文：黄利娥

从更长的历史看，这种逻辑一再重复：制造敌人、动员群众、再由国家机器完成清洗。个体的疯狂只是结果，制度性的运作才是根源。

今年是“文革”爆发60周年。

每到这个时间，都会有人回顾那段历史：红卫兵、批斗会、抄家、破四旧、武斗、全民恐惧。很多年轻人把“文革”理解成一场群众疯狂，仿佛只是时代失控造成的一次悲剧。

但“文革”从来不是简单的社会失序。

如果没有最高权力的发动，没有宣传系统的煽动，没有整个体制的默许和配合，它根本不可能席卷全国，更不可能持续十年。

所以，“文革”最值得反思的，从来不只是红卫兵。

红卫兵只是表面现象，真正的问题是背后的权力结构。

回头看中共历史就会发现，“文革”并不是孤立事件。

从土地改革、镇压反革命、三反五反，到反右运动、大跃进，再到“文革”，以及后来的“六·四”镇压，中共历史几乎始终伴随着政治斗争和系统性暴力。

这种暴力并不只是肉体层面的。

它既包括公开镇压，也包括思想改造、舆论控制、社会清洗，以及通过恐惧让整个社会服从。

每一次政治运动的逻辑都高度相似：先制造敌人，再发动群众，最后由国家机器完成清洗和整肃。

敌人可以是地主、右派、资本主义道路当权派，也可以是“境外势力”“历史虚无主义”或者“不稳定因素”。

名称一直在变，但逻辑并没有真正改变。

这也是为什么，很多人今天回看现实，仍然会感到一种熟悉感。

没有了红卫兵，但有了网络审查。

没有了大字报，但有了算法过滤和关键词屏蔽。

没有了群众批斗，却有越来越精密的监控系统和数据治理。

时代进步了，技术升级了，但某种控制方式只是换了外衣。

说到底，问题不在于某一代人突然疯狂，也不只是某一个领导人的个人错误。

真正的问题在于：一个缺乏权力制衡、把政治凌驾于法律之上的体制，本身就天然容易滑向暴力。

当权力无需接受约束，当异议被视为威胁，当政治忠诚高于个人权利，暴力就不再只是手段，而会逐渐成为制度的一部分。

“文革”已经过去60年，但它留下的最大警示，不只是历史记忆。

而是提醒人们：如果制造“文革”的制度土壤没有被真正清算，类似悲剧就始终存在重演的可能。

这或许才是“文革”60周年最沉重的现实意义。

编辑：Geoffrey Jin

校对：熊辩

翻译：戈冰

本文由周小星提供

“Cultural Revolution” 2.0: An Upgraded Form of Control in Disguise

By Huang Li’e

Abstract: The “Cultural Revolution” was not an accidental tragedy resulting from mass chaos, but rather the outcome of power mobilization, propaganda promotion, and institutional collaboration. The Red Guards were merely a surface manifestation; what truly requires reflection is the power structure behind them.

From a broader historical perspective, this logic has repeated itself time and again: creating enemies, mobilizing the masses, and then having the state apparatus carry out the purge. Individual madness is merely the result; institutional operation is the root cause.

This year marks the 60th anniversary of the outbreak of the “Cultural Revolution.”

Every year at this time, people look back on that period: the Red Guards, public criticism sessions, home raids, the destruction of the “Four Olds,” violent clashes, and widespread fear. Many young people view the “Cultural Revolution” as a frenzy of the masses, as if it were merely a tragedy caused by a society spiraling out of control.

But the “Cultural Revolution” was never simply a case of social disorder.

Without the instigation of the highest authorities, without the incitement of the propaganda apparatus, and without the tacit approval and cooperation of the entire system, it could never have swept across the nation, much less lasted for a decade.

Therefore, what deserves the most reflection regarding the Cultural Revolution has never been merely the Red Guards.

The Red Guards were merely a surface phenomenon; the real issue lies in the power structure behind them.

Looking back at the history of the Chinese Communist Party, one will discover that the Cultural Revolution was not an isolated event.

From the Land Reform, the Suppression of Counter-Revolutionaries, the “Three Anti” and “Five Anti” campaigns, to the Anti-Rightist Movement, the Great Leap Forward, the Cultural Revolution, and the subsequent June Fourth crackdown, the history of the Chinese Communist Party has almost always been accompanied by political struggles and systemic violence.

This violence is not merely physical.

It encompasses not only open suppression but also ideological re-education, control of public opinion, social purges, and the use of fear to force the entire society into submission.

The logic behind each political campaign is strikingly similar: first, create an enemy; then, mobilize the masses; and finally, have the state apparatus carry out the purge and crackdown.

The enemy could be landlords, rightists, or those in power who follow the capitalist road; it could also be “foreign forces,” “historical nihilism,” or “destabilizing elements.”

The labels have changed, but the logic has not truly changed.

This is why, when many people look back at reality today, they still feel a sense of familiarity.

The Red Guards are gone, but internet censorship remains.

The big-character posters are gone, but algorithmic filtering and keyword blocking have taken their place.

Public denunciations are gone, but increasingly sophisticated surveillance systems and data governance have emerged.

Times have progressed, technology has advanced, but certain methods of control have merely changed their outward appearance.

Ultimately, the problem does not lie in a particular generation suddenly going mad, nor is it merely the personal mistake of a single leader.

The real problem lies in a system that lacks checks and balances and places politics above the law—a system that is inherently prone to sliding into violence.

When power faces no constraints, when dissent is viewed as a threat, and when political loyalty takes precedence over individual rights, violence ceases to be merely a means and gradually becomes an integral part of the system.

Sixty years have passed since the Cultural Revolution, but the greatest warning it leaves behind is not merely a historical memory.

Rather, it serves as a reminder that if the institutional conditions that gave rise to the Cultural Revolution are not truly addressed, similar tragedies will always have the potential to recur.

This, perhaps, is the most profound practical significance of the 60th anniversary of the Cultural Revolution.

Editor: Geoffrey Jin

Proofreader: Xiong Bian

Translator: Ge Bing

This article was provided by Zhou Xiaoxing