——朱虞夫的民运回忆(中篇)
记者:沈美花 贾嘉
人物简介
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朱虞夫,浙江杭州人,中国大陆民主运动长期参与者,中国民主党早期重要参与者之一,《在野党》创办人。
十一、上街逼宫
朱虞夫散发传单被抓,激起了一片涟漪,中共完全没有料到它们刻意经营的中美蜜月祥和气氛中,有人向它们发难。向民政厅注册可以留着不发,“研究研究”,拖着拖着也就拖没了。但是仅仅五天,有人上街要逼宫了。抓了人,“留置”了二天,层层上报却因为没有人拍板拘留而只能放人。当局的患得患失是前所未有的,似乎中国的政治生态在没有了邓小平以后面临着一种新的可能。虽然放回家了,对于朱虞夫来说,他要趁着这个时刻继续给当局增加压力,为撬动中国社会的进步寻找一个支点。
其他参与者受到很大震动。
在此之前,很多人仍然抱有一种想法:
注册是按照法律程序办事;
如果政府不同意,就不批准;
至少不应该因此抓人。
但是朱虞夫散发宣言以后被带走,使所有人意识到:
事情正在迅速升级。
按照朱虞夫的回忆,王有才尤其紧张。
因为中国民主党甚至还没有真正形成完整的组织,一个主要参与者已经因为街头散发注册材料被抓。
但是对朱虞夫本人而言,这恰恰证明了他此前的判断:
政治空间不是等出来的,而是通过行动拓出来的。
当局当年对王有才的判决是毫无道理的,在所谓判决书的主要罪状中,凭空捏造朱虞夫散发传单是王有才“指使”的,王有才的回忆文章说,他根本就不知道朱虞夫上街散发的是什么传单,在哪里印的。朱虞夫本人也从来没有编造这样的故事。朱虞夫估计这个段子一定又是名扬天下的“神探”聂海芬的杰作。
十二、组建“浙江筹委会”
王有才与陈龙德、王东海、傅国涌等人在筹划“中国民主党”阶段考虑的是不至于遭到当局打压的注册,并没有考虑具有极大风险的组织和行动。最初参与注册的一些知识分子看到王有才被“监视居住”限制人身自由以后,急流勇退了,中国民主党的活动一度停顿。
朱虞夫脱险回家后就考虑要寻找一起干的朋友。他首先想到自己1978年底至1979年杭州民主墙时期认识的那些老朋友。
前文讲了浙江筹委会六位成员的参与过程,但是杭州的组党形势如果仅靠六个人也必然撑不开一片土地。
毛庆祥联络戚惠民提供采荷新村的房子作为党部联络处,安顿热恋中的吴义龙情侣。
李锡安利用他的社交能力陆续又带来了来金彪、池建伟、李巴根、黄国安、王富华、杨建明、吴远明、萧利彬、高海兵、聂敏之、昝爱宗、邹巍、叶建、余铁龙、余元洪、楼裕根等等,在他们后面还有许多热心市民,一时间杭州的组党活动轰轰烈烈,同时吸引全国各地的民运朋友来杭州“取经”。
杭州的组党活动完全不是王有才设想中的样子。
但是中国民主党的草根组织框架,就在这一过程中逐渐形成。
铁匠没样,边打边像。
十三、一段佚史
这也是朱虞夫特别希望澄清的一段历史。
1998年6月25日的注册石破天惊,名震天下,毕竟中共建政后49年间,所有组党的领导人连坐牢的资格都没有,无一例外都在看守所被枪杀了。他们的罪名很简单:反革命集团首犯。
朱虞夫出国后一位当年与国内关系最密切的朋友,向朱虞夫提了一个困扰他多年的疑问:王有才既然是注册行动中最知名的人物,为什么后来浙江筹委会的所有活动中都没有提到他的名字?
朱虞夫的回到非常简单,因为王有才没有参与浙江筹委会的所有活动。
主要原因是王有才在注册后迅速受到公安控制,因此无法参与任何实际工作。
其次是王有才的组党构想使他无法接受这类的草根政治。
那么既然王有才被限制了行动自由,其他二位注册者呢?
