记者：贾嘉
距离美国2026年中期选举只剩不到三周。目前的政治气氛明显不利于特朗普和共和党。经济、生活成本、伊朗战争以及特朗普个人支持率，都成为共和党需要面对的问题。近期调查也显示，独立选民对特朗普的支持明显下降，民主党选民的投票积极性暂时占优。
但如果现在就断言“民主党大胜”，仍然为时过早。值得观察的是未来三周有没有事件改变选民关注的核心问题。
美国中期选举历来不是一场完全按照民调运行的比赛。尤其是今年，政治环境存在几个非常明显的“变量”。
一、第一种可能：选情继续按照目前方向发展——民主党温和反弹
如果接下来三周：油价没有明显下降；食品和日用品价格继续成为抱怨重点；伊朗战争没有结束；特朗普继续成为选举核心议题；独立选民继续远离共和党；那么选举很可能继续向民主党倾斜。
这种情况下，最可能出现的并不是所谓“民主党横扫美国”，而是：
民主党拿回众议院，共和党在参议院苦苦防守。
因为现在共和党内部已经开始把更多资源用于守住原本比较安全的席位，而不是继续向传统民主党阵地进攻。这意味着共和党内部实际上已经开始承认：部分原本可以争取的战场正在变得困难。
如果这种趋势持续到投票日，众议院翻蓝的可能性会进一步提高。
二、第二种可能：突然出现“蓝色浪潮”
所谓蓝色浪潮，并不一定意味着民主党在全国获得压倒性支持。
更可能的情况是：共和党内部出现“弃保”。
一些共和党选民可能仍然不喜欢民主党，但他们对特朗普、经济、战争或者共和党国会候选人的表现已经不满意。于是出现：
“我不一定支持民主党，但这次我要投票改变华盛顿。”
目前已经出现一些迹象：部分2024年投票给特朗普的人，对共和党的忠诚度正在下降。如果最后三周这种情绪扩大，就可能形成一个非常典型的：“反总统型中期选举”。
这时候民主党甚至可能获得比目前预测更大的众议院优势。
三、第三种可能：特朗普突然重新掌握政治议程
这是我认为不能低估的情况。特朗普最大的政治优势一直不是传统意义上的“政策细节”，而是：他非常擅长改变政治议题。
如果共和党发现经济和物价对自己不利，那么特朗普很可能会尝试把选举重新定义成：移民问题、犯罪问题、国家安全、文化战争、社会主义、边境安全、美国在世界上的地位；也就是说：把选举从“你生活得怎么样？”重新变成：“你希望美国变成什么样？”
这可能会让共和党重新激活自己的核心选民。
而且共和党目前仍然拥有大量竞选资金，可以在最后阶段集中攻击民主党候选人。Reuters也指出，共和党目前在资金和广告投入方面仍然具有优势。所以：
特朗普并没有失去制造选举转折的能力。
四、第四种可能：真正的“黑天鹅”——伊朗局势突然升级
这是我个人认为最值得关注的变量之一。目前伊朗战争已经成为美国国内政治的一部分。如果未来突然出现：
情况A：美国取得重大军事成果
例如：伊朗主要军事设施遭到严重打击；伊朗政府接受停火；美国宣布军事行动取得重大目标；美国成功推动新的中东协议。那么特朗普可能出现一次短期政治反弹。因为选民有时候会在国际危机中出现所谓的：
“团结在总统周围”效应。共和党可能因此止跌。
但是还有完全相反的情况。
情况B：战争突然扩大
例如：美国军人出现重大伤亡；伊朗扩大报复；霍尔木兹海峡受到严重影响；石油价格继续大涨；美国被迫扩大军事行动。
那么情况可能完全反转。因为这会直接进入美国普通家庭的生活：
汽油涨价 → 运输成本上涨 → 食品涨价 → 通胀重新成为核心问题。
现在美国选民本来就已经对生活成本高度敏感，而近期调查显示，汽油和食品价格已经成为影响选民情绪的重要因素。
因此：伊朗战争可能成为特朗普的政治救命稻草，也可能成为共和党的政治炸弹。
关键不在“有没有战争”，而在于：战争在选民眼里到底意味着“胜利”，还是“失控”。
五、第五种可能：经济突然给特朗普一个“惊喜”
这可能是目前最容易被忽略的反转。
假如未来两三周出现：油价明显回落；通胀数据改善；股市持续上涨；就业数据好于预期；消费者信心改善；那么特朗普完全可以把选举重新包装成：
“媒体说美国经济崩溃，但事实并非如此。”
这对于共和党非常重要。因为经济是中期选举最大的主题。如果经济开始改善，民主党目前最重要的攻击点就会减弱。所以未来三周最值得观察的，不是某一份民调，而是油价、就业、通胀和消费者情绪有没有突然发生变化。
六、第六种可能：民主党自己“犯错”
这是民主党最大的内部风险。目前民主党最大的优势是：共和党政府不受欢迎。但问题是：“反特朗普”并不等于“喜欢民主党”。
如果民主党候选人在最后阶段：过度向左转；强调一些社会文化议题；出现激进言论；被共和党成功贴上“社会主义”标签；或者出现严重候选人丑闻；那么部分独立选民可能重新考虑。
