新疆对维吾尔族的镇压已经演变，而非结束
一份罕见的内部证词揭露了中共政权如何掩盖新疆地区的国家暴力行为
作者：Adrian Zenz
编辑：黄吉洲 校对：孔祥庆 翻译：周敏
根据一位来自中国警察系统内部的前成员的第一手证词揭露，北京并未拆除其在新疆的压制体系，而是对其进行了“调整”。强制性政策仍主导着日常生活，但其运作方式更加隐蔽、更加分散，也因此更难被外界察觉。
这一“调整”体系的设计者是马兴瑞，他于2021年12月接替以强硬政策著称的陈全国，出任新疆党委书记。在陈全国时期，国家依赖高度可见的运动式治理，将大量维吾尔人及其他少数民族族群送入法外拘禁营地。当时的行动由自上而下的拘押指标推动，也为当前短期拘留目标提供了行政先例。
当曾任广东省省长、被视为技术官僚的马兴瑞上任时，外界一度猜测他可能会推动新疆从高度安全化治理转向以经济发展为导向。
多位目击者回忆称，马兴瑞初到新疆时确实带来了一定程度的谨慎乐观。他取消了一些最显眼的警务措施，并暂时放松了部分社会管控。但事实上，他的治理只是将压制从“高可见度”转向“高度隐蔽”。
这些隐蔽压制的具体运作方式，来自张亚博的证词。张是一名汉族公民，2006年进入新疆工作。经过教师生涯后，他于2014年加入警察系统，被派往维吾尔族聚居的和田地区。
在2014年至2016年间，张作为拘留中心的看守，目睹了对维吾尔被拘人员的日常殴打与酷刑，包括将人悬吊于天花板长达24小时。他还目睹一名同事在审讯过程中强奸女性被拘者，并见证有人因虐待而死亡。2017年，在一次为期两周的拘留中心工作中，他看到严重的拥挤状况、“极其恶劣”的环境，以及“频繁发生”的死亡事件。
2016年底至2023年间，张在基层担任村级警察。他负责将“再教育营”释放的维吾尔人转送至拘留所，其中许多人随后被判处长期监禁。张估计，在他所辖区域，至少一半以上被释放人员最终进入监狱。
官方数据也印证了这一大规模“监禁转移”的趋势：2017年至2021年间，有超过50万人被判刑入狱。张还负责监督国家主导的劳动力转移，包括组织维吾尔人群体在警方看守下采摘棉花。
张的证词还显示，实际的拘禁规模可能甚至超过地方领导层的内部估计。2019年，他在和田县再教育总部工作时发现，地方官员经常向上级隐瞒真实拘押人数。在多重政策压力下，基层既执行大规模拘押，又为避免被指责“治理不力”而刻意隐瞒数据。
张估计，在他所在的村庄，大约25%的成年人口曾被送入再教育营（不包括另行送入监狱者）。为掩盖这一行动，2020年初，当局下令销毁所有与再教育营相关的档案。
2023年底，张辞去警职并逃离中国。此后，中国当局指控他“危害国家安全”，冻结其银行账户，并威胁其在国内的家人。
张参与执行的2023年和田地区拘押行动，也与更广泛的区域趋势相吻合。他获取的证词显示，在乌鲁木齐等地，在清零政策结束后，也出现了一波针对年轻维吾尔人的任意拘留潮，特别是在反封控抗议之后。
新疆新一轮压制与中国领导人习近平的政策表述变化相一致。2020年中央新疆工作座谈会上，习近平曾强调新疆政策“取得全面胜利”，突出经济发展。但在2023年8月一次未公开行程中，他则警告“存在隐患”，要求加强安全治理。
为延续大规模拘禁时期所建立的深层恐惧，马兴瑞时期采用了“预防性、轮换式短期拘留”机制。通过短期但持续的拘押，既维持普遍恐惧，又在表面上营造“正常生活”的假象。在这种“稳定”之下，是对民族同化的系统性推进。
张表示，对维吾尔语言、文化与宗教的压制在马上任后仍在持续。到他离职时，当地传统习俗和宗教信仰几乎被消除：诵读《古兰经》、在家祈祷、斋月禁食均被严格禁止；维吾尔干部甚至被强制食用猪肉以示“忠诚”；多数清真寺被拆毁，仅存的一座也全天候看守。
文化抹除还深入教育体系和日常生活。学校禁止使用维吾尔语，新一代正在与自身语言逐渐脱节。
这种文化消解与经济政策密切相关，尤其是国家推动的劳动力转移。官方将其描述为“自愿扶贫”，但张的证词表明，这实际上构成一个大规模的强制劳动与人口工程体系。
在马兴瑞时期，劳动力转移规模显著扩大，从阶段性动员转变为常态化、不可逃避的制度安排。官方数据显示，到2025年，转移规模达340万人次（涉及超过300万人，部分人员一年内被多次转移）。
但与此同时，持续的拘禁与劳动力抽调造成劳动力短缺，基层面临巨大压力，被迫“想方设法完成指标”。村委会与警方利用其权力，对居民施加各种行政骚扰与威胁，迫使其接受工作安排。
拒绝者将面临额外普通话学习、无偿劳动以及频繁上门“走访”。多次拒绝者则会被送入短期拘留设施，在张的话中，被“刻意置于困苦环境中以迫使服从”。
这种对劳动年龄人口的抽取正在掏空农村社会结构。张观察到村庄人口锐减，仅剩老人、病人和儿童。这种人为造成的人口空洞甚至导致无人照看的儿童溺亡，当地不得不发布禁止儿童靠近水域的警告。
官方文件也印证了这一环境。一份2023年的地方指令要求干部“转变农民思想”，以确保劳务转移执行；另一份规划文件则提出扩大跨省转移，并通过“感恩教育”“民族团结教育”将农民转化为产业工人。
张指出，所谓“思想转化”在实际操作中，就是通过威胁、惩罚以及长时间（甚至持续到凌晨两三点）的会议来施压。
这种制度化的强制迁移，体现了新疆治理模式的根本转变：从陈全国时期的显性高压，转向一种长期、无处不在的隐性控制。在政治学上，这意味着从“专制性权力”向“基础设施性权力”的转型。
前者依赖明显的暴力与压制，而后者则依赖国家通过官僚体系深入社会、实施控制的能力。
通过将维稳体系嵌入基层治理，国家从大规模拘禁的公开暴力，转向更隐蔽却更彻底的行政控制。
与此同时，马兴瑞还推动对外贸易大幅增长。官方数据显示，2021至2025年间，新疆对美国、加拿大、英国及欧盟的直接出口增长了465%，其中2024至2025年间增长达71%。
尽管实现了其所称的“高质量发展与高水平安全的良性互动”，马兴瑞仍在2025年7月被突然撤换，并因腐败问题接受调查。
在国际社会难以监测这一“由显转隐”的压制体系之际，像张这样的内部证人打破了“新疆趋于宽松”的假象。压制机制并未结束，而是演化为一种更持久、更深入的结构性控制，导致维吾尔社会的瓦解成为长期现实。
在对“绝对安全”的执念驱动下，这种无止境的社会控制需求，最终为大规模人权灾难的持续提供了条件。
原文链接https://foreignpolicy.com/author/adrian-zenz/
“The Opposition” China Human Rights Watch Briefing No. 24 (April 16, 2026)
The Repression of Uyghurs in Xinjiang Has Evolved, Not Ended
A rare internal testimony reveals how the CCP regime conceals state violence in the Xinjiang region.
Author: Adrian Zenz
Editor: Huang Jizhou Proofreader: Kong Xiangqing Translator: Zhou Min
