红地毯与铁杆之间：2026特习会背后的华盛顿街头战争
记者 张致君
2026年9月23日至25日，中国国家主席习近平访问美国，并在华盛顿与美国总统特朗普举行会晤。
白宫内，是红地毯、礼炮、军乐和外交会谈；白宫之外，则是近年来美国首都规模较大的反习近平示威之一。
西藏人、维吾尔人、香港人、台湾支持者、中国民主运动人士、法轮功学员、基督徒及其他人权团体，从美国各地甚至加拿大赶往华盛顿。与此同时，大批手持五星红旗的亲北京欢迎人群，也出现在习近平车队路线、酒店、白宫及中国驻美大使馆附近。
随着两股人群持续接触，推搡、抢夺标语、肢体冲突乃至袭击事件陆续发生。
而围绕这些欢迎人群究竟如何组织、是否得到中国使领馆或亲北京社团资助，以及部分蒙面人员是否与中国官方存在联系的争议，也让这场原本属于美国街头的政治表达，迅速延伸到一个更加敏感的问题——中国政府是否正在把针对海外异议者的政治压力和控制方式延伸到美国本土。
习近平9月23日抵达华盛顿地区后，欢迎者与抗议者已经开始在机场、酒店及车队沿线集结。
习近平抵达当天，亲北京欢迎者与反习近平抗议者在部分地点隔街对峙，警方不得不在双方之间部署力量维持秩序。
9月24日，抗议达到高潮。
大批藏人首先在中国驻美国大使馆附近集结，随后前往国会山、国家广场及白宫周边。公开报道显示，参与者来自纽约、新泽西、康涅狄格、波士顿、芝加哥、多伦多等地。
现场能够看到西藏雪山狮子旗、东突厥斯坦旗帜、香港民主运动标语、台湾相关旗帜，以及中国民主运动人士高喊的“习近平下台”“共产党下台”等口号。
美国前众议院议长南希·佩洛西以及多名美国国会议员也出现在部分藏人及人权团体的活动现场，公开呼吁美国政府在与习近平会谈时提出西藏、人权及跨国镇压问题。
“八·九学运”领袖、“六·四”纪念馆创办人王丹代表“六·四”纪念馆及“对话中国”智库参加白宫附近抗议。
王丹表示，此次走上华盛顿街头，主要有三项诉求：反对习近平在中国国内推行的独裁统治，反对中国共产党对民主化进程的压制，同时要求释放仍被关押的政治犯，包括黎智英、黄之锋、许志永等人。
他说，习近平在中国国内几乎听不到公开的反对声音，因此习近平来到美国，恰恰给海外抗议者提供了一个罕见机会。
王丹说，他们希望把抗议声直接送到习近平能够听见的地方，“让他知道他的这个政权不得人心”。
他还表示，从全美各地赶到华盛顿的抗议队伍已经形成共识——习近平的活动到哪里，抗议声音就跟到哪里。
王丹当天还特别强调，海外民主运动不能只把注意力集中在习近平个人身上，而应持续为中国境内遭关押和打压的政治犯发声。
他在社交平台上表示，海外人士的重要责任之一，就是不断提醒世界：仍然有人因为追求自由、公义和基本权利而被关押。因此，这次抗议的另一个重要目的，就是公开喊出这些政治犯的名字，让他们不被世界遗忘。
同日下午，中国著名民主运动人士魏京生、王丹和王军涛共同参与“中国国是会议”在白宫附近举行的记者会。这场活动将焦点从“反对习近平访问”进一步扩大到“习近平之后，中国怎么办”。
会议主办方在此前发布的公告中表示，在习近平访问白宫之际，海外民运人士将就习近平政治前途以及中国未来制度走向发表意见。活动由魏京生、王丹和王军涛共同领导。魏京生在当天讲话中提出了一个与一般“反习”口号不同的判断。
他说，即使习近平真的下台，也并不意味着中国的问题就此结束。
在魏京生看来，习近平个人权力的削弱或结束，并不等于中国共产党一党专政体制的终结，更不等于民主制度会自动建立。
他认为，中国未来真正的关键，不只是“去习近平”，而是中国能否借政治变化完成制度性的“新生”。
魏京生说，目前社会上存在大量关于习近平权力变化的传闻，无论这些消息是否准确，“天下苦习久矣”的社会情绪都是真实存在的。但他同时警告，如果习近平下台后，只是换一个中共领导人继续维持原有政治体制，那么中国依然可能重新回到专制循环。
他认为，中国未来可能出现两条道路：一条走向民主自由，另一条则是继续维持一党专政。最终结果，将取决于中国社会内部以及国际环境中各种力量之间的博弈。