共和党已经开始有意识地使用“社会主义”“激进左派”等标签攻击民主党候选人。Reuters认为，这种攻击虽然未必能改变整个选举，但在极其接近的选区可能产生边际影响。
所以民主党现在最大的错误可能不是：不够激进。而是：“把一场对特朗普的不满，变成了一场对民主党的投票。”这两者完全不同。
七、第七种可能：民调再次出现系统性错误
这是最典型的“黑天鹅”。
美国选举已经多次证明：民调不是结果。
现在各种民调数量非常多，调查方法也高度不统一。近期报道指出，2026年选举前已经出现大量不同机构、不同抽样方法的调查，甚至一些民调的抽样来源并不完全透明。
因此完全可能出现：民主党一直领先。媒体形成“蓝色浪潮”共识。最终共和党实际表现明显好于民调。这并不意味着特朗普一定赢。更可能的情况是：民主党原本预计拿下15～20个席位，最后只拿下5～10个。于是媒体会把它称为：“共和党意外保住多数。”
这就是典型的民调黑天鹅。
八、第八种可能：年轻选民“嘴上支持，实际上不投票”
这是民主党最大的结构性风险之一。民主党现在的选民热情比较高。但是中期选举和总统选举不同。
年轻人、部分少数族裔选民通常在总统选举中的参与度更高，而中期选举容易出现：“我支持你，但是我懒得去投票。”
如果民主党年轻选民实际投票率低于预期，而50岁以上选民投票率很高，那么民调优势可能迅速缩水。Reuters近期分析也把这个问题列为民主党可能无法形成“大胜”的重要原因。
所以最后三周真正应该问的是：“年轻人到底会不会去投票？”
九、第九种可能：共和党出现“地方性逆袭”
我认为这种情况非常现实。美国不是一个全国统一的选举市场。可能出现：全国民调民主党领先。
但是：Texas共和党保住；Ohio共和党保住；Iowa共和党保住；Alaska共和党保住；Maine出现意外；Michigan民主党优势缩水。
结果就是：
民主党赢了全国舆论，却没有拿到足够的参议院席位。
这也是为什么：众议院和参议院必须分开看。
民主党可能赢得众议院，但共和党仍然保住参议院。
这是我认为非常值得警惕的“中间结果”。
十、还有一种非常特殊的黑天鹅：特朗普主动把选举变成“对自己的公投”
特朗普最大的特点就是：很难退到幕后！
如果最后两周特朗普把自己的政治影响力发挥到极致，那么这场选举可能进一步变成：“支持特朗普还是反对特朗普？”而不是：“你支持本选区的共和党候选人还是民主党候选人？”
这对共和党是一把双刃剑。
如果特朗普状态好：可以带动低投票率的共和党选民。
如果特朗普状态不好：共和党候选人会被迫一起承担总统的负面情绪。
目前Pew的调查已经显示，特朗普比过去几次中期选举中的总统更加成为国会选举的核心变量。
十一、我最关注的，其实是“最后72小时”
如果让我预测，我不会太关注10月中旬的民调。
我会重点看：10月30日—11月3日。
因为美国政治经常存在一个现象：大量选民实际上是在最后几天才真正决定。
如果这个阶段突然发生：大规模国际事件；恐袭；重大经济消息；总统重大讲话；候选人丑闻；油价突然暴涨；股市剧烈下跌；重大司法裁决；大规模抗议；重大军事行动；
那么整个选举叙事可能在72小时内改变。
十二、所以我把2026中期选举分成三个主要剧本
🟦 剧本一：温和蓝色浪潮
最简单的路径：经济不改善 + 特朗普继续成为负面议题 + 民主党投票率较高
结果：民主党拿回众议院，参议院形成激烈争夺。
这是目前最值得认真考虑的基本情景。
🟪 剧本二：蓝色浪潮扩大
条件：经济继续恶化 + 伊朗战争拖长 + 特朗普继续失去独立选民 + 共和党出现内部疲劳。
结果可能是：民主党不仅拿回众议院，而且取得比较明显的多数；参议院也可能翻蓝。
这才是真正意义上的：“反特朗普浪潮”。
🟥 剧本三：共和党最后逆袭
条件：油价下降 + 伊朗局势缓和 + 特朗普重新控制政治议题 + 共和党成功激活基本盘 + 民调低估共和党。
结果：民主党可能赢得众议院，但赢得没有预期那么多；共和党保住参议院。
如果这个结果发生，媒体很可能会把它描述为：“特朗普逃过中期选举惩罚。”
十三、真正的“黑天鹅”，我认为有三个
如果让我现在只挑三个：
🦢 黑天鹅一：伊朗战争突然升级
这是最危险的外部变量。它可以同时影响：特朗普支持率 + 油价 + 通胀 + 国家安全 + 美国外交政策。
🦢 黑天鹅二：民调再次严重低估共和党
这是最危险的统计变量。
如果发生，民主党可能看起来已经赢了，最后却只取得非常有限的席位增长。
🦢 黑天鹅三：经济突然反弹
这是最危险的政治变量。
如果油价下降、通胀下降、股市上涨、就业改善，特朗普可能在最后两周突然重新获得一个非常有力的政治故事：“经济正在好转，不要让民主党夺走国会。”
