博客 页面 29

《政治民主》(三)权力的来源(第三期)

0

文:祝正明(中国民主党创党人)
编辑:Geoffrey Jin 校对:程筱筱 翻译:吕峰

人们经常说某人有权某人无权,那么什么叫权力呢?权力就是支配别人的强制力,在遇到不服从时,使对方受到各种惩罚的能力。当人们事先就了解到服从的好处与不服从的坏处,形成了感觉上的默契,对某人的指令自觉服从,就可以认为该人拥有权力。如果服从没有好处或不服从没有坏处,权力就会动摇,权威就会丧失,只有奖罚分明,才能维护权威。

权力从何而来?一般来说,权力的来源有五种:威望、暴力、宗教、约定、财富。拥有其中一项,就可以拥有权力,而拥有三项以上,就可以拥有绝对的权力。

一、威望

人有智商的高低,知识的多寡,能力的强弱,处理各种问题时所用方法的准确性、可靠性、周密性不同,因此成功率也就不同。知识丰富、聪明能干的人,解决问题的办法好,做事的成功率高,如果该人品德高尚,人们自然就会钦佩他、信任他,服从他作出的决定,他就会逐渐具有威望,威望的影响力无形中就会转换成支配力。但是,拥有威望,并不是一件很容易能做到的事,更无法在短期内获得,在一个群体,只有极少数智能高强、品格高尚的人才能获得威望。

二、暴力

当一方不愿服从另一方时,另一方拥有的暴力能够强制对方服从,否则便可以惩罚对方,而对方反抗将会遭受更大的痛苦和损失,甚至丧失自己的生命,使其不得服从。由此,暴力就衍生出了权力,拥有暴力的一方就拥有了对他人的支配力。军队是用来实施暴力的专用工具,因此,也可以说,拥有军队就可以直接拥有权力。但是,如果一个政府仅依赖于军队的镇压和威慑而存在,则无异于一个强盗政府。

三、宗教

宗教是人类社会发明的用来解释自身与自然界各种现象的因果关系的一种意念性学说,许多宗教相信在人与自然之间存在着第三种神秘的力量,主宰着人的生老病死、旱涝丰歉、吉凶祸福,它们总结出人应遵守的伦理关系,如果违反,必将受到自然的惩罚,而布道者和宗教领袖由于暗悉其中奥妙,能向人指点迷津,因而获得人们的崇拜。某些宗教在使人们相信了其教义的同时,也将宗教领袖进行了神化,使人们认为他是能够理解、代表神的意志的人,或干脆就是神,他的意志就是自然界不可抗拒的规律,使得人们就象服从自然界的规律一样服从他的号召,从而获得对民众的巨大号召力或支配力。

四、约定

一群权利(注:权力与权利是两个不同的概念,权力是指强制他人服从的强力,权利是指自身拥有的神圣不可侵犯的利益)平等的人,事先约定好必须共同遵守的规则,按照规则公平竞争,获胜的一方取得某种利益,失败的一方放弃这种利益,这就是约定。如果失败方不遵守事先约定,旁观者便主动加入,胁迫败方遵守。竞争获胜后享有利益的大小,在事先约定的范围内,获胜者不得随意超越。在一个取消身份等级限制的自由平等社会,这是一种直接以自身能力取得权力的方法,解决了有限的资源在不够分配时出现的问题,并能使有能力的人在短期内脱颖而出,竞争过程本身往往具有很强的观赏性,使社会生活变得丰富多彩。在现代文明的法制社会,这种以公平竞争方式取得权利的方法被广泛应用,将竞争规则文字化,约定双方共同遵守,已成社会活动照章有序化进行的重要组成部分。

五、财富

拥有财富者总是可以雇佣别人去干他想干的事,他可以用多给钱去鼓励对方,也可以用少给钱或不给钱去制裁对方,使对方服从他。这就是我们当今社会最常见,最广泛应用的雇佣与被雇佣现象。建立在双方自愿的基础之上,与和平稳定的社会秩序完全兼容,与人类的智商、能力和本性相适应,为人类社会所普遍认可。

显然,如果社会体制能保证有威望的人,按公众普遍认可的规则,以公平竞争方式选出领导人,行使事先规定的权力,就能使社会既有高素质的人来为人民服务,又能保证政府有足够的权威,权力也不会被滥用,只有这种权力才可以被认为是合理、合法的权力。

(四)道德与法律

随着人口的增加,在有限的生存空间里,人与人之间不可避免地会产生利益冲突,有时这种冲突甚至会严重到威胁个人生存的地步,如果互不妥协,时常两败俱伤。因此,在生存空间和生活资料变得逐渐紧张的情况下,人们懂得合作的好处,即只有每个人都对自己的欲望进行适当的克制,作出一定的让步,人们才能和平共处。这就有赖于人们共同遵守一系列行为准则,尽管这些准则会使个人的行为受到某种约束,但这样做对大家对社会都有好处。这一系列人所公知的,共同认可的、不需要明文规定的行为准则就是道德,它是人类社会为了自身的稳定和延续而自发产生的,它的约束力依赖的是人的荣誉感和作为群体一员的责任心。在一个相对稳定,没有人员流动,发展缓慢的传统社会,人们从小就接受传统道德的教育,并将其世代相传。当然,不遵守的人总是有的,但这些的人付出的代价通常是丧失威信、名誉或被排逐出群体。这种惩罚方式在固定群体内通常是有效的。

传统道德通常只注重熟人、朋友、家人之间的关系和个人义务,依靠家族戒律作为实施保障,对解决家庭与部族内部的矛盾行之有效,但对部族之间的冲突,陌生人之间、社团之间的争端时常无能为力。如果一个社会是一个迅速变化与发展的社会,人的生活方式不断发生变化,以致每代人的习惯都有所不同,道德规范在代与代之间的传递就会遇到问题。当人们的生活与居住流动性较大时,传统惩罚方式的有效性也会大大下降。这些因素都将使传统道德起到的维持秩序与安定的作用明显降低。由于传统道德的非文字化、含糊性、非强制性,对人的行为不能形成统一的约束,随着人们生活方式的复杂多样化,违反传统道德的人就会增加,结果,社会就会表现出道德水准下降,犯罪率上升。

最早设计的法律制度,就是要求部族之间放弃报复行力,由代表公正的第三方按规定程序,以机械式的审讯方法核定事实,制定惩罚方式和赔偿数额,以调节并最终终止私人争端和部落冲关。一个社会根据自己的民族习惯,将个人、社团、公司的行为准则及惩罚方式以文字的形式明确规定下来,就形成了法律。

法律本身也可以被当作一种工具,可以为各种政府、阶级和意识形态所采用,为某个阶级服务,因此,法制本身仍然会存在合法不一定合理的现象。但是,无论什么政体的国家,依法治国都有好处,它能直接明确地告诉人们哪些是可以做的,哪些是不可以做的。另一方面,也可以使统治者按既定的公布的法律来管理社会,防止下层官员凭一时兴起,以临时的命令和草拟的决议来专断行事,减少官僚的随意性对民众造成的危害。

法律较之道德的进步之处在于它能够将人的社会行为的内容表现得更具体、更全面、具有强制性。由于它的执行者是全社会性的执法机构,无人能够逃避,从而使法律成为现代社会维持治安、解决争端的必不可少的工具。

实行法治有两个问题非常关键:第一,法律是否健全;第二,法律由谁来制定。这两个问题关系到法治是否能行之有效,是否准确、合理、公正。法律影响着社会每个人的生活方式,其作用与传统的道德不可同日而语,因此,每个有责任心的公民都应当关心法律的内容。良好的法律,应能充分代表民意,反映民情,是道德的明文表达形式。

在文明社会,法律是为全体公民的公共利益服务的,要求全体公民共同遵守,因此,它必须能代表全体公民的意志,得到广大民众的认可。它的颁布、修改、废除必须经过全体公民的同意或他们授权的代表的许可,否则,所谓的法律就不能被认为是合法的法律。

法制不健全的表现之一,就是法律由社会的统治者或由他们指派的人员来制定。由于统治者有自己的地位、特权,他们的利益不可能与普通公民的利益完全一致。因此,这种法律代表的是统治者的意志,他们也能够按照自己的意志随意修改法律。法律是辅助独裁者统治的工具,其作用与民众的需要背道而驰,不是用来服务于民众,而是用来管制民众。

法律的不健全的另一表现就是内容粗糙简陋,在许多问题上找不到适用的法律,或者不详细,含糊其辞,都会给民众造成困惑,给社会带来混乱,使法治的有效性下降,这种情况在专制制度下经常发生,结果大大增加了政府执法人员及司法人员的个人意志对法律的影响,使同样的法律在不同的地方、不同的时间有不同的实施情况,同样的案件经不同的法官审判,结果会有很大的差异。当百姓对执法人员的行为没有任何约束与控制手段时,这些滥用手中权力的现象就会泛滥,司法人员自己的意志就是法律,法治成了人治。在后门、关系、贿赂比事实、证据、道德更能赢得官司的情况下,公民的正当利益无法得到法律的保障,反而会受到素质低劣的司法人员的侵害,最终必将使法律本身威信扫地。我们经常听说的“合理的不合法,合法的不合理”,莫不包涵着对这种法律的蔑视。

法律的威信依赖于公众对其公正合理性的认可程度,任何一种被公众所蔑视的法律都不会具有长久的生命力。

(五)政体的种类

在人类历史上,曾经出现过许多不同的社会结构形式和政治体制,归纳起来,政府管理形式可以按四种模式进行分类:专制模式、经济模式、主权模式、民主模式,见下图:

1、专制模式

专制统治模式是人类生活社会化以后,伴随着国家的出现而同时出现的一种最自然的统治模式,尽管原始,却也简便、稳定有效,任何人只要取得统治权,都会以自己的意志建立起能确保自己政令畅通的此种统治方式。

(1)君主家族政府:

政府的政治行为由一个世袭家族控制,一人按家族继承规则取得全部统辖权,成为世袭君主,其余家族成员把持政府各要害部门,血亲以外的人进入政府,处于只能利用,不能重用的地位,君主对百姓握有绝对的生杀大权。

(2)寡头独裁政府:

政府由拥有绝对权力的寡头一人控制,寡头与幕僚之间不一定有血亲关系,寡头通常以某种意识形态将部属聚结在一起,政府要员的行为不受家族纪律的约束,政治决策具有很大的任意性,易将国家拖入战争,决策效率高,失误大,损失严重,统治往往只能维持一代人。

(3)多头贵族政府:

国家政治行为由一批拥有对地方牢固的控制权的贵族或军阀把持,他们自己收税,甚至握有军队,政府领导人必须尊重他们的意见,依赖于他们的支持,他们联合起来,能很容易地调换政府领导人,国家很难形成一致的统一行动。

(4)政教合一政府:

