作者：张磊
最近，中国陆续通过了几部即将实施的法律。
在我看来，其中最值得关注、也与普通人切身利益关系最大的，是《国防动员法》和《医疗保障法》。
这两部法律看似一个涉及国防，一个涉及医疗，彼此毫不相关，但如果放在一起观察，却能看到一个共同趋势：国家权力正在越来越深入地介入个人财产、社会资源、医疗保障、信息传播乃至公民生活的方方面面。
一、《国防动员法》：不断扩大的国家动员权
近年来，随着习近平对军队高层持续整肃，其对军队的控制进一步加强。其野心想要统一台湾并不断制造台海局势高度紧张的背景下，如果未来发生战争，中共需要动员的显然不仅不止是军队，而是整个社会。
现代战争需要车辆、企业、能源、通信、数据、交通、物资以及大量社会资源。因此，要提高战时动员能力，首先就必须在法律上扩大国家的动员权限。
因此新版《国防动员法》的一些变化值得高度警惕。
例如，国防动员所涉及的情形，从过去强调国家安全受到威胁，进一步延伸到“国家发展利益受到威胁”。“国家安全”尚有相对明确的边界，而“发展利益”的含义则宽泛得多，可以涉及经济、贸易、能源、产业链乃至国际竞争。
这意味着，未来如果中国与其他国家发生严重的经济、贸易或战略冲突，这些矛盾是否也可能被纳入所谓“国家发展利益受到威胁”的框架，并成为扩大国防动员的重要依据？
这正是值得警惕之处。
与此同时，新版法律还将过去对民用资源的“征用”，扩展为“征收、征用”；过去所称的“其他物资”，也调整为“其他资源”。
几个字的变化，背后却意味着适用范围的扩大。
“物资”通常指车辆、设备、粮食和实物，而“资源”的概念显然更加宽泛。企业能力、设施、土地、技术、数据以及其他能够服务于国防动员的社会资源，都可能被纳入其中。
新法还进一步涉及国防动员所需的数据、信息收集以及动员状态下的信息传播管理。
换句话说，一旦进入国防动员状态，国家不仅可以调动军队，还可以更加深入地介入和控制社会资源、企业运行、个人财产、数据和信息传播。
符合条件的公民，还依法负有承担国防勤务的义务。
问题就在这里：如果国家可以决定是否发动战争，可以征收征用社会资源，也可以要求公民承担国防义务，而普通公民却缺乏真正参与重大国家决策的制度渠道，那么所谓“国家利益”，很容易最终演变成权力要求人民服从的理由。
二、《医疗保障法》：义务不断明确，公平问题依然存在
再来看《医疗保障法》。
医疗保障与每一个家庭都直接相关。
随着法律进一步明确参保责任，一个无法回避的问题就是：既然国家要求公民承担医保缴费义务，那么是否也应该承担同等明确的责任，保证医保制度公平、透明和有效运行？
中国正在快速进入老龄化社会。与此同时，“总加速师”正不断背离现代文明，开历史倒车，经济持续下行，就业和居民收入面临困难，而需要长期使用医保和医疗服务的人却越来越多。
这意味着医保基金未来必然承受更大的压力。
但现实问题是，医保体系本身仍存在不少结构性矛盾。
首先是医保基金的透明度和监管问题。
近年来，各地不断查处医保骗保、虚假诊疗、药械回扣和医疗腐败案件。仅2024年、2025年，共追回的医保基金就达到五百亿元以上规模。
追回的钱越多，一方面说明监管有所加强，另一方面也说明医保资金被违规使用的问题并非个别现象。
这自然会引出一个问题：已经查出来的有这么多，还有多少没有被发现？
对于普通缴费者而言，他们能够看到的是每年的缴费通知，却很难真正了解医保基金如何运行、如何分配、哪些机构获得了资金，以及违规使用后究竟由谁承担责任。
如果缴费义务能够通过法律强制落实，那么基金运行的公开透明也应该成为同样严格的法律责任。
三、医疗保障为什么仍然存在明显分层？
中国医疗保障体系另一个长期存在的问题，就是不同群体、地区和医疗机构之间的待遇差异。职工医保和城乡居民医保待遇不同；不同地区的报销标准不同；不同等级医院的起付线和报销比例也不同。
以我所在农村家庭最常见的情况为例：在我父母在乡镇卫生院看病，报销比例大致在75%；进入县级、市级医院后，个人承担比例在65%；但到了省级大型医院我们能报销承担的比例最多就只有55%。
于是便出现一种现实困境：病情越严重，越需要更好的医院；医院级别越高，家庭承担的医疗成本反而越大。
对于收入有限的家庭而言，小病或许还能承担，但真正遭遇重病时，医疗保障却不足以解除家庭的经济压力。
与此同时，中国长期存在干部医疗、特殊医疗保障以及所谓“高干病房”等制度安排。
一些高级干部能够享受到的医疗资源、专家条件和保障水平，与普通居民显然并不完全处于同一层级。
因此，真正值得追问的并不是“该不该参加医保”，而是：既然缴费强调人人有责，那么医疗保障为什么不能更加公平？
法律要求人民承担义务并不困难，真正困难的是让权利也得到平等保障。
四、纸面上的平等与现实中的权利
