“台湾不是中国的一部分”——一场从声援藏人延伸出的两岸民主对话

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作者:关永杰

编辑:钟然 责任编辑:胡丽莉 校对:程筱筱 翻译:吕峰

2026年1月18日,在北加州藏人文化中心举办的藏历新年市集中,华语青年挺藏会设立摊位,举办“为藏人政治犯写明信片”活动,呼吁外界关注仍被关押的藏人良心犯处境,并持续声援此前被中共当局逮捕的华语青年挺藏会成员张雅笛。这是该会第二年以此形式表达对藏人追求自由与人权的支持。

在去年已整理完成的20位藏人良心犯资料基础上,主办方今年新增整理了10位,均涉及因非暴力表达、宗教活动、文化保护或社会倡议,而被以“分裂国家”“危害国家安全”等模糊罪名判刑或长期羁押,关押地点主要集中在四川、青海及西藏自治区的监狱系统。

“台湾不是中国的一部分”——一场从声援藏人延伸出的两岸民主对话

本次活动由华语青年挺藏会发起,组织者包括一名匿名工作人员,以及 Pema、段荆棘、小翠、卢克等人。活动吸引了来自不同族裔和背景的民众参与,现场不断有民众驻足了解藏人政治犯的个案,并亲手书写明信片,表达关怀与声援。

活动现场陆续有藏人及藏族孩童前来参与。当他们得知该摊位主要由华语背景的参与者自发组织,并长期持续为藏人政治犯发声时,多位藏人表达了真挚的感激之情。其中一位藏族朋友表示,在海外看到汉人主动声援藏人处境,让他们感到并不孤单,也让跨族群之间建立理解与信任成为可能。

多位活跃于湾区的人权与民主运动人士亦到场担任义工,参与书写明信片并向公众介绍相关个案。亦有多位中国民主党成员到场支持,以实际行动声援藏人政治犯及相关人权议题。

活动现场,不同族裔的参与者在摊位前驻足交流。一对来自台湾的夫妻在询问活动内容时,也就「在美国举办反共或人权相关活动,如何应对可能来自亲共的极端民族主义者的骚扰」这一问题,与主办方成员展开了进一步的交流。讨论随后自然延伸至两岸关系、民主制度与威权扩张等议题。

两岸观点交锋:抵抗意志与民主生活

针对台海局势的复杂性,作者此前在湾区的某场活动中,曾分别与两位台湾年轻人进行交流。当谈及中共对台文攻武吓时,其中一位避而不谈,另一位则认为“大陆现在发展不错”,若抵抗换来的是战争与死亡,他宁愿选择“和平统一”。

对此,台湾女士 Stacy 表达了不同看法:首先,在讨论两岸议题时,Stacy 以「台湾」与「中国」作为清楚区分,而非使用「中国大陆」或「大陆」,以避免将台湾纳入中国主权叙事框架,并凸显台湾作为一个具有自身历史、政治与社会主体性的民主社会。接着,她认为,这两位年轻人反映的是目前台湾民调中的少数「投降派」(约二成),多项公开的民调资料显示,比例超过一半,甚至在某些调查中超过六成,展现出愿意抵抗武力入侵、守护家园的战斗意志(乌克兰人战前约四成)。Stacy 的回应,令现场关心台湾人民处境的大陆民运人士稍微松了一口气。

当被问及旅美台湾人对政治与台海局势的关注度时,Stacy 表示,台湾社会的日常生活与政治密切相关,从地方首长到总统选举,公民参与已如同空气与水一般自然。她观察到,相较之下,中国大陆似乎较少人关心与讨论公共事务。对此,作者现场补充并澄清:大陆并非无人关心政治,而是中共当局不允许民众公开讨论,勇于发声者往往面临打压甚至有刑事风险;官方宣传中反覆强调的「民主」「自由」与「法治」口号,恰恰反映了现实环境中的匮乏。

威权压迫与扩张侵略

相较于香港、图博(西藏)与维吾尔(新疆)长期处于中国共产党统治体系下,并承受不同形式的制度性压迫,台湾在历史上从未被中共统治。香港近年快速收紧的政治控制、西藏长期的宗教与文化压制,以及新疆对维吾尔族群的高度监控,皆显示威权治理对社会自由的实质冲击。台湾所面对的,则是一个试图透过政治、经济、资讯网络与军事手段扩张影响力的极权国家,而非既有统治关系下的内部压迫。