政府大小官员兼任宗教的传教士,政府主要领导人被神化,成为民众崇拜的偶像,即便是错误的决策,仍然能被奉为圣旨得到贯彻执行,迷信色彩浓,排斥外来文化,对异议者施刑残酷。

2、经济模式

经济统治模式是指政府对社会财富的所有、使用、分配方面的管理方式,经济模式直接而显著地影响着民众的生活方式。

(1)部落经济政府:

部落为基本生产单元,商品自给自足,部落之间甚少商品交易,内部成员劳动分工,财产公共所有,由酋长实行配给制,定期向君主缴纳贡品。

(2)土地册封政府:

政府或君主土地名义上的所有者,土地册封给幕僚或大贵族使用,大贵族则将土地册封给下一级的贵族使用,最小的贵族则将土地封给农民使用,农民及下级贵族依次将自己收获的一部分缴纳给上一级贵族或君主,贵族不从事体力劳动,练兵习武是其生活的重要组成部分。

(3)公有经济政府:

个人除极少量个人物品外不拥有任何财产,财产全社会共有,社会财富的生产、经营、分配、使用实际上由政府官员控制支配。

(4)私有经济政府:

个人社会财产的主人,政府对以盈利为目的的经营产生的利润按比例提成。

3、主权模式

主权模式是指政府权力的产生及使用方式。

(1)单一制政府:

国家为一个独立、统一的社会形态,实行同一种法律和管理模式。

(2)联邦制政府:

国家由一批相对独立的小国组成,各小国在法律和管理模式上保留自己的地方特色。

(3)殖民地政府:

国家被另一个国家占领和控制,政府官员由另一个国家指派,实行另一个国家的法律和管理模式。

4、民主模式

民主模式是指国家的法律政策,政府行为由占人口大多数的民众来控制的政治体制,实行法制,对政府领导人实行分权制和任期制,新闻自由,民选议会为国家的最高权力机关。

(1)君主立宪制政府:

国家有国王或皇帝,但只具象征地位,没有政治权力,权力由经民主选举产生的政府掌管。

(2)总统制政府:

由经国民直接选举产生的总统掌管国家的最高行政权。

(3)内阁制政府:

国家行政领导人由国会议员多数选举产生,通常为多数党领袖,如其失去国会支持,则需辞职。如国会随后不能以多数形成决议,提出新的首相人选,象征性的国家首脑国王或总统在总理的建议下可以解散国会,重新举行全民大选,产生新的议会。

(III) The Sources of Power

Written by: Zhu Zhengming
Edited by: Geoffrey Jin Proofread by: Cheng Xiaoxiao Translated by: Lyu Feng

Abstract:This article begins with a definition of power, interpreting it as the ability to exert influence and coercion over others. It identifies five primary sources of power: prestige, violence, religion, agreement, and wealth. The author further emphasizes that an ideal society should allocate power through fair rules and public recognition, enabling capable and reputable individuals to govern effectively while maintaining order.

People often say that some individuals have power while others do not. But what exactly is power?

Power is the coercive ability to control others—the capacity to impose penalties when obedience is refused. When people understand in advance the benefits of obedience and the consequences of disobedience, they develop an implicit consensus and willingly comply with a person’s commands; in such cases, that person can be said to possess power. If obedience brings no benefit or disobedience carries no cost, power will weaken and authority will erode. Only when rewards and punishments are clearly defined can authority be maintained.

Sources of Power

Generally speaking, power originates from five sources: prestige, violence, religion, agreement, and wealth. Possessing any one of these can confer power; possessing three or more can result in absolute power.

1. Prestige

People differ in intelligence, knowledge, ability, and the accuracy and reliability of their problem-solving methods. Those who are knowledgeable, capable, and morally upright tend to achieve higher success rates. Naturally, others admire, trust, and follow them, granting them prestige. This prestige gradually transforms into influence and control. However, gaining prestige is neither easy nor quick; within any group, only a few individuals of exceptional ability and character can attain it.

2. Violence

When one party refuses to obey another, the latter may use force to compel obedience. Resistance leads to greater pain, loss, or even death, forcing submission. Thus, violence gives rise to power, and those who control violence gain dominance over others. The military is a specialized tool for exercising violence; therefore, possessing a military effectively means possessing power. However, a government that relies solely on military suppression and intimidation is no different from a bandit regime.

3. Religion

Religion is a conceptual system developed by human societies to explain the causal relationships between humans and nature. Many religions posit a mysterious force that governs life, death, fortune, and misfortune. They establish ethical norms and warn that violations will result in punishment. Religious leaders, believed to understand these mysteries, gain followers’ reverence. In some cases, leaders are deified, regarded as representatives—or even embodiments—of divine will. As a result, people obey them as they would natural laws, granting them immense influence and control.

4. Agreement

A group of individuals with equal rights (note: rights differ from power—power refers to coercion, while rights refer to inviolable personal interests) may agree in advance on rules to be jointly observed. Through fair competition under these rules, winners obtain certain benefits while losers relinquish them. If losers refuse to comply, observers may intervene to enforce the agreement.

In a free and equal society without rigid hierarchies, this is a direct way to acquire power through individual ability. It helps allocate limited resources fairly and allows capable individuals to stand out quickly. The competitive process itself often adds vitality to social life. In modern legal societies, such rule-based competition is widely applied, with rules codified and mutually enforced as an essential component of orderly social activity.

5. Wealth

Those who possess wealth can hire others to carry out tasks on their behalf. They can incentivize compliance through higher pay or punish through reduced or withheld payment. This is the most common and widely practiced form of power in modern society—the relationship between employer and employee. Based on voluntary agreement, it is compatible with social stability and aligns with human nature and capability, making it broadly accepted.

It is evident that if a social system ensures that individuals with prestige are selected through fair competition under widely accepted rules, and are granted predefined powers, then society can benefit from capable leadership while maintaining authority without abuse. Only such power can be considered legitimate and reasonable.

(IV) Morality and Law

Abstract

As societies grow and resources become constrained, conflicts of interest inevitably arise. This section distinguishes morality from law, explaining their respective roles in maintaining social order. It argues that while morality relies on internalized norms and social pressure, law provides formalized, enforceable rules. A stable society requires both—but the legitimacy of law ultimately depends on its alignment with public interest and collective consent.

1. The Origins of Morality

With population growth and limited resources, conflicts between individuals become unavoidable. In extreme cases, such conflicts may threaten survival itself. Over time, people come to recognize that cooperation yields better outcomes than constant confrontation.

This realization gives rise to shared behavioral norms—commonly understood but not always formally codified. These norms constitute morality.

Morality operates through:

social recognition,

a sense of honor,

and responsibility toward the community.

In relatively stable, traditional societies with limited mobility, moral systems are transmitted across generations and enforced informally. Those who violate them may face reputational loss or exclusion from the community—sanctions that are often sufficient in tightly knit groups.

2. The Limits of Morality

Traditional morality is most effective within close social circles—families, acquaintances, and small communities. However, it struggles to regulate:

interactions among strangers,

conflicts between groups,

and rapidly changing social environments.

In dynamic societies, where mobility is high and lifestyles evolve quickly, moral norms become harder to transmit and enforce. Their informal nature—lack of codification, ambiguity, and absence of coercive power—reduces their effectiveness.

As a result, reliance on morality alone often leads to:

declining social cohesion,

increased uncertainty in behavior,

and rising levels of conflict or crime.

3. The Emergence of Law

Law arises as a structured response to these limitations.

Early legal systems replaced cycles of retaliation with third-party adjudication. A neutral authority determines facts, assigns responsibility, and imposes penalties or compensation according to established procedures.

In modern societies, law is defined as a system of codified rules that regulate the behavior of individuals, organizations, and institutions.

4. Law as an Instrument and Its Risks

Law is not inherently neutral. It can be used by different governments, classes, or ideologies as a tool to serve particular interests.

This creates a critical distinction:

what is legal is not always just.

Nevertheless, governance through law (“rule of law”) offers clear advantages:

it provides predictable standards of behavior,

it constrains arbitrary decision-making,

and it reduces the risk of abuse by lower-level officials.

5. Advantages of Law over Morality

Compared to morality, law has several defining features:

clarity (explicit rules),

universality (applies across society),

enforceability (backed by institutions).

Because legal enforcement is carried out by public institutions, individuals cannot easily evade its reach. This makes law indispensable for maintaining order and resolving disputes in modern societies.

6. Conditions for Effective Rule of Law

Two fundamental conditions determine whether a legal system functions effectively:

The completeness and coherence of the legal framework

Who has the authority to create and modify the law

Since law shapes nearly every aspect of social life, it must reflect public needs and ethical principles. Ideally, law should serve as the codified expression of shared moral values.

7. Legitimacy of Law

In a modern civil society, law must:

represent the will of the people,

serve the public interest,

and gain broad social recognition.

The enactment, revision, and abolition of laws should occur with public consent—either directly or through legitimate representation. Without such legitimacy, law becomes merely an instrument of control rather than a foundation of justice.

8. Deficiencies in Legal Systems

Legal systems may fail in two major ways:

(1) Concentration of law-making powerWhen laws are created solely by rulers or their appointees, they tend to reflect elite interests rather than those of the general population.

(2) Lack of clarity and completenessVague or incomplete laws create uncertainty, enabling inconsistent enforcement and increasing reliance on personal discretion.

In such conditions:

identical cases may yield different outcomes,

enforcement varies across time and place,

and personal influence may outweigh evidence or fairness.

When unchecked, this leads to the transformation of rule of law into rule by individuals.

9. The Authority of Law

The authority of law ultimately depends on public trust in its fairness and rationality. Laws that are widely perceived as unjust or unreasonable cannot maintain long-term legitimacy.

(V) Types of Political Systems

Abstract

Throughout history, societies have developed diverse forms of governance. These can be broadly categorized into four models: authoritarian, economic, sovereignty-based, and democratic systems. Each reflects a different way of organizing power, resources, and legitimacy.

1. Authoritarian Models

Authoritarian systems are among the earliest forms of governance, emerging naturally alongside the formation of states. They are often efficient and stable in the short term but concentrate power heavily.

(1) Hereditary Monarchy

Power is concentrated within a ruling family and passed down through lineage. The ruler holds absolute authority, often supported by relatives occupying key positions.

(2) Oligarchic Dictatorship

A single ruler or small group exercises absolute power, often bound by ideology rather than kinship. Decision-making is efficient but prone to instability and high-risk outcomes.

(3) Aristocratic Pluralism

Power is distributed among regional elites or warlords who maintain local control. Central authority depends on their support, making unified governance difficult.

(4) Theocratic Governance

Political authority is intertwined with religious authority. Leaders may be regarded as divine or divinely sanctioned, and dissent is often suppressed in the name of belief.

2. Economic Models of Governance

These systems define how wealth is owned, distributed, and managed.

