the records on my mobile phone, the window staff member returned the complaint originally received by the court and required me to modify the complaint according to their demands, saying that references to international conventions and issues concerning enslaved labor were not allowed to appear inside. I said: “The international conventions cited in the complaint have already been ratified by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress; the prohibition of enslaved labor is a specific provision within those terms; the widespread existence of forced unpaid labor in Chinese prisons is also a fact. If I, the plaintiff, raise any content in the complaint and the court considers it untrue, unlawful, or unreasonable, the court can fully rule to refute and dismiss it. Preventing the plaintiff from raising it in the first place is unreasonable, unfair, and ought to be unlawful as well.” However, the filing window staff member said: This is a Chinese court, this is an administrative trial division; if you do not agree to modify it according to our demands, then the case simply will not be filed.
In order to lock in the litigation process and prevent the court from evading case registration, I had no choice but to modify the complaint according to the demands of the filing window staff. At around 2:55 PM on July 14, I submitted the redacted and modified Administrative Complaint to the administrative filing window. After checking it repeatedly, the window staff member instructed me to sign and date it as Chen Shuqing and July 14, 2026, respectively, and to write “Revised Draft” clearly after the date before accepting the complaint. I asked her if the case could be filed now, and she said, “It has to be reviewed by a judge before a decision is made; once it’s ready, I will notify you by phone.” I said not to let another two months drag on without a filing result, and she replied, “The law provides that a response will be given to you within 7 working days.” I then left the court with peace of mind. At around 9:10 AM on July 22, 2026, I returned to the filing window of the Gongshu Court to inquire about the case filing status. The window staff member requested that the cause of action and litigation requests in the Administrative Complaint undergo standardized adjustment and correction. That afternoon, I submitted the re-modified and corrected Administrative Complaint to the administrative filing window. After waiting for another ten-plus days without news, at around 9:10 AM on August 5, 2026, I went again to the administrative filing window of the Gongshu Court to check on the case status. The window staff member said the case had already been filed on July 29. I asked for the case number, and the window staff member handwrote a small sticky note for me, which read “2026 Zhe 0105 Xing Su Qian Tiao No. 139, Judge Deng & Clerk Hu, 89508971,” and informed me to wait for the duplicate copy to be served on the defendants. Only after the defendants replied whether they agreed to pre-litigation mediation could the case be formally filed, and that the results for this stage would come around late August or early September.
On September 2, 2026, plaintiff Chen Shuqing received a Postal Express Mail (EMS) from the Gongshu Court, printed with “2026 Zhe 0105 Xing Su Qian Tiao No. 139.” Inside was one copy of the Notice on Judicial Fairness Code, as well as administrative defense statements, evidence lists, and evidence submitted to the court by the two defendants in this case—the Hangzhou Gongshu District Human Resources and Social Security Bureau and the Hangzhou Gongshu District People’s Government. Thus, nearly four months after the initial submission of the administrative complaint, Chen Shuqing’s administrative lawsuit for pension rights defense finally received a formal written response. From a procedural and formal standpoint, it remains in the pre-litigation mediation stage; although the defendants have submitted defense statements explicitly refusing to make concessions in pre-litigation mediation, because a formal notice of case filing and an official case number for this administrative litigation have not yet been obtained, it should be said that this case is still in a state where the court has accepted it but has not formally filed it on the docket.
Comparing this with Article 51 of the Administrative Litigation Law of the People’s Republic of China—”When receiving a complaint, if the conditions for prosecution provided for in this Law are met, the people’s court shall register and file the case.” “Where it cannot be determined on the spot whether the conditions for prosecution provided for in this Law are met, the complaint shall be received, a written receipt bearing the date of receipt shall be issued, and a decision on whether to file the case shall be made within seven days. If the conditions for prosecution are not met, a ruling not to file the case shall be made. The written ruling shall state the reasons for not filing the case. If the plaintiff is dissatisfied with the ruling, an appeal may be filed.” “Where the content of the complaint is deficient or contains other errors, guidance and explanation shall be provided, and the party shall be informed at one time of the content requiring correction. The complaint shall not be refused without guidance and explanation on the grounds that prosecution conditions are not met.” “Where a complaint is not received, where a written receipt is not issued after receiving a complaint, or where the party is not informed at one time of the content of the complaint requiring correction, the party may lodge a complaint with the people’s court at a higher level; the people’s court at a higher level shall order corrections and lawfully impose sanctions on the directly responsible person in charge and other directly responsible personnel.”—and Article 67—”The people’s court shall send a copy of the complaint to the defendant within five days from the date of case filing. The defendant shall submit evidence for the administrative act made and the normative documents on which it is based to the people’s court within fifteen days from the date of receiving the copy of the complaint, and present a defense statement. The people’s court shall send a copy of the defense statement to the plaintiff within five days from the date of receiving the defense statement”—I am filled with profound reflections.
