博客 页面 96

旧金山声援四川江油同胞

0
旧金山声援四川江油同胞

San Francisco Stands in Solidarity with Fellow Citizens in Jiangyou, Sichuan

作者:胡丽莉 编辑:李聪玲 责任编辑:鲁慧文 翻译:鲁慧文

旧金山声援四川江油同胞

2025年8月9日下午,中国民主党旧金山党部在中共领事馆前举行声援四川同胞的抗议集会,怒斥中共当局纵容校园霸凌、暴力镇压四川江油普通民众的恶行!民主勇士们汇聚一堂揭露中共极权暴行,誓为被铁拳镇压的同胞讨回公道!

抗议活动开始前,参与者们就四川江油事件进行了深入热烈的讨论,许多人深感中共铁腕统治下人民的无奈与绝望。活动现场气氛火热,参与者们激昂发言,控诉中共独裁政权对人民的无情蹂躏与残酷打压。中国民主党全国委员会副主席、旧金山党部主席方政,八九学运领袖赵常青,中国民主党全委会执行长陈闯创,中国民主党党员丘悦菲、郝剑平、关永杰等人轮番讲话。他们的发言如利剑出鞘,句句切中要害,引发在场者深深共鸣。值得一提的是,抗议现场吸引了过路车辆的关注,司机们纷纷按喇叭鸣笛,以实际行动表达对抗议者的支持与声援。

抗议者们愤怒表示:国内言论被封杀,人民被残酷镇压,我们不能沉默!既然国内不让聚集,我们就走到中共大使馆门口;既然国内无法发声,我们就在旧金山为同胞高喊“清算共产党!习近平下台!”

此次抗议不仅是对中共暴政的宣战,更是为中国民主自由奋战的战争吹响号角,呼吁全世界关注中国人民的苦难与抗争!

本文部分图片由Yongjie Guan提供

San Francisco Stands in Solidarity with Fellow Citizens in Jiangyou, Sichuan

Summary: On August 9, 2025, the San Francisco Branch of the China Democracy Party held a protest in front of the Chinese Consulate, condemning the CCP authorities for condoning campus bullying and violently suppressing ordinary people in Jiangyou, Sichuan!

Author: Hu Lili

Editor: Li Congling Executive Editor: Lu Huiwen Translation: Lu Huiwen

旧金山声援四川江油同胞

On the afternoon of August 9, 2025, the San Francisco Branch of the China Democracy Party staged a protest in front of the Chinese Consulate to show solidarity with the people of Sichuan, denouncing the CCP authorities for turning a blind eye to campus bullying and brutally repressing ordinary residents of Jiangyou, Sichuan. Pro-democracy fighters gathered together to expose the atrocities of the CCP’s totalitarian rule, vowing to seek justice for their compatriots crushed under the regime’s iron fist.

Before the protest began, participants engaged in an in-depth and passionate discussion about the Jiangyou incident, with many expressing deep feelings of helplessness and despair under the CCP’s iron-fisted rule. The atmosphere at the event was charged, as speakers delivered impassioned condemnations of the CCP dictatorship’s ruthless abuse and cruel repression of the people. Fang Zheng, Vice Chairman of the China Democracy Party National Committee and Chairman of the San Francisco Branch; Zhao Changqing, a leader of the 1989 student movement; Chen Chuangchuang, Executive Director of the China Democracy Party National Committee; and CDP members Qiu Yuefei, Hao Jianping, and Guan Yongjie all took turns speaking. Their words struck like unsheathed swords, hitting the mark with every sentence and resonating deeply with the crowd. Notably, the protest drew attention from passing vehicles—drivers honked their horns to express their support and solidarity with the demonstrators.

The protesters declared with anger: “In China, speech is silenced and the people are brutally suppressed. We cannot remain silent! If we cannot gather inside China, we will come to the gates of the CCP’s consulates; if we cannot speak out at home, we will raise our voices here in San Francisco, shouting ‘Bring the CCP to justice! Xi Jinping step down!’”

This protest was not only a declaration of war against the CCP’s tyranny but also a battle cry for the fight for democracy and freedom in China, calling on the world to pay attention to the suffering and resistance of the Chinese people.

Some photos in this article were provided by Yongjie Guan.

十年浩劫

0
十年浩劫

The Ten-Year Catastrophe

十年浩劫

1976年复旦大学邯郸校区围墙上的红字标语
“用鲜血和生命保卫党中央!” “用鲜血和生命保卫毛主席!”

“反党分子”习仲勋 挂牌游街

“反革命修正主义分子”彭德怀 “坐土飞机”押至大会审判

1966年,摄影师李振盛在哈尔滨的一座体育馆参加了一场批斗会。

一名党委书记和同样身为干部的妻子受到了批判,两人身上还被泼了墨水。

这样的批斗会每天都在全中国各地密集地发生 。

手持“红宝书”的红卫兵们聚集在广场

1966年北京天安门广场上的一场庆祝活动 《人民画报》1966年第11-12期

文化大革命(1966—1976)是毛泽东为巩固个人权力、清除政敌而发动的全国性政治运动,号称“破四旧、立四新”。运动中大批干部、知识分子遭批斗,社会秩序崩溃,经济与教育陷入瘫痪,文化遗产被严重破坏,造成数百万人冤死,国家陷入十年动荡。

作者:钟然

编辑:罗志飞 责任编辑:鲁慧文 翻译:鲁慧文

The Ten-Year Catastrophe

十年浩劫

In 1976, red slogans on the wall of Fudan University’s Handan Campus read:

“Defend the Party Central Committee with our blood and lives!”