最后，我的判断现在不要简单预测：“民主党一定赢。”
我更倾向于这样判断：共和党目前处于守势，特朗普本人已经成为共和党最大的资产，同时也是最大的负担。
如果未来三周没有重大变化，民主党更有可能拿回众议院。
但参议院完全不同，地理结构决定了民主党即使在全国范围获得明显优势，也未必能够顺利拿到足够席位。
而真正决定最后结果的，很可能不是今天的民调，而是未来三周发生什么事情。尤其是：伊朗战争 → 油价 → 通胀 → 经济情绪 → 特朗普支持率 → 独立选民 → 最后投票率。
这实际上是一条完整的因果链。所以2026年的中期选举，我认为最大的看点不是：
“特朗普还能不能赢？”
而是：“特朗普能不能在11月3日之前，成功让美国选民忘掉生活成本问题，把这场选举重新变成一场关于移民、国家安全、文化战争和美国未来方向的公投？”
如果他做到了，共和党仍然有可能上演最后逆袭。
如果做不到，那么目前形成的政治逆风很可能会持续到投票日。
美国政治现在已经高度极化，黑天鹅不一定改变10个百分点，但完全可能改变两三百分点；而在几个关键州，两三个百分点就足以决定整个国会由谁控制。这是一场看似正在形成的“蓝色浪潮”，但结果远未完全锁定的选举！
编辑：胡丽莉 校对：王滨 翻译：戈冰
US Midterm Elections: The Variables of the Final Three Weeks
Journalist: Jia Jia
Abstract: As the 2026 US midterm elections enter their final stage, the Republican Party faces pressures such as the economy, commodity prices, and a decline in Trump’s approval ratings. The situation in Iran, polling errors, voter turnout, and the campaign strategies of both parties could all alter the final outcome. The Democrats are expected to recapture the House of Representatives, but the affiliation of the Senate remains full of variables.
With less than three weeks remaining until the 2026 US midterm elections, the current political atmosphere is notably unfavorable for Trump and the Republican Party. The economy, the cost of living, the war in Iran, and Trump’s personal approval rating have all become issues that the Republicans must confront. Recent surveys also indicate a clear decline in independent voters’ support for Trump, and Democratic voters currently hold the upper hand in voting enthusiasm.
However, it is still premature to assert a “Democratic landslide” at this point. What warrants observation is whether any events over the next three weeks will alter the core issues of voter concern.
US midterm elections have historically never been races that run entirely according to polls. This year in particular, the political environment features several very distinct “variables.”
