作者：易勇    

        在探讨现代国家的国民财富分配时，大众往往将注意力集中于显性的个人所得税或企业所得税。然而在大众可见的税单之外，中国建立了一套极为独特且庞大的财富汲取机制。通过税收、土地财政、国企垄断以及金融抑制等组合拳，中共实质上将社会每年创造的新增财富与存量资产的近七成，直接或间接纳入了体制的调控与支配之下。“70%”不仅是一个直观的概念概括，更是通过宏观经济分配结构、国家资产控制力以及隐性抽取机制交织而成的客观现实。

        衡量社会财富分配最关键的宏观指标，是居民可支配收入占GDP的比重，这直接反映了每年创造的新增财富中，究竟有多少真正流入了普通百姓的口袋，又有多少被政府及公有部门留存。对比美国、日本等典型成熟经济体的国民分配结构，美国将近八成的GDP成果留给了居民部门，日本也保持在近六成水平。反观中国，居民仅拿走了约44%，剩余56%的成果在起点处就被财政税收、国有企业留存和国家资本划走。

        除了初次分配的先天倾斜，中共还通过独特的行政授权与资源垄断，设立了极其高效的隐形抽取管道。在庞大的房地产产业链中，房屋销售价格的60%至70%最终通过土地出让金、各类房地产税费以及国企开发商利润的形式流入地方财政；相较之下，美日等国的购房款主要流向建筑市场与私营房企，政府仅收取地税用于社区公共服务。此外，与美日等以直接税为主的国家不同，中国的税制以增值税、消费税等间接税为主，这些税负隐匿在日常商品价格之中，使全体消费者在购买衣食住行用品时都在无形中承担着流转税负。

        除了流量财富的抽取，政府对全社会存量财富与核心资源的控制力更是达到了极致。能源、电信、金融、铁路等基础行业均由国企专营，通过高昂的基础服务价格持续向全社会传导成本，将私营企业与个人的利润转化为国企收入。同时，通过对利率的管控和对资本流出的限制，广大居民放在银行的储蓄长期处于实际低利率状态，这些低成本的民间资金被定向注资给国有企业和地方融资平台，完成了从“民间储蓄”向“国家资本”的实质转移。

        所谓的“70%”，不仅代表了政府对土地、金融、矿产等核心资本存量的绝对控制，也反映了在剔除土地抽成、隐性税负、国企垄断溢价和高额行政成本后，普通大众实际所能自由支配和留存的财富份额已微乎其微。对比美日等国“藏富于民”的结构，中共通过这套涵盖“税收、土地、国企、金融”四位一体的汲取体系，实现了对全社会财富的高度集中与支配。这种体制虽然赋予了国家极高的资源动员能力，但也严重挤压了民间的消费与自主发展空间。

编辑：李晶     校对：孔祥庆 翻译：沈美花

How the CCP Extracts and Controls 70% of Society’s Wealth

Author: Yi Yong

When discussing the distribution of national wealth in modern states, the general public often focuses its attention on explicit personal income tax or corporate income tax. However, beyond the tax bills visible to the public, China has established an extremely unique and massive mechanism for wealth extraction. Through a multi-pronged strategy combining taxation, land finance, state-owned enterprise (SOE) monopolies, and financial suppression, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has, in essence, brought nearly 70% of the newly created wealth and existing stock assets of society directly or indirectly under the control and allocation of the system. “70%” is not only an intuitive conceptual abstraction, but also an objective reality woven together through macro-economic distribution structures, state control over assets, and implicit extraction mechanisms.

The most critical macro-indicator measuring social wealth distribution is the proportion of household disposable income relative to GDP. This directly reflects how much of the newly created annual wealth actually flows into the pockets of ordinary people, and how much is retained by the government and public sectors. Comparing the national distribution structures of typical mature economies such as the United States and Japan, the United States leaves nearly 80% of its GDP output to the household sector, while Japan also maintains a level of nearly 60%. In contrast, Chinese households receive only about 44%, while the remaining 56% of the output is taken away right at the primary distribution stage by fiscal taxation, state-owned enterprise retention, and state capital.

In addition to the inherent tilt in primary distribution, the CCP has also set up an extremely efficient invisible extraction pipeline through unique administrative authorizations and resource monopolies. In the massive real estate industry chain, 60% to 70% of the residential sales price ultimately flows into local government treasuries in the form of land transfer fees, various real estate taxes and fees, and profits of state-owned enterprise developers. By comparison, housing payments in countries like the United States and Japan mainly flow into the construction market and private real estate enterprises, with the government collecting only property taxes to fund public community services. Furthermore, unlike countries such as the United States and Japan, which rely mainly on direct taxation, China’s tax system relies primarily on indirect taxes such as value-added tax (VAT) and consumption tax. These tax burdens are concealed within the prices of daily goods, causing all consumers to invisibly bear turnover tax burdens whenever they buy items for food, clothing, shelter, or transportation.

Beyond the extraction of flow wealth, the government’s control over society’s overall existing stock wealth and core resources has reached the extreme. Foundational industries such as energy, telecommunications, finance, and railways are exclusively operated by state-owned enterprises, which continuously pass costs down to the whole society through high basic service prices, thereby converting the profits of private enterprises and individuals into SOE revenues. Meanwhile, through interest rate controls and restrictions on capital outflows, the bank savings of the general public remain in a state of practical low interest rates over long periods. This low-cost civilian capital is directionally injected into state-owned enterprises and local financing platforms, completing a substantive transfer from “private savings” to “state capital.”

The so-called “70%” represents not only the government’s absolute control over the core capital stock of land, finance, and mineral resources, but also reflects the reality that after deducting land cut-offs, implicit tax burdens, SOE monopoly premiums, and exorbitant administrative costs, the actual share of wealth that ordinary citizens can freely allocate and retain has become remarkably small. In contrast to the structure of “storing wealth among the people” seen in countries like the United States and Japan, the CCP—through this four-in-one extraction system encompassing “taxation, land, SOEs, and finance”—has achieved a high degree of concentration and control over all social wealth. Although this system equips the state with an extraordinarily high capacity for resource mobilization, it also severely squeezes private consumption and autonomous development space.

Editor: Li Jing Proofreader: Kong Xiangqing Translator: Shen Meihua