国安法之刀:先香港,后澳门

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两天之内,香港判了黄之锋,澳门判了区锦新

作者:刘叶梅

事情要连起来看,才看得明白。

11月5日,香港高等法院判黄之锋十年。罪名是串谋勾结外国势力危害国家安全。第二天,11月6日,澳门那边也判了一个人:前立法会议员区锦新,十二年六个月。

一个三十岁,一个六十九岁。一个在香港,一个在澳门。判决书一前一后,相隔只有一天。要说这是巧合,恐怕没人信。这更像是一个信号——这把刀,在香港用了六年,如今轮到澳门了。

黄之锋认了罪,还是判了十年

先说黄之锋这一宗。

他被指控的事情,发生在2020年7月1日到11月23日。说起来有点绕,其实内容很简单:他和已经流亡海外的罗冠聪等人一起,呼吁外国对中国和香港实施制裁。没有动刀动枪,没有伤人,没有什么秘密情报,就是公开喊话、游说、表态。放在很多地方,这叫政治表达;放在今天的香港,这叫勾结外国势力。

今年9月2日,他认了罪。按常理,认罪总该换一点宽大吧?结果呢,法官谭耀豪量刑的起点是十三年,认罪之后减到十年。而十年,恰好是国安法里“罪行重大”这一档的最低刑。也就是说,减无可减,法官给的已经是这一档里最轻的了——可还是整整十年。

更要命的是刑期怎么接。他从2020年11月被还押算起,已经在里面快六年了。初选案判的四年八个月,本来服到2027年1月就能出去,眼看只剩两个多月。可新判的十年,只有两个月零两天跟旧刑期重叠,剩下的要接着服完。这么一算,他得待到2036年底才能重获自由。那一年,他四十岁。

三十岁进去,四十岁出来。一个人的壮年,就这么交代在高墙里面了。

澳门这一刀,等了十七年

再看澳门。澳门的情况,其实更值得琢磨。

澳门的国家安全法,2009年就通过了,比香港早得多。可是通过之后,十七年,一次都没用过。澳门也因此落了个安稳的名声,常被拿来当“一国两制”的样板:你看,不抓人,不判刑,日子照样过。2023年,这部法律又修订了一次,罪名添了不少,口子开得更大。当时也有人担心,可澳门毕竟多年没动过这把刀,不少人觉得,修订也就是摆个样子。

现在,第一案来了,一出手就是十二年半。

区锦新这个人,在澳门政坛待了大半辈子,做立法会议员做了二十年。如今六十九岁了,判他的罪名有三项:颠覆国家政权、与境外组织保持联系危害国家安全,还有一项违反保密义务。刑期要到2038年1月29日才结束——到那时,他八十一岁。一个老人,这辈子还能不能走出监狱,谁也不敢说。

十七年不用的刀,第一次出鞘,就砍向一个在议会里坐了二十年的人。这说明什么?说明刀一直都在,只是以前没想用,或者说,没必要用。现在想用了,便是这个用法。

说到底,国安法已经沦为中国共产党惩处异议人士的工具。它收拾的不是什么危害安全的行为,而是立场——是那些敢批评、敢站在对立面的人的立场。

刀口对准的,一直是同一种人

把这两宗案子摆在一起,很多话就不用多说了。

黄之锋做过什么?呼吁制裁。区锦新做过什么?跟境外组织保持联系。一个在街头长大,一个在议会里老去,经历、年纪、做事的方式,没有一样相同。硬要找共同点,只有一个:他们都是当局眼里的异议人士,都是不听话的人。国安法惩罚一个人从来不是看他的行为有多危险,而是看这个人有多不顺眼。国际特赦组织这次的话说得很直白:国安法已沦为惩罚异议人士的工具。这话不是情绪话,是看着判决书说出来的。

还有刑期。呼吁几句,十年;联系往来,十二年半。这比不少伤人害命的案子判得都重。刑罚重到这个地步,图的就不是惩治已经发生的那点事了,图的是给旁人看:看清楚了,这就是说话的下场。说穿了,重判本身就是一种警告,警告所有还在观望的人。