“Defend Chairman Mao with our blood and lives!”

“Anti-Party element” Xi Zhongxun paraded through the streets with a placard hung on him.

“Counterrevolutionary revisionist element” Peng Dehuai was “flown” on a “soil airplane” (a humiliating stress position) to a mass rally for trial.

In 1966, photographer Li Zhensheng attended a public denunciation rally in a sports stadium in Harbin.

A Party committee secretary and his wife, also a cadre, were publicly criticized, with ink splashed on them.

Such denunciation rallies took place intensively every day across China.

Red Guards holding “Little Red Books” gathered in public squares.

A celebration event at Tiananmen Square in Beijing in 1966. People’s Pictorial, 1966, Issues 11–12.

The Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) was a nationwide political movement launched by Mao Zedong to consolidate his personal power and eliminate political rivals, under the banner of “Smash the Four Olds and Establish the Four News.” During the movement, large numbers of officials and intellectuals were publicly denounced, social order collapsed, the economy and education fell into paralysis, and cultural heritage suffered devastating destruction. Millions died unjustly, plunging the country into a decade of turmoil.

Author: Zhong Ran

Editor: Luo Zhifei

Executive Editor: Lu Huiwen

Translation: Lu Huiwen

“六四”纪念馆活动预告8月15日

0
“六四”纪念馆活动预告8月15日

Tiananmen Memorial Museum Event Announcement – August 15

“六四”纪念馆活动预告8月15日

“六四”纪念馆系列演讲之三:

时间:8月15日(周五)下午2-4点

地点:“六四”纪念馆( 3024 Peck Rd. El Monte, CA 91732)

主题:知识分子与抗争运动

主讲:陈小平(法学博士,独立学者)

王丹(“对话中国”智库所长)

吴祚来(“六四”纪念馆”顾问)

协办:《在野党》杂志

演讲免费向公众开放,欢迎参加。

Tiananmen Memorial Museum Event Announcement – August 15

“六四”纪念馆活动预告8月15日

Tiananmen Memorial Museum Lecture Series No. 3

Date & Time: Friday, August 15, 2:00–4:00 PM

Location: Tiananmen Memorial Museum (3024 Peck Rd., El Monte, CA 91732)

Topic: Intellectuals and the Resistance Movement

Speakers:

• Chen Xiaoping (Juris Doctor, Independent Scholar)

• Wang Dan (Director, “Dialogue China” Think Tank)

• Wu Zuolai (Advisor, Tiananmen Memorial Museum)

Co-organizer: The Opposition Party Magazine

The lecture is free and open to the public. All are welcome to attend.

江油与天安门:当人民再次走上街头

0
江油与天安门:当人民再次走上街头

Jiangyou and Tiananmen Square: When people go to streets again

作者:毛一炜(YIWEI MAO)
编辑:冯仍  责任编辑:罗志飞

2025年7月22日,四川江油,一段14岁女孩被围殴的视频引爆社交媒体。视频中,三名施暴女生不仅肆意辱骂、掌掴受害者,还扬言“进派出所几次都没事”,一副对法律毫无敬畏的姿态。江油警方随后通报称,受害人“轻微伤”,施暴者因未成年,仅予训诫。这一处理结果,反而激起了更大的民愤。

1989年8月4日,愤怒的市民走上街头,在江油市政府门前高唱国歌、呼喊口号,要求惩治施暴者、重新鉴定伤情、追责渎职警员。抗议持续到深夜,警方出动封锁道路并强制清场,多人被捕,现场爆发肢体冲突。这一幕,让人想起了另一个历史节点:1989年六四天安门事件。在街头民众高呼正义的那一刻,“我们要一个说法”的呐喊,穿越36年的时空,令人动容。

 

从江油回望天安门

六四是一场全国性的学生运动,最终演变为政治危机,提出的是“新闻自由”“民主改革”等深层制度诉求。而江油抗议则聚焦于一件校园欺凌案件的处理失当——一个地方性的执法问题,看似微小,却直击了民众对法律与权力的集体不信任。

六四的抗议者主要是大学生和知识分子,而江油的参与者是普通市民、家长、中小学生,是更“接地气”的沉默大多数。他们不是政治活动家,只是想要一个公道。

这也许正是今天中国的真实图景:政治改革的呼声或许已经退场,但对公平、对正义、对真相的渴望从未熄灭。江油事件像一记闷雷,提醒人们,即使高压维稳多年,街头依旧可能成为人民表达怒火的地方。

 

“轻微伤”与沉重的社会创伤

江油警方的“轻微伤”鉴定,成为引发抗议的直接导火索。这一判定不仅被网友质疑“伤害司法常识”,更折射出公众对权力腐败、执法不公的深层不信任。

更令人震惊的是,视频中施暴者反复炫耀自己的“豁免权”,仿佛未成年人保护法成了违法的挡箭牌。这一现象揭示出《未成年人保护法》在执行中的巨大漏洞,也提醒我们:当制度设计被滥用,它保护的就不再是孩子,而是恶意本身。

而在另一边,更加沉重的是信息的消失。这场抗议从一开始就被刻意“降温”甚至“消音”。微博没有热搜,抖音上视频迅速被删除,B站屏蔽关键词,知乎关闭讨论。一件本该引发全国热议的社会事件,反而在主流中文互联网平台上变得难以搜索、无法转发。

哪怕只是转发抗议视频、质疑警方通报,很多账号也遭到限流或封禁。于是,暴力发生了、愤怒发生了、抗议发生了,但它在国内网络上“没有发生”。

 

江油不是终点,而是序章?

