作者：张滨滨（X@reporterxiaowu）

临近中共二十届五中全会，关于习近平是否功成身退的猜测又多了起来，好事者甚至通过观察七名政治局常委进入会场时的间隔距离来猜测，习近平已经钦定了“皇储”李强，在明年秋天召开的中共二十一大上就将正式上位，而悬念只是在于习近平到底是像他的前任胡锦涛一样“高风亮节”直接裸退，还是像胡锦涛的前任江泽民那样保留军权对新上位的总书记“扶上马再送一程”。

说实话，对于中共这样的宫闱秘政操作，外界的任何猜测和解读实际上都不能算是离谱，毕竟除了身处其间的中共高层之外，没有谁能具体掌握他们的实锤信息。特别是事关习近平退休这样的高度机密，除了捕风捉影之外，政治分析人士也着实没有太多渠道，正因如此，一定程度上也给了听床师傅们想象和自由发挥的空间。

这样也好，共产党越是严肃越是高深莫测，佐以听床师傅的戏谑，反倒是给了我们这些日子过得本就苦哈哈的普通人一些乐趣，有时候用荒诞解构严肃可能还真是一种好主意。

当然，我们还是寄望于观察家们能够穿透迷雾，在繁杂的人事关系中为我们梳理出最接近真相的那些异动，比如，习近平会不会退位？谁又将接班？毕竟，共产党的颂圣歌曲就一直传唱“让我告诉未来，中国进行着接力赛”，强大如习近平这样的独裁野心家，终有老去的那天，没人希望他在赛道上一直跑到生命尽头，最起码这也不够人道。

在我看来，时下谈论习近平退位大家的迫切心情可以理解，但一眼望去，实际上现有的政治局班底并不具备接班人，这也就意味着，在明年的二十一大上，习近平交棒的可能性就不会存在，即便你不愿意，届时二十一届一中全会选出的新常委见面会上，习近平还是会说出那句“全会选举我继续担任中共中央总书记”，转过年，继续配齐“三位一体”。

实际上，这并不难以理解，政治局班底构架不具备潜在接班人选，加之修宪带来的制度性障碍已经清除，既然背负了千古骂名，多干一届和多干两届区别也不大，习近平没有理由不继续自己的“独角戏”，至少，“习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想”还只能持续“特色”无法进化为“习近平思想”之前，可能就不存在退休的可能性。

在中共党内，习近平已经不是一般的总书记，而是划时代的绝对核心，以中共党史为参照，毛泽东凭借1945年4月20日中共六届七中全会通过的《关于若干历史问题的决议》奠定了核心地位，邓小平主导1981年6月27日中共十一届六中全会通过的《关于建国以来党的若干历史问题的决议》奠定核心，习近平藉着2021年11月11日中共十九届六中全会通过的《关于党的百年奋斗重大成就和历史经验的决议》开创了“新时代”。

“十八大以来”已成中共叙事定语，而习近平本人，则是新时代新征程需要锚定的绝对核心，是需要全党维护的“党中央的核心、全党的核心地位”，说不上前无古人最起码是后无来者的历史定位下，中共党内谁又敢提交棒接班谁又敢提核心退位？

特别是在“总结新时代全面从严治党的成就和经验”已成未来中共二十届五中全会重要议题的背景下，主动触及这个话题无异于自杀，习近平能不能退休暂且不论，蠢蠢欲动的接班人就先被以反腐之名拿下了。

有分析认为，即将提交二十届五中全会讨论的《中共中央关于持之以恒推进全面从严治党若干重大问题的决定》是对习近平新时代执政成就的盖棺定论，在我看来实则不然，这份决定更可能是将习近平推升到新的历史定位的助推器，以便他可以继续执政长期执政，如若不然，当初违背民意违背党内共识推动修宪的意义又何在呢？

其实，早在习近平新时代开启之前，任剑涛教授就曾经预言，中国即将面对的一个基本的状况是，要进入一个毫无生气的二十年。因为这两代人都是红卫兵、红小兵出身，而红卫兵、红小兵最大的特点就是没规则。他表示，像50年代和60年代这两代人基本上是在毛泽东无产阶级专政下，继续革命理论的教育下和熏陶下，走向高中毕业。在大学的时候，基本上是在恢复共产党的权威，没有接受到真正的现代严格的知识训练，很难有现代观念。因而他们无法把一个制度的权威和人格的权威清晰的区别开来。

