作者：關永傑
2026年7月底，中國國務院公佈了新的《中華人民共和國出入境管理條例》，並將於2026年9月15日起正式實施。這部條例是對2012年通過、2013年實施的《中華人民共和國出入境管理法》的配套實施細則，對法律條文進行了進一步的細化。
新規公佈之後，網絡上已經出現了大量分析文章。有人逐條比較哪些規定比以前更加嚴格，哪些審核標準更加細化。但在我看來，他們看到的只是表象，真正的問題，不在於條文本身，而在於中國究竟是一個怎樣運行的社會。
很多人仍然習慣用法治國家的思維去理解中國。他們逐條分析法律，然後得出一個結論：“雖然規定更嚴格了，但對於正常旅遊、探親、留學等完全沒有影響”。當我看到“完全沒有影響”這幾個字，我不禁苦笑。按照我過去有二十年與國內體制內人士接觸、交流的經驗，如果沿著這一趨勢繼續發展，我認為，中國距離重新回到加入世貿前的那種狀態，已經不遠了。
（Ai製圖，圖片與現實無關）
因為中國從來就不是一個真正意義上的法治社會，而是一個以政治為最高原則的人治社會。法律並不是唯一的裁判標準，政治風向、領導意圖、穩定壓倒一切，往往比法律條文本身更重要。
因此，如果只研究法律，而不研究中國政治體系的運行方式，就很容易得出錯誤的判斷。真正需要觀察的，不是法律增加了幾條，而是北京向整個官僚體系釋放了什麼信號。對於基層出入境工作人員來說，他們每天面對的並不是一本法律，而是一套政治責任機制。在現實的考核制度下，基層工作人員往往更關注如何避免承擔政治責任和行政風險。
於是，他們心裡會有一套非常現實的計算：放行一萬人正常出境，對他們沒有任何獎勵，但是，這一萬人當中如果有一個人後來被認定為“非法”轉移資產者，或者是敏感人士，在海外發表了讓有關部門認為“不當”的言論，那麼對於具體審批人員來說，就可能變成一次政治責任事件。一旦出現這樣的情況，被追責的就不僅是個人，而是整個部門、整個單位。
因此，在這種責任機制下，他們最安全的選擇只有一個：寧可錯卡，也不要錯放，錯放了是政治事故，卡住只是按章辦事。這種行事風格就是中國官僚體系長期形成的一種運行邏輯。
也許大家還會問，基層單位有這麼大的能量隨便卡人嗎？那我們來細看本次規定。與以往一樣，中國很多法律條文本身都會保留一定的模糊空間，列舉幾條。
1、最大的“口袋”：“可能危害”
原文（第四款第三條）：“中國公民違反出口管制、技術進出口管理等規定，可能危害國家產業安全、技術安全的，國務院商務等有關主管部門可以決定不准其出境。”
“可能”無法量化，這條文並不依據既定事實，而是引入了“預判/推測”機制，邊檢或商務部門不需要證明你“已經”危害了安全，只需要主觀判定你“可能”危害就可以卡人。
2、剝奪知情權
原文（第六條）：“對依法決定不准出境的人員，決定機關應當向當事人書面告知……；有可能影響國家安全、刑事案件偵查等情形的，可以不告知當事人。”
秘密邊控合法化：這一條直接打破了行政法的程序正義。什麼算“有可能影響國家安全”依然是由官方說了算。如果當事人連自己被限制出境的真實原因和依據都無法掌握，他們就完全無法通過律師提起行政復議或司法訴訟。
3、 以“為你好”為名“保護”你
（第二條），條文規定在“必要時”可“勸阻”公民前往特定國家或地區。所謂“必要時”邊界不清，中國文字一向博大精深，請將“勸”與“阻”拆開來理解一下。
最近較熱門的話題就是，日本現在已被中國定義為“危險國家”。
4、 “長臂管轄”
（第四款第二條），針對所謂在境外從事“危害國家安全和利益”行為的公民，授權相關部門或省級政府限制其出境。此條規定將本來已經很寬泛的“危害國家安全和利益” 概念下放至地方執行，意味著海外言行可能導致回國後被“禁足”，並且地方的自主裁量權又無限地放大了。
5、監控前置，壓力下放
（第十條），該條款通過要求中介機構報告“違規辦理”出境業務，實際上將出境控制的門檻前移。由於“違規”標準不明確，中介機構為求自保極可能選擇主動加碼，將出境服務演變為監控手段，中國人辦理出國手續的關卡又添加了一道。
中國法律條文的這種模糊寬泛，並非漏洞，而是一種故意的制度設計。如果白紙黑字的法律寫得過於具體，過於嚴苛，除了造成執法機關缺乏靈活操作空間之外，也容易在國內及海外引發強烈反彈，甚至成為海外指責中國沒有人權的鐵證。
而保持表述溫和、概念寬泛、標準彈性，就意味著基層擁有更大的自由裁量權。最終，到普通民眾真正面對的時候，實際感受到的限制往往遠遠超過法律條文表面所呈現的內容。
在人治邏輯下，真正決定普通人命運的，很多時候並不是法律寫了什麼，而是執行法律的人，意會到上級希望他們怎麼做。只有理解這一點，才能真正看懂這次出入境新規的本質。讀完全文後，你們覺得中國的大門，還有多大的縫？
編輯：鍾然 校對：王濱 翻译：沈美花
Look Beyond the Text: What the New Chinese Exit and Entry Regulations Truly Change
Author: Guan Yongjie
Summary: An analysis of China’s new “Exit and Entry Administration Regulations,” arguing that what truly affects the freedom to leave the country is not the legal text itself, but rather the political responsibility mechanism and law enforcement discretion under a system of rule by man.
In late July 2026, China’s State Council promulgated the new Exit and Entry Administration Regulations of the People’s Republic of China, which will officially take effect on September 15, 2026. These regulations serve as supplementary implementation rules to the Exit and Entry Administration Law of the People’s Republic of China, which was passed in 2012 and implemented in 2013, further detailing the statutory provisions.
