作者：冯仍

2026年10月29日，中共二十届五中全会在北京闭幕。新华社当天公布的会议公报，确认了中央政治局此前对33名高级官员作出的开除党籍处分决定，另外还有原国家金融监督管理总局局长李云泽被撤销党内职务。

看到这份名单，确实让人感到吃惊。33人中有16人来自军队系统，另外17人涉及中央部委、地方政府、金融监管部门、军工企业和高校。这些人不是普通干部，而是曾经掌握重要权力的高级官员，有中央政治局委员、中央军委副主席、中央军委委员，也有省委书记、部长和大型国企负责人。

军队系统被开除党籍的16人包括：张又侠、刘振立、王仁华、刘青松、黄铭、李桥铭、李伟、张红兵、汪海江、张林、王鹏、刘发庆、杨诚、钟绍军、赵晓哲、方永祥。

其他17人分别是：马兴瑞、蓝天立、刘建超、王莉霞、金壮龙、雷凡培、易会满、王祥喜、孙绍骋、费东斌、吴胜华、余剑锋、袁洁、张忠阳、温刚、金东寒、方红卫。

单从这份名单就可以看出，此次受到处分的官员涉及面之广、级别之高。特别是军队系统，原中央军委副主席张又侠、原中央军委委员刘振立，以及多个战区和军兵种的高级将领都在其中。这已经不仅是几名官员个人违纪的问题，而是整个干部选拔、管理和监督制度都值得重新审视。

习近平上台已经十四年了，反腐败几乎贯穿了他的整个执政时期。从最初的“老虎苍蝇一起打”，到后来不断强调全面从严治党，中共查处了一批又一批高级官员。周永康、徐才厚、郭伯雄等人倒下后，还有更多省部级官员和军队将领陆续被查处。如今又有33名高级官员的开除党籍处分集中得到确认。

这就不得不让人怀疑，中共反腐败搞了十多年，为什么高级官员还是接二连三地出问题？如果反腐真的取得了那么大的成效，为什么腐败问题似乎始终没有得到根本解决？

更值得追问的是，这些被查处的官员，当年又是谁提拔和重用的？

能够做到中央政治局委员、中央军委副主席、省委书记或者部长的人，不可能没有经过中共组织部门长期的考察和审核。他们的任命、晋升，也不可能脱离中共中央的干部管理制度。既然这些人能够一路升到如此高的位置，说明他们当年都曾经得到组织的信任和认可。可如今，他们又被同一个组织以严重违纪违法的名义清除出去。那么，当年负责选拔、考察和任命这些干部的人，是否也应该承担相应的责任？

如果只是把责任全部推到落马官员个人身上，而不检讨整个选拔和监督制度，那么今天查处了33人，将来还可能出现新的33人。

特别是在军队系统，情况更加令人关注。此次被开除党籍的16名军队高级官员，涉及中央军委、战区、军兵种和军事管理部门。军队向来强调绝对忠诚和严格的政治审查，能够进入如此重要岗位的将领，理应经过层层把关。可这些经过多年培养和选拔的高级将领，如今又集中受到处分，至少说明过去的干部管理和内部监督存在需要解释的问题。

外界当然会怀疑，这些处分背后究竟有多少属于腐败案件，又有多少涉及中共高层内部的权力矛盾。仅凭目前公开的公报，还无法对此作出确定判断。但正是因为案件涉及如此重要的政治和军事人物，公众才更有理由要求有关部门公布具体事实，而不是只看到一份处分名单。

中共长期强调党的领导和内部监督，认为依靠自身的纪律检查和政治整顿，就能够解决党内腐败问题。然而，权力越是集中，监督就越容易受到限制。特别是当干部的政治前途主要取决于上级领导和组织决定时，下级官员往往更重视对上负责，而不是对社会公众负责。

这种权力运行方式存在一个明显问题：上级可以监督下级，但谁来有效监督上级？当监督权、任免权和重大决策权高度集中时，又如何防止掌握这些权力的人滥用权力？

中共一直强调自我革命，但一个政党是否能够依靠内部监督有效解决腐败问题，不能只看它查处了多少人，更应该看它是否建立了能够长期约束权力的制度。如果监督主要依赖领导人的意志，那么即使不断更换官员，也不能保证类似问题不再发生。

此次五中全会公报还有一个值得注意的地方，就是只公布了33名官员被开除党籍的结果，并没有逐一公开这些人的具体违法事实和证据。外界知道他们被处分了，却不完全清楚每个人究竟犯了什么错误、造成了多大的损失，以及后续是否会受到刑事追究。

