作者：吕峰
人民以为的社保：政府兜底，老有所养，病有所医。
中共治下的社保：人民兜底，为体制缺口持续买单。
据国新办发布会相关新闻，截至2026年9月底，全国基本养老保险参保人数达到10.79亿人。面对尚未参保的人群，人社部门提出，要通过“数据找人”，找到他们，动员参保。
对于这项政策，中共只关心还有多少人没有进入系统，而不是这些人为什么没有参保：是收入不足，是就业不稳定，还是对未来待遇缺乏信心？
当政府首先强调如何找到缴费者，却没有同样充分地回答民众如何负担、如何监督，社会保障就可能偏离保护劳动者的初衷，变成向劳动者转移制度成本的工具。中国社保争议背后，是中共独裁体制下权力与民众之间的不对等：制定规则的人掌握征缴权，承担成本的人却缺少有效的政治问责渠道。
一边是扩面指标，一边是家庭账本
根据网络数据，以河北灵活就业人员最低缴费基数4446元、养老保险费率20%计算，每月缴费889.2元，一年10670.4元。这还没有包括医疗保险。
同样一笔缴费，落在不同收入者身上，重量截然不同：
这一对比采用相同最低缴费额，只用于说明支付能力差异。对月收入3000元的人来说，单是养老保险就接近收入的三成。所谓“最低档”，并不意味着低收入者就承担得起。
根据网络公布的2025年收入数据，全国居民人均可支配收入中位数为36231元，低收入组人均可支配收入为10150元。河北上述最低档养老年缴费，分别相当于这两个数字的29.5%和105.1%。
家庭人均收入不是就业者工资，不能据此认定每个低收入者都必须拿出全年收入缴费。但这个对照揭示了一个基本事实：职工养老的缴费门槛，与部分家庭的经济能力之间存在明显距离。
政府不能把这种距离简单解释为“保障意识不足”。对于缺少积蓄的人，今天的房租、孩子的生活费和父母的医药费，都是无法推迟的支出。政策要求他们考虑几十年后的生活，也必须先尊重他们今天的生存。
一边是基金结余，一边是财政依赖
发布会相关新闻提到，三项社会保险基金累计结余达到11.2万亿元。这个数字包含不同险种，不能全部当作养老保险的可用资金，也不能用来代替对年度收支的解释。
根据网络财政数据，2024年全国基本养老保险基金收入约8.19万亿元，支出约7.28万亿元，其中财政补助约1.93万亿元。
最后一项只是静态算术对照，并不意味着财政补助应当被取消，更不等于基金已经无法支付。它说明的是，财政支持对于维持收支平衡具有重要作用。扣除财政补助后的收入，也不能直接等同于全部缴费收入。
既然养老保障依赖公共财政，公众就有权知道，补助如何分配，哪些群体获得更多支持，未来压力准备由谁承担。不能在展示成绩时强调结余，在讨论责任时却主要强调普通人的缴费义务。
财政压力不是独裁体制独有的问题，但谁有权决定解决办法、谁承担调整成本、谁能追究决策责任，是政治制度必须回答的问题。中共不能要求公众无条件承担长期责任，却拒绝让公众对权力形成实质约束。
一边是共同承担，一边是待遇悬殊
根据网络数据，2025年企业退休职工人均月养老金约3962元，城乡居民养老待遇领取者约281元。
两者月待遇相差约3681元，前者约为后者的14.1倍。
两套制度的缴费水平、缴费年限和历史安排不同，不能把这一差距直接解释为相同付出获得不同回报。但公共财政的作用，恰恰应当包括弥补弱者保障不足，而不是让历史差距成为永远不必改变的理由。
一个领取居民养老金的老人，全年待遇约3372元；一个按上述河北最低档缴费的灵活就业者，全年养老缴费约10670元，约为前者全年待遇的3.2倍。这并不是同一制度内部的个人收益比较，却能帮助我们理解一个农村家庭的感受：老人得到的支持有限，年轻人承担的缴费却并不轻。
最需要解释的，是公共资源为什么这样分配，以及处于底层的人能通过什么渠道推动改变。中共若以代表人民自居，就必须接受人民对分配公平的追问，而不能只要求人民理解财政困难。
一边是长期缴费，一边是门槛提高
按照已经公布的改革安排，领取基本养老金的最低缴费年限，从2030年起由15年逐步提高至20年。最低年限增加5年，增幅为三分之一。
如果仅以每年10670.4元作静态示例，15年缴费约16万元，20年约21.34万元，相差约5.34万元。实际缴费会受到未来基数变化影响，增加缴费也会影响待遇，因此这不是净损失测算。但对于现金紧张的家庭，多承担五年的缴费义务，已经足以改变原有生活安排。
退休年龄和缴费年限可以基于人口变化调整，但改革必要性不能代替公众参与。规则调整应当说明成本如何分担，为困难群体提供什么过渡安排，以及参保者的合理预期如何得到保护。
独裁体制的问题，在于政府能够要求个人修改人生计划，个人却难以通过选票追究政策制定者的责任。公众被要求相信长期承诺，却缺少足够力量约束作出承诺的一方。
保障人民，还是管理缴费者？
依法督促企业为员工缴纳社保，是保护劳动者权益；对于依法自愿参保的灵活就业人员，则应当尊重选择，通过补助和便利吸引参保。不能因为掌握了数据，就把所有未参保者都当成等待完成的行政任务。
当指标层层下达，基层可能更关心新增了多少账户，而不是家庭承受了多少压力。数据系统越精密，越需要清晰的权力边界和有效监督。否则，技术提高的只是征缴效率，民众的处境并未因此改善。
不是所有社会保险缴费都构成剥削。但如果权力能够持续向劳动者提出要求，却不必充分回应其支付能力；如果制度调整的成本不断向弱者转移，而资源分配缺少有效问责，那么对其剥削性的批评就有充分理由。
中国社保需要的，不只是更强的征缴能力，更是更公平的财政分配、更可负担的参保门槛，以及公开透明、能够追责的权力运行机制。
骑手、农民工和小摊贩首先是拥有权利的人，其次才是缴费者。他们没有义务以无限忍耐，承担不受自己监督的权力所分配的成本。
政府能够找到他们的身份证号、就业记录和缴费账户，也应当看见他们的收入、债务和生活困难。社保应当帮助人民抵御风险，不能成为中共向人民转移治理成本的提款机。
编辑：钟然 校对：王滨 翻译：沈美花
Social Security Has Degenerated into a Government Money-Grabbing Tool
Author: Lu Feng
Abstract: Behind the expansion of China’s social security coverage, low-income groups are burdened with heavy payment pressures, stark gaps in benefits, and extended contribution periods. The article criticizes the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) for its lack of an effective accountability mechanism, calling for greater fiscal allocation fairness, lower participation thresholds, and genuine protection of workers’ rights and interests.
What the people expect from social security: The government provides a safety net—security in old age, care in illness.
Social security under CCP rule: The people provide the safety net—continuously paying for systemic deficits.
