作者：华言（中国大陆）

编辑：李聪玲 责任编辑：胡丽莉

“吃饱饭，是最大的政治风险”，这不是一句玩笑，而是极权制度下隐藏的逻辑真相。它揭示了一个残酷的现实：当人民填饱了肚子，极权统治的根基便开始动摇。

极权制度依赖对社会资源的全面掌控和对个体思想的严密控制。饥饿或匮乏状态下的民众更容易被生存压力所驱使，服从权威以换取基本生存保障。这种“匮乏政治”使得极权政权能够通过分配稀缺资源来巩固权力，强化依赖关系。极权统治者深谙此道：饥饿是最好的枷锁，匮乏是最佳的统治工具。试想，在一个连面包都稀缺的社会，人民会为了什么而活？为了那一口救命的粮食，为了那一点微薄的希望。而这希望，正是统治者手中的筹码。他们用配给制、用特权、用恐惧，换取人民的顺从。极权需要的，是一个永远匮乏的社会，因为匮乏让人民低头，让反抗无从萌芽。

然而，一旦“吃饱饭”，即基本生存需求得到满足，根据马斯洛需求层次理论，民众会转向更高层次的需求，如安全、归属感、尊重，甚至自我实现。这些需求往往伴随着对自由、公平和个人权利的渴望。吃饱饭的人民，开始抬头，开始思考，开始质疑。他们不再满足于被喂食的温饱，而是渴望自由的空气、公正的天空。而这些诉求与极权制度的核心——压制异见、统一思想——相冲突，这就是极权最大的政治风险。因为一个觉醒的人民，是任何铁腕都无法锁住的。

面对这一风险，极权统治者从不坐以待毙。他们设计了一套应对之策：制造人为的匮乏，通过控制资源分配，维持民众的生存压力，限制其追求更高层次需求的空间；同时强化思想控制，宣传机器昼夜运转，强化对思想的垄断，审查无处不在，试图让人民相信极权是唯一的救赎；此外，他们还会转移矛盾，炮制外部敌人，利用外部威胁煽动民族主义情绪，转移民众对内部问题的关注，让人民将怒火投向虚构的威胁，而非真正的压迫者。

“吃饱饭是最大的政治风险”揭示了极权制度的一个悖论：经济发展是政权合法性的重要来源，但也可能动摇其控制基础。极权体制的逻辑在于通过控制资源和思想，压制民众的需求层次上升。一旦温饱解决，民众的觉醒和反抗潜力增加，迫使极权政权在开放与高压之间寻求平衡。然而，这种平衡往往是脆弱的，长期来看，压制人性需求的制度难以持续稳定。

真正的力量，不在于掌控资源与恐惧，而在于回应人民合理需求的能力。只有当温饱成为常态，思想得以呼吸，民众开始独立思考，国家才能走向良性。而看似强大的极权统治，如果仍靠人民吃不饱维系，终将不可持续，注定衰亡。

Eating well is the biggest political risk.

Abstract: Totalitarian rule is shackled by scarcity, and hunger is subject to obedience; but when the people are fed, they pursue freedom, fairness and rights, which poses the greatest risk to the regime.

Author: Huayan (Mainland China)

Editor: Li Congling Responsible Editor: Hu Lili Translator：Ming Cheng

“Eating enough is the biggest political risk”, this is not a joke, but the hidden logical truth under the totalitarian system. It reveals a cruel reality: when the people are full, the foundation of totalitarian rule begins to shake.

The totalitarian system relies on the overall control of social resources and the strict control of individual thoughts. People in a state of hunger or poverty are more likely to be driven by the pressure of survival and obey authority in exchange for basic survival guarantees. This “lack of politics” enables totalitarian regimes to consolidate power and strengthen dependence by allocating scarce resources. The politic rulers are well aware of this: hunger is the best shackle, and poverty is the best tool for domination. Imagine, in a society where even bread is scarce, what will people live for? For that life-saving grain, for that meager hope. And this hope is the chip in the hands of the ruler. They use rationing, privilege and fear in exchange for people’s obedience. What the totalitarian power needs is a society that is always scarce, because the lack makes the people bow down and the resistance can’t sprout.

