作者：张致君

编辑：李聪玲 校对：程筱筱 翻译：戈冰

“斩首”现在已经成为公共讨论中的高频词，情绪已经压过理性。尼古拉斯·马杜罗被美国政府捕获，阿里·哈梅内伊被美国政府击毙，无论是针对委内瑞拉的强人政治，还是伊朗的神权结构，外界都曾反复出现同一种声音：一个独裁者倒下，是否就会改变国家现状？

在威权政体转型的公共讨论中，政治精英的突发性更迭常被赋予过度跨时代的意义。“个体清算”仅属于政治学意义上的“突发事件”，无法自动诱发“结构性转型”。公众对“强人政治”的瓦解常抱有一种基于“政治清算叙事”的乐观预期。

必须先说清楚一点——独裁者的灭亡，从道义上讲，永远不值得同情。长期依赖压制、恐惧与控制维系统治的人，其权力终结本身，就是历史对权力滥用的回应。强人政治本质上压缩社会空间、扭曲制度运行、制造系统性恐惧。它的终结，无论以何种形式发生，在价值判断上都不需要替它辩护。

但问题在于，肯定独裁者的灭亡，并不等于可以把那一刻当作制度重生的完成。

以委内瑞拉为例，在马杜罗执政时期，权力高度集中，司法与军方被深度政治化，反对派长期受压。国际社会多次预测“临界时刻”即将到来，甚至出现过短暂的权力对峙。但真正改变国家命运的，并不是某个瞬间的冲击，而是军方站位、制度安排、经济结构和社会力量对比。如果这些结构没有重组，强人离场也未必带来制度性自由。

再看伊朗，哈梅内伊作为最高领袖，掌握宗教合法性与宪政之上的权威。外界长期设想“后哈梅内伊时代”的权力走向。但伊朗真正的核心，不仅是个人，而是“最高领袖—革命卫队—宗教监护委员会”这一整套权力体系。如果体系仍然完整，换人并不意味着换轨道。

这正是问题的关键：独裁的本质，不是某个人的性格，而是一种结构安排。

如果权力结构允许一个位置同时拥有军队的最终控制权，司法的最终解释权，媒体的话语垄断权，行政的任命主导权。这样的政权无论是谁掌控，都是在制度惯性中强化集中。因而人们在庆祝独裁者的灭亡只是历史的节点，却绝不是历史的终点。

一位叫Iman Jalali的伊朗人对体制的恐怖分析尤其警醒：哈梅内伊死了，很好。但现实远没有那么简单。伊朗已经为这一时刻准备了地球上最严密的应急计划，每个关键职位都设有四级继任机制，军事打击事先获得授权，地区指挥官无需德黑兰的命令即可采取行动。

当文章被读到时，新的最高领导人已经诞生。政府没有被推翻，体制承受了冲击，而这一切正是体制设计的初衷。所有可信的情报都指向同一个结论：后哈梅内伊时代的伊朗，更有可能变得更加强硬，而不是温和；伊斯兰革命卫队将更加活跃、更具威胁。对于伊朗人民而言，这种制度韧性可能带来比哈梅内伊本人更严重的压迫。

情绪让人渴望一个干脆的句号。多年压抑之后，人们自然希望看到象征性的崩塌。但政治现实没有句号，只有结构。如果结构没有被拆解，真空只会被新的力量填补。在高度集权体制中，权力真空往往引发内部重组，而不是自动民主化。历史多次证明，混乱中人们对“稳定”的渴望，反而可能为新的权力集中提供理由。这就是为什么，把政治想象成一次“终极清算”是危险的。它让人误以为问题的根源在“某个人”，而忽视了真正需要被改变的是：

权力如何分配。

权力如何被监督。

权力如何被限制。

真正的政治成熟，不是否认独裁者应当退出历史，而是明白制度没有约束机制，新的强人随时会出现。民主从来不是独裁者倒下的自然结果。它是一种制度设计的产物，是规则被写进法律、被执行、被普遍接受的结果。它意味着任何人掌权，也不能为所欲为；即使掌权者拥有多数，也不能压死少数；即使最高领袖声称代表国家，也必须受法律限制。

在强人政治中，人们习惯等待“关键人物”。在成熟制度中，人们依赖规则。民智不是情绪高潮，而是规则意识的形成。是多数人开始理解权力必须被拆分、军队必须国家化、司法必须独立、媒体必须开放，并愿意为这些原则承担责任。公民社会的成长，比任何戏剧性节点都更重要。

独裁者的灭亡，值得肯定，它象征着压迫性节点的终结。但真正值得庆祝的，不是独裁者名字消失，而是从此以后没有人可以再拥有那样的权力。如果权力仍然没有边界，那么下一位坐上去的人，可能只是换一种语言、换一种风格，却在同样的轨道上运行。

