作者：彭硕
编辑： 李晶 校对：周敏 翻译：周敏
共产主义作为一种政治与经济学说，在理论上追求消除阶级差异、实现资源平等分配。然而在不同国家的实践中，其政治形态往往演变为权力高度集中的统治结构，且多由强势领导人长期主导。从前苏联在斯大林统治时期，到波尔布特领导下的红色高棉政权，再到当代由习近平与金正恩主导的政治体系，这些领导人普遍被外界视为高度集权的独裁者。
这些案例在具体历史与国情上存在差异，但在权力结构上呈现出相似特征：当政治权力不依赖竞争性选举产生，且缺乏有效制衡机制时，权力更容易集中于个人，并逐步固化为以个人为中心的统治模式。共产主义政权的权力并非来自于选票，而是通过政党内部的权力斗争和一系列复杂的政治操作实现的，政权的获取方式并不是基于合法的民主程序。缺乏选票的支持，共产主义政权的领导人缺乏民意基础，他们的权力来源是强权和暴力。正如毛泽东所言，“枪杆子里面出政权”。这种权力来源方式，使得共产主义政权在本质上是一种独裁统治。
据最高人民法院公布的司法统计，近几年全国因贪污贿赂罪被判刑的人数，发生了显著变化，其中最引人注目的是重刑比例的持续攀升。2017年，被判处五年以上有期徒刑直至死刑的人数为2124人，到2024年，这一数字已上升至6630人，短短数年间增长超过三倍。重刑比例持续上升，这一现象表明，在高压反腐背景下，腐败问题可能并未明显收敛，而反腐在一定程度上也可能承担内部权力调整的功能，即以反腐之名来打压异己。与此同时，相关治理方式并未侧重于如公开官员财产等常见的制度性反腐手段。
据保护记者委员会（CPJ）的统计，中国长期是全球关押记者最多的国家之一，约40至50人。与此同时，根据无国界记者组织（RSF）发布的新闻自由指数显示，中国多年来持续处于全球排名末端（178/180）。从阶段性变化来看，一个更关键的差异：在胡锦涛时期，信息控制主要集中于传统媒体与关键政治议题，而在习近平时期，管控范围明显扩大至社交平台与个人表达层面，形成对内容生产、传播与反馈的全链条管理。同时，《网络安全法》（2017）、《数据安全法》（2021）与《个人信息保护法》（2021）相继实施，使信息控制进一步制度化与法律化。控制范围与方式转变为从以媒体为中心的管控，演变为覆盖整个社会的信息治理体系，其广度与执行强度均显著提升。这些变化反映出权力运行方式的进一步集中化趋势，作为“第四权”的媒体也沦为舆论宣传工具，这种独裁统治不仅抑制了社会的多样性和创造力，更导致了权力的滥用和严重的腐败问题。
习近平甚至能直接修改宪法，取消了国家主席任期限制，做终身主席。这种权力的高度集中，使得他可以肆无忌惮地推行自己的政策，而不必担心任何反对声音。这种独裁作风上行下效，导致下面的省市级官员也效仿其治理方式。在民主制度中，权力的制衡和监督机制是防止权力滥用的重要手段。司法、立法和行政三权分立，互相制衡，确保权力的行使符合公众利益。然而，在共产主义政权下，这种制衡机制缺失。政党和政府合二为一，党内的权力斗争取代了正常的政治竞争和监督机制。这种缺乏制衡和监督的体制，导致了领导人的决策缺乏透明度，没有有效的监督，领导人可以任意制定政策，而不必考虑政策的实际效果和对公众的影响。结果，社会资源被浪费，民众利益受损，比如贵州独山县人口不到40万，却欠下400亿高额负债做形象工程；类似地，雄安新区作为习近平亲自规划的项目已累计投入约1万亿元人民币，但目前人口导入进度与预期之间存在重大差距，项目在规划阶段缺乏公开听证机制，建设过程中也没有公开的审计。这类案例都指向一个共同问题：当决策缺乏外部反馈机制时，项目更容易呈现“先巨量投入、后匹配需求”的路径，这一机制在多个案例中有所体现。
在共产主义政权中，领导人对民众的责任感缺失。这不仅是因为权力集中和缺乏监督，更是因为领导人的选拔和任免机制本身存在问题。在这种体制下，领导人的升迁往往依赖于政治忠诚和派系斗争，而不是实际的治理能力和民众的支持。所以领导人并不真正关心普通民众的切身利益，加之缺乏媒体的监督，导致问题更加严重。以中国历年的抗洪救灾为例。江泽民和胡锦涛在任期间，社会舆论并没有像习近平时代这样管控程度显著增强，媒体还能批评政府。在重大灾害来临时，江、胡都会在第一时间亲自到达现场，至少在形式上表现出对灾区的关注和对民众的关怀。然而，习近平自上任以来，媒体逐渐被禁声，他很少在第一时间到达过任何重大的灾害现场，他只是发了无数的批示。权力只对权力的来源负责，不是通过选票上台的领导人，不会真正关心民众的疾苦和国家的长远发展，他们更关心的是如何巩固自己的权力和地位。
习近平通过其执政表现，亲自指挥亲自演示了共产主义的本质就是独裁。共产主义政权的虚假本质，在于其权力来源的非民主性、缺乏有效的制衡和监督机制以及领导人责任感的缺失。这种体制不仅难以实现其所宣称的平等与繁荣，反而可能导致权力滥用、腐败加剧与社会不公，并在一定程度上影响发展的质量与可持续性。
The Trend of Dictatorship in Communist Systems: Taking Xi Jinping as an Example
Author: Peng Shuo
Editor: Li Jing Proofreader: Zhou Min Translator: Zhou Min