(1) Tribal Economy

Self-sufficient communities with collective ownership and limited trade.

(2) Feudal Land System

Land is allocated hierarchically, with obligations flowing upward through the social structure.

(3) Public Ownership System

Property is collectively owned, but in practice managed by state authorities.

(4) Private Ownership System

Individuals own property, and governments regulate economic activity through taxation and policy.

3. Sovereignty Models

These describe how political authority is structured geographically and institutionally.

(1) Unitary System

A single, centralized authority governs the entire state under uniform laws.

(2) Federal System

Power is divided between central and regional governments, each retaining certain autonomy.

(3) Colonial System

A territory is governed by an external power, with laws and administration imposed from outside.

4. Democratic Models

Democratic systems are based on popular sovereignty, where authority derives from the majority of citizens. They typically include:

rule of law,

separation of powers,

limited terms of office,

and freedom of expression.

(1) Constitutional Monarchy

A monarch exists as a symbolic figure, while elected institutions exercise real political power.

(2) Presidential System

An independently elected president holds executive authority.

(3) Parliamentary System

The executive emerges from the legislature and depends on its support, ensuring accountability through political processes.

Conclusion

Across different systems, the core question remains the same:how power is acquired, exercised, and constrained.

Sustainable governance depends not only on institutional design, but on the alignment between authority, legitimacy, and public participation.

湾区 3月29日 声援信宜人民反抗中共暴政

0
湾区 3月29日 声援信宜人民反抗中共暴政
湾区 3月29日 声援信宜人民反抗中共暴政

声援信宜人民反抗中共暴政

活动组织:中国民主人权联盟旧金山分部

活动策划:李海风、关永杰、周志刚

活动联络:张勇6265816991

活动时间:2026年3月29日(周日)2-4pm

活动地点:圣何塞市政厅

FAttE: 200 E Santa Clara St

San Jose, CA 95113

洛杉矶 3月29日 声援广东信宜人民 打倒中共结束暴政

0
洛杉矶 3月29日 声援广东信宜人民 打倒中共结束暴政
洛杉矶 3月29日 声援广东信宜人民 打倒中共结束暴政

聲援廣東信宜人民 打倒中共 結束暴政

—— 關注「廣東信宜火葬場抗爭事件」集會通知

為聲援廣東信宜人民的抗爭行動,關注中國地方暴政與民生壓迫問題,將於洛杉磯中國領事館前舉行公開集會。

活動資訊

日期: 2026年3月29日(周日)

時間: 下午2:00-3:30

地點: 洛杉磯中國領事館443 Shatto Pl, Los Angeles, CA 90020

主辦/參與組織

中國民主黨國際聯盟

香港自由民主黨

遠東青年自由同盟

活動人員

活動負責: 王文遠

活動宣傳: 蘇一峰

活動主持人: 孟兵

活動組織者: 范英龍、皮喬海、廖文浩、陳寧

現場組織者: 白國武、莫小月、王志軍、肖文柱

洛杉矶 3月29日 第783次茉莉花行动 揭露中共医疗黑幕

0
洛杉矶 3月29日 第783次茉莉花行动 揭露中共医疗黑幕
洛杉矶 3月29日 第783次茉莉花行动 揭露中共医疗黑幕

第783次茉莉花行动

时间:2026年3月29日(周日)下午4:00

地点:中国洛杉矶总领事馆

揭露中共医疗黑幕

为医疗事故受害家庭发声

生命不该成为代价真相不应被掩盖

本次行动将有多位受害家庭家长与嘉宾来到现场,讲述他们真实而沉痛的经历:他们的子女因严重医疗事故失去生命或健康,却在维权的过程中遭遇推诿、压制与沉默。

其中一位家长,已经被迫走上长达八年的上访之路。八年奔波,只为一个说法;层层推诿,却始终没有答案。

而更多家庭,在漫长的维权过程中被拖延、被消耗、被迫放弃,

把无法言说的伤痛独自承受。

这不是个案,而是被掩盖的制度性问题。3月29日,我们站出来,让声音被听见,让真相被看见:

生命高于权力

医疗必须负责

真相必须公开

欢迎所有关心中国人权与生命尊严的朋友到场支持,也欢迎转发,让更多人知道。

旧金山 3月29日 要求中共立即释放谢阳!释放所有人权律师!

0
旧金山 3月29日  要求中共立即释放谢阳!释放所有人权律师!
旧金山 3月29日  要求中共立即释放谢阳!释放所有人权律师!

活動公告:中共立即釋放謝陽!釋放所有人權律師!

2026年3月23日中共長沙市中級法院以所謂「煽動顛覆國家政權罪」判處謝陽有期徒刑5年。

謝陽是湖南長沙人權律師,長期代理維權案件,替宗教受迫害者、土地維權者、公民權利受侵害者發聲。2015年「709大抓捕」中,他被中共抓捕,後來外界持續披露他在羈押期間遭受酷刑和虐待。曾代理山東薛明凱案、北京新公民運動張寶成案、河南南樂教案、湖南瀏陽張開華徵地案,參與徐純合案相關維權;還曾探訪陳光誠,並聲援建三江被捕律師。

2022年他因前往湖南聲援被強制送進精神病院的教師李田田再次被抓並關押至今。

中共立即釋放謝陽!釋放所有人權律師!

暴政必亡!中共下台!還政於民!民主中國!

中國民主黨舊金山黨部陳森鋒:

中共最厚顏無恥就是顛倒黑白,竊國者中共非法政權反過來把所有伸張正義、反抗不公的英雄污衊定罪為「煽動顛覆國家政權罪」。中共你他娘的這不就是賊喊捉賊「此地無銀三百兩」嗎?

中共你們都幹了些什麼?你們在殘害人民,在這片土地上橫徵暴斂、掠奪財富。無官不貪,哪個中共高官不是億萬甚至百億千億富翁?!你們不擇手段地掠奪,毫無底線地摧毀一切。現在中國大地還有一滴乾淨的水和一塊乾淨的土地嗎?!你們把災難轉嫁給人民,然後你們自己一邊享用特供,一邊轉移財產把子女家人送出國享受窮奢極欲生活。

中共你們真是:好話說盡,壞事做絕!到底是誰在摧毀國家、顛覆國家?就是中國共產黨!

我們從不「顛覆國家政權」!因為我們熱愛這個國家,熱愛這片我們土生土長的土地,熱愛這裡的山山水水一草一木,熱愛這裡的風土人情與勤勞善良的弟兄姊妹。

我們只想「顛覆中共非法政黨」,結束一黨暴政,讓中國建立自由民主制度,過上像台灣人民一樣的幸福美好生活。

主辦單位:中國民主黨(舊金山黨部)

活動召集:方政 鄭雲

策劃發起:陳森鋒 胡丕政

活動組織:關永傑 李栩 周雲龍 蔣書清 劉靜濤 衛仁喜 郭志軍

拍攝宣傳:繆青 何穎 莊帆 李小林

後勤保障:李樹青 盧占強 吳志創

現場義工: 周忠玉 高俊影 羅艷麗 韓秀花

活動聯係人:陳森鋒/6284687191

活動時間:2026年3月29日(週日)下午2:00pm—4:00pm

活動地點:舊金山中國領事館前

Consulate-General of the People’s Republic of China in San Francisco

我为何被迫离开:一个高校教师的公开说明

0

作者:何文龙
编辑:黄吉洲   校对:冯仍 翻译:周敏

本人何文龙,安徽庐江人。

中山大学翻译硕士研究生毕业,长期从事英语教学与文本翻译工作。

一直是基督教传道人,我所在的教会是RPC,上一份工作是广西理工职业技术学院英语专任教师,目前在广西梧州一所高校任职英语教师,已经被约谈要迫使我离开。

原因是,我是基督教传道人,和地下教会联系密切,和境外藏人与维吾尔人联系密切。我曾因为在教育系统,搜集了大量中共如何控制学校学生、教师信仰内容的一手资料。

我的职业路径清晰而普通:进入高校,从事教学,参与学术与语言相关工作。这本应是一条稳定、明确、可持续的道路。

但现在,这条道路被迫中断。

我已被有关方面约谈,并被明确要求“离开当前岗位”。没有正式文件,没有公开程序,但结论已经非常清楚:

我不再适合继续留在现有的高校体系之中。

这篇文章,是我对此的公开说明。

一、我做了什么

我没有参与任何非法活动,没有从事任何激烈行为,也没有组织任何对抗性事件。

我所做的事情,其实非常简单:

作为高校教师,完成日常教学工作

进行翻译与文本整理

发起并参与“经典与思想文本翻译项目”

与一些非体制化的社会群体保持联系

这些行为,在任何一个正常社会中,都应属于个人的职业延伸与文化实践。

但在现实中,它们被重新定义了。

二、问题不在于“我做了什么”,而在于“我属于哪一类人”

我逐渐意识到,真正的问题,并不在具体行为本身,而在于一种更深层的分类逻辑:

一个体制内的人,是否可以同时保持“非完全同质化”的状态?

换句话说:

是否必须完全一致

是否必须在所有层面都被纳入同一逻辑

是否允许存在边界之外的联系与实践

我的处境说明了一点:

答案是否定的。

三、所谓“稳定”,正在变成一种单向要求

体制内的稳定,通常被理解为一种保障:

岗位稳定、收入稳定、身份稳定。

但现实是,这种稳定正在附带越来越明确的前提:

行为必须可预期

联系必须可解释

表达必须在既定范围之内

当一个人超出这些范围,即使只是部分超出,他的“稳定性”就会被重新评估。

而这种评估,并不需要公开标准。

四、我被要求离开的真正含义

从形式上看,这是一次岗位调整;

但从实质上看,这是一个信号:

你可以存在,但不能以现在的方式存在。

也就是说:

你可以继续做教师,但要改变你是谁

你可以继续留在体系内,但要放弃你的一部分现实联系与实践

这不是一个简单的职业选择,而是一个身份重塑的要求。

五、我为什么不能接受

我不是不能理解现实规则,也不是不能做出妥协。

但问题在于:

这种妥协已经超出了职业调整的范围,而进入了“自我否认”的层面。

如果我接受:

我需要放弃已经长期投入的翻译工作

需要切断既有的社会联系

需要将自己压缩为一个“完全合规的单一身份”

那么我所保留下来的,只是一个形式上的岗位,而不是一个真实的人。

六、我并没有“选择在野”,但我被推向那里

我没有组织任何政治力量,也没有试图成为所谓的反对者。

但当一个人无法被既有结构容纳时,他的状态就已经发生变化。

“在野”,在这里并不是一种主动选择,而是一种被动结果。

它意味着:

你不再被正式体系承认

你必须重新寻找自己的位置

你开始在制度边缘生存

这正是我现在所处的位置。

七、这不是个体问题,而是结构问题

如果只是个体冲突,那么可以归结为个人选择。

但如果类似的情况不断出现,那么问题就不再是个体,而是结构。

我并不认为自己是特殊的。

相反,我更可能只是一个典型案例:

一个受过高等教育的人

一个进入体制内的人

一个尝试保留部分独立空间的人

最终被要求退出。

八、我将面对什么

离开体制,并不意味着结束,而意味着不确定的开始。

我将失去:

稳定的职业路径

明确的社会身份

可预期的生活结构

但与此同时,我也将面对一个更真实的问题:

在没有体制保障的情况下,一个人如何继续存在?