中国宪法明确规定：“中华人民共和国公民在法律面前一律平等。”
同时也规定：“国家尊重和保障人权。”
这些原则本身没有问题。真正的问题在于，它们能否在现实中得到有效保障。
中国各地都有公安机关、法院、纪委以及信访部门，理论上已经建立了一套庞大的行政、司法和监督体系。
然而现实中，仍然有大量群众在地方问题得不到解决之后，不得不层层上访，甚至前往北京寻求解决。
这说明一个非常重要的问题：有法律，不等于有法治；有权利条文，也不等于权利能够真正实现。
五、真正的问题是：法律究竟约束谁？
《国防动员法》和《医疗保障法》分别涉及完全不同的领域，但背后反映出的逻辑却十分相似：当国家需要社会承担责任时，法律往往规定得越来越具体；而当公民要求限制政府权力、实现权利平等时，相关保障却远没有那么有力。
谁制定法律？谁解释法律？谁监督法律执行？当掌握权力的人违法时，又由谁真正追究他们的责任？
如果人民只能服从法律，却无法通过真正有效的政治制度改变立法者、监督执政者和制约公权力，那么法律最终就很容易从保护人民的工具，变成维持权力秩序的工具。
结语
法律存在的根本意义，应当是保障公民权利、限制公共权力，而不是不断扩大国家控制社会的范围。
在我看来，中共现行政治体制下最大的问题，正是权力缺乏真正独立而有效的制约。
只有当人民拥有真实的选择权、监督权和问责权，“公民在法律面前一律平等”才不会只停留在纸面上。
当法律越来越强调人民应当承担什么，却无法同等有力地保证人民能够监督政府、追究权力责任，那么所谓“依法治国”就演变成“依法统治奴役人民”。
编辑：韩立华 校对：毛一炜 翻译：戈冰
The Nature of CCP Law as Seen Through Two Acts: Tools for Ruling and Enslaving the People
By Zhang Lei
Recently, China has successively passed several laws that are set to take effect. In my view, the two most worthy of attention and most closely tied to the vital interests of ordinary people are the National Defense Mobilization Law and the Healthcare Insurance Law.
These two laws appear entirely unrelated—one concerning national defense and the other healthcare—yet when examined together, a common trend emerges: state power is increasingly and more deeply intruding into individual property, social resources, healthcare, information dissemination, and indeed every aspect of citizens’ daily lives.
I. The National Defense Mobilization Law: The Ever-Expanding Mobilization Power of the State
In recent years, along with Xi Jinping’s continuous purges of the military high command, his control over the armed forces has been further consolidated. Against the backdrop of his ambition to unify Taiwan and his constant escalation of tensions across the Taiwan Strait, if a war breaks out in the future, what the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) needs to mobilize will clearly extend far beyond the military alone—it will require the mobilization of society as a whole.
