作者：周敏

编辑：张宇   责任编辑：钟然   校对：王滨   翻译：吕峰

   

在过去十五年间，中国的县城发生了一场外界几乎看不见的深刻变化:

    

    一个以身份垄断、权力继承、资源控制为核心的地方等级结构正在迅速固化。

     我们称之为“县城婆罗门阶层”。

    这种阶层化并不是文化遗产，也不是经济自然演化，而是威权体制在基层治理中长期积累的产物。其结果就是：县城的社会活力被抽空，向上通道被封死，年轻人被迫逃离，地方治理陷入了自循环的保守化。这一结构成了中国社会向下沉落的关键推手。

    这个现象可以描述为：县城正固化为一个“身份社会”。中国国务院发展研究中心、北大社科系、清华公共管理学院在过去十年的调查指出，中国70%的人口增长与创新资源正在向大城市集中；县域财政高度依赖上级转移支付；县域公共就业系统（编制内）在当地占30%-50%，远高于城市。在一个经济活力不足、机会稀缺的环境里，县城自然而然走向了“身份决定阶层”。拥有体制内身份=拥有稳定；拥有权力关系=拥有尊严；拥有内部资源=拥有上升通道。普普通通的老百姓则排斥在外部 。挤不进编制=没有未来；没有人脉关系=没有公平机会。循环往复不断固化。县城婆罗门阶层由此而生。

    那么，权力为什么可以在县城得到“继承”？

    中国的县域治理研究显示，约有2100个县级行政单位，它们呈现出一种典型结构：

    政法系统（公安、法院、检察院）本地化倾向极强；

    教育、卫健、住建等系统普遍存在“熟人化招聘、内部消化”现象；

    事业单位、国企和城投公司吸纳当地最优质的稳定收入岗位。

    在这样一个结构里，权力具有了三个特征。

    一、家族化倾向

    大量地方研究成果指出，县域事业单位与体制岗位存在明显的“家族集中性”。乡镇到县级的权力系统存在“科长-局长-书记”的关系链条。婚姻成为阶层内部的再结合机制，也就是说，体制内的通婚率高。这就意味着，县城的权力并不是公开竞争，而是继承、嫁接和血缘化。

    二、执法权力高度集中

    县城有三大权力：行政权，执法权，资源分配权。而这些往往由同一批人、同一套关系网掌握。在缺乏监督体系的环境中，这种体系天然形成了资源闭环。因此，一个县城的经济结构再怎么变化，其权力结构却几乎不会变化！

    三、资源配置由“权力逻辑”支配，而非市场逻辑。县城资源包括：老师编制、医院岗位、工程项目、国企招聘、土地指标和城市建设预算等。调查指出，这些资源在县城中往往由不到10%的人掌控分配权。而这10%的人，形成了现实中的县城婆罗门。

那么，县城婆罗门阶层为何会阻断社会流动？我们可以大概分析一下。首先是，教育机会被体制化。县域教育财政中，目前80%以上用于人员支出，几乎没有空间进行真正的教育质量改善。而老师岗位是高度体制化的，优质岗位由关系网分配。这就造成了普通家庭的孩子无法获得优质教育，体制家庭的孩子却能享受教育资源的倾斜。教育成了阶层固化的关键环节。其次，所有的经济机会被压缩为“体制内 VS 体制外”。县城缺乏产业，但体制岗位十分稳定，这形成了极端结构。体制内：铁饭碗+地位+资源，体制外：低工资+无机会+无保障。在县城里，体制内平均工资是体制外的2-4倍，体制外劳动者的社保缴纳率远远低于大城市水平。县城私营经济一年比一年差，对本地就业的吸纳能力持续下滑。而这一切意味着：体制就是命运。

中国有句古话叫“识时务者为俊杰”。普通家庭的年轻人看不到希望，便会选择远走大城市。十几年间年轻人口净流出率超过30%。部分县城18-35岁人口占比跌到15%以下。这是一个可怕的数字，但是实际情况可能是比统计数据更加糟糕的。年轻人代表的是创新变革与改天换日的勇气，他们走了之后，身后的县城便愈加陷入保守结构，和对外来竞争的恐惧。县城进一步陷入“老龄化-保守化-权力固化”，形成了一个东亚等级社会。