这个问题,没有标准答案。

九、我写这篇文章的目的

我不是在控诉,也不是在动员。

我只是做一件非常简单的事情:

把一个原本会被“静默处理”的过程,公开出来。

因为如果所有类似的变化都保持沉默,那么它们就不会被理解,也不会被讨论。

十、结语

我没有成为我曾经设想的那种人。

我没有在体制内稳定上升,也没有沿着既定路径发展。

相反,我正在被迫离开。

但这并不意味着失败。

它只是说明,在某些结构中,一个人无法同时保留:

职业身份

现实联系

自我一致性

当这三者发生冲突时,总要有一个被放弃。

而我选择保留后两者。

这就是我此刻的处境。

Why I Am Forced to Leave: A Public Statement by a University Teacher

Author: He Wenlong
Editor: Huang Jizhou Proofreader: Feng Reng Translator: Zhou Min

Abstract: The author frankly states that writing this article is not an accusation or a mobilization, but simply making public a process that would otherwise have been “silently handled,” because if all similar changes remain silent, they will be impossible to understand or discuss.

I am He Wenlong, a native of Lujiang, Anhui.

I graduated from Sun Yat-sen University with a Master of Arts in Translation and Interpretation, and have long been engaged in English teaching and text translation work.

I have always been a Christian preacher; the church I belong to is the RPC. My previous job was as a full-time English teacher at the Guangxi Polytechnic Vocational and Technical College. Currently, I hold a position as an English teacher at a university in Wuzhou, Guangxi, and I have already been summoned for talks to pressure me to leave.

The reason is that I am a Christian preacher, have close ties with house churches (underground churches), and maintain close contact with overseas Tibetans and Uyghurs. Because I was within the education system, I collected a large amount of first-hand materials on how the CCP controls the religious beliefs of students and teachers in schools.

My career path was clear and ordinary: enter a university, engage in teaching, and participate in academic and language-related work. This should have been a stable, clear, and sustainable path.

But now, this path has been forcibly interrupted.

I have been summoned for talks by the relevant authorities and explicitly required to “leave my current post.” There is no formal document, no public procedure, but the conclusion is very clear:

I am no longer suitable to continue remaining within the existing university system.

This article is my public statement regarding this matter.

1. What I Have Done

I have not participated in any illegal activities, have not engaged in any radical behavior, and have not organized any confrontational events.

What I have done is, in fact, very simple:

As a university teacher, completed daily teaching tasks.

Conducted translation and text editing.

Initiated and participated in the “Classic and Intellectual Text Translation Project.”

Maintained contact with some non-institutionalized social groups.

In any normal society, these actions should belong to an individual’s professional extension and cultural practice.

But in reality, they have been redefined.

2. The Problem Is Not “What I Have Done,” But “Which Category of Person I Belong To”

I gradually realized that the real problem does not lie in the specific actions themselves, but in a deeper logic of classification:

Can a person within the system simultaneously maintain a state of “not being completely homogenized”?

In other words:

Is total uniformity mandatory?

Is it mandatory to be incorporated into the same logic at all levels?

Is it permitted to have contacts and practices that exist outside the boundaries?

My situation illustrates one point:

The answer is no.

3. So-called “Stability” Is Becoming a One-Way Requirement

Stability within the system is usually understood as a guarantee:

Stability of the post, stability of income, and stability of identity.

But the reality is that this stability is being attached to increasingly explicit prerequisites:

Behavior must be predictable.

Contacts must be explainable.

Expression must remain within established limits.

When a person exceeds these ranges—even if only partially—his “stability” will be re-evaluated.

And this evaluation does not require public standards.

4. The True Meaning of Being Asked to Leave

From a formal perspective, this is a job adjustment;

But from a substantive perspective, it is a signal:

You can exist, but not in the way you do now.

That is to say:

You can continue to be a teacher, but you must change who you are.

You can continue to stay within the system, but you must give up a part of your existing social contacts and practices.

This is not a simple professional choice, but a demand for identity reshaping.

5. Why I Cannot Accept This

It is not that I cannot understand the rules of reality, nor that I cannot make compromises.

But the problem lies here:

This kind of compromise has exceeded the scope of professional adjustment and entered the level of “self-denial.”

If I accept:

I need to give up the translation work I have long been invested in.

I need to cut off existing social ties.

I need to compress myself into a “fully compliant, singular identity.”

Then what I would have preserved is only a formal post, not a real human being.

6. I Did Not “Choose to Be in the Wild,” But I Am Being Pushed There

I have not organized any political forces, nor have I attempted to become a so-called “dissenter.”

But when a person can no longer be accommodated by the existing structure, his status has already changed.

“In the wild” (Zai Ye) is not an active choice here, but a passive result.

It means:

You are no longer recognized by the formal system.

You must find your position anew.

You begin to survive on the margins of the system.

This is exactly where I am now.

7. This Is Not an Individual Problem, But a Structural Problem

If it were only an individual conflict, it could be attributed to personal choice.

But if similar situations continue to emerge, the problem is no longer the individual, but the structure.

I do not believe I am special.

On the contrary, I am more likely just a typical case:

A person who has received higher education.

A person who entered the system.

A person who tries to retain a part of independent space.

Ultimately being required to exit.

8. What I Will Face

Leaving the system does not mean an end, but means an uncertain beginning.

I will lose:

A stable career path.

A clear social identity.

A predictable life structure.

But at the same time, I will also face a more real question:

Without the guarantee of the system, how does a person continue to exist?

There is no standard answer to this question.

9. My Purpose in Writing This Article

I am not accusing, nor am I mobilizing.

I am simply doing one very simple thing:

Making public a process that would have been “silently handled.”

Because if all similar changes remain silent, they will not be understood, nor will they be discussed.

10. Conclusion

I did not become the kind of person I once envisioned.

I did not rise stably within the system, nor did I develop along a set path.

On the contrary, I am being forced to leave.

But this does not mean failure.

It simply illustrates that in certain structures, a person cannot simultaneously retain:

Professional identity

Actual social contacts

Self-consistency

When these three conflict, one must always be abandoned.

And I choose to retain the latter two.

This is my situation at this moment.

优待的幻象

0

——论中共少数民族政策的结构性本质

作者:周敏

编辑:黄吉洲 校对:冯仍 翻译:周敏

在中华人民共和国的官方叙事中,少数民族始终享有特殊照顾:豁免计划生育、高考加分、文化保护条款。这套表达被精心维护,在国内制造汉族对少数民族的隐性怨怼,在国际上作为外交防护工事。然而,当我们穿透这层叙事,所见到的,是一场系统性的文化解除武装。

1、优待的舆论功能

中共的少数民族优惠政策,在国内外同时运作着双重舆论效果。

对内,它向汉族传达一个清晰的道德信号:少数民族已经得到了充分的照顾,任何抵抗都是不知感恩。这使得汉族民众在面对新疆、西藏问题时,先天具有一种防御性的道德优越感,将抗议者视作分裂势力,而非受压迫的群体。

对外,这套舆论构成了应对国际人权批评的标准话术:我们给了他们生育豁免、给了他们加分、给了他们节日假期,何来压迫?这种反驳将人权问题化约为福利统计,以量化的优惠转移对本质性自由的追问。

对少数民族精英群体,则以上升通道换取沉默与代言:他们可以成为全国人大的代表,可以出现在官方宣传的画面里,条件是扮演体制所需要的民族团结符号,而非本族利益的真实发声者。

2、阉割发生在哪些层面

阉割,是比消灭更精密的统治技术。肉体的消灭会制造殉道者与历史记忆;文化的系统性解除,若能成功,连抵抗的语言都将消失。中共少数民族政策,正是沿着这一逻辑展开的。系统性剥夺表现在五个层面。

关于语言:削减母语教育。2020年内蒙古强制以普通话代替蒙古语授课,引发大规模抗议。藏语学校持续萎缩。语言的消亡即意味着一个族群无法再用自己的思维结构去理解和传承世界。

关于宗教:伊斯兰教与藏传佛教被纳入中国化改造工程。清真寺被拆除圆顶与月牙,神职人员须宣誓效忠党。宗教是少数民族自我认同与道德秩序的核心,去除宗教即切断族群的精神主权。

关于历史记忆:将少数民族历史重新编码,使之成为自古以来融入中华大家庭的注脚,而非拥有独立轨迹的历史主题。

关于生育:纸面上豁免计划生育,实际上对维吾尔族女性强制安装宫内节育器、实施绝育手术。2015至2018年间,维吾尔族聚居县份出生率断崖式下降,部分地区降幅超过80%。这是对优待神话直接的证伪。

关于政治代表:有少数民族面孔的官员存在,但他们代表的是党的意志,而非本族群的利益诉求。代表权在形式上保留,在实质上被架空。

给你面包,让你没力气造反;拿走你的语言,让你没有工具思考;保留你的节日服装,让外人看见“多元文化”。这是宽容吗?这是隐蔽的征服。

3、这套模式的历史性谱系

以优惠换认同、以收编代替征服,不是中共的原创。这是帝国们统治边疆少数民族的经典绝活,在历史上有着清晰谱系。

罗马公民权:扩大公民权以整合精英,以法律身份的赋予稀释地方认同,使边疆族群内化帝国的价值体系。

清朝盟旗制:保留蒙藏贵族的形式权威和宗教特权,把它纳入帝国等级体制,用有限的自制换取对中央权威的效忠。

苏联民族区划:创造民族形式的自治单位,填充社会主义的政治内容——列宁称之为“民族形式,社会主义内容”

中共的版本是这一传统当代升级版。数字监控提供了前所未有的精细管控,大数据治理使异见的识别与压制可以在公开镇压之前完成,“职业教育培训中心”则将再教育(洗脑)工程规模化、系统化。

4、统战逻辑之本质

理解中共的少数民族政策,统战是比种族歧视或文化多元主义都更准确的分析框架。统战的核心是:对稳定有利者给予可控的利益;对稳定构成威胁者,施以不对称的软暴力。

因此,优惠不是权利保障,而是维稳成本的精算结果。当生育豁免有助于边疆稳定时,它存在;当某个族群的人口增长被评估为威胁时,绝育政策随之而来。政策的弹性,本身就揭示了其工具性的本质——它服从于统治的需要,而非任何内在的平等原则。

中共给少数民族的,从来不是权利,而是赎买——赎买顺从,赎买沉默,赎买对主权的放弃。

拨开以上种种幻象的迷雾,当我们再问“中共是否优待少数民族”,我们就知道,这其实是两个截然不同的问题:在福利政策的账面上,是的,曾经存在,且正在被侵蚀。在政治权利与文化主体性的意义上,从未有过。

优待的幻象,是帝国统治精妙的修辞成就:让被统治者感激,让旁观者困惑,让批评者一上来就会陷入对是否真的有优待的无谓争辩,而无暇追问更根本的问题——一个民族,是否有权做自己?