开除党籍是党内处分，并不等于法院已经作出刑事判决。对于涉嫌违法犯罪的官员，应该通过公开、公正的法律程序查明事实，依法追究责任。特别是这些曾经掌握重大公共权力的人，所涉及的案件很可能关系到公共资金、国家工程和行政决策，社会公众有权了解案件的真实情况。

反腐败当然是必要的，腐败官员也应当受到法律制裁。但反腐败不能成为一种只由掌权者决定调查谁、处分谁，而社会公众无法进行有效监督的权力运行方式。否则，反腐败本身也会面临缺乏外部监督的问题。

在一个正常的法治社会，无论官员的职位有多高，都应该接受法律、媒体和公众的监督。官员涉嫌违法，应当由司法机关依法调查和审判；媒体发现权力滥用，应当有权进行调查报道；普通公民对政府官员提出批评，也不应该因此受到打压。

而在中国现实的政治环境中，独立的新闻调查、民间监督和公众对高级官员的公开问责，仍然面临诸多限制。即使一些官员已经被查处，公众能够获得的案件信息也往往有限。这种监督上的不足，恰恰值得在每一次大规模反腐之后认真检讨。

习近平执政十多年来，一批又一批高级官员倒下，许多曾经受到重用的人最终成为被调查和处分的对象。中共可以将这些案件解释为反腐败取得的成果，但从另一个角度看，如此多的高级干部接连出现问题，同样反映出干部选拔、权力约束和监督制度存在不可忽视的缺陷。

如果反腐败十多年后，还需要不断通过大规模查处高级官员来整顿党政军系统，那么真正需要反思的，恐怕不只是这些官员个人有没有问题，而是整个制度为什么不断产生这样的问题。

今天公布的是33人的名单，过几年又会是多少人？难道中国的反腐败，就只能这样一轮又一轮地持续下去？

我认为，中国真正需要的不是永无止境的政治整顿，而是能够有效限制权力、保障司法公正、允许新闻自由调查和公民监督的政治制度。只有把权力关进制度的笼子，而不是让掌权者自己决定笼子的钥匙由谁保管，才有可能从根本上减少权力滥用和腐败。

33名高官被开除党籍，也许还会成为中共反腐败宣传中的一项成果，但这份名单同时留下了一个无法回避的问题：如果连中央政治局委员、中央军委副主席这样的高级官员都不断出现问题，那么究竟是谁在监督他们？又有谁能够监督那些掌握最高权力的人？

这个问题不解决，中国的反腐败即使再持续十年、二十年，恐怕仍然难以摆脱今天这样的局面。

2026年10月29日于美国洛杉矶

编辑：黄吉洲 校对：王滨 翻译：戈冰

参考资料

1. 新华社：《中国共产党第二十届中央委员会第五次全体会议公报》

2026年10月29日

https://www.xinhuanet.com/

公报全文：

https://www.12371.cn/2026/10/29/ARTI1793267034443539.shtml

2. 路透社：《China’s Communist Party confirms expulsion of 33 officials》

2026年10月29日

https://www.reuters.com/world/china/chinas-communist-party-confirms-expulsion-33-officials-2026-10-29/

3. 新加坡《联合早报》：《刘建超、金壮龙等33人被开除党籍 李云泽被撤销党内职务》

2026年10月29日

https://www.zaobao.com.sg/news/china/story20261029-9916157

4. 台湾中央社：《中共20届五中全会落幕 增选张升民任政治局委员》

2026年10月29日

https://www.cna.com.tw/news/acn/202610290320.aspx

Thirty-Three Senior Officials Expelled from the Party at the Fifth Plenary Session: What Has More Than a Decade of Anti-Corruption Really Yielded?

By Feng Reng

On October 29, 2026, the Fifth Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China concluded in Beijing. The meeting’s official communique, released by Xinhua News Agency on the same day, confirmed the decisions previously made by the Political Bureau of the Central Committee to expel 33 senior officials from the Party. Additionally, Li Yunze, former director of the National Financial Regulatory Administration, was removed from his inner-Party positions.

Seeing this list is indeed shocking. Among the 33 individuals, 16 hail from the military system, while the other 17 span central ministries and commissions, local governments, financial regulatory departments, defense industry enterprises, and higher education institutions. These individuals were no ordinary cadres, but senior officials who once held significant power—including members of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, vice chairmen of the Central Military Commission, members of the Central Military Commission, as well as provincial Party committee secretaries, ministers, and heads of major state-owned enterprises.