According to first-hand testimony from a former member of the Chinese police system, Beijing has not dismantled its apparatus of repression in Xinjiang, but has instead “adjusted” it. Coercive policies still dominate daily life, but they operate in a more hidden and decentralized manner, making them increasingly difficult for the outside world to detect.
The architect of this “adjusted” system is Ma Xingrui, who succeeded Chen Quanguo—known for his hardline policies—as the Party Secretary of Xinjiang in December 2021. Under Chen, the state relied on highly visible, campaign-style governance, sending vast numbers of Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities into extrajudicial detention camps. Those actions were driven by top-down detention quotas, which set the administrative precedent for current short-term detention targets.
When Ma Xingrui, a former governor of Guangdong Province regarded as a technocrat, took office, there was initial outside speculation that he might shift Xinjiang from high-security governance toward economic development.
Witnesses recall a degree of cautious optimism upon Ma’s arrival. He removed some of the most conspicuous police measures and temporarily relaxed certain social controls. However, in reality, his governance merely shifted repression from “high visibility” to “high invisibility.”
The specific workings of this concealed repression come from the testimony of Zhang Yabo. A Han Chinese citizen who began working in Xinjiang in 2006, Zhang joined the police force in 2014 after a career in teaching and was stationed in the Uyghur-populated Hotan region.
Between 2014 and 2016, as a detention center guard, Zhang witnessed daily beatings and torture of Uyghur detainees, including individuals suspended from ceilings for up to 24 hours. He also witnessed a colleague rape a female detainee during interrogation and saw deaths resulting from abuse. In 2017, during a two-week stint at a detention center, he observed severe overcrowding, “extremely appalling” environments, and “frequent” deaths.
From late 2016 to 2023, Zhang served as a village-level police officer at the grassroots. He was responsible for transferring Uyghurs released from “re-education camps” to detention houses, many of whom were subsequently sentenced to long prison terms. Zhang estimates that in his jurisdiction, more than half of those released eventually entered the prison system.
Official data corroborates this trend of mass “detention transfer”: between 2017 and 2021, over 500,000 people were sentenced to prison. Zhang was also responsible for supervising state-led labor transfers, including organizing groups of Uyghurs to pick cotton under police watch.
Zhang’s testimony suggests that the actual scale of detention may exceed even the internal estimates of local leadership. In 2019, while working at the Hotan County Re-education Headquarters, he discovered that local officials frequently hid true detention numbers from superiors. Under multifaceted policy pressure, the grassroots both executed mass detentions and deliberately falsified data to avoid accusations of “ineffective governance.”