文化灭绝与肉体灭绝的区别,不在于后果的轻重,而在于可见性。前者更难被看见,因此也更难被追责。正因如此,探讨这套系统的结构性逻辑,对笔者与读者都意义重大。

The Illusion of Preferential Treatment

On the Structural Essence of the CCP’s Ethnic Minority Policies

Author: Zhou Min

Editor: Huang Jizhou Proofreader: Feng Reng Translator: Zhou Min

Abstract: This article criticizes the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) “preferential” policies toward ethnic minorities as tools of United Front work that mask cultural suppression and the deprivation of rights, revealing a structural logic of rule that exchanges benefits for obedience.

In the official narrative of the People’s Republic of China, ethnic minorities have always enjoyed special care: exemptions from family planning, bonus points on the college entrance exam (Gaokao), and cultural protection clauses. This set of expressions is meticulously maintained to create hidden resentment among the Han toward ethnic minorities domestically, and to serve as a diplomatic fortification internationally. However, when we pierce through this narrative, what we see is a systematic cultural disarmament.

1. The Public Opinion Function of Preferential Treatment

The CCP’s preferential policies for ethnic minorities operate with a dual public opinion effect both at home and abroad.

Internally, it sends a clear moral signal to the Han: ethnic minorities have already received sufficient care; any resistance is ungrateful. This gives the Han public a preemptive sense of defensive moral superiority when facing issues in Xinjiang or Tibet, viewing protesters as separatist forces rather than oppressed groups.

Externally, this set of rhetoric constitutes a standard talking point for responding to international human rights criticism: We gave them birth exemptions, gave them bonus points, and gave them festival holidays—where is the oppression? This rebuttal reduces human rights issues to welfare statistics, using quantified benefits to divert inquiries into the essence of freedom.

For ethnic minority elite groups, the upward mobility channel is exchanged for silence and representation: they can become delegates to the National People’s Congress and appear in official propaganda images, on the condition that they play the role of symbols of ethnic unity required by the system, rather than acting as authentic voices for their own group’s interests.

2. At Which Levels Does Emasculation Occur?

Emasculation is a more sophisticated technique of rule than extermination. Physical extermination creates martyrs and historical memories; if the systematic dismantling of a culture succeeds, even the language of resistance will disappear. The CCP’s ethnic minority policy unfolds precisely along this logic. Systematic deprivation is manifested in five levels:

Regarding Language: The curtailing of mother-tongue education. In 2020, Inner Mongolia forcibly replaced Mongolian with Mandarin for instruction, triggering large-scale protests. Tibetan language schools continue to shrink. The extinction of a language means an ethnic group can no longer use its own cognitive structures to understand and inherit the world.

Regarding Religion: Islam and Tibetan Buddhism have been incorporated into “Sinicization” transformation projects. Domes and crescents are removed from mosques, and clergy members must swear allegiance to the Party. Religion is the core of ethnic identity and moral order; removing religion cuts off the spiritual sovereignty of the group.

Regarding Historical Memory: Recoding the history of ethnic minorities to make it a footnote to their “integration into the great Chinese family since ancient times,” rather than a historical subject with an independent trajectory.

Regarding Childbearing: On paper, they are exempt from family planning; in reality, Uyghur women have been subjected to forced IUD insertions and sterilization surgeries. Between 2015 and 2018, the birth rate in Uyghur-populated counties plummeted, with declines exceeding 80% in some areas. This is a direct falsification of the myth of preferential treatment.

Regarding Political Representation: Officials with ethnic minority faces exist, but they represent the will of the Party, not the interest demands of their own ethnic groups. Representation is preserved in form but hollowed out in substance.

Give you bread so you have no strength to rebel; take away your language so you have no tools to think; keep your festival costumes so outsiders see “multiculturalism.” Is this tolerance? This is hidden conquest.

3. The Historical Pedigree of This Model

Exchanging benefits for identification and replacing conquest with co-option is not an original creation of the CCP. It is a classic “signature move” of empires ruling frontier ethnic minorities, with a clear historical pedigree:

Roman Citizenship: Expanding citizenship to integrate elites and dilute local identity through the granting of legal status, causing frontier groups to internalize the empire’s value system.

The Qing Dynasty’s League and Banner System: Retaining the formal authority and religious privileges of Mongolian and Tibetan aristocrats, incorporating them into the imperial hierarchy, and exchanging limited autonomy for loyalty to the central authority.

Soviet National Delimitation: Creating autonomous units of national form and filling them with socialist political content—what Lenin called “national in form, socialist in content.”

The CCP’s version is a contemporary upgraded edition of this tradition. Digital surveillance provides unprecedented granular control; Big Data governance allows for the identification and suppression of dissent before public crackdowns occur; and “Vocational Education and Training Centers” have scaled and systematized the re-education (brainwashing) project.

4. The Essence of the United Front Logic

To understand the CCP’s ethnic minority policy, “United Front” (Tongzhan) is a more accurate analytical framework than either racial discrimination or multiculturalism. The core of the United Front is: providing controllable interests to those beneficial to stability; and applying asymmetric soft violence to those who pose a threat to stability.

Therefore, preferential treatment is not a guarantee of rights, but the result of an actuarial calculation of “stability maintenance” (Weiven) costs. When birth exemptions contribute to frontier stability, they exist; when the population growth of a certain group is assessed as a threat, sterilization policies follow. The elasticity of the policy itself reveals its instrumental essence—it serves the needs of rule, not any inherent principle of equality.

What the CCP gives to ethnic minorities has never been rights, but a buyout—buying out obedience, buying out silence, and buying out the surrender of sovereignty.

Dispersing the mist of these illusions, when we ask again “Does the CCP treat ethnic minorities preferentially?”, we realize these are actually two completely different questions: In terms of the ledger of welfare policies, yes, it once existed and is currently being eroded. In the sense of political rights and cultural subjectivity, it never existed.

The illusion of preferential treatment is a sophisticated rhetorical achievement of imperial rule: it makes the ruled feel grateful, makes onlookers feel confused, and makes critics fall into a pointless debate over whether “preferential treatment” truly exists, leaving no time to ask the more fundamental question—does a nation have the right to be itself?

The difference between cultural genocide and physical genocide is not the severity of the consequence, but the visibility. The former is harder to see, and therefore harder to hold accountable. Precisely for this reason, exploring the structural logic of this system is of great significance to both the author and the reader.

洛杉矶 3月28日 上海封城四周年纪念活动召集令

0
洛杉矶 3月28日 上海封城四周年纪念活动召集令
洛杉矶 3月28日 上海封城四周年纪念活动召集令

【活动召集令|上海封城四周年】

四年前的这个春天,上海封城成为无数人难以忘却的记忆。

封控之下,有人失去亲人,有人失去生计,也有人失去了最基本的尊严与自由。这不仅是一座城市的创伤,更是一段不应被遗忘的历史。

值此四周年之际,我们发起纪念活动,旨在:

– 追忆逝者,铭记苦难

– 还原真相,拒绝遗忘

– 反思制度,呼唤改变

活动时间:3月28日(周六)14:00–17:00

活动地点:200 E Garey Avenue,Monterey Park, CA 91755

活动召集人:方政、张俊杰

活动组织人:袁平、谢燊权

活动策划人:李茂毅、谢志诚

主办方:中国民主党、中国民主教育基金会、硬糖联盟、洛杉矶民主平台

历史不应被掩盖,记忆不应被抹去。

唯有面对,才有未来;唯有记录,才有公正。

我们邀请每一位关心真相与自由的人,前来参与这场纪念与见证。

郭泉:他因一句话坐牢14年

0
郭泉:他因一句话坐牢14年

采访:林小龙 资料整理:赵杰
编辑:张致君 责任编辑:朱虞夫 翻译:戈冰

郭泉:他因一句话坐牢14年

在当今中国政治言论空间持续收紧、公共表达不断被压缩的现实中,公开讨论制度问题本身已成为一种风险行为。在这样的环境下,仍坚持表达独立政治观点的人,往往要付出沉重代价。郭泉,曾任南京师范大学副教授,社会学硕士、哲学博士,正是这样一位在高压之下持续发声的学者型异议人士。

与许多仅停留在学术讨论层面的知识分子不同,郭泉将其政治理念直接付诸实践。他并不满足于抽象地讨论“民主”“自由”等概念,而是以极为明确甚至具有挑战性的方式提出:真正的制度核心不在于修辞,而在于“多党竞选”。在他看来,所有可以被专制体制反复包装和利用的政治话语——无论是“民主”“法治”还是“宪政”——如果缺乏真实的权力竞争机制,都不过是对权力的再装饰。

2007年,郭泉在互联网发起组建“中国新民党”,公开主张以多党竞选取代一党专政。这一举动迅即触碰政治禁区,使其成为当局重点打压对象。2008年,他以“颠覆国家政权罪”被判刑十年;出狱后短短一年多时间,再次因言论问题被捕并被判刑四年,直至2024年才得以再次走出监狱。前后超过十年的牢狱生涯,并未使其沉默,反而使其立场更加激进、表达更加直接。

郭泉的特殊之处,在于他不仅是制度批评者,更是制度替代方案的明确倡导者。他将复杂的政治问题压缩为一个极具冲击力的判断:没有多党竞选,就不存在真正意义上的民主;一切不建立在权力竞争基础上的制度,最终都将滑向专制。这种高度简化但极具指向性的表达,使其观点在支持者与反对者之间都引发强烈反响。

在一个强调“稳定压倒一切”的政治环境中,郭泉的持续表达本身,已构成一种对现实秩序的挑战。他的经历,也折射出当代中国公共知识分子所面临的共同困境:在表达与风险之间反复权衡,在沉默与发声之间作出选择。

本次采访中,郭泉不仅回顾了自身从学术研究走向政治表达的思想路径,也进一步阐述了其对专制体制、外部干预以及中国未来政治转型的判断。他的观点或许激烈,甚至具有争议,但在日益收缩的公共空间中,这样的声音本身,已成为值得记录的一部分。

