作者：陀先润
1970年，约旦军队在镇压巴勒斯坦武装的过程中，俘虏了一批特殊的囚犯。
这批人不是巴勒斯坦人，不是约旦人，也不是任何一个阿拉伯国家的公民。他们是中国人，混在法塔赫的武装队伍里，以军事顾问的身份在约旦的土地上活动。约旦国王侯赛因下令把他们单独关押，不和其他俘虏混在一起。这件事随后被压了下来，约旦政府和中国政府都不想把它闹大，这批人悄悄被遣返，从公开记录里消失，就好像从来没有发生过一样。
他们在约旦的沙漠里教阿拉伯人打仗，教的是毛泽东思想，教的是农村包围城市，教的是如何在敌后建立群众组织。这些知识从延安的窑洞里出发，经过朝鲜的山地、越南的丛林、缅甸的原始森林，最终传到了中东的沙漠里，被一批说着阿拉伯语的年轻人用来对付以色列和西方世界。
中共进入中东的时间，比大多数人想象的要晚。在中东最早活动的是苏联，从二战期间就开始通过高加索方向渗透中东各国，克格勃在这个地区经营了几十年，影响力根深蒂固。中共在五十年代初才开始认真经营中东，而且进入的路径非常隐蔽，不是通过政党关系，不是通过外交渠道，而是通过一条几乎没有人注意到的秘密线索：以色列。
中以关系是中共对外关系里最难说清楚的一段历史。以色列1948年建国，中华人民共和国1949年建政，两个新生国家几乎同时出现在世界地图上。以色列随即通过犹太商人网络，和中共建立了秘密联系渠道。这个渠道的建立，前期通过南方局，通过中共在香港的情报体系来操作。
朝鲜战争期间，这条渠道发挥了意想不到的作用。中国那时候一穷二白，面对西方的封锁禁运，很多战略物资根本买不到。以色列通过犹太商人网络，帮助中国获取了包括稀有金属在内的一批战略物资，其中有乌矿，是生产坦克装甲穿甲弹不可或缺的原料。以色列缺这个，中国有；中国缺的东西，以色列能搞到。这是一笔双方都需要的买卖。
中苏关系破裂之后，这条线变得更有价值。苏联大力支持埃及、叙利亚、约旦对抗以色列，中国和苏联撕破了脸，敌人的敌人自然就变成了朋友。从那个时候开始，中以之间开始了更大规模的军事技术交流，中国向以色列提供了缴获的苏制武器样品，包括各种型号的火炮、坦克和飞机，让以色列可以研究苏制武器的弱点，有针对性地开发反制手段。以色列回报的，是各种领先的军事技术，从雷达到航空电子系统，门类繁多。
这条线一直延续到七十年代正式建交，然后在八九十年代进一步扩大。网上能查到的那些交易——费尔康预警机、幼狮无人机、各种军事技术图纸——都只是冰山露出水面的那一角。水面以下有多少，没有人完整地知道，大概也永远不会完整地知道。
但中东对中共来说，真正的战略价值不是以色列，而是巴勒斯坦。
1964年，巴勒斯坦解放组织成立。随后几年里，大大小小的巴勒斯坦武装组织如雨后春笋般冒出来，每一个都需要钱、需要武器、需要国际支持。其中有一个组织叫法塔赫，领袖是阿拉法特。他在六十年代中期来到中国，见了毛泽东，见了周恩来，谈了很久。
中共在众多巴勒斯坦组织里选择了法塔赫，这个选择在当时被很多人认为是中共少有的有眼力的一次判断。法塔赫不是一个宗教组织，不是意识形态极端的马克思列宁主义团体，而是一个以巴勒斯坦民族主义为旗帜的世俗武装，有广泛的群众基础，有务实的政治头脑。中共看中的，正是这种灵活性。
支持是全方位的。法塔赫的游击队员到中国接受训练，中国的军事顾问和政治顾问随队跟进。政治顾问教的是毛泽东思想，教的是如何建立基层组织，如何发动群众，如何把武装斗争和政治动员结合起来。军事顾问教的是游击战术，教的是如何在城市里和正规军周旋，如何利用平民区域作为掩护。
阿拉法特后来建立的巴勒斯坦解放组织的整体架构，包括联合各派别的统一阵线模式，包括以民族主义而非意识形态为旗帜的政治策略，都有浓厚的中共影子。这不是巧合，这是中共政治顾问手把手教出来的。
与此同时，中共在巴勒斯坦的布局并不是铁板一块，不同的派系支持不同的组织。中联部系统支持法塔赫，中央文革的激进派另有一条线，支持的是一个叫巴勒斯坦人民阵线的组织，这个组织下面有一个分支叫黑九月，就是1972年慕尼黑奥运会劫持以色列运动员、造成十一人死亡的那个恐怖组织。
和黑九月合作的，还有日本赤军。日本赤军在中东活动期间，和巴勒斯坦各武装组织有密切的合作，一起搞劫机，一起制造爆炸，共同对抗西方世界。1972年，三名日本赤军成员在以色列特拉维夫机场发动枪击，造成二十六人死亡，其中大部分是刚刚落地的波多黎各天主教朝圣者。这次袭击至今是以色列历史上最惨烈的恐怖袭击之一。
日本赤军在中东活动的后勤保障，有相当一部分来自中国。重信房子在被捕之前的几年里，护照上有超过二十次进入中国的记录，在北京居住的时间将近两年。她不是在北京旅游，也不是在北京做生意。日本警视厅认为，日本赤军在中国有一个实质性的基地，负责提供庇护、经费和后勤支持。中国从来没有承认这件事，但也从来没有认真否认过。
1977年之后，和中联部激进派有关联的那条巴勒斯坦线索突然断掉了，相关组织销声匿迹。时间节点是“四人帮”倒台，邓小平重新掌权，中共的对外政策开始全面收缩。那些在文革期间被激进派推动起来的海外布局，在这个时间节点上陆续被切断。
这说明了一件事：中共在中东的输出革命，从来不是一个统一的战略，而是几个不同派系在争夺主导权的产物。周恩来系统支持的法塔赫，操作相对克制，注重长远效果；中央文革激进派支持的那条线，走的是极端路线，搞的是恐怖主义。两条线同时在中东运作，有时候甚至支持立场相对立的组织，造成了中国人支持的一派和中国人支持的另一派在沙漠里打来打去的荒诞局面。
这种内部混乱，是中共在所有输出革命区域里都存在的问题，只是在中东因为地缘的复杂性而表现得尤为突出。
拉美的故事相对简单，简单到可以用一句话概括：中共在拉美主要是给钱，具体的事情让古巴去做。
卡斯特罗1959年革命成功之后，和中国的关系不错，但和苏联的关系更好。古巴革命胜利之后，切·格瓦拉和卡斯特罗之间出现了方向上的分歧。卡斯特罗认为革命已经成功，接下来要经营国家，建设政权，不能无休止地在全球各地点火。格瓦拉是浪漫的理想主义者，他认为古巴的革命成功只是开始，整个拉丁美洲都需要革命，他要去拉美的丛林里继续战斗。
