编辑：周志刚   责任编辑：钟然   校对：冯仍   翻译：吕峰

最近这一阵子，国际新闻看下来，真有点“独裁者排队倒下”的感觉。

德黑兰枪声：不再恐惧的伊朗人

就在今年1月，伊朗的局势已经到了失控的边缘。这场从去年底爆发的抗议，起因还是老生常谈的经济崩溃——通胀率飙升，老百姓连基本的生活物资都买不起。但这一次，火苗迅速烧成了大火。

细节比以往任何一次都更惨烈。据报道，德黑兰的抗议已经蔓延到180多个城市。虽然伊朗当局故技重施，在1月8日实施了全国断网，并出动安全部队开枪镇压，但是这次年轻人没退缩。最震撼的消息是，有视频流出显示德黑兰郊区的停尸房里堆满了遇难者的遗体，民间传闻遇难人数甚至超过了万人。

这次抗议有一个细节很关键：口号变了。以前大家可能还只是喊喊“要面包”，现在满大街喊的是“打倒哈梅内伊”。更重要的是，像阿卜达南这样的城市，安全部队竟然因为无法维持局面而选择了撤离。当暴力工具开始失效，当恐惧不再能吓住老百姓，这个神权独裁政权的倒计时就已经开始了。

纽约囚服：马杜罗的神话破灭

如果说伊朗还在“挣扎”，那委内瑞拉的马杜罗则是彻底“凉了”。2026年1月3日，美军发动了名为“绝对决心”的突袭行动，在加拉加斯直接抓捕了马杜罗及其夫人，并迅速把他们押解到了纽约。

这个细节非常具有讽刺意味：一个曾经在电视上指点江山、大谈反美的独裁者，几天后竟然身穿囚服、戴着手铐出现在纽约的法庭上。马杜罗一直觉得只要抓牢军方、搞定选举，就能靠石油财富一直统治下去。但他忽略了，当国家通胀到钞票不如废纸、数百万人流亡海外时，他的统治根基早已腐烂。

马杜罗的倒台给全世界的独裁者提了个醒：在这个时代，没有谁是绝对安全的。即便你自诩有强大的武装，但在失去民心和国际社会合法性之后，崩溃往往就在一夜之间。

全球趋势重点：独裁者的生存空间在缩小

这两个事件连在一起看，其实释放了一个信号：独裁统治的“红利期”结束了。

过去独裁政权靠三招：封锁消息、经济收买、武力镇压。但现在，虽然有高科技监控，但去中心化的信息传播依然挡不住；全球经济进入下行周期，独裁者没钱收买人心了；而当镇压的代价大到连士兵都不愿开枪时，独裁政权的死穴就被点中了。

展望国内：中国高压效应已经形成

回过头来看看中国。虽然现在国内看起来风平浪静，各方面的控制手段也比伊朗、委内瑞拉高明得多，但逻辑其实是一样的。

过去大家愿意听话，是因为日子还能过，有一种“拿自由换面包”的默契。但现在经济慢下来了，年轻人找工作难，这种默契就开始裂了。再加上那种无孔不入的监控，短期看确实有效，但长期看，它就像个高压锅，把所有的不满都闷在里面，压力只会越来越大。

看未来的中国民主，我觉得没必要认为一夜之间天翻地覆，它更多的是一种“憋不住”的过程。当大家发现原本那套法子不灵了，当每个人开始意识到自己的尊严和权利不能永远被代表时，改变就会发生了。

历史这东西，一旦开了倒车，最后总会撞到墙。那些看起来铁板一块的墙，其实裂缝早就在里面长出来了。总结来看： 中国的民主化，可能不会是委内瑞拉那种戏剧性的“外力突袭”，而更像是一种“冰川崩裂”的过程——起初是看不见的裂纹，接着是咔咔作响的断裂，最后是不可阻挡的崩塌。

Lu Chao: The Coming Twilight of Authoritarianism

Editor: Zhou Zhigang   Responsible Editor: Zhong Ran   Proofreader: Feng Reng   Translator: Lyu Feng

Abstract: Recent intensifying protests in Iran and the arrest of Venezuela’s president indicate that authoritarian regimes may be approaching the end of their rule.

In recent weeks, following international news has given a distinct sense that “dictators are falling one after another.”

Gunfire in Tehran: An Iran No Longer Afraid

As early as January this year, the situation in Iran had already reached the brink of losing control. The protests, which erupted at the end of last year, were once again triggered by a familiar cause: economic collapse—soaring inflation and the inability of ordinary people to afford even basic necessities. This time, however, the spark quickly turned into a raging fire.

The details are more brutal than in any previous wave of unrest. Reports indicate that protests in Tehran have spread to more than 180 cities nationwide. Although Iranian authorities resorted to their usual tactics—imposing a nationwide internet shutdown on January 8 and deploying security forces to suppress the demonstrations with live ammunition—this time, young people did not retreat. The most shocking reports include videos allegedly showing morgues on the outskirts of Tehran filled with the bodies of victims, with unconfirmed accounts from civil society claiming that the death toll may have exceeded ten thousand.

One detail of this round of protests is particularly significant: the slogans have changed. In the past, crowds might have merely demanded “bread,” but now the streets are echoing with chants of “Down with Khamenei.” Even more telling is that in cities such as Abadan, security forces reportedly withdrew after being unable to maintain control. When the instruments of violence begin to fail, and when fear can no longer intimidate the population, the countdown to the collapse of a theocratic authoritarian regime has already begun.

The New York Prison Uniform: The Shattering of the Maduro Myth

If Iran can still be said to be “struggling,” then Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro is already finished. On January 3, 2026, the U.S. military launched a raid codenamed Operation Absolute Resolve, capturing Maduro and his wife directly in Caracas and swiftly transferring them to New York.

The symbolism of this moment is deeply ironic. A dictator who once lectured the world on television, railing against the United States and boasting of his power, appeared only days later in a New York courtroom wearing a prison uniform and shackled in handcuffs. Maduro long believed that as long as he maintained a firm grip on the military and managed electoral procedures, Venezuela’s oil wealth would allow him to rule indefinitely. What he failed to recognize was that when inflation rendered banknotes worth less than waste paper and millions of citizens fled the country, the foundations of his rule had already rotted beyond repair.

Maduro’s downfall delivers a stark warning to authoritarian rulers worldwide: in this era, no one is absolutely secure. Even those who pride themselves on commanding formidable armed forces may find that once popular support and international legitimacy are lost, collapse can come almost overnight.

Global Trend in Focus: The Shrinking Survival Space of Dictatorships

Viewed together, these two events send a clear signal: the so-called “dividend period” of authoritarian rule has come to an end.

In the past, authoritarian regimes relied on three main tools: information control, economic co-optation, and violent repression. Today, however, each of these pillars is eroding. Even with advanced surveillance technologies, decentralized information flows can no longer be fully contained. As the global economy enters a downturn, dictators increasingly lack the financial resources to buy loyalty. And when the cost of repression becomes so high that even soldiers hesitate to pull the trigger, the regime’s fatal vulnerability is exposed.

Looking Inward: China’s High-Pressure Effect Has Taken Shape

Turning back to China, the surface may still appear calm. Its systems of control are, in many respects, more sophisticated than those of Iran or Venezuela. Yet the underlying logic is the same.

In the past, people were willing to comply because life was still manageable—there existed an implicit bargain of “trading freedom for bread.” Now, as economic growth slows and young people struggle to find jobs, that tacit agreement is beginning to crack. At the same time, pervasive surveillance may seem effective in the short term, but in the long run it functions like a pressure cooker, trapping all discontent inside. The pressure can only continue to build.

When considering China’s future democratization, there is no need to imagine a sudden overnight upheaval. It is more likely to be a gradual process of “no longer being able to hold it in.” When people realize that the old methods no longer work, and when individuals begin to understand that their dignity and rights cannot be indefinitely substituted or represented by others, change will occur.

History has a way of asserting itself. Once it is forced into reverse, it eventually crashes into a wall. Those walls that appear solid and impenetrable often already contain growing cracks within. In summary, China’s path toward democratization is unlikely to resemble Venezuela’s dramatic, externally driven “sudden strike.” Instead, it may unfold more like a glacial collapse: invisible fissures at first, followed by audible cracking, and finally an unstoppable breakdown.

