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政治民主(二十四期 三章3-6节 )

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作者:祝正明

(三)言论自由的意义

  人类的行为方式并无固定的模式可世代通用,任何人想把一种固定的模式作为人类千年通用的准则都是枉费心机,其作用反而是阻碍历史车轮的前进。而反对、批评的意见与建议,正是推动社会进步的自然动力。保护言论对政治思想、政府结构、政府官员进行反对或批评的自由,目的并不是出于对批评者个人的关心,更非是赞同他们的观点,而在于这些言论能及时地使社会发现自己的缺陷,使社会明白需要努力改进的地方。反对、批评的言论,较之拥护的言论,更能保护整个社会的利益。   

古人云:良药苦口利于病,忠言逆耳利于行。批评与反对的言论也许并不动听、并不在理,但是,让它们有发表的机会仍然是必要的。只有保护了这些言论,才能集思广益,使各种有关政治理论和政治结构的问题、政府官员的不良行为,能够接受严格的检验,使存在的缺陷充分暴露,也才能使那些最能经得起论战考验,最合理,拥有最多支持者的见解与论点来主导社会的各项事务。最终使全体公民的利益得到最好的维护。 

一个社会,就算其宪法、法律、社会结构、政策已经到了很完美的程度,仍然应该让反对者与拥护者有均等的机会表达意见。听听反对者的意见,对之进行评论,正可以使已有的优点更深入人心,获得更多的支持,人们更自发地拥护,也正是最好的加强巩固它们自己的机会。 

在一个公共场所,对于一个宣讲革命的人,没有人肯定周围的群众会作出何种反应。人们可能报以掌声,也可能把他轰下台,或置之不理,嗤之以鼻。宣讲者可能是位煽动家,但群众不可能是一煽就动的暴民。即便是鼓吹推翻一个合理合法的政府,只要他还没有动手侵犯别人的利益,就应该容忍他发表言论,不要去打扰他,允许他象路标一样站在那里,借此也可以表明我们社会在进步的过程中,能在种种错误的导向牌面前经受得住考验,没有误入歧途。 

批评的自由,发表反对言论的自由,无论多么不受欢迎,在民主制度中都是不可缺少的。民主是民众的意志参与决策的过程,实现这一过程,必然依赖于民众的各种主张能够自由地提出并进行自由地讨论。执政党压制批评意见和反对意见的行为,无论有多少理由,都是对民主制度的破坏。 

如果说出版一本书就会导致信仰的破灭和政府的垮台,那么,这样的信仰就应该破灭,政府就应该垮台。它之所以会垮台,正说明了它信仰的伪善、结构的缺陷和制度的腐朽已经使它不堪一击,而并非单单是一本书造成。事实上,一个愚昧无知、专横贪婪的政府官员,比一个仗义执言的作家,更能使政府威信扫地,更能对政府的垮台起到实质性的促进作用。 

民主是民众参与全社会治理的过程。而人的正确判断依赖于获得充分的、准确的信息。没有信息的自由流动,民众就不可能了解有关的背景知识,不知道存在的问题,不晓得有哪些可能的选择。民意也就很难显得明智,很难使决策达到最优化。公民有权知道自己生活的社会的情况,有权了解发生了什么问题,这是公民神圣的知的权利,任何人均无权剥夺公民的这一权利。 

现代文明是对话的文明,这意味着各种意见应能够进行自由的讨论,讨论的主要目的不仅仅是为了说服对方,而是便于将各种思想观点加以对比,共同改进。因此,言论自由包括在思想和著作方面犯错误的自由。社会必须珍惜这种自由,这种看上去无用的自由具有至高无上的价值。 

在任何人都能自由地办报、出书以后,任何人的观点都能够在自由的新闻出版媒体上发表出来,乏味的说教报道很快就会从传播媒体上消失,取而代之的将是大量事实性、评论性和观感性的报道,从而能极大地增强新闻媒体的信息量、可信度、趣味性和观赏性,增加民众对新闻媒体的阅读量和收视率、对社会问题的了解和对政治的关心程度,缩小民众与政治的距离,民众的政治参与意识和社会责任感将会同步增加,这对提高整个民族的文化素质和社会道德水准,改变社会的风气都会带来明显的好处。                   

(四)鼓吹与煽动   

鼓吹是言论的一种形式,大鸣大放的辩论与鼓吹是民主政治生活的重要内容之一。任何人都有权自由地,以自己喜欢的方式去鼓吹任何东西。一切党派,不论其观点如何偏激,都有同样的权利去鼓吹任何东西。口头鼓吹如此,文字鼓吹也一样。   

煽动是鼓吹的一种形式。实际上每一种主张都是一种鼓吹,每一种鼓吹都是一种煸动。它们提出来的目的就是要让人相信。煽动、鼓吹、挑动,在民主国家中,决不能被视为非法,它们是言论自由的一部分。人人都有自由地煽动、鼓吹的权利,不论什么都可以,包括鼓吹暴力革命。只要没有以暴力违法,口头攻击现行的法律亦不违法。   

在民主社会,任何人都可以自由地鼓吹任何主义。莫尔的《乌托邦》、卢梭的《社会契约论》、希特勒的《我的奋斗》,马克思的《共产党宣言》等在专制制度下曾被封为禁书的书籍,都应该可以在任何地方自由地印刷、发行、出售、阅读、研究。这样做,并不等于就是社会赞同了作者的观点,也不是为了保护出版者的利益,其目的在于使各种赞成、反对当代社会制度的人的一切观点,都能让公众了解到,让民众自行判断正确与否,自行决定接受与否,这是公民神圣的选择权利。   