情绪可以推翻一个象征，理性才能建构一个制度。历史不会因为一次震荡就自动改变方向。方向取决于结构是否重组，规则是否重写，权力是否真正被关进制度的笼子。

真正的胜利，不是强人的终结，而是强人政治的终结。

前者是事件，后者是结构。

中文世界中“斩首习近平”的呼吁绝对是对个人权力滥用的一种回应，具有象征性意义的存在。但中共的体制也早已设计得天衣无缝：权力不仅集中在一个人身上，更深深嵌入了党、军队、宣传体系、官僚网络和地方利益集团的多层次结构。谁上位，国家机器照样运转。

中共不依赖个人，它是依赖制度化的权力链条。军队、公安、宣传、行政、地方党组织，各自独立又互相牵制，即便习近平倒下，继任机制、核心领导班子、应急指挥体系早已准备完毕。权力空缺不会变成民主自由的空白，而是被制度化安排的下一位掌权者迅速填补。清掉一个名字，政治也不会解放。更重要的是，这套机器经过几十年的运作，已经学习了如何在震荡中自我稳固。任何外部冲击、内部动荡，都不会让制度本身被撼动太久。军队和安全系统有明确指挥链条；地方党组织在平衡中央与本地利益中已形成自我保护机制；宣传和舆论系统能够在瞬间重塑合法性。斩首只是切掉了一个象征，却不能拆掉支撑权力的框架。幻想中有人认为下一任会更温和、会开放空间，这是典型的逻辑错误。历史和现实告诉我们：权力空缺往往促使体制强化，而不是松动。继任者必须维持党的统一和权力集中，否则体系会崩塌。

如同伊朗的哈梅内伊，核心人物的倒下并没有撕裂制度，制度反而借此机会显示了韧性和自我延续的能力。中共也同样如此。

把希望寄托在“习近平倒下”上，本质还是在消费强人逻辑，只是从崇拜换成仇恨。真正的关键不在个人，而在制度。如果没有制度约束，司法、军队、宣传、官僚体系依然可以被新的掌权者无限扩张。斩首幻想只会让你忽略长期问题，而政治现实永远关注结构。

所以人们在幻想斩首习近平能带来自由，请先清醒：斩首只是事件，制度才是结构。前者短暂，后者长久。任何真正的改变，都必须从结构入手，而不是偶像。

对于我们来说，独裁政权必然灭亡，只是先别呼吸，路还很长，一切只是刚刚开始。

Political Liquidation Is Not the Same as Institutional Transformation

Abstract: “Political liquidation” is not the same as “institutional transformation”. Consider Nicolás Maduro, Ali Khamenei, and Xi Jinping, who emphasized that dictatorship is about power structures, not individuals, and that only institutional reconfiguration can lead to real transformation.

By Zhang Zhijun

Editor: Li Congling Proofreading: Cheng Xiaoxiao Translation: Ge Bing

“Beheadings” are now a high-frequency word in public discourse, and emotions have trumped reason. Whether it is the strongman politics of Venezuela or the theocratic structure of Iran, the same refrain has been repeated about whether the fall of a dictator will change the state of the country.

Sudden changes in the political elite are often given excessive, epochal significance in public discussions of authoritarian transitions. “Individual resolution” is a political “contingency” that does not automatically trigger a “structural transition.” The public often has an optimistic expectation of the unraveling of strongman politics based on a “narrative of political liquidation”.

To be clear — the demise of dictators is never morally compassionate. The end of power for those who have long relied on repression, fear, and control to maintain the system is itself history’s response to abuse. Strongman politics essentially reduces social space, distorts institutional functioning, and creates systemic fear. Its end, in any form, does not need to be defended in terms of value.

But the problem is that affirming the demise of dictators does not amount to treating that moment as the completion of institutional rebirth.

Consider Venezuela, where under Maduro, power was highly concentrated, the judiciary and military were deeply politicized, and the opposition long suppressed. The international community has repeatedly predicted that a “critical moment” is at hand, and even a brief power stand-off has occurred. But what really changes the country’s destiny is not an instant shock, but rather the military’s standing, institutional arrangements, economic structure and social balance of power. If these structures are not restructured, the departure of the strongman does not necessarily lead to institutional freedom.

Consider Iran, where, as supreme leader, Khamenei commands authority over religious legitimacy and constitutionalism. Power in the post-Khamenei era has long been envisioned. But the real core of Iran is not just the individual, but the entire power system of the Supreme Leader — the Revolutionary Guards — the Guardian Council. If the system remains intact, changing people does not mean changing tracks.

That is the point: the nature of dictatorship is not a person’s character, but a structural arrangement.