Modern warfare requires vehicles, enterprises, energy, communications, data, transportation, supplies, and vast amounts of social resources. Therefore, to raise wartime mobilization capacity, the state must first expand its mobilization authority within the law.
Consequently, certain changes in the revised National Defense Mobilization Law warrant a high degree of vigilance.
For instance, the circumstances triggering national defense mobilization have been extended from the past emphasis on threats to “national security” to include threats to “national development interests.” While “national security” still possesses relatively defined boundaries, the phrase “development interests” is far broader in meaning and can encompass the economy, trade, energy, supply chains, and even international competition.
Does this mean that in the future, if China enters into severe economic, trade, or strategic conflicts with other countries, these friction points might also be brought under the framework of so-called “threats to national development interests” and serve as a major justification for expanding national defense mobilization?
This is precisely where the need for vigilance lies.
At the same time, the revised law has expanded the past provision concerning the “requisitioning” of civilian resources to include both “expropriation and requisitioning”; additionally, the term previously rendered as “other supplies” has been adjusted to “other resources”.
A shift in just a few words signifies, behind the scenes, an expansion in scope of application.
“Supplies” typically refers to vehicles, equipment, grain, and physical goods, whereas the concept of “resources” is obviously far broader. Enterprise capacity, facilities, land, technology, data, and other social resources capable of serving national defense mobilization could all potentially be brought under its scope.
The new law also further touches upon the collection of data and information required for national defense mobilization, as well as the management of information dissemination during a state of mobilization.
In other words, once a state of national defense mobilization is entered, the state can not only deploy the military, but can also more deeply intervene in and control social resources, enterprise operations, personal property, data, and information dissemination.
Eligible citizens are also legally obligated to undertake national defense service.
The problem lies precisely here: if the state can decide whether to launch a war, expropriate and requisition social resources, and demand that citizens undertake national defense obligations, yet ordinary citizens lack genuine institutional channels to participate in major state decision-making, then so-called “national interests” can easily end up degenerating into a justification for power to demand the compliance of the people.
II. The Healthcare Insurance Law: Continuously Clarified Obligations, Persistently Existing Equity Issues
Now let us look at the Healthcare Insurance Law.
Healthcare insurance is directly relevant to every single family.
As the law further clarifies the responsibility to participate in coverage, an unavoidable question arises: since the state demands that citizens fulfill their obligation to pay healthcare premiums, should it not also assume an equally clear responsibility to guarantee that the healthcare insurance system operates in a fair, transparent, and effective manner?
China is rapidly entering an aging society. At the same time, the “Chief Accelerator” is continuously deviating from modern civilization and turning back the wheels of history, leading to a sustained economic downturn, difficulties in employment and household income, while the number of people requiring long-term use of healthcare insurance and medical services grows ever larger.
This means that the healthcare insurance fund will inevitably bear greater pressure in the future.
However, the reality of the situation is that the healthcare insurance system itself still suffers from no small number of structural contradictions.
First is the issue of transparency and supervision regarding the healthcare insurance fund.
In recent years, local authorities have continuously investigated and handled cases of healthcare insurance fraud, fake medical treatments, kickbacks for pharmaceuticals and medical devices, and medical corruption. In 2024 and 2025 alone, the total amount of recovered healthcare insurance funds reached a scale of over 50 billion yuan.
The more money recovered, on one hand, shows that supervision has been strengthened; on the other hand, it also demonstrates that the problem of irregular use of healthcare insurance funds is by no means an isolated phenomenon.
This naturally brings up a question: with so much having already been uncovered, how much more remains undiscovered?
For ordinary premium payers, what they can see is the annual payment notice, yet it is very difficult for them to truly understand how the healthcare insurance fund is operated, how it is allocated, which institutions receive funds, and who ultimately bears responsibility after irregular usage occurs.