当然,民众也有暂时被愚弄而误入歧途的可能。但是,民众有能力很快察觉和纠正。对付这种愚弄的有效办法就是更多的言论。一个能干的煽动家会发现,要煽动群众在短时期内相信他并从事某种行为是有可能做到的事,但要将群众长期维持在这一状态中则绝无可能。因此,完全不用担心存在这种误导的可能性,民众有能力发现其问题,人类理智的判断力是邪恶所无法战胜的。 

大吵大闹,粗野放肆的辩论与攻击是民主政治的特色。那些经常在公众面前抛头露面的政治家必须对此有所心理准备,必须具备相应的忍耐力,容忍别人直接反对自己的观念,并把支持自己观点的人从自己的阵营中拉走。民主之所以奇特,在于它要求有权力的一方具有和反对派共处的意向,愿意和他们一起工作和讨论问题,当人民需要的时候,把权力交给对方。   

没有在剧场禁止叫失火的法律,因为,如果真的失火,众人还要感谢他,如果没有失火,受到惊扰的众人随后自然会惩罚他。因此,用不着制定法律禁止人们在剧场叫失火,只要有惩罚造谣与诽谤行为的法律就足够了。 
对言论和出版自由的控制取消后,短期内,也许所有刊物上最初都会充满鼓吹、煽动,但是,由于这些报道的目的各不相同,它们的作用会相互抵消,短时期以后,民众会逐渐习惯,产生应有的分析辨别能力。在这种环境中,个别人的某一种言论,即便其再奇特,也不可能对社会产生什么影响,因为一种新奇的言论一出笼,立即就会遭到各方面的抨击,如果其没有坚实的基础,很快就会在众多抨击的重压下溃败。只有那些能代表大多数人的利益,能引起大多数人共鸣的言论才能够逐渐脱颖而出,变成一种社会性意志,推动社会进行改良。                   

(五)诽谤与中伤 

对于一个有尊严的公民来说,身外之物再也没有比清白的名誉更有价值的了。言论自由应受到保护,人的名声同样应受到保护。保护言论自由,并不等于就是保护以言论蓄意伤害他人名誉的行为。如果言论自由可以变成诽谤与诬陷的自由,社会舆论就很难变得明智。民主制度下,社会允许任何人自由地发表任何言论,但必须对自己言论的内容与后果负责。这就是言论的事后负责制。   
拥有了权利,也必须承担行使这种权利所附带的责任。言论自由的权利、责任和义务必须以法律来明确规定,这就是《新闻出版法》与《诽谤法》。它们的作用就是既要保护公民言论自由的权利,又要保护公民名誉不受无礼侵犯的权利,解决这两种权利冲突时的争端。   
通常,恶意的言论对公民利益的侵犯可以分为四类:   
1.打扰公民的隐居或安静的生活方式。   
2.未经授权,公开泄露私人不宜公开的事实。 
3.公开那些在公民心目中对公民产生错误看法的材料。   
4.为了得到好处和利益而盗用他人姓名和肖像。   

新闻出版界的根本任务是向社会提供有价值的信息,而不是以哗众取宠,招摇撞骗。新闻从业人员必须具备基本的责任感。对于用造谣、诽谤手段侵犯他人利益、诬陷他人清白的责任人,社会必须以法律进行限制和制裁。一般认为,构成诽谤罪有以下要素:   
1.动机 — 怀有恶意,故意损坏他人名誉和人格。   
2.手段— 捏造事实,无中生有,凭空制造虚假事实,强加于他人,并以众人能够看到或听到的方式散发出去,中伤他人。   
3.有明确的对象— 针对具体的人。   
4.表现形式——语言、文字等。   

必须认识到,对杰出人物进行忘恩负义的诽谤的恶劣行径,对社会的政治稳定也是一种威胁,那些有能力,有影响力,肩负重任的人,在受到不公平对待时,作出任何反应都可能会对社会产生不利影响,在诽谤面前,他们可能会消耗大量的精力而穷于应付,也有可能急流勇退,拒绝为公众服务,或进行的有力回击,产生专断行为。   

言论自由不是诽谤自由。社会需要言论出版自由,但并不能庇护造谣、中伤、诽谤者。社会的法律必须保证,任何人,只要受到不正当的伤害,都可以随时依法向法庭起诉,让诽谤者在法庭上露面,接受陪审团和法官的审判,只要控告成立,责任人就必须赔礼道歉,赔偿损失,承担民事责任,使其在经济上、名誉上加倍损失,自食其果。   

有时,故意发表某些内容真实,但又不宜公开的材料,也可造成恶意的伤害。因此,有意伤害别人的公开言论,并不能仅仅因为内容真实即可摆脱对诽谤的诉讼。只要是出自不纯正的动机,对他人做出不正当的伤害的责任人,都应承担法律责任。               

(六)传播媒体的责任   

现代社会传播媒体已成为一个巨大的产业,承担着向社会提供信息的重任,但是,电视、广播节目往往由少数人制作产生,报纸、杂志、书籍的稿件也绝大部分出自个人之手,因此,新闻报道与出版发行的内容极易受个人好恶的影响,受党派利益的左右。对言论与新闻自由的限制解除以后,新闻媒体将会首先成为各党派团体进行论战、攻击的工具。 

偏袒是新闻媒体最易出现的问题,是影响新闻客观公正性的一个重要因素。在编写新闻报道时,从业人员有根据个人的好恶来选择材料的倾向,从而影响公众对全部的事实真相的了解,甚至会使公众产生错觉,损害公众利益。

 
民主社会在建立初期要注意的是,应尽量避免新闻媒体因失去约束而变得不负责任。否则,传播媒体有可能在法律上获得了自由,但在向民众提供真实充分的信息方面,却没有完成任务。   

