作者：冯仍
2026年，中国又开始了一轮 “扫黑除恶” 。
从官方公布的信息看，这一次除了继续打击所谓“村霸”“乡霸”“矿霸”“市霸”等传统黑恶势力，还把“软暴力催收”“恶意索赔”“舆情敲诈”“劳务碰瓷”“网络暴力”等列入重点打击范围。各地随后开始集中收网、抓人、公布战果，一场熟悉的“专项斗争”又一次铺开。
每当看到这样的新闻，我从来没有跟着叫好。
不是因为我反对打击黑社会。
真正欺压百姓、敲诈勒索、暴力讨债、强迫交易的人，当然应该受到法律制裁。任何一个正常社会都必须打击这些犯罪。
我担心的是另外一件事：为什么本来应该由司法机关依据现有法律处理的刑事犯罪，总要变成一场又一场声势浩大的政治运动？
在一个司法不能真正独立、公检法都受到政治权力领导的制度里，我很难相信这种自上而下发动的“专项斗争”，最后只会精准地落在真正的黑恶犯罪分子身上。
历史已经一次又一次告诉我们，运动一旦开始，就会有指标，会有压力，会有层层落实，也会有人为了完成任务扩大打击范围。
于是我首先想到的不是“又抓了多少人”，而是：这些被抓的人里面，有多少真正属于黑恶势力？又会不会有人因为经济纠纷、劳动纠纷、民间借贷、正常维权甚至得罪地方权力，被一步一步推入所谓“涉黑涉恶”的案件之中？
真正的法治其实没有这么复杂。
杀人，就按照杀人罪处理；敲诈，就按照敲诈勒索罪处理；非法拘禁，就按照非法拘禁罪处理；暴力讨债、强迫交易，同样都有相应的法律。
一个人有没有犯罪，应当看证据。
构成什么罪，应当看法律。
判多少年，应当由法院依法裁判。
如果证据不足，就不应该定罪。
这本来就是最基本的司法常识。
可是“专项斗争”的思维完全不同。它往往先确定一个政治任务，再由中央部署、地方落实、集中行动、挂牌督办，最后不断公布“打掉多少团伙”“抓获多少嫌疑人”“破获多少案件”。
当司法开始用“战果”来衡量的时候，我就会本能地警惕。
因为司法最不应该追求的，恰恰就是数字。
法院的任务不是判得越多越好，公安的任务也不是抓得越多越好。一个成熟的司法体系，首先应该保证一个无辜的人不会因为一场运动而被错误地送进监狱。
这些年，中国司法机关自己也不断强调，“是黑恶一个不漏，不是黑恶一个不凑”，还多次要求不得“拔高认定”。
为什么这种话需要一遍又一遍强调？
因为“凑数”和“拔高”的危险一直存在。
这一次尤其让我警惕的，是“黑恶”的定义正在从传统暴力犯罪进一步延伸。
比如“恶意索赔”“舆情敲诈”“劳务碰瓷”“网络暴力”。
这些概念听起来都有它们需要打击的对象。确实有人利用投诉敲诈企业，也有人故意制造舆情索取钱财，还有人组织网络暴力。
真正犯罪的，当然应该依法处理。
但问题在于，这些概念同时又处在大量正常社会活动的边缘。
什么叫恶意索赔，什么叫消费者依法索赔？
什么叫劳务碰瓷，什么叫工人依法追讨工资？
什么叫舆情敲诈，什么叫记者、自媒体或者普通公民曝光企业和地方政府的问题？
什么叫网络暴力，什么又只是一个公民对政府、官员或者公共事件发表非常尖锐的批评？
法律边界如果足够清楚，司法又真正独立，这些问题并不是不能解决。
可一旦最终解释这些边界的，仍然是一个缺乏独立审判和权力制约的体系，问题就完全不同了。
一个讨薪的工人，可以被说成“恶意维权”；一个长期投诉的消费者，可以被说成“恶意索赔”；一个揭露地方丑闻的自媒体，也可能被怀疑是“舆情敲诈”。
真正让我不安的，就是这种越来越大的解释空间。
权力一旦得到一个足够宽的口袋，最后装进去什么人，往往就不再只是法律问题。
民营企业尤其应该对此保持警惕。
中国企业家这些年最害怕的事情之一，就是普通经济纠纷被刑事化。
本来是合作失败，最后可能变成合同诈骗；本来是股东争议，最后可能变成刑事案件；本来是企业之间的资金问题，最后却由公安介入。
而一个企业一旦被戴上“涉黑”的帽子，后果往往远远超过普通刑事案件。
老板可能被长期羁押，企业账户被冻结，资产被查封，财产被追缴，一个经营多年的公司甚至可能就此消失。
中国官方这些年一方面不断强调保护民营经济、保护企业家财产权，另一方面又不断进行各种专项整治。这恰恰说明，民营企业真正缺少的并不是几句“支持民营经济”的口号，而是一种最基本的制度安全感。
一个企业家真正需要知道的是：
只要我没有违法，我的企业就不会因为得罪某一个官员而被整；我的财产不会因为一场政治运动突然失去保障；我的商业纠纷不会因为地方权力介入而变成刑事案件。
这种安全感，宣传给不了。
领导讲话也给不了。
只有独立司法能够给。
还有一个问题始终绕不过去。
中国已经扫黑这么多年了，为什么还需要不停地扫？
2018年开始过全国扫黑除恶专项斗争，后来宣布“常态化扫黑除恶”，现在又再次进行“深化扫黑除恶专项斗争”。
如果黑社会真的已经扫了一轮又一轮，却总是不断重新出现，那么真正值得问的，就不只是“还有多少黑社会没有抓完”，而是：
这些黑恶势力为什么能够长期存在？
一个地方的“村霸”“矿霸”“市霸”，如果背后没有地方权力保护，真的能够横行十年、二十年吗？
一个犯罪团伙如果长期垄断市场、暴力讨债、欺压百姓，却一直没人敢碰，它背后究竟站着谁？
中国官方自己也承认，扫黑必须“打伞破网”，也就是要查黑恶势力背后的“保护伞”。
这实际上已经承认了一个非常重要的问题：很多地方的黑恶势力，从来就不是几个流氓单独作恶那么简单。
真正可怕的，是黑恶势力与公权力结合。
几个流氓欺负老百姓，已经很坏；如果流氓背后还站着警察、官员和地方利益集团，那普通人面对的就不再是一个犯罪团伙，而是一整套权力网络。
今天打掉一个张三，明天还会出来一个李四。
因为产生张三、李四的土壤没有发生根本改变。
所以比“这次抓了多少黑社会”更重要的问题应该是：
是谁让这些黑社会成长起来的？
是谁给他们提供保护？
又是谁赋予那些“保护伞”如此巨大的、缺乏制约的权力？
这才是问题的根。
也是我为什么一直认为，中国真正需要的不是一场又一场“扫黑除恶”，而是司法独立。