历史上,当年随国民党迁台的人口仅占台湾总人口的少数,台湾社会本身具有不同于中国的族群结构、历史经验与民主化路径。这样的背景,也使台湾在面对统战与安全威胁时,展现出独特的社会韧性。

国际评比与未来展望

在谈及台湾的民主表现时,Stacy 援引国际评比指出,根据经济学人资讯社(EIU)于 2025 年 2 月底发布的「2024 民主指数」,台湾全球排名第 12、亚洲第 1;而自由之家(Freedom House)同期公布的「2025 全球自由度报告」中,台湾名列全球第 6、亚洲第 1。

参与讨论者普遍认为,对照中共在境内对不同族群实施的高压治理模式,台湾今日仍能维持完整的民主制度与公民自由,显得尤为珍贵。台湾若能持续深化公民韧性、强化对认知作战的辨识能力,并与国际社会保持紧密连结,不仅有助于自身安全,也能为仍处于威权压力下的社群提供重要的参考与希望。

【资料附录】2026 年由华语青年挺藏会新增整理的 10 位藏人良心犯概况

(以下人员均因非暴力表达、宗教活动、文化保护或社会倡议而遭拘押或判刑。)

一、 西绕·降央列谢(Sherab Jamyang Lekshey)

二、 贡布次仁(Gonpo Tsering)

三、 泽嘎嘉措(Zega Gyatso)

四、 岗·次仁卓玛(Gang Tsering Drolma)

五、 果·喜绕嘉措(Go Sherab Gyatso,别名果喜 Goshe)

六、 岗布优顿(Gangbu Yudrum)

七、 岗吉·卓巴杰(Gangkyi Drupa Kyab)

八、 桑珠(Samdu)

九、 赛朗(Seynam)

十、 阿亚桑扎(Anya Sengdra)

“Taiwan Is Not Part of China” — A Democratic Dialogue Across the Taiwan Strait Emerging from Solidarity with Tibetans

Author: Guan YongjieEditor: Zhong RanExecutive Editor: Hu LiliProofreading: Cheng XiaoxiaoTranslator: Lyu Feng

Abstract: At a Tibetan New Year market in Northern California, the Chinese-speaking Youth for Tibet group organized a postcard-writing campaign for Tibetan political prisoners. The event also sparked discussions on Taiwan’s democracy and authoritarian expansion, calling for greater attention to human rights and freedom.

On January 18, 2026, at the Tibetan New Year market held at the Tibetan Cultural Center in Northern California, the Chinese-speaking Youth for Tibet set up a booth to host a “Postcards for Tibetan Political Prisoners” campaign. The event aimed to raise public awareness about Tibetan prisoners of conscience who remain detained, while continuing to express support for Zhang Yadi, a member of the group who had previously been arrested by the Chinese Communist authorities. This marked the second consecutive year the organization used this format to express support for Tibetans’ pursuit of freedom and human rights.

Building upon a list of 20 Tibetan prisoners of conscience compiled last year, the organizers added ten more cases this year. These individuals were imprisoned or detained primarily for non-violent expression, religious activities, cultural preservation, or social advocacy, often under vague charges such as “splitting the country” or “endangering national security.” Most are currently held in prison systems located in Sichuan, Qinghai, and the Tibet Autonomous Region.

“台湾不是中国的一部分”——一场从声援藏人延伸出的两岸民主对话

The event was initiated by the Chinese-speaking Youth for Tibet and organized by an anonymous staff member together with Pema, Duan Jingji, Xiao Cui, Luke, and others. Participants from diverse ethnicities and backgrounds stopped by the booth throughout the day to learn about individual cases of Tibetan political prisoners and to personally write postcards expressing concern and solidarity.

Tibetans and Tibetan children also came to the booth during the event. When they learned that the initiative was largely organized by participants from Chinese-speaking backgrounds who had long continued to speak out for Tibetan prisoners, many expressed sincere gratitude. One Tibetan participant remarked that seeing Han Chinese voluntarily advocating for Tibetan rights abroad made them feel less alone and helped foster understanding and trust across ethnic communities.

Several activists from the Bay Area’s human rights and democracy movements volunteered at the booth, writing postcards and introducing the cases to the public. Members of the China Democracy Party were also present to express support for Tibetan political prisoners and related human rights issues.