作者：陈树庆  
编辑：冯仍 校对：冯仍 翻译：周敏  

 早在两千多年前，《史记·李斯列传》与《史记·秦始皇本纪》就记载了“以吏为师”的典故，讲的是以政府工作人员为主体的政府工作，无论是社会道德，还是执行国家的法令，应做全社会的表率，其中最基本的，就是“无信不立”！按照现在的说法，政府要有公信力，尤其在处理老百姓的各种日常事务中，应确保民众对政府信赖利益的保障原则。

 社会养老保险作为社会保障体系的核心组成部分，不仅关系到亿万民众的切身利益，更直接关联着政府在公众心中的信誉与权威。政府作为社会养老保险制度的设计者、推行者和最终责任承担者，其政策的连续性、执行的透明度以及承诺的兑现程度，都深刻影响着民众对制度的信任度，进而构成政府公信力的重要基石。

 当政府能够通过完善的制度设计确保养老保险基金的稳健运行，通过公平的待遇调整机制保障参保人员的合理权益，通过畅通的信息渠道让公众清晰了解政策内容与资金流向时，民众便会对政府的治理能力和责任担当产生积极认知，这种认知转化为对政府的信任，促使社会形成可靠的预期和良好的秩序。反之，若养老保险政策朝令夕改、执行过程中官吏们凭借“根据相关政策”的一句笼统托词，可以言而无信、约而不守，或基金管理存在漏洞导致支付能力受质疑，公众对政府的信任便会受到冲击，引发对公共政策的普遍疑虑，小到民众的生活，大到社会的稳定与发展就失去指望，所谓的礼崩乐坏、法制颓废和无可救药了，往往从此得以萌生与蔓延。

 因此，社会养老保险制度的有效运行与政府公信力的建设之间存在着密不可分的正向互动关系，前者的完善是后者提升的重要途径，而后者的坚实则为前者的可持续发展提供了根本保障。本文作者陈树庆，就自己在办理社会养老保险时所遭遇的情况进行维权，不妨就政府公信力这个问题，首先撕开一层面纱：

《政府信息公开申请书》

杭州市拱墅区人力资源和社会保障局：

 申请人陈树庆，男，浙江省杭州市人，现住杭州市拱墅区大关苑东五苑6幢5单元202室，身份证号330106196509260073，联系电话15958160478。

 至2025年12月17日，申请人陈树庆已达法定退休年龄60周岁+3个月，实际已缴社会保险统筹24年4个月，超过了15年的最低缴费年限。2025年12月17日上午9时许，申请人到贵局（拱墅区人社局）设在拱墅区政务服务中心的办公场所办理退休手续，办事人员以陈树庆曾经因遭2007年“煽动颠覆国家政权罪”判刑4年和2016年“颠覆国家政权罪”判刑10年6个月为由，社保缴费年限扣除两项刑期累加，剩余缴费年限只有九年多，不足最低缴费年限15年的规定，拒不办理申请人的退休资格，只是一味要求申请人对服刑期间已交的社会保险先行退费。

（图为拱墅区政府信息公开申请表）

由此，申请人产生两项疑惑并提出相应的两项政府信息公开事项：

一、20多年来，申请人、申请人家属、申请人工作或社保挂靠的单位替申请人缴纳社会保险，从未遇到服刑期间不能缴费的明确告知，甚至2025年3月10日申请人最后一次刑满释放后，到贵局设在拱墅区香积寺东路58号的政务服务中心几次补缴中间断交的最近几年（这其中就包括部分刑期内的期间）社保费用也都顺利完成。贵局在收取保险缴费的时候好好的，现在要贵局履行保险责任的时候，突然变卦，以所谓“相关政策”为托词，拒不履行贵局应负的社会保险责任，让申请人对政府信赖利益的保护原则顿生疑惑。为此，申请人提出的第一项要求政府信息公开事项是：服刑期间已经缴纳社保的期限无效并退回缴费的具体法律（包括政策）依据，包括法律（政策）的具体名称，第几条第几款。当然，答复函中对这些法律（政策）的内容予以清晰载明，则更好。

 二、贵局在政务服务中心的工作人员让申请人先退费，口头答应退费后才能续办申请人退休资格和待遇的其他审定工作，申请人认为，退完刑期内的已缴费社保费用，剩余期限已远远不足办理退休的最低缴费年限15年的规定，届时申请人不仅现在办不了退休，连接下来的现实经济负担和最终养老社会保险结果也是无从确信和依托。为此，申请人提出的第二项要求政府信息公开事项是：1、具体退费流程，根据缴费人不同而确定的不同缴费时段，各时段具体退费数额（或退费内容与计算标准）；2、退费完毕后的详细善后流程与结果预判，同时注明所依据的法律（政策）的条款及内容则更好。

 本《政府信息公开申请书》恳请贵局以书面的形式具体明确答复，请求不要再派员含糊其辞的“根据相关政策”及可以不认账、不负责任的任何口头“咨询”或“建议”。 

 申请人：陈树庆 

申请日期： 2025年12月 21 日

 注：本《政府信息公开申请书》已于2025年12月21日寄发拱墅区人力资源和社会保障局。 

Chen Shuqing: Social Pension Insurance and the Credibility of the Government

Author: Chen Shuqing
Editor: Feng Reng Proofreader: Feng Reng Translator: Zhou Min

As early as over two thousand years ago, the Records of the Grand Historian: Biographies of Li Si and the Records of the Grand Historian: Annals of Qin Shi Huang recorded the allusion of “taking officials as teachers” (yi li wei shi). It speaks of government work, with government personnel as the main body, being a role model for the whole society, whether in social morality or in the execution of national laws and decrees. Among these, the most fundamental is: “Without credibility, one cannot stand” (wu xin bu li)! According to modern parlance, the government must have credibility; especially in handling various daily affairs of the common people, it should ensure the principle of protecting the public’s reliance interests in the government.

Social pension insurance, as a core component of the social security system, not only concerns the vital interests of hundreds of millions of people but is also directly linked to the reputation and authority of the government in the hearts of the public. As the designer, promoter, and ultimate bearer of responsibility for the social pension insurance system, the government’s policy continuity, transparency of execution, and the extent to which promises are fulfilled all profoundly affect the public’s level of trust in the system, which in turn constitutes an important cornerstone of government credibility.

When the government can ensure the stable operation of the pension insurance fund through perfect institutional design, protect the reasonable rights and interests of participants through fair benefit adjustment mechanisms, and allow the public to clearly understand policy content and fund flows through open information channels, the people will develop a positive perception of the government’s governance capacity and sense of responsibility. This perception translates into trust in the government, prompting society to form reliable expectations and a good order. Conversely, if pension insurance policies change unpredictably, if officials rely on the vague pretext of “according to relevant policies” during the execution process to be untrustworthy or fail to keep agreements, or if loopholes in fund management cause the ability to pay to be questioned, public trust in the government will be impacted. This triggers general suspicion toward public policies; ranging from the lives of individuals to the stability and development of society, hope is lost. What is called the collapse of rites and music, the decadence of the legal system, and hopelessness often germinates and spreads from this.

Therefore, there is an inseparable positive interactive relationship between the effective operation of the social pension insurance system and the construction of government credibility. The perfection of the former is an important way to enhance the latter, while the firmness of the latter provides the fundamental guarantee for the sustainable development of the former. The author of this article, Chen Shuqing, is defending his rights regarding the situation he encountered when handling his social pension insurance. One might as well tear open a layer of the veil regarding this issue of government credibility:

Application for Disclosure of Government Information

To: Hangzhou Gongshu District Human Resources and Social Security Bureau

Applicant: Chen Shuqing, Male, native of Hangzhou, Zhejiang Province. Current residence: Room 202, Unit 5, Building 6, Daguan Yuan East Fifth Park, Gongshu District, Hangzhou. ID Number: 330106196509260073. Contact Number: 15958160478.

By December 17, 2025, the applicant, Chen Shuqing, had reached the statutory retirement age of 60 years + 3 months, and had actually paid into the social insurance pool for 24 years and 4 months, exceeding the minimum payment period of 15 years. At approximately 9:00 AM on December 17, 2025, the applicant went to your bureau’s (Gongshu District HRSSB) office located in the Gongshu District Government Service Center to handle retirement procedures. The staff member, on the grounds that Chen Shuqing had been sentenced to 4 years for the “crime of inciting subversion of state power” in 2007 and 10 years and 6 months for the “crime of subverting state power” in 2016, deducted the social security payment years cumulative to the two prison terms. The remaining payment years were only nine-plus years, failing to meet the minimum payment period requirement of 15 years. They refused to process the applicant’s retirement eligibility and merely kept demanding that the applicant first refund the social insurance already paid during the period of imprisonment.

(Image: Gongshu District Government Information Disclosure Application Form)

From this, the applicant has two doubts and proposes two corresponding items for government information disclosure:

I. For over 20 years, the applicant, the applicant’s family, and the units where the applicant worked or where his social security was affiliated paid social insurance for the applicant. Never did they encounter a clear notification that payments could not be made during imprisonment. Even after the applicant was released from his last prison term on March 10, 2025, he went several times to your bureau’s government service center located at No. 58 Xiangjisi East Road, Gongshu District, to make up payments for the disconnected social security fees of the past few years (which included portions of the time during the prison term), and all were completed successfully. Your bureau was fine when collecting the insurance payments, but now when it is time for your bureau to fulfill the insurance responsibilities, you suddenly change face, using so-called “relevant policies” as a pretext to refuse to fulfill the social insurance responsibilities that your bureau should bear. This makes the applicant suddenly doubt the principle of protecting the public’s reliance interests in the government. To this end, the first item the applicant requests for government information disclosure is: The specific legal (including policy) basis for the invalidity and refund of social security payments already made during the period of imprisonment, including the specific name of the law (policy) and the specific article and clause. Of course, it would be even better if the reply letter clearly states the content of these laws (policies).

II. The staff at your bureau’s government service center asked the applicant to refund the fees first, orally promising that other verification work for the applicant’s retirement eligibility and benefits could only continue after the refund. The applicant believes that after refunding the social security fees paid during the prison term, the remaining period will be far less than the 15-year minimum payment period required for retirement. At that time, the applicant will not only be unable to retire now, but will also have no certainty or reliance regarding the subsequent actual economic burden and the final social pension insurance outcome. To this end, the second item the applicant requests for government information disclosure is: 1. The specific refund process, the different payment periods determined based on different payers, and the specific refund amounts (or refund content and calculation standards) for each period; 2. The detailed follow-up process and result prediction after the refund is completed, with the clauses and content of the relied-upon laws (policies) noted.