我所理解的司法独立其实很简单。
警察只根据事实和法律侦查案件，检察官依法决定是否起诉，律师能够真正为被告人辩护，法官不需要听党委、政法委或者某个领导对具体案件的意见。
证据不足，就无罪。
刑讯逼供取得的证据，就不能使用。
办错案，就必须追责。
违法羁押，就必须赔偿。
私人财产受到法律保护。
一个普通工人、一个企业家、一个政府官员、一个党员、一个政府批评者，在同一部法律面前都应该适用同样的规则。
只有这样，才叫法治。
真正的司法独立不但能够打击街头上的黑社会，更重要的是，它能够约束那些拥有比黑社会更大力量的人。
一个黑社会团伙也许可以伤害几十个人、几百个人。
但是一个不受监督的国家权力如果作恶，能够伤害多少人？
这才是任何社会真正应该警惕的事情。
所以，我不是反对“扫黑”。
我反对的是以扫黑之名，让权力获得越来越大的解释权、抓捕权和财产处置权。
我也从来不认为抓得越多，就代表一个国家越法治。
恰恰相反。
一个真正尊重法治的社会，在国家机器决定抓走一个人、判一个人十年二十年、没收一个家庭财产的时候，应该格外慎重。
因为对公安机关来说，这可能只是一个案件编号。
对一个无辜的人和他的家庭来说，却可能是一辈子。
所以每当新一轮“扫黑除恶”开始，我不会因为公布了多少“战果”就鼓掌。
我更关心的是，那些被抓的人有没有真正得到公正审判，律师能不能正常辩护，证据经不经得起公开审查，被查封和没收的财产到底是不是犯罪所得。
一个真正有公信力的司法制度，不应该要求人民先相信政府，再相信判决。
它应该把证据摆在阳光下面，把审判放在公众面前，让人们因为司法本身的公正而相信判决。
扫黑除恶不能代替法治。
政治运动也不能代替司法。
如果有一天，中国真正建立了司法独立、程序正义、权力制衡和可靠的私人产权保护，也许根本不需要一次又一次轰轰烈烈的“扫黑除恶”。
法律每天都在那里。
黑社会犯罪，依法处理。
企业家犯罪，依法处理。
官员犯罪，也依法处理。
掌权者违法，同样不能例外。
不需要政治运动，不需要完成指标，也不需要先问这个人是什么身份、站在哪一边。
法律面前，没有谁拥有特权。
那才是真正值得期待的法治社会。
在这一天到来之前，我不会轻易为任何一场声势浩大的“扫黑除恶”叫好。
因为一个首先不能约束权力的法律体系，最终最容易被“扫掉”的，可能并不是黑恶。
而是法治本身。
编辑：李晶 校对：熊辩 翻译：戈冰
Without Judicial Independence, “Sweeping Away Black and Evil Forces” May Ultimately Sweep Away the Rule of Law
By Feng Reng
In 2026, China launched another round of “sweeping away black and evil forces.”
According to information published by official sources, this round—in addition to continuing to crack down on traditional black and evil forces such as so-called “village tyrants,” “township tyrants,” “mine tyrants,” and “market tyrants”—has also included within its scope of key targets practices like “soft-violence debt collection,” “malicious compensation claims,” “public-opinion extortion,” “labor-dispute fraud,” and “cyberbullying.” Various localities subsequently began concentrated operations to make arrests, pull in the net, and announce achievements in battle, as a familiar “special struggle” once again unfolded across the board.
Whenever I see news like this, I never join in the applause.
It is not because I oppose cracking down on organized crime.
Those who genuinely oppress and bully common people, extort, collect debts with violence, or force transactions should, of course, be subjected to legal sanctions. Any normal society must crack down on these crimes.
What worries me is another matter: why must criminal offenses that ought to be handled by judicial organs in accordance with existing laws always turn into one grand, momentum-driven political campaign after another?