However, once the basic needs of survival are met, according to Maslow’s theory of hierarchy of needs, people will turn to higher needs, such as safety, sense of belonging, respect, and even self-realization. These needs are often accompanied by the desire for freedom, fairness and personal rights. The people who were full began to look up, think and question. They are no longer satisfied with the food and clothing of being fed but yearn for free air and fair sky. And these demands conflict with the core of the totalitarian system – suppressing dissis and unifying ideas, which is the biggest political risk of the totopolitism. Because an awakened people can’t be locked by any iron fist.

In the face of this risk, totalitarian rulers never sit by and wait for death. They designed a set of countermeasures: create man-made scarcity, maintain the people’s survival pressure by controlling the allocation of resources, and limit their space to pursue higher-level needs; at the same time, strengthen thought control, propaganda machines run day and night, strengthen the monopoly of thought, and censorship is ubiquitous, trying to make people believe that totalitarianism is the only Redemption; in addition, they will also divert contradictions, concoct external enemies, use external threats to incite nationalism, divert people’s attention from internal problems, and make people turn their anger into fictional threats rather than real oppressors.

“Eating well is the biggest political risk” reveals a paradox of the totalitarian system: economic development is an important source of legitimacy for the regime, but it may also shake its control. The logic of the totalitarian system is to suppress the rising level of people’s demand by controlling resources and ideas. Once food and clothing are settled, the awakening of the people and the potential for resistance will increase, forcing the totalitarian regime to seek a balance between opening up and high pressure. However, this balance is often fragile. In the long run, the system that suppresses human needs is difficult to be sustainable and stable.

The real power lies not in controlling resources and fear, but in the ability to respond to the reasonable needs of the people. Only when food and clothing become the norm, thoughts can breathe, and people begin to think independently, can the country become benign. The seemingly powerful totalitarian rule, if it is still maintained by the people’s lack of food, will eventually be unsustainable and doomed to decline.

作者：陀先润

编辑：周志刚 责任编辑 胡丽莉

我们这一代三十八九岁的人，大多是在“增长神话”和KPI语言里长大的，习惯了用经济学的曲线解释一切转弯。可要读懂过去四十多年，你得先把顺序摆正：先开放，后改革；开放向外，改革向内。开放是外交筹码，用来换技术、换市场、换时间；改革是统治修复，用来把秩序收回来、把资源再分配的阀门握紧。经济只是扳手，不是方向盘。权力才是那只不会放手的手。

很多人相信“经济危机逼出来改革”。这话好听，也最能安慰市场派的自尊：只要增长下滑，政策就会转向。但回头看，恰恰相反。六七十年代对外“开放”的起点，不是慈悲，也不是市场共识，而是安全焦虑。中苏翻脸、边境压顶，才有了对美和解与引资的窗口。开放不是为了老百姓口袋鼓一点，而是为了把国家机器的短板补起来，把卡脖子的装备补齐，把时间赢到自己一边。“改革”也并非要动根基。真正被触碰的，始终是非命脉地带：能放给市场的就放一点，放出来再随时回收；不能放的——军工、能源、金融枢纽、信息阀门——一寸不让。八十年代那套“双轨制”把计划与市场绑在一起跑，结果不是自动到站，而是一路颠簸，1988年价格闯关差点把经济掀翻。你可以说那是“改革成本”，但它更像一次内部压力测试：放到哪一步会触发系统性不稳，触发就回头。经济在这里不是目标，而是表。表针抖得太厉害，就拧回去。九十年代的“外向型理性”同样如此。每年和美国谈最惠国待遇，谈的是时间与空间——用人情、用姿态、用有限释放换一个年度通行证。直到加入世贸组织，才把筹码一次性推了上去。很多人把入世解读成“倒逼国内改革”，可真实的执行逻辑是：先拿到十五年的高速发展窗口，至于承诺，能拖则拖，能打补丁就打补丁。开放从来是单向的：要你的技术、要你的订单、要你的资本，但我的壁垒、我的口岸、我的红线，仍然归我。