香港人对这一套已经不陌生了。2020年6月30日国安法落地,六年下来,报纸关了,团体散了,初选案里四十五个人被判颠覆国家政权,黄之锋也在其中。当年有人说,这部法律只针对极少数人。六年过去,“极少数”已经数不过来了。如今澳门补上第一案,版图又拼上了一块:先香港,后澳门,路数一模一样,只是时间早晚。

判决出来之后,外面的反应不小。人权观察说黄之锋这一判“残酷且不公正”;11月6日,欧盟和美国、英国、澳大利亚、加拿大等十国发表联合声明,公开谴责。香港政府的回应还是那四个字:铁证如山。

铁证如山。这四个字,这些年听得太多了。证据到底在哪里,普通人看不到卷宗,也无从判断;能看到的,只有结果——一个三十岁的人要坐到四十岁,一个六十九岁的人要坐到八十一岁。

刀还在往下落。香港落完,澳门落。下一个地方、下一个名字会是谁,现在没人知道。只是照这个势头看,名单恐怕只会越来越长。编辑:周志刚 校对:王滨 翻译:戈冰

The Sword of the National Security Law: First Hong Kong, Then Macau

Within Two Days, Hong Kong Sentences Joshua Wong, and Macau Sentences Au Kam-san

By Liu Yemei

Abstract: Joshua Wong and Au Kam-san have been sentenced to prison in succession. The National Security Laws in Hong Kong and Macau have been further implemented, the space for political expression in the Hong Kong and Macau regions continues to shrink, and freedom of speech remains continuously suppressed.

Things must be viewed together to be truly understood.

On November 5, the High Court of Hong Kong sentenced Joshua Wong to ten years. The charge was conspiracy to collude with foreign forces to endanger national security. The next day, on November 6, over in Macau, another person was sentenced: former Legislative Assembly member Au Kam-san, to twelve years and six months.

One is thirty years old, the other sixty-nine. One is in Hong Kong, the other in Macau. The judgments came one after the other, separated by only a single day. To say this is a coincidence, I am afraid nobody would believe it. This looks more like a signal—this sword, having been wielded in Hong Kong for six years, has now reached Macau’s turn.

Joshua Wong Pleaded Guilty, Yet Was Still Sentenced to Ten Years

Let us start with Joshua Wong’s case.

The acts he was charged with occurred between July 1 and November 23, 2020. Put into words, it sounds a bit convoluted, yet the substance is actually quite simple: together with Nathan Law and others who had already fled into exile overseas, he called upon foreign countries to impose sanctions on China and Hong Kong. No knives or guns were drawn, no one was injured, and there was no secret intelligence involved—it was simply speaking out publicly, lobbying, and stating a political stance. In many places, this is called political expression; in today’s Hong Kong, it is called collusion with foreign forces.

On September 2 of this year, he pleaded guilty. By common logic, a guilty plea ought to buy at least a measure of leniency, right? And the result? Judge Johnny Tam Yiu-ho set the starting point for sentencing at thirteen years, reducing it to ten years after the guilty plea. Ten years, as it happens, is the statutory minimum sentence under the “grave offense” tier of the National Security Law. In other words, there was no room left to reduce it further; what the judge handed down was already the lightest sentence available within that tier—yet it was still ten full years.

Even worse is how the sentences are stacked. Counting from his remand in November 2020, he has already spent nearly six years behind bars. For the four-year-and-eight-month sentence handed down in the primary election case, he was originally set to be released in January 2027, with barely more than two months left to serve. However, of the newly imposed ten-year sentence, only two months and two days run concurrently with the previous term; the remainder must be served consecutively. Calculated this way, he will have to remain inside until the end of 2036 before regaining his freedom. In that year, he will be forty years old.

Going in at thirty, coming out at forty. The prime of a person’s life is spent away just like that behind high prison walls.

This Strike in Macau Waited Seventeen Years

Now let us look at Macau. The situation in Macau is, in fact, even more worth pondering.

