大树已经朽了,为什么还不倒?(上)

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笔杆子撑着的帝国老树

作者:王立君

一棵老树,树干空了,根也烂了,远远看去却还站着。人们就问:都朽成这样了,为什么还不倒?

要回答这个问题,得先看看,树身四周还有什么在撑着。

中共维持统治,靠枪杆子,靠刀把子,也靠笔杆子。强制力量使人不敢反抗,宣传机器则替权力解释现实,决定哪些事情让人知道,哪些事情不让人知道。出了问题,它还能安排一套说法,使人把愤怒投向别处。

我越来越觉得,在日常维持统治这件事上,笔杆子的作用往往比枪杆子更深。枪能让人害怕,却未必让人心服;宣传一旦进入人的头脑,人便可能把权力灌输的说法,当成自己得出的结论。

这一点,我自己就经历过。

一. 我也说过文化大革命就是好

文化大革命把中国人害得那么凄惨,可我们当时被洗脑了。我不过十一二岁、十三四岁的年纪,也还要说:“文化大革命就是好,就是好。”

这不是我今天拿来批评别人的一句话。我自己说过,还上台讲过。

在《我的文革十年》中,我记下了那段经历。学校出了演讲题目,我不会写,就到图书馆找报纸,把人造卫星上天、万吨巨轮下水、原子弹、氢弹和粮食产量等消息往稿子里抄。稿子后来被选上,我代表学校到厂区各处巡回演讲,还有车接送。

那些建设成就当然可以逐项讨论。但把报纸上的成就抄在一起,就能证明文化大革命是好的吗?学校停课、正常教学被打断,孩子们把批判稿当作业,这些损失又算在谁的账上?

同一段少年岁月里,我还见过邻居赵老太太胸前挂着写有“黑五类”的白布,后来戴着高帽挨批斗。她究竟做过什么坏事,我不知道。当时大人说她坏,我们就信她坏,围着看热闹。一个活生生的人,先被几句话定了性,孩子们便不再觉得她值得同情。

今天回头看,我最难受的是,自己生活在那场运动造成的伤害里,却还在替它说好话。我不能只写别人受了蒙骗,把当年站在台上的自己删掉。

笔杆子的力量有多大?它能教一个孩子怎样赞美一场正在耽误自己、伤害他人的运动。等他长大,才可能慢慢明白,当年背熟的道理,与自己真正经历的日子,原来隔着那么远。

二. 父亲讲过的土改造假

父亲年轻时参军,也参加过东北农村的土改工作队。后来,他给我讲过一些与宣传很不一样的往事。

按父亲的讲述,有些村子里,人们沾亲带故,并没有宣传中那样现成的、势不两立的对抗。工作队发动不起来,就要设法制造对立。把村里的大户人家定成斗争对象,再编造罪名、煽起仇怨。原本不该被划成地主的,硬给他戴上地主的帽子;没有杀过人的,也可以被说成杀人犯。

父亲还讲过杀人以后嫁祸于人、挑起村落之间仇怨的做法。人们怕遭报复,又被要求拿起武器,保卫分到手的土地。到了这一步,造谣、嫁祸和政治动员便连在了一起。他讲到这些事时说,造假的事情太多了。

这些不是我的亲眼所见,是父亲当年讲给我的往事。但土改中的错划与滥杀,也并非只见于私人回忆。毛泽东1948年在晋绥干部会议上的讲话,谈到当地曾把许多劳动者错误地划入地主、富农之列,也承认有人被不必要地处死,另有劳动人民遭到借机报复者杀害。

我想追问的是,普通人怎样会参与这种伤害?一个原来熟悉的邻人,一旦被说成穷凶极恶的敌人,旁人便可能觉得,对他再狠一点也是应该的。无辜的家庭惨遭伤害,一些被蒙蔽的普通百姓,也一步步被推到了施暴者的位置。

