作者:祝正明
实现政治民主,有三个重要问题需要解决:(一)、如何产生民意?(二)、如何制约权力?(三)、如何形成决议?民主政治经过两百年的摸索和发展,到今天,对上述问题已经有了一整套完善的解决方法,这就是民主政体的四项组织原则:分权原则、代议原则、多数原则、任期原则。
(一)分权原则
民主政治思想认为,不能过于相信人的忠诚。人的私欲是没有止境的,如果不加以限制,势必使人类社会陷于无休止的纷争之中,没有制约,政府并不会比普通人更少犯错误。
有权力就会有腐败,拥有绝对的权力,就会有绝对的腐败,必须以权力制约权力,才能制止腐败。
如何制约权力,是民主政治要解决的首要问题。
一个国家的政府,不论在权力上、在组织效率上、在经济实力上、在人员数量上,与任何形式的民间组织相比,都要强大得多。它掌管着与国家国民经济有关的各部门,其下属的众多的机构管理着与百姓生活息息相关的方方面面。中央政府或其下属部门的任何一项行政指令或条例,都将影响成千上万人的切身利益。如果这些官员都能时时处处为平民的利益着想,那无疑是广大百姓的幸运。
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政府的概念:一般来讲,政府是指统治国家的政治权力机构的总称,但在分权制的民主政治模式中,国家政治权力分别由三个机构掌握:立法机关、行政机关、司法机关,行政机关通常也被单独称为政府。
但是,假如他们漠视百姓的利益,恣意妄为、刚愎自用,百姓又能拿他们怎么样呢?即便只是他们中间的一部分人或者是个别人的不负责任,也足以使众多百姓的利益生灵涂炭。就算他是经人民选举产生的官员,曾经取得过人民的信任,但当他手中掌有大权,具有与其原先完全不同的地位,身处在完全不同的环境中以后,他是否还会保持其在做平民百姓时所持有的思想观点和激情呢?对此,谁也不敢作出保证。人本身就是多变的动物,当他发现自己有众多机会而又无任何风险就能为自己或亲属捞取好处时,他未必能保持廉洁自律。他很可能成为因为握有权力而自持高人一等、粗暴蛮横、盛气凌人的新贵族。就算公民是具有强烈主权意识的公民,对自己权益遭到侵犯具有极高的敏感性,并能做出迅速反应,但是,普通百姓要想直接抑制身居高位的人的行为,绝非易事。即便他们有良好的组织性,组成各种维护自身利益的团体,随时可以游行抗议,但是这种民间团体的分散力量仍然无法有效地同政府庞大的专业力量相抗衡。
任何人都希望自己能为所欲为,握有权力的人总是有滥用权力的趋势,那些经过选举产生的人也不例外。那么,进行选举是否还有意义呢?民主政治思想认为:防止滥用权力的唯一办法,就是实行分权制,以权力约束权力,非得把制定法律的权力交给代表人民的集合体——议会,人民才能感到安全和放心。
减少当局权威有两种方法,一是剥夺当局在某些情况下的自卫能力,二是将权力分散,分别交给许多人掌握,分散权威之后,权威的不可抗拒性和危险性就被减弱,但权威本身并没有被破坏,既削弱了官僚的权力又加强了政府的权威。
分权制的中心思想就是将国家的政治权力,按照法制社会权力性质的不同,分为三种不同的性质:立法权、行政权、司法权,分别交由不同的机构和人员来掌管,使其相互制约,相互监督,防止掌权者权力过大。将滥用权力的现象减少到最低程度。
人都有一种名誉感,当人知道有人在监督自己时,往往会自觉把事情做好;当人知道无人监督时,则往往会放任自己。
分权制减弱了个人或少数几个人在国家政治决策中的作用,使任何人要想操纵整个国家机器都不再可能。假如某个大权在握的人一意孤行,徇私舞弊,即便其任期未满,也能按既定的法律程序将其革职或弹劾,而不会引起任何政治动荡。这就是三权分立,或三权鼎立,如下图所示。
对总统的制约:总统缔结条约,任命官员,设立部、局机关必须由国会同意;
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政府财政预算,财政拨款必须由国会批准;国会可以对总统的欺诈、受贿等渎职犯罪行为提出弹劾,由最高法院进行审判。
对国会的制约:总统可以否决法律和财政议案;最高法院可以宣布国会通过的法律不符合宪法而无效。最高法院和总统对国会制约的目的在于防止国会在少数人的操纵下匆忙通过不成熟的法律。
对最高法院制约:总统对最高法院法官有提名权,国会批准任命,并有免职权,国会决定最高法院的管辖权,最高法院判决的执行,大部分情况下要依赖于政府官员的协助。
任何社会,如果三种权力合为一体,由当权者独揽一切,就无人能动摇当权者的地位。如果立法权和行政权合二为一,由同样的人行使,就会给人性的弱点以极大的诱惑,由于他们有特殊的地位和巨大的权力,与广大民众有不同的利益,他们就会使法律适合他们自己的利益需要。如果司法权和行政权合二为一,那就不存在裁判者,由行政管理者或其下属给百姓造成的损失或不幸就无法向公正无私的,有权裁判的人或机构提出申诉,以期得到补偿和解决。如果谁敢与执政者相对抗,他们总是能让法官找出罪名给你定罪。如果立法权与司法权合二为一,则可以完全控制总统,使总统成为议会的傀儡。
法律由执政者来制定,法律就会成为为政府服务,约束百姓的工具。只有使国家的立法权与行政权相互分离,才能保障法律能服务于百姓的利益、约束政府的组织过程和运作方式,使它不会偏离民众的需要,因此,立法权必须高于行政权。同样,执政者都有滥用权力的倾向,必须要有一个独立的、具有民意代表性的司法机构来监督行政权的行使,制裁行政权的滥用行为,才能保证行政权被正确而慎重地使用。因此,可以认为,一个国家,要想保障公民的权利不受政府侵犯,就必须确保两点:第一,必须将政府的权力进行分立;第二,必须按照公开的明文规定组织政府,依法治国。