The Administrative Complaint accepted by the court after modification on July 22 removed the citations to human rights conventions signed by our government and approved by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress contained in the original complaint, and removed content regarding forced unpaid labor in prison. Although it lacks these two items of powerful support advocated by the plaintiff, considering the status of this case up to the present, the administrative act remains in a paradoxical state where the administrative organ at fault bears no responsibility while the non-fault party is made to bear responsibility in violation of the principle of protection of legitimate expectations. Given that the reasons in the Administrative Complaint submitted by the plaintiff and ultimately accepted by the court are sufficiently ample and powerful, I know that the slogan solemnly displayed in prominent places in every court—”Let the people feel fairness and justice in every judicial case”—is bound to face another severe test.
The Administrative Complaint submitted by the plaintiff after corrections on July 22 and accepted by the court is as follows:
ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINT
Plaintiff: Chen Shuqing, Male, Han ethnicity, born September 26, 1965, native of Hangzhou City, Zhejiang Province, currently residing at Room 202, Unit 5, Building 6, Daguan Yuan East 5th Court, Gongshu District, Hangzhou City, ID No.: 330106196509260073, Contact Tel: 15958160478.
Defendant 1: Hangzhou Gongshu District Human Resources and Social Security Bureau
Person in Charge: Chen Yu, Position: District Mayor
Cause of Action: Administrative Confirmation and Administrative Review
Litigation Requests:
1. Request to revoke the Notice of Transaction Matters issued to the plaintiff by Defendant 1, Hangzhou Gongshu District Human Resources and Social Security Bureau, on December 25, 2025;
2. Request to revoke the Administrative Review Decision of the Hangzhou Gongshu District People’s Government Hang Gong Zheng Fu [2026] No. 67 issued by Defendant 2, Hangzhou Gongshu District People’s Government.
Facts and Reasons:
As of December 25, 2025, plaintiff Chen Shuqing reached the age of 60 years and 3 months, with an actual accumulated social insurance contribution period of 24 years and 4 months, exceeding the minimum contribution requirement of 15 years. When processing retirement procedures in December 2025, staff of Defendant 1, Hangzhou Gongshu District Human Resources and Social Security Bureau, on the grounds that the plaintiff was sentenced to 4 years in prison in 2007 for the crime of incitement to subvert state power and 10 years and 6 months in prison in 2016 for the crime of subverting state power, deducted the combined years of the two prison sentences from the social insurance contribution period. This left a remaining contribution period of only 9-plus years, falling short of the minimum contribution period, and they refused to process the plaintiff’s retirement procedures.
In repeated negotiations, dissatisfied with Defendant 1’s staff remaining at vague verbal statements about “according to relevant policies,” the plaintiff submitted an application for disclosure of government information. On December 25, 2025, Chen Zupeng, a staff member of Defendant 1, issued to the plaintiff in his office the Hangzhou Gongshu District Social Insurance Management Service Center Notice of Transaction Matters, the Notice Letter, and the Reply Letter Regarding Issues Concerning Basic Pension Insurance for Persons Sentenced to Fixed-Term Imprisonment (This Document Disclosed Upon Application) (Zhe Ren She Han [2010] No. 358), formally confirming in writing Defendant 1’s decision refusing to process the plaintiff’s retirement procedures.
The plaintiff holds that the legal application relied upon in the aforementioned documents is improper and the policy validity is insufficient. On January 27, 2026, the plaintiff applied for administrative review regarding this matter. On April 30, 2026, Defendant 2, Gongshu District People’s Government, issued the Administrative Review Decision of the Hangzhou Gongshu District People’s Government Hang Gong Zheng Fu [2026] No. 67, upholding the applicant’s (Defendant 1 in this case) aforementioned Notice Letter refusing to process Chen Shuqing’s retirement procedures. Dissatisfied, the plaintiff now files an administrative lawsuit with your Court, requesting a lawful trial and a fair judgment.