换言之，魏京生把这场抗议的目标，从“习近平下台”进一步推进到“结束一党专政、建立民主制度”。
中国民主党全国委员会主席王军涛同样参与了当天的抗议。
王军涛领导的中国民主党全国委员会在习近平访美期间连续组织党员前往安德鲁斯联合基地、白宫以及习近平下榻酒店附近进行抗议。
中国民主党表示，参加者连续三天跟随习近平公开行程举行示威，以横幅、标语和口号表达对中国人权、民主和自由的诉求。相较于单纯针对习近平个人，王军涛及中国民主党此次行动更强调政党政治和制度替代。
这一立场与其长期主张一致：问题不仅在于某一个中国领导人，而在于中国缺乏真正意义上的选举、多党竞争和权力制衡。
因此，在此次华盛顿抗议中，“习近平下台”与“共产党下台”同时成为中国民主运动团体最频繁的口号之一。
而从美国西海岸赶到华盛顿的自由雕塑公园创办人、雕塑家陈维明，则代表了另一种抗争方式。
陈维明长期以大型公共艺术和政治雕塑表达对中共政权的批判。自由雕塑公园近年来先后通过“中共病毒”“坦克人”“习近平病毒头”等大型作品，把中国政治迫害和历史记忆转化为具有强烈视觉冲击力的公共艺术。
习近平此次访美期间，陈维明率自由雕塑公园义工团队前往华盛顿参加抗议。
他在现场强调，海外中国人不能因为已经身处自由社会，就忘记仍在中国境内遭受政治迫害的人。在他的表达中，抗议习近平不仅是对一个领导人的抗议，也是在公开挑战一个依靠恐惧、审查和政治镇压维持的制度。
陈维明的行动方式尤其具有象征意义。
自由雕塑公园团队将曾经用于“习近平病毒头”等政治艺术项目的大型黑色旗帜及视觉元素带到抗议现场，把街头示威与政治艺术结合起来。
对于陈维明而言，雕塑本身就是抗议的一部分。
他过去多次表示，公共艺术的意义，不只是纪念受害者，更是让独裁者无法控制历史叙事。因此，当习近平的车队出现在华盛顿时，自由雕塑公园团队试图用巨型旗帜和现场行动制造一个完全不同于官方欢迎仪式的视觉现场——一边是红毯与五星红旗，另一边则是记录中共暴政的公共艺术。
陈维明、王丹、魏京生和王军涛虽然来自不同世代，也采取不同的政治行动方式，但他们在这次习近平访美期间表达的核心判断高度一致：海外抗议不能只停留在反对某一次访问，也不能只针对习近平个人。
真正的问题，是中国政治制度本身。
在白宫举行高层会谈的同时，街头则呈现出完全不同的画面。
一侧，是支持习近平和中国政府的欢迎人群；另一侧，是来自不同族群、不同政治背景的反习近平抗议者。警方站在中间，防止双方发生更大规模冲突。
围绕亲北京欢迎团的组织方式，争议很快出现。
习近平访问前，部分中文微信群和社交平台已经流传欢迎团招募信息。
部分招募内容声称，将为参与者提供机票、住宿、餐食和当地交通补助，个别信息甚至提到现金补贴。
还有参与欢迎活动的人在接受日本媒体采访时表示，自己是由中国总领馆“安排”前往现场。
这些信息使外界进一步怀疑，部分欢迎活动并非完全自发，而是存在由中国使领馆、亲北京侨团或其他相关组织协调和资助的可能。
不过，目前公开证据仍不足以证明所有参加欢迎活动的人都接受了中国政府付款，也不能把所有挥舞五星红旗的人都直接认定为中国政府代理人。
较为准确的表述是：公开信息已经显示，至少存在有组织招募、提供交通住宿甚至现金补贴的情况，同时有参与者本人向媒体表示曾得到总领馆方面安排。
类似模式并非第一次出现。
2023年习近平参加旧金山APEC会议期间，《华盛顿邮报》曾通过视频、微信聊天记录、采访和身份核实调查发现，中国驻美使领馆曾参与协调部分欢迎活动，并为部分参与者提供酒店、餐饮等支持。
该调查还发现，当时旧金山街头曾发生多起亲北京人士与反习近平抗议者之间的暴力冲突。部分反习近平人士遭到拳打、推搡、旗杆攻击以及化学喷剂袭击。
(图为现场知情者提供，现场中共雇佣团对抗议者进行物理攻击）
(图为现场知情者提供，现场中共雇佣团对抗议者进行物理攻击）
当2026年华盛顿再次出现类似的欢迎团、蒙面人员和街头冲突时，不少海外异议人士立即联想到2023年旧金山发生的事件。