Macau’s National Security Law was passed back in 2009, much earlier than Hong Kong’s. Yet after its passage, for seventeen years, it was never used even once. Macau thus earned a reputation for stability and was frequently held up as a model of “One Country, Two Systems”: look, nobody gets arrested, nobody gets sentenced, and life goes on as usual. In 2023, this law was amended once again, with numerous charges added and the legal net cast even wider. At the time, some people did worry, yet given that Macau had not wielded this sword for so many years, many felt the amendments were merely for show.

Now, the very first case has arrived, and the very first strike is twelve and a half years.

Au Kam-san is someone who has spent most of his life in Macau’s political arena, serving as a member of the Legislative Assembly for twenty years. Now sixty-nine years old, he was convicted on three counts: subversion of state power, maintaining ties with overseas organizations to endanger national security, and a further count of violating confidentiality obligations. His sentence will not end until January 29, 2038—by which time he will be eighty-one years old. Whether an elderly man will ever walk out of prison alive in this lifetime, nobody dares to say.

A sword left unused for seventeen years, drawn from its sheath for the very first time, strikes straight at a man who sat in the legislature for twenty years. What does this show? It shows the sword was always there—it simply had not been used before, or rather, there had been no need to use it. Now that they want to use it, this is how it is used.

When it comes down to it, the National Security Law has degenerated into a tool for the Chinese Communist Party to punish dissidents. What it cracks down on is not acts that genuinely endanger security, but political stances—the stances of those who dare to criticize and dare to stand on the opposing side.

The Blade Has Always Been Aimed at the Same Kind of People

When these two cases are placed side by side, little else needs to be said.

What did Joshua Wong do? He called for sanctions. What did Au Kam-san do? He maintained ties with overseas organizations. One grew up on the streets, while the other grew old inside the legislature; their life experiences, ages, and ways of doing things share not a single similarity. If one were forced to find a common denominator, there is only one: in the eyes of the authorities, both are dissidents, and both are people who refuse to obey. When the National Security Law punishes someone, it has never been about how dangerous their actions are, but rather how much of an eyesore that person is to the regime. Amnesty International put it bluntly this time: the National Security Law has become a tool for punishing dissidents. Those words were not spoken out of emotion, but after looking directly at the court verdicts.

And then there are the prison terms. A few public appeals: ten years; maintaining contact and exchanges: twelve and a half years. These sentences are harsher than those handed down in many cases involving bodily harm or the taking of human life. When punishments reach such severity, the aim is no longer merely to penalize the minor acts that have already occurred, but to make an example for bystanders to see: look closely, this is the fate that awaits those who speak out. To put it plainly, heavy sentencing itself serves as a warning—a warning to everyone still watching from the sidelines.

Hong Kongers are already no strangers to this playbook. Since the National Security Law came into force on June 30, 2020, over the past six years, newspapers have been shut down, civic groups have disbanded, and forty-five individuals in the primary election case were convicted of subversion of state power, Joshua Wong among them. Back then, some claimed this law targeted only a tiny minority. Six years on, that “tiny minority” has grown beyond counting. Now, with Macau adding its very first case, another piece of the puzzle has fallen into place: first Hong Kong, then Macau—the exact same modus operandi, differing only in timing.

Following the verdicts, the reaction from the outside world was considerable. Human Rights Watch called Joshua Wong’s sentence “cruel and unjust”; on November 6, the European Union along with ten countries—including the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, and Canada—issued a joint statement publicly condemning it. The Hong Kong government’s response remained the same four-character phrase: “irrefutable evidence.”

“Irrefutable evidence.” We have heard those four characters far too often in recent years. Where that evidence actually lies, ordinary people cannot see in the case files, nor do they have any way to judge; all that can be seen is the outcome—a thirty-year-old man locked away until he is forty, and a sixty-nine-year-old man locked away until he is eighty-one.

The blade is still falling. Having fallen on Hong Kong, it now falls on Macau. Who the next place and the next name will be, nobody knows for now. Yet judging by this momentum, I am afraid the list will only grow longer and longer.

Editor: Zhou Zhigang Proofreader: Wang Bin Translator: Ge Bing

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