The plaintiff holds that the spirit of contract is the cornerstone for the stable operation of a modern civilized society; the people take officials as their model, and in the honest and trustworthy behavior of the entire society, government conduct must set an example. In this case, over the past 20-plus years, when the plaintiff, the plaintiff’s family, or the units to which the plaintiff’s employment or social insurance was attached paid social insurance premiums for the plaintiff, they never encountered any explicit notification that payments could not be made during imprisonment. Even after the plaintiff’s final release from prison upon serving his sentence on March 10, 2025, when the plaintiff went several times to Defendant 1’s government service center located at No. 58 Xiangjisi East Road, Gongshu District, to retroactively pay missed social insurance fees for recent years (including periods within part of the prison terms), those transactions were successfully completed. When accepting insurance payments, the defendant was perfectly fine with it; now when the defendant is required to fulfill insurance obligations, it suddenly changes its tune, using the pretext of “belonging to non-compliant participation and payment” to refuse fulfilling the social insurance obligations it ought to bear, while making the payer—the plaintiff Chen Shuqing in this case—unilaterally bear the adverse consequences of the alleged “non-compliance.” This causes the principle of protection of legitimate expectations of the masses regarding government conduct to vanish completely.
As seen from the Notice Letter provided by Defendant 1, the reasons for its repudiation of the agreement and refusal to fulfill social insurance obligations toward the plaintiff are: According to Article 2, Paragraph 1 of the Labor Law of the People’s Republic of China (“This Law applies to enterprises, individual economic organizations [hereinafter collectively referred to as employing units] and workers who form a labor relationship with them within the territory of the People’s Republic of China”) and Article 72 (“Employing units and workers must participate in social insurance and pay social insurance premiums in accordance with the law”); Article 10, Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Social Insurance Law of the People’s Republic of China (“Employees shall participate in basic pension insurance, and basic pension insurance premiums shall be jointly paid by employing units and employees. Individual industrial and commercial households without employees, part-time employees not participating in basic pension insurance with employing units, and other flexibly employed personnel may participate in basic pension insurance, with individual payment of basic pension insurance premiums”); and the provisions of the Reply Letter of the Zhejiang Provincial Department of Human Resources and Social Security Regarding Issues Concerning Basic Pension Insurance for Persons Sentenced to Fixed-Term Imprisonment (Zhe Ren She Han [2010] No. 358) that “serving prisoners during their imprisonment do not belong to the scope of participants in employee basic pension insurance.”
It is obvious that the provisions in the aforementioned Labor Law and Social Insurance Law, as well as the Regulations of Zhejiang Province on Employee Basic Pension Insurance, require employing units and workers to pay social insurance premiums, and the legislative purpose is to safeguard the social insurance rights of employed personnel; there is no mandatory provision stating that “serving prisoners cannot participate in social insurance.” As for Zhe Ren She Han [2010] No. 358 Reply Letter, it is marked “(This Document Disclosed Upon Application).” According to the principle that laws do not take effect without publication, “disclosed upon application” cannot be equated with “promulgation,” and has no binding force against uninformed counterparties; the date of issuance of the Reply Letter is “September 30, 2010,” and the print date is October 9, 2010, which clearly has no retroactive effect on the plaintiff’s four-year payment period during his first prison sentence that had already ended on September 13, 2010; moreover, the Reply Letter does not possess the status and effect of laws, administrative regulations, local regulations, autonomous regulations, separate regulations, or rules under the Legislation Law of the People’s Republic of China, belonging instead to “game rules” formulated by a government department lacking legislative power acting as “both athlete and referee.” The assertion inside that “serving prisoners cannot participate in social insurance” clearly falls under Article 99 of the Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court on the Application of the Administrative Litigation Law of the People’s Republic of China (effective February 8, 2018) regarding typical circumstances where an administrative entity commits a “grave and obvious violation of law”—namely: “Second, administrative acts that reduce rights (in this case: where law does not explicitly prohibit, the Reply Letter imposes a prohibition) or increase obligations (combined with current policy, the result of the Reply Letter in this case: requiring the plaintiff, after age 60, to incur additional continuous social insurance payment obligations annually for another 5 years until reaching 15 years, before being permitted retirement eligibility that should have already existed) without legal basis.” Therefore, the Reply Letter cannot serve as a basis for the government itself to breach the agreement. As the saying goes, “Law cannot stand without virtue”; the principle of a good law, such as Article 99 of the Supreme People’s Court’s Interpretation regarding administrative litigation, should not only be promulgated formally, but must also be applied in judicial practice.