江油的抗议已被镇压,媒体被控评,视频下架,话题降温。但这件事是否真的过去了?不是。它留下了深刻的记忆,也留下了一个问题:当合法的渠道不能表达诉求时,民众还有哪些方式争取正义?

36年前,北京的大学生曾试图用鲜血唤醒制度的变革;今天,江油的家长和中学生尝试用歌声、国旗与呼喊,换来一句公道。但政府依旧选择沉默与清场。历史不会简单重复,却会在压抑与沉默中,酝酿下一次觉醒。

 

写在最后

作为身在海外的中国人,我看到江油家长的眼泪、江油女孩的委屈、江油政府的冷漠,我想说:当“进过派出所也没事”成为施暴者的底气,真正的问题,就早已超越了校园暴力事件。

六四之后,有人说中国人再不会上街;而江油告诉我们,街头的火种,哪怕微弱,也从未熄灭。它等待的,只是一个重新燃烧的机会。

Jiangyou and Tiananmen Square: When people go to streets again

Abstract: In 2025, Jiangyou caused public protests because of the unfair handling of the school violence case, and the scene was reminiscent of the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989. The article analyzes the differences between the two demands and groups, and reveals that under high pressure and blockade, the people’s pursuit of fairness and justice is still there.

Author: Yiwei Mao
Editor: Feng Still Responsible Editor: Luo Zhifei
Translator: Ming Cheng

On July 22, 2025, in Jiangyou, Sichuan, a video of a 14-year-old girl being beaten exploded on social media. In the video, the three violent girls not only abused and slapped the victims wantonly, but also threatened that “it’s okay to go to the police station several times”, with a posture of no awe of the law. Jiangyou police then reported that the victim was “slightly injured”, and the perpetrator was only reprimanded because he was underage. The result of this treatment, on the contrary, aroused greater public anger.

On August 4, 1989, angry citizens took to the streets, singing the national anthem and shouting slogans in front of the Jiangyou Municipal Government, demanding that the abusers be punished, the injuries should be re-identified, and the police officers should be held accountable. The protest lasted until late at night. The police sent to block the road and force the field to clear. Many people were arrested, and physical conflicts broke out at the scene. This scene reminds people of another historical node: the Tiananmen Incident on June 4th in 1989. At the moment when the street people shouted justice, the cry of “we want a statement” traveled through 36 years of time and space, which was touching.

Looking back at Tiananmen Square from Jiangyou

June 4th is a national student movement, which eventually evolves into a political crisis, put forward deep institutional demands such as “freedom of the press” and “democratic reform”. Jiangyou’s protest focused on the mishandling of a school bullying case – a local law enforcement problem, which seems to be small, directly hits the people’s collective distrust of the law and power.

The protesters of June 4th are mainly college students and intellectuals, while the participants of Jiangyou are ordinary citizens, parents, primary and secondary school students, who are the more “down-to-earth” silent majority. They are not political activists, they just want justice.

This may be the real picture of China today: the call for political reform may have left, but the desire for fairness, justice and truth has never been extinguished. The Jiangyou incident is like a muffled thunder, reminding people that even if the high pressure has been stable for many years, the streets may still be a place for people to express their anger.

“Slight injury” and heavy social trauma

The “minor injury” identification by the Jiangyou police became a direct trigger for the protest. This judgment is not only questioned by netizens to “harm the common sense of justice”, but also reflects the public’s deep distrust of power corruption and injustice in law enforcement.

What’s more shocking is that the offenders in the video repeatedly show off their “immunities”, as if the Law on the Protection of Minors has become a shield against the law. This phenomenon reveals the huge loopholes in the implementation of the Law on the Protection of Minors, and also reminds us that when the system design is abused, what it protects is no longer children, but malice itself.

On the other hand, what is heavier is the disappearance of information. The protest was deliberately “cooled down” and even “muted” from the beginning. There are no trending searches on Weibo, the videos on TikTok were quickly deleted, the B station blocked the keywords, and Zhihu closed the discussion. A social event that should have caused a heated discussion throughout the country has become difficult to search and forward on the mainstream Chinese Internet platform.

Even if it is just to forward protest videos and question the police report, many accounts have been restricted or blocked. Therefore, violence, anger and protests occurred, but it “did not happen” on the domestic network.

Jiangyou is not the end, but the prologue?

Jiangyou’s protest has been suppressed, the media has been accused of commenting, the video has been removed from the shelves, and the topic has cooled down. But is this matter really over? No. It leaves a deep memory and a question: when legal channels cannot express their demands, what other ways can the people fight for justice?

Thinty-six years ago, college students in Beijing tried to awaken the reform of the system with their blood; today, parents and middle school students in Jiangyou tried to exchange songs, national flags and shouts for justice. But the government still chooses to remain silent and clear the field. History will not be repeated simply, but will brew the next awakening in oppression and silence.

Write at the end

As a Chinese overseas, I see the tears of Jiang You’s parents, the grievances of Jiang You girls, and the indifference of Jiang You’s government. I want to say that when “it’s okay to enter the police station” becomes the confidence of the violent, the real problem has long gone beyond the campus violence.

After June 4th, some people said that Chinese people would never go to the street again; but Jiangyou told us that the fire on the street, even if it was weak, would never be extinguished. What it is waiting for is just a chance to burn again.