（图为视频截图，中共雇佣人员服装统一，佩戴鸭舌帽，墨镜，口罩，携带黑色长柄雨伞，视频截图显示雇佣者使用 雨伞击打抗议者 ）
（图为视频截图，中共雇佣人员服装统一，佩戴鸭舌帽，墨镜，口罩，携带黑色长柄雨伞，视频截图显示雇佣者三人一组围殴落单的抗议者）
9月24日下午，白宫附近多处出现肢体冲突。
警方随后介入，并拘捕多人。
公开报道显示，被捕者涉及普通攻击、盗窃以及涉嫌袭击警员等不同指控。
当天还发生了一起受到较多关注的袭击事件。
一名反对中共的女性示威者称，自己在现场拍摄时遭亲北京人士拉扯并摔倒，随后遭多人围攻，手机也受到损坏。警方随后控制并拘捕了一名涉嫌参与袭击的人员。
但更具争议的冲突发生在中国驻美国大使馆附近。
9月24日晚至25日凌晨，一批中国民主运动人士前往使馆附近，以投影、标语等方式进行抗议。随后流出的多段现场视频显示，中国领事馆冲出多名男子与抗议者发生肢体冲突。
(图为现场视频截图，中国领事馆安保正在用雨伞旗杆等物攻击躲在车上的抗议者)
(图为现场视频截图，中国领事馆安保正在用雨伞旗杆等物攻击躲在车上的抗议者)
(图为现场视频截图，抗议者被袭击躲到车顶躲避中国领事馆安保的袭击)
现场有人使用杆状物，有抗议者倒地，车辆和设备也遭到损坏。
参与者、中国民主党蔡晓丽称自己遭金属杆攻击，现场视频显示中共领事馆人员携带刀具。
冲突结束后，一些涉事人员退回中国使馆方向。
(图为现场知情者提供，疑似袭击抗议者的中国领事馆安保)
(图为现场知情者提供，疑似袭击抗议者的中国领事馆安保)
正因如此，多名抗议者指控，参与冲突者中可能包括中国使馆工作人员、使馆安保人员或受中国方面指挥的人员。截至目前，美国警方、国务院和FBI尚未公开确认这些人的具体身份。
网络流传的视频显示，一名反习近平人士在相关活动区域高喊反共口号后，与周围欢迎人群及安保人员发生拉扯。
部分中文媒体称涉事人员为“中国特工”，但截至目前同样缺乏公开司法文件或执法机关的正式身份确认。
此次习近平访美期间，还有大量抗议者特别关注一批在现场反复出现的蒙面人员。
公开视频中可以看到，一些人员身穿黑色或深色衣服，戴口罩、棒球帽和墨镜，并携带大型雨伞。
部分人员使用雨伞遮挡记者和抗议者拍摄，另一些人员则近距离拍摄示威者面孔。
不少海外中国政治异议人士认为，这些行为具有明显的监控和信息搜集特征。
近年来，美国司法部、FBI及国会多次公开指出，中国政府曾被指通过侨团、代理人、私家侦探、网络骚扰、威胁家属、非法监控等方式，对生活在美国的中国异议人士、人权活动人士以及少数民族群体施加压力。
当习近平访问美国期间再次出现大规模拍摄抗议者、遮挡镜头、跟踪、冲突和暴力事件时，这些行为究竟只是普通支持者和反对者之间的街头冲突，还是存在更加系统性的组织和指挥？
抗议并不仅发生在华盛顿。在洛杉矶、旧金山等地，中国民主运动人士、西藏人权团体及其他组织也举行了反习近平活动。
在旧金山，中国总领馆外出现要求“习近平下台”“共产党下台”的口号。
在洛杉矶，中国总领馆外也有抗议者举行集会，声援华盛顿抗议现场，并要求美国社会关注西藏、新疆、香港、台湾及中国政治犯问题。
2026年的“特习会”，最终形成了两个完全不同的政治场景。
在官方外交层面，美国政府给予习近平高规格接待，美中两国领导人讨论贸易、台湾、人工智能、国际安全等议题，试图展示两国仍具备维持高层沟通的能力。
而在美国街头，另一场完全不同的政治表达同时发生。
数千名抗议者试图提醒美国社会：与中国进行外交和经济谈判的同时，也不应忽视中国国内的人权状况，以及中国政府被指对海外异议人士实施的跨国镇压。
一边是五星红旗。
另一边，是西藏雪山狮子旗、东突厥斯坦旗帜、香港民主运动标语、台湾相关旗帜，以及中国民主运动人士的反共口号。
警察站在双方之间。
这或许是2026年“特习会”最具有象征意义的一幕。
习近平希望通过这次访问展示中国的国家实力、国际地位和外交影响力。
