作者：张兴贵

极权主义国家为何事故多发、频发。这绝非孤立的技术故障、个别官员渎职、偶然的天灾；不是管理失误，不是技术落后，更不是“发展阶段问题”，而是极权制度内在逻辑的必然产物。它根植于权力结构的本质，层层衍生出信息、激励、认知与文化的系统性扭曲。

第一层，权力的高度垄断。极权主义的核心是权力的绝对集中与不可分割。它不仅垄断暴力与资源，更试图垄断真理与未来。这种“单一大脑”治理复杂社会的狂妄，哈耶克称之为“致命的自负”。复杂系统中的知识是分散的、默会的、动态的，任何中央计划者都不可能完全掌握。而极权体制却拒绝承认这一人类认知的根本限制，坚信通过意识形态与行政命令就能实现完美控制。这一原罪直接导致系统性认知盲区。决策者远离现场，信息链条冗长且被层层过滤；基层的真实风险信号在上传过程中被扭曲、淡化甚至删除。因为承认问题就等于承认体制优越性的瑕疵。结果是风险被低估，隐患被常态化，事故从“可预防”变成“必然爆发”。于是，小概率事件变成大概率灾难。

第二层，问责向上负责而非向下负责。权力垄断必然衍生出扭曲的激励结构。官员与管理者的仕途、利益和安全，全部系于上级的评价，而非实际的安全绩效或公众福祉。这就形成了经典的“委托-代理”问题极端化：地方官员的最理性的选择永远是掩盖、粉饰、甩锅，而不是根治。小事故被定性为“不可抗力”或“个别现象”，以避免影响政绩；安全投入被挤压，因为它不产生短期可见的政治红利；报告真相的风险远高于隐瞒的风险——前者可能被视为“政治不成熟”，后者最多是“技术事故”。这种激励错位制造了负反馈缺失的恶性循环：错误得不到纠正，反而被强化。

第三层，信息封闭与恐惧文化。极权体制必须控制叙事，因为真相是权力的天敌。媒体、学术、工会皆被纳入宣传体系，独立监督被视为威胁。于是形成了双重信息屏障：对上隐瞒与对下封锁。一线工程师、工人发现隐患却不敢言——因为批评可能被上纲上线为“动摇军心”“别有用心”。久而久之，“报喜不报忧”成为生存理性，专业判断让位于政治忠诚。安全文化无法生成，取而代之的是形式主义与表演式治理。这种封闭切断了跨层级、跨领域的纠错机制。民主法治社会通过自由言论、独立调查和司法问责，形成持续的进化压力；而极权体制则像一个封闭的热力学系统，熵值（混乱度）不断累积，直至以灾难形式释放。

第四层，专业主义崩塌与人才逆淘汰。忠诚优先于能力的选拔机制，必然导致逆向选择。真正懂安全、敢担当的专业人才被边缘化，甚至被淘汰；善于揣摩上意、粉饰太平者则步步高升。腐败进一步加剧这一过程：安全资金被挪用、设备偷工减料、监管走过场成为常态。结果是整个治理链条的专业能力与责任感同步衰减。

编辑：Geoffrey Jin 校对：毛一炜 翻译：戈冰

Phenomenon of Totalitarianism, Part V: High and Frequent Occurrence of Accidents

By Zhang Xinggui

Abstract: This paper explores the institutional roots of frequent accidents under totalitarian regimes, arguing that major disasters do not stem merely from technical flaws, management failures, or accidental factors, but are rather the systemic consequences of the extreme concentration of power. The author points out that when power monopolizes decision-making, information, and truth, the dispersed knowledge required by a complex society cannot be effectively gathered, and risk information at the primary level is continuously distorted as it passes upward through administrative layers, creating cognitive blind spots and decision-making deviations. Under the pressure to maintain the correctness of the system, problems are covered up and hidden hazards accumulate, ultimately transforming preventable and controllable risks into major accidents. Through this analysis, the article reflects on the intrinsic limitations of highly centralized regimes in information feedback, risk governance, and public safety.