林小龙: 郭先生您好,鉴于目前国内的严峻政治言论环境,关于本次采访您的问题,你愿意回答就回答,不愿意回答,你换个题目就是了。

首先我想您这边能不能简单介绍一下您的一个成长的经历和家庭背景,对您的成年后的价值观会产生过什么影响,以至于后来您在那样一个政治高压的社会敢于公开的发表自己的政治观点并也为此付出巨大的代价。

郭泉先生: 我先简单介绍一下我自己,我是1987年上大学,所以经历过八九六四运动,但是我不是在北京,不是在天安门,我们在全国各地,在各自的地方,也就是参加过那次的运动。那么之后呢,也是经历过,接受过一些民主思想的熏陶,后来90年大学毕业后带着这些民主思想后就走向工作岗位,它就会对我的日常生活产生了很大影响。

先是在企业政府里面工作,那么就发现很多社会问题,如果不用民主的方式进行解决,那就解决不了,虽然专制制度它很能解决一些问题,但是它在民主决策上面是有很大很大问题的。所以我93年就考了南京大学社会学的硕士,在这个社会学硕士的学习过程中,我更加发现民主制度会给社会带来一种运作方式,但是专制不行。所以说硕士毕业之后,然后读博士,这个时候是在法院工作,在南京市法院工作。那么在法院的审判工作当中,也发现很多很多的,其实社会问题是专制体制造成的。所以后来我就又去读了哲学博士,在读哲学博士基本上形成的观念

就是,政治它跟哲学是密不可分的。也就是说,如果不用哲学来思考政治,那么政治就会走向极端。

所以说在96年到99年读哲学博士,这三年就形成了民主观,也就是普世价值。那么这个普世价值呢,现在整个社会也在讲普世价值,但是比如说自由,民主,我认为自由民主这四个字,专制者它也会拿来忽悠人,它也会用说:我们是社会主义民主,社会主义法治,甚至还有我们社会主义也是自由。所以我觉得这个不行,所以我把这个自由民主换成四个字,多党竞选,我认为只有多党竞选,才能制衡专制。

林小龙: 是的,几乎所有的反美的国家它都是专制的制度,它有一个共同特点,就是它不愿意多党竞选。

郭泉先生:所以这个是专制制度的死穴。我在我写的文章里面讲过这个问题,后来1999年博士毕业,我到南师大做博士后,在博士后研究的课题就是:自由主义文学,这个更加让我觉得,一切社会矛盾的根本原因,就是缺乏民主制度。所以后来做了博士后论文结束之后,留在南师大做副教授,在教学过程中,就逐渐地给同学们探讨民主制度,然后和他们一起研究中国未来的发展方向。最后逐渐到了2007年,就自己在网上发起了中国新民党。那么到2008年,就抓起来,被判刑,判了10年,那么整个这个过程呢,就是从发展到被捕,然后在监狱里10年,出来2018年,出来我的观点不仅没有改变,相反越来越成熟,越来越成熟。就是说多党竞选,哪怕有一万个,这不好,比如说效率的一种损耗,那不好啊,比如:是决策的缓慢,或者其他对于专制制度的劣势,但是多党竞争的制度都要比专制要好。这是一个确定的概念,就是民主制、多党竞选的民主制,一定比专制要好。所以你专制制度怎么伪装自己,说我们是社会主义民主,全过程民主,等等,那肯定是不如多党竞选的。这是肯定的。所以到现在2020年,就出狱一年两个月,又被捕了,又说我是在煽动宣传颠覆国家政权罪,又判了4年,到2024年出来。出来之后,我没有任何改变,还是在写文章,包括现在,我认为关注国际政治的民主发展,对中国将来是有很大的一个借鉴和促进作用的。所以我现在我的文章已经不大关注中国内部的事务,因为我觉得中国内部事务其实很简单,比如说什么食品问题啦、环境问题啦、这个维权问题啦,这些我认为这些东西如果用多党竞选,一切迎刃而解。

林小龙: 您的这个多党竞选理论是与宪政这个概念有什么区别,这两者有什么不一样的地方?

郭泉先生: 就现在,我们中国现在也讲我们国家也是宪政民主,但其实它不是多党竞争的。就是说,如果不是多党竞争,那你是什么宪政都没有用的。因为这可以就像我刚才讲的,民主、自由、宪政、法治,专制国家它也这样讲了。历史上秦始皇统治的时期,它也有秦朝的法律,它也可以说它是法治国家,皇权专制。所以,用多党竞争这四个字来替代一切,就是掩盖真相的那些名词,什么人权啊、自由啊、民主啊、法治啊、宪政啊,那些东西我认为全部都会被专制者利用。即使是希特勒活到现在,或者是慈禧太后活到现在,她也是。

林小龙: 对,要落在实处,落在实处就是四个字:多党竞选。

关于竞选,您认为,如果实现这个多党竞选,需要什么样的社会去变动或者推动,然后怎么样去实现这个呢?

郭泉先生: 过程呢,我现在我的感觉呢就是如果没有美国打击委内瑞拉,没有美国打击伊朗,这种方式是实现不了的。也就是说,如果美国不去把马杜罗抓到美国,那么委内瑞拉永远都是这种专制国家。那么,如果没有美国对伊朗发动的实施怒火行动,伊朗永远不可能走向民主。那么,同样是中国,也是现在有很多人认为,专制制度自己内部矛盾、内部斗争,会出现像蒋经国或者戈尔巴乔夫这种敢于推翻的专制制度的人,那种方式就是自动的通过党内内部的斗争走向民主,我认为不可能,所以必须借助外力,一定要来自外力的干预。

林小龙:但是我的了解的就是共产党,它是一个集体,它现在是一个集体在执行这个专

政,并不是一个人。如果就是把这个人,就是把一个总统,或者把习近平这个抓了以后,但依然不会影响这种专制体制,不会走到您说的那个多党竞选

郭泉先生: 我今天写的文章就谈到这个事情,就是说让一个领导人先走,根本不能动摇它整个管理体制的那种运行方式,就是说如果是川普总统这次把哈梅内伊杀死了,但是没有把革命卫队所有的管理层消灭的话,那没有用的,他换成他儿子就行了,他儿子还有什么弟弟啊,哥哥啊,甚至还有孙子啊。所以说,现在的问题已经不是让领导人先走,而是要让领导层全走,让整个管理体制全部消灭,才能够让老百姓去建立一个新的政权,一个新的政府。但是呢,在委内瑞拉这个问题上,川普总统选择了一个方法,就是先用了你原来的人,但是你原来那些人如果不是按照美国那种操作方式操作的话,美国照样把你清除掉。所以川普总统现在就是用委内瑞拉原来政府里面的一些人进行临时的操作,目的是为了过渡到最后多党竞选,这点是很明确的,就是他的现在临时政府是为了多党竞选做准备。

林小龙: 也就是说你认为:未来中国如果要实现多党竞选这条路,就必须依赖外部的力量干预。

郭泉: 对,就是只有外力,只有外力,否则不可能的,因为中国九千万党员,你去掉哪一个,那么

还有其他人,就会继续上台专政。

林小龙: 那您认为普通的老百姓如何参与这样的一个进程,如何贡献自己的一份

力量,在推动中国民主这个事情上去呢?

郭泉先生: 我觉得就是,就像我一样嘛,接受你们的采访嘛,和你们在海外的朋友们做朋友嘛,然后写文章,多介绍国外的一些情况,然后让国外的一些先进的制度,能让中国人知道。然后也要让我们这些在国内的人做的事情,让海外的人知道。这个就像什么呢?就是,如果一个新的政府要使用人的话,它当然要使用符合新的运行体制的人,不能使用原来的人的。所以说,我们这些人将来肯定是新社会要使用的人。所以说,我们现在在国内的人,如果你愿意成为新社会使用的力量,那么现在就要露出你的光芒,要准备好。

林小龙: 您認為這個進程會很快吗?

郭泉先生: 我个人认为还是很快的,因为中国经济现在越来越下滑,老百姓的生活很显然没有前几年好了。中国跟克林顿当时搞这个经济捆绑,那个时候经济非常好,现在基本上脱钩,断

链差不多了。经济非常不好,这就是一种内在的因素,就是说老百姓希望生活。然后,另外中国有一种这个扩张的这种意图,这种意图跟美国是冲突的,所以说必然未来中美冲突可能会以某种方式会发生。

从经济战发生到外交战,最后还是能发生成热战的。只要一旦热战爆发,那么中国就会发生变化,就会发生变化。所以现在看中国攻台,中国打台湾可能是解决问题的一个关键的时间点。所以我经常跟很多人开玩笑,我想如果中国不攻打台湾,那么中国就会永远这样,因为国际社会没有办法改变中国。那么,但是中国如果攻打台湾,那么很有可能这就是一个破局。比如说其他国家就会美日澳就会联合起来帮助台湾。如果中国不攻打台湾,那中国永远跟国际社会不会战斗,那不会战斗,那它永远能执政。所以说如果中国不发声攻台,很有可能,因为没有办法可以改变他,没有办法。中国老百姓可以讲,14亿人,14亿没有枪的人根本打不过10万有枪的。

林小龙: 对1989年,我们已经经历过了。

郭泉先生:对呀,所以那个伊朗9000万人根本打不过10万革命卫队,根本打不过。所

说,美国必须帮伊朗人民。如果美国不帮伊朗人民,伊朗永远永远被这个伊朗邪恶政权统治。

林小龙: 在您公开表达自己的政治关点后,您印象最深刻的是有什么样具体事件?因为您经历过很多困难和压力嘛,包括被逮捕,判刑过程中。

郭泉先生: 我最深刻的,就是总是社会上有很多人理解我。我觉得这个是我最开心,也是最让人鼓舞的地方。如果我做这个事,很多人不能理解,社会上人不能理解,那么我就觉得我做错了。如果是一部分人不理解,但是另外一部分人理解,多党竞选就是有人赞同你,有人支持你,要有人反对你,对吧,有人反对你,有人支持你,那我现在,我总是能发现有人支持我,这就够了。包括很多朋友,在我沒有收入的情況下,看我文章,看我一篇文章,打賞一元钱。錢雖然不多,但是就這樣子,也能夠讓我生存了,所以非常開心。

林小龙: 这个也是您持续这样做自己的一个观点,去形成一个动力。对,只要有人支持你,这就是动力, 我之前也对中国的一些大民众稍微有一点失望吧。但是听您这么说,我觉得还是我们

还是有一定的希望的。

郭泉先生: 现在可以讲就是改变。我们没有办法,没有什么改变的。你比如说:你要想帮老百姓维权,或者批评政府,那么很显然,马上就坐牢,这改变是不可能的。所以我现在就是说,我们现在能做的,我认为就是把自己这把宝剑打造成锋利,等待最后的时刻,我们要杀出去,要恢复这个宝剑的。所以说,现在的在国内的人应该多写文章,多接收你们的访谈,然后让社会上知道,比如说这个中国还有一个郭泉,还有一个某某某。那么将来这个社会发生变革之后,这些人要能用起来,要能用起来。比如说,我从2007年写文章,一直写到现在,除了坐牢的时间,其他时间一天一篇文章,一天一篇文章。那么整个国际社会都在关注,都知道我的思想始终没有发生变化。那么等到中国社会发生变化之后,那么我就是一个可以被用的人,被使用的人。至于放在什么岗位上使用,那个时候需要竞选,但是如果你在国内,你默默无闻,或者你有观点却没有文章,你怎么能接受别人的选择呢?你怎么参加?