制造敌人、煽起仇恨,再给伤害人的行为安排一个正当的名义,这正是我所警惕的统治手段。笔杆子写出的罪名,传到群众中间,可能就变成挥向一个人的拳头。

三. 从组织群众到安排记忆

这种力量并非偶然形成。列宁早在1901年的《从何着手?》中,就把报纸看作宣传、鼓动和组织政治力量的工具。文章把分散的人联系起来,也使他们用同一套语言理解局势。对争取政权的人来说,报刊本来就是政治行动的一部分。

到了斯大林时期,连照片里的历史也可以修改。1937年,叶若夫曾与斯大林等人在莫斯科运河边合影。后来叶若夫失势,他的身影便从照片中被抹去。纽约大都会艺术博物馆的摄影展曾并列展示两个版本,一个有人,一个没人。

权力处置了这个人,还要改掉人们能够看见的记录。假如原始照片没有保存下来,后来的人凭什么知道,画面曾经被动过手脚?

中国的“大跃进”又让人看见,文字怎样给荒唐的数字盖上权威的印章。1958年8月13日,《人民日报》头版报道湖北麻城的早稻“天下第一田”,声称亩产干谷36956斤,还列出了省、专区、县三级验收的过程。

数字精确到个位,验收层级一应俱全。普通读者面对的,已经是一份由官方确认、由大报刊登的“事实”。报纸上的数字可以越写越高,田里却不会因此多长出一粒粮食。

更严重的是,宣传还会反过来影响决策。上面盼着听到好消息,下面就争着报喜;报上来的成绩,又被用来证明原来的判断正确。到这一步,承认困难反而可能成为政治上的麻烦。事实越难进入汇报,错误就越难纠正。

四. 高学历为什么挡不住宣传

如果说孩子年幼,容易受到灌输,那么,受过高等教育的成年人呢?这也是我一直想不通的地方。

我的大学同学都是受过高等教育的人,也都或多或少赶上过文革末期。几十年过去,有人当过局长、处长,有人在大学做博士生导师。论学历,他们不低;论阅历,也亲身走过了那个年代。照说,对政治运动怎样伤害人,对这个社会怎样运转,应该已有相当清楚的认识。

可从交谈中,我感觉到,他们当中绝大多数仍然拥护这套在我看来已经腐朽的制度。我甚至忍不住感叹,怎么像有“百分之九十九”的人还在拥护?这是熟人交谈给我的强烈感受,并非统计数字。

尤其让我吃惊的是,有些人的认同,听起来并不是场面上的敷衍。我能感觉到,他们是真心拥护,觉得这套制度有道理。经历过文革末期,后来又成了高级知识分子,却仍然接受那套解释,这让我更加看见笔杆子的厉害。

当然,真心认同与为了过关而表态,是两回事。我在已发表的《当谎言成为国策,告密成为制度》和《从“懂法”到深渊》中,写过八九年学校要求人人表态、我的话被记下上报的经历。那种场合,会让人先掂量说话的后果,公开的拥护未必就是真心。

而同学们的交谈又让我看见另一层问题:专业上的知识,并不自动带来对政治叙述的独立判断。一个人能指导博士、管理一个部门,却可能从未认真核对自己接受了几十年的那套说法。童年学会的解释,后来又不断得到报纸、电视和周围人的重复,便越来越像不需要证明的常识。

宣传能使人违心附和,也能使一些有知识、有阅历的人由衷认同。要理解这棵朽树为什么还站着,这两种作用都不能忽略。

五. 平台多了声音未必多

如今,传播工具比我少年时多得多。报纸、小喇叭之外,又有电视、电脑和手机。一个人每天看见的消息,过去几天也未必看得完。但消息多,并不等于能够接触到的事实更完整。

同一种说法在不同平台上反复出现,看起来像许多来源相互印证,实际可能只是同一口径被转发了许多遍。另一面的材料如果难以找到,原本可供比较的问题,就会变成只有一种答案的常识。