According to news reports from a State Council Information Office (SCIO) press conference, as of the end of September 2026, the number of participants in the national basic pension insurance reached 1.079 billion. Facing the remaining uninsured population, human resources and social security departments proposed using “data-driven targeting” (data finding people) to locate them and mobilize their enrollment.
Regarding this policy, the CCP only cares about how many people have not yet entered the system, rather than why these people have not enrolled: Is it due to insufficient income, unstable employment, or a lack of confidence in future benefits?
When the government prioritizes how to find contributors without equally and fully addressing how citizens can afford it or how they can exercise oversight, social security risks straying from its original intent of protecting workers—becoming instead a tool for shifting institutional costs onto the labor force. Behind China’s social security controversy lies an asymmetry between power and the public under the CCP’s authoritarian system: Those who formulate the rules hold the power of collection, while those who bear the costs lack effective political accountability channels.
Expansion Targets vs. Family Budgets
According to online data, taking Hebei Province’s minimum contribution base for flexible employees of 4,446 RMB and a pension contribution rate of 20% as an example, the monthly contribution is 889.2 RMB, totaling 10,670.4 RMB per year. This does not even include medical insurance.
The exact same contribution burden falls with vastly different weight on individuals with different incomes:
Note: This comparison uses the same minimum contribution amount solely to illustrate differences in payment capacity. For an individual with a monthly income of 3,000 RMB, pension insurance alone consumes nearly 30% of their income. The so-called “lowest tier” does not mean that low-income individuals can actually afford it.
According to publicly available 2025 income data, the national median per capita disposable income was 36,231 RMB, while the per capita disposable income for the low-income group was 10,150 RMB. The aforementioned minimum pension contribution in Hebei corresponds to 29.5% and 105.1% of these two figures, respectively.
Per capita household income is not an employed worker’s wage, so one cannot assert based on this that every low-income individual must surrender their entire annual income for insurance contributions. However, this comparison reveals a fundamental fact: There is a clear disconnect between the contribution threshold for employee pensions and the financial capabilities of some households.
The government cannot simply explain away this disconnect as a “lack of security awareness.” For those lacking savings, today’s rent, children’s living expenses, and parents’ medical bills are non-deferrable expenses. If policy demands that they consider their lives decades into the future, it must first respect their survival today.
Fund Balances vs. Fiscal Reliance
News from the press conference mentioned that the cumulative balance of the three social insurance funds reached 11.2 trillion RMB. This figure includes different types of insurance and cannot be treated entirely as usable funds for pensions, nor can it replace an explanation of annual revenues and expenditures.