This “Application for Disclosure of Government Information” sincerely requests your bureau to respond specifically and clearly in writing. Please do not again send personnel to use vague phrases like “according to relevant policies” or any oral “consultation” or “suggestion” that can be disavowed or be irresponsible.

Applicant: Chen Shuqing Date of Application: December 21, 2025

Note: This “Application for Disclosure of Government Information” was sent to the Gongshu District Human Resources and Social Security Bureau on December 21, 2025.

——写在香港民主党解散之后

作者：张致君 编辑：李聪玲 责任编辑：钟然 校对：王滨 翻译：周敏

2025年12月14日，香港民主党宣布解散。

在任何一个正常的政治体制中，反对派的存在，从来不是威胁。恰恰相反，它是一种证明——证明权力仍然承认自身有限，证明制度仍然相信辩论，证明统治仍然愿意被质询、被监督、被纠错。而当一个政权不再允许反对派存在，它真正表达的只有一件事：它已经不再需要被解释。

香港民主党的角色，从来不是推翻秩序。它所做的，只是提醒秩序仍需回应人民。

12月14日，这个成立逾三十年、曾是香港立法会最大反对党的政党，走到了终点。据路透社报道，民主党高层曾被中国官员或中间人接触，被明确告知：若不解散，将面临被捕等严重后果。这不是一次政治竞争的失败，而是一次制度性“清场”的完成。

民主党成立于1994年，诞生于香港仍被视为一个“可以讨论未来”的地方。它长期作为反对派领头羊，主张民主改革，维护自由、人权与法治——这些在过去曾被写入香港政治语言的词汇，如今却变得危险。

2020年，民主党公开反对《国安法》。同年，自行规划初选。结果并非选举失败，而是政治后果：时任党主席胡志伟被捕，反对派整体被视为“风险源”。

2021年，北京彻底重塑香港选举制度，只允许经审查的“爱国者”参选。反对派从议会被逐步清除，不是因为输了选票，而是因为失去了被允许存在的资格。政治不再是竞争，而变成筛选。最终的结局，并不突然。

2025年2月，民主党宣布启动解散程序；4月，授权中委会处理解散与清盘。而12月14日，只是制度逻辑的最后一步。一个不再允许反对派存在的体制，并不是更稳定，而是更脆弱。

因为反对派真正的功能，从来不是夺权，而是让权力记住：它仍然需要解释自己。

当反对派被清除，权力不再需要回答“为什么”；当议会只剩一种声音，错误也失去了被纠正的路径；当制度不再容许不同意见，社会便只剩下顺从与沉默。

而沉默，并不等于认同。香港民主党的解散，并不意味着它曾经代表的价值消失了。它只意味着，这些价值已经无法在公开政治中被表达。在一个仍然自信的制度里，反对派是被容忍的；在一个失去安全感的体制里，反对派是必须被消灭的。

历史会记住的，并不只是一个政党的终结，而是一个城市何时、如何，被剥夺了说“不”的权利。当反对派不再存在，问题从来不是“谁赢了”，而是：这个制度，已经不打算再回答任何人。

When the Opposition is Purged, the System No Longer Needs to Explain Itself

— Written Following the Dissolution of the Democratic Party of Hong Kong

Abstract: The dissolution of the Democratic Party in 2025 marks the institutional clearing of Hong Kong’s opposition. This was not a failure of election, but the result of political screening. As opposing voices vanish, power no longer requires explanation, and the system moves toward fragility and silence.

Author: Zhang Zhijun Editor: Li Congling Executive Editor: Zhong Ran Proofreader: Wang Bin Translator: Zhou Min

On December 14, 2025, the Democratic Party of Hong Kong announced its dissolution.

In any normal political system, the existence of an opposition is never a threat. On the contrary, it is a testament—proof that power still acknowledges its own limits, that the system still believes in debate, and that the rule is still willing to be questioned, supervised, and corrected. When a regime no longer permits the existence of an opposition, it truly expresses only one thing: it no longer needs to be explained.

The role of the Democratic Party of Hong Kong was never to overthrow the order. What it did was merely to remind the order that it still needed to respond to the people.

On December 14, this political party—established over thirty years ago and once the largest opposition party in the Legislative Council—reached its end. According to reports from Reuters, high-ranking members of the Democratic Party had been contacted by Chinese officials or intermediaries and were explicitly told: if they did not dissolve, they would face serious consequences, including arrest. This was not a defeat in political competition, but the completion of an institutional “clearing.”

The Democratic Party was founded in 1994, born at a time when Hong Kong was still regarded as a place where one “could discuss the future.” It long served as the leader of the opposition, advocating for democratic reform and defending freedom, human rights, and the rule of law—vocabulary that was once inscribed in Hong Kong’s political language but has now become dangerous.

In 2020, the Democratic Party publicly opposed the National Security Law. In the same year, it organized its own primary elections. The result was not an electoral failure, but political consequences: then-party chairman Wu Chi-wai was arrested, and the opposition as a whole was deemed a “source of risk.”

In 2021, Beijing completely reshaped Hong Kong’s electoral system, allowing only vetted “patriots” to run for office. The opposition was gradually purged from the council, not because they lost votes, but because they lost the qualification to be permitted to exist. Politics ceased to be competition and became screening. The final ending was not sudden.

In February 2025, the Democratic Party announced the commencement of dissolution procedures; in April, it authorized the Central Committee to handle the dissolution and liquidation. December 14 was merely the final step of the institutional logic. A system that no longer allows for an opposition is not more stable, but more fragile.

Because the true function of the opposition has never been to seize power, but to make power remember: it still needs to explain itself.

When the opposition is purged, power no longer needs to answer “why”; when only one voice remains in the council, errors lose their path to correction; when the system no longer tolerates differing opinions, society is left with nothing but compliance and silence.

And silence does not equal consent. The dissolution of the Democratic Party of Hong Kong does not mean the values it once represented have vanished. It only means those values can no longer be expressed in public politics. In a system that remains confident, the opposition is tolerated; in a system that has lost its sense of security, the opposition must be eliminated.

What history will remember is not just the end of a political party, but when and how a city was stripped of its right to say “no.” When the opposition no longer exists, the question is never “who won,” but rather: this system no longer intends to answer anyone.

作者：张宇 编辑：冯仍 校对：程筱筱 翻译：周敏

你可以在某个时候欺骗所有人，也可以一直欺骗某些人，但你不能永远欺骗所有人。

——亚伯拉罕·林肯

没有哪一个政权能永远靠谎言维系，但中共却试图用谎言去建造一个完整的世界——一个由假新闻、假繁荣、假数据、假承诺所堆砌的幻象国度。中共在政治口号中塑造“伟光正”的形象，在信息审查中封锁真相的裂缝，在舆论机器里制造“人民幸福”的幻觉。可当谎言成为日常语言，真相便成了政治禁忌，而整个国家，也在信任崩塌中缓缓腐烂。

一个政权的力量，不在于军事的力量，而在于它能否让人民相信它的正当性，而中共早已耗尽了这种“政治公信力”。它的医疗体系以“全民医保”为幌子，掩盖资源被权利垄断的事实；它的养老制度以“幸福晚年”为旗号，却让老人们在通胀与谎报中艰难求生；一切制度都在共同编织一场巨大的政治幻觉。

在这个幻觉中，人民被教育去“感恩”虚假的繁荣，被鼓励去“相信”被扭曲的现实。当一个国家以欺骗为常态，它不只是丧失了道德基础，更是在自掘坟墓。因为没有任何谎言能永远取代真相；当信任的最后一根弦被拉断，崩塌的不只是政权的形象，而是整个社会的灵魂。

（图为张宇参加在洛杉矶总领馆门前举行的“习近平病毒头”活动）

中共最擅长的，是把苦难包装成成就，把失败装饰成胜利。在医疗领域，这种谎言达到了病态的精致程度。中共宣称“全民医保”“健康中国”，在宣传片里，医生微笑、病人感恩、制度完美无缺；但现实中的医院门口，却是病人无助的哭声、家属的绝望与医疗账单的重压。

所谓“全民医保”，在本质上不过是一张无法兑现的政治支票。医保报销比例被层层稀释，药价虚高，基层医疗体系早已被权利和资本联手掏空。那些被宣传成“免费”的项目，背后往往隐藏着更深的腐败。对底层百姓而言，看一次病，就是一次家庭经济的坍塌。在“人民健康”的口号下，健康早已成为特权阶层的专属福利。

疫情期间，更暴露了这一体制的谎言本质。面对公共卫生危机，中共选择的不是透明与科学，而是掩盖与欺骗。从最初的封锁信息到强制“清零”的荒唐执行，无数生命在谎言中消失。数据被篡改，死亡被隐瞒，媒体被噤声，医生被“约谈”。那些敢说真话的专业人士，不是被追责就是被消失；而那些制造假象的人，却在新闻镜头前被赞为“英雄”。

医疗体系的腐败不仅在经济层面，更在道德层面。医生与患者之间失去了信任，公立医院成了逐利机器，医护人员工作有了KPI,医患关系被毒化。中共的医疗政策，已经从保障民生的制度，堕落为维稳的工具。它所追求的“稳定”，不是人民健康，而是维持政治形象。在这里，健康不再是人权，而是被权利过滤后的政治数字。