这里就不得不提“海外民运”的污浊了。
1998年二月,王炳章先生闯关在杭州见了几位民运人士,“中国人权”主席刘X,十分光火,公开谴责王炳章见了“我的人”,动了他的奶酪。当注册的信息一公开,他就千方百计压迫“他的人”离开,果然,他的人就在他的金钱操作下,于10月23日(离注册还不到四个月)发表公开声明,表示“回想我与有才等朋友公开组党的行动实有不妥之处”,“给国内留下了不良的后遗症”,“我认为我们必须作全面的检讨”。
朱虞夫认为,后来浙江民主党的发展,是另外一批参与者继续推动的结果。
所以他一直强调:
“注册中国民主党”与“后来把中国民主党真正组织起来”,是两个既相连又完全不相同的过程。
他并不否定王有才注册行动的重要意义。
但他反对把中国民主党的全部历史归结为某一个人的个人历史。
十四、向全国“点火”
随着杭州组党活动的展开,外地民运朋友纷纷前往取经,上海姚遵宪参与了杭州的所有活动,上海、陕西、四川、东三省、云南、安徽、江苏、甘肃、宁夏、北京、重庆、两广、内蒙的朋友纷至沓来。
说真的 ,大家都在利用这个难得的机会尽量扩展,希望其它省市也起来冲击党禁,记得西安的傅升建议浙江派人去外地“点火”,大家都认为是好办法,吴义龙正好写完了硕士论文,有大把时间可以利用,而姚遵宪也非常乐意陪着一起去。
于是,他们开始搜集各地民运人士的名单、住址和联系电话,延京广线的省会城市找到当地民运人士鼓动他们组党。
一路上基本很顺利。2025年朱虞夫偶遇参加房东party的杨海,他回忆吴义龙当年去西安的时候是坐飞机去的,看来浙江朋友很有钱。朱虞夫说当时王荣清、毛庆祥和我们几个人都凑了路费给吴义龙,但是姚遵宪陪着吴义龙全国跑,花费的都是姚遵宪卖了上海的房子的钱。
到一个地方,找到当地愿意承担风险的人,告诉他们浙江已经开始组党,希望当地也成立自己的中国民主党筹委会。
如果一个联系人找不到,就找名单上的下一个。
中国民主党之所以能够得到大家的首肯,来自于祝正明的制度设计,祝正明没有“占山为王”的想法,通常人都有权欲,拉一个杆子抢一个位置,而且嘴上还念念有词的喊着“公心至上”。但是浙江组党不抢位置、只办实事。虽然成立了中国民主党,也只是“浙江筹委会”,准备与各地的“筹委会”平起平坐。朱虞夫记得在入狱前曾经与湖南的谢长发谈过,筹委会是浙江搭台,大家唱戏,如果浙江一上来就占了位置,这戏就没人唱了,你们湖南唱得好,湖南就是老大,别的哪个地方唱得更好也可以超过湖南。未来的位置是由大家的选票决定的,没有这样的意识就别称自己是“民主党”。
没想到浙江的谦让被个别野心家以为有机可乘,争抢桃子,给中国民主党的发展带来灭顶之灾。
1998年之所以组党活动如燎原之势席卷全国,祝正明的设计功不可没。
在他的构想里,各省之间应该竞争的是
谁真正把事情做好。
而不是:
谁先抢到主席的位置。
十五、浙江筹委会为什么没有“主席”?
