兄弟反目——日共与中共
作者：陀先润
在全球所有的共产党里，骂中国共产党骂得最狠的，不是美国，不是欧洲，而是日本共产党。日共骂中共骂了几十年，骂独裁，骂军国主义，骂文化大革命，骂天安门，骂习近平。骂得比日本自民党还要狠，比美国的民主党共和党加起来还要难听。这件事本身就很奇怪——两个共产党，同属国际共运，为什么会变成这副局面？
答案要从他们之间纠缠了半个世纪的爱恨情仇说起。
日共比中共资历更老，成立于1922年，比中共晚一年。但日共一直认为自己才是亚洲共产主义运动真正的源头，理由不是没有道理：中国最早接触马克思主义的那批人，包括李大钊、陈独秀，读到的都是日文翻译的马列著作。马克思和恩格斯的思想经过俄文翻译，再经过日文翻译，再经过中文翻译，到了中国共产党创始人手里已经是三手材料。日共因此一直觉得自己是老大哥，中共是小弟，这种心态在他们后来的关系里从来没有真正消失过。
但日共在日本本土的处境从一开始就极为艰难。日本政府把共产党视为颠覆国家的组织，从1930年代开始展开大清洗，大批日共党员被逮捕入狱，总书记德田球一坐了将近二十年的牢。剩下没被抓的，要么流亡海外，要么转入地下。一部分人辗转到了苏联，一部分人留在了中国，这就是后来所说的延安派。
延安派里最重要的人物叫野坂参三。他在延安待了好几年，帮中共做日本战俘的思想工作，参加反战同盟，和毛泽东、周恩来都有过来往。1946年他回到日本，在日共五大上提出了一个后来引发巨大争议的主张：日本共产党要走和平革命的路线，不搞武装斗争，通过议会选举来实现社会主义。
这个主张在当时的共产主义世界里是异端。苏联代表共产党情报局公开批评野坂参三，说他是修正主义，说他背叛了革命原则。但批评归批评，野坂参三背后站着的是中国，是一直在延安收留他、培养他的中共。苏联人看得很清楚，这个主张代表的是中国的某种想法，不是野坂参三个人的发明。
日共内部随之分裂成两派。一派叫所感派，支持野坂参三的和平路线，德田球一是代表人物。另一派叫国际派，认为应该跟着苏联走，坚持武装斗争，拒绝妥协。国际派在共产党情报局的支持下，把所感派从日共开除了。
开除之后，所感派的德田球一跑去了中国，在北京召开了日共的中央代表大会，见了毛泽东，又去见了斯大林，试图在中苏两党之间寻找支持。这个操作现在看起来像是闹剧，但在当时的政治格局里是一种现实的生存策略。国际派迫于压力，最终在1954年提交了自我批评，两派重新合并。
但合并之后，日共内部对中共的态度已经分裂，这道裂缝再也没有真正愈合过。国际派的干部记得，是中共和苏共联手，把他们在内部政治斗争里玩弄了一番。这种记忆埋得很深，等待着合适的时机爆发出来。
1966年，机会来了。
那一年，日共总书记宫本显治来中国访问，和周恩来等人进行了会谈。他看到的中国，正在文化大革命的前夜，各种迹象都显示一场大规模的政治运动即将爆发。宫本显治回去之后发表了一份公报，表达了日共对中国国内政治走向的担忧，同时坚持日共走自己的和平议会路线，不跟着中国搞武装革命。
毛泽东看了这份公报，说太软弱了，说这是和平共处，是修正主义。双方就此撕破了脸。中共在日共内部的浮线随之开始浮出水面。
所谓浮线，是中共在日共里长期埋下的一批亲中人士。这批人在日共和中共决裂之后，被日共认定为搅局者，陆续被开除出党。他们出来之后成立了新的派别，继续鼓吹毛泽东思想，继续走武装革命路线。这些分裂出来的小团体，后来成了日本赤军最重要的思想来源之一。
日本赤军的起源可以追溯到1958年成立的共产主义同盟。这个组织最大的特点是，它学习的不是列宁主义，不是苏联模式，而是毛泽东思想，是农村包围城市，是枪杆子里出政权。1966年文化大革命爆发之后，日本的学生运动越来越激进，到1969年，正式成立了赤军派。
赤军派刚成立就遇到了麻烦。他们在大菩萨岭集结了数百人准备军事训练，计划训练完毕之后刺杀日本首相，被日本警察一网打尽。这次失败让赤军派分裂成两股：一股留在日本，和另一个叫革命左派的组织合并，成立了联合赤军，继续在日本本土搞武装斗争；另一股出走海外，寻找新的战场。
留在日本的联合赤军，走上了一条极为惨烈的自我毁灭之路。他们认为之前的失败是因为队伍不纯洁，于是开始内部整风，逐一审查每个成员的革命纯洁性。审查的方式是严刑逼供，逼出认罪之后继续追问，追问出更多的名字，然后对那些名字继续审查。这个过程里，联合赤军自己杀死了自己十四名成员，有些人是被打死的，有些人是在寒冬里被强迫暴露在室外冻死的。
1972年，联合赤军的残余部分躲进了长野县的浅间山庄，被日本警察包围。这场对峙被日本电视台全程直播，全国收视率据说超过了百分之九十。最后警察攻入山庄，逮捕了里面的人。那场直播里有一个细节，当时的纪录片里都有：一个母亲对着山庄喊话，叫里面的儿子出来，说毛泽东已经和尼克松握手了，中美不再是敌人了，你们的使命已经完成了。山庄里回答她的，是她儿子打出来的子弹。
出走海外的那一股，去了中东，和巴勒斯坦的武装组织合作，在中东的沙漠里打游击，搞劫机，制造爆炸。这就是后来被称为日本赤军的那个组织，领袖是一个叫重信房子的女人，后来在第一篇里已经提到过：她被捕时的护照上有二十多次进入中国的记录，在北京居住的时间加起来将近两年。
日共和中共的决裂，最终对两者产生了截然不同的影响。
中共失去了一个潜在的盟友，但在日本留下了一批不受控制的激进势力，这些人后来造成的麻烦，远比一个听话的日共要大得多。日共则在决裂之后，逐渐把自己的政治路线向欧洲社会民主主义方向调整，放弃了武装革命的幻想，专心做议会政治。他们在日本的议席越来越稳固，在地方选举里表现不错，成了日本政治格局里一个正常的组成部分。
这个结局印证了本系列一直在说的那条规律：和中共切割得越彻底，活得越好。马共和泰共紧跟北京，最后在丛林里消耗殆尽。日共在1966年彻底和中共决裂，然后活到了今天，而且活得比任何一个曾经和中共保持密切关系的亚洲共产党都要健康。
日共骂中共骂得那么狠，不是没有原因的。他们比任何人都更清楚，那只手伸进来之后会做什么。
编辑：黄吉洲 校对：周敏 翻译：戈冰
The Party’s Pawns — The Secret History of the CCP’s Export of Revolution (Part V)
Turn Against Brothers—The Japanese Communist Party and the Chinese Communist Party
Author: Tuo Xianrun
Among all the Communist Parties across the globe, the one that fiercely denounces the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) most harshly is neither America nor Europe, but the Japanese Communist Party (JCP).
The JCP has cursed the CCP for decades—denouncing its dictatorship, militarism, the Cultural Revolution, Tiananmen, and Xi Jinping. Their criticisms are even harsher than those of Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), and more biting than the U.S. Democratic and Republican Parties combined. This phenomenon itself is exceedingly strange: two Communist parties belonging to the same international communist movement—why did they end up in such a state?