Following the announcement of the new regulations, a flood of analytical articles has already appeared online. Some people line up provisions side-by-side to compare which rules have become stricter and which review criteria have been refined. But in my view, they are only looking at the surface; the real issue does not lie within the text of the regulations itself, but in how Chinese society actually operates.
Many people remain accustomed to understanding China through the mindset of a state governed by rule of law. They analyze the legal clauses one by one and arrive at the conclusion: “Although the rules are stricter, they have absolutely no impact on normal tourism, family visits, or studying abroad.” When I see the phrase “absolutely no impact,” I cannot help but smile wryly. Based on my past twenty years of experience interacting and communicating with insiders within China’s institutional system, if this trend continues to develop, I believe China is not far from returning to the state it was in before joining the WTO.
(AI-generated imagery; images are unrelated to reality)
Because China has never been a true rule-of-law society in the real sense, but rather a system of rule by man where politics serves as the supreme principle. The law is not the sole standard of judgment; political winds, leadership intentions, and the principle of “stability overriding everything” often carry far more weight than the legal provisions themselves.
Therefore, if one only studies the law without examining the operational mechanisms of China’s political system, it is very easy to arrive at erroneous judgments. What truly needs to be observed is not how many clauses have been added to the law, but what signals Beijing is transmitting to the entire bureaucratic apparatus. For frontline immigration and border control personnel, what they face every day is not a legal code, but a system of political accountability. Under the reality of performance evaluation systems, grassroots personnel often focus more on how to avoid bearing political responsibility and administrative risk.
Consequently, they hold a very pragmatic calculation in their minds: letting ten thousand people depart normally yields no reward whatsoever for them. However, if even one of those ten thousand people is later designated as an “illegal” capital flight risk or a sensitive person who makes remarks abroad deemed “improper” by relevant departments, it could turn into a political accountability incident for the specific approval officers. Once such a situation arises, the person held accountable will not just be the individual, but the entire department and unit.