制订法律必须能代表民意,立法机关必须是民意的代理议事机关,由一批地位平等、来自全国各地的具有广泛代表性的民选代表组成,由他们对各种社会问题及法律草案进行仔细、充分、全面的分析讨论,制订、通过和修改法律。立法机关被称为国会或议会,民选代表即国会议员,由全国各地民众按事先分配的名额直接选举产生,定期改选。
国家的公共事业、日常事务由政府、即行政机关来管理,行政机关的任务就是依照立法机关所制订的法律,解决社会各类问题,应付临时性事件,就一些简明问题,颁布政策性文件,管理社会各项公共事务,为人民大众及经济发展提供服务,保障社会的安定有序发展。政府的下属机构众多,其设立、撤销和预算经费必须有代议机关批准。民主政治的实践表明,行政权由一人掌握比由数人掌握效率要高得多,对社会更有益,因此,该项权力保留由行政机关首脑个人掌管,实行个人负责制。政府首脑必须由国民选举产生,定期改选,候选人由各党派推荐,经初选、预选后进入最终决选。
解释法律、监督法律的执行,裁决各种争端,对违法事件进行审判的权力,则交由独立的、不受行政机构控制的司法机关来行使。其最高机关为宪法法院或最高法院,主要负责解释宪法、监督宪法的执行、审判违宪行为、裁决涉宪纠纷。它有权判决任何人、包括总统在内。成员由数名地位相等的大法官组成,按多数制原则通过决议。人选通常以间接民意选举产生,实行任期制。
三权分立是人们经过长期的实践和探索而总结出的一种有效、合理而简捷的民主政治结构模式,它使掌权各方即拥有明确的权力,又不能滥用这种权力。这种模式已经在全世界绝大多数国家得到应用,被证明有效可靠,保证了民主制度能够长期、稳定地运行下去。它的另一个优点是,行政上重大疑难问题的决策交由国会集体研究讨论决定,能增加决策本身的可靠性,减轻执政者个人对重大决策所承当的过重的责任,节省其精力用于事务性管理。
分权制的特点:
(1)它不是积极地增进效率的制度,而是积极地防止滥用职权的制度;不是为了避免权力之间的摩擦,而是直接通过不可避免的摩擦,使民众从专制统治下解脱出来。
(2)它是对掌握、行使国家权力的个人,持以怀疑的、不信任的态度为出发点而建立起来的。
(3)它具有自我协调解决内部争端的机制,是注重民众权利的政治组织原则,目的完全在于维护公民的自由与人权。
一个国家有无独立的立法机构和司法机构,它是否由民主选举产生,是否能充分代表民意,在换届时是否能平稳过渡,是否能进行长期稳定的运作,是衡量一个社会是否可以称为是真正民主、文明、法制社会的根本标志。
在许多国家和地区的政府,除了将政治权力分为立法权、行政权、司法权之外,还将庞大的行政权进一步分离出半独立性质的人事权和财政审计权,隶属于立法机构,目的亦在于进一步有效地防止执法者可能出现的腐败行为。
(二)代议原则
民主政治的中心思想就是国家根据民众的意志来治理。但是,民众的意志只是一个抽象的概念,一个人或一群人的意志可能就是民众的意志,也可能根本不是民众的意志。因此,如何产生民意,如何将民意这一概念具体化,是实现民主政治必须要解决的问题。
实现政治民主的原始方法,就是以全体公众集会的方式,讨论国家的政策、法律,行政管理等社会公共行为,以多数制形成决议,委派专人去执行,这是直接民主制,即由公民直接参与政治权力的行使。它的优点是:每个人都亲自参与决策,关心社会问题,讨论社会问题,最终形成妥协达成一致,使得每个成员都能感觉到自己作为集体的一员,实实在在地参与了决策过程。
一个国家,从经济立法到处罚刑事犯罪,从建设电站道路到筹集警察经费,从监督食品卫生到进行环境保护等等,社会事务极其繁多,是否都能让全体公民在同一时间,同一地点聚集在一起讨论决定呢?显然,直接民主制在小国或小的行政区可以实现,但是在一个人口众多,幅员广阔,地区习惯和生活方式有明显差异的大国实际上无法操作。另一方面,处理各种事务必须要有专门的知识和能力,在当今社会的各种新知识新技术新问题层出不穷,复杂多样的情况下,人们通常只能了解某一方面的知识,而且也未必都很精通。其次,公众也不可能都有充分的空余时间来考虑与研究这些社会问题,他们还要忙于处理自己工作中的各种事务,为应付日常生活而忙碌,人们也不可能对所有的社会问题都感兴趣。因此,除非个别关系到全体公民共同利益的重大问题有必要交由全民进行讨论公决外,社会的日常事务由全体公民共同直接管理是不现实的。民主政治的历史经验表明,全体公民聚集在一起并不适宜讨论问题,用这种方式管理国家效率非常低下,不具备可操作性。
但是,尽管民众不可能都有各种丰富的知识、足够的兴趣、充分的时间参与政治决策,他们却有充分的能力判断在他们中间谁最有能力和知识,代表他们的意志,维护他们的利益。在现代社会,民众可以选出自己的代表,授予他们决策的权力,让他们替自己制定政策。实践表明,民众对选派自己的代表代替他们去参与政治事务,既有能力又有兴趣。由此,让一批直接由公民选举出来的代表组成的议事机关来代替公众讨论制订国家的法律与政策,就是代议制,这是一种间接民主制。它能够满足民主政治所要求的三点:
(1)代表公民的意志;
(2)保证议事者有较高的个人素质和充分的议政能力,使社会的精英分子不受任何出身的限制就能脱颖而出,为大众提供最好的服务;
(3)充分的议事效率。
代议机关的代表数量应能对全国民众的民意有充分的代表性,同时应避免人数过多,造成代表机构过分庞大,降低议事效率,增加国民负担。
如果议事者并非由人们直接选举产生,而由已经掌握行政大权的人指定,则这种“代表”只会代表统治者的个人意志,不能保证他们是公众利益的代言人。确定人选时的任人唯亲,无法保证这些人有良好的个人素质和充分的议事能力。代表人数庞大,不仅使议事效率低下,还会成为国家的一大财政负担,使立法机关变成一个老态龙钟的养老院,政府政策的举手机器,当政者手中的橡皮图章。这是专制统治下立法机关的实质。