In a system where the judiciary cannot be genuinely independent, and where the public security organs, procuratorates, and courts are all subject to the leadership of political power, I find it hard to believe that this kind of top-down “special struggle” will ultimately land only precisely upon genuine gang and evil criminals.
History has told us time and again that once a campaign begins, there will be quotas, there will be pressure, there will be tier-by-tier implementation, and there will also be people who expand the scope of crackdown in order to fulfill their tasks.
Thus, what first comes to my mind is not “how many more people have been arrested,” but rather: among those arrested, how many genuinely belong to black and evil forces? And could there be people who, due to economic disputes, labor disputes, private lending, normal rights-defense activities, or even having offended local authorities, are pushed step by step into so-called “organized and evil crime” cases?
Genuine rule of law is actually not that complicated.
If someone commits murder, handle it according to the crime of intentional homicide; if extortion, handle it according to the crime of extortion; if illegal detention, handle it according to the crime of illegal detention; as for violent debt collection and forced transactions, there are likewise corresponding laws.
Whether a person has committed a crime should depend on the evidence.
What crime it constitutes should depend on the law.
How many years one is sentenced to should be adjudicated by the court according to the law.
If the evidence is insufficient, one should not be convicted.
Yet the mindset of a “special struggle” is completely different. It often first establishes a political mission, which is then deployed by the central government, implemented by local authorities, carried out through concentrated action, and supervised by designated placement on warning lists, ultimately leading to the continuous publication of how many “gangs were eliminated,” how many “suspects were captured,” and how many “cases were solved.”
When the judiciary begins to measure itself by “battle fruits,” I automatically become vigilant.
Because what the judiciary least ought to pursue is precisely numbers.
The task of the court is not that the more convictions handed down, the better; nor is the task of public security that the more arrests made, the better. A mature judicial system should, first and foremost, ensure that an innocent person is not mistakenly sent to prison because of a campaign.
