编辑：冯仍 校对：王滨 翻译：吕峰
浙江的响雷，山东的曙光，使国内公开层面的民运活动提升到一个新的高度，即筹组公开反对党的高度。一个公开的反对党，正在孕育之中。
在专制制度下，催生一个公开的反对党（注意：不是秘密层面的反对党，此问题以后讨论），需要客观和主观的很多条件。这里，我只想谈谈主观因素，即我们民运自身可以掌控的因素。主观因素，包括勇气和策略等。
上一篇文章中，我主要谈的是勇气。我始终坚持，勇气为第一要素，勇气为开路先锋。在当前，勇敢是最大的道德体现。试想，当人们通通勇敢地走向牢房的时候，再专制的牢房都会被踏平，牢房的存在就失去了意义。问题是，有勇气的人，并不是很多。这就涉及到避免或减少镇压损失、让胆量不是那么大的人士也能参与，争取中间人士的同情、争取舆论的支持等一系列的问题，也就是策略问题。
只有勇，没用谋，是政治上的冒险主义；只会谋，缺少勇，是政治上的保守主义。两种倾向都要避免。
策略是桥和船，是抵达彼岸不可或缺的工具。毛泽东讲过：“政策和策略是党的生命” 。这句话有道理，不可因人废言。讲起毛，可能大家还记得四六年的重庆谈判。毛到了重庆，高呼蒋委员长万岁，三民主义万岁，俯首称臣，做了一场漂亮的 “政治秀” 。这是什么？这是策略。毛泽东打江山的一些策略，是成功的。舍之，到不了彼岸，达不成政治目标。
策略之所以运用，乃为绕过礁石，达到彼岸；策略的原则，是削弱对手，壮大自己，争取群众；策略的生命，在于其灵活性。船为绕过礁石，有时必须采取迂回；为了避开浪头，甚至走段回头路。关键是灵活二字。
我们的口号是，让勇气与道义使魔鬼退却；让战略与策略使魔鬼迷惑。
这次，浙江和山东的民运朋友们，在组党过程中的策略表现如何呢？我说，很好。我从天时、地利、人和等角度分析一下。
天时：时间是可以基本由自己掌握的。浙江选在美国总统克林顿访华期间举事；山东选在联合国人权委员会高级专员罗宾森夫人访华前夕响应。两个时间都不错。此时，中共一时不好抓，要给客人一个面子。几天之后，舆论已经造大，也难以下手。下了手，克林顿、罗宾森肯定要表态，中共后患无穷。
地利：浙江和山东都是民运力量比较雄厚的地方。
人和：浙江、山东的民运人士比较团结，心齐。除此之外，人员的分线安排也很有策略，第一线冲出来公开注册，第二线预备，第三、四线人员做后援和后勤。
提法：浙江明确表示尊重中国宪法，用“和平、理性、非暴力”的原则，推动中国大陆的民主化。山东的组党申请提出，尊重江泽民的国家元首地位，承认中共为执政党。这是毛泽东教出来的招术：“打着红旗反红旗” 。中共心知肚明，但是又不好说。棋下到这个地步，可说是出自高手。
做法：完全公开、合法、合中共的法。注册人员公开、纲领公开、做法公开。除了注册外，浙江朱康大还上街公开散发了上千份的“宣言”。王有才和王东海等人被抓后，二线人员通过合法手段申请示威抗议，明知得不到批准，但造成舆论，争取了同情。合法斗争还有一着：法律抗争。你不是有法吗？我就来个以法抗争。为此，各地民运人士组成了法律后援会，二、三线人员给被捕者聘请了律师。如果中共审判王有才，一场法律大战不可避免。其它的做法，如声援灾区、谴责印尼屠华等，不仅合法，而且得分。
总之，这次浙江和山东民运在策略上的操作，可圈可点，给后继者提供了不少借鉴。当策略灵活得使魔鬼迷惑时，我们算是相当地成功了。
前面还有很多弯路，还有很多浪头，还要设计一系列的策略。勇气带动下的策略运用，仍须我们仔细探讨。
（作者为中国之春创办人，现任民主正义党发言人）（1998, 9, 9）
Wang Bingzhang: Let Flexibility in Tactics Confound the Devil— Reflections No. 2 from the Zhejiang and Shandong pro-democracy Party-building groups(September 9, 1998)
Editor: Feng Reng Proofreader: Wang Bin Translator: Lyu Feng
The thunder in Zhejiang and the dawn in Shandong have elevated open pro-democracy activities inside the country to a new level—the level of organizing an open opposition party. A public opposition party is now in gestation.