而聚集在华盛顿、洛杉矶和旧金山街头的抗议者，则试图让另一个中国故事被看见：
政治犯、宗教迫害、西藏、新疆、香港、台湾，以及那些即使已经离开中国，仍然担心自己的面孔被拍摄、身份被记录、家人被威胁，甚至在民主国家街头遭遇暴力的人。
2026年的“特习会”最终留下的，并不单是一次美中最高层会晤。
它还留下了一个美国社会无法回避的问题：一个外国政府究竟可以在美国领土上，把自己的政治动员、外交网络、安全体系和对异议者的压力延伸到什么程度？
如果未来调查进一步证实，中国使领馆不仅组织和资助欢迎活动，还存在工作人员、安保人员或受指挥人员直接参与袭击、监控或恐吓抗议者的情况，那么事件的性质将远远超出普通的街头冲突。
它将涉及外国代理人活动、外交人员行为边界、暴力犯罪，以及美国近年来持续高度关注的跨国镇压问题。
截至2026年9月26日，部分冲突仍在等待进一步调查，个别涉事人员身份也尚未得到美国执法部门公开确认。
但至少有一点已经十分清楚：
当习近平在白宫接受最高规格外交接待时，数以千计反对其统治的人，也同时站在华盛顿街头。
白宫可以铺开红地毯。
但红地毯之外的声音，并没有因此消失。
编辑：黄吉洲 校对：熊辩 翻译：沈美花
Special Coverage: The 2026 Trump-Xi Summit
Between the Red Carpet and the Iron Rods: The Street War in Washington Behind the 2026 Trump-Xi Summit
Reporter: Zhang Zhijun
From September 23 to 25, 2026, Chinese President Xi Jinping visited the United States and held a summit in Washington with U.S. President Donald Trump.
Inside the White House were red carpets, gun salutes, military bands, and diplomatic meetings; outside the White House unfolded one of the largest anti-Xi Jinping protests seen in the U.S. capital in recent years.
Tibetans, Uyghurs, Hongkongers, Taiwan supporters, Chinese pro-democracy activists, Falun Gong practitioners, Christians, and other human rights organizations traveled to Washington from across the United States and even Canada. At the same time, large crowds of pro-Beijing welcomers holding five-star red flags also appeared along President Xi’s motorcade route, near his hotel, around the White House, and near the Chinese Embassy in the United States.
As the two opposing crowds came into continuous contact, shoving, snatched banners, physical altercations, and even violent assaults occurred one after another.