If the power structure allows a position to have the ultimate control of the military, the ultimate interpretation of the judiciary, the discourse monopoly of the media, the executive appointment dominance. Regimes like these, whoever controls them, reinforce concentration in institutional inertia. Thus, the celebration of the demise of dictators is only the end of history, not the end of it.

One Iranian, Iman Jalali, was particularly alarmed by the regime’s horror analysis: Khamenei is dead, good. But the reality is far less straightforward. Iran has prepared the most rigorous contingency plan on earth for this moment, with four levels of succession for every key position, pre-authorized military strikes, and regional commanders able to act without orders from Tehran.

By the time the article was read, a new supreme leader was born. The government has not been overthrown, the system has been hit, and that is what the system was designed for. All credible intelligence points to the same conclusion: a post-Khamenei Iran is more likely to be assertive than moderate; the IRGC will be more active and more threatening. For Iranians, this institutional resilience could lead to even greater oppression than Khamenei himself.

Emotions make one yearn for a clean end. After years of repression, it is natural to hope for a symbolic collapse. But there is no end to political reality. There is only structure. If the structure is not dismantled, the vacuum will only be filled by new forces. In highly centralized systems, power vacuums often lead to internal restructuring rather than automatic democratization. History has shown time and again that the desire for “stability” amid chaos can justify new concentration of power. That is why it is dangerous to imagine politics as a “final reckoning”. It creates the illusion that the problem is rooted in “someone,” while ignoring what really needs to change:

how power is distributed.

how power is monitored.

how power is restricted.

Real political maturity is not to deny that dictators should withdraw from history, but to understand that institutions have no discipline and that new strongmen are ready to emerge. Democracy was never a natural consequence of the fall of dictators. It is a product of institutional design, the result of rules being written into law, enforced, and universally accepted. It means that no one in power can do anything they want; that even if the people in power have a majority, the minority cannot be crushed; and that even if the Supreme Leader claims to represent the country, it must be subject to the law.

In strongman politics, people are used to waiting for the “key man”. In mature systems, people rely on rules. The wisdom of the people is not an emotional climax, but the formation of a sense of rules. It is the majority that has come to understand that power must be dismantled, that the military must be nationalized, that the judiciary must be independent, that the media must be open and willing to take responsibility for these principles. The growth of civil society is more important than any dramatic juncture.

The demise of dictators, to its credit, symbolizes the end of the node of oppression. But it is not the disappearance of the dictator’s name that is really worth celebrating, but the fact that no one will ever be able to wield that power again. If power remains boundless, the next person to sit on it may simply be a different language, a different style, but on the same track.

Emotions can overturn a symbol, and reason is what builds a system. History does not automatically change direction in response to a shock. Direction depends on whether the structure is restructured, rules rewritten, and power is genuinely locked in a cage of institutions.

The real victory is not the end of the strongman, but the end of the strongman politics.

The former is the event, the latter is the structure.

The Chinese-language call to “behead Xi Jinping” is an unqualified response to the abuse of individual power and a symbolic presence. But the CCP’s system has long been designed to be seamless: power is not concentrated in one person; it is embedded in the party, the military, the propaganda system, the bureaucracy, and the local interest groups. The state machine is still running.

The CCP does not rely on individuals; it relies on institutionalized power chains. The military, the public security, propaganda, the administration, and local party organizations are independent and interfering, and even with Xi’s fall, succession mechanisms, core leadership, and emergency command systems have been prepared. The power gap will not become a democratic and liberal void, but will be filled quickly by the next holder of power, who is institutionalized. Politics can’t be liberated without a name. More important, the machine has learnt how to stabilize itself in shock after decades of operation. No external shock, no internal upheaval will shake the system itself for long. The military and security systems have clear chains of command; local party organizations have developed self-protection mechanisms to balance central and local interests; and propaganda and opinion systems can restore legitimacy in an instant. Beheadings cut out a symbol, but not the framework that underpins power. It is a classic logical mistake to imagine that the next generation will be gentler and open up. History and reality tell us that power vacancies tend to lead to institutional strengthening, not loosening. Successors must maintain party unity and concentration of power or the system will collapse.

As in Iran’s Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the fall of the central figure did not tear the system apart; instead, the system took the opportunity to show resilience and self-perpetuation. The same is true of the Chinese Communist Party.

The essence of pinning hope on “Xi Jinping’s downfall” is to consume strongman logic, from admiration to hatred. The real key is not the individual, but the system. Without institutional constraints, the judiciary, military, propaganda, and bureaucracy can be expanded indefinitely by the new rulers. Beheading fantasies only make you ignore long-term issues, and political reality always focuses on structure.

So people are imagining that beheading Xi Jinping will bring freedom. The former is short; the latter is long. Any real change must start with structure, not idols.

For us, the dictatorship is doomed. It’s just a long way to go. It’s just the beginning.