If payment obligations can be forcibly implemented through law, then the openness and transparency of the fund’s operation should likewise become an equally strict legal responsibility.
III. Why Does Healthcare Insurance Still Feature Obvious Stratification?
Another long-standing problem in China’s healthcare insurance system is the disparity in benefits among different demographic groups, regions, and medical institutions. Urban employee healthcare insurance and urban and rural resident healthcare insurance differ in benefits; reimbursement standards vary across different regions; and deductible thresholds alongside reimbursement ratios differ across various tiers of hospitals.
Take the situation most common in rural families like mine as an example: when my parents seek medical treatment at township health centers, the reimbursement ratio is roughly 75%; after entering county-level and municipal-level hospitals, the proportion borne by the individual reaches 65%; but upon reaching large provincial-level hospitals, the proportion we can receive reimbursement for—and thus have to bear—leaves us with at most 55%.
Consequently, a practical dilemma arises: the more severe the illness, the greater the need for better hospitals; yet the higher the level of the hospital, the larger the medical cost the family ultimately has to bear.
For families with limited income, minor illnesses can perhaps still be managed, but when facing genuinely severe illnesses, healthcare insurance is insufficient to relieve the family’s financial pressure.
At the same time, China has long maintained institutional arrangements such as CADRE medical care, special medical guarantees, and so-called “high-cadre wards”.
The medical resources, specialist conditions, and level of coverage that some senior cadres can enjoy are obviously not entirely on the same tier as those of ordinary residents.
Therefore, what is truly worth questioning is not “whether one should participate in healthcare insurance,” but rather: since premium payments emphasize that everyone bears responsibility, why cannot healthcare coverage be more equitable?
It is not difficult for the law to require the people to fulfill obligations; what is genuinely difficult is enabling rights to receive equal protection as well.
IV. Equality on Paper and Rights in Reality
The Constitution of the People’s Republic of China explicitly stipulates: “All citizens of the People’s Republic of China are equal before the law.”
It also stipulates: “The state respects and guarantees human rights.”
These principles themselves are unobjectionable. The real issue lies in whether they can be effectively guaranteed in practice.
Public security organs, courts, commissions for discipline inspection, and letters-and-visits petitioning departments exist throughout China, theoretically establishing a vast administrative, judicial, and supervisory system.
However, in reality, after local problems fail to get resolved, huge numbers of ordinary people still have no choice but to petition layer by layer, or even head to Beijing to seek resolution.
This illustrates a crucially important point: having laws does not equate to having the rule of law; having clauses on rights does not equate to rights being genuinely realized.
V. The Real Issue Is: Whom Does the Law Ultimately Restrain?
The National Defense Mobilization Law and the Healthcare Insurance Law touch upon completely different fields, yet the underlying logic they reflect is remarkably similar: when the state needs society to assume responsibilities, the law tends to prescribe them in increasingly granular detail; whereas when citizens demand constraints on governmental power and the realization of equal rights, the corresponding protections are far less forceful.
Who makes the laws? Who interprets the laws? Who supervises the enforcement of the laws? When those in power break the law, who truly holds them accountable?
If the people can only obey the law, yet lack genuinely effective political institutions through which to change lawmakers, supervise the governing authorities, and restrict public power, then the law can easily end up transforming from a tool for protecting the people into a tool for maintaining the order of power.
Conclusion
The fundamental meaning of the existence of law ought to be the protection of citizens’ rights and the restriction of public power, rather than the continuous expansion of the scope of state control over society.
In my view, the single greatest problem under the CCP’s current political system is precisely the lack of truly independent and effective constraints on power.
Only when the people possess genuine rights of choice, supervision, and accountability will “all citizens are equal before the law” cease to remain merely on paper.
When the law increasingly emphasizes what the people ought to bear, yet fails to guarantee with equal force that the people can supervise the government and hold power accountable, then so-called “ruling the country according to law” degenerates into “ruling and enslaving the people according to law.”
Editor: Han Lihua Proofreader: Mao Yiwei Translator: Ge Bing
