—— 從鄭麗文訪中看台灣的安全迷思

作者：趙紀森 编辑：周志刚 校对：王滨 翻译：彭小梅

在兩岸關係持續緊張的情況下，任何與中國的接觸，都難以被視為單純交流。鄭麗文的訪中，引發了明顯分歧。有人認為這是務實溝通的嘗試，也有人質疑這樣的判斷過於樂觀，甚至可能傳遞錯誤訊號。

爭議尚未平息，她已在上海落地，並受到高規格接待。同時，她的公開發言也將台灣的選擇描繪為和平與繁榮，或戰爭與毀滅之間的對立。這樣的說法，讓原本屬於政策層面的討論，迅速轉向更強烈的政治敘事。

回到問題本身，關鍵或許不在於要不要對話，而在於對話是建立在什麼樣的現實判斷之上。

在官方互動受限的情況下，非執政政治人物的交流，確實可能在某種程度上降低誤判風險。國際政治中，維持最低限度的接觸，本來就是避免衝突升高的一種手段。因此，把所有交流一概視為錯誤，並不符合現實。

但對話從來不是安全本身。它只是一種工具，而且效果高度依賴條件。如果缺乏對等的實力基礎，也缺乏基本信任，對話往往難以轉化為實質保障。

這也是台灣社會普遍存在疑慮的原因。對於共產黨的長期戰略，多數人並不抱持信任，這並非單純情緒，而是來自過往經驗與現實觀察。在權力明顯不對等的情況下，單方面釋放善意，很可能得不到對等回應，甚至被轉化為對方的政治敘事資源。

此次訪問所呈現的高規格接待，本身也值得注意。在不對等關係中，禮遇往往不只是禮遇，同時具有明確的政治訊號。這使得相關行動的效果，不能只從表面來理解。

如果將這一爭議放入政黨競爭的背景，也更容易看出差異所在。國民黨傾向透過降低對抗與恢復交流來爭取空間，民進黨則強調防衛能力與國際合作，將嚇阻視為穩定的基礎。

這兩種路線之間，與其說是立場對立，不如說是風險排序的不同。一種更擔心衝突升高，另一種更擔心被誤判為缺乏決心。在權力不對等的條件下，後者的顧慮往往更直接影響安全。

鄭麗文的主張，確實回應了一部分人對戰爭風險的焦慮。但她在公開場合所採用的說法，也呈現出另一個問題。當複雜的安全議題被簡化為單一選項時，反而容易讓判斷失去精準度。

兩岸關係從來不是簡單的選擇題，而是一個充滿不確定性與權衡的結構。如果將不同路線理解為和平與毀滅之間的對立，不僅難以促進理性討論，也可能進一步加深社會分裂。

更重要的是，這樣的論述背後，隱含著對現實條件較為樂觀的判斷。在缺乏對等籌碼的情況下，對話本身難以轉化為穩定保障；若同時過度強調衝突的不可承受性，甚至可能在無意中影響社會對防衛的認知。

鄭麗文的訪中，不需要用情緒去否定，但也不應被過度理想化。理解其出發點並不困難，真正需要討論的，是這樣的路徑在現實條件下是否可行。

對話可以存在，但不能被高估。

在缺乏實力與清晰底線的情況下，對話未必降低風險，反而可能成為風險的一部分。

Equality Dialogue, or Misjudgment?— Viewing Taiwan’s Security Misperceptions Through Cheng Li-wen’s Visit to China

Author: Zhao JisenEditor: Zhou Zhigang Proofreader: Wang Bin Translator: Peng Xiaomei

Abstract: Under conditions of asymmetry in cross-strait power and lack of trust, dialogue does not necessarily provide substantive security guarantees and may instead introduce risks.

Amid continued tensions in cross-strait relations, any engagement with China can hardly be regarded as a simple exchange. Cheng Li-wen’s visit to China has triggered clear divisions. Some view it as an attempt at pragmatic communication, while others question whether such judgment is overly optimistic, or even potentially conveys the wrong signals.

Before the controversy had subsided, she had already landed in Shanghai and received high-level reception. At the same time, her public remarks framed Taiwan’s choices as a dichotomy between peace and prosperity, or war and destruction. Such statements quickly shifted what was originally a policy-level discussion into a more intense political narrative.

Returning to the core issue, the key may not be whether to engage in dialogue, but on what kind of assessment of reality that dialogue is based.

Under conditions where official interactions are limited, exchanges by non-ruling political figures may indeed, to some extent, reduce the risk of misjudgment. In international politics, maintaining a minimum level of contact is itself a means of preventing escalation of conflict. Therefore, categorically viewing all exchanges as wrong does not align with reality.

However, dialogue has never been security itself. It is merely a tool, and its effectiveness is highly dependent on conditions. If there is a lack of equal strength and a lack of basic trust, dialogue often cannot be transformed into substantive guarantees.

This is also the reason why doubts are widely present in Taiwanese society. Most people do not hold trust toward the long-term strategy of the Communist Party; this is not merely an emotional reaction but stems from experience and real-world observation. Under conditions of clear power asymmetry, unilateral goodwill is likely not to receive an equal response and may even be converted into political narrative resources for the other side.

The high-level reception presented during this visit itself also deserves attention. In unequal relationships, courtesy is often not merely courtesy but also carries clear political signals. This makes the effects of such actions impossible to understand only at the surface level.

If this controversy is placed within the context of party competition, the differences become easier to see. The Kuomintang tends to seek space by reducing confrontation and restoring exchanges, while the Democratic Progressive Party emphasizes defense capabilities and international cooperation, viewing deterrence as the foundation of stability.

Between these two approaches, rather than being a simple opposition of positions, it is more a difference in the ordering of risks. One side is more concerned about the escalation of conflict, while the other is more concerned about being misjudged as lacking resolve. Under conditions of power asymmetry, the latter concern often more directly affects security.

Cheng Li-wen’s position does respond to a portion of public anxiety about the risk of war. However, the way she frames the issue in public also reveals another problem. When complex security issues are simplified into a single-choice option, it instead makes judgment lose precision.

Cross-strait relations have never been a simple multiple-choice question, but a structure full of uncertainty and trade-offs. If different approaches are understood as a dichotomy between peace and destruction, it not only fails to promote rational discussion, but may further deepen social division.

More importantly, behind such discourse lies a relatively optimistic assessment of real conditions. In the absence of equal bargaining power, dialogue itself is difficult to transform into stable guarantees; if, at the same time, the unbearable nature of conflict is overemphasized, it may even unintentionally affect society’s understanding of defense.

Cheng Li-wen’s visit to China does not need to be rejected emotionally, but it also should not be overly idealized. It is not difficult to understand its starting point; what truly needs discussion is whether such a path is feasible under real conditions.

Dialogue can exist, but it must not be overestimated.Under conditions lacking strength and clear bottom lines, dialogue may not reduce risk but may instead become part of the risk itself.