Over these years, China’s judicial organs themselves have repeatedly emphasized that “if it is black or evil, not one shall be missed; if it is not black or evil, not one shall be fabricated to pad the numbers,” and have on numerous occasions required that there be no “exaggerated designation.”
Why does this kind of language need to be emphasized over and over again?
Because the danger of “padding numbers” and “exaggerated designation” has always existed.
What makes me particularly vigilant this time around is that the definition of “black and evil” is further extending from traditional violent crime.
For instance, “malicious compensation claims,” “public-opinion extortion,” “labor-dispute fraud,” and “cyberbullying.”
These concepts all sound like they have targets that need to be cracked down on. Indeed, there are people who make use of complaints to extort enterprises, people who deliberately generate public opinion to extract money, and people who organize cyberbullying.
Those who commit real crimes should, of course, be handled in accordance with the law.
But the problem lies in the fact that these concepts, at the same time, sit right on the periphery of a vast amount of normal social activity.
What is meant by “malicious compensation claims,” and what is meant by consumers claiming compensation in accordance with the law?
What is meant by “labor-dispute fraud,” and what is meant by workers recovering unpaid wages in accordance with the law?
What is meant by “public-opinion extortion,” and what is meant by journalists, self-media, or ordinary citizens exposing problems of enterprises and local governments?
What is meant by “cyberbullying,” and what, on the other hand, is merely a citizen expressing sharp criticism of the government, officials, or public events?
If legal boundaries are clear enough and the judiciary is genuinely independent, these questions are not impossible to resolve.
However, once the entity ultimately interpreting these boundaries remains a system lacking independent trial and constraints on power, the problem becomes entirely different.
A worker demanding unpaid wages can be framed as engaging in “malicious rights-defense”; a consumer filing long-term complaints can be framed as making “malicious compensation claims”; and a self-media account exposing a local scandal may also be suspected of committing “public-opinion extortion.”
What truly causes me anxiety is precisely this increasingly expansive room for interpretation.
Once power gains a pocket wide enough, what kind of people ultimately get shoved inside often ceases to be merely a legal question.
Private enterprises in particular should remain vigilant about this.
In recent years, one of the things Chinese entrepreneurs have feared most is the criminalization of ordinary economic disputes.
What was originally a failed business cooperation may ultimately turn into contract fraud; what was originally a shareholder dispute may ultimately turn into a criminal case; what was originally a capital dispute between enterprises is ultimately intervened in by the public security organ.
And once an enterprise is tagged with the label of “involvement in organized crime,” the consequences often far exceed those of an ordinary criminal case.
The boss may be detained for a long period, corporate accounts frozen, assets seized, and property confiscated; a company operated for many years may even disappear altogether as a result.
In recent years, while Chinese officialdom has repeatedly emphasized protecting the private economy and safeguarding entrepreneurs’ property rights, it has at the same time continuously launched various special rectification campaigns. This precisely demonstrates that what private enterprises truly lack is not a few slogans about “supporting the private economy,” but rather a most fundamental sense of institutional security.
What an entrepreneur truly needs to know is this:
As long as I have not violated the law, my enterprise will not be targeted simply because I offended a certain official; my property will not suddenly lose protection because of a political campaign; my commercial disputes will not turn into criminal cases because of local power intervention.
This kind of security cannot be provided by propaganda.
It cannot be provided by leaders’ speeches either.
Only an independent judiciary can provide it.
There is another question that can never be bypassed.
China has been sweeping away black and evil forces for so many years; why does it still need to keep sweeping without end?
Starting in 2018, the nationwide special struggle to “sweep away black and evil forces” was launched; later, it was announced that “sweeping away black and evil forces would be normalized”; and now, the “deepening of the special struggle to sweep away black and evil forces” is underway once again.
If organized crime really has been swept clean round after round, yet constantly reappears without end, then what is truly worth asking is not merely “how many more organized crime figures have not yet been caught,” but rather:
Why are these black and evil forces able to exist over the long term?
If a local “village tyrant,” “mine tyrant,” or “market tyrant” lacks the protection of local power behind them, can they really run rampant for ten or twenty years?
If a criminal gang long monopolizes markets, collects debts through violence, and oppresses common people, yet remains untouched by anyone, who exactly is standing behind it?