中国民主党浙江筹委会早期有一个非常值得注意的特点:
没有主席。
朱虞夫反复强调这一点。
在他的理解中,中国民主党不是要首先找一个全国领袖,然后由这个领袖向各地任命负责人。
浙江成立浙江筹委会;
上海可以成立上海筹委会;
湖南可以成立湖南筹委会;
各地都是平等关系。
大家共同在这个平台上为中国社会民主化做出自己的贡献。
初始的这种组织思想与后来变了味的“中国民主党主席”、“全国委员会、“全国联合总部”等形成鲜明对照,甚至一个街头混混都可以自称是“国际联盟主席”。
当然海外的那些组织除了街头表演賺非法移民的钱,基本上与国内的中国民主党没有什么关系了。
朱虞夫曾经希望海外的“中国民主党”能停止内耗,联合起来,走上正路,他好不容易说通了一家,却在另一家碰了鼻子,那家的“主席”说,联合是好事情,但是他不希望在他的任上有大动作。他已经做了十五年主席了,他的“任上”恐怕还有十五年吧,朱虞夫彻底失望了。
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编辑:黄吉洲 校对:毛一炜 翻译:沈美花
Lest the Annals of History Turn to Ashes
— Zhu Yufu’s Reminiscences of the Democracy Movement(PartII
)
Reporters: Shen Meihua, Jia Jia
Abstract: Zhu Yufu personally experienced the Cultural Revolution, the Hangzhou Democracy Wall, the 1989 Democracy Movement, and the preparation and establishment of the China Democracy Party. He was imprisoned three times, serving over sixteen years in jail. Recalling the past in his late years, his sole purpose is to preserve the history of the democracy movement, ensuring that future generations remember those who paid the price for democracy.
Profile
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Zhu Yufu, a native of Hangzhou, Zhejiang Province, is a longtime participant in the mainland Chinese democracy movement, one of the early key figures in the China Democracy Party, and the founder of the publication The Opposition Party (Zai Ye Dang).
XI. Taking to the Streets to Force the Regime’s Hand
Zhu Yufu’s arrest for handing out leaflets sent ripples through the political landscape. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) had entirely failed to anticipate that someone would launch a challenge against them right amidst the harmonious “U.S.–China honeymoon” atmosphere they had so meticulously cultivated.
An application for party registration submitted to the Civil Affairs Bureau could simply be shelved without approval—put under “study and deliberation” until it quietly faded into obscurity. Yet, just five days after the filing, someone took to the streets to force the regime’s hand.
They arrested him and held him under “administrative retention” (liúzhì) for two days. However, as the report worked its way up through the bureaucratic chain of command, no official was willing to sign off on a formal criminal detention, and they were ultimately forced to release him.
The authorities displayed an unprecedented level of indecisiveness and anxiety. It appeared as though China’s political landscape, now bereft of Deng Xiaoping, was facing new possibilities. Though he was allowed to return home, Zhu Yufu intended to seize this momentum to keep pressuring the authorities, searching for a fulcrum to leverage social progress in China.
Other participants were deeply shaken. Prior to this, many had harbored the assumption that:
Registering a party was simply following legal procedures;
If the government disagreed, it would simply deny approval;
At the very least, people should not be arrested for doing so.
However, Zhu Yufu’s detention following his street distribution of the declaration made everyone realize one thing: the situation was escalating rapidly.
According to Zhu Yufu’s recollections, Wang Youcai was particularly nervous. The China Democracy Party had not even formed a complete organizational structure yet, and already a primary participant had been arrested for distributing registration materials on the street.
For Zhu Yufu himself, however, this confirmed his prior judgment: political space is not something you wait for; it is something carved out through action.
The court ruling handed down against Wang Youcai by the authorities back then was completely groundless. Among the main charges listed in the verdict, it fabricated out of thin air that Zhu Yufu’s distribution of flyers was done under Wang Youcai’s “instruction.” In Wang Youcai’s memoir, he stated that he had no idea what flyers Zhu Yufu was distributing on the street or where they had been printed. Zhu Yufu himself had never made up such a story either. Zhu Yufu surmises that this narrative must have been another masterpiece by the infamous “master detective” Nie Haifen.
XII. Establishing the “Zhejiang Preparatory Committee”
When Wang Youcai, Chen Longde, Wang Donghai, Fu Guoyong, and others were planning the “China Democracy Party,” what they contemplated was registering under legal procedures that would not trigger government suppression. They had not considered high-risk organizing and direct action.
When some of the intellectuals who initially participated in the registration saw that Wang Youcai was placed under “residential surveillance” and stripped of his personal freedom, they rapidly withdrew from the movement. The activities of the China Democracy Party temporarily ground to a halt.
After escaping danger and returning home, Zhu Yufu considered finding comrades to work alongside. The first people who came to his mind were old friends he had met during the Hangzhou Democracy Wall movement from late 1978 to 1979.