Controversies surrounding how these welcoming crowds were organized, whether they received funding from Chinese embassies, consulates, or pro-Beijing community organizations, and whether certain masked individuals maintained ties with Chinese officialdom quickly extended this political expression on American streets into a far more sensitive question: whether the Chinese government is extending its political pressure and methods of control targeting overseas dissidents directly onto U.S. soil.
After Xi Jinping arrived in the Washington region on September 23, welcomers and protesters had already begun assembling at the airport, around hotels, and along motorcade routes.
On the day of Xi’s arrival, pro-Beijing welcomers and anti-Xi protesters faced off across the street in several locations, forcing law enforcement to deploy officers between the two groups to maintain order.
On September 24, the protests reached their peak.
A large crowd of Tibetans gathered first near the Chinese Embassy in the United States, before moving toward Capitol Hill, the National Mall, and the perimeter of the White House. Public reports indicate that participants traveled from New York, New Jersey, Connecticut, Boston, Chicago, Toronto, and other regions.
At the scene, one could see Tibetan Snow Mountain Lion flags, East Turkestan flags, slogans from the Hong Kong democracy movement, and banners related to Taiwan, alongside chants from Chinese pro-democracy activists shouting slogans such as “Step Down, Xi Jinping!” and “Step Down, Communist Party!”
Former U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi and several U.S. members of Congress also appeared at events organized by certain Tibetan and human rights groups, publicly calling on the U.S. government to raise issues regarding Tibet, human rights, and transnational repression during talks with Xi Jinping.
Wang Dan, a leader of the 1989 Democracy Movement and founder of the June 4th Memorial Museum, participated in protests near the White House on behalf of the June 4th Memorial Museum and the “Dialogue China” think tank.
Wang Dan stated that taking to the streets of Washington this time was driven by three primary demands: opposing Xi Jinping’s autocratic rule implemented within China, opposing the Chinese Communist Party’s suppression of the democratization process, and demanding the release of political prisoners who remain incarcerated, including Jimmy Lai, Joshua Wong, and Xu Zhiyong.
He noted that because public voices of opposition are almost impossible to hear within China, Xi Jinping’s visit to the United States provides overseas protesters with a rare opportunity.
Wang Dan said they hope to deliver the sound of protest directly to where Xi Jinping can hear it, “to let him know that his regime does not enjoy the support of the people.”
He also stated that a consensus has formed among protest groups arriving in Washington from across the United States—wherever Xi Jinping goes, the voices of protest will follow.
On the same day, Wang Dan particularly emphasized that the overseas democracy movement must not focus its attention solely on Xi Jinping as an individual, but should continuously speak out for political prisoners who are incarcerated and suppressed inside China.
He expressed on social media platforms that one of the vital responsibilities of those living overseas is to constantly remind the world that people are still being imprisoned for pursuing freedom, justice, and fundamental rights. Therefore, another important purpose of this protest is to publicly call out the names of these political prisoners so that they are not forgotten by the world.
On the afternoon of the same day, prominent Chinese pro-democracy figures Wei Jingsheng, Wang Dan, and Wang Juntao jointly participated in a press conference held near the White House by the “National Conference on China”. This event further expanded the focus from “opposing Xi Jinping’s visit” to “what happens to China after Xi Jinping.”
In an announcement released prior to the event, the organizers stated that on the occasion of Xi Jinping’s visit to the White House, overseas pro-democracy figures would express their views regarding Xi Jinping’s political future and the future trajectory of China’s institutional system. The event was co-led by Wei Jingsheng, Wang Dan, and Wang Juntao.
In his speech that day, Wei Jingsheng put forward a judgment distinct from general “Anti-Xi” slogans.
He stated that even if Xi Jinping actually steps down, it does not mean China’s problems will end there.
In Wei Jingsheng’s view, the weakening or end of Xi Jinping’s personal power is not equivalent to the termination of the Chinese Communist Party’s one-party authoritarian system, nor does it mean a democratic system will automatically be established.
He argued that the true key to China’s future lies not merely in “removing Xi Jinping,” but in whether China can accomplish an institutional “rebirth” through political change.
