朱虞夫先生：

您好！

近日拜读您与郑存柱先生联名提出的《中国人民政治协商会议提案——恢复政协的正常功能：邀请反对派政党、异议人士参加政治协商会议》。通篇阅读之后，我对您长期以来为中国民主事业所付出的勇气与坚持，依然深怀敬意。您在提案中提出，希望恢复政协设立之初的政治协商精神，让包括反对派政党、异议人士在内的不同政治力量进入协商体系，从而推动中国政治制度向更加开放、多元、包容的方向发展。这种以和平、理性方式推动政治进步的愿望，本身体现了一种建设性的政治理想。

然而，在认真思考之后，我仍有一些不同的看法，愿以坦诚而尊重的方式向您提出讨论。

从历史经验来看，中国共产党执政七十余年以来，其政治结构、权力运行方式以及对社会的控制机制，已经形成了高度封闭且自我保护的体系。在这样的体系之中，真正意义上的政治协商空间极为有限。虽然在某些历史时期曾出现过短暂的“政治协商”的表面景象，但很快便以严厉的政治运动作为收场。1957年的反右运动，正是一个深刻而沉痛的历史例证。许多原本被邀请“帮助共产党整风”的知识分子和民主人士，最终却被打成“右派”，其后数十年的人生命运因此彻底改变。

这一历史事实，使人不得不对“体制内部改良”的可能性产生深刻怀疑。

表面上看，中国人民政治协商会议在制度设计上，本应成为多党派参与公共事务的重要平台。但在现实运作中，所谓“民主党派”早已成为体制内的附属组织，它们在政治上公开承认并接受中国共产党的领导，缺乏真正独立的政治立场与监督能力。在这样的结构下，政协更多呈现为一种象征性的政治仪式，而非真实意义上的政策辩论与制度监督平台。

因此，尽管您提出邀请反对派政党与异议人士进入政协，是一种试图恢复制度本意的努力，但这一设想依然建立在一个前提之上：即中国共产党愿意主动开放权力结构，并允许真正的政治竞争与监督存在。

而这一前提，在现实政治逻辑中却显得极其脆弱，不现实的。

纵观近几十年的政治发展，特别是习上台之后，中国共产党不仅没有逐渐放松对社会与政治空间的控制，反而在多个领域呈现出更加集中化和收紧化的趋势。独立媒体空间不断缩小，民间组织受到严格限制，言论环境日趋紧张。在这样的背景下，邀请真正的反对派进入政协，恐怕不仅难以实现，甚至在现行政治环境中几乎没有现实可能。

更进一步说，中国社会之所以不断出现要求改革的声音，恰恰说明现行体制已经积累了大量深层矛盾。如果一个制度在几十年时间里始终拒绝建立真正的权力制衡机制，拒绝允许社会力量参与政治监督，那么这种制度本身就很难通过局部修补来完成自我更新。

正因如此，我个人逐渐形成一种较为悲观却也更加现实的判断：单纯寄希望于体制内部的改良，是不可能解决中国政治结构中长期积累的问题的。

历史上许多国家的经验表明，当权力长期缺乏监督与制衡时，制度内部往往难以自我纠正。真正的政治转型，往往来自社会力量、历史环境以及制度压力的综合作用，而不是仅仅依靠执政集团的自觉改变。

因此，在我看来，与其期待一个已经高度固化的权力体系主动开放，不如更加清醒地认识历史发展的规律。任何政权，无论其力量多么强大，只要长期背离社会公义与人民权利，终究无法逃避历史的审判。历史长河中曾经不可一世的统治集团，最终大多都成为时代的过客。

当然，这并不意味着我们应当放弃理性、和平与文明的原则。恰恰相反，在面对复杂而漫长的历史进程时，更需要保持理性的思考与道义的坚持。对于过去历史中发生的种种政治迫害与制度性伤害，也终究需要在未来某个阶段通过公开、透明、法治化的方式进行历史清算与责任追究。这既是对受害者的尊重，也是一个国家实现真正和解与重建所必须经历的过程。

先生长期以来以诗人与行动者的身份参与中国民主运动，您的经历本身已经成为中国当代历史的一部分。正因如此，我也十分希望未来中国的政治讨论能够更加坦诚、多元，而不同路径之间也能够彼此理解、相互讨论。

对于中国未来的道路，我们或许有不同的判断与策略。但所有追求自由、法治与尊严的人们，最终的目标应当是一致的——那就是建立一个真正尊重公民权利、拥有制度制衡、能够保障人性尊严的现代国家。

谨以此信表达个人的一点思考，若有不当之处，尚祈海涵。

顺颂

安好。

中国民主党旧金山宣传部副部长 

《北京之春》《在野党》旧金山记者站站长 缪青

2026年3月6日

朱虞夫回复缪青：

缪青先生的信写得非常好 ！我完全赞同。中共的本质难道还有人比我更清楚吗？王某的信与我没有任何关系，难道我还不知道其醉翁之意吗？有人对苍蝇说，我给你消消毒，苍蝇不会答应，因为它的本质必须是脏的。但是可以通过苍蝇的讳疾忌医让大家更看清中共是什么货色。我发此文到群里的时候给张致君说，用意一，给中共添堵；用意二，给国内民主党朋友打气。与其空喊口号，不如大家都来为“两会”献计献策。

An Open Letter to Mr. Zhu Yufu

Mr. Zhu Yufu:

Hello!