Chinese officials themselves also admit that sweeping away black and evil forces must “shatter the umbrellas and break the networks”—that is, investigate the “protective umbrellas” behind the black and evil forces.
This actually concedes a crucial point: black and evil forces in many places have never been as simple as a few thugs doing evil on their own.
What is truly terrifying is the union of black and evil forces with public power.
A few thugs bullying common citizens is bad enough; if standing behind those thugs are police, officials, and local interest groups, then what ordinary people face is no longer just a criminal gang, but an entire network of power.
If Zhang San is taken down today, Li Si will still emerge tomorrow.
Because the soil that produces Zhang San and Li Si has undergone no fundamental change.
Therefore, a question far more important than “how many organized crime members were caught this time” should be:
Who allowed these black and evil forces to grow in the first place?
Who provided them with protection?
And who bestowed upon those “protective umbrellas” such immense and unconstrained power?
This is the root of the problem.
It is also why I have always maintained that what China truly needs is not one round of “sweeping away black and evil forces” after another, but judicial independence.
The judicial independence I understand is actually very simple.
Police investigate cases based solely on facts and the law, prosecutors decide whether to indict according to the law, lawyers are genuinely able to defend the accused, and judges do not need to listen to the opinions of the Party committee, the Political and Legal Affairs Commission, or any particular leader regarding a specific case.
If evidence is insufficient, the verdict is not guilty.
Evidence obtained through confession under torture cannot be used.
If a case is mishandled, accountability must be pursued.
If detention is unlawful, compensation must be paid.
Private property is protected by law.
An ordinary worker, an entrepreneur, a government official, a Party member, and a critic of the government should all be subject to the very same rules before the exact same law.
Only thus can it be called the rule of law.
Genuine judicial independence can not only strike at organized crime on the streets, but more importantly, it can constrain those who possess power far greater than any gang.
A criminal gang may perhaps harm dozens or hundreds of people.
However, if an unmonitored state power does evil, how many people can it harm?
This is precisely what any society truly ought to be vigilant against.
Therefore, I am not opposed to “sweeping away black forces.”
What I oppose is allowing power to acquire increasingly expansive rights of interpretation, arrest, and asset disposal in the name of sweeping away black forces.
Nor have I ever believed that the more people arrested, the more a country embodies the rule of law.
Quite the contrary.
A society that truly respects the rule of law should be exceptionally cautious when the state apparatus decides to arrest a person, sentence a person to ten or twenty years, or confiscate a family’s property.
Because to a public security organ, this may merely be a case serial number.
Yet to an innocent person and their family, it may very well be an entire lifetime.
So whenever a new round of “sweeping away black and evil forces” begins, I do not applaud simply because a certain number of “battle fruits” have been announced.
What I care about more is whether those who were arrested genuinely received a fair trial, whether defense attorneys were able to mount a proper defense, whether the evidence can withstand public scrutiny, and whether the frozen and confiscated property truly constituted proceeds of crime.
A judicial system with genuine credibility should not demand that the people first trust the government and only then trust the verdict.
It should lay the evidence out in the open sun, place the trial before the public, and allow people to trust the verdict because of the justice of the judiciary itself.
Sweeping away black and evil forces cannot replace the rule of law.
Nor can political campaigns replace the judiciary.
If one day China genuinely establishes judicial independence, procedural justice, checks and balances on power, and reliable protection of private property rights, perhaps there will be no need at all for grand, dynamic campaigns of “sweeping away black and evil forces” time and time again.
processing everyday affairs, the law is always there.
If organized criminals commit a crime, handle it according to the law.
If entrepreneurs commit a crime, handle it according to the law.
If officials commit a crime, handle it according to the law as well.
When powerholders violate the law, they likewise cannot be an exception.
There is no need for political campaigns, no need to fulfill quotas, and no need to first ask what a person’s identity is or which side they stand on.
Before the law, no one possesses privilege.
That is the true society under the rule of law worth looking forward to.
Until that day arrives, I will not easily applaud any grand, momentum-driven campaign to “sweep away black and evil forces.”
Because in a legal system that first and foremost fails to constrain power, what is ultimately most easily “swept away” may not be black and evil forces.
It is the rule of law itself.
Editor: Li Jing Proofreader: Xiong Bian Translator: Ge Bing