当政府谎报疫情数字，当病人无法知道真相，当“生命”被简化为政绩曲线的一个变量，这个体制的公信力就已经死亡。中共可以用宣传控制舆论，却无法控制人们亲身感受到的痛苦；可以篡改报告，却无法掩盖医院走廊里一张张等不到治疗的面孔。

谎言的毒，不仅腐蚀了制度，也腐蚀了人心。一个政权若连“生命的价值”都可以欺骗，那么它已经不是失误，而是犯罪。中共的医疗神话，本质上就是一个国家对人类尊严的冷血嘲弄。

（图片提供：张宇；图为张宇参加在洛杉矶星光大道举行的集会活动）

在中共的宣传中，老人是“被党温暖守护的一代”，是“国家进步的见证者”。然而，现实中的中国老人，正在经历一种悄无声息的绝望。那种“幸福晚年”的幻象，只存在于中共的宣传片里，而不在空荡的养老金账户中。

中国的养老体系，是谎言与透支叠加的产物。官方反复宣称“养老金发放有保障”，可财政赤字的现实无人能否认。许多地方政府已偷偷挪用养老金补财政窟窿，年轻人被迫用更高的税负去支撑一个濒临破产的系统，而他们自己却知道，等他们老了，或许连这点保障都不会存在。这是一个用未来抵押现实、用谎言掩盖崩塌的制度。

中共的社会保障体系，本质上并不为民众服务，而是为政治稳定服务。养老金、医保、低保、补贴，这些原本该属于公共责任的项目，都被权利染上了“政治筛选”的色彩：能顺从者得益，敢质疑者被边缘化。一个政权若连“养老”都要纳入忠诚考核，那它所谓的“人民政府”，实际上只是掌控生老病死的冷漠管理者。

与此同时，城乡差距、地区不均、物价飞涨、医疗负担叠加，让无数老人陷入生活的边缘。有人卖废品补贴生活费药费；有人靠子女借贷做手术，有人独自死在出租屋内数月无人问津。而政府却在媒体上宣扬“银发经济”“老有所养”的政绩。

养老金的数字可以造假，但老人脸上的皱纹不会。那些被掩盖的痛苦，终将在时间的裂缝中暴露。中共可以通过宣传掩饰财政危机，却掩盖不了人心的寒凉。一个连老人都不敢老的国家，一个让人害怕变老的社会，是人性被侮辱的地方。

真正的“幸福晚年”，不来自口号，而来自制度的诚实、政府的责任与社会的信任。而当这些都被谎言所取代时，所谓的“晚年幸福”，就成了荒诞剧的一幕。中共的养老神话，不过是一场集体催眠：让人们在麻木与恐惧中等待老去，在失望与谎言中走向终点。

一个政权，可以靠谎言延长寿命，却无法靠谎言获得永生。

因为谎言的本质，是自我毁灭。

它需要不断制造新的谎言去掩盖旧的谎言，直到整个体系陷入疯狂。

真相或许会被掩盖，但它不会被消灭；信任或许被摧毁，但它终将成为复苏的起点。中共之所以畏惧真相，不是因为真相会让它立刻崩塌，而是因为真相会让人民学会思考——而思考，才是独裁者最害怕的力量。

The CCP is Built on Lies

Author: Zhang Yu Editor: Feng Reng Proofreader: Cheng Xiaoxiao Translator: Zhou Min

“You can fool all the people some of the time, and some of the people all the time, but you cannot fool all the people all the time.”

— Abraham Lincoln

No regime can sustain itself forever on lies, yet the CCP attempts to use lies to construct an entire world—an illusionary kingdom piled high with fake news, fake prosperity, fake data, and fake promises. The CCP shapes an image of being “Great, Glorious, and Correct” in its political slogans, seals the cracks of truth through information censorship, and manufactures the hallucination of “people’s happiness” within its propaganda machine. But when lies become the daily language, truth becomes a political taboo, and the entire country slowly rots amidst the collapse of trust.

The strength of a regime lies not in military power, but in whether it can make the people believe in its legitimacy; the CCP has long since exhausted this “political credibility.” Its medical system uses “universal healthcare” as a front to cover the fact that resources are monopolized by power; its pension system uses the banner of “happy sunset years” while leaving the elderly to struggle for survival amidst inflation and false reporting. All systems are woven together to orchestrate a massive political hallucination.

In this hallucination, the people are educated to be “grateful” for a fake prosperity and encouraged to “believe” in a distorted reality. When a state takes deception as its norm, it does not merely lose its moral foundation; it digs its own grave. Because no lie can forever replace the truth; when the last string of trust snaps, what collapses is not just the image of the regime, but the soul of the entire society.

(Photo: Zhang Yu participating in the “Xi Jinping Virus Head” protest held in front of the Consulate General in Los Angeles)

What the CCP is best at is packaging suffering as achievement and decorating failure as victory. In the field of healthcare, this lie has reached a level of morbid sophistication. The CCP proclaims “Universal Healthcare” and “Healthy China.” In propaganda films, doctors smile, patients are grateful, and the system is flawless; but at the entrances of real-world hospitals, there are the helpless cries of patients, the despair of families, and the heavy burden of medical bills.

The so-called “universal healthcare” is, in essence, nothing more than a political check that cannot be cashed. Reimbursement ratios are diluted layer by layer, drug prices are artificially high, and the grassroots medical system has long been hollowed out by the alliance of power and capital. Behind those projects advertised as “free,” there is often deeper corruption hidden. For the common people at the bottom, seeing a doctor once means the collapse of a family’s finances. Under the slogan of “People’s Health,” health has long become an exclusive benefit for the privileged class.

The pandemic period further exposed the lying nature of this system. Faced with a public health crisis, the CCP chose concealment and deception rather than transparency and science. From the initial suppression of information to the absurd execution of the mandatory “Zero-COVID” policy, countless lives vanished amidst lies. Data was tampered with, deaths were concealed, media was silenced, and doctors were “summoned for talks.” Those professionals who dared to speak the truth were either held accountable or disappeared; while those who manufactured illusions were praised as “heroes” before news cameras.

The corruption of the medical system exists not only at the economic level but also at the moral level. Trust between doctors and patients has been lost, public hospitals have become profit-seeking machines, medical staff have KPIs, and doctor-patient relationships have been poisoned. The CCP’s medical policy has degenerated from a system guaranteeing people’s livelihoods into a tool for “stability maintenance.” The “stability” it pursues is not the health of the people, but the maintenance of its political image. Here, health is no longer a human right, but a political figure filtered through power.

When a government lies about pandemic numbers, when patients cannot know the truth, and when “life” is simplified into a variable on a performance curve, the credibility of this system has already died. The CCP can use propaganda to control public opinion, but it cannot control the pain people feel personally; it can tamper with reports, but it cannot cover the faces waiting for treatment in hospital corridors.

The poison of lies corrodes not only the system but also the human heart. If a regime can even deceive regarding the “value of life,” it is no longer a mistake—it is a crime. The CCP’s medical myth is, in essence, a cold-blooded mockery of human dignity by a state.

(Photo provided by: Zhang Yu; Image shows Zhang Yu participating in a rally held at the Hollywood Walk of Fame in Los Angeles)

In the CCP’s propaganda, the elderly are “the generation warmly guarded by the Party” and “witnesses to national progress.” However, in reality, China’s elderly are experiencing a silent despair. That illusion of “happy sunset years” exists only in the CCP’s propaganda films, not in the empty pension accounts.

China’s pension system is the product of superimposed lies and overdrawing. Officials repeatedly claim “pension payments are guaranteed,” but the reality of fiscal deficits cannot be denied by anyone. Many local governments have secretly misappropriated pension funds to fill fiscal holes; young people are forced to use higher tax burdens to support a system on the verge of bankruptcy, yet they themselves know that when they grow old, perhaps even this bit of protection will not exist. This is a system that mortgages the future for the present and covers collapse with lies.

The CCP’s social security system does not, in essence, serve the public, but serves political stability. Pensions, healthcare, minimum living allowances, subsidies—these items that should belong to public responsibility have all been stained with the color of “political screening” by power: those who comply benefit, while those who dare to question are marginalized. If a regime even incorporates “elderly care” into loyalty assessments, then its so-called “People’s Government” is actually just a cold manager in control of birth, aging, sickness, and death.

At the same time, the urban-rural gap, regional inequality, skyrocketing prices, and the accumulation of medical burdens have pushed countless elderly people to the margins of life. Some sell recyclables to supplement living and medical expenses; some rely on children taking out loans for surgeries; some die alone in rental rooms and go unnoticed for months. Meanwhile, the government touts the achievements of the “silver economy” and “care for the aged” in the media.

Pension figures can be faked, but the wrinkles on an old person’s face cannot. The hidden suffering will eventually be exposed in the cracks of time. The CCP can use propaganda to disguise a fiscal crisis, but it cannot disguise the coldness in people’s hearts. A country where people are afraid to grow old, a society that makes people fear aging, is a place where humanity is insulted.

True “happy sunset years” do not come from slogans, but from the honesty of the system, the responsibility of the government, and the trust of society. When these are replaced by lies, the so-called “happiness in old age” becomes a scene in an absurd drama. The CCP’s pension myth is nothing more than a collective hypnosis: making people wait to grow old in numbness and fear, and march toward the end in disappointment and lies.