The answer lies in the half-century of tangled love, hate, and resentment between them.
The JCP possesses a seniority nearly on par with the CCP, having been founded in 1922—just one year after the CCP. Yet the JCP has always considered itself the true origin of the Asian communist movement, and their reasoning is not without foundation: the earliest figures in China to encounter Marxism, including Li Dazhao and Chen Duxiu, read Marxist-Leninist texts translated into Japanese. The ideas of Marx and Engels passed from Russian translations, through Japanese translations, and finally into Chinese translations, reaching the founders of the Chinese Communist Party as third-hand material. Consequently, the JCP always viewed itself as the elder brother and the CCP as the younger brother, a mindset that never truly vanished from their subsequent relationship.
However, the JCP’s predicament within Japan itself was extremely dire from the very beginning. The Japanese government regarded the Communist Party as an organization aimed at subverting the state, launching massive purges starting in the 1930s. Large numbers of JCP members were arrested and imprisoned, with General Secretary Tokuda Kyuichi serving nearly twenty years in prison. Those remaining who escaped arrest either went into exile abroad or went underground. Some eventually made their way to the Soviet Union, while others remained in China—forming what would later be known as the Yan’an faction.
The most critical figure within the Yan’an faction was Nosaka Sanzo. He stayed in Yan’an for several years, assisting the CCP with ideological work among Japanese prisoners of war, participating in anti-war leagues, and interacting directly with Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai. Returning to Japan in 1946, he proposed a proposition at the 5th National Congress of the JCP that later sparked immense controversy: the Japanese Communist Party should pursue a path of peaceful revolution, eschewing armed struggle and achieving socialism through parliamentary elections.
This proposition was considered heresy within the communist world at the time. Representing the Cominform, the Soviet Union publicly criticized Nosaka Sanzo, accusing him of revisionism and betraying revolutionary principles. Yet criticism aside, standing behind Nosaka Sanzo was China—the CCP, which had sheltered and nurtured him in Yan’an for years. The Soviets saw quite clearly that this proposition reflected certain ideas held by China, rather than being Nosaka Sanzo’s personal invention.
Consequently, the JCP split into two internal factions. One was the Mainstream Faction (Shokan-ha), which supported Nosaka Sanzo’s peaceful line and had Tokuda Kyuichi as its leading figure. The other was the International Faction (Kokusai-ha), which believed in following the Soviet Union, adhering to armed struggle, and refusing compromise. Backed by the Cominform, the International Faction expelled the Mainstream Faction from the JCP.