2008 年之后的剧本更直白。四万亿不是去托举现金流断裂的民营外贸，而是去喂养“看得见”的铁公鸡与大国企。民营像孵化器，不停下蛋；国企像保温箱，把能量集中到可控处。理由很简单：当经济与稳权发生冲突，先稳权。一个路灯公司的电源都不能完全市场化，因为“断电”的按钮象征着政治风险。金融与数据更不用说，连“谁能发声、怎么发声”都要纳管。边界不是写在法条里，而是写在“风险叙事”里——凡是可被解读为组织风险的，都不属于市场。这就是为什么，每当民间资本试图自我组织、试图建制度、试图把“企业家共同体”变成公共议题时，红灯就会亮。不是你做得不够好，而是你做得太像制度要件。大学、基金会、行业自治、跨区域的职业资格——凡是能产生独立秩序的东西，都会被归类为“可疑的权力替代”。这不是经济学问题，是政治学问题：秩序来源必须唯一。把这条主线放回历史坐标，你就不再指望“危机推动善意拐点”。危机只会推动两种动作：一是对外更激进的讨价还价，争取喘息；二是对内更坚决的结构回收，确保关键阀门不在别人手里。市场与法治只有在不威胁阀门时才会得到扩容，一旦触线，就缩回去。所谓“中国式现代化”，核心机制就是“可增长的边界”：边界在，增长就存在；边界被触动，增长就让路。这并不意味着增长不重要。恰恰相反，增长是合法性叙事的底座，是“绩效政治”的KPI。投资、地价、出口、产业迭代，这些指标变成了“统治会计”的科目表。你能在表上交出成绩，就能在政治上换来安全。但当“绩效”和“安全”发生冲突，选择题没有悬念。于是我们看到“先放后收”的循环：放，是为了把经济这匹马拉起来；收，是为了确保缰绳在手。对我们这代人而言，真正需要更新的认知是：不要用经济逻辑套政治抉择。你可以用现金流模型估企业，用需求曲线看行业，但不要用它来预测“何时转向”。转向从来不是由GDP 的同比数决定的，而是由“风险感知”的温度计决定的。今天的外部压力会带来一些短期的姿态调整、一些技术型的“开放修辞”，但这不代表边界被重写。边界的书写者只认一条：政权安全。

那么，我们是不是在走一条熟悉的老路？如果“老路”指的是“以安全为纲、以经济为器、以开放求时、以改革修政”的路径，那么答案八九不离十。不同的是，外部世界更复杂，国内结构更庞大；相同的是，方向盘握在同一只手上。看懂这点，才知道该把哪些期待放低、哪些行动提速：做生意要看边界，做公共议题要看风险叙事；与其把希望交给“转向”，不如把准备交给“常态”。这不是犬儒，是成年人的清醒。我们这一代人，至少要把清醒当作基本素养。

The upper limit of reform and the lower limit of opening up

Author: Tuo Xianrun

Editor: Zhou Zhigang Responsible Editor Hu Lili

Abstract: The path of China’s “reform and opening up” for more than 40 years is “opening up first, reform later”. The economy has always served power; the crisis is not driving institutional breakthroughs, but external bargaining and internal tightening. The core logic is growth is important, but the security of the regime is a priority.

Most of our generation of thirty-eight-nine-year-olds grew up in the “growth myth” and KPI language and are used to explaining all the turns with the curve of economics. But to understand the past 40 years, you must first correct the order: first open up, then reform; open outward, reform inward. Opening up is a diplomatic chip, which is used to change technology, market and time; reform is the repair of rule, which is used to bring back order and redistribute resources. Economy is just a wrench, not a steering wheel. Power is the hand that won’t let go.