代议制是简化由民众直接参与讨论与处理国家公共事务所可能引起的混乱、纷争,提高议事效率的一种方法。是国家最高权利属于全体人民的一种政治形式。代议机关的工作是商议各种影响到民众利益的重大问题,制订法律,并监督其执行情况。各国的实践表明,代议机关能很好地胜任这项工作。实际上,也只有它才有权力从事这项工作。
在代议制政体下,每个公民都是国家的主权人,能够通过投票或参与竞选影响国家的政治进程,他们自然会更关心国家的公共事务,如有兴趣和能力,还会有担任公共职务的机会。这是民主制度和专制制度的根本区别。一个社会的统治管理者是否经过具有竞争性的、由全体公民自由地、公开地、不记名地选举而产生,是一个社会是否已摆脱专制统治的具体表现。
编辑:赵杰 校对:孔祥庆 翻译:戈冰
Chapter 7: The Operation of Democratic Politics
Author: Zhu Zhengming
To achieve political democracy, three critical questions must be resolved: (1) How is the popular will generated? (2) How is power constrained? (3) How are resolutions formed? Through two hundred years of exploration and development, democratic politics has today arrived at a complete and well-established set of solutions to these questions—namely, the four organizational principles of a democratic polity: the principle of the separation of powers, the principle of representation, the principle of majority rule, and the principle of fixed terms of office.
(1) The Principle of the Separation of Powers
Democratic political thought holds that one cannot place excessive trust in human loyalty. Human self-interest knows no bounds; if left unchecked, it will inevitably plunge human society into endless strife. Without constraints, a government is no less prone to making mistakes than ordinary people.
Where there is power, there is corruption; absolute power brings absolute corruption. Power must be constrained by power in order to curb corruption.
How to constrain power is the primary issue that democratic politics must resolve.
A nation’s government—whether in terms of authority, organizational efficiency, economic strength, or sheer number of personnel—is vastly more powerful than any form of civil organization. It controls all ministries and departments vital to the national economy, and its numerous subordinate agencies manage every aspect closely tied to the daily lives of the common people. Any single administrative directive or regulation issued by the central government or its subordinate departments will affect the vital interests of tens of thousands of people. If these officials could always and everywhere put the interests of ordinary citizens first, that would undoubtedly be the good fortune of the broad masses.