When the plaintiff negotiated with Defendant 1’s staff, a staff member explained: “During your imprisonment, you were unable to become a real worker of a paying enterprise as stipulated in the legal clauses of the aforementioned Labor Law; your employee pension insurance was merely a virtual agency payment form, which does not comply with the provisions of law and policy.” At that time, the plaintiff argued: “Agency payment of social insurance has never been explicitly prohibited by law to date; it is a policy tacitly approved and widely implemented in practice since social insurance pooling began. Over the past twenty-plus years, many front-line staff members of government agencies and public institutions—including your human resources and social security department—did not actually work at labor dispatch units, yet labor dispatch units paid their remuneration and social insurance on their behalf. You cannot apply double standards to others and yourselves.” They replied, “Labor dispatch has a basis in law.” After further investigating the laws, regulations, rules, and the history and current situation of government agencies and public institutions using labor dispatch workers, the plaintiff discovered that this attempts to use a “lawful” form to actually exceed legal provisions, concealing the identity-based occupational discrimination caused by the dual-track system inside and outside formal staff quotas, which is an act in serious violation of the “equal pay for equal work” requirement under the Labor Law and Labor Contract Law. Speaking of exceeding the scope of labor usage authorized by law, Article 2 of the Interim Provisions on Labor Dispatch explicitly provides: “Where labor dispatch units engage in labor dispatch operations, and enterprises (hereinafter referred to as labor-using units) use dispatched workers, these Provisions apply. Where partnership organizations such as law accounting firms and law firms formed in accordance with law, foundations, and private non-enterprise units use dispatched workers, execution shall follow these Provisions”—it does not list government agencies or public institutions as labor-using units using dispatched workers. Furthermore, in recent years, relevant national departments have explicitly prohibited this in corrective and improvement measures, for example: Article 10 of Ministry of Finance Order No. 102, Measures for the Administration of Government Procurement of Services: “The following items shall not be included in the scope of government procurement of services: … recruitment and employment of personnel by purchasing entities, use of labor through labor dispatch, and creation of public service positions.” The plaintiff holds that Defendant 1 uses its power to exclude the plaintiff’s social insurance rights through “prohibiting what is not explicitly prohibited” by labeling “not included in law” as “non-compliant,” while abusing power where “unauthorized by law” regarding its own extensive use of labor dispatch workers. Defendant 1’s practice not only openly violates the basic requirement of a rule-of-law society that “citizens are free to do anything not prohibited by law, while government power cannot act without authorization by law,” but also becomes another typical case akin to “allowing the magistrate to burn down houses while forbidding the common folk from lighting lamps.”
The applicant holds that he has reached the statutory age to enjoy retirement eligibility and benefits. Apart from the aforementioned actual contribution years and the principle of protection of legitimate expectations regarding government conduct, no existing legal clause explicitly stipulates that serving prisoners may not participate in social insurance (including social insurance contributions). In the criminal judgments of the applicant’s two sentences, deprivation of personal freedom and political rights for a certain period were sentenced, but deprivation of socio-economic rights—which naturally includes the right to enjoy social insurance—was never sentenced.