我在《有形的墙倒了,无形的墙还在》中谈过网络封锁与信息审查。墙的作用,也包括使人难以接触、核对不同的叙述。一个人当然可能真诚地相信自己看到的东西;可如果他看到的材料事先经过了筛选,真诚也不能保证判断准确。

还有一种更省力的办法,是替人规定追问的终点。成绩可以归于领导,问题却常被解释为基层没有执行好、个别干部出了毛病。人们可以骂某个办事人员,却不容易继续问:政策由谁制定?这样的权力怎样受到约束?出了问题,谁有能力把它纠正?

把政党与国家捆在一起,也有同样的作用。批评一项政策,还没有讨论到事实,先被问是不是爱国;追究一次失误,还没有说清责任,先被怀疑是不是另有目的。提出问题的人忙着证明自己,原来的问题就被挤到了一边。

久而久之,人们学会先辨认立场,再判断是非;先问这话能不能说,再问这话对不对。宣传走到这一步,已经影响了人们思考问题的习惯。

六. 看清朽树周围的支架

说宣传机器强大,是要正视它实际起过的作用。我们不能因为看见腐败、听见怨言,就以为一个政权已经失去了全部支撑。树朽了,与树倒了,中间还隔着那些支架怎样继续承重的过程。

笔杆子就是其中一根。它能把服从解释成忠诚,把伤害包装成必要的代价,也能在事后把不利的记忆渐渐移出人们的视线。强制力量站在它背后,使另一种声音承担风险;它又替强制力量安排理由,让旁观者觉得那些受到惩罚的人本来就不该开口。

我少年时说过“文化大革命就是好”。几十年后,我把这段经历写出来,就是要留下一个可以对照的见证:一个孩子怎样学会了那些话,又怎样在长大以后,重新认识自己经历过的年代。

朽树还站着,不能据此证明它没有朽;宣传仍然响亮,也不能替它遮住已经发生的苦难。那些被耽误的岁月、被羞辱的人,应当与当年的赞歌放在一起,让后来的人自己判断。

看清笔杆子的作用,再往前追问,就会碰到具体的人:谁在相信,谁在附和,谁明知有问题仍愿意替它撑着?这也正是从宣传走向人心时,绕不开的问题。

王立君,独立记者、自由撰稿人。曾在大学任教,高级工程师职称。因支持1989年学生民主运动被捕入狱,狱中遭受酷刑。此后信仰基督教,立足亲身经历写作,揭露教育腐败、司法不公、权力滥用与宗教迫害,呼吁社会正义、法治与人的尊严。作品发表于《北京之春》《在野党》《大纪元》《希望之声》等媒体。

编辑:钟然 校对:王滨 翻译:戈冰

The Old Tree Is Already Rotten—Why Hasn’t It Fallen Yet? (Part I)

An Ancient Imperial Tree Propped Up by the Pen

By Wang Lijun

Abstract: By fabricating lies, manipulating information, falsifying history, and shaping collective memory, the propaganda apparatus influences public perception, enabling an internally rotten regime to cling to power.

An old tree—its trunk hollowed out, its roots decayed—still appears to be standing from afar. People ask: It has rotted to this extent; why hasn’t it fallen yet?

To answer this question, one must first look at what is still propping up the trunk from all sides.

The Chinese Communist Party maintains its rule by relying on the barrel of a gun, the handle of a knife, and the barrel of a pen. Coercive force makes people dare not resist, while the propaganda apparatus interprets reality on behalf of power, deciding what people are allowed to know and what they are kept from knowing. When things go wrong, it can also orchestrate a narrative that redirects public anger elsewhere.

I increasingly feel that when it comes to the day-to-day maintenance of rule, the role of the pen often runs deeper than that of the gun. Guns can make people afraid, yet they do not necessarily win genuine submission; once propaganda enters people’s minds, they may mistake the narratives indoctrinated by power for conclusions they reached on their own.