At the booth, participants from different ethnic backgrounds engaged in conversations. A Taiwanese couple who stopped to inquire about the activity also discussed with organizers how activists in the United States might respond to potential harassment from pro-Beijing nationalist groups during anti-communist or human-rights-related events. The discussion naturally expanded to topics such as cross-strait relations, democratic systems, and authoritarian expansion.

Diverging Perspectives Across the Taiwan Strait: Resistance and Democratic Life

Regarding the complexity of the Taiwan Strait situation, the author recalled previous conversations with two young Taiwanese participants at a Bay Area event. When discussing Beijing’s political and military pressure on Taiwan, one avoided the topic entirely, while the other argued that “the mainland is developing quite well,” and suggested that if resistance meant war and death, he would rather accept “peaceful reunification.”

A Taiwanese woman named Stacy offered a different perspective. She first emphasized that in discussing cross-strait issues, she clearly distinguished between “Taiwan” and “China,” rather than using terms such as “mainland China” or “the mainland,” which could implicitly place Taiwan within China’s sovereignty narrative. Instead, she stressed Taiwan’s identity as a democratic society with its own history, politics, and social agency.

She further argued that the two young men represented only a minority opinion within Taiwan—what she described as the “surrender faction,” accounting for roughly 20 percent according to public opinion surveys. Multiple surveys indicate that more than half of Taiwanese people—and in some polls over 60 percent—express willingness to resist military invasion to defend their homeland (by comparison, about 40 percent of Ukrainians expressed such willingness before the war).

Stacy’s response reassured some mainland Chinese democracy activists present who were concerned about Taiwanese public sentiment.

When asked about the level of political engagement among Taiwanese living in the United States, Stacy explained that in Taiwan, everyday life is closely connected with politics. Civic participation—from local elections to presidential elections—has become as natural as air and water.

She observed that, by contrast, fewer people in mainland China appear to discuss public affairs. The author added an important clarification: it is not that people in mainland China are uninterested in politics, but rather that the Chinese Communist Party does not allow open discussion of political matters. Those who speak out risk suppression or even criminal prosecution. The repeated slogans of “democracy,” “freedom,” and “rule of law” in official propaganda often highlight the very absence of these principles in reality.

Authoritarian Repression and Expansion

Unlike Hong Kong, Tibet, and Xinjiang—regions that have long existed within the Chinese Communist Party’s governance system and experienced various forms of institutional repression—Taiwan has never been ruled by the CCP.

In recent years, Hong Kong has experienced rapidly tightening political control. Tibet has long faced religious and cultural suppression, while the Uyghur population in Xinjiang has been subjected to extensive surveillance. These developments illustrate the tangible impact of authoritarian governance on social freedoms.

Taiwan, by contrast, faces a different challenge: an authoritarian state attempting to expand influence through political, economic, informational, and military means, rather than internal repression under an existing ruling relationship.

Historically, the population that moved to Taiwan with the Kuomintang represented only a minority of the island’s total population. Taiwan’s society developed along a distinct path shaped by its own ethnic composition, historical experiences, and democratization process. These factors contribute to Taiwan’s unique societal resilience when confronting united-front strategies and security threats.

International Rankings and Future Outlook

When discussing Taiwan’s democratic performance, Stacy cited international assessments. According to the Economist Intelligence Unit’s 2024 Democracy Index, released in February 2025, Taiwan ranked 12th globally and 1st in Asia. Meanwhile, in Freedom House’s 2025 Freedom in the World report, Taiwan ranked 6th globally and 1st in Asia.

Participants generally agreed that, compared with the high-pressure governance imposed by the CCP on various ethnic groups within its territory, Taiwan’s ability to maintain a fully functioning democratic system and civil liberties is especially valuable.

If Taiwan continues strengthening civic resilience, improving its ability to identify information warfare, and maintaining close connections with the international community, it may not only enhance its own security but also provide inspiration and hope for societies still living under authoritarian pressure.

Appendix: Overview of Ten Additional Tibetan Prisoners of Conscience Compiled by the Chinese-speaking Youth for Tibet in 2026

(All individuals listed below were detained or sentenced for non-violent expression, religious activities, cultural preservation, or social advocacy.)

Sherab Jamyang Lekshey

Gonpo Tsering

Zega Gyatso

Gang Tsering Drolma

Go Sherab Gyatso (also known as Goshe)

Gangbu Yudrum

Gangkyi Drupa Kyab

Samdu

Seynam

Anya Sengdra

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