A regime can rely on lies to prolong its life, but it cannot rely on lies to gain eternal life.

Because the essence of a lie is self-destruction.

It requires the continuous creation of new lies to cover old ones until the entire system falls into madness.

The truth may be covered up, but it will not be extinguished; trust may be destroyed, but it will eventually become the starting point for recovery. The reason the CCP fears the truth is not because the truth will make it collapse instantly, but because the truth will make the people learn to think—and thinking is the power that dictators fear most.

——香港自民党成立现场纪实

作者：冯仍 编辑：李晶 校对：林小龙 翻译：周敏

时间：2025年12月27日｜地点：1300 John Reed Ct, City of Industry, CA 91745

12月27日下午，City of Industry 的会场里坐着两排人。前排多是流亡港人，约二十位；后排与两侧则是声援团体成员，约三十位。舞台背景板上用中英双语写着：“香港自民党成立暨香港未来研讨会”。灯光打在那行字上，像把一个曾经被迫沉默的议题，硬生生重新照亮。

（图为发起人廖文浩阐述政治愿景；右侧为中国民主党联合总部主席郑存柱）

这场活动的核心不是“仪式感”，而是“恢复发声”。对许多人而言，香港的政治空间早已被挤压到几乎无处落脚：政党解散、媒体噤声、公共表达被定性为风险。也正因为如此，“成立”本身变成了一句宣告——不是庆典，而是拒绝消音。

发起人廖文浩在台上阐述政治愿景。他回顾香港在1997年后逐步恶化的处境，并将2020年《国安法》视作分水岭：自由法治从此急剧倒退，朋友入狱、组织被迫停止运作，许多人只能离开家园。他把这种变化称为对承诺的背弃与对社会的清算。

当天，活动现场发布《香港自由民主党（HKLDP）创党宣言》。宣言的措辞强硬，但结构清晰，几乎是按“行动清单”写成：其一，主张以“国际线”推动外交游说与公共倡议；其二，强调对践踏人权者进行制裁追责；其三，将“无条件释放香港政治犯”置于突出位置，并以“光复公义，自决未来”作为号召语。宣言试图把香港议题从“地方争议”重新放回“国际人权与制度责任”的框架之中。

研讨会期间，来自声援团体的代表发言。中国民主党联合总部主席郑存柱强调，在民主法治社会，政治主张属于宪法保护的言论自由范畴；香港人提出政治诉求，应当被尊重与保护。他同时回顾港人多次移民潮的历史背景，指出《国安法》后自由空间坍塌，是推动新一轮流亡潮的重要原因之一。

（图为中国民主党党员梁振华对香港自民党发起人廖文浩提问）

我在现场也作了临时发言。我说：“我是来自中国的流亡者，也是中国民主党成员。今天香港自民党成立，不是仪式，是香港人拒绝被消音的宣告。创党宣言讲得很清楚：第一，无条件释放所有香港政治犯；第二，对践踏人权者制裁追责；第三，香港必须走向自决未来，让香港人自己决定命运。中共撕毁承诺、以恶法镇压香港，这不是治理，是清算。我们今天站出来，就是要让世界继续看见真相、继续行动。”

（图为中国民主党党员冯仍现场发言）

发言结束后，会场短暂安静了一秒，随后掌声响起。那不是热闹的掌声，更像是一种确认：确认彼此仍在，确认这件事还值得被讲，确认“未来”不是被允许才拥有，而是要靠行动去争取。

对外界来说，这也许只是一场规模不大的海外集会；但对经历过恐惧与噤声的人而言，它更像一次“重新把话说出来”的练习——把宣言、诉求与行动路线摆上桌面，接受质询，也接受记录。香港的处境并没有因为一场活动而改变，但至少在这个下午，有人选择不再把香港当作过去式。

In Los Angeles, a Group of Hongkongers Put the “Future” Back on the Table

—— On-the-scene Documentary of the Founding of the Hong Kong Liberal Democratic

Party

Author: Feng Reng Editor: Li Jing Proofreader: Lin Xiaolong Translator: Zhou Min

Time: December 27, 2025 Location: 1300 John Reed Ct, City of Industry, CA 91745

On the afternoon of December 27, two rows of people sat in a meeting hall in the City of Industry. The front row consisted mostly of exiled Hongkongers, about twenty in total; the back row and the sides were members of solidarity groups, numbering about thirty. The stage backdrop was inscribed in both Chinese and English: “Founding of the Hong Kong Liberal Democratic Party & Symposium on the Future of Hong Kong.” The lights hit those words, seemingly forcibly re-illuminating an issue that was once forced into silence.

(Photo: Initiator Liao Wenhao expounding on the political vision; on the right is Zheng Cunzhu, Chairperson of the Joint Headquarters of the China Democracy Party)

The core of this event was not “a sense of ceremony,” but “the restoration of voice.” For many, Hong Kong’s political space has long been squeezed to the point where there is almost nowhere to stand: political parties have disbanded, the media has been silenced, and public expression has been characterized as a risk. Precisely because of this, the “founding” itself became a declaration—not a celebration, but a refusal to be muted.

Initiator Liao Wenhao stood on stage to expound on the political vision. He reviewed the gradually deteriorating situation in Hong Kong after 1997 and viewed the 2020 “National Security Law” as a watershed: since then, freedom and the rule of law have regressed sharply, friends have been imprisoned, organizations have been forced to cease operations, and many have had no choice but to leave their homes. He referred to this change as a betrayal of promises and a liquidation of society.

On that day, the event released the “Founding Manifesto of the Hong Kong Liberal Democratic Party (HKLDP).” The wording of the manifesto was tough, but the structure was clear, written almost like an “action list”: First, it advocates for the “International Line” to promote diplomatic lobbying and public advocacy; second, it emphasizes sanctions and accountability for those who trample on human rights; third, it places the “unconditional release of Hong Kong political prisoners” in a prominent position and uses “Restore Justice, Self-determine the Future” as its rallying cry. The manifesto attempts to reframe the Hong Kong issue from a “local dispute” back into the framework of “international human rights and institutional responsibility.”

During the symposium, representatives from solidarity groups delivered speeches. Zheng Cunzhu, Chairperson of the Joint Headquarters of the China Democracy Party, emphasized that in a democratic and rule-of-law society, political views fall within the scope of freedom of speech protected by the constitution; when Hongkongers put forward political demands, they should be respected and protected. He also reviewed the historical background of the multiple waves of migration from Hong Kong, pointing out that the collapse of the space for freedom following the “National Security Law” is one of the important reasons driving the new wave of exile.

(Photo: China Democracy Party member Liang Zhenhua questioning Liao Wenhao, the initiator of the Hong Kong Liberal Democratic Party)

I also gave a spontaneous speech at the scene. I said: “I am an exile from China and a member of the China Democracy Party. The founding of the Hong Kong Liberal Democratic Party today is not a ceremony; it is a declaration by Hongkongers refusing to be silenced. The founding manifesto states very clearly: First, the unconditional release of all Hong Kong political prisoners; second, sanctions and accountability for those who trample on human rights; third, Hong Kong must move toward a self-determined future, letting Hongkongers decide their own destiny. The CCP tore up its promises and suppressed Hong Kong with evil laws; this is not governance, it is liquidation. We stand up today to ensure the world continues to see the truth and continues to take action.”

(Photo: China Democracy Party member Feng Reng speaking at the scene)

After the speech ended, the hall fell silent for a brief second, followed by a burst of applause. It was not the applause of a lively celebration, but more like a form of confirmation: confirming that each other is still there, confirming that this matter is still worth speaking about, and confirming that the “future” is not something possessed only when permitted, but something to be fought for through action.

To the outside world, this may just be a small-scale overseas gathering; but for those who have experienced fear and silencing, it is more like an exercise in “speaking out again”—putting manifestos, demands, and action plans on the table to be questioned and to be recorded. Hong Kong’s situation did not change because of one event, but at least on this afternoon, some people chose to no longer treat Hong Kong as a thing of the past.

作者：何愚 编辑：程伟 校对：冯仍 翻译：戈冰

习近平独裁政府长期以来试图通过“一带一路”、对外巨额资金投放，以及与一系列威权国家和政权的深度合作，构建其所谓的“人类命运共同体”。这一概念在官方话语中被包装为“合作共赢”，但在现实操作中，更像是一种以政权互保、利益交换和地缘政治对抗为核心的国际网络。

在这一过程中，习近平独裁政府不断拉拢国际独裁政权，以经济援助、能源合作和政治支持作为交换条件，试图扩大自身影响力。同时，围绕这一体系，也不断出现涉及毒品、情报渗透、贿赂等跨国犯罪与腐败指控，甚至支援和挑唆别国和组织恐怖行动、战争和事端，严重侵蚀民主国家的政治与社会安全。中国这种支援别国和组织恐怖行动的行为从来都把自己隐藏起来。

但这一妄想正在走向破裂。2026年1月2日，美国政府采取迅速而精准的行动，抓捕了长期被指控利用国家机器从事毒品贩运、并与习近平独裁政府保持密切合作的委内瑞拉“伪总统”马杜罗。值得注意的是，此次行动发生时，习近平独裁者代表团正好在访问马杜罗政权，时间点极具象征意义。这是美国政府抓捕本拉登以来又一次非常成功的打击恐怖主义行动。

据多家媒体报道，中国政府此前向马杜罗政权投入了高达数千亿美元规模的资金和资源，双方在政治、经济和安全层面的合作关系极为紧密。马杜罗政权不仅是中国在拉美地区的重要代理节点，也是其威权国际网络中的关键一环。

更早之前，美墨两国执法机构曾公开指控一名中国籍男子张志东（音）为大型贩毒集团的重要中间人，被认为是连接中国、美洲和欧洲犯罪网络的核心人物，拥有包括“王哥”在内的多个化名。墨西哥安全部门随后宣布，该人已在古巴被捕，同时被捕的还有一名墨西哥籍人员和一名中国籍人员。

芬太尼这一毒品在北美被称为“China Girl”，早已成为美国社会的重大灾难。大量事实表明，中国相关网络在芬太尼及其前体化学品的生产、流通和跨国贩运中扮演着关键角色。毒品，正在成为一种现实中的武器，被用来腐蚀和破坏以美国为代表的西方民主国家的社会根基。

从这个角度看，川普政府针对马杜罗政权的行动，并非孤立事件，而是对以“人类命运共同体”为名、实则建立在威权勾连和非法网络之上的国际体系的一次直接打击。

Trump Is Destroying Xi Jinping’s “Community of Shared Future for Mankind”

Summary: On January 2, 2026, the U.S. government launched swift and precise action to apprehend Venezuela’s “pseudo-president” Maduro, who had long been accused of using state machinery for drug trafficking while maintaining close collaboration with Xi Jinping’s authoritarian regime.