This is something I have experienced firsthand.

I. I, Too, Once Said, “The Cultural Revolution Is Just Great”

The Cultural Revolution inflicted such misery on the Chinese people, yet we were brainwashed at the time. At the tender age of just eleven or twelve, thirteen or fourteen, I still had to chant: “The Cultural Revolution is just great, just great.”

This is not a line I bring up today merely to criticize others. I said it myself, and I even went up on stage to deliver speeches about it.

In My Ten Years of the Cultural Revolution, I recorded that experience. The school assigned an essay topic for a speech, and not knowing how to write it, I went to the library to dig through newspapers, copying reports about artificial satellites launching into space, 10,000-ton ocean liners setting sail, atomic bombs, hydrogen bombs, and grain harvests into my draft. My speech was later selected, and I represented the school on a speaking tour across various factory districts, complete with a car to pick me up and drop me off.

Those construction achievements can certainly be discussed item by item. But can copying achievements from newspapers together prove that the Cultural Revolution was good? Schools suspending classes, normal teaching being interrupted, and children treating critique drafts as homework—to whose account should these losses be charged?

During that same period of my youth, I also witnessed our neighbor, Old Mrs. Zhao, with a white cloth hanging across her chest bearing the words “Black Five Categories,” and later being subjected to public struggle while wearing a tall dunce cap. What bad deeds she had actually committed, I did not know. At the time, when the adults said she was bad, we believed she was bad, and gathered around to watch the spectacle. Once a living, breathing person was defined by just a few sentences, children no longer felt she deserved any sympathy.

Looking back today, what distresses me the most is that I lived amidst the trauma inflicted by that movement, yet still spoke well of it. I cannot simply write about how others were hoodwinked while erasing my former self who stood upon that stage.

Just how great is the power of the pen? It can teach a child how to praise a movement that is ruining his own life and harming others. Only after growing up does he slowly come to realize how vast a distance lies between the doctrines he memorized by heart back then and the days he actually lived through.

II. The Fabrications of Land Reform Recounted by My Father

When my father was young, he enlisted in the army and participated in a land reform work team in the rural Northeast. Later on, he recounted to me past events that were vastly different from official propaganda.

According to my father’s account, in some villages people were connected by ties of kinship and affinity, lacking the ready-made, irreconcilable antagonism depicted in propaganda. When the work team could not mobilize the masses, they had to resort to manufacturing opposition. They designated prominent, wealthy families in the village as targets of struggle, then fabricated charges and stirred up hatred and resentment. Those who originally should not have been classified as landlords were forcibly slapped with the label of landlord; those who had never killed anyone could likewise be labeled as murderers.

Father also spoke of practices such as committing murders and then framing others, thereby provoking animosity and vendettas between villages. Fearing retaliation, people were once again called upon to take up arms to defend the land allocated to them. At this stage, rumor-mongering, framing, and political mobilization became intertwined. When speaking of these matters, he remarked that there were simply far too many instances of fabrication.

These were not things I witnessed with my own eyes, but past events recounted to me by my father back then. However, the misclassification and indiscriminate killings during land reform are not found solely in private memoirs. In Mao Zedong’s 1948 speech at the conference of cadres in the Jin-Sui base area, he discussed how many laborers had been erroneously categorized as landlords and rich peasants locally, and acknowledged that some people had been executed unnecessarily, while other working people were killed by those taking advantage of the situation for retaliation.

What I wish to probe further is: how do ordinary people come to participate in such harm? Once a formerly familiar neighbor is labeled as a vicious and heinous enemy, bystanders may feel that treating them even more harshly is entirely justified. Innocent families suffer tragic persecution, while ordinary people who have been hoodwinked are pushed step by step into the position of perpetrators.

Manufacturing enemies, inciting hatred, and then furnishing a righteous pretext for acts of harm—this is precisely the means of rule that I guard against. Charges written by the pen, once disseminated among the masses, can transform into a clenched fist swung at an individual.