格瓦拉来到中国，和周恩来系统进行了会谈。中国以政府间贸易协定的名义，给了他几千万美元，说是贸易往来，实际上是给他去拉美搞革命用的。协议里有一个条款：如果钱用完了，可以来谈债务减免。这意味着这笔钱从一开始就没打算要回来，只是用一个经济协议的外壳包装，让双方都有台阶下。卡斯特罗帮着做了账目上的处理，格瓦拉拿着这笔钱离开了。
1967年，格瓦拉在玻利维亚的丛林里被捕，随即被处决。他死的时候身上带着一本破旧的笔记本，里面记着他的战略计划和对革命的思考。这本笔记本后来成了博物馆里的展品，浪漫而悲凉。
格瓦拉死后，中共在拉美的直接投入大幅减少。剩下的工作继续通过古巴来做，中国出钱，古巴出人，分工明确，责任清晰。这种代理人模式让中共在拉美的存在感相对隐蔽，不容易被直接追溯到北京。
但有一条线是直接的，那就是对墨西哥共产党游击队的支持。这条线在中联部的档案里做得极为隐秘，几乎没有公开记录，偶尔在一些解密文件里出现只言片语，研究者很难把它完整地拼出来。它的存在本身，说明中共在拉美的布局比外界通常认为的要更深、更广。
秘鲁的“光辉道路”是另一个值得一提的案例。“光辉道路”在1960年代末受到中共输出革命的直接影响，以毛泽东思想为指导思想，走农村包围城市的路线，在安第斯山区建立根据地，对抗秘鲁政府。1982年，当中国开始和拉美国家恢复正常外交关系，不再公开支持武装革命之后，“光辉道路”拒绝放下武器，和中共切割，独立走自己的路。
然后它就活下来了。活得很难看，变成了贩毒和勒索，但它活下来了。这个结局，和本系列一直在追踪的那条规律完全吻合：越听话，死得越快；越不听话，反而越能活。
日共不听话，活到了今天，在日本议会里有一席之地。菲律宾共产党不听话，现在还在菲律宾的丛林里打游击，主要业务变成了向华人企业收保护费。“光辉道路”不听话，变成了毒枭，但还在。马共听话，老死在旅游景点里。泰共听话，从历史记录里消失。缅共听话，在内讧里四分五裂，留下一个烂摊子变成了今天的缅北乱局。
这条规律不是偶然的，它反映了中共输出革命的本质：中共从来没有真正关心过那些被它扶持的组织的命运，它关心的只是这些组织对自己有没有用。有用的时候，给钱给枪给顾问。没用的时候，一个电话停止援助，然后假装不认识。
习近平当副主席的时候，在巴西说过一句话：我们一不输出革命，二不输出贫穷。这句话说出来的时候，他大概知道这是谎言，听他说话的人大概也知道这是谎言，只是大家都假装信以为真，因为这符合外交场合的礼仪。
从1920年代的唐人街到1960年代的缅北丛林，从中东的沙漠到安第斯山区的高原，中共用了半个世纪，在全球各地布下了一张巨大的网。这张网造成了多少人死亡，没有人统计过。那些死去的人，有的是信了共产主义理想的年轻人，有的是被谎言骗去充当炮灰的红卫兵，有的是在“肃反运动”里被自己同志杀死的无辜者，有的是在恐怖袭击里遇难的平民。
他们的共同点是，没有一个人知道自己只是一颗棋子。
那只手现在还在。只是棋盘更大了，棋子的种类更多了，玩法也更复杂了。武装革命的时代已经过去，现在是大外宣、选举干预、政党渗透、经济控制。工具变了，逻辑没变。棋子还是棋子，棋手还是棋手。
编辑：胡景 校对：熊辩 翻译：周敏
Section 7: The Chess Game in the Desert — The Middle East and Latin America
Author: Tuo Xianrun
Abstract: This article combs through the history of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) exporting revolution to the Middle East and Latin America during the Cold War. It points out that through financial aid, military training, political advisors, and proxy cooperation, the CCP supported Middle Eastern armed organizations and Latin American revolutionary forces. During the Cultural Revolution, factional struggles caused external support to show contradictory phenomena. As the international strategic landscape changed, the CCP supported or abandoned proxies based on its strategic needs, extending this logic to contemporary public opinion, political, and economic influence operations—the essence of which is a power relation where “the chess player operates the board, and the chess pieces bear the consequences.”
In 1970, the Jordanian military captured a special group of prisoners during its suppression of Palestinian armed forces.