Communism, as a political and economic theory, theoretically pursues the elimination of class differences and the realization of equal distribution of resources. However, in the practice of different countries, its political form often evolves into a ruling structure with highly concentrated power, and is mostly dominated by strong leaders for long periods. From the former Soviet Union during Stalin’s rule, to the Khmer Rouge regime under Pol Pot, to the contemporary political systems dominated by Xi Jinping and Kim Jong-un, these leaders are generally regarded by the outside world as highly centralized dictators.
While these cases differ in specific history and national conditions, they present similar characteristics in power structure: when political power does not arise from competitive elections and lacks effective checks and balances, power is more easily concentrated in an individual and gradually solidifies into an individual-centered ruling model. The power of communist regimes does not come from votes, but is achieved through internal power struggles within the political party and a series of complex political operations; the method of acquiring power is not based on legitimate democratic procedures. Lacking the support of votes, leaders of communist regimes lack a basis in public opinion; the source of their power is might and violence. Just as Mao Zedong said, “Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun.” This method of sourcing power makes communist regimes essentially a form of dictatorial rule.
According to judicial statistics released by the Supreme People’s Court, the number of people sentenced for crimes of embezzlement and bribery nationwide has undergone significant changes in recent years, the most striking of which is the continuous rise in the proportion of heavy sentences. In 2017, the number of people sentenced to more than five years of fixed-term imprisonment up to the death penalty was 2,124; by 2024, this figure had risen to 6,630, an increase of more than three times in just a few years. The continuous rise in the proportion of heavy sentences indicates that, against the backdrop of high-pressure anti-corruption efforts, the problem of corruption may not have significantly receded, and anti-corruption may also, to a certain extent, assume the function of internal power adjustment—that is, using the name of anti-corruption to suppress dissidents. Meanwhile, relevant governance methods have not focused on common institutional anti-corruption measures such as the public disclosure of officials’ assets.