                  

禁锢的好奇

0
禁锢的好奇
禁锢的好奇

Curiosity in Captivity

这两张照片拍摄于2021年,那一年公共场所所有人都必须佩戴口罩。年仅几个月大的宝宝因无法正常佩戴口罩,只得在口罩上剪出两个洞。透过这两个洞,用清澈纯真的眼神,探索这个被禁锢的世界。

作者:钟然
编辑:罗志飞 责任编辑:鲁慧文
翻译:何兴强

Curiosity in Captivity

These two photos were taken in 2021, the year when everyone in public places was required to wear a mask.
A baby, only a few months old, could not properly wear a mask, so two holes had to be cut into it.
Through these holes, with clear and innocent eyes, the baby explored this confined world.

Author: Zhong Ran
Editor: Luo Zhifei
Chief Editor: Lu Huiwen
Translator:He XingQiang

江油抗暴事件与孟加拉庶民的胜利

0
江油抗暴事件与孟加拉庶民的胜利

The Jiangyou Anti-Tyranny Incident and the Victory of the Common People of Bangladesh

作者:袁崛   编辑:何清风 责任编辑:鲁慧文

翻译:何兴强

 7月22日,四川省江油市发生未成年人校园霸凌案,一名14岁女中学生被另外三名女中学生辱骂、威胁和殴打。相关视频公布在网上后,引进公众愤怒。 8月4日警方公布案情及处置情况,引发民众对警方的质疑与愤怒,从而发展成为大规模的抗议事件。

江油抗暴事件与孟加拉庶民的胜利

大批江油市民被警方暴力抓捕,甚至送上运猪车。

8月4日,大批市民聚集在江油市主要路口进行游行抗议。警方设置路障封锁,但仍有大量民众突破封锁。抗议者高唱《义勇军进行曲》并高喊“还我民主”、“还孩子真相”、“严惩凶手”、“依法办案”等口号。大量示威者遭到抓捕。另有市民聚集在霸凌者居住的小区门口抗议,并摆放花圈。8月4日晚学生加入示威游行,与警察对峙,并高喊“团结”、“拒绝霸凌”、“还我民主”等口号。8月5日凌晨警察向示威人群发起更为猛烈的镇压,警察手持警棍冲入人群并使用辣椒水,多名学生及市民被警察用警棍殴打以致头破血流,抗议学生很快被冲散。

8月5日后,民众的抗议行动虽然被镇压下去,江油事件所引发的社会舆论影响并没有消除。海内外民众通过推特、油管围观与传播,为受到校园霸凌的女生和她的聋哑妈妈遭受的不公发声。同时也控诉中共残暴镇压和平抗议的学生与市民,更有甚者联想起去年8月5日发生在孟加拉国的反抗运动,抗议民众借此推翻了哈西娜独裁政权,希望中国也能由局部的抗议星火燎原,早日推翻中共以实现中国的民主化。在此贴出一篇旧文,总结由孟加拉政权的跨台对于反抗中共专制政权的启示。

2024年8月5日,孟加拉前总理哈西娜领导的政权被愤怒的民众推翻,她本人被迫辞职并仓皇出逃印度。由2006年诺贝尔和平奖获得者,孟加拉著名经济学家尤纳斯牵头,组织包括原政府人员、军方、学生反对派组成临时政府,预示着在这场持续一个多月的孟加拉国公职配额改革运动中,孟加拉民众取得了决定性的胜利。

孟加拉反配额运动中青年占领政府大楼

这场抗议运动缘起于2024年6月5日,孟加拉国高等法院在一起案件中恢复了原本的公职配额,即允许孟加拉政府将超过半数的空缺职位给予参加孟加拉解放战争的老兵(即自由战士)后代,没有背景的普通青年只能争夺剩下的少部分职位。这一类似于中共政权统治下的军二代红二代特权泛滥行为迅速引发孟加拉各大学学生的不满和抗议。孟加拉哈西娜政府不仅没有响应抗议学生的呼声,反而暴力镇压导致两百多人死亡。学生和民众的抗议行为由最初的反对公务员配额制度扩展为全社会参与,多种诉求的政治运动并最终推翻了哈西娜政权。

 孟加拉前总理哈西娜在一处受损的地铁站前发表讲话

中国网民在社媒上对孟加拉反世袭抗议用直白或隐晦的方式表达支持,以此表明对中共专制政权中特权世袭与泛滥的不满。通过观察这场持续近两个月的运动,结合各路专家学者给出的各种建议和分析,笔者总结了以下几点:

任何一项社会改革或重大的意外事件引发的动荡都有可能成为中国民主运动的燎原之火。孟加拉国最高法院的一次关于公务员配额不公的判决,就拉开了全国抗议的序幕。而中共高官及其子女所享用的特权、特供,他们使用白手套所获得的金钱和利益,比孟加拉 “红二代”所获得的不知高出多少倍!中国人所遭受的不公、迫害、暴力镇压比孟加拉人也不知要严重多少倍。现在经济濒临崩溃,年轻人找不到工作,看不到未来。压抑的氛围、严重的戾气让中国社会成了一个火药桶,未来任何一个导火索都可能引爆这个高压罐。温和者用跳楼、跳河等方式结束自己的生命,而暴戾者则在街上用刀捅人或驾驶汽车冲撞行人,以此表达不满与绝望。

1989年六四运动的导火索是中共前总书记胡耀邦的去世,民众悼念胡所遭受的不公及借此表达对中共贪污专制的不满而提出政治诉求,从而引发全国各地各群体的抗议运动。现在中国每年的抗议运动数万起,近些年来经济萧条,由于工资拖欠、房企爆雷、食品安全问题,各种维权和抗议活动大幅增加,中共为了维持政权稳定,需要耗费超过国防开支的维稳经费。大部分抗议行为都被中共暴力镇压或采用拖延方式化解,例如河南村镇银行维权事件。如何让维权运动能够持久,大规模的进行下去,造成广泛的社会影响,是一个很值得探讨的话题。