个人好恶人皆有之,对于新闻从业人员,有客观公正地向公众提供全面事实材料的义务,不作删减,不添加自己的见解,没有多余的赞扬、推荐、指责、嘲笑。而反映某些人观点的评论性文章应与事实报道分题另列,不应与事实报道混融一体。   

言论自由是社会的治病良药,诽谤与诬陷却是它的副作用。社会为了能够享用出版自由带来的好处,必须忍受它所产生的不可避免的酸痛。新闻出版是一种事后责任制,当诽谤罪名成立时,伤害已经造成,而且往往不可愈合。要让诽谤者受到惩罚,受害者还需要付出更多的精力进行法律诉讼,损耗精力、财力,这是不公平的。但是,社会又不能为了避免这种对少数人的伤害而取消言论自由。减少这种副作用的主要办法就是要求新闻出版界加强社会责任感,提高从业人员的道德素质和业务水平,实行自律,自己加强对自身言行的约束,做到在各种情况下,都不应该因政治观点的不同而对别人的人格进行恶意攻击。 

在任何社会,人与人之间的利益冲突都是无法避免的,要用大家都满意的方法来解决争端并非经常可能。因此,民主社会要求矛盾的双方乐意以妥协的办法来解决分歧。如果双方都不妥协,即无达成协议的可能,问题长久搁置无法解决,对双方都没好处。 

客观、公正是新闻媒介需要长期追求的目标。民主社会之所以繁荣兴旺,很大程度上依赖于新闻出版界提供的准确信息、健康的评论和负责任的导向。责任、自由、独立、真实、诚信、公平、正直、庄重,是新闻出版从业人员应当遵守的基本原则。只有遵守这些原则,社会才能在稳定祥和的政治环境中集中精力发展经济与科学技术,增强国威,壮大国力,提高全民族的福利。   

在发展民主政治的过程中,培养自由与健康的新闻事业是一项非常重要的工作,它需要各方面长期认真的努力。

编辑:李晶  校对:程筱筱 翻译:沈美花

Political Democracy (Issue No. 24, Chapter 3, Sections 3–6)

Author: Zhu Zhengming

(III) The Significance of Freedom of Speech

Human behavior does not follow a fixed model that can be universally applied from one generation to the next. Anyone who attempts to establish a single fixed pattern as a timeless standard for humanity over thousands of years is laboring in vain. Such efforts, rather than benefiting society, only impede the forward movement of the wheel of history. Dissenting opinions, criticisms, and suggestions are precisely the natural driving forces behind social progress.

The purpose of protecting the freedom to oppose or criticize political ideas, governmental structures, and public officials is not to show concern for the critics themselves, nor does it imply agreement with their views. Rather, it is because such expressions enable society to discover its own shortcomings in a timely manner and to recognize where improvements are needed. Compared with speech that merely supports existing institutions, dissenting and critical speech is often more effective in safeguarding the interests of society as a whole.

As an ancient Chinese saying goes: “Good medicine tastes bitter but cures illness; honest advice sounds unpleasant but benefits conduct.” Criticism and dissenting opinions may not be pleasing to the ear, and they may not always be correct. Nevertheless, it remains necessary to allow them the opportunity to be expressed. Only by protecting such speech can society draw upon collective wisdom, enabling various questions concerning political theories, political structures, and the misconduct of public officials to undergo rigorous scrutiny. In this way, existing defects can be fully exposed, and those views and arguments that are most capable of withstanding debate, that are the most reasonable, and that enjoy the broadest support can come to guide public affairs. Ultimately, this serves to best protect the interests of all citizens.

Even if a society’s constitution, laws, social structure, and public policies have reached a highly perfected state, opponents and supporters should still be given equal opportunities to express their views. Listening to the opinions of opponents and responding to them through discussion can further reinforce the strengths that already exist, allowing them to take deeper root in the public consciousness and gain broader support. As people come to embrace them more willingly, this process itself becomes the best means of strengthening and consolidating those achievements.

In a public place, when someone advocates revolution, no one can predict how the surrounding crowd will respond. People may applaud; they may drive the speaker away; or they may simply ignore him and dismiss him with contempt. The speaker may be an agitator, but the public is not necessarily a mob that can be manipulated at the slightest provocation. Even if he advocates the overthrow of a reasonable and legitimate government, as long as he has not taken action to infringe upon the rights or interests of others, his speech should be tolerated. He should not be disturbed. He should be allowed to stand there like a signpost. In doing so, society demonstrates that, in the course of its progress, it is capable of withstanding the test of misleading signposts without losing its way.

The freedom to criticize and the freedom to express dissenting opinions, no matter how unpopular they may be, are indispensable elements of a democratic system. Democracy is a process through which the will of the people participates in decision-making. The realization of this process necessarily depends upon the ability of citizens to freely present their views and to engage in free discussion. Whenever a ruling party suppresses criticism and opposition, regardless of the reasons offered, such actions constitute a violation of democratic principles and an undermining of democratic institutions.

If the publication of a single book is enough to destroy a faith or bring down a government, then such a faith deserves to collapse and such a government deserves to fall. Its downfall would demonstrate that the hypocrisy of its beliefs, the defects of its structure, and the decay of its institutions have already rendered it incapable of withstanding challenge. The book itself would not be the true cause of its collapse. In reality, an ignorant, arrogant, and corrupt government official is far more likely than a conscientious writer speaking for justice to discredit a government and substantially contribute to its downfall.

Democracy is the process through which the people participate in the governance of society as a whole. Sound judgment depends upon access to sufficient and accurate information. Without the free flow of information, citizens cannot acquire the relevant background knowledge, understand existing problems, or know what alternatives are available. Under such circumstances, public opinion can hardly be expected to be wise, nor can decision-making be optimized. Citizens have the right to know the conditions of the society in which they live and to understand what problems exist and what events have occurred. This is the sacred right to know possessed by every citizen, and no one has the authority to deprive citizens of this right.