In summary, given that the plaintiff’s actual social insurance contribution of 24 years and 4 months has exceeded the stipulated minimum contribution standard of 15 years, and given that regardless of the Notice Letter and Notice of Transaction Matters issued by Defendant 1 or the Review Decision made by Defendant 2, both have ignored the following facts and legal effects that a government under the rule of law and its organs cannot overlook in administration:
(I) When the plaintiff himself, employing enterprises, or family members paid or retroactively paid social insurance fees in the past, they were never informed that payments could not be made during imprisonment. Prior to the Government Information Disclosure Application submitted during the confirmation of the plaintiff’s retirement eligibility in this case, Zhe Ren She Han [2010] No. 358 Reply Letter (This Document Disclosed Upon Application) was never made public, and cannot serve as a basis for the government to renege on its agreement against an uninformed counterparty, thereby severely damaging the principle of protecting legitimate expectations in government conduct;
(II) In interpreting and applying the “scope” of legal application, the defendants apply double standards to themselves and others. Regarding their own recruitment and use of personnel, they openly and extensively use labor dispatch workers where “not contained in law,” severely violating the legal requirement of equal pay for equal work; yet regarding the plaintiff’s social insurance rights, they exclude them on the grounds of “not contained in law” as alleged “non-compliance.” This act of “allowing the magistrate to burn down houses while forbidding the common folk from lighting lamps” violates the basic requirement of a rule-of-law society that “government conduct cannot act without authorization by law, while popular conduct is free where not prohibited by law”;
(III) The Labor Law of the People’s Republic of China, the Social Insurance Law of the People’s Republic of China, and any other normative document possessing legal status and effect under the Legislation Law of the People’s Republic of China contain no mandatory clauses explicitly excluding social insurance participants during imprisonment.
Regarding the three reasons raised by the plaintiff above around the core dispute, if the two defendants in the specific administrative act of this case are unable to answer (whether by acknowledging or lawfully refuting), it indicates that the defendants’ administrative breach of trust in this case cannot withstand careful legal scrutiny; if they disdain to answer, it incurs suspicion of the reckless arrogance of power—a major taboo in building a rule-of-law society and establishing a rule-of-law government—which should be all the more stopped and guarded against.
To this end, the plaintiff hereby files this administrative lawsuit, requesting your Court to try this case in accordance with law, support the plaintiff’s litigation requests, revoke the Notice of Transaction Matters made against the plaintiff by Defendant 1 on December 25, 2025, and the Administrative Review Decision of the Hangzhou Gongshu District People’s Government Hang Gong Zheng Fu [2026] No. 67 made by Defendant 2, and compel Defendant 1 to promptly process the plaintiff’s retirement eligibility and fulfill the social insurance responsibilities owed to the plaintiff based on the 24-year and 4-month contribution period.
Respectfully submitted,
Gongshu District People’s Court of Hangzhou City
Plaintiff: Chen Shuqing
July 22, 2026 (Revised Draft)
Enclosures:
1. 2 copies of this Complaint;
2. 1 copy of plaintiff Chen Shuqing’s ID card (including front and back sides);
3. 1 copy of Proof of Participation in Pension Insurance Over the Years;
4. 1 photocopy of Hangzhou Gongshu District Social Insurance Management Service Center Notice of Transaction Matters;
5. 1 copy of the Notice Letter stamped with the seal of “Hangzhou Gongshu District Social Insurance Management Service Center”;
6. 1 photocopy of Zhe Ren She Han [2010] No. 358;
7. 1 copy of Administrative Review Decision of the Hangzhou Gongshu District People’s Government Hang Gong Zheng Fu [2026] No. 67.
Editor: Li Jing | Proofreader: Wang Bin | Translator: Shen Meihua
Chen Shuqing: Democracy Is Not a Belief That Arrives Suddenly, but a Choice Gradually Hardened Over a Lifetime
— From the Social Observations of an Ordinary Person to Stepping Unhesitatingly onto the Path of Democracy
Reporters: Jia Jia, Shen Meihua Interviewee: Chen Shuqing Location: Editorial Office of The Opposition Party Magazine
Biography: Chen Shuqing, a prominent figure in the Chinese democracy movement and Vice Chairman of the Zhejiang Committee of the Democracy Party of China, has long focused on issues concerning democracy, human rights, and civil rights in China.
Born into an ordinary family, Chen Shuqing developed his early reflections on democracy, freedom, and social justice through observations of social fairness, the plight of ordinary people, and the exercise of public power in daily life. The 1989 “June Fourth” Incident had a major impact on his ideological development, prompting him to rethink the path toward democratization in China.
Thereafter, Chen Shuqing participated in activities related to the Democracy Party of China, engaging in the dissemination of democratic and human rights concepts and working on related publications. Due to his involvement in and promotion of the democracy movement, he repeatedly suffered political suppression and imprisonment, ultimately serving a total of fourteen years and six months in prison.
Through long-term political pressure and prison life, Chen Shuqing consistently adhered to his democratic beliefs. He holds that China’s democratization process cannot rely on any single individual, single group, or single force, but requires long-term, joint efforts from different groups both at home and abroad.
