作者：冯仍

2026年9月24日，习近平将再次走进白宫。白宫已经正式公布行程，习近平与彭丽媛将于9月23日抵达美国，第二天举行国事访问，当晚出席国宴。

对于中美关系来说，这当然是一场受到高度关注的外交活动。但作为一个生活在美国的中国人，我关注的并不只是白宫里的会谈，也会想到三年前旧金山街头发生的事情。

2023年11月，习近平前往旧金山参加APEC峰会。当时，大批维吾尔人、西藏人、香港人以及中国民主人士来到街头抗议，也有大量支持习近平和中国政府的人前往欢迎。不同政治立场的人同时出现在街头，在美国本来并不是什么问题，因为无论支持还是反对一个外国政府，都属于表达自由。

真政府，也允许人们反对中国政府。一个人在街头挥五星红旗，只要和平守法，这是他的权利；另一个人在旁边举起批评习近平或者批评中国共产党的标语，同样也是他的权利。

问题从来不是谁可以表达，而是谁试图让另外一方不能表达。

我来到美国以后，对这一点的认识越来越深。一个社会真正重要的，并不是所有人讲同一种话，而是彼此意见完全相反的时候，法律仍然保护双方说话的权利。一个人可以不同意我的观点，但不能因为不同意，就抢走我的标语、殴打我或者威胁我的家人。

这也是为什么“跨国镇压”这个词这些年越来越受到美国社会关注。

所谓跨国镇压，简单来说，就是一个政府把对国内异议人士的监控、恐吓、骚扰甚至强制手段延伸到境外。美国国会举行过专门听证，美国司法部近年来也连续处理涉及中国政府海外活动的案件。2025年，美国司法部曾宣布逮捕两名被指为中国国家安全部在美国从事秘密活动的人士。司法部明确称，中国国家安全部承担境外情报和政治安全任务。需要强调的是，这些案件中的刑事指控仍应按照法律程序，由法院最终裁决。

这种事情距离加州并不遥远。

位于南加州耶莫的自由雕塑公园，也曾进入美国司法部调查文件。联邦调查人员指称，有人员曾受命对中国异议艺术家进行监视，包括秘密拍摄、记录车辆信息以及安装GPS追踪设备。

这些案例放在一起看，就会明白为什么2023年旧金山发生的事情不能简单理解为“两群中国人在街头打架”。

如果有人只是因为政治立场不同而发生普通冲突，那当然应该由警方按照普通治安案件处理。但如果背后存在外国政府官员、情报机构或者受到其指挥和资助的组织参与，那问题的性质就完全不同了。它已经不只是中国人之间的政治争论，而涉及美国境内的言论自由、公共安全和国家主权。

这也是我读到这份有关习近平再次访美的材料时，最关注的一点。

三年前旧金山发生过什么，现在已经留下大量影像、调查报道和政府记录。这一次习近平来到华盛顿，无论欢迎他的人，还是抗议他的人，都应该受到同样的法律保护。支持习近平不是犯罪，反对习近平也不是犯罪；挥舞五星红旗受到宪法保护，举起批评中国共产党的标语同样受到保护。

真正需要防止的，是任何一方把暴力、威胁、跟踪和恐吓带进政治表达之中，更不能允许外国政府利用自己在美国的影响网络，把中国国内压制异议的方式复制到美国街头。

习近平这次访问美国，白宫里的外交当然重要。

但对白宫之外的很多中国人来说，还有另外一个问题值得观察：三年前旧金山发生的事情，这一次会不会再次发生？

美国如何回答这个问题，不只关系到中国异议人士，也关系到一个更基本的原则——来到这片土地以后，一个人是不是仍然可以因为自己的观点，自由地说话，而不必继续害怕来自另一个国家的权力。

编辑：Geoffrey Jin 校对：王滨 翻译：戈冰

Xi Jinping Visits the US Again: The Warning Left Behind in San Francisco

Author: Feng Reng

Abstract: Xi Jinping’s visit to the White House has once again drawn international attention to US-China relations, while also recalling the clashes between supporters and protesters during the 2023 APEC Summit in San Francisco. Different political stances should all be protected under the freedom of expression; however, whether supporting or opposing the Chinese government, violence, threats, and intimidation must not be tolerated.