The 16 individuals from the military system expelled from the Party include: Zhang Youxia, Liu Zhenli, Wang Renhua, Liu Qingsong, Huang Ming, Li Qiaoming, Li Wei, Zhang Hongbing, Wang Haijiang, Zhang Lin, Wang Peng, Liu Faqing, Yang Cheng, Zhong Shaojun, Zhao Xiaozhe, and Fang Yongxiang.

The other 17 individuals are: Ma Xingrui, Lan Tianli, Liu Jianchao, Bu Xiaolin (Wang Lixia), Jin Zhuanglong, Lei Fanpei, Yi Huiman, Wang Xiangxi, Sun Shaocheng, Fei Dongbin, Wu Shenghua, Yu Jianfeng, Yuan Jie, Zhang Zhongyang, Wen Gang, Jin Donghan, and Fang Hongwei.

From this list alone, one can see the broad scope and high rank of the officials penalized this time. This is especially true of the military system, which includes Zhang Youxia, former vice chairman of the Central Military Commission; Liu Zhenli, former member of the Central Military Commission; as well as senior generals from multiple theater commands and military services/branches. This is no longer merely a matter of individual disciplinary violations by a few officials, but points to a whole system of cadre selection, management, and supervision that warrants a thorough re-examination.

Xi Jinping has been in power for fourteen years now, and anti-corruption has run through virtually his entire period of governance. From the initial “fighting tigers and flies together” to the subsequent and continuous emphasis on full and rigorous governance over the Party, the CPC has investigated and handled batch after batch of senior officials. After the downfalls of Zhou Yongkang, Xu Caihou, and Guo Boxiong, even more provincial- and ministerial-level officials as well as military generals were successively investigated and dealt with. Now, the expulsions of another 33 senior officials from the Party have been confirmed in one fell swoop.

This inevitably makes one wonder: after more than a decade of the CPC’s anti-corruption drive, why do high-ranking officials continue to fall into trouble one after another? If anti-corruption efforts have truly achieved such great success, why does the problem of corruption seem to have never been fundamentally resolved?

What warrants even deeper questioning is: who promoted and appointed these investigated officials back in the day?

Those who were able to rise to the positions of Political Bureau members of the Central Committee, vice chairmen of the Central Military Commission, provincial Party committee secretaries, or ministers could not have done so without long-term assessment and vetting by the Party’s organization departments. Their appointments and promotions could not have taken place outside the CPC Central Committee’s system of cadre management. Since these individuals were able to climb all the way to such high positions, it indicates that they once enjoyed the trust and approval of the Organization. Yet today, they have been purged by that very same Organization on the grounds of severe violations of discipline and law. In that case, should those who were responsible for selecting, assessing, and appointing these cadres back then also bear corresponding responsibility?

If responsibility is placed entirely on the fallen officials as individuals, without reflecting on the entire system of selection and supervision, then after handling 33 individuals today, another 33 may well emerge in the future.

The situation is particularly concerning in the military system. The 16 senior military officials expelled from the Party this time involve the Central Military Commission, theater commands, military services and branches, and military administration departments. The military has always emphasized absolute loyalty and strict political screening; generals who reached such pivotal posts ought to have passed through layers of checks. Yet these senior generals, cultivated and selected over many years, have now been penalized en masse—a fact that, at the very least, indicates issues within past cadre management and internal supervision that require an explanation.

The outside world will naturally wonder how much of what lies behind these penalties belongs to corruption cases, and how much involves internal power conflicts within the top leadership of the CPC. Based solely on the currently published communique, it is impossible to make a definitive judgment on this matter. However, precisely because these cases involve such major political and military figures, the public has all the more reason to demand that the relevant departments publish the concrete facts, rather than presenting merely a list of penalties.

The CPC has long emphasized the Party’s leadership and internal supervision, maintaining that relying on its own disciplinary inspection and political rectification is sufficient to resolve internal corruption. However, the more power is concentrated, the more easily supervision is restricted. Particularly when cadres’ political prospects depend primarily on superior leaders and organizational decisions, subordinate officials often prioritize being accountable to their superiors rather than to the general public.

There is an obvious flaw in this mechanism of power operation: superiors can supervise subordinates, but who effectively supervises the superiors? When supervisory authority, personnel appointment and dismissal rights, and major decision-making powers are highly centralized, how can the misuse of power by those who hold these authorities be prevented?

The CPC has consistently stressed self-reform, but whether a political party can effectively resolve corruption through internal supervision depends not merely on how many individuals it investigates and handles, but more importantly on whether it has established a system capable of constraining power over the long term. If supervision relies mainly on the personal will of top leaders, then even if officials are continually replaced, there is no guarantee that similar issues will not recur.