    那么这个现象的根本原因是什么呢？那就是，威权体制是不会允许一个开放的县城存在的。县城婆罗门阶层之所以形成，并不是地方官员个别腐败，而是整个制度结构决定的！首先，也是最重要的：权力不透明。在没有透明预算、没有自治、没有独立媒体的环境里，权力者天然优先满足自己及自己的人。而普通人无处申诉，没有渠道监督。中国的制度决定了资源永远向上、向内流动，而不会向社会扩散。第二是，社会组织受限，公民（实际上只是居民）无法参与治理。在健康的民主国家里，县城往往是地方自治的基础单位，是NGO、公民组织活跃的场所，是媒体定期监督的对象。但是在中国，自治是被行政化的，社会组织被审批牢牢控制，公民参与和舆论监督都压缩到极小。结果就是只有权力能决定县城的走向。最后一点，威权结构让县城必须维稳。县城要对上负责，而不是对下、对人民负责。地方官员的首要目标不是发展，而是不出事，不给上级添麻烦，不发生“政治风险”。于是一个怪象出现了：创新被怀疑，活力被压制，社会被降级。权力需要“稳定”来证明自己合理（尽管谁都知道这个“稳定”是波涛汹涌的表象）。这正是县城婆罗门阶层最坚固的土壤。

    县城婆罗门阶层的问题不是地方问题，而是威权结构问题。它的根源在于权力不受监督、资源不公开透明、社会组织无法成长、公民（其实是居民）参与被最小化、以及媒体不能独立监督。要走出阶层固化陷阱，必须从制度层面改变权力逻辑。要建立真正的地方自治，公开预算和公共资源分配，建立独立的媒体与审计机制，鼓励公民社会和公共监督，让权力回到人民的问责之下。开放、透明、民主是唯一解药。

    一个国家的现代化，不是大城市的高楼与高科技决定的，而是县城的公平与自由决定的。

    县城能自由呼吸的那一天，中国才真正拥有未来。

Zhou Min: County-Town Brahmins — The Solidification of China’s Grassroots Power Structure

Abstract:From the perspectives of the political–legal system, education, and employment, the author analyzes the rise of a “Brahmin class” within China’s county towns. By examining the development of small counties, the article reveals the nature of authoritarian rule under the Chinese Communist Party at the grassroots level.

Author: Zhou Min

Editor: Zhang Yu Managing Editor: Zhong Ran Proofreader: Wang Bin Translator:Lyu Feng

Over the past fifteen years, China’s county towns have undergone a profound transformation that has largely escaped public attention:

A local hierarchical structure centered on identity monopoly, power inheritance, and resource control has rapidly solidified.

We may call this structure the “county-town Brahmin class.”

This form of stratification is neither a cultural legacy nor the result of natural economic evolution. Rather, it is the cumulative product of long-term authoritarian governance at the grassroots level. The consequences are stark: social vitality in county towns has been drained, upward mobility channels have been blocked, young people are forced to leave, and local governance has sunk into a self-reinforcing conservatism. This structure has become a key driver of China’s broader social downward drift.

The phenomenon can be described as follows: county towns are hardening into “identity-based societies.” Surveys over the past decade by the Development Research Center of the State Council, the Department of Sociology at Peking University, and the School of Public Policy and Management at Tsinghua University indicate that around 70% of population growth and innovative resources are concentrating in large cities; county-level finances are highly dependent on upper-level transfer payments; and public employment systems (positions within the state apparatus) account for 30–50% of local employment—far higher than in cities.

In an environment lacking economic dynamism and rich opportunities, county towns naturally evolve toward a system in which identity determines class. Possessing an institutional position means stability; possessing power connections means dignity; possessing internal resources means access to upward mobility. Ordinary people are excluded from this system. Failing to enter the state establishment means no future; lacking personal connections means no fair opportunity. This cycle continually reinforces itself, giving rise to the county-town Brahmin class.

Why, then, is power able to be “inherited” within county towns?

Research on county-level governance in China shows that among roughly 2,100 county-level administrative units, a typical structure prevails:

The political–legal system (public security, courts, procuratorates) is highly localized;

Education, healthcare, housing, and urban development systems commonly exhibit “acquaintance-based recruitment” and internal absorption;

Public institutions, state-owned enterprises, and urban investment companies absorb the most stable and best-paid local jobs.

Within this structure, power takes on three defining characteristics.