I. The First Possibility: The Electoral Situation Continues to Develop Along Its Current Trajectory—A Moderate Democratic Rebound
If over the next three weeks: oil prices do not drop significantly; prices of food and daily necessities continue to be a focal point of grievances; the war in Iran does not end; Trump continues to be the core issue of the elections; and independent voters continue to distance themselves from the Republican Party; then the elections are very likely to continue tilting toward the Democrats.
Under such circumstances, what is most likely to emerge is not a so-called “Democratic sweep of America,” but rather:
The Democrats take back the House of Representatives, while the Republicans fight a hard defense in the Senate.
This is because the internal ranks of the Republican Party have already begun shifting more resources toward defending seats that were originally relatively safe, rather than continuing to launch offensives into traditional Democratic territory. This signifies that internally, the Republicans have actually started to concede that some battlegrounds they could have originally contested are becoming difficult.
If this trend persists until polling day, the likelihood of the House turning blue will increase further.
II. The Second Possibility: The Sudden Appearance of a “Blue Wave”
The so-called blue wave does not necessarily mean that the Democratic Party wins overwhelming support nationwide.
A more likely scenario is: internal “abandoning the weak to protect the strong” [lit. abandoning the insured/protected] within the Republican Party.
Some Republican voters may still dislike the Democratic Party, but they are already dissatisfied with Trump, the economy, the war, or the performance of Republican congressional candidates. Consequently, this sentiment emerges:
“I do not necessarily support the Democratic Party, but this time I am voting to change Washington.”
Some signs have already appeared: the loyalty of some voters who cast their ballots for Trump in 2024 is declining toward the Republican Party. If this sentiment amplifies over the final three weeks, it could form a very typical: “anti-presidential midterm election.”
At that point, the Democrats might even secure a larger House majority than currently projected.
III. The Third Possibility: Trump Suddenly Re-seizes the Political Agenda
This is a situation I believe must not be underestimated. Trump’s greatest political advantage has never been traditional “policy details,” but rather: he is exceptionally skilled at altering political issues.
If the Republicans find that the economy and commodity prices are unfavorable to them, then Trump will likely attempt to redefine the election into: immigration issues, crime issues, national security, culture wars, socialism, border security, and America’s standing in the world; in other words, transforming the election from “How are you living your life?” back into “What kind of America do you want?”
This could enable the Republicans to re-energize their core base of voters.
Moreover, the Republican Party still possesses substantial campaign funds, which can be concentrated in the final stage to attack Democratic candidates. Reuters has also pointed out that the Republicans still hold an advantage in funding and advertising investments. Therefore:
Trump has not lost the ability to create electoral turning points.
IV. The Fourth Possibility: The True “Black Swan”—The Situation in Iran Suddenly Escalates
This is personally one of the variables I consider most worthy of attention. Currently, the war in Iran has already become a component of domestic American politics. If in the future there suddenly appears:
Scenario A: The United States Achieves Major Military Successes
For example: major military facilities of Iran suffer severe strikes; the Iranian government accepts a ceasefire; the United States announces that military operations have achieved major objectives; the United States successfully advances a new Middle East agreement. Then Trump could experience a short-term political rebound. Because voters sometimes exhibit what is known during international crises as:
The “rally ’round the flag” effect. The Republicans might thereby arrest their decline.
However, there is also the complete opposite scenario.
Scenario B: The War Suddenly Expands
For example: major U.S. military casualties occur; Iran expands its retaliation; the Strait of Hormuz is severely impacted; oil prices continue to surge drastically; the U.S. is forced to expand its military operations.
Then the situation could completely invert. Because this would directly enter the daily lives of ordinary American families:
Gasoline price hikes → Rising transportation costs → Food price increases → Inflation re-emerges as the core issue.At present, American voters are already highly sensitive to the cost of living, and recent surveys indicate that gasoline and food prices have become vital factors influencing voter sentiment.
Therefore: the war in Iran could become Trump’s political lifeline, or it could become the Republican Party’s political bomb.
The key lies not in “whether there is a war,” but rather in whether the war, in the eyes of voters, ultimately signifies “victory” or “losing control.”
V. The Fifth Possibility: The Economy Suddenly Gives Trump a “Surprise”
This is perhaps the reversal most easily overlooked at present.If over the next two or three weeks there appears: a noticeable drop in oil prices; improved inflation data; a sustained stock market rally; better-than-expected employment figures; and improved consumer confidence; then Trump could completely repackage the election into:
“The media said the American economy was collapsing, but the facts prove otherwise.”