Wei Jingsheng said that there are currently numerous rumors regarding changes in Xi Jinping’s power. Regardless of whether these reports are accurate, the societal sentiment that “the world has suffered under Xi for too long” is real. However, he simultaneously warned that if another CCP leader simply replaces Xi Jinping while maintaining the original political system, China could still return to the cycle of autocracy.
He posited that two paths could emerge for China’s future: one leading toward democracy and freedom, and the other continuing to maintain one-party dictatorship. The ultimate outcome will depend on the dynamic interplay among various forces within Chinese society and the international environment.
In other words, Wei Jingsheng pushed the target of this protest further—moving from “Xi Jinping Step Down” to “End One-Party Dictatorship and Establish a Democratic System.”
Wang Juntao, Chairman of the National Committee of the China Democracy Party, also participated in the protests that day.
The National Committee of the China Democracy Party, led by Wang Juntao, continuously organized party members to conduct protests near Joint Base Andrews, the White House, and President Xi Jinping’s hotel during his visit to the United States.
The China Democracy Party stated that participants followed Xi Jinping’s public itinerary for three consecutive days to conduct demonstrations, expressing their demands for human rights, democracy, and freedom in China through banners, signs, and slogans. Compared to targeting Xi Jinping solely as an individual, the actions of Wang Juntao and the China Democracy Party emphasized party politics and institutional alternatives.
This stance aligns with their long-standing position: the fundamental issue lies not merely with a single Chinese leader, but with China’s lack of genuine elections, multi-party competition, and checks and balances on power.
Consequently, during these protests in Washington, “Step Down, Xi Jinping!” and “Step Down, Communist Party!” simultaneously became among the most frequently chanted slogans by Chinese pro-democracy groups.
Meanwhile, sculptor Chen Weiming, founder of Liberty Sculpture Park who traveled to Washington from the U.S. West Coast, represented another approach to resistance.
Chen Weiming has long used large-scale public art and political sculptures to express criticism of the Chinese Communist Party regime. In recent years, Liberty Sculpture Park has created large-scale works such as “CCP Virus,” “Tank Man,” and “Xi Jinping Virus Head,” transforming China’s political persecution and historical memory into public art with strong visual impact.
During Xi Jinping’s visit to the United States, Chen Weiming led a team of volunteers from Liberty Sculpture Park to Washington to join the protests.
Speaking at the scene, he emphasized that overseas Chinese must not forget those who still suffer political persecution inside China simply because they themselves now live in a free society. In his view, protesting Xi Jinping is not merely a protest against an individual leader, but also a public challenge to a system maintained through fear, censorship, and political repression.
Chen Weiming’s approach was particularly symbolic.
The Liberty Sculpture Park team brought large black flags and visual elements—previously used in political art projects such as the “Xi Jinping Virus Head”—to the protest site, merging street demonstrations with political art.
For Chen Weiming, the sculpture itself forms an integral part of the protest.
He has stated on multiple occasions in the past that the significance of public art lies not only in commemorating victims, but also in preventing dictators from controlling the historical narrative. Thus, as Xi Jinping’s motorcade appeared in Washington, the Liberty Sculpture Park team sought to use massive flags and physical actions to create a visual scene completely distinct from the official welcoming ceremony—with red carpets and five-star red flags on one side, and public art documenting CCP tyranny on the other.
Although Chen Weiming, Wang Dan, Wei Jingsheng, and Wang Juntao belong to different generations and employ varied political strategies, their core assessment expressed during Xi Jinping’s U.S. visit was highly consistent: overseas protests must not remain limited to opposing a single visit or targeting Xi Jinping as an individual.
The true issue is the Chinese political system itself.
While high-level talks were held inside the White House, a completely different scene unfolded on the streets.
On one side were crowds supporting Xi Jinping and the Chinese government; on the other side were anti-Xi protesters from various ethnic backgrounds and political orientations. Police stood between the two sides to prevent larger-scale conflicts.
Controversies soon arose surrounding the organization of the pro-Beijing welcoming groups.
Prior to Xi Jinping’s visit, recruitment messages for welcoming groups were already circulating in certain Chinese WeChat groups and social media platforms.