Recently, I read the “Proposal for the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC)—Restoring the Normal Functions of the CPPCC: Inviting Opposition Parties and Dissidents to Participate in the Political Consultative Conference,” jointly proposed by you and Mr. Zheng Cunzhu. After reading it in its entirety, I still harbor deep respect for the courage and persistence you have long dedicated to China’s democratic cause. In your proposal, you suggest restoring the spirit of political consultation as it existed at the founding of the CPPCC, allowing different political forces—including opposition parties and dissidents—to enter the consultative system, thereby promoting the development of China’s political system toward a more open, pluralistic, and inclusive direction. This desire to advance political progress through peaceful and rational means itself embodies a constructive political ideal.

However, after careful reflection, I still hold some differing views and wish to present them for discussion in a candid and respectful manner.

From the perspective of historical experience, in the seventy-plus years since the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) took power, its political structure, the way power operates, and its mechanisms for social control have formed a highly closed and self-protective system. Within such a system, the space for political consultation in any true sense is extremely limited. Although brief “political consultation” facades appeared during certain historical periods, they were quickly concluded with severe political movements. The Anti-Rightist Movement of 1957 is a profound and painful historical example. Many intellectuals and democratic figures who were originally invited to “help the Communist Party rectify its style” were ultimately labeled as “Rightists,” and their fates for the following decades were completely transformed as a result.

This historical fact forces one to harbor deep doubts about the possibility of “internal reform within the system.”

On the surface, the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference was originally intended in its institutional design to be an important platform for multi-party participation in public affairs. But in reality, the so-called “democratic parties” have long since become subordinate organizations within the system; they publicly acknowledge and accept the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party politically, lacking truly independent political stances and supervisory capabilities. Under such a structure, the CPPCC functions more as a symbolic political ritual than a platform for genuine policy debate and institutional oversight.

Therefore, although your proposal to invite opposition parties and dissidents into the CPPCC is an effort to restore the original intent of the institution, this vision is still built upon a premise: that the Chinese Communist Party is willing to actively open its power structure and allow for the existence of true political competition and supervision.

And this premise, in the logic of real-world politics, appears extremely fragile and unrealistic.

Looking at the political developments of recent decades, particularly since Xi took office, the Chinese Communist Party has not only failed to gradually relax its control over social and political spaces but has instead shown a trend toward greater centralization and tightening in multiple fields. The space for independent media continues to shrink, civil organizations are strictly restricted, and the environment for speech is becoming increasingly tense. In this context, inviting true opposition into the CPPCC is likely not only difficult to achieve but almost a physical impossibility in the current political environment.

Furthermore, the fact that calls for reform continue to emerge in Chinese society precisely proves that the current system has accumulated a large number of deep-seated contradictions. If a system has consistently refused to establish true mechanisms for checks and balances and refused to allow social forces to participate in political supervision over several decades, then it is very difficult for such a system to complete self-renewal through partial repairs.

Because of this, I have personally gradually formed a relatively pessimistic yet more realistic judgment: simply pinning hopes on reform from within the system is incapable of solving the problems long accumulated in China’s political structure.

The experiences of many countries in history show that when power lacks supervision and checks and balances for a long time, the interior of the system often finds it difficult to correct itself. True political transition often comes from the combined effects of social forces, the historical environment, and institutional pressure, rather than relying solely on the conscious change of the ruling group.

Therefore, in my view, rather than expecting a highly solidified power system to open up voluntarily, it is better to have a clearer understanding of the laws of historical development. Any regime, no matter how powerful its strength, will ultimately be unable to escape the judgment of history as long as it deviates from social justice and the rights of the people for a long time. Most of the ruling groups that were once insufferably arrogant in the long river of history eventually became mere passersby of the era.

Of course, this does not mean we should abandon the principles of rationality, peace, and civilization. On the contrary, when facing a complex and long historical process, it is even more necessary to maintain rational thinking and moral persistence. Regarding the various political persecutions and institutional injuries that occurred in the past, historical accountability and the pursuit of responsibility through open, transparent, and legalized means will eventually be required at some future stage. This is both a sign of respect for the victims and a process that a country must undergo to achieve true reconciliation and reconstruction.

You have long participated in the Chinese democracy movement as both a poet and an activist; your experience has itself become a part of contemporary Chinese history. Because of this, I also very much hope that China’s future political discussions can be more candid and pluralistic, and that different paths can understand and discuss one another.

Regarding China’s future path, we may have different judgments and strategies. But the ultimate goal of all people who pursue freedom, the rule of law, and dignity should be consistent—that is, to establish a modern country that truly respects civil rights, possesses institutional checks and balances, and can guarantee human dignity.

I offer this letter to express a few of my personal thoughts. If there are any improprieties, I pray for your indulgence.

Wishing you well.

Miao Qing Deputy Director of the Propaganda Department of the China Democracy Party, San Francisco Station Chief of the San Francisco Press Station for “Beijing Spring” and “The Opposition Party”

March 6, 2026

Zhu Yufu’s Reply to Miao Qing:

Mr. Miao Qing’s letter is written very well! I completely agree. Is there anyone who understands the essence of the CCP better than I do? That letter by a certain Mr. Wang has nothing to do with me; do I not already know his “ulterior motives” (literally: the drunkard’s heart is not in the wine)? If someone says to a fly, “I’ll disinfect you,” the fly won’t agree, because its essence must be dirty. However, through the fly’s “refusal to face its illness,” we can let everyone see more clearly what kind of “goods” the CCP really is. When I sent this text to the group, I told Zhang Zhijun: Intent one, to cause trouble for the CCP; Intent two, to boost the morale of Democracy Party friends inside the country. Instead of shouting empty slogans, it is better for everyone to come and offer “advice and suggestions” for the “Two Sessions.”