Zhang estimates that in his village, approximately 25% of the adult population had been sent to re-education camps (excluding those sent directly to prison). To cover up these actions, authorities ordered the destruction of all archives related to re-education camps in early 2020.
Zhang resigned from the police force and fled China in late 2023. Since then, Chinese authorities have accused him of “endangering national security,” frozen his bank accounts, and threatened his family members remaining in the country.
The 2023 detention operations in Hotan that Zhang participated in align with broader regional trends. Testimony he obtained shows that in places like Urumqi, a wave of arbitrary detentions targeting young Uyghurs emerged after the end of the “Zero-COVID” policy, particularly following anti-lockdown protests.
The new round of repression in Xinjiang aligns with shifts in the policy rhetoric of Chinese leader Xi Jinping. At the 2020 Central Symposium on Xinjiang Work, Xi emphasized that Xinjiang policy had “achieved a comprehensive victory,” highlighting economic development. However, during an unannounced visit in August 2023, he warned of “hidden dangers” and demanded strengthened security governance.
To maintain the deep-seated fear established during the era of mass internment, the Ma Xingrui era adopted a mechanism of “preventative, rotating short-term detention.” Through short but continuous detentions, the state maintains pervasive fear while maintaining a surface illusion of “normal life.” Beneath this “stability” lies a systematic push for ethnic assimilation.
Zhang states that the suppression of Uyghur language, culture, and religion continued under Ma. By the time of Zhang’s departure, local traditional customs and religious beliefs had been nearly eradicated: reciting the Quran, praying at home, and fasting during Ramadan were strictly prohibited. Uyghur cadres were even forced to consume pork to demonstrate “loyalty.” Most mosques were demolished, and the few remaining were under 24-hour surveillance.
Cultural erasure has also permeated the education system and daily life. Schools prohibit the use of the Uyghur language, causing the younger generation to gradually lose touch with their own tongue.
This cultural dissolution is closely linked to economic policies, particularly state-mandated labor transfers. While official narratives describe this as “voluntary poverty alleviation,” Zhang’s testimony indicates it actually constitutes a system of mass forced labor and demographic engineering.
Under Ma Xingrui, the scale of labor transfers expanded significantly, evolving from episodic mobilization into a normalized, unavoidable institutional arrangement. Official data shows that by 2025, the scale of transfers reached 3.4 million person-times (involving over 3 million people, some transferred multiple times a year).
Simultaneously, continuous detentions and labor extractions caused labor shortages, placing immense pressure on grassroots officials who were forced to “find any means necessary to complete quotas.” Village committees and police used their power to subject residents to administrative harassment and threats to force acceptance of work assignments.
Those who refuse face additional Mandarin language study, unpaid labor, and frequent “home visits.” Repeat refusers are sent to short-term detention facilities, which, in Zhang’s words, are “deliberately placed in hardships to coerce compliance.”
This extraction of the working-age population is hollowing out rural social structures. Zhang observed a sharp decline in village populations, leaving only the elderly, the sick, and children. This man-made demographic void even led to the drowning of unsupervised children, prompting local authorities to issue warnings against children approaching bodies of water.
Official documents also reflect this environment. A 2023 local directive required cadres to “transform the thoughts of farmers” to ensure the execution of labor transfers; another planning document proposed expanding inter-provincial transfers and transforming farmers into industrial workers through “gratitude education” and “ethnic unity education.”
Zhang noted that “thought transformation” in practice meant applying pressure through threats, punishments, and marathon meetings that often lasted until 2 or 3 AM.
This institutionalized forced migration embodies a fundamental shift in Xinjiang’s governance model: from the explicit high-pressure tactics of the Chen Quanguo era to a long-term, ubiquitous form of implicit control. In political science terms, this represents a transition from “despotic power” to “infrastructural power.”
The former relies on overt violence and repression, while the latter relies on the state’s ability to permeate society and implement control through bureaucratic systems. By embedding the stability-maintenance apparatus into grassroots governance, the state has pivoted from the public violence of mass internment to a more concealed yet more totalizing administrative control.
Meanwhile, Ma Xingrui also oversaw a significant surge in foreign trade. Official data shows that between 2021 and 2025, Xinjiang’s direct exports to the US, Canada, the UK, and the EU grew by 465%, with a 71% increase between 2024 and 2025 alone.
Despite achieving what he termed a “positive interaction between high-quality development and high-level security,” Ma Xingrui was abruptly replaced in July 2025 and placed under investigation for corruption.
As the international community struggles to monitor this “visible to invisible” system of repression, internal witnesses like Zhang shatter the illusion that Xinjiang is trending toward leniency. The repressive mechanisms have not ended; they have evolved into a more enduring, deeper structural control, making the disintegration of Uyghur society a long-term reality.
Driven by an obsession with “absolute security,” this endless demand for social control ultimately sustains the conditions for ongoing mass human rights disasters.
Original Link: https://foreignpolicy.com/author/adrian-zenz/