林小龙: 对的。最后一点,您对接下来中国的一些年轻一代,您有什么想说的,或者一个期待?

郭泉先生:我不建议大家搞一些实体性的对抗运动,因为这个很显然,你只要稍微有一点活动就会被消失。

我建议大家第一个:就是了解中国现状,这个很关键。那么了解这个现状呢。

第二个:必须得出一个结论,就只有多党竞选才能解决这个问题,其他没有用。很多人讲改革开放,改革开放能解决这个问题,但是改革开放,它是在党内,是一种专制的延续方式,它并不是在根本上解决问题的。所以,根本上解决问题还是多党竞选,这点是明确无误的。

第三个:你要持续表达你的观点,而且要强化,强化就是每天都要有表达,这样才能到了一个新时代之后,你才有资本来参与竞选。因为最终,中国不是靠打打杀杀,像革命者,像那种成为领导人的,一定不是,一定是多党竞选。那多党竞选的一个核心,就是你曾经做过的事和你曾经的表达,这个才是最关键的。如果你曾经没有做过事,你只有表达也不行,因为别人会讲某某人只会说,不会做,所以说,又要有行动,又要有表达。当然,现在行动是很困难了,但是也要做一些行动,要有表达。最后还要跟国外建立好一种良好的关系,因为最终的中国一定是像委内瑞拉和美国,伊朗和美国最后的那种连接方式,它是建立在美国这个民主思想熏陶下的。中国一定的未来是这样子,它不可能是脱离美国搞的一个民主制度,这肯定不行的。比如现在欧洲,欧洲现在的民主制度就是脱离美国的一种民主制度,结果出问题了吧。你讲西班牙呀,法国呀,英国啊,他们都脱离美国来搞他们的民主,最后就搞成了一种类似于伊斯兰社会主义的东西,这个多可怕。

林小龙: 是的,感谢郭老师接受我们在野党杂志采访,也希望中国早日实现我们的多党执政制度,保重,再见。

编者按:

在本次访谈中,郭泉以其一贯鲜明而坚定的立场,反复强调“多党竞选”作为政治制度核心的重要性。在他看来,衡量一个制度是否具备民主性质的关键,并不在于其宣称的理念或标签,而在于是否存在真实、有效的权力竞争机制。相较于任何形式的专制体制,多党竞争不仅是一种制度安排,更是一种防止权力固化与滥用的根本性保障,是解决社会矛盾与实现公共利益的必要前提。

与此同时,郭泉对中国未来可能出现的变革路径也作出了明确而直接的判断。他认为,在现有权力结构高度稳固的情况下,单纯依赖内部演变难以撼动体制根基,国际格局的变化与外部力量的介入,将在某种程度上成为推动转型的重要变量。这一判断,既反映出其对现实结构的清醒认知,也体现出其对制度变迁路径的激进预设。

对于个体而言,郭泉特别强调“准备”的意义。他认为,制度的更替不会自动完成,它最终需要具体的人去参与、去承担、去构建。因此,持续表达、形成思想、积累公共记录,不仅是一种个人选择,更是一种面向未来的政治准备。在他看来,未来的新制度不会凭空产生,它需要一批早已完成自我塑造的人,作为其参与者与推动者。

更进一步,这种“表达本身”的意义,甚至在当下就已经成立。在一个表达受限、风险高企的环境中,发声不再只是意见的传递,而成为一种对沉默机制的突破。它既是对现实秩序的微小撬动,也是对未来可能性的提前书写。

尽管现实环境依然严峻,代价依然真实存在,但正如郭泉在访谈中所言,只要仍有人理解与支持,这种表达便不会是徒劳的。它所维系的,不只是个体的立场,更是一种尚未消失的公共精神。

而这种持续而稀缺的声音,也正构成了当下中国公共知识分子群体中,少见却未曾断裂的思想脉络。

Guo Quan: He was imprisoned for 14 years for one sentence

Interview: Lin Xiaolong Information compilation: Zhao Jie
Editor: Zhang Zhijun Editor-in-Chief: Zhu Yufu Translator: Ge Bing

郭泉:他因一句话坐牢14年

In today’s reality where China’s political speech space continues to tighten and public expression is constantly compressed, openly discussing institutional issues has become a risky behavior in itself. In such an environment, those who still insist on expressing independent political views often have to pay a heavy price. Guo Quan, a former associate professor at Nanjing Normal University, holds a master’s degree in sociology and a doctorate in philosophy. He is exactly such a scholar-dissident who continues to speak out under high pressure.

Unlike many intellectuals who only stay at the level of academic discussion, Guo Quan puts his political ideas into direct practice. He was not content to discuss concepts such as “democracy ”“ freedom” in the abstract, but put it in an extremely clear and even challenging way: the true institutional core lies not in rhetoric but in “multi-party campaigning”. In his view, all political discourse ——whether “democracy ”“ rule of law” or “constitutionalism”—— that can be repeatedly packaged and exploited by authoritarian systems is nothing more than a re-decoration of power if it lacks real mechanisms for competing for power.

In 2007, Guo Quan initiated the formation of the “China New People’s Party” on the Internet, openly advocating multi-party elections to replace one-party dictatorship. This move quickly touched a political no-go zone, making it a key target of suppression by the authorities. In 2008, he was sentenced to ten years in prison “for subversion of state power”; just over a year after his release from prison, he was arrested again for speech and sentenced to four years in prison, and was not allowed to leave prison again until 2024. His imprisonment of more than ten years has not silenced him, but has made his position more radical and his expression more direct.

Guo Quan is special in that he is not only a critic of the system, but also a clear advocate of institutional alternatives. He compressed complex political issues into a powerful judgment: without multi-party elections, there can be no true democracy; all systems that are not based on power competition will eventually slide into authoritarianism. This highly simplified but highly directional expression has caused its views to resonate strongly between supporters and opponents.

In a political environment that emphasizes “stability overrides everything”, Guo Quan’s continued expression itself has constituted a challenge to the order of reality. His experience also reflects the common dilemma faced by contemporary Chinese public intellectuals: repeatedly weighing expression and risk, and making choices between silence and voice.

In this interview, Guo Quan not only reviewed his own ideological path from academic research to political expression, but also further elaborated on his judgment on the authoritarian system, external intervention and China’s future political transformation. His views may be fierce, even controversial, but in increasingly shrinking public spaces, such voices themselves have become a part of the record.

Lin Xiaolong: Hello Mr. Guo, given the current severe political speech environment in China, regarding your question in this interview, you can answer it if you are willing to answer it, and if you are not willing to answer it, just change the topic.

First of all, I would like to ask if you could briefly introduce a growing experience and family background of yours, and what impact it had on your values as an adult, so that later you dared to express your political views openly in such a politically high-pressure society and paid a huge price for it.

Mr. Guo Quan: Let me first briefly introduce myself. I went to college in 1987, so I experienced the August 964 Movement. However, I am not in Beijing, not in Tiananmen Square. We are in various parts of the country and in our respective places, that is, we participated in that movement. So what happened after that was also an experience, being influenced by some democratic ideas, and then after graduating from university in 1990 with these democratic ideas and heading to work, it would have a great impact on my daily life.

First, when working in corporate government, we will find that many social problems cannot be solved if they are not solved in a democratic way. Although the authoritarian system can solve some problems, it has great problems in democratic decision-making. So I took the master’s degree in sociology from Nanjing University in 1993. During the study process of this master’s degree in sociology, I discovered even more that democratic systems will bring a way of operating to society, but autocracy is not an option. So after graduating with a master’s degree, I went on to study for a doctorate, at which time I worked in the court and at the Nanjing Municipal Court. Then, in the court’s trial work, we also found many, many things. In fact, social problems are caused by authoritarian systems. So then I went to study for a PhD, and the concepts that were basically formed while studying for a PhD

That is, politics and philosophy are inseparable. That is, if politics is not thought of in terms of philosophy, then politics will go to extremes.

So, from 1996 to 1999, when I studied for a doctorate in philosophy, I formed a view of democracy, that is, universal values, in those three years. So what about this universal value, the whole society is also talking about universal values now, but for example, freedom, democracy, I think the four words freedom and democracy will also be used by despots to deceive people. It will also say: we are socialist democracy, socialist rule of law, and even our socialism is freedom. So I thought this was not okay, so I replaced this liberal democracy with four words, multi-party campaign. I think only multi-party campaign can check and balance authoritarianism.

Lin Xiaolong: Yes, almost all anti-American countries have an authoritarian system. One common feature is that they are unwilling to run for multiple parties.

Mr. Guo Quan: So this is the death hole of the authoritarian system. I talked about this issue in the article I wrote. Later, after graduating with a doctorate in 1999, I went to South Normal University as a postdoctoral fellow. The topic of my postdoctoral research was: liberal literature. This made me feel even more that the fundamental reason for all social contradictions is the lack of democratic systems. So after completing his postdoctoral thesis, he stayed at South Normal University as an associate professor. During the teaching process, he gradually discussed the democratic system with his classmates and then studied China’s future development direction with them. Finally, in 2007, he launched the China New People’s Party online. So by 2008, I was arrested, sentenced, and sentenced for 10 years. What about the whole process, which was from development to arrest, then 10 years in prison, and then coming out in 2018, my opinion not only did not change, but on the contrary became more and more mature and mature. That is, multi-party elections, even if there are even 10,000, are not good. For example, it is a loss of efficiency, which is not good. For example, it is slow decision-making or other disadvantages to authoritarian systems. However, the system of multi-party competition is better than authoritarianism. This is a certain concept, that is, democracy, democracy with multi-party elections, must be better than autocracy. So how do you disguise yourself as an authoritarian system, saying that we are socialist democracy, whole-process democracy, etc., is definitely not as good as multi-party campaigning. That’s for sure. So now in 2020, I have been released from prison for one year and two months, and was arrested again. I was also accused of inciting propaganda to subvert state power. I was sentenced to another four years and will be released in 2024. After coming out, I haven’t changed at all. I am still writing articles, including now. I think paying attention to the democratic development of international politics will be a great reference and promotion for China in the future. So now my articles don’t pay much attention to internal affairs in China, because I think internal affairs in China are actually very simple, such as the food issue, the environmental issue, and the rights protection issue. I think if these things are used in multi-party elections, everything will be solved.