Author: He Yu Editor: Cheng Wei Proofreader: Feng Reng Translator: Ge Bing

Xi Jinping’s authoritarian regime has long sought to construct its so-called “Community of Shared Future for Mankind” through the Belt and Road Initiative, massive overseas capital investments, and deep cooperation with a series of authoritarian states and regimes. This concept is packaged in official discourse as “win-win cooperation,” but in practice, it resembles an international network centered on mutual regime preservation, interest exchange, and geopolitical confrontation.

Throughout this process, Xi Jinping’s authoritarian regime has continually courted international dictatorships, offering economic aid, energy cooperation, and political support in exchange for expanding its influence. Simultaneously, allegations of transnational crime and corruption—involving narcotics, intelligence infiltration, and bribery—have repeatedly surfaced around this system. China has even been implicated in supporting and instigating terrorist acts, wars, and provocations by other nations and organizations, severely eroding the political and social security of democratic states. China has consistently concealed its role in supporting such terrorist activities by other nations and organizations.

But this delusion is now shattering. On January 2, 2026, the U.S. government executed swift and precise action, capturing Venezuela’s “pseudo-president” Maduro—long accused of using state machinery for drug trafficking while maintaining close collaboration with Xi Jinping’s authoritarian regime. Notably, this operation occurred while Xi Jinping’s authoritarian delegation was visiting the Maduro regime, making the timing highly symbolic. This marks another highly successful counterterrorism operation by the U.S. government since the capture of Osama bin Laden.

Multiple media reports indicate that the Chinese government had previously invested hundreds of billions of dollars in funds and resources into the Maduro regime, forging an extremely close partnership across political, economic, and security spheres. The Maduro regime serves not only as China’s crucial proxy node in Latin America but also as a pivotal link in its authoritarian international network.

Earlier, U.S. and Mexican law enforcement agencies publicly accused a Chinese national, Zhang Zhidong (surname first), of being a key intermediary for a major drug trafficking syndicate. He was identified as a central figure linking criminal networks across China, the Americas, and Europe, operating under multiple aliases including “Brother Wang.” Mexican security authorities subsequently announced his arrest in Cuba, alongside one Mexican national and another Chinese national.

Fentanyl, known in North America as “China Girl,” has long been a major scourge in American society. Substantial evidence indicates that Chinese-linked networks play a pivotal role in the production, distribution, and transnational trafficking of fentanyl and its precursor chemicals. Drugs are increasingly becoming a weapon in reality, used to corrode and undermine the social foundations of Western democracies, particularly the United States.

From this perspective, the Trump administration’s actions against the Maduro regime are not isolated incidents but a direct blow to an international system that, under the banner of a “community with a shared future for mankind,” is in fact built upon authoritarian collusion and illicit networks.

作者：陈树庆

编辑：冯仍

责任编辑：钟然

在法治社会，制定法律，建立权力制衡制度，保障人民监督权，目的是将权力这一猛兽关进牢笼，在充分发挥权力服务于社会的同时，有效防止滥用权力，确保这猛兽不能伤害民众的自由和权利。

把权力比作猛兽，把法律、制度和人民的监督权比作笼子的说法，早在2004年10月10日，美国总统布什在讨论国家安全与权力时，使用了“Power is a formidable, awesome beast”（权力是可怕、令人敬畏的野兽），在他随后的一次演讲中，更为精彩：“人类千万年的历史，最为珍贵的不是令人炫目的科技，不是浩瀚的大师们的经典著作，不是政客们天花乱坠的演讲，而是实现了对统治者的驯服，实现了把他们关进笼子里的梦想。因为只有驯服了他们，把他们关起来，才不会害人。我现在就站在笼子里向你们讲话。”

2013年1月22日，刚履新职不久的中共中央习近平总书记在第十八届中央纪律检查委员会第二次全体会议上有关反腐的讲话中，也提出要“把权力关进笼子”，随后的十几年来，无论习的讲话还是其他官方文件，“把权力关进笼子”一直在反复强调。实际效果如何呢？官方宣传与民间舆论众说纷纭，对我自己而言，亲身遭遇的感触与思考，才是最为深切的。

2025年12月25日上午9点刚过，我接到0571-87882793电话，电话那头是12月17日我在香积寺路58号拱墅区政务服务中心办理退休手续时，接待我的105室工作人员陈明朋，说他才知道我在12月4日已经向大关街道提交了办理退休的申请，而且他现在也已收到了我向杭州市拱墅区人力资源和社会保障局提出《政府信息公开申请书》，说我所要的材料已经准备好，他让我过去拿。我答应马上过去，在上午10点不到就赶到了他那里，拿了几份材料，其中有一份盖着“杭州市拱墅区社会保险管理服务中心”印章的《告知书》，一份制作日期是二〇一〇年九月三十日的《浙江省人力资源和社会保障厅文件-浙人社函[2010]358号-关于被判处有期徒刑人员基本养老保险有关问题的复函（此件依申请公开）》等。

看了这些材料，我既失望，又高兴。失望的是，《告知书》明确以“不符合政策”的原因，否定了我社保缴费24年4个月已经超出15年最低缴费要求可以领养老金的申请，只确认我“合法有效的职工基本养老保险实际缴费年限为9年10月”，看来我要现在就领养老金，难！高兴的是，《告知书》所依据的法律及政策明显适用不当或效力不足，为我接下来的维权铺开了伸展的余地。

本案的事实是，我陈树庆、家属、工作或社保挂靠的单位为我缴纳社会保险，从未遇到服刑期间不能缴费的明确告知，甚至2025年3月10日我最后一次刑满释放后，到拱墅区社保经办机构几次补缴中间断交的最近几年（包括部分刑期内的期间）社保费用也都顺利完成。社保经办机构在收取保险缴费的时候顺顺利利，现在要其履行保险责任的时候，突然变卦，以所谓“相关政策”为托词，拒不履行其应负的社会保险责任。由此可见，本案的争议焦点，首先集中在具体行政行为中，民众对于政府的信赖利益能否得到保护，说的通俗一点，就是政府是否可以随意违约？

不难发现，近几十年来，政府违约的案例屡屡见诸于舆论。如果政府可以随意违约，显然会让民众面对政府不能预期、无所适从，担心政府的权力会像野兽吞噬自己的权利。虽然每一个案子政府方对于自己“言而无信，约而不守”总是有一定的“理由”来说辞，但其“理由”必须经得起严格的法律限制，本案杭州市拱墅区社会保险经办机构拒绝为陈树庆现在办理领取养老金资格，所依托的“相关政策”是否也站得住脚呢？本文不妨展开初步的分析如下：

本案的法律关系由两项事实构成，第一项是缴纳社保，其中包括服刑期间缴纳的是否有效？陈树庆、就业单位等是缴费义务人，政府（社保经办机构和财税机构）是收费权利人；第二项是到了法定年龄领取养老金，陈树庆变成了领取权利人（受益人），政府变成了社会保险支付的义务人。该行为由于社会保险经办机构根据法定授权履行政府的社会保险管理与服务职责，既有具体行政行为的性质，又由于该行为的整个过程由民事主体陈树庆一方和行政主体社保经办机构一方共同完成，类似于民事法律行为的“合同”。如果社保经办机构主张第一项事实陈树庆一方缴纳10年6个月刑期间的社会保险无效成立，那么本案《告知书》上认为陈树庆只剩下9年10个月的有效缴费期也是确立的；如果陈树庆认为己方缴纳社保包括刑期内的都有效，本案《告知书》认定就是错误的，代表政府方的杭州市拱墅区社会保险管理服务中心应该立即替陈树庆办好退休手续并按时发放法定与约定的养老金。

现代法治社会是“对政府法无授权不可为，对民众是法无禁止即自由”，如果主张作为民众陈树庆一方缴纳刑期内社会保险费的行为无效，就必须指出其“法”之所“禁”。对此《中华人民共和国民法典》对于民事法律行为的效力问题，就有类似的规定，在《民法典》第一编“总则”的第六章第三节第一百五十三条规定“违反法律、行政法规的强制性规定的民事法律行为无效。……违背公序良俗的民事法律行为无效”，将“违反法律、行政法规的强制性规定”或“违背公序良俗”的事实作为“无效”前提。