Today, Chen Shuqing continues to remain concerned about the cause of democracy and human rights in China. At the same time, he appeals to overseas democracy activists and the younger generation: while staying true to ideals and caring for Chinese society, first take good care of your own lives, families, and health, and continue to pay attention to and support China’s democracy and human rights causes within your capabilities.
When discussing why he has been able to persevere over the long term, he summarized his life in a simple yet firm sentence:
“I am a fighter. I’m a fighter.”
[Interview Introduction]
When the video interview began, Teacher Chen Shuqing appeared in good spirits on camera.
Speaking of his current life, he seemed calm and optimistic:
“My current living condition is decent, and my health is good too. Whenever I have free time, I seize the opportunity to exercise.”
It is hard to imagine that this man, now conversing and laughing with composure, suffered political persecution multiple times for pursuing democracy and freedom, spending long years behind bars.
Emerging from an ordinary family to gradually developing democratic ideas; moving from a belief that society could gradually improve under the existing system to ultimately realizing that democracy must involve the participation and decisions of all the people—Chen Shuqing’s life trajectory is a microcosm of the ideological growth and real-world choices of a generation of Chinese pro-democracy figures.
And all of this did not begin in a single moment.
“Democratic ideas do not change suddenly because of one thing; they accumulate bit by bit.”
I. Democratic Ideas Formed Gradually Over Time, Not Overnight
Jia Jia: When did you first come into contact with democratic ideas? Was there a particularly important event that changed your life?
Chen Shuqing said that his understanding of democracy, freedom, and social fairness did not undergo a sudden, dramatic transformation on a single day.
“This mindset accumulated slowly, making progress and building up bit by bit. It wasn’t one single event that suddenly changed me completely. Of course, a few events had a relatively major influence on me.”
He said that coming from an ordinary family, he could feel many of the inequalities present in real society from an early age.
“We ordinary folks can feel many of the injustices and unfairness in society, and we can also see the suffering of the common people, as well as phenomena such as bureaucracy and official posturing.”
These everyday observations sparked a simple desire within him from early on.
“From the bottom of my heart, I wished that China and our society could become fairer, and that ordinary people could truly enjoy democracy.”
However, in the early days, this idea was not yet distinct, nor had it formed a complete, systematic political ideology.
II. “June Fourth” Made Him Re-evaluate the Relationship Between the Communist Party and Democracy
In Chen Shuqing’s view, the 1989 “June Fourth” Incident was a profoundly impactful event in his ideological growth.
Prior to that, he had not entirely ruled out the possibility of political reform under the leadership of the Communist Party.
“In the past, I even thought that concepts like freedom and democracy were consistent with the superficial propaganda of the Communist Party. We also used to think that under the leadership of the Communist Party, or by improving the Party’s leadership, China could gradually move toward democracy.”
However, the “June Fourth” Incident completely changed his perspective.
“After 1989, I began to see one issue clearly: in order to maintain its regime, the Communist Party can treat this political power as its private property.”
This realization caused him to rethink the path to China’s democratization.
“I previously thought that perhaps we could work with them to gradually achieve democracy under their leadership. But later, that thought was completely abandoned.”
Chen Shuqing gradually formed a firmer conviction:
“If China is to truly achieve democracy, it absolutely cannot rely on any single group, including the ruling party. All the people must possess genuine, inalienable decision-making power over the nation’s destiny.”
In his view, this is what true democracy means.
III. Knowing the Road Is Arduous, Yet Still Deciding to “Do What I Can”
Of course, ideological awakening did not mean that the real-world path would become easy.
Chen Shuqing knew very well that China’s political reality meant promoting democratization would be a long and arduous journey.
“Since coming to power, the Communist Party has monopolized all political and economic resources in society. To truly achieve democracy, we naturally knew this process would be extremely difficult.”
However, he believed that difficulty could not be a reason to give up.
“Since I believe this direction is right, then no matter how many difficulties there are, it just comes down to how much one can do. Do one’s best and exert full effort.”
This sentence sounds simple, yet it became a true reflection of his subsequent life choices.
IV. From Offering Help to Stepping Forward Personally
Reflecting on his experiences around 2006, Chen Shuqing recalled the process of working together with other democracy activists at that time.
Back then, he met several like-minded friends and began coming into contact with activities related to the Democracy Party of China.
Initially, Chen Shuqing had no plans to become a primary organizer.