毫无疑问，习近平退位当然是民心所向，但从任剑涛预言的这个层面来看，未来的中共总书记是习近平还是李强或者其他人，可能对中国未来走向的改变并不是那么值得期待，预期盼着习近平退位，不如盼着共产党倒台。

几千年来，我们这个民族无时无刻不在期盼明君，总是认为出个好皇帝大家的日子就好了，如今共和百年了，很多人还是抱着这样的心态。辛亥革命之后中国确实没有了皇帝，但1949年之后，共产党这种党内继位的传承制度比起皇帝的家传承制度进步了吗？改变了吗？可能有一点，但不多。

在习近平新时代之前，我们还可能透过储君配置提前观察未来动向，到了习近平这里，中共的接班人序列已经被打乱了，储君不再出现在公众视野，真正把共产党打造成了宫闱秘政，持续下去，没准哪一天我们又要回到去正大光明匾后面去找遗诏确认中共接班人了。

编辑：黄吉洲 校对：程筱筱 翻译：周敏

Hoping for Xi Jinping to Step Down Is Worse Than Hoping for the Communist Party to Collapse

Author: Zhang Binbin (X: @reporterxiaowu)

As the 5th Plenary Session of the 20th CPC Central Committee approaches, speculations regarding whether Xi Jinping will step down gracefully have increased once again. Amused onlookers have even attempted to speculate—by observing the physical distance between the seven members of the Politburo Standing Committee as they entered the hall—that Xi Jinping has already anointed Li Qiang as the “crown prince,” who will officially assume power at the 20th National Congress of the CPC next autumn. The only remaining suspense is whether Xi Jinping will, like his predecessor Hu Jintao, display “high moral integrity” by executing a complete (“naked”) retirement, or like Hu Jintao’s predecessor Jiang Zemin, retain military power to “help the new General Secretary mount the horse and guide him a bit further.”

To be honest, regarding such palace-secrecy political operations of the CCP, any outside speculation or interpretation cannot really be considered outlandish. After all, except for the high-level CCP officials situated within it, nobody can concretely grasp hard evidence or real information. Particularly on a matter of high secrecy like Xi Jinping’s retirement, political analysts truly have few channels other than chasing shadows and catching wind; precisely for this reason, to a certain extent, it has given “bed-listeners” (political rumor-mongers) space for imagination and free play.

This is fine as well. The more serious and profoundly inscrutable the Communist Party acts, paired with the jesting of the bed-listeners, it actually provides us ordinary people—whose lives are already bitter and hard—with some amusement. Sometimes, deconstructing seriousness with absurdity might genuinely be a good idea.

Of course, we still hope observers can penetrate the mist and clarify for us the movements closest to the truth among the intricate interpersonal relationships—for instance, will Xi Jinping step down? Who will succeed him? After all, the Communist Party’s hymns of praise have continuously sung, “Let me tell the future, China is running a relay race.” A despotic careerist as powerful as Xi Jinping will eventually have a day when he grows old; no one wishes for him to keep running on the track until the end of his life—at the very least, that is not humane enough.

In my view, people’s urgent mood when discussing Xi Jinping’s retirement nowadays is understandable. However, looking at it at a glance, the existing Politburo lineup actually does not possess a successor. This means that at next year’s 21st National Congress, the possibility of Xi Jinping handing over the baton will not exist. Even if you are unwilling, when the time comes, at the press conference introducing the new Standing Committee members elected by the 1st Plenary Session of the 21st Central Committee, Xi Jinping will still utter that phrase: “The Plenary Session has elected me to continue serving as the General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee.” Turning into the next year, he will continue to assemble his full “trinity” of titles.

In reality, this is not difficult to understand. The structural framework of the Politburo lineup lacks potential candidates for succession, combined with the fact that the institutional obstacles brought about by constitutional amendment have already been cleared. Since he has already borne eternal infamy, there is little difference between serving one more term or two more terms; Xi Jinping has no reason not to continue his “one-man show.” At least, until “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era” can only continue to be “characteristic” and cannot evolve into “Xi Jinping Thought,” the possibility of retirement likely does not exist.