The previous chapter recounted how the six members of the Zhejiang Preparatory Committee joined. However, if the party-building efforts in Hangzhou had relied solely on six people, they could never have opened up a real foothold.
Mao Qingxiang contacted Qi Huimin to provide a house in the Caihe Xincun neighborhood as a communications hub for the party headquarters, settling the deeply in-love couple Wu Yilong and his partner.
Li Xian utilized his social skills to continuously bring in people like Lai Jinbiao, Chi Jianwei, Li Bangen, Huang Guo’an, Wang Fuhua, Yang Jianming, Wu Yuanming, Xiao Libin, Gao Haibing, Nie Minzhi, Zan Aizong, Zou Wei, Ye Jian, Yu Tielong, Yu Yuanhong, Lou Yugen, and others. Behind them stood many enthusiastic local citizens. For a time, party-building activities in Hangzhou flared up vigorously, attracting democracy friends from across the country to Hangzhou to learn from their experience.
The party-building activities in Hangzhou turned out completely different from what Wang Youcai had originally envisioned. Yet, it was through this very process that the grassroots organizational framework of the China Democracy Party gradually took shape.
As the saying goes: “A blacksmith works without a fixed mold; the shape emerges with every strike.”
XIII. An Omitted Chapter of History
This is a piece of history that Zhu Yufu particularly wishes to clarify.
The registration attempt on June 25, 1998, sent shockwaves through the nation and achieved world renown. After all, during the 49 years since the founding of the CCP regime, leaders of any attempt to form a political party were not even granted the “privilege” of serving time in prison—without exception, they were all executed at detention centers under the simple charge of being “chief culprits of a counter-revolutionary clique.”
After Zhu Yufu went abroad, a friend who had maintained the closest ties to the movement inside China asked him a question that had perplexed him for years: Since Wang Youcai was the most prominent figure in the registration action, why was his name never mentioned in any of the subsequent activities of the Zhejiang Preparatory Committee?
Zhu Yufu’s answer was very simple: because Wang Youcai did not participate in any of the activities of the Zhejiang Preparatory Committee.
The primary reason was that Wang Youcai was quickly placed under police control following the registration, rendering him unable to participate in any practical work. Secondly, Wang Youcai’s concept of party-building made it difficult for him to accept this style of grassroots politics.
Then, if Wang Youcai’s freedom of movement was restricted, what about the other two individuals who signed the registration?
Here, one cannot avoid mentioning the sordid side of the “overseas democracy movement.”
In February 1998, Dr. Wang Bingzhang slipped past border controls and met with several democracy activists in Hangzhou. Liu [Qing], chairman of “Human Rights in China,” was extremely incensed, publicly condemning Wang Bingzhang for meeting “his people” and stepping on his turf.
When the news of the party registration became public, Liu used every means possible to pressure “his people” to pull out. Sure enough, under the influence of his money, “his person” issued a public statement on October 23 (less than four months after the registration), stating: “Reflecting on the action of openly forming a party with Youcai and other friends, it was indeed improper… it left negative aftermath domestically… I believe we must conduct a comprehensive self-criticism.”
Zhu Yufu believes that the subsequent development of the Zhejiang Democracy Party was the result of continuous pushing by another group of participants.
Therefore, he has consistently emphasized: “Registering the China Democracy Party” and “actually organizing the China Democracy Party later” were two interconnected yet completely distinct processes.
He does not deny the significant historic weight of Wang Youcai’s registration action. However, he opposes reducing the entire history of the China Democracy Party to the personal history of a single individual.
XIV. Setting “Fires” Across the Nation
As the party-building activities unfolded in Hangzhou, democracy activists from other regions flocked there to learn from their experience. Shanghai activist Yao Zunxian participated in all the activities in Hangzhou, and friends from Shanghai, Shaanxi, Sichuan, the Northeast provinces, Yunnan, Anhui, Jiangsu, Gansu, Ningxia, Beijing, Chongqing, Guangdong, Guangxi, and Inner Mongolia arrived one after another.
Truth be told, everyone was trying to make the most of this rare opportunity to expand as much as possible, hoping that other provinces and cities would also rise up to challenge the ban on political parties.