Another noteworthy aspect of this Fifth Plenary Session’s communique is that it only released the outcome of the 33 officials being expelled from the Party, without disclosing the specific facts of violations and evidence for each individual one by one. The outside world knows they have been penalized, yet lacks full clarity on what specific offenses each person committed, how much loss was incurred, and whether they will face subsequent criminal prosecution.

Expulsion from the Party is an intra-Party disciplinary measure, which is not equivalent to a criminal judgment delivered by a court. For officials suspected of violating laws and committing crimes, the facts should be established through transparent and impartial legal procedures, and accountability pursued in accordance with the law. Especially given that these individuals once exercised significant public power, the cases involved are highly likely tied to public funds, national key infrastructure projects, and administrative decisions; the general public has every right to know the true facts of these cases.

Anti-corruption is of course necessary, and corrupt officials ought to be punished in accordance with the law. However, anti-corruption must not become a mode of power operation in which those in power alone decide who to investigate and who to penalize, while the general public is unable to exercise effective supervision. Otherwise, the anti-corruption drive itself will face the problem of lacking external oversight.

In a normal rule-of-law society, no matter how high an official’s position may be, they should be subject to the supervision of the law, the media, and the public. When an official is suspected of breaking the law, judicial organs should investigate and try the case in accordance with the law; when the media uncovers an abuse of power, it should have the right to conduct investigative reporting; and when ordinary citizens criticize government officials, they should not face suppression as a result.

Yet in China’s actual political environment, independent investigative journalism, public supervision from civil society, and public accountability of high-ranking officials still face numerous restrictions. Even after certain officials have been investigated and handled, the information available to the public about their cases often remains limited. This deficit in supervision is precisely what warrants serious reflection after every large-scale anti-corruption drive.

During Xi Jinping’s more than a decade in power, batch after batch of senior officials have fallen, and many who were once heavily relied upon ultimately became the targets of investigation and disciplinary action. The CPC may explain these cases as achievements of the anti-corruption campaign, but viewed from another perspective, the fact that so many senior cadres have fallen into trouble one after another likewise reflects non-negligible flaws in the systems of cadre selection, power constraint, and supervision.

If, after more than a decade of anti-corruption efforts, it remains necessary to continually purge the Party, government, and military systems through large-scale investigations of senior officials, then what truly requires deep reflection is perhaps not merely whether these officials individually have issues, but why the system as a whole continually generates such issues.

Today, a list of 33 individuals was released; how many will it be a few years from now? Must China’s anti-corruption drive simply continue in this way, round after round?

I believe what China truly needs is not an endless cycle of political rectifications, but a political system capable of effectively constraining power, safeguarding judicial impartiality, and allowing free journalistic investigation as well as civic supervision. Only by truly confining power within the cage of the system—rather than letting those in power decide for themselves who keeps the key to that cage—will it be possible to fundamentally reduce power abuse and corruption.

The expulsion of 33 senior officials from the Party may well be framed as another achievement in the CPC’s anti-corruption propaganda. However, this list simultaneously leaves behind an unavoidable question: if even senior officials as high-ranking as members of the Central Political Bureau and vice chairmen of the Central Military Commission continually run into trouble, then who, after all, is supervising them? And who can supervise those holding the ultimate power?

Unless this question is resolved, even if China’s anti-corruption drive continues for another ten or twenty years, it will likely remain difficult to break free from the situation seen today.

October 29, 2026, Los Angeles, USA

Editor: Huang Jizhou Proofreader: Wang Bin Translator: Ge Bing

References

Xinhua News Agency: “Communique of the Fifth Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China” October 29, 2026 https://www.xinhuanet.com/ Full text of the Communique:https://www.12371.cn/2026/10/29/ARTI1793267034443539.shtml

Reuters: “China’s Communist Party confirms expulsion of 33 officials” October 29, 2026 https://www.reuters.com/world/china/chinas-communist-party-confirms-expulsion-33-officials-2026-10-29/

Lianhe Zaobao (Singapore): “33 Officials Including Liu Jianchao and Jin Zhuanglong Expelled from Party; Li Yunze Removed from Inner-Party Positions” October 29, 2026 https://www.zaobao.com.sg/news/china/story20261029-9916157

Central News Agency (Taiwan): “CPC 20th Central Committee Fifth Plenary Session Concludes; Zhang Shengmin Co-opted as Political Bureau Member” October 29, 2026 https://www.cna.com.tw/news/acn/202610290320.aspx