Some recruitment notices claimed that participants would be provided with airfare, lodging, meals, and local transportation stipends, with a few messages even mentioning cash allowances.
Furthermore, some individuals participating in the welcoming events stated in interviews with Japanese media that they were “arranged” to attend the scene by the Chinese Consulate General.
These details led external observers to further suspect that some welcoming activities were not entirely spontaneous, but rather involved potential coordination and funding by Chinese embassies, consulates, pro-Beijing community associations, or other related organizations.
However, current public evidence remains insufficient to prove that all participants in the welcoming activities received payments from the Chinese government, nor can every person waving a five-star red flag be directly classified as an agent of the Chinese government.
A more accurate formulation is: public information indicates that there were at least organized recruitments providing transportation, lodging, and cash stipends, and certain participants personally stated to the media that they were arranged by the Consulate General.
A similar pattern has appeared before.
During Xi Jinping’s attendance at the San Francisco APEC summit in 2023, an investigation by The Washington Post using videos, WeChat chat logs, interviews, and identity verifications revealed that Chinese diplomatic missions in the U.S. were involved in coordinating certain welcoming activities and providing hotel, dining, and other support to some participants.
The investigation also found that multiple violent conflicts occurred on the streets of San Francisco between pro-Beijing figures and anti-Xi protesters at that time. Several anti-Xi activists were subjected to punches, pushes, attacks with flagpoles, and chemical sprays.
(Image provided by an eyewitness at the scene showing physical attacks by CCP-hired groups against protesters)
When similar welcoming groups, masked individuals, and street conflicts re-emerged in Washington in 2026, many overseas dissidents immediately recalled the events that occurred in San Francisco in 2023.
(Image showing a video screenshot: the CCP-hired personnel wore matching attire, baseball caps, sunglasses, and masks, carrying long black umbrellas. The screenshot shows a hired individual using an umbrella to strike a protester)
On the afternoon of September 24, physical altercations broke out at multiple locations near the White House.
Police subsequently intervened and arrested several individuals.
Public reports indicate that those arrested faced various charges, including simple assault, theft, and alleged assault on a police officer.
Another high-profile assault took place on the same day.
An anti-CCP female demonstrator stated that while filming at the scene, she was yanked and knocked down by pro-Beijing individuals before being mobbed by several people, resulting in damage to her cell phone. Police subsequently detained and arrested an individual suspected of involvement in the assault.
However, an even more controversial conflict unfolded near the Chinese Embassy in the United States.
From the night of September 24 into the early morning of September 25, a group of Chinese pro-democracy activists proceeded to the vicinity of the embassy to protest using projections and banners. Subsequently circulated video clips from the scene show multiple men rushing out from the Chinese Consulate/Embassy and engaging in physical altercations with the protesters.
(Image showing a video screenshot: Chinese Consulate security personnel using umbrellas, flagpoles, and other objects to attack protesters taking shelter on a vehicle)
(Image showing a video screenshot: A protester climbs onto a vehicle roof to escape an attack by Chinese Consulate security personnel)
People used pole-like objects at the scene; some protesters fell to the ground, and vehicles and equipment were damaged.
Participant Cai Xiaoli of the China Democracy Party stated that she was attacked with a metal pole, and video footage from the scene showed CCP consulate personnel carrying knives.
After the conflict ended, some individuals involved retreated in the direction of the Chinese Embassy.
(Image provided by an insider at the scene showing suspected Chinese Consulate security personnel who allegedly attacked protesters)
For this reason, multiple protesters alleged that those participating in the conflict may have included Chinese embassy staff, embassy security personnel, or individuals operating under instructions from the Chinese side. As of now, U.S. police, the State Department, and the FBI have not publicly confirmed the specific identities of these individuals.
Videos circulating online show an anti-Xi Jinping figure shouting anti-communist slogans in the designated event area before getting involved in physical pulling and shoving with surrounding welcoming crowds and security personnel.
Some Chinese-language media outlets referred to the individuals involved as “Chinese agents,” though as of now, there is likewise a lack of public judicial documents or formal identity confirmation from law enforcement agencies.
During Xi Jinping’s visit to the United States, a large number of protesters paid special attention to a group of masked individuals who repeatedly appeared at the scene.