Within the CCP, Xi Jinping is no longer an ordinary General Secretary, but an epoch-making absolute core. Taking CCP history as a reference: Mao Zedong established his core status by virtue of the Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party adopted on April 20, 1945, at the 7th Plenary Session of the 6th CPC Central Committee; Deng Xiaoping dominated and established his core status via the Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party Since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China adopted on June 27, 1981, at the 6th Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee; Xi Jinping created a “new era” by relying on the Resolution on the Major Achievements and Historical Experience of the Party’s Party-Wide Endeavors over the Past Century adopted on November 11, 2021, at the 6th Plenary Session of the 19th CPC Central Committee.

“Since the 18th National Congress” has become a fixed qualifier in CCP narrative, and Xi Jinping himself is the absolute core that needs to be anchored for the new era and new journey, as well as “the core of the Party Central Committee and the core status of the whole Party” that the entire Party must safeguard. Under a historical positioning that cannot be described as unprecedented, but is at least unrepeatable for posterity, who within the CCP would dare mention handing over the baton of succession, and who would dare mention the stepping down of the core?

Particularly against the background where “summarizing the achievements and experience of full and rigorous governance of the Party in the new era” has become an important agenda item for the upcoming 5th Plenary Session of the 20th CPC Central Committee, actively touching upon this topic is tantamount to suicide. Leaving aside whether Xi Jinping can retire or not for the moment, restless prospective successors would first be taken down under the banner of anti-corruption.

Some analyses believe that the upcoming Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Unswervingly Advancing the Full and Rigorous Governance of the Party on Major Issues, to be submitted to the 5th Plenary Session of the 20th CPC Central Committee for discussion, represents a final verdict on Xi Jinping’s governance achievements in the new era. In my view, this is actually not the case. This decision is more likely a booster to elevate Xi Jinping to a new historical positioning so that he can continue to govern and govern long-term. Otherwise, what would have been the significance of pushing through constitutional amendments back then against the public will and against intra-Party consensus?

In fact, long before the opening of the Xi Jinping New Era, Professor Ren Jiantao had predicted that a basic condition China was about to face was entering a lifeless period of twenty years. Because these two generations both came from Red Guard and Little Red Guard backgrounds, and the greatest characteristic of the Red Guards and Little Red Guards was a lack of rules. He stated that generations like those born in the 1950s and 1960s basically reached high school graduation under Mao Zedong’s dictatorship of the proletariat and under the education and influence of the theory of continued revolution. During their university years, they were basically restoring the authority of the Communist Party without having received genuine, rigorous modern knowledge training, making it very difficult for them to possess modern concepts. Consequently, they are unable to clearly distinguish between institutional authority and personal authority.

Without a doubt, Xi Jinping stepping down is certainly what the people desire. However, looking at it from the level predicted by Ren Jiantao, whether the future CCP General Secretary is Xi Jinping, Li Qiang, or someone else, the potential change to China’s future direction might not be all that worthy of anticipation. Rather than hoping for Xi Jinping to step down, it is better to hope for the Communist Party to collapse.

For thousands of years, our nation has been looking forward to an enlightened ruler every single moment, always believing that if a good emperor appears, everyone’s life will get better. Now, after a century of the republic, many people still hold this mindset. After the 1911 Revolution, China indeed no longer had an emperor, but after 1949, has this intra-party succession transfer system of the Communist Party advanced or changed compared to the hereditary imperial system? Perhaps a little bit, but not much.

Prior to Xi Jinping’s new era, we could still observe future trends in advance through the placement of crown princes. Arriving at Xi Jinping’s era, the CCP’s line of succession has been disrupted; crown princes no longer appear in public view, truly turning the Communist Party into a system of palace secrecy. If this continues, who knows—one day we might have to go back to looking behind the “Zheng Da Guang Ming” (Upright and Frank) plaque to find the secret edict to confirm the CCP successor.

Editor: Huang Jizhou Proofreader: Cheng Xiaoxiao Translator: Zhou Min