1989年六四运动天安门广场

各种反对运动、抗议的彼此呼应与联结才能让暴政机器顾此失彼、难以形成有效镇压,从而能够撼动乃至推翻中共政权。2008年贵州瓮安事件后,中共更重视地方的治理与稳定,所谓“郡县治,天下安”,当年即安排万名县委书记进京培训,学习如何加强对地方的管控。习近平政权实行网格化管理,将城市和社区化分为若干网格,有专门的网格员负责信息收集、矛盾调解与问题报告。这一类似于中国古代专制社会的保甲制度,将中共对民众的防范与管控发挥到了极致。

现在中国社会的抗议大多是分散且局部的,大多是利益诉求而不是政治权利诉求。他们是由于某一具体利益受损,如买房收不到房、存款或理财取不出钱、工作领不到工资等而采取行动。这些诉求单一且分散的抗议行为参加的人数有限,很难同时或同地进行,诉求的利益得到部分解决后很容易被瓦解分化及镇压,抗议的召集人事后被严惩,对其它人起到杀鸡儆猴的效应。

最近杭州外卖小哥抗议事件事出偶然,有一外卖员被小区保安欺压,其它外卖员知道后一呼百应,甚至从几十公里之外赶来支援,这体现了外卖员群体的团结与效率。如果杭州其它维权团体能够同时采取行动,提出各种不同的利益诉求,形成共振效应,效果会明显不同。

2022年11月底爆发的白纸运动

中共政权的统治绝不是铁板一块,争取中共党内或军队开明派保持中立甚至支持非常重要。孟加拉人民抗议能够取得胜利,其中一个重要因素是军队高层明确告诉哈西娜,不会对她个人效忠,军队将保持中立,不会对抗议民众开枪,并且只对她本人提供24小时的安全保护。哈西娜知道大势已去,紧急出逃印度。对比35年前的六四运动,根据六四学者吴仁华先生的研究,虽然有中共38集团军徐勤先军长的抗命不从,但是徐军长很快被解职逮捕。不仅其它中共党卫军积极屠杀民众,38军在高压之下为了表功,反而屠杀抗议青年更多更狠。中共党卫军如果能够保持基本的人性,减少滥杀,结局也可能完全不同。

纵使如此,中共党内也不是铁板一块,远者有以《炎黄春秋》杂志社杜导正、李锐那批中共老人为代表的党内开明派,他们是倡导政治体制改革,积极向普世价值靠拢的。去年有一段红二代内部群的争论:贺姓前附马爷在争论中痛骂习,说恨不得亲手宰了这头猪。表明中共权贵家族的内斗到了刺刀见红的地步。因为习近平政权这些年的倒行逆施,不仅使中国经济萧条,百业凋敝,也阻挡了权贵们的窃取财富之路。如香港作为国际金融中心,一直是权贵们转移财富至国外的理想地点,这些年香港金融业的迅速衰落,让权贵们转移财富增加了难度。利用好中共内部的矛盾,争取开明派和部分军队高层对民主运动者的支持,至关重要。

抓住中共党魁及其爪牙的软肋,给予迎头痛击,让其在镇压民众时有所顾忌。中共政权挟14亿人矿资源,以低人权优势发展成世界最大的专制经济体。在14亿人矿中,大多数人都有父母、孩子等软肋,遭遇社会不公与压迫时只能逆来顺受、忍气苟活。那中共及其爪牙有没有软肋,当然有!中共统治者不会在乎普通民众的尊严与生命,但是他们会在意自己的财产、亲人家属的生命。孟加拉抗议运动中,因警察采用暴力手段对付民众,民众以暴制暴,用暴力手段对付军警的家属,导致军警无心镇压,带着家人四处逃散。极大的影响了孟加拉军方的镇压决心。以暴制暴虽不值得赞扬,但是在面对强大的暴力机器而非对称作战时,是一种无奈却十分有效的策略。辛亥革命前夕,革命党人通过暗杀等手段,有效地动摇了清朝统治者的心理,促进了清朝统治集团的退位。如汪精卫对摄政王载沣的暗杀,吴樾对出洋考察宪政五大臣的暗杀。我们通过技术手段,一是可以获取中共红二代三代在国外生活的住址、财富的规模,必要时予以曝光,二是可以获取所有军警等暴力机关人员的住址,亲属名单,以备将来不时之需。特别是公检法中过去或现在仍然在迫害国内民主人士、造成冤假错案的恶人,通过中共恶人榜公布其个人信息与罪行,必要时采取行动,起到震慑作用。

寒冬已然降临,处在恶政暴行下的人民仍在苦苦挣扎,哀鸣。然哀莫大于心死,中国人骨子里从来不缺反抗的基因,属于中国人的茉莉花之春不会为时太久。

The Jiangyou Anti-Tyranny Incident and the Victory of the Common People of Bangladesh

Abstract: On July 22, in Jiangyou City, Sichuan Province, a case of school bullying involving minors occurred: a 14-year-old girl was insulted, threatened, and beaten by three other girls. On August 4, a large number of citizens gathered at major intersections in Jiangyou to protest, but were met with the most brutal crackdown by the CCP authorities since the Tiananmen Massacre.

Author: Yuan Jue

Editor: He Qingfeng

Chief Editor: Lu Huiwen

Translator:He XingQiang

 

On July 22, 2025, in Jiangyou City, Sichuan Province, a 14-year-old girl was insulted, threatened, and beaten by three other girls. When videos of the incident were posted online, they sparked public outrage. On August 4, after the police announced their account of the case and their handling of it, citizens questioned the police response and grew angry, leading to large-scale protests.