Following the expulsion, Tokuda Kyuichi of the Mainstream Faction fled to China, convened a National Conference of the JCP Central Committee in Beijing, met with Mao Zedong, and then went to see Stalin, seeking support between the Chinese and Soviet parties. While this maneuver may look like a farce today, within the political landscape of that era, it represented a realistic survival strategy. Yielding to pressure, the International Faction ultimately submitted a self-criticism in 1954, leading to the reunification of the two factions.
However, after the merger, the internal attitude of the JCP toward the CCP remained divided, and this rift never truly healed. Cadres of the International Faction remembered that the CCP and the CPSU had joined forces to play them like pawns in internal political struggles. This memory ran deep, waiting for the right moment to erupt.
In 1966, that opportunity arrived.
That year, JCP General Secretary Miyamoto Kenji visited China and held talks with Zhou Enlai and others. The China he observed stood on the eve of the Cultural Revolution, with all signs indicating that a massive political movement was about to break out. Upon his return, Miyamoto Kenji issued a communiqué expressing the JCP’s concerns over the trajectory of China’s domestic politics, while insisting that the JCP would pursue its own peaceful parliamentary route rather than following China into armed revolution.
Upon reading this communiqué, Mao Zedong declared it to be too soft, calling it peaceful coexistence and revisionism. The two sides completely fell out over the matter.
Consequently, the hidden networks embedded by the CCP within the JCP began to surface.
These so-called hidden networks referred to a cohort of pro-China figures long planted by the CCP inside the JCP. Following the rift between the JCP and the CCP, these individuals were identified by the JCP as troublemakers and were expelled from the party one after another. After their expulsion, they formed new factions, continuing to advocate Mao Zedong Thought and adhering to the path of armed revolution. These splinter micro-groups later became one of the most critical ideological origins of the Japanese Red Army.
The origin of the Japanese Red Army can be traced back to the Communist League founded in 1958. The defining characteristic of this organization was that what it studied was not Leninism or the Soviet model, but Mao Zedong Thought—encircling the cities from the countryside and political power growing out of the barrel of a gun. After the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution in 1966, the Japanese student movement grew increasingly radical, culminating in the official establishment of the Red Army Faction in 1969.
The Red Army Faction ran into trouble immediately upon its inception. They assembled hundreds of people at Mount Daibosatsu to undergo military training, planning to assassinate the Prime Minister of Japan once the training was complete, only to be caught in a single sweep by the Japanese police. This setback caused the Red Army Faction to split into two streams: one remained in Japan, merging with another organization called the Revolutionary Left to form the United Red Army and continuing armed struggle on the Japanese mainland; the other stream went overseas to seek new battlefields.
The United Red Army that remained in Japan embarked on an extraordinarily tragic path of self-destruction. Believing that their previous failures stemmed from ideological impurity within their ranks, they initiated internal rectification campaigns, auditing the revolutionary purity of each member one by one. The method of audit was torture to extract confessions; once a confession was forced out, further questioning ensued to yield more names, followed by audits of those newly named individuals. In this process, the United Red Army killed fourteen of its own members—some were beaten to death, while others were forced into outdoor exposure in the dead of winter and froze to death.
In 1972, the remnants of the United Red Army took refuge in the Asama-Sanso villa in Nagano Prefecture, surrounded by the Japanese police. This standoff was broadcast live by Japanese television networks across the nation, with ratings reportedly exceeding ninety percent. Ultimately, police stormed the villa and arrested those inside. A detail from that live broadcast, captured in documentaries of the time, remains vivid: a mother called out to the villa, pleading for her son inside to come out, telling him that Mao Zedong had already shaken hands with Nixon, that China and the United States were no longer enemies, and that their mission had concluded. The answer returned to her from inside the villa was a bullet fired by her son.
The stream that fled overseas went to the Middle East, partnering with Palestinian armed organizations to conduct guerrilla warfare, hijackings, and bombings in the Middle Eastern deserts. This was the organization later known as the Japanese Red Army, led by a woman named Shigenobu Fusako—who was previously mentioned in the first article: upon her arrest, her passport contained records of over twenty entries into China, with her cumulative time living in Beijing adding up to nearly two years.
The break between the JCP and the CCP ultimately exerted starkly different impacts on both parties.
The CCP lost a potential ally while leaving behind an uncontrolled force of radicals in Japan; the trouble subsequently caused by these individuals was far greater than what a compliant JCP would have ever produced. The JCP, meanwhile, progressively adjusted its political trajectory toward European social democracy following the split, abandoning illusions of armed revolution to focus exclusively on parliamentary politics. Their seats in Japan’s parliament grew increasingly secure, and their strong performance in local elections established them as a normal component of the Japanese political landscape.
This outcome substantiates the law reiterated throughout this series: the more thoroughly one severs ties with the CCP, the better off one lives. The Malayan Communist Party (CPM) and the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) followed Beijing closely, only to be completely consumed and erased in the jungles. The JCP broke with the CCP completely in 1966 and has survived to this day—living far more healthily than any other Asian communist party that once maintained close ties with the CCP.
There is good reason why the JCP denounces the CCP so fiercely. Better than anyone else, they understand precisely what that hand will do once it reaches in.
Editor: Huang Jizhou Proofreader: Zhou Min Translator: Ge Bing
