作者：张超瑜
编辑：周志刚 校对：孔祥庆 翻译：周敏

在讨论中国宗教问题时，一个无法回避的现象是：宗教事务正在越来越深地被纳入“维稳逻辑”之中。过去，人们普遍认为，宗教主要属于个人精神领域。一个人是否信仰、如何敬拜、选择何种聚会方式，本应属于私人自由范畴。可在现实中，宗教却越来越被视为一个需要重点管理、重点防范、重点控制的社会领域。这种变化，并不是简单的行政管理加强，而是治理逻辑本身的改变。

近年来，“宗教中国化”被不断强调。官方表述中，这一方向被解释为引导宗教适应社会主义社会、防范境外渗透、维护国家安全。从国家治理角度看，任何政权都会关注组织动员能力较强的社会群体，这本身并不难理解。问题在于，当“安全”与“稳定”被不断扩大解释后，许多正常宗教活动也开始被纳入高压管理范围。尤其对于家庭教会而言，这种变化尤为明显。很多家庭教会并不参与政治，也不具备社会对抗能力。它们存在的原因，往往只是部分信徒希望保留一种不依附行政体系的聚会方式。然而，在现实操作中，“不纳入统一管理”本身，就可能被视为一种风险。于是，一个原本关于信仰自主的问题，逐渐被转化成了治理问题。

在某些地区，宗教场所需要安装监控设备；未成年人参与宗教活动受到限制；聚会人数、讲道内容、培训活动需要层层审批；甚至连十字架、宗教标语等象征性元素，也可能进入行政整顿范围。这些措施背后的核心逻辑其实非常清晰：任何无法完全被纳入管理体系的社会空间，都会被视为潜在的不稳定因素。而宗教，恰恰天然具有组织性、共同价值观以及精神凝聚力。问题也因此出现：一个社会，是否只能允许“被定义过的信仰”存在？如果一种信仰必须先接受组织结构、表达方式乃至思想内容上的统一规范，才能获得合法空间，那么信仰本身的自主性就会越来越弱。因为真正的宗教，并不仅仅是形式上的聚会，更涉及个人内心世界。

很多信徒之所以坚持家庭聚会，并不是为了对抗，而是认为信仰应当首先服从内心，而非行政安排。对于他们而言，敬拜的意义，在于人与信仰之间的直接关系，而不是先经过制度许可。可在高度行政化的治理逻辑下，这种“自发性”本身，恰恰最容易引发警惕。事实上，中国社会对于“自发组织”的长期敏感，并不仅仅体现在宗教领域。无论是民间公益、独立社群，还是具有共同理念的人群，只要脱离统一管理框架，往往都会面临越来越严格的监管。这种治理方式的底层逻辑，是对“不确定性”的控制。因为对于高度强调稳定的治理体系而言，可控，往往比多元更重要。但问题是，一个真正成熟且稳定的社会，是否一定要建立在高度压缩社会空间之上？如果所有社会组织都必须依附于行政体系才能存在，那么社会本身的自我调节能力就会越来越弱。久而久之，人们会逐渐失去自主组织、自主表达以及彼此建立信任的能力。

而宗教问题之所以特殊，恰恰因为它触及人的精神世界。精神世界与行政命令之间，本身就存在天然张力。历史经验反复证明，信仰无法通过高压彻底消失。越是强制压缩空间，很多信仰活动反而越容易转入地下、走向隐蔽，甚至进一步加剧彼此的不信任。真正健康的治理，未必意味着完全放任，但至少应当允许合法边界内的多元存在。否则，当“统一”逐渐高于“自由”，当“管理”逐渐覆盖“信仰”，宗教就会越来越失去其原本属于个人内心的部分。而这，也许才是今天很多人真正担忧的问题。

When “Stability” Surpasses Faith: Why Religious Issues Are Becoming Increasingly Sensitive?