Zhu Yufu recalls that Fu Sheng from Xi’an suggested Zhejiang send people to other regions to “set fires” (ignite local movements), a proposal everyone agreed was a great strategy. Wu Yilong had just finished his master’s thesis and had plenty of free time, while Yao Zunxian was more than happy to accompany him on the trip.
Thus, they began gathering lists of democracy activists across various regions, along with their addresses and contact numbers, traveling to provincial capitals along the Beijing–Guangzhou Railway line to find local activists and encourage them to form party chapters.
The journey was generally smooth. In 2025, Zhu Yufu happened to run into Yang Hai at a landlord’s party. Yang recalled that when Wu Yilong visited Xi’an back then, he flew there by plane, making it seem like the Zhejiang activists were very wealthy. Zhu Yufu clarified that while he, Wang Rongqing, Mao Qingxiang, and a few others pooled together travel funds for Wu Yilong, all the expenses for Yao Zunxian traveling across the country with Wu Yilong were paid out of Yao Zunxian’s own pocket from selling his apartment in Shanghai.
Upon arriving at a location, they would look for individuals willing to take the risk, informing them that Zhejiang had already begun organizing the party and encouraging the local community to establish their own China Democracy Party Preparatory Committee. If a contact could not be reached, they moved on to the next name on the list.
The reason the China Democracy Party was able to gain widespread endorsement stemmed from Zhu Zhengming’s institutional design. Zhu Zhengming had no intention of “claiming a mountain to play king.” Normally, people are driven by a desire for power—hoisting a flag to grab a leadership position while spouting hypocritical rhetoric about “putting the public good first.”
However, the Zhejiang movement did not fight for positions; it simply got real work done. Although they founded the China Democracy Party, they intentionally titled themselves only the “Zhejiang Preparatory Committee,” intending to sit on equal footing with preparatory committees across other regions.
Zhu Yufu recalls speaking with Xie Changfa from Hunan before his imprisonment, explaining that the Preparatory Committee was a platform set up by Zhejiang for everyone to perform on: “If Zhejiang grabs the top spots right out of the gate, no one else will want to participate. If you in Hunan perform well, Hunan is the leader. If any other region performs even better, they can surpass Hunan too. Future positions will be decided by everyone’s votes. Without this mindset, one shouldn’t call themselves a ‘Democracy Party’.”
Unexpectedly, Zhejiang’s humility was misinterpreted by a few ambitious individuals as an opportunity to snatch the fruits of victory, which ultimately dealt a fatal blow to the development of the China Democracy Party.
The reason party-building activities swept the nation like a wildfire in 1998 owed much to Zhu Zhengming’s framework. In his vision, what the provinces should compete over was: Who actually gets things done well, rather than Who grabs the position of chairman first.
XV. Why Did the Zhejiang Preparatory Committee Have No “Chairman”?
In its early stages, the Zhejiang Preparatory Committee of the China Democracy Party possessed a very notable feature: It had no chairman.
Zhu Yufu has repeatedly stressed this point. In his understanding, the goal of the China Democracy Party was not to first find a national leader who would then appoint regional heads.
Zhejiang established the Zhejiang Preparatory Committee;
Shanghai could establish the Shanghai Preparatory Committee;
Hunan could establish the Hunan Preparatory Committee;
All regions maintained an equal relationship.
Together on this platform, everyone contributed their part toward the democratization of Chinese society.
This original organizational philosophy stands in stark contrast to the later corrupted iterations—such as “Chairman of the China Democracy Party,” “National Committee,” or “National Joint Headquarters”—where even street hustlers could self-style as the “Chairman of the International Alliance.”
Of course, those overseas organizations—aside from conducting street performances to extract money from illegal immigrants—have largely had nothing to do with the China Democracy Party inside China.
Zhu Yufu once hoped that overseas branches of the “China Democracy Party” could halt their internal friction, unite, and get on the right track. He managed with great effort to convince one faction, only to run into a wall with another. The “chairman” of that other faction said that while unification was a good thing, he did not want any major shifts during his tenure. He had already been chairman for fifteen years, and his “tenure” would likely last another fifteen years. Zhu Yufu was utterly disappointed.
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Editor: Huang Jizhou Proofreader: Mao Yiwei Translator: Shen Meihua