This is exceptionally important for the Republican Party. Because the economy is the single largest theme of the midterm elections. If the economy begins to improve, the Democrats’ most important point of attack will weaken. Thus, what is most worth observing over the next three weeks is not any single poll, but whether oil prices, employment, inflation, and consumer sentiment undergo a sudden shift.
VI. The Sixth Possibility: The Democrats Themselves “Make a Mistake”
This is the largest internal risk for the Democrats. Currently, the Democrats’ greatest advantage is: the Republican administration is unpopular. But the issue is: being “anti-Trump” does not equate to “liking the Democrats.”
If Democratic candidates, in the final stage: shift excessively to the left; emphasize certain socio-cultural issues; make radical statements; are successfully labeled as “socialist” by the Republicans; or if serious candidate scandals break out; then a segment of independent voters may reconsider.
The Republicans have already begun consciously utilizing labels such as “socialism” and “radical left” to attack Democratic candidates. Reuters believes that while such attacks may not necessarily alter the entire election, they could yield a marginal impact in extremely close districts.
Therefore, the Democrats’ greatest mistake right now might not be: being insufficiently radical. Rather, it is: “turning a expression of discontent with Trump into a referendum vote on the Democrats.” These two are entirely distinct.
VII. The Seventh Possibility: Polls Suffer a Systematic Error Once Again
This represents the most classic “black swan.”
US elections have repeatedly proven: polls are not outcomes.
Currently, the sheer volume of various polls is immense, and survey methodologies are highly inconsistent. Recent reports point out that prior to the 2026 election, a large number of surveys from different institutions employing different sampling methods have emerged, with the sampling sources of certain polls not even being entirely transparent.
Thus, it is completely possible for this to happen: the Democrats lead all along; the media forms a “blue wave” consensus; yet ultimately, the actual performance of the Republicans turns out noticeably better than the polls indicated. This does not mean Trump will definitely win. A more likely scenario is: the Democrats were originally projected to gain 15 to 20 seats, but end up securing only 5 to 10. Consequently, the media will term it: “The Republicans unexpectedly hold their majority.”
This is a classic polling black swan.
VIII. The Eighth Possibility: Young Voters “Support in Words, but Don’t Show Up to Vote in Fact”
This is one of the Democrats’ largest structural risks. Democratic voter enthusiasm is currently relatively high. However, midterm elections differ from presidential elections.
Young people and certain minority voters typically have higher participation rates in presidential elections, whereas midterm elections easily see: “I support you, but I can’t be bothered to go vote.”
If actual turnout among young Democratic voters falls below expectations while turnout among voters aged 50 and above remains very high, then the polling advantage could rapidly shrink. Recent analysis by Reuters also lists this issue as a key reason why the Democrats might fail to form a “landslide victory.”
Therefore, what should really be asked over the final three weeks is: “Will young people actually show up to vote?”
IX. The Ninth Possibility: The Republicans Execute a “Local Counter-Offensive”
I believe this scenario is extremely realistic. The United States is not a single, nationally unified electoral market. It could occur that: nationwide polls show the Democrats leading;
However: the Republicans hold Texas; the Republicans hold Ohio; the Republicans hold Iowa; the Republicans hold Alaska; Maine sees an unexpected outcome; and the Democratic advantage in Michigan shrinks.
The result would be:
The Democrats win the nationwide public opinion, yet fail to capture enough Senate seats.
This is precisely why: the House of Representatives and the Senate must be viewed separately.
The Democrats might win the House, but the Republicans could still retain the Senate.
This is a “middle-ground outcome” that I consider highly worthy of vigilance.
X. Another Very Special Black Swan: Trump Actively Turning the Election Into a “Referendum on Himself
“Trump’s single greatest trait is: it is exceedingly difficult for him to step back into the background!
If, during the final two weeks, Trump leverages his political influence to its absolute limit, then this election could further transform into: “Are you for Trump or against Trump?” rather than: “Do you support your local district’s Republican candidate or Democratic candidate?”This is a double-edged sword for the Republican Party.If Trump is in top form: he can drive turnout among low-propensity Republican voters.If Trump is not in good form: Republican candidates will be forced to shoulder the negative sentiment surrounding the president together.