On September 24, 2026, Xi Jinping will step into the White House once again. The White House has officially announced the itinerary: Xi Jinping and Peng Liyuan will arrive in the United States on September 23, hold a state visit the following day, and attend a state dinner that evening.

For US-China relations, this is naturally a high-profile diplomatic event. However, as a Chinese person living in the United States, my focus is not limited to the talks inside the White House; I also recall the events that took place on the streets of San Francisco three years ago.

In November 2023, Xi Jinping traveled to San Francisco to attend the APEC Summit. At that time, large numbers of Uyghurs, Tibetans, Hong Kongers, and Chinese pro-democracy activists took to the streets in protest, while a massive crowd of supporters of Xi Jinping and the Chinese government also gathered to welcome him. The simultaneous presence of people holding differing political stances on the streets is not, in principle, an issue in the United States, as supporting or opposing a foreign government both fall under the freedom of expression.

The law permits people to support the Chinese government, and it also permits people to oppose the Chinese government. If a person waves the Five-Star Red Flag on the street, as long as they are peaceful and law-abiding, it is their right; if another person beside them holds up a sign criticizing Xi Jinping or criticizing the Chinese Communist Party, that is equally their right.

The issue has never been who is allowed to express themselves, but rather who attempts to deny the other side from expressing themselves.

Since coming to the United States, my understanding of this point has grown deeper and deeper. What is truly important for a society is not that everyone speaks with one voice, but that when people hold completely opposing views, the law still protects the right of both sides to speak. A person can disagree with my viewpoint, but they cannot, simply because they disagree, snatch away my sign, beat me, or threaten my family.

This is also why the term “transnational repression” has drawn increasing attention from American society in recent years.

So-called transnational repression, simply put, refers to a government extending its surveillance, intimidation, harassment, and even coercive measures against domestic dissidents beyond its borders. The United States Congress has held dedicated hearings, and the U.S. Department of Justice has continuously handled cases in recent years involving the overseas activities of the Chinese government. In 2025, the U.S. Department of Justice announced the arrest of two individuals accused of engaging in secret operations in the United States on behalf of China’s Ministry of State Security. The Department of Justice explicitly stated that China’s Ministry of State Security undertakes overseas intelligence and political security missions. It must be emphasized that the criminal charges in these cases remain subject to final determination by the courts according to legal procedures.

Such matters are not far removed from California.

Liberty Sculpture Park, located in Yermo, Southern California, has also appeared in U.S. Department of Justice investigative documents. Federal investigators alleged that certain individuals were instructed to conduct surveillance on Chinese dissident artists, including secret photography, recording license plate information, and installing GPS tracking devices.

When these cases are viewed together, it becomes clear why what happened in San Francisco in 2023 cannot simply be understood as “two groups of Chinese people fighting on the street.”

If ordinary conflicts occur between people merely because of differing political stances, they should naturally be handled by the police as standard public security cases. However, if there is involvement behind the scenes by foreign government officials, intelligence agencies, or organizations directed and funded by them, the nature of the issue changes completely. It is no longer just a political dispute among Chinese people, but involves freedom of speech, public safety, and national sovereignty within the United States.

This is also the point I care about most when reading this material regarding Xi Jinping visiting the United States once again.

What took place in San Francisco three years ago has now left behind extensive video records, investigative reports, and government documentation. This time, as Xi Jinping comes to Washington, both those who welcome him and those who protest against him should receive the same legal protection. Supporting Xi Jinping is not a crime, nor is opposing Xi Jinping a crime; waving the Five-Star Red Flag is protected by the Constitution, and holding up signs criticizing the Chinese Communist Party is equally protected.

What truly needs to be prevented is any party bringing violence, threats, stalking, and intimidation into political expression, and under no circumstances should a foreign government be allowed to leverage its network of influence in the United States to replicate the domestic suppression of dissent onto American streets.

During Xi Jinping’s visit to the United States this time, the diplomacy inside the White House is, of course, important.

However, for many Chinese people outside the White House, there remains another question worth observing: Will what took place in San Francisco three years ago happen once again this time?

How the United States answers this question concerns not only Chinese dissidents, but also a more fundamental principle—after arriving on this land, can a person still speak freely based on their own views, without continuing to fear the power coming from another country?

Editor: Geoffrey Jin Proofreader: Wang Bin Translator: Ge Bing