These people were not Palestinians, not Jordanians, nor citizens of any Arab country. They were Chinese, mingled within the armed ranks of Fatah, operating on Jordanian soil as military advisors. King Hussein of Jordan ordered them to be detained separately, not mixed with other captives. This incident was subsequently suppressed; neither the Jordanian government nor the Chinese government wanted to make a big fuss over it. This group of people was quietly repatriated, disappearing from public records as if it had never happened.
In the deserts of Jordan, they taught Arabs how to fight—teaching Mao Zedong Thought, teaching surrounding the cities from the countryside, and teaching how to establish mass organizations behind enemy lines. This knowledge departed from the cave dwellings of Yan’an, traversed the mountains of Korea, the jungles of Vietnam, and the primeval forests of Myanmar, ultimately reaching the deserts of the Middle East, where it was used by a group of Arabic-speaking youth to deal with Israel and the Western world.
The CCP’s entry into the Middle East occurred later than most people imagine. The earliest actor in the Middle East was the Soviet Union, which began penetrating Middle Eastern countries from the Caucasus direction during World War II; the KGB operated in this region for decades, its influence deeply entrenched. The CCP only began seriously operating in the Middle East in the early 1950s, and its entry path was extremely covert—not through inter-party relations, nor through diplomatic channels, but through a secret clue that almost no one noticed: Israel.
Sino-Israeli relations are one of the most difficult histories to explain clearly in the CCP’s foreign relations. Israel was established in 1948, and the People’s Republic of China was established in 1949; the two new nations appeared on the world map almost simultaneously. Israel immediately established secret communication channels with the CCP through networks of Jewish merchants. The establishment of this channel was operated in the early stage through the Southern Bureau and through the CCP’s intelligence system in Hong Kong.
During the Korean War, this channel played an unexpected role. China was destitute at that time, facing Western blockades and embargoes, making many strategic materials impossible to purchase. Israel, through its Jewish merchant network, helped China acquire a batch of strategic materials including rare metals, among which was tungsten ore—an indispensable raw material for producing armor-piercing shells for tank armor. Israel lacked this, and China had it; what China lacked, Israel could procure. It was a deal both sides needed.