III. From Organizing the Masses to Arranging Memory

This power did not form by accident. As early as 1901, in Where to Begin?, Lenin viewed the newspaper as an instrument for propaganda, agitation, and organizing political forces. Articles linked scattered individuals together and also led them to understand the situation using the same set of terminology. For those striving for political power, the press was inherently an integral part of political action.

By the Stalin era, even history captured within photographs could be altered. In 1937, Nikolai Yezhov had once posed for a group photograph alongside Stalin and others by the Moscow Canal. Later, after Yezhov fell from power, his figure was erased from the photograph. A photography exhibition at the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York once displayed the two versions side by side—one with the man present, and one with him gone.

Power disposed of the man, and still felt compelled to alter the records people could see. Had the original photograph not been preserved, on what basis could later generations know that the image had been tampered with?

China’s “Great Leap Forward” further demonstrated how the written word stamps an authoritative seal onto absurd figures. On August 13, 1958, the front page of the People’s Daily reported on the “Number One Field Under Heaven” for early rice in Macheng, Hubei, claiming a dry grain yield of 36,956 jin per mu, and even listed the verification and acceptance procedures conducted across three administrative levels: the province, the prefecture, and the county.

The figures were precise down to the single digit, and every tier of official verification was accounted for. What the ordinary reader confronted was already a “fact” officially confirmed and published by a major state newspaper. The numbers printed in the papers could climb higher and higher, yet not a single extra grain of food would grow in the fields as a result.

More seriously, propaganda also feeds back into decision-making. Those at the top longed to hear good news, so those below competed to report successes; the achievements reported upward were then used to prove that the original judgments had been correct. By this stage, admitting difficulties could instead become a political liability. The harder it became for facts to enter official reports, the harder it was to correct mistakes.

IV. Why Higher Education Cannot Ward Off Propaganda

If one argues that children are young and therefore easily indoctrinated, what about adults who have received a higher education? This, too, is something I have never been able to fathom.

My university classmates are all people with higher education, and all of them, to varying degrees, experienced the final years of the Cultural Revolution. Decades have passed; some have served as bureau directors or division chiefs, while others work as doctoral advisors at universities. In terms of academic credentials, theirs are not low; in terms of life experience, they personally lived through that era. By all logic, they ought to possess a fairly clear understanding of how political campaigns harm people and how this society actually operates.

Yet from our conversations, I sensed that the overwhelming majority of them still uphold this system, which in my eyes has already rotted through. I could not even help sighing in dismay: why does it seem as though “ninety-nine percent” of people are still supporting it? This is a strong impression left on me by conversations with acquaintances, not a statistical figure.

What particularly astonished me is that the agreement expressed by some of them did not sound like mere lip service for appearances’ sake. I could tell they genuinely supported it and believed this system made sense. Having lived through the tail end of the Cultural Revolution and later becoming senior intellectuals, yet still accepting that official narrative—this made me see all the more clearly just how formidable the power of the pen truly is.

Of course, genuine identification and declaring a political stance merely to pass an ordeal are two different things. In my previously published essays, When Lies Become National Policy and Informers Become an Institution and From “Understanding the Law” to the Abyss, I wrote about my experience in 1989 when the school required everyone to state their political stance, and my words were recorded and reported upward. Situations like that force people to weigh the consequences of speaking before uttering a word; public expressions of support are not necessarily sincere.

Yet conversations with my classmates also revealed another layer of the problem: specialized professional knowledge does not automatically bring about independent judgment regarding political narratives. A person can supervise doctoral students or manage a government department, yet may never have seriously fact-checked the set of explanations they have accepted for decades. Explanations learned in childhood, subsequently repeated endlessly by newspapers, television, and the people around them, increasingly come to resemble self-evident common sense requiring no proof.

