作者：张兴贵
为什么极权国家在对外交往中特别喜欢“摆排场”？从纳粹德国的盛大阅兵，到苏联的宏伟国事访问，再到当代某些国家的豪华接待和军事展示，这一幕幕场景反复上演。外交成为“剧场政治”的舞台：通过视觉震撼、仪式秩序和象征符号，制造“强大统一”的幻象。这种表演性并非偶然，而是源于极权政权深刻的内在不安全感——它必须不断证明自身的“必然胜利”和“历史正当性”，因为其合法性并非源于民众同意，而是源于神话构建。
第一，摆排场是投射力量、制造威慑的工具。 极权政权往往内部存在结构性脆弱：经济可能低效、民生压力巨大、社会不满潜伏。它们无法通过透明治理赢得认可，于是转向外部“秀肌肉”。一场盛大的阅兵或国宾仪式，能瞬间营造“国家强大、领袖英明”的形象。这些排场不是浪费，而是战略投资：通过视觉震撼，弥补硬实力不足或掩盖内部问题。民主国家外交更注重实质谈判和互惠，而极权外交则把“形式”本身变成武器——让对手感受到压力，让潜在盟友看到“靠山”。
第二，摆排场服务于宣传机器。极权体制的核心是意识形态垄断和群众动员。这种政权需要不断制造“神话”来维持民众的狂热或顺从。对外排场被精心包装，通过国家媒体向国内传播：外国领导人鞠躬、盛大欢迎仪式、礼物交换，都被解读为“世界认可我们的伟大成就”。这能转移国内矛盾，强化“举国一致”的幻觉。它制造一种“外部肯定内部稳定”的循环：排场越隆重，国内忠诚度越高；忠诚度越高，越能支撑更多排场。这种表演性政治，正是极权主义“剧场国家”的特征——一切皆为演出，一切演出皆为统治。
第三，摆排场是寻求国际承认的手段。极权国家常面临“合法性赤字”。它们缺乏选举授权，无法靠民意支撑，于是依赖“绩效合法性”和“程序合法性”（仪式）。当绩效不足时，仪式就成为替代品。极权主义不满足于统治人民，它试图重塑人民感知的世界。盛大排场正是这一企图的国际版：通过仪式秩序，暗示“混乱的外部世界”最终会臣服于“有序的极权模式”。
从更宏大视角看，这一现象反映了“景观社会”理论在极权语境下的极端化。权力不再满足于隐藏，它需要被观看、被崇拜。极权排场是将政治彻底审美化、戏剧化的结果：群众成为观众，领袖成为主角，历史成为导演。这暴露了极权主义的内在矛盾——它声称代表“历史必然”，却必须不断通过人为表演来证明。
极权外交的“摆排场”不是孤立文化现象，而是体制逻辑、权力心理与宣传机制的系统产物。真正的国家力量，源于治理效能、民众福祉与普世价值，而非舞台上的灯光与队列。唯有摒弃表演性政治，拥抱理性对话，世界才能走向持久和平与繁荣。
编辑：Geoffrey 校对：王滨 翻译：戈冰
Totalitarianism Part VI: Silk Wrapped Around Trees
By Zhang Xinggui
Why are totalitarian states so particularly fond of “putting on grand spectacles” in their foreign interactions? From Nazi Germany’s lavish military parades to the Soviet Union’s grand state visits, to the luxurious receptions and military displays of certain contemporary states, these scenes are performed over and over again. Diplomacy becomes a stage for “theater politics”: through visual shock, ritual order, and symbolic signs, a illusion of “power and unity” is manufactured. This performative nature is by no means accidental; rather, it stems from a profound inner insecurity inherent in totalitarian regimes—they must constantly prove their own “inevitable victory” and “historical legitimacy,” because their legitimacy originates not from the consent of the governed, but from the construction of myth.
First, putting on grand spectacles is a tool for projecting power and manufacturing deterrence. Totalitarian regimes often harbour internal structural vulnerabilities: their economies may be inefficient, livelihood pressures immense, and social discontent latent. Unable to win recognition through transparent governance, they turn outward to “flex their muscles.” A grand military parade or state guest ceremony can instantly construct an image of a “mighty nation and wise leader.” These grand spectacles are not mere waste, but strategic investments: through visual shock, they make up for deficiencies in hard power or conceal internal problems. While diplomacy in democratic countries places greater emphasis on substantive negotiations and reciprocity, totalitarian diplomacy turns “form” itself into a weapon—making adversaries feel pressure and enabling potential allies to see a “backer.”
Second, putting on grand spectacles serves the propaganda machine. The core of a totalitarian system is ideology monopoly and mass mobilization. Such regimes need to continuously manufacture “myths” to maintain the fervor or compliance of the populace. External spectacles are meticulously packaged and broadcast domestically through state media: foreign leaders bowing, grand welcoming ceremonies, and exchange of gifts are all interpreted as “world recognition of our great achievements.” This diverts domestic contradictions and reinforces the illusion of “nationwide unity.” It creates a cycle where “external validation reinforces internal stability”: the more luxurious the spectacle, the higher the domestic loyalty; the higher the loyalty, the more it can sustain further spectacles. This performative politics is precisely the defining characteristic of the totalitarian “theater state”—everything is a performance, and every performance serves the rule.
Third, putting on grand spectacles is a means of seeking international recognition. Totalitarian states often face a “legitimacy deficit.” Lacking electoral authorization, they cannot rely on popular mandate for support, and thus depend on “performance legitimacy” and “procedural legitimacy” (rituals). When performance falls short, rituals become the substitute. Totalitarianism is not content with merely ruling over the people; it attempts to reshape the world as perceived by the people. Grand spectacles are precisely the international version of this attempt: through ritualized order, they imply that the “chaotic outside world” will ultimately submit to the “ordered totalitarian model.”
From a broader perspective, this phenomenon reflects the extreme application of the theory of the “Society of the Spectacle” within a totalitarian context. Power is no longer content with remaining hidden; it demands to be watched and worshipped. Totalitarian spectacles are the result of the complete aestheticization and dramatization of politics: the masses become the audience, the leader becomes the protagonist, and history becomes the director. This exposes the inherent contradiction of totalitarianism—while claiming to represent “historical inevitability,” it must constantly rely on artificial performances to prove it.
The “grand spectacles” of totalitarian diplomacy are not an isolated cultural phenomenon, but a systemic product of institutional logic, power psychology, and propaganda mechanisms. True national strength stems from governance efficacy, public well-being, and universal values, rather than stage lights and marching formations on a stage. Only by abandoning performative politics and embracing rational dialogue can the world move toward lasting peace and prosperity.
Editor: Geoffrey Proofreader: Wang Bin Translator: Ge Bing
