作者：卢超
编辑：程伟 责任编辑：侯改英 校对：王滨 翻译：吕峰

在当下的中国，经济活动陷入持续的低迷与不确定，内需不足、外贸承压、青年失业率高企、民营企业信心受挫，普通民众的日常生活更是感受到了前所未有的压力与焦虑。面对这场系统性的经济困境，本文旨在剖析其深层政治根源，强调一个核心论断：经济的兴衰，始终是政治选择的表象，而当下的经济困境，正源于政治路线的根本性转向。政治倾向，如同经济之舟的船锚，决定了航向的开放与闭塞，以及最终的民生福祉。

韬光养晦与经济腾飞的“黄金二十年”：

在江泽民和胡锦涛主政时期，虽然体制依旧，但政治核心暂时聚焦于“发展”与“稳定”。这一时期的政治倾向可以概括为：对内放权搞活，对外融入全球体系，奉行邓小平时代“韬光养晦”的策略。 政治上的务实主义：领导层采纳了集体领导制，政策制定倾向于技术官僚主导的务实路线，将经济增长（GDP）视为主要衡量指标。这种暂时去意识形态化的务实作风，极大地降低了私人资本和外来投资者的不确定性，为市场提供了稳定且可预测的法律和政策环境。 经济上的全面开放：2001年加入世界贸易组织（WTO）是中国经济崛起的关键一步，这展现了中国融入全球分工体系的决心。宽松的政策鼓励外资进入，成就了“世界工厂”的地位。同时，民营企业的生存空间得到保障和扩大，成为创造就业和技术创新的主要动力。这种开放与稳定的政治环境，是经济整体向上的根本原因。

政治集权与经济转向：从集体领导到“皇权”的路线更迭： 自2012年习近平上任以来，特别是通过修改宪法取消国家主席连任限制之后，中共的政治路线发生了根本性转变。这种转变的核心是权力的高度集中化与个人化，打破了此前相对平衡的集体领导制度，形成了类似“皇权制”的个人决策模式。经济发展的重心从“效率优先”转向了“意识形态优先”和“国家安全优先”，这彻底改变了中国经济运行的底层逻辑，并导致了持续的结构性困境。 核心根源：个人化集权导致政策朝令夕改：在集体领导制被削弱后，最高领导人的个人意志成为决定国家经济政策的首要因素。这种机制的弊端是政策缺乏制衡、难以预测且极易出现“运动式”执行，形成了市场最厌恶的“朝令夕改”环境。从2020年起，突然针对互联网、教育、房地产等核心行业的全面打击，就是这种个人意志凌驾于市场规律之上的体现。政策的不确定性使得投资者（尤其是私人资本）对营商环境的信心崩溃，加剧了资本外流和投资停滞。希捷（Seagate）工厂等外资企业的撤出，正是对这种政治不确定性的“用脚投票”。 “战狼外交”对经济的直接国际反噬：在个人化权力驱动下，中共的外交路线也趋向强硬和意识形态化。“战狼外交”的推行，使得中国与西方发达国家的关系陷入持续的紧张与对抗。这种非务实的外交策略，直接催生了西方世界的“去风险化”（De-risking）和供应链重组。中国在全球产业链中的“不可替代性”正在被政治因素快速侵蚀，外贸订单和FDI（外商直接投资）的下滑，是中共将政治野心置于经济利益之上的直接后果。 “封关锁国”与内循环的自我限制：在习近平的领导下，“内循环”战略被提升到极致，并伴随着对数据、人员和信息流动的严格管控。这种“封关锁国”的倾向，不仅在疫情期间以严苛的“清零政策”表现出来，在疫情结束后也未能完全解除。对国际交流的限制、对敏感数据的收紧，以及意识形态对文化和资本的渗透，都严重阻碍了市场活力和创新精神。经济的活力源于开放和竞争，主动或被动地与世界脱钩，只会限制中国经济的潜能，并最终让民生承担代价。结论：结束专制才是经济复苏的根本 历史昭示，经济的繁荣从来不是单纯的技术或市场问题，它与政治体制紧密挂钩。江胡时期的经济成功是政治上选择“务实、稳定、开放”的结果；而当前经济面临的挑战，则是政治上选择“集中、个人化统治、意识形态优先”的直接后果。 民生经济的根本在于信心、活力和预期。当政治方向让外资感到不确定，让民企感到压抑，让社会感到紧张时，投资会停止，消费会萎缩，创新会枯竭。换言之，政治才是经济的根本。唯有结束中共的一党专制，彻底打破权力的垄断与“皇权”思维，建立法治保障下的自由市场，才会有真正具备活力的自由经济。否则，任何经济上的修补都只是扬汤止沸，无法改变衰退的命运。

Lu Chao: Economic Collapse under Autocracy — The Destructive Path from Reform and Opening to the Restoration of Imperial Power

Abstract:During the administrations of Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, although the political system itself remained unchanged, the core orientation of governance was temporarily focused on “development” and “stability.” Since Xi Jinping assumed office in 2012—particularly following the constitutional amendment that abolished term limits for the state presidency—the political line of the Chinese Communist Party has undergone a fundamental transformation.