Modern civilization is a civilization of dialogue. This means that different opinions should be able to engage in free discussion. The primary purpose of discussion is not merely to persuade one’s opponent, but to compare different ideas and viewpoints so that all sides may improve together. Therefore, freedom of speech includes the freedom to make mistakes in thought and in writing. Society must cherish this freedom. This freedom, which may appear useless on the surface, possesses the highest value.

Once everyone is free to establish newspapers and publish books, every person’s viewpoints will be able to find expression through a free press and publishing system. Dull and dogmatic propaganda-style reporting will quickly disappear from the media. In its place will emerge a large quantity of factual reporting, commentary, and observational reporting. This will greatly enhance the amount of information available, as well as the credibility, interest, and appeal of the news media. It will increase public readership and viewership, deepen people’s understanding of social issues, and strengthen public concern for political affairs. The distance between ordinary citizens and politics will be reduced. At the same time, citizens’ awareness of political participation and their sense of social responsibility will grow. Such developments will bring significant benefits to raising the cultural standards and moral character of the nation as a whole and to improving the general social atmosphere.

(IV) Advocacy and Agitation

Advocacy is a form of speech. Open and unrestricted debate, together with vigorous advocacy, constitutes one of the essential components of democratic political life. Every individual has the right to freely advocate anything in whatever manner they prefer. All political parties, regardless of how extreme their views may be, possess the same right to advocate anything. This applies equally to oral advocacy and to written advocacy.

Agitation is one form of advocacy. In fact, every proposition is a form of advocacy, and every act of advocacy is, in essence, a form of agitation. Their purpose is to persuade others to believe. Agitation, advocacy, and incitement must under no circumstances be regarded as illegal in a democratic society; they are an integral part of freedom of speech. Everyone has the right to freely engage in agitation and advocacy, including the advocacy of violent revolution. As long as no unlawful violence is actually carried out, even verbal attacks on existing laws are not illegal.

In a democratic society, anyone may freely advocate any ideology. Books such as Thomas More’s Utopia, Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s The Social Contract, Adolf Hitler’s Mein Kampf, and Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels’ The Communist Manifesto—works that were once banned under various authoritarian systems—should be freely printed, distributed, sold, read, and studied anywhere.

Doing so does not mean that society endorses the authors’ views, nor is it intended to protect the interests of publishers. Its purpose is to ensure that all viewpoints, whether supporting or opposing the contemporary social system, can be made known to the public, allowing citizens to judge their correctness for themselves and decide whether to accept them. This is a sacred right of citizens: the right of choice.

Of course, the public may at times be deceived and temporarily led astray. However, the people are capable of quickly recognizing such deception and correcting it. The most effective way to counter such deception is through more speech. A capable agitator may indeed succeed in temporarily persuading the masses and inducing certain actions. However, it is impossible to maintain such a condition for a long period. Therefore, there is no need to worry about the possibility of manipulation; the public has the ability to recognize errors, and human rational judgment cannot ultimately be defeated by evil.

Noisy, rough, and even boisterous debate and attack are characteristics of democratic politics. Politicians who frequently appear in public must be psychologically prepared for this; they must develop the ability to tolerate others directly opposing their views and even drawing supporters away from their camp. The peculiarity of democracy lies in the fact that it requires those in power to be willing to coexist with their opponents, to work and deliberate with them, and when the people so require, to transfer power to them.

There is no law in theaters prohibiting someone from shouting “Fire!” This is because if there truly is a fire, the crowd will be grateful; and if there is no fire, the person who caused the disturbance will naturally be punished afterward by public reaction. Therefore, it is unnecessary to enact laws prohibiting such speech in advance. It is sufficient to have laws that punish false accusations and defamation.

Once restrictions on freedom of speech and publication are removed, it is possible that in the short term all publications will be filled with advocacy and agitation. However, because these expressions pursue different purposes, their effects will cancel each other out. After a short period, people will gradually become accustomed to this environment and will develop the necessary capacity for analysis and judgment.

In such a context, any individual statement, no matter how unusual, cannot have a decisive impact on society. As soon as a new and unusual opinion emerges, it will immediately be subjected to criticism from all sides. If it lacks a solid foundation, it will quickly collapse under the pressure of widespread criticism. Only those views that represent the interests of the majority and resonate with the majority of people can gradually emerge, become a kind of social will, and thereby promote social reform.

(V) Defamation and Slander

For a citizen of dignity, among all external possessions, nothing is more valuable than a clean and unblemished reputation. Freedom of speech must be protected, and a person’s reputation must likewise be protected. Protecting freedom of speech does not mean protecting acts in which speech is used to deliberately harm the reputation of others. If freedom of speech is turned into freedom for defamation and false accusation, public opinion in society can hardly become rational and wise.

Under a democratic system, society allows anyone to freely express any speech, but one must be responsible for the content and consequences of one’s own speech. This is what is known as the post-accountability system of speech.

Having rights necessarily entails bearing the responsibilities attached to the exercise of those rights. The rights, responsibilities, and obligations of freedom of speech must be clearly defined by law. This is the purpose of the “Press and Publication Law” and the “Defamation Law.” Their function is both to protect citizens’ right to freedom of speech and to protect citizens’ right to reputation from improper infringement, thereby resolving disputes arising from conflicts between these two rights.

Generally, malicious speech that infringes upon citizens’ interests can be divided into four categories:

Disturbing a citizen’s secluded life or peaceful way of living.

Without authorization, publicly disclosing private facts that should not be made public.

Publicly presenting materials that lead to false impressions about a citizen in the minds of others.