Propaganda can compel people to chime in against their conscience, and it can also make some knowledgeable, experienced individuals sincerely identify with it. To understand why this rotten tree is still standing, neither of these two effects can be overlooked.

V. More Platforms Do Not Necessarily Mean More Voices

Today, the tools of communication are far more numerous than in my youth. Beyond newspapers and village loudspeakers, there are now televisions, computers, and mobile phones. The sheer volume of news a person sees in a single day could not have been finished even in several days in the past. Yet an abundance of information does not equate to having access to more complete facts.

When the exact same narrative appears repeatedly across different platforms, it looks as though multiple sources are corroborating one another, when in reality it may simply be the same official line reposted countless times. If materials presenting the other side are difficult to find, questions that originally allowed for comparison turn into common sense with only one single answer.

In The Tangible Wall Has Fallen, the Invisible Wall Remains, I discussed internet blockades and information censorship. The function of the wall also includes making it difficult for people to access and cross-check differing narratives. A person may certainly believe sincerely in what they see; however, if the materials they see have been pre-screened beforehand, sincerity cannot guarantee accurate judgment either.

There is an even more effortless method: prescribing the endpoint of inquiry on people’s behalf. Achievements can be credited to the leadership, whereas problems are routinely explained away as poor implementation at the grassroots level or individual cadres going astray. People are permitted to curse a particular functionary, yet it is not easy for them to press further and ask: Who formulated the policy? How is such power constrained? And when things go wrong, who has the capacity to correct them?

Binding the political party together with the nation serves the exact same function. When criticizing a policy, before the facts are even discussed, one is first asked whether one is patriotic; when investigating a blunder, before responsibility is even clarified, one is first suspected of harboring ulterior motives. Those who raise questions become busy proving their own innocence, and the original issue is pushed aside.

Over time, people learn to identify political stance first before judging right from wrong; to ask first whether something is permissible to say before asking whether it is true. When propaganda reaches this stage, it has already reshaped the very habits of how people think.

VI. Seeing Clearly the Props Surrounding the Rotten Tree

To say that the propaganda apparatus is powerful is to face squarely the actual role it has played. We cannot assume that a regime has lost all support simply because we see corruption and hear grievances. Between a tree rotting and a tree falling lies the ongoing process of how those surrounding props continue to bear its weight.

The barrel of the pen is one such prop. It can interpret obedience as loyalty, package harm as a necessary price to pay, and afterward gradually remove unfavorable memories from people’s sight. Coercive force stands behind it, ensuring that alternative voices carry risk; in turn, the pen furnishes justifications for coercive force, making bystanders feel that those who were punished should never have spoken up in the first place.

In my youth, I said, “The Cultural Revolution is just great.” Decades later, I am writing down this experience precisely to leave behind a testimony for comparison: how a child learned those words, and how, after growing up, he came to re-examine the era he had lived through.

The rotten tree is still standing, but that does not prove it is not rotten; nor can the propaganda, loud as it still is, cover up the sufferings that have already taken place. Those delayed years and humiliated people ought to be placed side by side with the paeans of that era, allowing future generations to judge for themselves.

Once we see clearly the role of the pen and pursue the inquiry further, we encounter specific individuals: Who is believing? Who is chiming in? Who, knowing full well there are problems, is still willing to prop it up? This is precisely the inescapable question when moving from propaganda to the human heart.

Wang Lijun is an independent journalist and freelance writer. He formerly taught at a university and holds the professional title of senior engineer. Because of his support for the 1989 student democratic movement, he was arrested and imprisoned, enduring torture while incarcerated. Afterward, he converted to Christianity. Writing from his personal experiences, he exposes educational corruption, judicial injustice, abuse of power, and religious persecution, while calling for social justice, the rule of law, and human dignity. His works have been published in media outlets such as Beijing Spring, The Opposition Party, The Epoch Times, and Sound of Hope.

Editor: Zhong Ran Proofreader: Wang Bin Translator: Ge Bing

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