Therefore, under this accountability mechanism, they have only one safest choice: rather make the mistake of blocking someone than the mistake of letting them pass. Letting someone pass by mistake is a political accident, whereas blocking them is merely “acting in accordance with the rules.” This style of operation is a logic long cultivated within China’s bureaucratic system.
Perhaps people might still ask: Do frontline units possess such immense clout that they can arbitrarily block people? Let us take a closer look at these new regulations. As is customary, many of China’s legal provisions intentionally retain a degree of ambiguity, enumerating a few broad clauses:
1. The Biggest “Pocket” Provision: “May Endanger” Original Text (Section 4, Article 3): “Where Chinese citizens violate regulations on export control, technology import and export management, etc., and may endanger national industrial security or technological security, competent departments of the State Council such as commerce may decide to prohibit them from exiting the country.” The word “may” cannot be quantified. This clause does not rely on established facts; instead, it introduces a “prejudgment/speculation” mechanism. Border inspection or commerce departments do not need to prove that you have already endangered security—they only need to subjectively determine that you may do so in order to block you.
2. Deprivation of the Right to Know Original Text (Article 6): “For personnel legally decided to be prohibited from exiting the country, the deciding authority shall notify the parties concerned in writing… in circumstances where it may affect national security, criminal case investigation, etc., the parties concerned may not be notified.” The legalization of secret exit bans: This provision directly shatters the procedural justice of administrative law. What counts as “possibly affecting national security” is still entirely determined by the authorities. If individuals cannot even grasp the true reasons and basis for why their travel has been restricted, they are completely unable to file for administrative reconsideration or judicial litigation through a lawyer.
3. “Protecting” You Under the Guise of “For Your Own Good” (Article 2) stipulates that “when necessary,” citizens can be “persuaded and dissuaded” from traveling to specific countries or regions. The boundaries of so-called “when necessary” are unclear. Chinese phrasing has always been profound and broad; try breaking down the characters for “persuade” (quan) and “dissuade” (zu) to understand them.
A recent trending topic is that Japan has now been defined by China as a “dangerous country.”
4. “Long-Arm Jurisdiction” Original Text (Section 4, Article 2): Targeting citizens who allegedly engage in acts of “endangering national security and interests” overseas, it authorizes relevant departments or provincial governments to restrict their exit. This provision descends the already broad concept of “endangering national security and interests” down to local execution, meaning that speech and conduct overseas could lead to being “grounded” upon returning to China, while local discretionary power is infinitely magnified.
5. Preempting Surveillance and Descending Pressure (Article 10) requires intermediary agencies to report “violations in handling” exit services, effectively shifting the threshold of exit control upstream. Because the standard for what constitutes a “violation” is ambiguous, intermediary agencies are extremely likely to voluntarily increase self-censorship to protect themselves, turning exit services into tools of surveillance—adding yet another checkpoint for Chinese citizens handling overseas travel procedures.
This kind of vagueness and breadth in Chinese legal provisions is not a loophole, but a deliberate institutional design. If black-and-letter law were written too specifically or too harshly, aside from depriving law enforcement agencies of flexible operational space, it would easily provoke fierce domestic and overseas backlash, or even become ironclad evidence for the international community to accuse China of human rights abuses.
Maintaining a mild expression, vague concepts, and elastic standards means that the grassroots possess greater discretionary power. Ultimately, when ordinary citizens face it firsthand, the restrictions they actually experience far exceed what is presented on the surface of the legal text.
Under the logic of rule by man, what truly decides the fate of ordinary people much of the time is not what the law writes, but what those executing the law sense their superiors want them to do. Only by understanding this point can one truly comprehend the essence of these new exit and entry regulations. After reading the full text, how big of a gap do you think remains in China’s open doors?
Editor: Zhong Ran
Proofreader: Wang Bin
Translator: Shen Meihua