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The Concept of Government: Generally speaking, “government” refers to the collective term for the political organs of state power that rule a country; however, under a democratic political model based on the separation of powers, state political power is held separately by three institutions—the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary—with the executive branch also commonly referred to on its own as “the government.”
Yet, suppose they disregard the interests of the common people, acting arbitrarily, recklessly, and obstinately—what can the people possibly do to them? Even if only a portion of them, or merely a few individuals, act irresponsibly, that alone is enough to bring ruin and devastation upon the interests of countless ordinary people. Even if an official was elected by the people and once enjoyed their trust, once he holds great power in his hands, occupies a status entirely different from before, and finds himself in a completely different environment, will he still preserve the ideas, viewpoints, and passion he held when he was an ordinary citizen? On this, no one dares give any guarantee. Human beings are inherently changeable creatures; when an official discovers that he has abundant opportunities to reap benefits for himself or his relatives without incurring any risk, he will not necessarily remain honest and self-disciplined. He is very likely to become a new aristocrat—arrogant, overbearing, and domineering because of the power in his grasp, considering himself superior to everyone else. Even if citizens possess a strong sense of popular sovereignty, are acutely sensitive to any infringement upon their rights and interests, and can react swiftly, it is by no means easy for ordinary people to directly curb the behavior of those in high office. Even if they are well organized, forming various groups to defend their own interests and able to march and protest at any moment, the dispersed strength of such civil groups still cannot effectively counterbalance the vast, professional apparatus of the government.
Everyone wishes to do as they please, and those who hold power always tend to abuse it—those who come to office through elections are no exception. That being so, does holding elections still have any meaning? Democratic political thought holds that the only way to prevent the abuse of power is to implement a system of separation of powers, constraining power with power; only when the power to make laws is entrusted to a collective body representing the people—namely, parliament—can the people feel secure and at ease.