“At that time, my business was doing quite well. Seeing them gather together as active, idealistic people, I was willing to contribute what little strength I had.”
However, as the authorities intensified their suppression, many participants were successively arrested and sentenced, leaving fewer and fewer people involved in the activities.
“Later, the Communist Party cracked down step by step. Many friends, like Zhu Yufu, were arrested and put in prison.”
Under these circumstances, he had no choice but to step into a more prominent role.
Chen Shuqing said that at the time, his friends did not need his money or other material support.
“What they needed was not my money, nor other things; they just needed me as a person to step out and do the work.”
Thus, he began participating in the editorial work for The Opposition Party magazine.
However, it soon met with suppression from the authorities.
V. Imprisoned for More Than Four Months for the First Time
Due to his participation in editing the DPC publication The Opposition Party, Chen Shuqing was investigated by the police.
The authorities demanded that he disclose the printing location of the publication and the sources of the manuscripts.
To this, he explicitly refused.
“They asked me where it was printed and where the manuscripts came from. I refused to answer.”
Chen Shuqing believed that if democracy activists provided the police with information about other participants, it would be equivalent to helping the authorities continue their crackdown.
He used a vivid metaphor to express his stance:
“I said, this would be like leading the Japanese invaders on a search-and-destroy mission. As a member of the Democracy Party, how could I lead the police to the printing location, or tell them about other people’s situations?”
Because he refused to cooperate with the investigation, he was detained for more than four months.
Ultimately, the authorities demanded that he sign a letter of guarantee promising no longer to edit or publish The Opposition Party magazine.
Chen Shuqing noted that the publication had already been destroyed at that point, and even if he wanted to continue, it would have been very difficult to resume the original work.
Therefore, after undergoing more than four months of detention, he was released.
However, this experience did not make him give up.
Quite the contrary, it made him see even more clearly what he might face in the future.
VI. Knowing Imprisonment Was Likely, Why Still Persevere?
After his first experience with detention, Chen Shuqing was already acutely aware of what continuing forward entailed.
“Many of my like-minded friends had already been sentenced. I knew that if I continued doing this, I might end up like them—facing political persecution and even going to jail.”
However, he believed that the pursuit of democracy and freedom has never come without a cost.
“Looking horizontally across countries around the world, and looking vertically through history, no nation’s process of achieving democracy and moving toward progress has ever occurred without people paying a price.”
In Chen Shuqing’s view, every historical step of social progress has required people to take risks and even sacrifice their lives.
He mentioned the revolutionaries of the 1911 Xinhai Revolution era.
“For example, during the 1911 Revolution, among the revolutionaries around Dr. Sun Yat-sen, many clearly knew they might fail and knew they might lose their lives, yet they still proceeded without hesitation.”
Therefore, he did not feel there was anything particularly boastful about his own sacrifices.
“I am simply willing to do a little something for my motherland and to safeguard my compatriots’ basic human rights. If paying a price is required for this, I consider it only natural and right.”
Faced with the reporter’s expression of admiration, Chen Shuqing appeared remarkably humble instead.
“There are so many like-minded friends like us. I am just one of them. Many people have made greater sacrifices than I have and done more work than I have.”
Perhaps it was precisely this simple conviction that led an ordinary person, who originally possessed a stable life, to make his choice amidst the torrents of the era.
And this road ultimately led him into two prison terms totaling fourteen years and six months.
Faced with the regime’s brutal suppression of the Democracy Party of China, brave men from Zhejiang like Chen Shuqing knew full well the dangers ahead, yet pressed forward undeterred. They chose not self-preservation, nor a timely retreat, but to calmly endure more than a decade of imprisonment. The interviewing reporter was deeply moved by these courageous individuals.
Preview of Part II:
Chen Shuqing: You Can Imprison My Body, But You Cannot Remold My Convictions
What did he experience during his fourteen years and six months of prison life?
Facing the prison’s so-called “ideological remolding,” why did he say: “If something is correct, you don’t need to remold me—I will change myself; if something is wrong, even if you beat me to death, I will not change”?
During the long years behind bars, what sustained him to persevere?
Part II will continue the story of Chen Shuqing and how a pro-democracy figure held fast to his convictions throughout those long years.
Editor: Li Jing Proofreader: Xiong Bian Translator: Shen Meihua