After the Sino-Soviet split, this line became even more valuable. The Soviet Union vigorously supported Egypt, Syria, and Jordan to confront Israel; China had fallen out with the Soviet Union, so the enemy’s enemy naturally became a friend. From that point on, larger-scale military technology exchanges began between China and Israel. China provided Israel with captured Soviet-made weapon samples, including various models of artillery, tanks, and aircraft, allowing Israel to study the weaknesses of Soviet weapons and develop targeted countermeasures. In return, Israel provided various cutting-edge military technologies, ranging from radar to avionics systems, in a wide variety of categories.
This line continued until formal diplomatic relations were established in the 1970s, and then further expanded in the 1980s and 1990s. The deals that can be found online—Phalcon early warning aircraft, Lavi/Kfir drones, various military technical drawings—are only the tip of the iceberg above the water. How much lies below the water level, no one fully knows, and probably no one will ever fully know.
However, for the CCP, the real strategic value in the Middle East was not Israel, but Palestine.
In 1964, the Palestine Liberation Organization was established. In the following years, armed Palestinian organizations, large and small, mushroomed; each needed money, weapons, and international support. Among them was an organization called Fatah, led by Yasser Arafat. He came to China in the mid-1960s, met Mao Zedong, met Zhou Enlai, and talked for a long time.
The CCP chose Fatah among numerous Palestinian organizations—a choice considered by many at the time as one of the CCP’s rare insightful judgments. Fatah was not a religious organization, nor an ideologically extreme Marxist-Leninist group, but a secular armed force under the banner of Palestinian nationalism, with a broad mass base and a pragmatic political mind. What the CCP valued was precisely this flexibility.
Support was all-encompassing. Fatah guerrillas went to China for training, followed by Chinese military advisors and political advisors. Political advisors taught Mao Zedong Thought—how to establish grassroots organizations, how to mobilize the masses, and how to combine armed struggle with political mobilization. Military advisors taught guerrilla tactics—how to maneuver against regular forces in cities, and how to use civilian areas as cover.
The overall structure of the Palestine Liberation Organization that Arafat later established, including the united front model that consolidated various factions, and the political strategy under the banner of nationalism rather than ideology, bore heavy shadows of the CCP. This was no coincidence; this was taught hand-in-hand by CCP political advisors.
At the same time, the CCP’s layout in Palestine was not a monolith; different factions supported different organizations. The International Department system supported Fatah, while the radicals of the Central Cultural Revolution Group had a separate line supporting an organization called the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). A branch under this organization was Black September, the terrorist organization responsible for hijacking Israeli athletes at the 1972 Munich Olympics, causing eleven deaths.
Cooperating with Black September was the Japanese Red Army. During its activities in the Middle East, the Japanese Red Army cooperated closely with various Palestinian armed organizations, conducting hijackings and bombings together to jointly confront the Western world. In 1972, three members of the Japanese Red Army launched a shooting attack at Tel Aviv Airport in Israel, killing twenty-six people, most of whom were Puerto Rican Catholic pilgrims who had just landed. This attack remains one of the deadliest terrorist attacks in Israeli history.
A considerable portion of the logistical support for the Japanese Red Army’s activities in the Middle East came from China. In the years before Fusako Shigenobu was arrested, her passport had records of over twenty entries into China, and her time living in Beijing totaled nearly two years. She was not vacationing in Beijing, nor was she doing business in Beijing. The Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department believed that the Japanese Red Army had a substantial base in China responsible for providing shelter, funding, and logistical support. China has never admitted this, but it has never earnestly denied it either.
After 1977, the Palestinian line associated with the radicals of the International Department suddenly snapped, and the related organizations vanished without a trace. The time node coincided with the fall of the “Gang of Four” and Deng Xiaoping regaining power; the CCP’s foreign policy began a comprehensive contraction. Those overseas operations pushed by radicals during the Cultural Revolution were severed one after another at this time node.
This demonstrates one thing: the CCP’s export of revolution in the Middle East was never a unified strategy, but the product of several different factions competing for dominance. The Fatah supported by Zhou Enlai’s system operated relatively with restraint, emphasizing long-term results; the line supported by the radicals of the Central Cultural Revolution Group took an extreme route, engaging in terrorism. The two lines operated simultaneously in the Middle East, sometimes even supporting organizations with opposing stances, creating the absurd situation where one faction supported by the Chinese and another faction supported by the Chinese were fighting each other in the desert.
This internal chaos was a problem present in all regions where the CCP exported revolution, but it manifested with particular prominence in the Middle East due to geopolitical complexity.
The story of Latin America is relatively simple—simple enough to summarize in one sentence: in Latin America, the CCP mainly provided money, leaving the specific execution to Cuba.