There are two ways to diminish the authority of the ruling authorities: the first is to deprive the authorities of their capacity for self-defense under certain circumstances; the second is to disperse power, placing it separately in the hands of many people. Once authority is dispersed, its irresistibility and danger are weakened, yet authority itself is not destroyed—thereby both curbing the power of bureaucrats and strengthening the legitimate authority of the government.
The central idea of the system of separation of powers is to divide a nation’s political power, according to the differing natures of power in a society governed by the rule of law, into three distinct types: legislative power, executive power, and judicial power, entrusting them separately to different institutions and personnel so that they check and supervise one another, preventing any power-holder from accumulating excessive authority and reducing the abuse of power to the lowest possible degree.
Every person possesses a sense of honor: when people know someone is supervising them, they tend to consciously do their job well; when they know no one is watching over them, they tend to let themselves go unchecked.
The separation of powers diminishes the role of an individual or a small handful of individuals in national political decision-making, making it no longer possible for any single person to manipulate the entire state apparatus. Suppose someone wielding immense power insists on having their own way and engages in favoritism and malpractice; even if their term of office has not yet expired, they can be removed from office or impeached in accordance with established legal procedures without triggering any political upheaval. This is the separation of three powers—or the tripartite balance of power—as illustrated in the diagram below.
Checks on the President: The President’s conclusion of treaties, appointment of officials, and establishment of ministries, bureaus, and agencies must all receive the consent of Congress;
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The government’s fiscal budget and financial appropriations must be approved by Congress; Congress may bring articles of impeachment against the President for fraud, bribery, and other offenses of malfeasance in office, to be tried by the Supreme Court.
Checks on Congress: The President can veto laws and fiscal bills; the Supreme Court can declare laws passed by Congress unconstitutional and therefore invalid. The purpose of the checks exercised by the Supreme Court and the President over Congress is to prevent Congress, under the manipulation of a minority, from hastily passing immature legislation.
Checks on the Supreme Court: The President holds the power to nominate Supreme Court justices, while Congress confirms their appointments and holds the power of removal; Congress determines the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court; and the enforcement of the Supreme Court’s rulings relies, in most cases, on the assistance of government officials.
In any society, if these three powers are merged into one, with those in power monopolizing everything, no one will be able to shake the position of the rulers. If legislative power and executive power are combined into one and exercised by the same people, it presents a tremendous temptation to human frailty: because of their special status and immense power, their interests diverge from those of the broad populace, and they will tailor the laws to suit their own self-serving needs. If judicial power and executive power are combined into one, there is no impartial arbiter; any loss or misfortune inflicted upon ordinary people by administrative officials or their subordinates cannot be appealed to a fair, disinterested person or institution with the authority to adjudicate, in hopes of obtaining compensation and redress. Should anyone dare to oppose those in power, the rulers can always have judges find some charge on which to convict them. And if legislative power and judicial power are combined into one, they can completely control the President, reducing the President to a mere puppet of parliament.
When laws are made by those in power, the law becomes an instrument that serves the government and restrains the common people. Only by separating a nation’s legislative power from its executive power can it be guaranteed that the law serves the interests of the common people and constrains the organizational process and operational methods of the government so that it does not deviate from the needs of the public; therefore, legislative power must stand above executive power. Likewise, because rulers always tend to abuse power, there must be an independent judicial institution that represents the popular will to supervise the exercise of executive power and sanction its abuse, thereby ensuring that executive power is used properly and prudently. Thus, it may be held that if a country wishes to protect citizens’ rights from infringement by the government, it must ensure two things: first, the powers of the government must be separated; second, the government must be organized in accordance with explicit, publicly promulgated provisions, governing the country according to law.
The making of laws must be able to represent the popular will, and the legislature must serve as a representative deliberative body acting on behalf of the people. It is composed of a group of popularly elected representatives of equal status who come from all across the country and possess broad representativeness; they carefully, thoroughly, and comprehensively analyze and debate various social issues and draft bills, and enact, pass, and amend laws. The legislature is called Congress or Parliament, and its popularly elected representatives—members of Congress or parliamentarians—are directly elected by the people across the country according to pre-allocated quotas and stand for periodic re-election.
