作者：陀先润
编辑：周志刚 责任编辑：罗志飞 校对：林小龙 翻译：彭小梅
随着中共20届四中全会的临近，各种传闻和谣言如潮水般涌来。从所谓“元老PK”到“政变在即”，这些故事在海外自媒体和社交平台上流传甚广。然而，我认为这些传闻大多缺乏事实基础，甚至违背基本的政治逻辑。本文旨在剖析这些谣言的荒谬之处，并揭示中共体制的深层问题——不是某个领导人的个人作风，而是整个政党的本质缺陷。
四中全会原定于去年召开，却被推迟至今年。这本是中共一贯的“宁缺毋滥”作风：如果党内共识未成，或领导层感到形势不稳，便宁可不开。回顾历史，毛泽东时代曾数年不开党代会；习近平去年也以此拖延。早在7月30日，新华社就发布了会议消息，内容与当前基本一致，这表明早在7月前，党内各派已达成相对平衡。会议定于10月20日至23日举行，主要议题未变，何来“剧变”一说？
然而，谣言却将此描绘成一场“黑手党式”对决：元老们与习近平在会上“投票拉锯”，开会前各方拉拢势力、比拼票数，甚至有人“犹豫不决”。这完全是西方式民主幻想的投射，与中共的运作模式格格不入。中央委员的投票并非随意，每一票背后牵扯利益网络和权力平衡。这种“拍桌子瞪眼”的场景，更像是意大利黑帮电影，而非北京中南海的现实。
更耸人听闻的是“政变”谣言。传闻称汪洋或胡春华将上位，借助军方力量：张又侠“反水”，刘源“回归”，掌控军队，将习近平软禁。四中全会仅剩“宣布喜讯”——习近平只剩国家主席虚衔，至明年结束。
这些说法忽略了政变的本质：在任期未满时推翻总书记、军委主席和国家元首，在任何体制下均属政变。中共历史上确有先例：1976年逮捕“四人帮”、胡耀邦下台、赵紫阳事件。但每次政变均为控制当事人后立即宣布，并召开特别会议确认合法性。拖延数月至十月再宣？这是“夜长梦多”的自杀行为，历史上鲜有成功案例。
近期，何卫东、苗华等9名上将被开除党籍军籍，涉嫌严重职务犯罪。谣言称这是“清洗异己”，暗示军队反叛。但若真如此，习近平早被捕、“喜讯”早已公布。事实是，这些动作说明他仍掌控大局，继续巩固权力。刘源虽出身显赫，但军队基础薄弱——半路转任，反腐得罪诸多将领，难以掌控。张又侠或许尚有影响力，但刘源难成气候。
我理解这些谣言的流行：自媒体为流量编造“爽文”，迎合海外华人的不满情绪。许多人长期憋屈，便寄希望于“万一成真”，明知虚假仍愿倾听。但这无济于事。更扎心的是：在特朗普政策间接助益中共、习近平和普京的国际环境下，谁愿接手这个“烂摊子”？
有人幻想胡春华或汪洋上台，即可“改弦更张”：对美妥协、结束贸易战、重返全球化。这是中产阶层的美梦。他们首先是中共成员，首要目标是维护党的存续。全面认输？短期或缓和经济，但将摧毁党的基本盘——民族主义者和“小粉红”难以接受，“独立自主”原则荡然无存。谁如此行事，谁将面临亡党危机。更何况，中美冲突已渐行渐远，非一时之争，而是意识形态和地缘政治的深层对立。
四中全会即将召开，习近平去留自有分晓。但我明确表态：期待四天内他下台、交出实权、仅剩虚衔？此景不会出现。我们不妨打赌，静观其变。
此类幻想常源于“换人即变天”的错觉：踹掉习近平，来个“明君”，中国就新生。回顾中共党史和历次政治运动，便知并非如此。这不是个体问题，而是中共本质缺陷。该党不变革，换多少领导亦徒劳。习近平并非“开倒车”，而是踩油门加速原有路径，并拉开车窗帘，让乘客看清冲向悬崖的方向。过去虽缓慢前行，却遮蔽视线，大家在车厢里高唱《一条大河》，喊着“没有共产党就没有新中国，党带领我们吃上肉了。
今日之言或许消极，但事实如此。若不愿面对，可选择官方新闻联播，沉浸正能量幻觉；或浏览某些海外节目，如大纪元、希望之声，幻想明天习近平下台，后天中国美好。想自欺欺人？此类内容可暂缓情绪。但若真心求索，我唯有实言：中共不亡，中国难变。这不是悲观，而是对历史的清醒认知。《在野党》杂志作为独立声音的平台，应继续揭露这些真相，推动海外华人反思。
Rumors Around the Fourth Plenary Session: The Illusion of Xi’s Downfall and the Unchanging Nature of the CCP
Author: Tuo Xianrun
Edited: Zhou Zhigang Managing Editor: Luo Zhifei Proofread: Lin Xiaolong Translated: Xiaomei Peng
Abstract:This article examines the widespread rumors surrounding the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) upcoming Fourth Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee—claims such as “Wang Yang or Hu Chunhua will take power with military backing,” “Zhang Youxia has defected,” or “Liu Yuan will return and place Xi under house arrest.” The author argues that these stories are baseless and politically illogical. Even if Xi were to step down, the CCP’s fundamental nature would remain unchanged.