According to statistics from the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), China has long been one of the countries that imprisons the most journalists in the world, approximately 40 to 50 people. At the same time, according to the Press Freedom Index released by Reporters Without Borders (RSF), China has for many years consistently ranked at the bottom of the world (178/180). Looking at stage-by-stage changes, there is an even more critical difference: during the Hu Jintao era, information control was mainly concentrated on traditional media and key political issues, whereas in the Xi Jinping era, the scope of control has clearly expanded to social media platforms and individual expression, forming a full-chain management of content production, dissemination, and feedback. Simultaneously, the Cybersecurity Law (2017), the Data Security Law (2021), and the Personal Information Protection Law (2021) were implemented successively, making information control further institutionalized and legalized. The scope and methods of control have evolved from media-centric management into an information governance system covering the entire society, with both breadth and execution intensity significantly enhanced. These changes reflect a trend of further centralization in the way power operates; the media, as the “fourth estate,” has also been reduced to a propaganda tool. This dictatorial rule not only suppresses social diversity and creativity but also leads to the abuse of power and serious corruption issues.
Xi Jinping was even able to directly amend the Constitution, abolishing the term limits for the President of the State to become a president for life. This high concentration of power allows him to push through his own policies unscrupulously without worrying about any opposing voices. This dictatorial style is emulated by subordinates, leading provincial and municipal officials to imitate his governance methods. In democratic systems, the mechanism of checks and balances and supervision of power is an important means to prevent the abuse of power. The separation of powers among the judiciary, legislature, and executive ensures that the exercise of power aligns with the public interest. However, under communist regimes, this check-and-balance mechanism is missing. The party and the government merge into one, and internal party power struggles replace normal political competition and supervision mechanisms. This system, lacking checks and balances and supervision, leads to a lack of transparency in the leader’s decision-making. Without effective supervision, the leader can formulate policies arbitrarily without having to consider the actual effects of the policies or their impact on the public. As a result, social resources are wasted and public interests are damaged. For example, Dushan County in Guizhou, with a population of less than 400,000, incurred a high debt of 40 billion yuan to build “image projects”; similarly, the Xiong’an New Area, a project personally planned by Xi Jinping, has accumulated an investment of approximately 1 trillion yuan, but there is currently a significant gap between the progress of population introduction and expectations. The project lacked a public hearing mechanism during the planning stage, and there was no public audit during the construction process. These types of cases point to a common problem: when decision-making lacks an external feedback mechanism, projects are more likely to follow a path of “massive initial investment followed by matching demand,” a mechanism reflected in multiple cases.
In communist regimes, leaders lack a sense of responsibility toward the people. This is not only because of the concentration of power and lack of supervision, but also because the selection and appointment mechanisms for leaders themselves are problematic. Under this system, the promotion of leaders often depends on political loyalty and factional struggles rather than actual governance ability and public support. Therefore, leaders do not truly care about the vital interests of ordinary people; coupled with the lack of media supervision, the problems become more serious. Take China’s flood control and disaster relief over the years as an example. During the terms of Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, social public opinion was not controlled to the significant degree it is in the Xi Jinping era, and the media could still criticize the government. When major disasters struck, both Jiang and Hu would arrive at the scene at the first opportunity, at least formally demonstrating concern for the disaster area and care for the people. However, since Xi Jinping took office, the media has gradually been silenced; he has rarely arrived at the scene of any major disaster at the first opportunity; instead, he has merely issued countless “instructions.” Power is only responsible to the source of power. Leaders who did not take office through votes will not truly care about the suffering of the people or the long-term development of the country; they are more concerned with how to consolidate their own power and position.
Through his governance performance, Xi Jinping has personally commanded and demonstrated that the essence of communism is dictatorship. The false nature of communist regimes lies in the non-democratic source of their power, the lack of effective checks and balances and supervision mechanisms, and the lack of responsibility among leaders. This system not only struggles to achieve the equality and prosperity it claims but may instead lead to the abuse of power, intensified corruption, and social injustice, and to a certain extent, affect the quality and sustainability of development.