Large numbers of Jiangyou residents were violently arrested by police, some even loaded onto pig-transport trucks.

On August 4, crowds gathered at major intersections in Jiangyou City to protest. Police set up barricades, but many protesters broke through. Demonstrators sang the March of the Volunteers and shouted slogans such as “Return our democracy,” “Give us the truth about the child,” “Severely punish the perpetrators,” and “Enforce the law.” Many demonstrators were arrested. Some citizens gathered outside the neighborhood where the bullies lived to protest, placing funeral wreaths at the gates.

That evening, students joined the protest marches, confronting the police and chanting “Unity,” “Reject bullying,” and “Return our democracy.” In the early hours of August 5, the police launched a more violent crackdown—charging into the crowd with batons and using pepper spray. Many students and citizens were beaten so badly that their heads were split open, and the student protesters were quickly dispersed.

Although the protests were suppressed after August 5, the public debate sparked by the Jiangyou Incident did not die down. Chinese citizens at home and abroad used Twitter and YouTube to speak out for the bullied girl and her deaf-mute mother, and to condemn the CCP’s brutal suppression of peaceful protests by students and citizens. Some drew parallels to the protest movement in Bangladesh on August 5 of the previous year, in which mass resistance toppled the authoritarian regime of Sheikh Hasina. They expressed hope that, in China too, local protests could ignite a nationwide movement, leading to the CCP’s downfall and the realization of democracy. Here, I share an older article summarizing the lessons from the fall of the Bangladeshi regime for resisting the CCP’s dictatorship.

On August 5, 2024, the government led by former Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina was overthrown by angry citizens. Hasina was forced to resign and flee to India in haste. Nobel Peace Prize laureate (2006) and renowned Bangladeshi economist Muhammad Yunus organized a transitional government composed of former officials, the military, and student opposition groups—signaling a decisive victory for the Bangladeshi people in their month-long movement to reform the public service quota system.

Bengali youths occupy government buildings during the anti-quota movement.

This protest movement began on June 5, 2024, when Bangladesh’s High Court reinstated the old civil service quota system, allowing more than half of government vacancies to be allocated to the descendants of veterans of the country’s Liberation War (the “freedom fighters”). Ordinary young people without such backgrounds had to compete for the remaining minority of positions. This system, similar to the CCP’s entrenched privileges for the “second-generation reds” (children of high-ranking officials), quickly provoked student anger and protests across Bangladeshi universities. Rather than listening to the students, Hasina’s government violently suppressed the protests, killing more than 200 people. The protests soon expanded beyond the single issue of quotas into a broad, society-wide political movement, eventually overthrowing Hasina’s regime.

Former Bangladeshi Prime Minister Hasina delivers a speech in front of a damaged metro station.

Chinese netizens on social media expressed their support—either openly or indirectly—for the anti-hereditary-privilege protests in Bangladesh, as a way to show their own dissatisfaction with the CCP’s entrenched privileges and corruption. Observing this two-month-long movement, and considering the advice and analysis from experts and scholars, I have summarized the following points:

Any social reform or unexpected event that triggers unrest can ignite the flames of a Chinese democracy movement. In Bangladesh, it was an unfair court ruling on civil service quotas that sparked nationwide protests. In China, the privileges enjoyed by CCP officials and their children, and the vast wealth they accumulate through proxies, far exceed anything in Bangladesh. The injustices, persecution, and violent repression faced by the Chinese people are far worse. With the economy on the verge of collapse, youth unemployment high, and a suffocating atmosphere of resentment, Chinese society is like a powder keg—any spark could trigger an explosion. While some desperate individuals quietly take their own lives, others lash out violently in public.

In 1989, the death of former CCP General Secretary Hu Yaobang was the spark that triggered the Tiananmen democracy movement. Citizens first mourned Hu’s unjust treatment, then channeled their anger into demands for political reform. Protests spread nationwide. Today, there are tens of thousands of protests in China each year. With the economic downturn, wage arrears, real estate bankruptcies, and food safety scandals, protests have increased sharply. The CCP spends more on “stability maintenance” than on national defense. Most protests are either violently suppressed or stalled out, as in the Henan rural bank scandal. The challenge is how to sustain such movements, expand them, and generate broad social impact.

Tiananmen Square during the 1989 June Fourth massacre .

Solidarity between different protests is key. When protests support each other and connect, the dictatorship’s machinery of repression is stretched thin, making effective suppression difficult. Since the 2008 Weng’an incident in Guizhou, the CCP has prioritized local stability. Xi Jinping’s regime has implemented “grid management,” dividing urban neighborhoods into small zones with “grid workers” tasked with gathering information and mediating disputes—similar to the ancient baojia system. This extends the CCP’s surveillance and control to the extreme.

Most current Chinese protests are scattered and issue-specific, such as disputes over undelivered apartments, frozen deposits, or unpaid wages. These narrow and localized actions rarely occur simultaneously or in the same place. Once the immediate grievance is partially addressed, the movement is easily dismantled. Organizers are punished to “kill the chicken to scare the monkeys.”

The recent Hangzhou food delivery workers’ protest began when a security guard bullied one rider; others responded in solidarity, some traveling from dozens of kilometers away. This shows the unity and rapid mobilization potential of certain labor groups. If other groups could act simultaneously with diverse demands, the effect could be much greater.

The White Paper Movement that broke out in late November 2022.