As the Fourth Plenary Session of the 20th CCP Central Committee approaches, a flood of rumors has emerged. From supposed “power struggles among party elders” to “an imminent coup,” such tales have spread widely across overseas media and social platforms. Yet most lack factual foundation and contradict the basic logic of how the CCP operates. This essay dissects the absurdity of these rumors and reveals the deeper truth: the real problem lies not in any one leader’s personality, but in the structural corruption and nature of the Party itself.
Originally scheduled for last year, the session was postponed—consistent with the CCP’s habitual “better none than instability” approach. When internal consensus falters or political tension rises, it simply delays meetings. Historically, Mao Zedong went years without holding Party congresses; Xi Jinping did the same last year.By July 30, Xinhua News Agency had already announced the conference and its themes, suggesting that by mid-summer the factions had reached equilibrium. The meeting, set for October 20–23, retains its original agenda—hardly a sign of upheaval.
Yet rumormongers describe it as a “mafia-style showdown” in Zhongnanhai: elders confronting Xi in a vote, factions bargaining for influence, and delegates wavering in their loyalties. Such stories are pure fantasy—a Western projection of democratic politics onto an authoritarian machine. In the CCP, a vote is never free; every ballot reflects complex networks of patronage and power balance. The imagined scene of people shouting and slamming tables belongs more to The Godfather than to Beijing’s political reality.
Even more sensational are the coup narratives: claims that Wang Yang or Hu Chunhua will take over with the army’s support; that General Zhang Youxia has turned against Xi; that Liu Yuan is returning to command the military and will place Xi under house arrest. Supposedly, the Plenary Session will “announce the good news”—Xi demoted to a ceremonial presidency by year’s end.
These scenarios ignore the essence of a coup: forcibly removing the General Secretary, Chairman of the Central Military Commission, and Head of State before term’s end. The CCP has seen power struggles before—the arrest of the Gang of Four (1976), Hu Yaobang’s ouster, Zhao Ziyang’s purge—but in each case, the operation was swift, announced immediately, and followed by an emergency meeting to legitimize it. To delay months until October would be political suicide.
Recent purges of nine senior generals—including He Weidong and Miao Hua—were interpreted by rumor mills as “cleansing rivals.” If true, Xi would have already fallen, and the “good news” proclaimed. Instead, the opposite is true: such purges show Xi still consolidates control. Liu Yuan, though well connected, lacks a solid military base—his anti-corruption crusade alienated key officers. Zhang Youxia retains influence, but Liu Yuan is unlikely to mount any real challenge.
The popularity of these rumors is understandable. Overseas Chinese, long frustrated with China’s authoritarian system, yearn for “what if” stories that offer emotional relief. Many self-media creators exploit this sentiment for traffic, crafting “feel-good fiction” that fuels fleeting hope. Yet none of this changes reality.
Some imagine that if Hu Chunhua or Wang Yang took power, China would “change course”—reconcile with the U.S., end trade wars, and return to globalization. Such dreams belong to the urban middle class. But these figures are first and foremost Party members; their priority is the CCP’s survival. To “surrender” to the West might temporarily ease economic pain but would alienate nationalists and Party loyalists—triggering a legitimacy crisis and even collapse.Moreover, the U.S.–China confrontation is no longer about tariffs or tactics; it is a deep ideological and geopolitical divide.
As the plenary session begins, Xi’s political fate will become clearer—but expecting him to lose real power within four days is naïve. If anyone wishes to wager otherwise, let’s wait and see.
Such fantasies stem from the illusion that “changing the leader means changing China.” History proves otherwise. The CCP’s crises are systemic, not personal. Replacing one leader with other changes nothing. Xi is not “driving in reverse”—he’s flooring the accelerator on the same old road, only pulling back the curtain so passengers can finally see the cliff ahead. In the past, the car moved slower, and people sang songs of praise, believing “Without the Party, there would be no New China.”
This may sound pessimistic, but it is reality. Those who prefer denial can turn to state propaganda for “positive energy,” or watch certain exile channels promising that “Xi will fall tomorrow, and China will be free the day after.” Such illusions may offer emotional comfort—but for those who truly seek understanding, there is only one sober truth: China will not change until the CCP collapses.
That is not despair—it is clarity.As an independent platform for free thought, In Opposition must continue exposing these truths and urging overseas Chinese to think critically, beyond rumor and fantasy.