从杭州市拱墅区社会保险管理服务中心提供的《告知书》中可见，其推翻约定拒不履行对陈树庆的社会保险责任的理由是：根据《中华人民共和国劳动法》第二条第一款“在中华人民共和国境内的企业、个体经济组织（以下统称用人单位）和与之形成劳动关系的劳动者，适用本法”、第七十二条“用人单位和劳动者必须依法参加社会保险，缴纳社会保险费”，《中华人民共和国社会保险法》第十条第一款、第二款“职工应当参加基本养老保险，由用人单位和职工共同缴纳基本养老保险费。无雇工的个体工商户、未在用人单位参加基本养老保险的非全日制从业人员以及其他灵活就业人员可以参加基本养老保险，由个人缴纳基本养老保险费”，《浙江省人力资源和社会保障厅关于被判处有期徒刑人员基本养老保险有关问题的复函》（浙人社函[2010]358号）等规定服刑人员在服刑期间不属于职工基本养老保险参保对象，服刑期间参保属于违规参保缴费，该期间缴纳的职工基本养老保险应当清退。

显而易见，上述《劳动法》和《社会保险法》包括《浙江省职工基本养老保险条例》里的规定，是要求用人单位和劳动者去缴纳社会保险费，立法目的是保障从业人员的社会保险权利，里面并没有“服刑人员不能参加社会保险”的强制性规定；至于浙人社函[2010]358号《复函》，是（此件依申请公开），根据法律未经公布不生效的原则，“依申请公开”不能等同于“公布”，没有对抗不知情相对人的任何效力；《复函》做出日期是“二〇一〇年九月三十日”、印发日期是2010年10月9日，对我在2010年9月13日已经结束的第一次服刑四年期间缴费显然没有追溯效果；更何况《复函》不具备《中华人民共和国立法法》中有关法律、行政法规、地方性法规、自治条例和单行条例、规章的级别和效果，属于无立法权的政府部门替自己“既当运动员，又当裁判员”制定的“比赛规则”，里面所指的“服刑人员不能参加社会保险”明显属于2018年2月8日施行的《最高人民法院关于适用〈中华人民共和国行政诉讼法〉的解释》99 条将典型的关于行政主体“重大且明显违法”的情形之“第二，减损权利或增加义务的行政行为没有法律依据。”，所以也不能作为政府自己违约的依据。

陈树庆认为自己已经到了法定年龄享受退休的资格与待遇，除了前述实际已缴费的年限及对政府信赖利益保护原则以外，没有任一现行法律的条款明确规定服刑人员在服刑期间不得享有社会保险。而在对陈树庆的两次判刑的判决书中，判决了剥夺一定期限的人身自由与政治权利，并没有判决剥夺社会经济权利当然包括享有社会保险的权利。根据中华人民共和国政府1997年10月27日签署、全国人民代表大会常务委员会2001年2月28日批准的已经具备法律效力的《经济、社会及文化权利国际公约》“第九条：本盟约缔约国确认人人享有社会保障，包括社会保险”的规定，陈树庆并不因为其服刑就成了“人人”之外，应该享有社会保险。

    更何况，本案如果进一步展开下去，还牵涉到中国监狱普遍的对犯人强制无偿劳动的问题。本案原告陈树庆第一次坐牢期间自2008年1月至2010年9月共计2年零8个月在浙江省乔司监狱六分监狱七监区参与生产外贸箱包3个月及伙房菜班组进行菜肴初加工2年5个月；第二次坐牢期间自2017年1月至2025年3月共计8年2个月在浙江省乔司监狱三分监狱六监区参与生产外贸箱包3个月及伙房面食组烧制犯人主食7年11个月。两次坐牢期间不算第一次坐牢看守所里的零星劳动，实际参加监狱劳动累计10年10个月，所以，根据早在1948年12月10日联合国大会通过的《世界人权宣言》第四条“任何人不得使为奴隶或奴役，一切形式的奴隶制度和奴隶买卖，均应禁止”；第二十二条“每个人，作为社会的一员，有享有社会保障，并有权享有他的个人尊严和人格的自由发展所必须的经济、社会和文化方面各种权利的实现，……”；第二十三条第（二）款“人人有同工同酬之权利，不容任何区别”。中华人民共和国政府1998年10月5日签署的《公民权利及政治权利国际公约》也有“任何人不得使充奴工”的相关规定。按照这些国际法的要求，即使监狱犯人依法判决并以改造为目标的服“苦役”，也应与《中华人民共和国劳动法》相应的同工同酬及社会保险接轨。如果作为联合国常任理事国的我国政府能够遵守这些宣言与公约，将我服刑期间参加劳动应有的劳动报酬与社会保障予以考量和贯彻，即使我自己及亲朋好友工作单位替我服刑期间的缴费不算，也够15年以上办理退休的资格与相关手续。

当然，政府遵守已经签署、甚至有的已经批准的《国际公约》，不仅是法治社会依法行政的要求，也是一个文明社会起码得“公序良俗”。

综上，无论是《浙江省人力资源和社会保障厅关于被判处有期徒刑人员基本养老保险有关问题的复函》的抽象行政行为，还是杭州市拱墅区社会保险管理服务中心处理陈树庆退休事宜的具体行政行为，为了让行政主体可以“约而不守”，对自己的权力做出了超出法律规定的扩张性理解，对民众的权利做出了法律规定以外的压缩性诠释，法律在他们眼里于己于人双重标准，成了权力随意拿捏、对别人可紧、对自己可松的橡皮筋，而非可以将权力关进笼子的刚性标准。

好在《最高人民法院关于适用〈中华人民共和国行政诉讼法〉的解释》99 条将行政主体“减损（行政相对人）权利或增加（行政相对人）义务的行政行为”认定为“没有法律依据”。接下来，我不妨探究司法这一权力制衡的“笼子”，在实践中是否足够刚性与坚硬，能不能关住行政权力这一“猛兽”，拭目以待！ 

附：一、盖着“杭州市拱墅区社会保险管理服务中心”印章的《告知书》；

二、《浙江省人力资源和社会保障厅文件》浙人社函[2010]358号。

2026年1月2日 完稿于中国杭州

Can a Cage Made of Rubber Bands Confine the Beast of Power?

Author: Chen ShuqingEditor: Feng RengManaging Editor: Zhong RanProofreader: Lin XiaolongTranslator: Peng Xiaomei

Abstract:The author recounts his experience of being denied a pension by a social security agency on the grounds of “non-compliance with policy,” arguing that the government has breached its commitment and lacks sufficient legal basis. The article analyzes the legal effectiveness of social insurance contributions made by incarcerated persons and the legal force of official reply letters and emphasizes that the judiciary should serve as the “cage” that restrains administrative power.

In a society governed by the rule of law, the purpose of enacting laws, establishing systems of checks and balances on power, and safeguarding the people’s right to supervision is to confine power—the beast—within a cage, so that while power is fully exercised in service of society, abuses of power are effectively prevented, ensuring that this beast cannot harm the people’s freedom and rights.

The metaphor of power as a beast, and of law, institutions, and the people’s supervisory rights as a cage, appeared as early as October 10, 2004, when U.S. President George W. Bush, in a discussion of national security and power, used the phrase “Power is a formidable, awesome beast.” In a subsequent speech, he put it even more vividly: “The most precious achievement in thousands of years of human history is not dazzling technology, not the classic works of great masters, not politicians’ flowery speeches, but the realization of the dream of taming rulers and putting them in cages. Only by taming them and locking them up can they be prevented from harming people. I am now speaking to you from inside the cage.”

On January 22, 2013, shortly after assuming office, General Secretary Xi Jinping of the Communist Party of China, in an anti-corruption speech at the Second Plenary Session of the 18th Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, also proposed to “lock power in a cage.” In the more than ten years since, whether in Xi’s speeches or in other official documents, the phrase “lock power in a cage” has been repeatedly emphasized. But what have the actual results been? Official propaganda and public opinion offer divergent views. For me personally, it is my own lived experience and reflections that are the most profound.

At just after 9 a.m. on December 25, 2025, I received a phone call from 0571-87882793. On the other end was Chen Mingpeng, the staff member in Room 105 who had received me on December 17 when I handled my retirement procedures at the Gongshu District Government Service Center on Xiangjisi Road No. 58. He said he had just learned that I had already submitted an application for retirement on December 4 to Daguan Subdistrict, and that he had now also received my “Application for Government Information Disclosure” submitted to the Hangzhou Gongshu District Human Resources and Social Security Bureau. He said the materials I requested were ready and asked me to come pick them up. I agreed and arrived before 10 a.m. I received several documents, including a “Notice” stamped with the seal of the “Hangzhou Gongshu District Social Insurance Management Service Center,” and a document dated September 30, 2010, titled “Reply on Issues Concerning Basic Pension Insurance for Persons Sentenced to Fixed-Term Imprisonment (This Document Is Disclosed Upon Request)” (Zhejiang Human Resources and Social Security Letter [2010] No. 358) issued by the Zhejiang Provincial Department of Human Resources and Social Security.