The nation’s public undertakings and day-to-day affairs are managed by the government—that is, the executive branch. The task of the executive branch is to resolve various social problems in accordance with the laws enacted by the legislature, handle contingencies, issue policy documents on straightforward matters, manage all public affairs of society, provide services for the general public and economic development, and safeguard the stable and orderly development of society. The government has numerous subordinate agencies, whose establishment, abolition, and budgetary expenditures must be approved by the representative body. The practice of democratic politics demonstrates that vesting executive power in a single person is far more efficient and more beneficial to society than placing it in the hands of several people; therefore, this power is reserved to be exercised individually by the head of the executive branch under a system of personal responsibility. The head of government must be elected by the citizenry and stand for periodic re-election, with candidates nominated by the various political parties and advancing through primaries and preliminary rounds into the final runoff election.
The power to interpret the law, supervise its enforcement, adjudicate disputes of all kinds, and try violations of the law is entrusted to an independent judiciary free from control by the executive branch. Its highest body is the Constitutional Court or the Supreme Court, which is primarily responsible for interpreting the Constitution, supervising its implementation, trying unconstitutional acts, and adjudicating constitutional disputes. It holds the authority to pass judgment on anyone, including the President. Its membership consists of several justices of equal standing who adopt decisions in accordance with the principle of majority rule; these members are typically chosen through an indirect expression of the popular will and serve fixed terms of office.
The separation of three powers is an effective, rational, and concise structural model of democratic politics distilled by humanity through long-term practice and exploration; it ensures that each branch holding power possesses clearly defined authority while being prevented from abusing it. This model has been adopted in the vast majority of countries around the world and has proven effective and reliable, guaranteeing that a democratic system can operate stably over the long term. Another of its advantages is that entrusting decisions on major, complex administrative issues to Congress for collective study, deliberation, and resolution enhances the reliability of the decisions themselves, relieves the individual ruler of an excessive burden of responsibility for major policy choices, and conserves their energy for day-to-day administrative management.
Characteristics of the System of Separation of Powers:
1, It is not a system designed to actively boost efficiency, but rather one designed to actively prevent the abuse of office; its aim is not to avoid friction between powers, but directly through that inevitable friction to emancipate the populace from despotic rule.
2, It is established on the starting premise of maintaining an attitude of skepticism and distrust toward individuals who hold and exercise state power.
3, It possesses a self-coordinating mechanism for resolving internal disputes; it is a principle of political organization focused on the rights of the people, whose sole purpose is to safeguard citizens’ liberty and human rights.
Whether a country possesses an independent legislature and an independent judiciary, whether they are produced through democratic elections, whether they can fully represent the popular will, whether they can achieve a smooth transition during changes of government, and whether they can operate stably over the long term—these are the fundamental hallmarks by which to measure whether a society can truly be called a democratic, civilized society governed by the rule of law.
In the governments of many countries and regions, beyond dividing political power into legislative power, executive power, and judicial power, the vast executive power is further separated to carve out semi-independent personnel authority and fiscal auditing authority, placed under the legislature, with the aim likewise of further and more effectively preventing potential corruption among law enforcement and executive officials.
(2) The Principle of Representation
The central idea of democratic politics is that a country is governed in accordance with the will of the people. Yet the will of the people is merely an abstract concept: the will of a single person or a group of people may indeed be the will of the people, or it may not be the will of the people at all. Therefore, how to generate the popular will, and how to give concrete form to this concept of the popular will, are problems that must be resolved in order to achieve political democracy.
The original method of realizing political democracy was for the entire public to assemble together to deliberate on state policies, laws, administrative management, and other public social acts, adopt resolutions by majority rule, and appoint designated persons to carry them out. This is direct democracy—that is, the direct participation of citizens in the exercise of political power. Its advantage is that everyone participates personally in decision-making, takes an interest in social issues, and debates social issues, eventually reaching compromise and consensus, so that each member feels that, as part of the collective, they have genuinely taken part in the decision-making process.