Illegally using another person’s name or image for personal gain or benefit.

The fundamental task of the press and publishing sector is to provide society with valuable information, rather than to seek sensationalism or engage in deceptive publicity. Journalism practitioners must possess a basic sense of responsibility. For those responsible who use rumor-mongering and defamation to infringe upon others’ interests and falsely accuse innocent people, society must impose legal restrictions and sanctions.

It is generally believed that the elements constituting the crime of defamation are as follows:

Motive — harboring malice and intentionally damaging another person’s reputation and character.

Means — fabricating facts, creating falsehoods out of nothing, producing fictitious information and attributing it to others, and disseminating it in a form visible or audible to the public, thereby slandering others.

Clear target — directed at a specific individual.

Form of expression — speech, writing, etc.

It must be recognized that malicious acts of ungrateful defamation against outstanding individuals also constitute a threat to social and political stability. Those who are capable, influential, and bear significant responsibilities may, when subjected to unfair treatment, respond in ways that have adverse effects on society. In the face of defamation, they may be forced to expend enormous energy in constant defense and be overwhelmed by it; or they may withdraw from public service; or they may carry out powerful retaliatory responses, thereby giving rise to authoritarian behavior.

Freedom of speech is not freedom for defamation. Society requires freedom of speech and publication, but it must not shelter those who spread rumors, slander, and defamation. The law must ensure that anyone who suffers unjust harm may, at any time, bring a lawsuit in accordance with the law, allowing the defamer to appear in court and stand trial before a jury and a judge. Once the accusation is established, the responsible party must issue an apology, compensate for losses, and bear civil liability, suffering both economic and reputational consequences, thereby reaping what they have sown.

At times, deliberately publishing certain materials that are factually true but inappropriate for public disclosure may also cause malicious harm. Therefore, publicly expressed speech that intentionally harms others cannot avoid defamation liability merely on the grounds that its content is true. As long as the act is driven by improper motives and results in unjust harm to others, the responsible party should bear legal responsibility.

(VI) The Responsibility of the Media

In modern society, the mass media has become a vast industry, bearing the important responsibility of providing information to society. However, television and radio programs are often produced by only a small number of individuals, and most articles in newspapers, magazines, and books are also written by individuals. Therefore, the content of news reporting and publishing is highly susceptible to personal likes and dislikes, as well as being influenced by party or factional interests.

Once restrictions on freedom of speech and press are lifted, the news media will likely first become a tool for various political parties and groups to engage in debate and attack one another.

Bias is the most common problem in the news media and is an important factor affecting the objectivity and fairness of journalism. When compiling news reports, practitioners tend to select materials according to their personal preferences, thereby influencing the public’s understanding of the full truth of events, and may even cause public misunderstanding and harm the public interest.

A democratic society in its early stage of development must be particularly careful to avoid the news media becoming irresponsible due to the absence of constraints. Otherwise, although the media may obtain legal freedom, it may fail to fulfill its duty of providing the public with truthful and sufficient information.

Personal preferences exist in everyone. However, journalists have the obligation to present comprehensive factual materials to the public in an objective and fair manner, without omission or distortion, without inserting personal opinions, and without unnecessary praise, recommendation, criticism, or ridicule. Commentary articles that reflect certain viewpoints should be clearly separated from factual reporting and should not be mixed with factual news content.

Freedom of speech is a social remedy, while defamation and false accusation are its side effects. In order to enjoy the benefits brought by press freedom, society must tolerate the unavoidable discomfort it produces.

Journalism and publishing operate under a system of post facto responsibility: when a defamation case is established, the harm has already been done and is often irreversible. To hold defamers accountable, victims must also expend additional effort in legal proceedings, losing time and financial resources—this is inherently unfair. However, society cannot abolish freedom of speech in order to avoid such harm to a minority of individuals.

The main way to reduce such side effects is to strengthen the media’s sense of social responsibility, improve the moral standards and professional competence of practitioners, and implement self-regulation. The media should restrain its own conduct, ensuring that under all circumstances it does not engage in malicious personal attacks against others due to political differences.

In any society, conflicts of interest between individuals are unavoidable. It is not always possible to resolve disputes in a way that satisfies everyone. Therefore, a democratic society requires both sides of a conflict to be willing to reach compromises. If neither side is willing to compromise, and no agreement can be reached, the issue will remain unresolved for a long time, which is detrimental to both parties.

Objectivity and fairness are long-term goals that the media must continuously pursue. The prosperity and development of a democratic society depend greatly on the accurate information, healthy commentary, and responsible guidance provided by the press and publishing industry.

Responsibility, freedom, independence, truthfulness, integrity, fairness, honesty, and dignity are the fundamental principles that media professionals must follow. Only by adhering to these principles can society concentrate its efforts on economic development and scientific and technological advancement in a stable and peaceful political environment, thereby enhancing national prestige, strengthening national power, and improving the overall welfare of the people.

In the process of developing democratic politics, cultivating a free and healthy press is a highly important task that requires long-term and serious effort from all sectors of society.