Lin Xiaolong: What is the difference between your multi-party campaign theory and the concept of constitutionalism, and what is the difference between the two?

Mr. Guo Quan: Right now, we in China also say that our country is also a constitutional democracy, but in fact it is not multi-party competition. That is, if it is not multi-party competition, then it is useless to have any constitutional government. Because this can be said as I just said, democracy, freedom, constitutionalism, the rule of law, and it is also said in the case of authoritarian countries. During the period of Qin Shi Huang’s rule in history, it also had the laws of the Qin Dynasty. It can also be said that it was a country ruled by law and had absolute imperial power. So, replacing everything with the four words multi-party competition is the nouns that cover up the truth, such as human rights, freedom, democracy, rule of law, constitutionalism, and I think all of these things will be used by despots. Even if Hitler lived to this day, or the Empress Dowager Cixi lived to this day, she did.

Lin Xiaolong: Yes, we must be realistic. Realistic means four words: multi-party campaign.

Regarding the campaign, what kind of social changes or promotion do you think are needed to achieve this multi-party campaign, and how can we achieve this?

Mr. Guo Quan: What about the process, what I feel now is that this approach cannot be achieved without the United States striking Venezuela and the United States striking Iran. That is, if the United States does not catch Maduro in the United States, then Venezuela will always be this kind of authoritarian country. Iran, then, could never have moved towards democracy without the US-led Operation Imposing Rage against Iran. So, it is also China, and many people now believe that the autocratic system has its own internal contradictions and internal struggles, and there will be people like Chiang Ching-kuo or Gorbachev who dare to overthrow the autocratic system. That way, people like Chiang Ching-kuo or Gorbachev will automatically move towards democracy through internal struggles within the party. I think it is impossible, so we must use external forces and must intervene from external forces.

Lin Xiaolong: But what I understand is the Communist Party. It is a collective. It is now a collective that implements this special

Zheng is not a person. If we arrest this person, a president, or Xi Jinping, but it will not affect this authoritarian system and will not lead to the multi-party campaign you mentioned

Mr. Guo Quan: The article I wrote today talks about this, which is that letting a leader go first will not shake the way the entire management system operates. It is that if President Trump kills Khamenei this time but does not eliminate all the management of the Revolutionary Guard, then it is useless. He can just replace him with his son What younger brothers, older brothers, and even grandchildren does his son have. So, the problem now is not to let the leaders go first, but to let the leadership go all the way and the entire management system be eliminated, so that the people can establish a new regime and a new government. But what about the Venezuelan issue, President Trump chose a method, which is to use your original people first, but if your original people did not operate in the same way as the United States, the United States would still eliminate you. So President Trump is now using some people in Venezuela’s original government to conduct temporary operations in order to transition to the final multi-party election. This is very clear, that his current temporary government is preparing for a multi-party election.

Lin Xiaolong: In other words, you believe that if China wants to achieve multi-party elections in the future, it must rely on external forces to intervene.

Guo Quan: Yes, there is only external force, only external force, otherwise it is impossible, because of China’s 90 million party members, which one do you want to remove, then

There are others who will continue to come to power.

Lin Xiaolong: Then how do you think ordinary people can participate in such a process and contribute their part

What is the power behind promoting democracy in China?

Mr. Guo Quan: I think it is just like me, to accept interviews with you, to be friends with your friends overseas, and then write articles to introduce more about the situation abroad, and then let the Chinese know about some advanced systems abroad. Then let those of us who are at home do things so that people overseas can know about them. What is this like? That is, if a new government wants to use people, it must of course use people who are in line with the new operating system and cannot use the original people. So, we are definitely the ones that the new society will use in the future. So, we are here in the country now, if you are willing to be a force for use in the new society, then show your light now and be ready.

Lin Xiaolong: Do you think this journey will be fast?

Mr. Guo Quan: Personally, I think it will be very fast because China’s economy is declining more and more, and people’s lives are obviously not as good as in previous years. China and Clinton were doing this economic bundling at the time. The economy was very good at that time, but now it is basically decoupled and broken

The chain is almost there. The economy is very bad, which is an inherent factor, that is, people want to live. Then, China has this intention to expand, and this intention is in conflict with the United States, so it is inevitable that the Sino-US conflict may occur in some way in the future.

From economic war to diplomatic war, and finally hot war can still occur. As long as once the hot war breaks out, then China will change, it will change. So now looking at China’s attack on Taiwan, China’s attack on Taiwan may be a key time point for resolving the problem. So I often joke with many people that if China does not attack Taiwan, then China will always be like this because the international community has no way to change China. Well, but if China attacks Taiwan, then there is a good chance that this will be a breakthrough. For example, other countries will join forces with the United States, Japan and Australia to help Taiwan. If China does not attack Taiwan, then China will never fight the international community, will never fight, and will always be able to govern. So if China doesn’t speak out against Taiwan, it’s very likely, because there’s no way to change him, no way. The Chinese people can say that 1.4 billion people, 1.4 billion people without guns, can’t fight 100,000 people with guns.

Lin Xiaolong: For 1989, we have already experienced it.

Mr. Guo Quan: Yes, so Iran’s 90 million people can’t defeat the 100,000 Revolutionary Guards at all. What

Said, the United States must help the Iranian people. If the United States does not help the Iranian people, Iran will always be ruled by this evil Iranian regime.

Lin Xiaolong: After you publicly expressed your political concerns, what specific events impressed you most were? Because you have experienced a lot of difficulties and pressures, including being arrested and being sentenced.

Mr. Guo Quan: What is most profound about me is that there are always many people in society who understand me. I think this is what makes me happiest and most inspiring. If I do this thing and many people don’t understand it, and people in society don’t understand it, then I feel that I have done it wrong. If some people don’t understand, but another part of people understand, multi-party campaigning means that some people agree with you, some people support you, and some people have to oppose you, right, some people oppose you, and some people support you, then now, I can always find that some people support me, and that’s enough. Including many friends, when I have no income, I read my articles, read my articles, and pay one yuan. There’s not much money, but it’s the same thing that can help me survive, so I’m very concerned.

Lin Xiaolong: This is also your point of view to continue doing this to form a driving force. Yes, as long as there are people supporting you, that is the motivation. I was also a little disappointed with some big people in China before. But hearing you say that, I think it’s still us

There is still some hope.

Mr. Guo Quan: Now we can talk about change. We have no way, nothing has changed. You say, for example: if you want to help the people defend their rights or criticize the government, then obviously, you will be imprisoned immediately and this change is impossible. So I’m saying now, what we can do now, I think it’s to make this sword of our own sharp and wait for the final moment, we’re going to kill it and restore this sword. So, people in China now should write more articles, receive more interviews from you, and let society know that, for example, there is another Guo Quan and another so-and-so in this China. Then after the changes in this society in the future, these people must be able to use it and be able to use it. For example, I have been writing articles since 2007 and have been writing articles ever since. Except for the time I was in jail, I have written articles every day and every day. Then the entire international community is paying attention and knows that my thoughts have never changed. Then after the changes in Chinese society, then I am a person who can be used, a person who can be used. As for what position to use it in, you need to run for election at that time, but if you are in the country, you are unknown, or you have an opinion but no articles, how can you accept other people’s choices? How do you participate?

Lin Xiaolong: Yes. Finally, what do you want to say or expect about some of China’s younger generation?

Mr. Guo Quan: I don’t recommend everyone to engage in some physical confrontation movement, because obviously, if you have even the slightest activity, you will disappear.

I suggest that the first one is: to understand the current situation in China, which is very critical. So understand the current situation.

Second: One conclusion must be drawn, that only multi-party campaigning can solve this problem, and the rest is useless. Many people talk about reform and opening up, and reform and opening up can solve this problem, but reform and opening up, it is within the party and is a way to continue authoritarianism. It is not fundamentally solving the problem. So, it is clear that the fundamental solution is multi-party campaigning.

The third one: you have to express your views continuously and strengthen them. Strengthening means expressing them every day so that after a new era, you will have the capital to participate in the campaign. Because in the end, China does not rely on fighting and killing. If it becomes a leader like a revolutionary, it must not be a multi-party campaign. One of the core things about multi-party campaigns is what you have done and what you have expressed, and that is the most critical. If you have never done something, you can’t just express it, because others will tell you that someone can only say and not do it, so there must be action and expression. Of course, it is difficult to act now, but some action must be taken and expressed. Finally, we must establish good relations with foreign countries, because the final China must be like Venezuela and the United States, Iran and the United States, the last way to connect. It was built on the influence of American democratic ideas. This is the future of China. It cannot be a democratic system separated from the United States. This is certainly not possible. For example, in Europe now, the current democratic system in Europe is a democratic system that is separated from the United States. As a result, something went wrong. You talk about Spain, France, and Britain. They all broke away from the United States to pursue their democracy, and ended up with something similar to Islamic socialism. How terrible this is.

Lin Xiaolong: Yes, thank you to Teacher Guo for accepting our interview in the opposition party magazine. I also hope that China will realize our multi-party governance system as soon as possible. Take care and goodbye.

Editor’s Note:

In this interview, Guo Quan, with his usual clear and firm stance, repeatedly emphasized the importance of “multi-party campaigning” as the core of the political system. In his view, the key to measuring whether a system is democratic lies not in its stated ideas or labels, but in whether there are real and effective mechanisms for competing for power. Compared with any form of authoritarian system, multi-party competition is not only an institutional arrangement, but also a fundamental guarantee to prevent the consolidation and abuse of power. It is an essential prerequisite for resolving social contradictions and realizing the public interest.

At the same time, Guo Quan also made a clear and direct judgment on the possible future change path for China. He believes that with the existing power structure highly stable, relying solely on internal evolution will not be able to shake the institutional foundation. Changes in the international landscape and the intervention of external forces will become important variables in promoting transformation to some extent. This judgment reflects both its clear understanding of the structure of reality and its radical presupposition of the path of institutional change.

For individuals, Guo Quan particularly emphasizes the meaning of “preparation”. He believes that the replacement of systems will not be automatic; it ultimately requires specific people to participate, take on, and build. Therefore, continuous expression, thought formation, and accumulation of public records are not only a personal choice, but also a political preparation for the future. In his view, the new system of the future will not emerge out of thin air. It will require a group of people who have already completed self-molding as its participants and promoters.

Furthermore, the meaning of this “expression itself” is already established even in the present moment. In an environment where expression is limited and risks are high, speaking out is no longer just a transmission of opinions, but a breakthrough to the mechanism of silence. It is both a small leverage on the order of reality and an advance writing of future possibilities.

Although the real environment remains severe and the costs are still real, as Guo Quan said in the interview, as long as there are still people who understand and support it, this expression will not be in vain. What it maintains is not just the individual’s position, but also a public spirit that has not disappeared.

This continuous and scarce voice also constitutes a rare but unbroken ideological vein among China’s current public intellectual community.