Why do accidents occur so highly and frequently in totalitarian states? This is by no means an isolated technical breakdown, the dereliction of duty by individual officials, or an accidental natural disaster; it is not a management failure, not technical backwardness, and even less a “problem of the stage of development,” but the inevitable product of the internal logic of the totalitarian system. It is deeply rooted in the essence of the power structure, generating systematic distortions in information, incentives, cognition, and culture at every level.

The first layer: The extreme monopoly of power. The core of totalitarianism is the absolute concentration and indivisibility of power. It not only monopolizes violence and resources, but also attempts to monopolize truth and the future. This arrogance of using a “single brain” to govern a complex society was called “the fatal conceit” by Hayek. Knowledge in a complex system is dispersed, tacit, and dynamic, making it impossible for any central planner to fully master. Totalitarian regimes, however, refuse to acknowledge this fundamental limitation of human cognition, firmly believing that perfect control can be achieved through ideology and administrative orders. This original sin directly leads to systemic cognitive blind spots. Decision-makers are far removed from the ground level, and the information chain is protracted and filtered layer by layer; real risk signals at the primary level are distorted, diluted, or even deleted in the process of being passed upward. This is because admitting a problem is equivalent to admitting a flaw in the superiority of the system. The result is that risks are underestimated, hidden hazards are normalized, and accidents change from “preventable” to “inevitable.” Thus, small-probability events turn into high-probability disasters.

The second layer: Accountability directed upward rather than downward. The monopoly of power inevitably breeds a distorted incentive structure. The political careers, interests, and safety of officials and managers are all bound to the evaluations of their superiors, rather than actual safety performance or public well-being. This creates an extreme version of the classic “principal-agent” problem: the most rational choice for local officials is always to cover up, gloss over, and pass the buck, rather than to address root causes. Minor accidents are categorized as “force majeure” or “isolated phenomena” to avoid affecting political performance achievements; investments in safety are squeezed out because they generate no short-term, visible political dividends; and the risk of reporting the truth is far higher than the risk of concealing it—the former may be regarded as “politically immature,” while the latter is at most a “technical accident.” This misalignment of incentives creates a vicious cycle lacking negative feedback: errors are not corrected, but rather reinforced.

The third layer: Information blockade and a culture of fear. Totalitarian regimes must control the narrative because truth is the natural enemy of power. The media, academia, and labor unions are all incorporated into the propaganda system, and independent supervision is viewed as a threat. Thus, a dual information barrier is formed: concealment from above and blockades against below. Frontline engineers and workers detect hidden hazards yet dare not speak out—because criticism might be politically elevated and branded as “shaking morale” or having “ulterior motives.” Over time, “reporting good news while withholding bad news” becomes the logic for survival, and professional judgment yields to political loyalty. A culture of safety cannot emerge, replaced instead by formalism and performative governance. This closure cuts off cross-level and cross-domain error-correction mechanisms. Democratic societies governed by the rule of law generate continuous pressure for evolution through free speech, independent investigations, and judicial accountability; a totalitarian regime, by contrast, resembles a closed thermodynamic system in which entropy (disorder) continuously accumulates until it is released in the form of disaster.

The fourth layer: The collapse of professionalism and adverse selection of talent. A selection mechanism that prioritizes loyalty over capability inevitably leads to adverse selection. Professional talent who truly understand safety and dare to take responsibility are marginalized or even eliminated, while those adept at figuring out the intentions of superiors and painting a false picture of peace advance step by step. Corruption further exacerbates this process: safety funds are embezzled, materials are cut on equipment, and regulation becomes a mere formality as standard practice. The result is the simultaneous decay of professional competence and sense of responsibility throughout the entire governance chain.

Editor: Geoffrey Jin Proofreader: Mao Yiwei Translator: Ge Bing