Editor: Li Jing Proofreader: Cheng Xiaoxiao Translator: Shen Meihua

救人先审批,拍照是重罪

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——从石门洪灾看中国灾难治理的真实逻辑

作者:周敏

2026年5月17日,湖南省常德市石门县遭遇特大洪灾。三座水电站被洪水冲垮,下游村庄房屋被夷为平地,当地居民反映物资极度短缺,实际死亡人数可能远超官方公布的7人。就在这场灾难发生之际,河南省蓝天救援队的伊川、宜阳、嵩县三支队伍——全部由自费出行、自带装备的志愿者组成——连夜赶赴灾区。

5月22日,河南省蓝天救援督察部发出通报,措辞严峻:上述三支队伍”未报备、未获批,擅自前往湖南常德开展救援作业”,并在石门收费站”私自拍摄、发布视频,引发网络舆情,造成极其恶劣的社会影响,严重损毁蓝天救援品牌形象”。处罚结果:责令全员撤回,全队书面警告。

救人先审批,拍照是重罪

请注意通报里的两个并列罪状:一是去救人,二是拍了视频。在这份文件里,这两件事的严重性是对等的。

负面舆情比洪水更危险

蓝天救援队成立于2007年,是中国规模最大的民间公益救援机构之一,队训是”少说多做,默默奉献”。这支队伍在多次重大灾难中发挥过关键作用。然而这一次,他们面对的惩罚竟然不是来自洪水,而恰恰来自于自己的上级——一个深度编织进官方应急管理体系的组织。

通报明确要求,所有跨区域救援必须”先报备、后审批、再出队”,并”严禁违规拍摄传播现场影像资料、制造负面舆情”。

“制造负面舆情”——这几个字是理解整个事件的钥匙。

灾区物资极度短缺,整村被淹,官方死亡数字与现实严重脱节,这些才是真正的”负面”现实。而这份通报所要消灭的,不是现实本身,而是关于现实的画面和信息。换句话说,志愿者拍下的视频之所以成为罪证,恰恰是因为它展示了真相。

不知道大家注意到没有,这次洪灾有个很关键的点:当地灾民反映,县政府没有提前通知村民撤离,在没有预警的情况下泄洪,引发严重洪灾,三座水电站被冲垮,下游村庄房屋被洪水冲走,灾区的物资极度短缺。官方公布的是死亡7人、14人失联,但是当地居民表示实际伤亡可能远超官方数字,”有的整个村全部灭了”。这让通报中”造成极其恶劣的社会影响”这句话显得挺耐人寻味——到底是救援行为本身造成了影响呢,还是拍摄、传播灾区的真实画面造成了”舆情”呢?

这不是第一次,也不会是最后一次

石门洪灾不是孤例,它是一个中国大地上上演多次的剧本。

2019年12月,武汉医生李文亮在同学群转发不明肺炎的预警信息,旋即就被警方传唤,在训诫书上签字画押,被定性为”散布不实信息”。三周后武汉封城,数月后李文亮以34岁之龄因感染新冠病毒离世。他预警的,正是后来夺去数百万人生命的病毒。他的罪行,只不过是提前说了真话。

2021年7月,郑州暴雨,京广北路隧道内车辆被淹,多人遇难。现场随即被军警封锁,禁止拍摄。凤凰卫视记者胡玲发微博记录”郑州京广隧道全部戒严,不允许拍照”,帖子很快被删除。与此同时,一份民间志愿者自发建立的腾讯文档救援信息表,24小时内更新超过270版,在官方渠道失灵的时刻承担起了协调救援的职能。

三次灾难,却生发出别无二致的脉络:最先被压制的,不是灾祸和混乱,而是关于灾祸真相的信息。

审批程序是协调机制,还是过滤器?

官方的辩护词不是毫无道理。跨区域救援确实需要协调,避免资源重叠、道路拥堵,这是现代应急管理的基本原则。蓝天救援队总部也强调,”先报备、后审批”的目的是统一调度、按需支援。

但这个辩护在石门案例里能站得住脚吗?我们看一下,通报的重心落在”拍摄视频”上。如果说真正的问题是救援协调混乱,处罚肯定是清楚地针对行动层面的失序,对不对?然而通报专门列出”违规拍摄传播现场影像资料”作为独立罪状,这说明让上级真正不安的,根本不是志愿者的靴子沾满了灾区的泥泞,而是他们的镜头对准了灾区的现实。

审批程序在这里承担的功能是:表面上是救援协调机制,实质上是个信息过滤的漏斗。两者被捆绑在一起,无法分离。想去救人,那就得先接受这套过滤。

社会的免疫系统在萎缩

任何社会在面对灾难时,都需要两种能力:一是动员和救援的能力,二是感知和反馈的能力。前者需要组织和资源,后者需要自由流通的信息。

中国不缺这第一个能力。解放军也好、消防也好、还有国家救援队,在重大灾难中的动员速度令人印象深刻。但第二个能力——社会的自我感知、自我纠错的能力——自始至终都在被全面地、极限地压缩。李文亮的预警要是真的被听取了,新冠的扩散时间线会完全不同。郑州地铁隧道的封锁,让死亡人数直到现在也没有眉目。石门洪灾里那些被强制撤回的志愿者和被没收的视频,令我们至今不能得知那些村庄里究竟发生了什么。

温暖的社会像是个健康的有机体,有感受到痛苦的神经系统。要是信息传递被人为阻断,社会就失去了对自身处境的感知——它仍然能动,但它感觉不到自己在流血,不知道自己受到了什么样的伤害。

网民们问得真好:”私自赈灾等同谋反?”

这个问题的答案,在通报发出的那一刻其实很清楚了。

在中国当下的治理逻辑里,一个拿着摄像机的志愿者,比一场洪水更需要被管控。因为洪水过去之后什么都不会留下,而一段真实的视频,可能永远留在互联网上。还有什么东西能比真相更让中国政府害怕呢?

编辑:张宇 校对:程筱筱 翻译:戈冰

Approval Before Rescue, Photography as a Felony

—Seeing the True Logic of China’s Disaster Governance Through the Shimen Flood

Author: Zhou Min

On May 17, 2026, Shimen County, Changde City, Hunan Province, was struck by a catastrophic flood. Three hydropower stations were breached and washed away by the floodwaters, and downstream villages were razed to the ground. Local residents reported an extreme shortage of supplies, and the actual death toll may far exceed the official figure of seven. Right as this disaster unfolded, the Yichuan, Yiyang, and Songxian teams of the Henan Province Blue Sky Rescue League—entirely comprised of volunteers traveling at their own expense and equipped with their own gear—rushed to the disaster area overnight.