Author: Lu Chao
Editor: Cheng Wei  Managing Editor: Hou Gaiying  Proofreader: Wang Bin  Translator: Lyu Feng

In contemporary China, economic activity has fallen into a prolonged state of stagnation and uncertainty. Domestic demand remains weak, foreign trade is under increasing pressure, youth unemployment is persistently high, and confidence among private enterprises has been seriously undermined. For ordinary citizens, daily life is marked by an unprecedented sense of strain and anxiety. Confronting this systemic economic predicament, this article seeks to analyze its deeper political roots and advances a central argument: economic prosperity or decline is ultimately a manifestation of political choice. The current economic difficulties arise precisely from a fundamental shift in political direction. Political orientation, like the anchor of an economic vessel, determines whether its course is open or constrained—and, ultimately, the well-being of the people.

“Keeping a Low Profile” and the “Golden Two Decades” of Economic Takeoff:During the administrations of Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, although the institutional framework remained unchanged, the political core temporarily concentrated on “development” and “stability.” The political orientation of this period can be summarized as decentralizing authority and invigorating the domestic economy while integrating into the global system externally, in accordance with Deng Xiaoping’s strategy of taoguang yanghui (“keeping a low profile and biding one’s time”).

Political Pragmatism:At the political level, the leadership adopted a system of collective leadership, and policy formulation tended to follow a technocratic, pragmatic approach, with economic growth (GDP) serving as the primary metric of performance. This temporary de-ideologization of governance substantially reduced uncertainty for private capital and foreign investors, providing the market with a stable and predictable legal and policy environment.

Comprehensive Economic Opening:China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001 constituted a pivotal step in its economic ascent, demonstrating a clear commitment to integration into the global division of labor. Liberal policies encouraged inflows of foreign capital, enabling China to attain its status as the “world’s factory.” At the same time, the space for private enterprises was protected and expanded, allowing them to become the principal drivers of job creation and technological innovation. This combination of political openness and stability formed the fundamental basis for sustained, broad-based economic growth.

Political Centralization and Economic Reorientation: The Shift from Collective Leadership to a “Neo-Imperial” Model

Since Xi Jinping assumed office in 2012—particularly following the constitutional amendment that abolished term limits for the state presidency—the political trajectory of the Chinese Communist Party has undergone a fundamental transformation. The core of this shift lies in the extreme centralization and personalization of power, dismantling the previously more balanced system of collective leadership and giving rise to a personal decision-making model akin to a “neo-imperial” order. Correspondingly, the focus of economic development has shifted from “efficiency first” to “ideology first” and “national security first.” This reorientation has fundamentally altered the underlying logic of China’s economic operation and has generated persistent structural difficulties.

Core Cause: Personalized Centralization and Policy VolatilityWith the weakening of collective leadership, the personal will of the top leader has become the decisive factor shaping national economic policy. The inherent flaw of this mechanism is the lack of effective checks and balances, resulting in policies that are unpredictable and prone to abrupt, campaign-style implementation—precisely the type of environment most detested by markets. Since 2020, sudden and sweeping crackdowns on key sectors such as the internet, education, and real estate have exemplified the subordination of market principles to personal political will. Policy uncertainty has shattered investor confidence—particularly among private capital—thereby accelerating capital outflows and investment paralysis. The withdrawal of foreign enterprises, such as Seagate’s factory closures, represents a form of “voting with one’s feet” in response to heightened political uncertainty.

The International Economic Backlash of “Wolf-Warrior Diplomacy”Driven by personalized power, China’s foreign policy has also become increasingly confrontational and ideologically charged. The adoption of so-called “wolf-warrior diplomacy” has plunged relations with advanced Western economies into sustained tension and rivalry. This non-pragmatic diplomatic posture has directly fueled Western strategies of “de-risking” and global supply-chain reconfiguration. China’s former “irreplaceability” within global value chains is being rapidly eroded by political factors. The decline in export orders and foreign direct investment (FDI) is a direct consequence of prioritizing political ambition over economic interest.

“Border Closure” Tendencies and the Self-Constraining Logic of the Dual-Circulation StrategyUnder Xi’s leadership, the “internal circulation” strategy has been elevated to an extreme, accompanied by stringent controls over data, personnel, and information flows. This tendency toward de facto “border closure” was most evident during the pandemic through the harsh “zero-COVID” policy, yet it has not been fully reversed in the post-pandemic period. Restrictions on international exchange, tighter controls over sensitive data, and the ideological penetration of culture and capital have all severely undermined market dynamism and innovative capacity. Economic vitality derives from openness and competition; deliberate or involuntary decoupling from the world can only constrain China’s economic potential and ultimately impose costs on livelihoods.

Conclusion: Ending Authoritarianism as the Fundamental Condition for Economic Recovery

History demonstrates that economic prosperity is never merely a technical or market issue; it is inseparably linked to political institutions. The economic success of the Jiang and Hu eras resulted from political choices favoring pragmatism, stability, and openness. By contrast, the challenges confronting today’s economy are the direct outcome of political choices emphasizing concentration of power, personalized rule, and ideological primacy.

The foundations of a people-centered economy are confidence, vitality, and stable expectations. When political direction generates uncertainty for foreign capital, repression for private enterprise, and pervasive tension within society, investment stalls, consumption contracts, and innovation withers. In other words, politics constitutes the economic base. Only by ending one-party authoritarian rule, dismantling the monopoly of power and the “imperial” mindset, and establishing a free market protected by the rule of law can a genuinely dynamic and free economy emerge. Otherwise, any economic tinkering will merely treat symptoms without addressing the cause, and cannot alter the trajectory of decline.