The attitude of the military is decisive. In Bangladesh, a key reason for the protesters’ victory was that senior military officers told Hasina they would not personally protect her or fire on the people. They would only ensure her personal safety for 24 hours. Knowing she had lost, Hasina fled. In contrast, during the Tiananmen Massacre, although 38th Army Commander Xu Qinxian refused orders, he was quickly dismissed and arrested, and other military units eagerly massacred the protesters to show loyalty.

The CCP is not monolithic. In the past, there were reformist insiders—such as Du Daozheng and Li Rui of Yanhuang Chunqiu—who supported political reform. Even some “second-generation reds” have expressed open hatred for Xi Jinping. Xi’s policies have not only devastated the economy but also hindered the elites’ ability to transfer wealth overseas, especially after Hong Kong’s decline as a financial hub. This internal discontent can be leveraged.

Strike at the regime’s soft spots. While the CCP rulers do not care about the dignity or lives of ordinary citizens, they do care about their own wealth and families. In Bangladesh, when the police used violence against protesters, citizens retaliated against the families of security forces, causing many to abandon their posts and flee with their relatives—crippling the military’s will to suppress dissent. Such asymmetric tactics, while not admirable, can be effective against overwhelming state violence.

Before the 1911 Revolution, revolutionaries used assassinations to shake the Qing rulers’ confidence, such as Wang Jingwei’s attempt on Regent Zaifeng and Wu Yue’s attack on the five ministers sent to study constitutional reform abroad.

We can use technology to identify and expose the foreign residences and assets of the CCP’s second and third generation elites, as well as the addresses and family members of current and former police, prosecutors, and judges responsible for persecuting dissidents. Creating and publicizing a “CCP Perpetrator List” could serve as a warning and deterrent.

Winter has descended, and the people still suffer and cry under tyranny. Yet there is nothing more tragic than a deadened heart. The Chinese people have never lacked the genes of resistance. The “Jasmine Spring” that belongs to China will not be far away.

执笔为剑:推翻中共暴政,重建民主中国

0
执笔为剑:推翻中共暴政,重建民主中国

Pen as Sword: Overthrow the CCP’s Tyranny and Rebuild a Democratic China

 

执笔为剑:推翻中共暴政,重建民主中国

我是中国民主党员赵杰。2025年7月29号中国民主党党刊《在野党》第十二期纸质版样书已经印刷出来了,在中国民主党罗兰岗党部我们《在野党》所有工作人员召开第一次全体线下讨论会。很荣幸能见证这一重要的历史的时刻,更荣幸能作为《在野党》期刊的编辑、财务,以及加入刚刚成立的外联部部长,这一切都是内心对于渴望追求自由、正义、真理的见证,执笔为武器,加速中共的倒台,建立属于中国人的民主国家,这是我的责任。

 

作者:赵杰

编辑:罗志飞 责任编辑:鲁慧文

翻译:何兴强

Pen as Sword: Overthrow the CCP’s Tyranny and Rebuild a Democratic China

I am Zhao Jie, a member of the China Democracy Party. On July 29, 2025, the 12th issue of the China Democracy Party’s official journal The Opposition (print edition) has been printed. At the party headquarters in Rowland Heights, all staff of The Opposition held the first full in-person discussion meeting.

I am honored to witness this historic moment, and even more honored to serve as the editor and financial officer of The Opposition, as well as to join the newly established External Liaison Department as its head. All of this reflects my inner yearning for freedom, justice, and truth.

With the pen as my weapon, I aim to accelerate the downfall of the Chinese Communist Party and establish a democratic nation that belongs to the Chinese people. This is my responsibility.

Author: Zhao Jie

Editor: Luo Zhifei

Chief Editor: Lu Huiwen

Translator:He XingQiang

全民强制社保,中共自掘坟墓

0
全民强制社保,中共自掘坟墓

Universal Mandatory Social Security — The CCP Digging Its Own Grave

作者:罗志飞 编辑:李聪玲 责任编辑:鲁慧文 翻译:鲁慧文

2025年8月6日中国墙内发生了一起性质比江油打人还要恶劣、影响还要广泛的事情,那就是9月1号就要实行的强制社保新规。这件事情之所以引发广泛的共鸣和超高的热度,是因为江油的打人不会打在所有人的身上,但是这个社保新规将会大面积催生中国墙内的破产潮、倒闭潮、裁员潮,全民都会遭殃。笔者从来没见过给自己挖坟掘墓挖得这么彻底并且这么积极的政党。

根据相关媒体报道,中国的最高法院出台了一个看起来人畜无害的司法解释。7月31日最高人民法院发布了一个叫《关于审理劳动争议案件适用法律问题的解释(二)》,看起来很小众,跟我们没有关系,但是它规定的内容是明确针对用人单位规避社保缴纳、劳动者主动放弃社保等问题,无论是双方协商还是劳动者单方面承诺,任何不缴社保的约定都是无效的。

全民强制社保,中共自掘坟墓

有人可能在想这明明是对劳动者的保护,但这个政策与其说是保护劳动者,倒不如说是在劳动者和企业主之间种下不信任的种子,并大规模催生倒闭、破产、裁员潮。因为它已经规避了所有不交社保的可能性,比如相互举报,比如绑定孩子上学问题,堵住了老百姓所有退路。

中国经济现在举步维艰,外贸逐日衰减,很多的问题逐日浮现,很多企业商户都在咬牙硬撑。当前有些人甚至在赔本经营了,只是为了占住店面,占住这个行业,占住这个市场份额。以前双方可以协商,都不交社保,公司给员工多发点工资,双方一般都是一拍即合。