After reading these materials, I felt both disappointed and relieved. I was disappointed because the “Notice” explicitly rejected my application to receive a pension on the grounds of “non-compliance with policy,” despite the fact that my 24 years and 4 months of social insurance contributions exceeded the minimum requirement of 15 years. It only confirmed that my “legally valid actual contribution period for employee basic pension insurance” was 9 years and 10 months. It seemed that receiving my pension now would be very difficult. I was relieved because the legal and policy bases cited in the “Notice” were clearly misapplied or lacked sufficient legal force, leaving room for further rights-protection efforts.

The facts of this case are as follows: I, Chen Shuqing, along with my family and the units through which I worked or had my social insurance registered, paid social insurance contributions on my behalf, and were never clearly informed that contributions could not be made during periods of imprisonment. Even after my final release upon completion of my sentence on March 10, 2025, the social insurance contributions for the most recent years of interrupted payments (including some periods during imprisonment) were successfully completed through several supplementary payments to the Gongshu District social insurance agency. The social insurance agency had no difficulty collecting the contributions, but when it came time to fulfill its insurance obligations, it suddenly changed its position, citing so-called “relevant policies” to refuse to perform its social insurance responsibilities. Thus, the core dispute in this case first centers on whether the people’s legitimate expectation interests vis-à-vis the government can be protected in specific administrative actions—put more plainly, whether the government can arbitrarily breach its commitments.

It is not hard to see that in recent decades, cases of government breach of commitment have repeatedly appeared in public discourse. If the government can breach commitments at will, the public will inevitably face uncertainty and confusion, fearing that government power may devour their rights like a beast. Although in each case the government offers certain “reasons” to justify its failure to honor its word, those reasons must withstand strict legal scrutiny. Do the “relevant policies” relied upon by the Hangzhou Gongshu District social insurance agency to refuse to process my pension eligibility actually hold water? This article now offers a preliminary analysis.

The legal relationships in this case are constituted by two sets of facts. The first concerns the payment of social insurance contributions, including whether contributions made during imprisonment are valid. I, Chen Shuqing, and my employing units are the obligors of payment, while the government (the social insurance agency and fiscal authorities) are the rights holders of collection. The second concerns the receipt of a pension upon reaching statutory retirement age, at which point I become the rights holder (beneficiary), and the government becomes the obligor for social insurance payment. Because the social insurance agency performs government social insurance management and service duties under statutory authorization, this conduct has the nature of a specific administrative act; yet because the entire process is jointly completed by a civil subject (me) and an administrative subject (the social insurance agency), it resembles a “contract” in civil legal behavior. If the social insurance agency asserts that the 10 years and 6 months of social insurance contributions paid during my imprisonment are invalid, then the conclusion in the “Notice” that I have only 9 years and 10 months of valid contributions would stand. If I maintain that all contributions I made, including those during imprisonment, are valid, then the determination in the “Notice” is erroneous, and the Hangzhou Gongshu District Social Insurance Management Service Center, representing the government, should immediately complete my retirement procedures and pay the statutory and agreed-upon pension on time.

A modern society governed by the rule of law operates on the principle that “for the government, what is not authorized by law is prohibited; for the people, what is not prohibited by law is free.” If one claims that my payment of social insurance contributions during imprisonment is invalid, one must point out what the law “prohibits.” On this issue, the Civil Code of the People’s Republic of China contains relevant provisions regarding the validity of civil legal acts. Article 153 of Chapter 6, Section 3, “General Provisions,” of Book One of the Civil Code provides: “A civil legal act that violates mandatory provisions of laws or administrative regulations is void… A civil legal act that violates public order or good morals is void.” Thus, “violation of mandatory provisions of laws or administrative regulations” or “violation of public order or good morals” are prerequisites for invalidity.

From the “Notice” provided by the Hangzhou Gongshu District Social Insurance Management Service Center, it can be seen that its reason for repudiating the agreement and refusing to perform its social insurance obligations to me is based on Article 2, Paragraph 1, and Article 72 of the Labor Law of the People’s Republic of China; Article 10, Paragraphs 1 and 2, of the Social Insurance Law of the People’s Republic of China; and the “Reply on Issues Concerning Basic Pension Insurance for Persons Sentenced to Fixed-Term Imprisonment” (Zhejiang Human Resources and Social Security Letter [2010] No. 358). These provisions assert that incarcerated persons do not fall within the scope of insured participants in employee basic pension insurance, that participation during imprisonment constitutes irregular enrollment, and that contributions paid during such periods should be refunded.

It is evident that the provisions of the Labor Law, the Social Insurance Law, and the Regulations on Employee Basic Pension Insurance of Zhejiang Province require employers and workers to pay social insurance contributions, with the legislative purpose of safeguarding workers’ social insurance rights. They do not contain any mandatory provision stating that incarcerated persons may not participate in social insurance. As for the Reply Letter [2010] No. 358, it was disclosed “upon request.” Under the principle that laws not promulgated do not take effect, “disclosed upon request” cannot be equated with “promulgated,” and thus has no effect against uninformed parties. Moreover, the date of issuance of the Reply is September 30, 2010, with a distribution date of October 9, 2010, and it clearly has no retroactive effect on the first period of my imprisonment, which ended on September 13, 2010. Furthermore, the Reply lacks the legal status and effect of laws, administrative regulations, local regulations, autonomous regulations, separate regulations, or rules as provided under the Legislative Law of the People’s Republic of China. It is a set of “competition rules” made by a government department without legislative authority, acting as both “athlete and referee.” Its assertion that “incarcerated persons may not participate in social insurance” clearly falls under the circumstance described in Article 99 of the Supreme People’s Court’s Interpretation on the Application of the Administrative Litigation Law (effective February 8, 2018): “Second, administrative acts that reduce rights or increase obligations without a legal basis,” which constitutes a “serious and obvious illegality.” Therefore, it cannot serve as a basis for the government’s breach of commitment.

I, Chen Shuqing, believe that having reached the statutory retirement age, I am entitled to retirement qualifications and benefits. Apart from the actual contribution period already paid and the principle of protecting legitimate expectations, there is no existing legal provision that explicitly states that incarcerated persons may not enjoy social insurance during imprisonment. In the two criminal judgments against me, the penalties imposed were deprivation of personal liberty and political rights for a certain period; there was no judgment depriving me of social and economic rights, including the right to social insurance. According to Article 9 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, signed by the Chinese government on October 27, 1997, and approved by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on February 28, 2001, which has legal effect—“The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to social security, including social insurance”—I do not cease to be part of “everyone” merely because I was incarcerated, and should enjoy social insurance.

Moreover, if this case is pursued further, it also involves the widespread issue of compulsory unpaid labor imposed on prisoners in Chinese prisons. During my first imprisonment, from January 2008 to September 2010, I spent a total of 2 years and 8 months in the Seventh Ward of the Sixth Division of Qiaosi Prison in Zhejiang Province, participating in the production of export bags for 3 months and in preliminary food processing in the prison kitchen for 2 years and 5 months. During my second imprisonment, from January 2017 to March 2025, I spent 8 years and 2 months in the Sixth Ward of the Third Division of Qiaosi Prison, participating in export bag production for 3 months and in cooking staple foods for prisoners in the kitchen for 7 years and 11 months. Excluding sporadic labor during detention before my first imprisonment, I participated in prison labor for a cumulative total of 10 years and 10 months. According to Article 4 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the UN General Assembly on December 10, 1948—“No one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all their forms”; Article 22—“Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security…”; and Article 23(2)—“Everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to equal pay for equal work”—as well as provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights signed by the Chinese government on October 5, 1998 prohibiting forced labor, even prisoners lawfully sentenced to “penal labor” for the purpose of reform should have their labor aligned with the principles of equal pay for equal work and social insurance under the Labor Law of the People’s Republic of China. If our government, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, were to comply with these declarations and covenants, and take into account and implement the labor remuneration and social security due for my labor during imprisonment, then even without counting the contributions paid by myself, my family, or my employers during imprisonment, I would still meet the 15-year requirement for retirement eligibility and related procedures.

Of course, for the government to comply with international covenants that it has signed—and in some cases ratified—is not only a requirement of governing according to law in a rule-of-law society, but also a minimum standard of “public order and good morals” for a civilized society.

In sum, whether it is the abstract administrative act embodied in the “Reply on Issues Concerning Basic Pension Insurance for Persons Sentenced to Fixed-Term Imprisonment” issued by the Zhejiang Provincial Department of Human Resources and Social Security, or the specific administrative act by the Hangzhou Gongshu District Social Insurance Management Service Center in handling my retirement, both reflect an expansionist interpretation of power beyond legal limits in order to allow the administrative authority to “break its promises,” and a restrictive interpretation of citizens’ rights beyond what the law provides. In their eyes, the law applies double standards—tight on others, loose on themselves—becoming a rubber band that power can stretch at will, rather than a rigid standard capable of confining power in a cage.

Fortunately, Article 99 of the Supreme People’s Court’s Interpretation on the Application of the Administrative Litigation Law identifies administrative acts that “reduce the rights of administrative counterparts or increase their obligations” as acts “without legal basis.” Next, I intend to examine whether the judiciary—the “cage” of power checks and balances—is sufficiently rigid and strong in practice to confine the “beast” of administrative power. We shall wait and see.

Appendices:

“Notice” stamped with the seal of the Hangzhou Gongshu District Social Insurance Management Service Center.

Zhejiang Human Resources and Social Security Letter [2010] No. 358.

Completed on January 2, 2026, in Hangzhou, China.