Author: Zhang Chaoyu

Editor: Zhou Zhigang Proofreader: Kong Xiangqing Translator: Zhou Min

Abstract: Chinese religion is being incorporated into the “logic of maintaining stability” (Weiwen logic). House churches are facing suppression because they are not under the management of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), yet faith cannot be completely eradicated through high-pressure management. Truly healthy governance should allow for pluralistic existence within legal boundaries; otherwise, religion will gradually lose the part of itself that originally belongs to the individual’s inner heart.

In the discussion of Chinese religious issues, an unavoidable phenomenon is that religious affairs are being increasingly and deeply incorporated into the “logic of maintaining stability.” In the past, it was generally believed that religion primarily belonged to the realm of individual spirituality. Whether a person has a faith, how they worship, and what kind of gathering method they choose should inherently belong to the category of private freedom. However, in reality, religion is increasingly viewed as a social field that requires key management, key prevention, and key control. This change is not a simple strengthening of administrative management, but a shift in the logic of governance itself.

In recent years, “the Sinicization of religion” has been continuously emphasized. In official expressions, this direction is explained as guiding religions to adapt to a socialist society, preventing overseas infiltration, and safeguarding national security. From the perspective of state governance, it is not difficult to understand that any regime would pay attention to social groups with strong organizational and mobilization capabilities. The problem lies in the fact that when “security” and “stability” are constantly expanded in their interpretation, many normal religious activities also begin to be included within the scope of high-pressure management.

This change is particularly evident for house churches. Many house churches do not participate in politics, nor do they possess the capacity for social confrontation. The reason for their existence is often simply that some believers wish to preserve a way of gathering that does not depend on the administrative system. However, in practical operations, “not being included in unified management” itself may be regarded as a risk. Thus, an issue that was originally about the autonomy of faith is gradually transformed into a governance issue.

In certain regions, religious venues are required to install monitoring equipment; the participation of minors in religious activities is restricted; the number of attendees, the content of preaching, and training activities require layers of approval; even symbolic elements such as crosses and religious slogans may fall within the scope of administrative rectification. The core logic behind these measures is actually very clear: any social space that cannot be fully incorporated into the management system will be regarded as a potential factor of instability. And religion, precisely, possesses natural organizational characteristics, shared values, and spiritual cohesion.

The question then arises: Is a society only allowed to have “defined faith” exist? If a faith must first accept unified standardization in its organizational structure, mode of expression, and even ideological content before it can obtain legal space, then the autonomy of the faith itself will become increasingly weak. Because true religion is not merely a formal gathering, but involves the individual’s inner world.

Many believers persist in house gatherings not for the sake of confrontation, but because they believe that faith should first obey the inner heart rather than administrative arrangements. For them, the meaning of worship lies in the direct relationship between man and faith, rather than first undergoing institutional permission. However, under the highly administrative logic of governance, this “spontaneity” itself is precisely what most easily triggers vigilance.

In fact, the long-standing sensitivity of Chinese society toward “spontaneous organizations” is not only reflected in the religious field. Whether it is civil society philanthropy, independent communities, or groups with shared philosophies, as long as they deviate from the unified management framework, they often face increasingly strict supervision. The underlying logic of this governance method is the control of “uncertainty.” Because for a governance system that highly emphasizes stability, controllability is often more important than plurality.

But the question is: Must a truly mature and stable society be built upon the highly compressed social space? If all social organizations must depend on the administrative system to exist, then the self-adjustment capability of society itself will become weaker and weaker. Over time, people will gradually lose the ability for autonomous organization, autonomous expression, and the establishment of mutual trust.

The religious issue is special precisely because it touches the spiritual world of human beings. There is a natural tension between the spiritual world and administrative orders. Historical experience has repeatedly proven that faith cannot disappear completely through high pressure. The more the space is forcibly compressed, the easier it is for many religious activities to move underground or become hidden, potentially even further intensifying mutual distrust.

Truly healthy governance does not necessarily mean total laissez-faire, but it should at least allow for pluralistic existence within legal boundaries. Otherwise, when “unity” gradually rises above “freedom,” and when “management” gradually covers “faith,” religion will increasingly lose the part of itself that originally belongs to the individual’s inner heart. And this, perhaps, is the issue that many people are truly worried about today.