According to online fiscal data, in 2024, the total income of the national basic pension insurance fund was approximately 8.19 trillion RMB, with expenditures of approximately 7.28 trillion RMB, which included government fiscal subsidies of roughly 1.93 trillion RMB.
Note: The final row is merely a static arithmetic comparison; it does not mean that fiscal subsidies should be canceled, nor does it imply that the fund is incapable of making payments. What it demonstrates is that fiscal support plays a vital role in maintaining balance between income and expenses. Revenue excluding fiscal subsidies also cannot be directly equated with total contribution revenue from participants.
Since pension security relies on public finance, the public has the right to know how subsidies are allocated, which groups receive more support, and who is expected to bear future pressures. The government cannot emphasize surplus balances when showcasing achievements, yet primarily stress the contribution obligations of ordinary people when discussing responsibilities.
Fiscal pressure is not a problem unique to authoritarian regimes, but who has the right to decide solutions, who bears the costs of adjustments, and who can hold decision-makers accountable are political questions that any system must answer. The CCP cannot demand that the public unconditionally bear long-term obligations while refusing to allow the public to exercise substantive constraints on power.
Shared Burden vs. Disparate Benefits
According to online data, in 2025, the average monthly pension for enterprise retired employees was approximately 3,962 RMB, whereas for recipients of urban and rural resident pension benefits, it was approximately 281 RMB.
The two systems differ in contribution levels, contribution years, and historical arrangements; thus, this disparity cannot be directly interpreted as identical contributions yielding different returns. However, the exact role of public finance should include compensating for insufficient security among vulnerable groups, rather than letting historical gaps become a permanent excuse against change.
An elderly person receiving a resident pension gets about 3,372 RMB annually; a flexible employee paying according to the aforementioned minimum tier in Hebei pays about 10,670 RMB per year—roughly 3.2 times the annual benefit of the former. While this is not an internal comparison of individual returns within the same system, it helps us understand the perspective of a rural family: The support received by the elderly is limited, yet the contribution burden borne by the young is by no means light.
What requires explanation most is why public resources are allocated this way, and through what channels those at the bottom can push for change. If the CCP claims to represent the people, it must accept the people’s questioning regarding distribution fairness, rather than merely demanding that the people empathize with fiscal difficulties.
Long-Term Contributions vs. Rising Thresholds
According to announced reform arrangements, the minimum contribution period required to receive a basic pension will gradually increase from 15 years to 20 years starting in 2030—an increase of 5 years, or a 33.3% rise.
If we use the annual 10,670.4 RMB as a static example, 15 years of contributions total roughly 160,000 RMB, while 20 years total roughly 213,400 RMB—a difference of about 53,400 RMB. Actual contributions will be affected by future base changes, and additional years of contribution will also impact ultimate pension levels; therefore, this is not a calculation of net loss. However, for cash-strapped families, taking on five additional years of contribution obligations is enough to disrupt original life plans.
Retirement age and contribution years can be adjusted based on demographic shifts, but policy necessity cannot replace public participation. Rule adjustments should clarify how costs are shared, what transition arrangements are provided for struggling groups, and how the reasonable expectations of participants are protected.
The fundamental flaw of an authoritarian system is that the government can require individuals to modify their life plans, while individuals can hardly use the ballot box to hold policymakers accountable. The public is expected to trust long-term promises, yet lacks sufficient power to constrain the party making those promises.
Protecting the People, or Managing Contributors?
Enforcing social security contributions on enterprises according to law is protecting workers’ rights; for flexible employees who participate voluntarily by law, their choices should be respected, and participation should be encouraged through subsidies and convenience. Having access to data must not lead to treating all uninsured individuals as mere administrative tasks waiting to be completed.
When targets are passed down tier by tier, grass-roots officials may care more about how many new accounts have been opened rather than how much pressure families are under. The more sophisticated the data system becomes, the greater the need for clear boundaries of power and effective oversight. Otherwise, technology merely enhances collection efficiency without improving the actual plight of the public.
Not all social security contributions constitute exploitation. However, if power can continuously make demands on workers without adequately responding to their capacity to pay, and if the costs of policy adjustments are continuously shifted onto the vulnerable while resource allocation lacks effective accountability, then criticisms of its exploitative nature are fully justified.
What China’s social security system needs is not just stronger collection capabilities, but fairer fiscal allocation, more affordable entry thresholds, and an open, transparent power-operating mechanism subject to accountability.
Delivery riders, migrant workers, and street vendors are first and foremost human beings endowed with rights, and only secondarily contributors. They have no obligation to endure infinitely and bear the costs allocated by a power structure that operates beyond their oversight.
The government may be able to find their ID numbers, employment records, and payment accounts; it should also see their income, debt, and life hardships. Social security ought to help the people withstand risks—it must not become an ATM for the CCP to transfer governance costs onto the people.
Editor: Zhong Ran Proofreader: Wang Bin Translator: Shen Meihua