In a country, from economic legislation to the punishment of criminal offenses, from building power stations and roads to raising funds for the police, from supervising food hygiene to carrying out environmental protection, social affairs are extraordinarily numerous. Can all citizens possibly gather together at the same time and in the same place to deliberate and decide on all of them? Clearly, direct democracy can be realized in a small state or a small administrative district, but in a large country with a huge population, a vast territory, and marked differences in regional customs and ways of life, it is in practice unworkable. On the other hand, handling various affairs requires specialized knowledge and competence; in today’s society, where new knowledge, new technologies, and new problems emerge endlessly in complex and diverse forms, people can generally only understand one particular field of knowledge, and even then are not necessarily deeply proficient in it. Furthermore, the public cannot possibly all have ample spare time to reflect upon and study these social issues—they are also busy handling all manner of affairs in their own work and preoccupied with coping with daily life, nor can people be expected to take an interest in every single social issue. Therefore, except for isolated major questions bearing on the common interests of all citizens that warrant being submitted to the entire citizenry for deliberation and a public referendum, it is unrealistic for the day-to-day affairs of society to be managed directly and jointly by all citizens. The historical experience of democratic politics demonstrates that gathering all citizens together is ill-suited for deliberating on issues, and governing a country in this manner is exceedingly inefficient and lacks practical feasibility.
However, although the general public cannot possibly all possess extensive knowledge of every kind, sufficient interest, or ample time to participate in political decision-making, they nevertheless have ample ability to judge who among them possesses the greatest competence and knowledge to represent their will and safeguard their interests. In modern society, the people can elect their own representatives, vest them with decision-making power, and let them formulate policies on their behalf. Practice has shown that the public possesses both the ability and the interest to select and dispatch their own representatives to participate in political affairs in their stead. Accordingly, having a deliberative body composed of representatives directly elected by citizens deliberate upon and enact the nation’s laws and policies on behalf of the public constitutes the representative system—which is a form of indirect democracy. It is able to fulfill the three requirements demanded by democratic politics:
1, Representing the will of the citizens;
2, Ensuring that the deliberators possess high personal caliber and adequate competence in deliberating on state affairs, enabling the finest minds of society to rise to prominence without being restricted by social origin and to provide the best service to the general public;
3, Adequate efficiency in deliberation.
The number of representatives in a representative body should be sufficient to provide full representation of the popular will of the nation’s people, while at the same time avoiding excessive numbers that would render the representative institution overly bloated, reduce deliberative efficiency, and increase the burden on the citizenry.
If the deliberators are not produced through direct election by the people, but are instead designated by those who already wield supreme executive power, then such “representatives” will only represent the personal will of the rulers and cannot be guaranteed to act as spokespersons for the public interest. Favoritism and nepotism in determining candidates cannot guarantee that these individuals possess sound personal caliber and adequate deliberative ability. An excessively large number of representatives not only renders deliberative efficiency low, but also becomes a major financial burden on the state, turning the legislature into a decrepit nursing home, a hand-raising machine for government policies, and a rubber stamp in the hands of those in power. This is the true essence of a legislature under autocratic rule.
The representative system is a method of simplifying the chaos and strife that could arise from the public’s direct participation in debating and handling public state affairs, thereby enhancing deliberative efficiency. It is a political form in which the supreme power of the state belongs to the entire people. The work of the representative body is to deliberate on major issues affecting the interests of the populace, enact laws, and supervise their implementation. The practice of various countries demonstrates that a representative body is well-suited to this task; indeed, it alone holds the legitimate authority to perform this work.
Under a representative polity, every citizen is a sovereign of the state, able to influence the nation’s political process by casting a vote or running for office. Naturally, they will take a greater interest in the nation’s public affairs, and if they have the interest and ability, they will also have the opportunity to hold public office. This is the fundamental distinction between a democratic system and an autocratic system. Whether a society’s rulers and administrators are produced through competitive elections conducted freely, openly, and by secret ballot among all citizens is the concrete manifestation of whether a society has broken free from autocratic rule.
Edited by: Zhao Jie Proofread by: Kong Xiangqing Translated by: Ge Bing