但现在中共政府突然出这么个政策,就等于是在逼着这些小企业走上绝路。其中服装商户、餐饮商户,这两个是绝对的重灾区,因为这两个行业的商户交不起社保。服装也好,餐饮也好,是很多普通人的工作首选。这两个行业是雇人最多的,也是普通人除了送外卖、跑网约车之外,能找到的比较靠谱的、不太吃学历的就业岗位,也最能代表广大的人民群体。

但现在中共强制要求全部的商户都得交社保。商户一算下来,开店的用工成本陡然增加,那别了吧。商户会心想:“我没员工,我没企业,我把店关了,你还能怎么地,我回家坐吃山空,也比我开这个店的损失要小。”, 所以只要这个社保新规执行,墙内的企业和店面必将出现大面积倒闭。

那为什么中共会出这个新规?因为现在的养老金出现巨大的亏空。根据网上的公开信息推算,中国的养老金至少有1.2万亿的缺口。前两个月,中国审计部门调查中国13个省,中共官方承认审计说有13个省多挪用了400亿资金,用来弥补当地的一些县的基本支出,实际上就是给公务员发工资。这就是中共政府没钱的有效佐证。

中国的经济或中国养老金的亏空已经到了什么地步,让中共宁愿要动摇国本,挖韭菜根,也不舍得把自己填进去。而中共这些利益集团真的没有钱吗,并不是,只是中共政府没钱而已。跟明朝末年是一样的,明朝末年,老百姓越没钱,官家从上级到啰啰,搜刮民脂民膏就越狠。那些官僚家中富裕如流。

所以官逼民反的那一天,结合江油事件,它就越来越近了。当中共不触及人民利益的时候,人民也就懒得说话,都忙着生存呢,谁有空理你。但是当中共触及人民根本利益的时候,人民会团结起来,教你中共做人。那时候,中共就能体会到,什么是人民的汪洋大海,谁才是真正的当家人。

Universal Mandatory Social Security — The CCP Digging Its Own Grave

Summary: The CCP’s forcible rollout of universal mandatory social security will trigger business closures and a wave of unemployment, stemming from a massive pension deficit. Public outrage may accelerate a political crisis for the regime.

Author: Luo Zhifei

Editor: Li Congling Chief Editor: Lu Huiwen Translation: Lu Huiwen

On August 6, 2025, an incident occurred inside China’s Great Firewall that is more malignant in nature and more far-reaching in impact than even the Jiangyou assault case — the mandatory social security regulation set to take effect on September 1.

The reason this has struck such a deep chord and generated such massive public attention is that the Jiangyou beating incident does not affect everyone, but this new social security regulation will trigger a nationwide wave of bankruptcies, closures, and layoffs. Everyone will suffer. I have never seen a political party dig its own grave so thoroughly and so enthusiastically.

According to relevant media reports, China’s Supreme People’s Court issued what appears to be a harmless judicial interpretation. On July 31, the court released the Interpretation (II) on Several Issues Concerning the Application of Law in the Trial of Labor Dispute Cases.

It sounds niche and unrelated to most of us, but its provisions explicitly target employers avoiding social security contributions and employees voluntarily giving them up. It states that any agreement — whether reached through mutual negotiation or a unilateral promise by the employee — to forgo social security contributions is invalid.

Some might think this is protection for workers, but rather than protecting them, this policy plants seeds of mistrust between workers and employers and will massively accelerate closures, bankruptcies, and layoffs.

It eliminates all possibilities of not paying social security — such as mutual consent or opting out in exchange for higher wages — and even ties compliance to things like children’s school enrollment, cutting off every escape route for ordinary people.

China’s economy is already struggling; foreign trade is declining daily, more problems are surfacing, and many businesses are barely hanging on. Some are even operating at a loss just to hold onto their storefronts, their industries, or their market share. Previously, employers and employees could agree to skip social security contributions, with companies paying higher salaries instead — a win-win.

Now, the CCP’s sudden policy is effectively forcing small businesses into a dead end.

Clothing retailers and restaurants are particularly hard-hit, because they cannot afford the social security costs. These two industries employ large numbers of ordinary people and, aside from food delivery and ride-hailing, offer the most accessible, relatively stable jobs for those without higher education. They represent a broad swath of the population.

But with mandatory contributions, business owners will do the math and realize their labor costs have suddenly skyrocketed. Many will simply decide: “If I have no employees, I have no business. I’ll close my shop — what can you do about it? Sitting idle at home is still better than bleeding money by keeping the shop open.”

Once the new rule is enforced, there will inevitably be mass closures of businesses and storefronts across China.

Why is the CCP doing this? Because China’s pension system has a huge deficit.

Publicly available information suggests the shortfall is at least 1.2 trillion yuan. Two months ago, China’s auditing authorities investigated 13 provinces, and the CCP itself admitted that over 40 billion yuan had been diverted in these provinces to cover basic expenses in some counties — in reality, to pay civil servants’ salaries. This is strong evidence that the government is running out of money.

China’s economy and pension deficit have reached a point where the CCP is willing to destabilize the country and strip the grassroots bare rather than cut into its own privileges. Does this interest group really have no money? Not at all — the CCP government has no money, but the elites themselves are wealthy beyond measure.

It’s just like the final years of the Ming Dynasty: the poorer the common people became, the more viciously officials at every level squeezed them. The homes of bureaucrats were overflowing with riches.

The day when official oppression sparks popular rebellion is drawing closer — especially in light of the Jiangyou incident.

When the CCP does not touch the people’s interests, they remain silent, too busy trying to survive to bother speaking out. But when it strikes at their core interests, the people will unite and teach the CCP a lesson. On that day, the CCP will understand what it means for the people to be a vast ocean — and who truly owns the country.