On May 22, the Supervisory Department of the Henan Province Blue Sky Rescue League issued a notice using severe wording: The aforementioned three teams “failed to report and obtain approval, and without authorization, proceeded to Changde, Hunan, to carry out rescue operations.” Furthermore, at the Shimen toll station, they “unauthorizedly filmed and published videos, triggering online public opinion and causing an extremely adverse social impact, which severely damaged the brand image of Blue Sky Rescue.” The resulting punishment: The entire personnel were ordered to withdraw, and the full teams were issued written warnings.

救人先审批,拍照是重罪

Please note the two parallel charges in the official notice: first, going to rescue people, and second, filming videos. In this document, the severity of these two actions is treated as entirely equal.

Negative Public Opinion Is More Dangerous Than the Flood

Founded in 2007, the Blue Sky Rescue League is one of China’s largest non-governmental public welfare rescue organizations, guided by the team motto: “Speak less, do more, and contribute silently.” This team has played a critical role in numerous major disasters. This time, however, the punishment they face did not come from the floodwaters, but precisely from their own superiors—an organization deeply woven into the official emergency management system.

The notice explicitly demands that all cross-regional rescues must follow the sequence of “report first, obtain approval next, and deploy only thereafter,” while strictly “prohibiting the unauthorized filming and dissemination of on-site visual materials, or the creation of negative public opinion.”

“The creation of negative public opinion”—these few words are the key to understanding the entire incident.

The extreme shortage of supplies in the disaster area, entire villages submerged, and official death tolls severely detached from reality—these constitute the true “negative” reality. Yet, what this notice seeks to eliminate is not the reality itself, but the footage and information regarding that reality. In other words, the videos captured by the volunteers became incriminating evidence precisely because they revealed the truth.

I wonder if anyone has noticed a critical point regarding this flood: local victims reported that the county government failed to notify villagers to evacuate in advance, discharging floodwaters without any early warning and triggering a severe deluge. Three hydropower stations were breached and washed away, downstream village houses were swept away by the floodwaters, and supplies in the disaster area were in extreme short supply. The official announcement stated 7 dead and 14 missing, but local residents indicated that the actual casualties might far exceed official numbers, stating that “some entire villages were completely wiped out.” This makes the phrase “caused an extremely adverse social impact” in the notice quite thought-provoking—did the act of rescue itself cause the impact, or was it the filming and dissemination of the real footage from the disaster area that generated the “public opinion storm”?

This Is Neither the First Time, Nor Will It Be the Last

The Shimen flood is not an isolated case; it is a script that has been staged multiple times across the land of China.

In December 2019, Wuhan doctor Li Wenliang forwarded warning information about an unexplained pneumonia in a classmate group chat. He was immediately summoned by the police, forced to sign and fingerprint a letter of admonition, and his actions were categorized as “spreading untruthful information.” Three weeks later, Wuhan was locked down. A few months later, Li Wenliang passed away at the age of 34 due to contracting the novel coronavirus. What he had warned about was precisely the virus that would later claim millions of lives. His crime was merely telling the truth ahead of time.

In July 2021, during the Zhengzhou torrential rainstorm, vehicles inside the Jingguang North Road Tunnel were submerged, and multiple people lost their lives. The site was immediately cordoned off by military and police forces, and photography was strictly prohibited. Phoenix Television journalist Hu Ling posted on Weibo, recording that “the entire Zhengzhou Jingguang Tunnel is under martial law, and no photography is allowed”; the post was deleted shortly thereafter. Concurrently, a Tencent Docs rescue information sheet, spontaneously established by grassroots volunteers, was updated more than 270 times within 24 hours, assuming the function of coordinating rescue efforts at a moment when official channels had failed.

Three different disasters, yet they engendered an identical pattern: the very first thing to be suppressed was not the catastrophe or the chaos, but the information regarding the truth of the catastrophe.

Are Approval Procedures a Coordination Mechanism, or a Filter?

The official defense is not entirely without reason. Cross-regional rescue operations do indeed require coordination to avoid resource duplication and road congestion; this is a fundamental principle of modern emergency management. The headquarters of the Blue Sky Rescue League also emphasized that the purpose of “reporting first and obtaining approval next” is to ensure unified dispatch and support based on actual needs.

But can this defense hold ground in the case of Shimen? Let us take a look: the focus of the notice lands squarely on “filming videos.” If the real problem were chaotic rescue coordination, the punishment would certainly be clearly targeted at operational disorder, would it not? Yet, the notice specifically lists “unauthorizedly filming and disseminating on-site visual materials” as an independent charge. This demonstrates that what truly unsettled the superiors was fundamentally not that the volunteers’ boots were caked in the mud of the disaster area, but that their lenses were aimed at the reality of the disaster area.

The function assumed by the approval procedure here is: superficially a rescue coordination mechanism, but substantively an information-filtering funnel. The two are bound together, impossible to separate. If you want to go and save people, you must first accept this system of filtering.

The Immune System of Society Is Atrophying

When confronting disasters, any society requires two capabilities: first, the capability to mobilize and rescue; second, the capability to perceive and feedback. The former requires organization and resources; the latter requires the free flow of information.

China does not lack the first capability. Whether it is the People’s Liberation Army, the fire services, or the national rescue teams, their speed of mobilization during major disasters is deeply impressive. But the second capability—the society’s capability for self-perception and self-correction—has been comprehensively and maximally compressed from start to finish. If Li Wenliang’s warning had actually been heeded, the timeline of the spread of COVID-19 would be completely different. The lockdown of the Zhengzhou subway tunnel has left the death toll without any clear answer to this day. In the Shimen flood, those volunteers who were forcibly withdrawn and the videos that were confiscated prevent us from knowing, even to this day, what exactly happened in those villages.