Many people believe that “the economic crisis has forced reform”. This is nice to hear, and it can also comfort the self-esteem of the market faction: as long as the growth declines, the policy will turn around. But looking back, it’s just the opposite. The starting point of “opening up” to the outside world in the 1960s and 1970s was not compassion or market consensus, but security anxiety. Only by turning the face of China and the Soviet Union and pressing the border to the top, there is a window for reconciliation with the United States and attracting investment. Opening up is not to make up the pockets of the common people, but to make up for the shortcomings of the national machinery, make up for the equipment of the stuck neck, and win time on your side. “Reform” does not need to be rooted. What is really touched is always the non-lifeblood zone: if you can release it to the market, put a little, release it and recycle it at any time; what can’t be released – military industry, energy, financial hub, information valve – don’t give up an inch. The “dual-track system” in the 1980s tied the plan to the market. The result was not automatic arrival but bumps all the way. In 1988, the price breakthrough almost overturned the economy. You can say that it is the “cost of reform”, but it is more like an internal stress test: whichever step it is put, it will trigger systemic instability, and if it is triggered, it will turn back. The economy here is not a goal, but a table. The needle of the watch shook too much, so I screwed it back. The same is true for the “extroverted rationality” in the 1990s. Every year, we talk about most-favored-nation treatment with the United States, which is about time and space – using kindness, posture, and limited release in exchange for an annual pass. It was not until he joined the WTO that the chips were pushed up at once. Many people interpret the accession to the WK as “reverse domestic reform”, but the real implementation logic is getting the 15-year window of high-speed development first, as for the promise, drag it if you can, and patch it if you can patch it. Opening up has always been one-way: I want your technology, I want your order, I want your capital, but my barriers, my port, my red line, still belong to me.

The script after 2008 is more straightforward. Four trillion yuan is not to support private foreign trade with broken cash flow, but to feed the “visible” iron rooster and large enterprises. Private enterprises are like incubators, which do not stop laying eggs; state-owned enterprises are like incubators, concentrating energy in a controllable place. The reason is very simple: when there is a conflict between the economy and stability, the power should be stabilized first. The power supply of a streetlamp company cannot be fully marketize, because the “power off” button symbolizes political risk. Not to mention finance and data, even “who can speak out and how to speak out” needs to be managed. The boundary is not written in the law, but in the “risk narrative” – anything that can be interpreted as organizational risk does not belong to the market. That’s why whenever private capital tries to self-organize, tries to build a system, and tries to turn the “entrepreneur community” into a public issue, the red light will come on. It’s not that you don’t do it well enough, but that you do it too much like the institutional requirements. Universities, foundations, industry autonomy, and cross-regional professional qualifications – anything that can produce an independent order will be classified as “suspicious power substitution”. This is not a problem of economics, but a problem of political science: the source of order must be unique. Put this main line back to the historical coordinates, and you will no longer expect “the crisis drives the inflection point of goodwill”. The crisis will only promote two actions: one is to bargain more radically externally to fight for respite; the other is to make more resolute structural recovery internally to ensure that key valves are not in the hands of others. The market and the rule of law will only be expanded when it does not threaten the valve. Once it touches the line, it will be retracted. The core mechanism of the so-called “Chinese-style modernization” is the “border of growth”: when the boundary is there, growth exists; when the boundary is touched, growth gives way. This does not mean that growth is not important. On the contrary, growth is the basis of the narrative of legitimacy and the KPI of “performance politics”. Investment, land prices, exports, industrial iteration, these indicators have become the account list of “dominant accounting”. If you can hand in your grades on the table, you can get security in politics. But when “performance” and “safety” conflict, there is no suspense in multiple-choice questions. So, we see the cycle of “release first and then collect”: release is to bring up the economy; collect is to ensure that the reins are in hand.

For our generation, the real understanding that needs to be updated is don’t use economic logic to make political choices. You can use the cash flow model to estimate the enterprise and the demand curve to look at the industry, but do not use it to predict “when to turn”. The shift is never determined by the ratio of GDP, but by the thermometer of “risk perception”. Today’s external pressure will bring some short-term posture adjustments and some technical “open rhetoric”, but this does not mean that the boundaries have been rewritten. The writer of the boundary only recognizes one: The security of the regime.

So, are we walking a familiar old road? If the “old road” refers to the path of “security as the platform, economy as the tool, openness to seek the time, and reform and government”, then the answer is eight or nine. The difference is that the outside world is more complex, and the domestic structure is larger; the same thing is that the steering wheel is held in the same hand. Only by understanding this point can we know which expectations should be lowered and which actions should be accelerated: doing business should look at boundaries, and doing public issues should look at risk narrative; instead of giving hope to “turning”, it’s better toLeave the preparation to “normal”. This is not cynicism, but the sobriety of adults. Our generation should at least regard sobriety as a basic literacy.