First, a tendency toward familialization.A large body of local research indicates a pronounced “family concentration” in county-level public institutions and state positions. From townships to county governments, power networks often follow chains such as “section chief–bureau director–party secretary.” Marriage functions as an internal mechanism of class recombination; in other words, intermarriage rates within the system are high. County-town power is therefore not the result of open competition, but of inheritance, grafting, and bloodline consolidation.

Second, a high concentration of enforcement power.County towns revolve around three core powers: administrative authority, law-enforcement authority, and resource-allocation authority. These are often held by the same group of people within the same relational network. In the absence of effective oversight, this structure naturally forms a closed resource loop. As a result, no matter how much a county’s economic structure changes, its power structure remains largely unchanged.

Third, resource allocation governed by power logic rather than market logic.County-level resources include teaching posts, hospital positions, construction projects, state-owned enterprise recruitment, land quotas, and urban development budgets. Studies indicate that fewer than 10% of individuals control the allocation of these resources. This 10% constitutes the de facto county-town Brahmin class.

Why does this class block social mobility? Several mechanisms are evident. First, educational opportunity becomes institutionalized. Over 80% of county-level education budgets are currently spent on personnel costs, leaving little room for genuine improvements in educational quality. Teaching positions are highly institutionalized, and desirable posts are distributed through relational networks. As a result, children from ordinary families are unable to access quality education, while children from institutional families benefit from systematic advantages. Education thus becomes a key mechanism of class consolidation.

Second, economic opportunities are compressed into a binary of “inside the system versus outside the system.” County towns lack diversified industries, yet institutional positions remain highly stable, producing an extreme structural divide. Inside the system: iron rice bowl, social status, and access to resources. Outside the system: low wages, few opportunities, and weak social security. In county towns, average wages inside the system are two to four times those outside it, and social-security participation rates among non-institutional workers are far below those in large cities. The private economy in county towns deteriorates year by year, with declining capacity to absorb local labor. All of this sends a single message: the system determines destiny.

There is a Chinese saying: “Those who understand the times are heroes.” Young people from ordinary families see no future and therefore choose to leave for big cities. Over the past decade, net youth out-migration rates have exceeded 30%. In some county towns, the proportion of residents aged 18–35 has fallen below 15%. This is an alarming figure, and the reality may be even worse than official statistics suggest. Young people embody innovation, change, and the courage to reshape society. Once they leave, county towns sink deeper into conservatism and fear of external competition, further locking themselves into a cycle of aging, rigidity, and power consolidation—forming a distinctly East Asian hierarchical society.

What, then, is the root cause of this phenomenon? The answer is that an authoritarian system does not permit the existence of open county towns. The formation of the county-town Brahmin class is not the result of isolated local corruption, but of the institutional structure as a whole.

First and most fundamentally, power lacks transparency. In the absence of transparent budgets, local autonomy, and independent media, those in power naturally prioritize themselves and their networks. Ordinary people have no effective channels for redress or oversight. China’s institutional design ensures that resources flow upward and inward, rather than outward to society.

Second, social organizations are constrained, and citizens (in practice, merely “residents”) cannot meaningfully participate in governance. In healthy democracies, county towns are foundational units of local self-government, vibrant arenas for NGOs, civic organizations, and regular media oversight. In China, however, self-governance is administrative in nature, social organizations are tightly controlled through approval mechanisms, and civic participation and public scrutiny are reduced to a minimum. The result is that only power determines the direction of county towns.

Finally, authoritarian structures require county towns to prioritize “stability maintenance.” Local governments are accountable upward, not downward to the people. Officials’ primary objective is not development, but avoiding incidents, avoiding trouble for superiors, and preventing “political risks.” A paradox emerges: innovation is viewed with suspicion, vitality is suppressed, and society is downgraded. Power requires “stability” to justify itself, even though everyone knows this stability is merely a turbulent façade. This is the most fertile soil for the county-town Brahmin class.

The problem of the county-town Brahmin class is not a local issue, but a systemic one rooted in authoritarian governance. Its causes lie in unchecked power, opaque resource allocation, stunted social organizations, minimized civic participation, and the absence of independent media oversight. Escaping the trap of class solidification requires institutional change: genuine local self-government, transparent budgets and public resource allocation, independent media and auditing mechanisms, and the encouragement of civil society and public oversight—bringing power back under popular accountability. Openness, transparency, and democracy are the only remedies.

A nation’s modernization is not determined by skyscrapers and advanced technology in major cities, but by fairness and freedom in its county towns.

Only when county towns can breathe freely will China truly have a future.