Currently, Pew Research surveys have already indicated that Trump has become a more central variable in congressional elections than sitting presidents were in several past midterms.
XI. What Concerns Me Most Is Actually “The Final 72 Hours”
If you were to ask for my prediction, I would not pay overly close attention to mid-October polling.
I will focus primarily on: October 30 to November 3.
Because a phenomenon frequently exists in American politics: a massive volume of voters actually make up their minds only in the final few days.
If, during this phase, there suddenly occurs: a large-scale international event; a terrorist attack; major economic news; a major presidential address; a candidate scandal; a sudden surge in oil prices; a sharp stock market crash; a major judicial ruling; widespread protests; or significant military operations;Then the entire election narrative could invert within 72 hours.
XII. Therefore, I Divide the 2026 Midterm Elections Into Three Main Scenarios
🟦 Scenario 1: A Moderate Blue Wave
The simplest path: no economic improvement + Trump remaining a negative issue + relatively high Democratic turnout.
Result: The Democrats take back the House of Representatives, while a fierce struggle unfolds for control of the Senate.
This is currently the basic baseline scenario most deserving of serious consideration.
🟪 **Scenario 2: An Expanded Blue Wave**
**Conditions:** Continued economic deterioration + prolonged war in Iran + Trump continuing to lose independent voters + internal fatigue emerging within the Republican Party.
**Outcome:** The Democrats not only retake the House of Representatives but also secure a fairly distinct majority; the Senate could also flip blue.
This would constitute a true “anti-Trump wave.”
🟥 **Scenario 3: A Final Republican Counter-Offensive**
**Conditions:** Declining oil prices + easing of the Iran situation + Trump re-establishing control over the political agenda + the Republicans successfully activating their base + polling underestimating the Republicans.
**Outcome:** The Democrats might win the House of Representatives, but by a smaller margin than expected; the Republicans retain the Senate.
Should this outcome occur, the media would likely portray it as: “Trump escapes midterm punishment.”
XIII. The Three Genuine “Black Swans”
If I were forced to pick just three right now:
🦢 **Black Swan One: The War in Iran Suddenly Escalates**
This is the most dangerous external variable. It can simultaneously impact: Trump’s approval ratings + oil prices + inflation + national security + US foreign policy.
🦢 **Black Swan Two: Polls Severely Underestimate the Republicans Once Again**
This is the most dangerous statistical variable.
If it occurs, the Democrats may appear to have already won, yet end up securing only extremely limited seat gains in the end.
🦢 **Black Swan Three: The Economy Suddenly Rebounds**
This is the most dangerous political variable.
If oil prices fall, inflation drops, the stock market rises, and employment improves, Trump could suddenly regain a very compelling political narrative in the final two weeks: “The economy is turning around; do not let the Democrats take away Congress.”
In conclusion, my assessment right now is not to make a simple prediction like “the Democrats will definitely win.”
I lean more toward assessing it this way: the Republican Party is currently on the defensive; Trump himself has become the Republicans’ greatest asset, while simultaneously serving as their heaviest burden.
If no major changes occur over the next three weeks, the Democrats are more likely to take back the House of Representatives.
However, the Senate is entirely different; electoral geography dictates that even if the Democrats secure a distinct advantage nationwide, they may not necessarily succeed in capturing enough seats smoothly.
And what truly decides the final outcome will very likely not be today’s polls, but what transpires over the next three weeks. In particular:
The war in Iran → Oil prices → Inflation → Economic sentiment → Trump’s approval ratings → Independent voters → Final voter turnout.
This is, in fact, a complete causal chain. Therefore, in the 2026 midterm elections, I believe the greatest focal point is not:
“Can Trump still win?”
Rather, it is: “Can Trump, before November 3, successfully compel American voters to forget about the cost of living issues and transform this election once again into a referendum on immigration, national security, culture wars, and the future direction of America?”
If he succeeds, it remains possible for the Republicans to stage a final comeback.
If he fails, the current political headwinds will very likely persist all the way until polling day.
American politics is now highly polarized; a black swan event may not necessarily shift things by 10 percentage points, but it could completely alter two or three percentage points—and in a few key swing states, two or three percentage points are more than enough to determine which party controls the entire Congress. This is an election where a “blue wave” appears to be forming, but the final outcome is far from locked in!
Editor: Hu Lili Proofreader: Wang Bin Translator: Ge Bing