Public video shows some personnel dressed in black or dark clothing, wearing masks, baseball caps, and sunglasses, and carrying large umbrellas.
Some personnel used umbrellas to block journalists and protesters from filming, while others photographed the faces of demonstrators at close range.
Many overseas Chinese political dissidents believe these actions exhibit clear characteristics of surveillance and intelligence gathering.
In recent years, the U.S. Department of Justice, the FBI, and the U.S. Congress have publicly pointed out on multiple occasions that the Chinese government has been accused of exerting pressure on Chinese dissidents, human rights activists, and ethnic minority groups living in the United States through hometown associations, proxies, private investigators, online harassment, threats against family members, and illegal surveillance.
As Xi Jinping’s visit to the United States again coincided with large-scale photographing of protesters, lens blocking, stalking, altercations, and violent incidents, do these actions represent mere street conflicts between ordinary supporters and opponents, or is there a more systematic organization and command structure behind them?
The protests did not occur only in Washington. In cities like Los Angeles and San Francisco, Chinese pro-democracy activists, Tibetan human rights groups, and other organizations also held anti-Xi Jinping events.
In San Francisco, slogans calling for “Xi Jinping Step Down” and “Communist Party Step Down” appeared outside the Chinese Consulate-General.
In Los Angeles, protesters held rallies outside the Chinese Consulate-General to support the protest site in Washington and demand that American society pay attention to issues involving Tibet, Xinjiang, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Chinese political prisoners.
The 2026 “Trump-Xi Summit” ultimately produced two completely different political scenes.
At the official diplomatic level, the U.S. government accorded Xi Jinping a high-specification reception, with the leaders of the U.S. and China discussing issues such as trade, Taiwan, artificial intelligence, and international security in an attempt to demonstrate that both nations retain the capacity to maintain high-level communication.
On the streets of America, however, an entirely different form of political expression unfolded simultaneously.
Thousands of protesters sought to remind American society: while conducting diplomatic and economic negotiations with China, one should not overlook the domestic human rights situation in China, nor the transnational repression the Chinese government is accused of committing against overseas dissidents.
On one side flew the five-star red flags.
On the other side were the Tibetan Snow Mountain Lion flags, East Turkestan flags, slogans from the Hong Kong democracy movement, banners related to Taiwan, and the anti-communist slogans of Chinese pro-democracy activists.
Police stood between both sides.
This was perhaps the most symbolically significant scene of the 2026 “Trump-Xi Summit.”
Xi Jinping hoped to use this visit to showcase China’s national power, international standing, and diplomatic influence.
Meanwhile, the protesters gathered on the streets of Washington, Los Angeles, and San Francisco attempted to make another story of China seen:
Political prisoners, religious persecution, Tibet, Xinjiang, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and those who, despite having already left China, still fear having their faces photographed, their identities recorded, their families threatened, or even encountering violence on the streets of a democratic nation.
What the 2026 “Trump-Xi Summit” ultimately left behind was not merely a top-level summit between the United States and China.
It also left behind an unavoidable question for American society: To what extent can a foreign government extend its political mobilization, diplomatic networks, security apparatus, and pressure on dissidents onto U.S. territory?
If future investigations further confirm that Chinese embassies and consulates not only organized and funded welcoming activities, but that staff, security personnel, or individuals under instruction directly participated in attacking, monitoring, or intimidating protesters, the nature of the event will far exceed ordinary street conflicts.
It will touch upon foreign agent activities, the boundaries of diplomatic conduct, violent crime, and the issue of transnational repression that the United States has continuously monitored with high concern in recent years.
As of September 26, 2026, parts of the conflicts are still awaiting further investigation, and the identities of certain individuals involved have not yet been publicly confirmed by U.S. law enforcement agencies.
However, at least one point has become abundantly clear:
While Xi Jinping received the highest-specification diplomatic reception at the White House, thousands of people opposing his rule simultaneously stood on the streets of Washington.
The White House can roll out the red carpet.
Yet the voices beyond the red carpet did not disappear because of it.
Editor: Huang Jizhou Proofreader: Xiong Bian Translator: Shen Meihua