After Castro’s successful revolution in 1959, his relationship with China was good, but his relationship with the Soviet Union was even better. Following the victory of the Cuban Revolution, directional differences emerged between Che Guevara and Castro. Castro believed the revolution had succeeded, and next came managing the country and constructing the regime, rather than endlessly igniting fires around the globe. Guevara was a romantic idealist who believed Cuba’s revolutionary victory was merely the beginning; the whole of Latin America needed revolution, and he was going to the jungles of Latin America to continue fighting.
Guevara came to China and held talks with Zhou Enlai’s system. China gave him tens of millions of US dollars in the name of inter-governmental trade agreements—framed as trade exchanges, but actually for him to conduct revolution in Latin America. The agreement contained a clause: if the money ran out, they could discuss debt relief. This meant from the outset there was no intention of getting the money back; it was merely packaged in the shell of an economic agreement so both sides had a honorable way out. Castro helped process the accounting records, and Guevara left with the money.
In 1967, Guevara was captured in the jungles of Bolivia and executed shortly thereafter. When he died, he carried a tattered notebook containing his strategic plans and reflections on revolution. This notebook later became an exhibit in a museum—romantic yet desolate.
After Guevara’s death, the CCP’s direct investment in Latin America decreased significantly. The remaining work continued to be done through Cuba: China provided the money, Cuba provided the personnel, with clear division of labor and clear responsibilities. This proxy model rendered the CCP’s presence in Latin America relatively covert and difficult to trace directly back to Beijing.
However, one line was direct: the support for Mexican communist guerrillas. This line was kept extremely secret in the archives of the International Department, with almost no public records, only occasionally appearing in fragmentary words in certain declassified documents, making it difficult for researchers to piece together completely. Its very existence shows that the CCP’s layout in Latin America was deeper and wider than generally thought by the outside world.
Peru’s “Shining Path” is another case worth mentioning. In the late 1960s, the “Shining Path” was directly influenced by the CCP’s export of revolution, taking Mao Zedong Thought as its guiding ideology, following the route of surrounding the cities from the countryside, establishing base areas in the Andes Mountains, and fighting against the Peruvian government. In 1982, when China began restoring normal diplomatic relations with Latin American countries and no longer publicly supported armed revolution, the “Shining Path” refused to lay down its arms, severed ties with the CCP, and independently walked its own path.
And then it survived. It survived ugly—devolving into drug trafficking and extortion—but it survived. This outcome perfectly aligns with the law tracked throughout this series: the more obedient, the faster they die; the more disobedient, the more likely they are to survive instead.
The Japanese Communist Party was disobedient and survived to this day, holding a seat in the Japanese Parliament. The Philippine Communist Party was disobedient and is still waging guerrilla warfare in the jungles of the Philippines today, its main business having turned into collecting protection money from Chinese businesses. The “Shining Path” was disobedient and turned into drug lords, but it is still around. The Malayan Communist Party was obedient and died of old age in tourist attractions. The Communist Party of Thailand was obedient and vanished from historical records. The Communist Party of Burma was obedient, disintegrated in internal strife, leaving behind a mess that became today’s turmoil in northern Myanmar.
This law is no accident; it reflects the essence of the CCP’s export of revolution: the CCP has never truly cared about the fate of the organizations it supported; it only cared about whether these organizations were useful to itself. When useful, it provided money, guns, and advisors. When useless, it stopped aid with a single phone call and then pretended not to recognize them.
When Xi Jinping was Vice President, he said a sentence in Brazil: “We do not export revolution, nor do we export poverty.” When he said this sentence, he probably knew it was a lie, and those listening to him probably also knew it was a lie; everyone merely pretended to take it as true because it suited the etiquette of diplomatic occasions.
From the Chinatowns of the 1920s to the jungles of northern Myanmar in the 1960s, from the deserts of the Middle East to the high plains of the Andes, the CCP spent half a century laying down a vast net across the globe. How many people died as a result of this net, no one has counted. Among those who died, some were young people who believed in communist ideals, some were Red Guards tricked by lies into serving as cannon fodder, some were innocent people killed by their own comrades during “anti-counterrevolutionary movements,” and some were civilians who perished in terrorist attacks.
What they had in common was that not a single one knew they were merely a chess piece.
That hand is still there now. It’s just that the chessboard is larger, the types of chess pieces are more numerous, and the gameplay has become more complex. The era of armed revolution has passed; now it is grand propaganda, election interference, political party penetration, and economic control. The tools have changed, but the logic has not. The chess piece is still a chess piece, and the chess player is still a chess player.
Editor: Hu Jing Proofreader: Xiong Bian Translator: Zhou Min