Under an authoritarian system, the birth of an open opposition party (note: not one operating underground; that issue can be discussed later) requires many objective and subjective conditions. Here I want to speak only about the subjective factors, those that we in the pro-democracy movement can control. These include courage and tactics.
In my previous article, I focused mainly on courage. I have always maintained that courage is the primary element, the pioneer that clears the way. At present, bravery is the greatest moral expression. Imagine: if people were to walk toward prison cells with courage, even the most repressive prisons would be trampled flat, and their existence would lose meaning. The problem is that there are not many people with such courage. This brings up how to avoid or reduce the costs of repression, how to enable those with less boldness to participate, how to win the sympathy of the middle ground, and how to gain support from public opinion—in other words, questions of tactics.
Courage without strategy becomes political adventurism; strategy without courage becomes political conservatism. Both tendencies must be avoided.
Tactics are the bridges and boats—indispensable tools for reaching the other shore. Mao Zedong once said, “Policy and tactics are the life of the Party.” There is truth in that statement; one should not reject words simply because of who said them. Speaking of Mao, many may remember the Chongqing negotiations in 1946. When Mao arrived in Chongqing, he shouted, “Long live Chairman Chiang! Long live the Three Principles of the People!” bowing his head in submission and putting on a splendid political show. What was that? It was tactics. Some of Mao Zedong’s strategies in seizing power were successful. Without them, he could not have reached the other shore or achieved his political objectives.
Tactics are employed to bypass reefs and arrive at the destination. Their principle is to weaken the opponent, strengthen oneself, and win over the masses. The vitality of tactics lies in flexibility. To steer around reefs, a boat sometimes must take a detour; to avoid high waves, it may even have to retrace part of its path. The key word is flexibility.
Our slogan is: let courage and moral righteousness force the devil to retreat; let strategy and tactics confound the devil.
So how did our friends in Zhejiang and Shandong perform tactically during their party-building efforts? I would say: very well. Let me analyze this from the perspectives of timing, geographic advantage, and unity among people.
Timing: The moment can largely be chosen by oneself. Zhejiang acted during U.S. President Clinton’s visit to China; Shandong responded on the eve of the visit by U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights Mary Robinson. Both moments were excellent. At such times, the authorities would find it inconvenient to make arrests—they must give face to their guests. A few days later, public opinion had already grown, making action more difficult. If arrests were made, Clinton and Robinson would surely have to respond, leaving the authorities with endless troubles.
Geographic advantage: Both Zhejiang and Shandong are places where the pro-democracy movement is relatively strong.
Unity: Activists in Zhejiang and Shandong are relatively united and of one mind. In addition, the arrangement of personnel into different lines was also strategic: the first line stepped forward to register publicly; the second line stood ready; the third and fourth lines provided support and logistics.
Formulation of demands: Zhejiang clearly expressed respect for China’s Constitution and advocated promoting democratization on the mainland through the principles of “peace, rationality, and non-violence.” Shandong’s application for party formation stated respect for Jiang Zemin’s position as head of state and recognized the Communist Party as the ruling party. This is a tactic taught by Mao Zedong: “opposing the red flag while carrying the red flag.” The authorities understand perfectly well, yet they find it hard to object. To reach this stage in the game can truly be called the work of masters.
Methods: Completely open, legal, and in accordance with the authorities’ own laws. The registrants were public, the platform was public, and the methods were public. Beyond registration, Zhu Kangda in Zhejiang even went into the streets and distributed thousands of copies of a “Declaration.” After Wang Youcai and Wang Donghai were arrested, second-line personnel applied through legal channels for demonstrations and protests. They knew approval would not be granted, but they created public opinion and gained sympathy. There is another move in lawful struggle: legal resistance. Don’t you have laws? Then we will use the law to resist. To this end, activists in various places formed legal support groups, and second- and third-line personnel hired lawyers for those arrested. If the authorities put Wang Youcai on trial, a major legal battle would be unavoidable. Other actions, such as supporting disaster areas and condemning anti-Chinese violence in Indonesia, were not only legal but also earned moral credit.
In sum, the tactical operations of the Zhejiang and Shandong activists this time were highly commendable and provide many lessons for those who follow. When tactics are flexible enough to confound the devil, we can say we are considerably successful.
There are still many bends ahead, many waves, and many more strategies to design. Under the impetus of courage, the application of tactics remains something we must continue to explore carefully.
(The author is the founder of China Spring and currently serves as spokesperson for the Democratic Justice Party.)(September 9, 1998)