A warm society resembles a healthy organism, possessing a nervous system that feels pain. If the transmission of information is artificially blocked, society loses the perception of its own situation—it can still move, but it cannot feel that it is bleeding, and it does not know what kind of harm it has suffered.

Netizens asked so well: “Is unauthorized disaster relief equivalent to rebellion?”

The answer to this question, at the moment the notice was issued, was actually very clear.

Within the current governance logic of China, a volunteer holding a camera needs to be controlled far more than a flood. Because after the flood passes, it leaves nothing behind, whereas a piece of real footage might remain on the internet forever. What else could make the Chinese government more afraid than the truth?

Editor: Zhang Yu

Proofreader: Cheng Xiaoxiao

Translator: Ge Bing

中共才是最大的行为“分裂主义”(西藏/图博篇)

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作者:张致君

2026年中共当局颁发《中华人民共和国民族团结进步促进法》宣传党性教育,压制少数民族文化继承,进一步在体制层面加大民族撕裂。中国共产党在实际行为上在“制造分裂”和“加剧对立”,但却把“分裂主义”的标签用来指责别人。

随着流亡藏人超过9万人在世界各地做登记选民,成功进行议会选举,展现了卓越的政治能力。达赖喇嘛荣获第68届格莱美奖,藏人的精神文化在传播慈悲与和平理念方面树立了国际上的重要里程。而中共当局却对传播藏区文化归国的张雅笛进行抓捕,以”危害国家安全“”分裂国家“等罪名被起诉关押。

西藏问题长期以来不仅是一个政治议题,更是一个涉及文明传统、民族认同、宗教信仰、历史记忆与现代治理方式的综合性议题。若仅仅以领土完整、行政主权或国家安全的角度理解西藏问题,往往会忽略其最核心、最敏感的部分——那就是西藏独特的文化体系,以及藏传佛教在当地社会结构中的深层地位。

对藏人而言,宗教并不是私人生活中可有可无的一部分,而是语言传承、教育体系、伦理观念、节庆习俗、社区组织乃至个人身份认同的重要基础。寺院不仅是宗教场所,也曾长期承担教育中心、文化保存中心与社会协调机制的功能。

任何针对宗教制度的外部干预,都不仅是政策层面的调整,而是对整个民族文化生命的介入。

西藏问题之所以持续受到国际关注,正因为它不只是一个区域治理问题,而是现代国家如何面对历史文明、少数民族文化与宗教自由的问题。世界上许多国家都面临多元文化治理的挑战,但真正考验国家成熟度的,不应该是如何统一差异,而是如何在统一的政治框架之下尊重差异。西藏正是这样一个典型案例。这里既有高度独特的宗教传统,也有强烈的历史记忆与文化主体意识,任何单纯依赖行政命令的治理方式,都难以触及问题本质。

在众多争议之中,最具象征意义、也最受国际社会关注的问题之一,就是中国政府对达赖喇嘛转世制度的介入。达赖喇嘛既是藏传佛教格鲁派的重要精神领袖,也是藏人心中慈悲、智慧与文化延续的象征人物。在过去数百年中,达赖喇嘛制度已经超越单纯宗教职位,成为西藏社会集体记忆的重要组成部分。对于信众而言,达赖喇嘛代表的不只是一个人,而是精神传统的连续性。

达赖喇嘛的转世制度本身具有深厚宗教内涵。按照藏传佛教传统,高僧圆寂后可能以转世方式再度来到世间,继续弘法利生。寻找转世灵童也非现代意义上的选举或任命,而是一套复杂而神圣的宗教程序,通常包括遗训线索、高僧禅观、护法神谕、圣湖启示、特定征兆、候选儿童辨认前世遗物,以及资深僧团的共同确认。这一过程之所以被接受,并不在法律授权上,而因信众相信其宗教意义,并愿意接受其结果。换句话说,转世制度的核心基础是信仰共同体的认可,而非国家权力的许可。

然而,近年来,北京当局多次公开表示,下一世达赖喇嘛的认定必须经过中国政府批准,并强调中央政府拥有所谓“最终决定权”。这一表述意味着国家试图以行政权力介入宗教领袖继承问题,将本属于宗教共同体内部的事务纳入政治控制框架。2025年,中国官员再次明确表示,未来达赖喇嘛的转世将由中国政府主导,而非由现任达赖喇嘛指定的宗教机构决定。这一立场引发藏人社会和信徒的广泛忧虑,当局的主导已经超越一般政策争议,触及一个更根本的问题:现代国家是否有权决定宗教的精神领袖。

问题的关键在于,宗教权威与政治权威本质上来自完全不同的合法性来源。

政治权力来自宪法、法律、制度与国家机器,其核心功能是管理公共秩序、提供安全保障、维护社会运行。宗教权威则来自信仰、传统、伦理影响力与精神认同,其核心功能是回应人的内在需求、提供意义感与道德方向。两者可以并存,也可以互动,但不应互相替代。政府或能控制行政程序、宣传系统与组织资源,却无法命令人们真诚地相信谁具有信仰认可的正统性。若缺乏宗教共同体的承认,即使拥有官方头衔,也难以获得真实的精神权威。历史一再证明,国家可以任命职位,却无法制造信仰。

从宗教自由原则来看,任何政府都不应决定谁是宗教领袖。现代文明社会普遍承认宗教团体拥有依据自身教义处理内部事务的权利,包括领袖继承、教义解释、仪式安排与组织治理。天主教的教宗由教会体系选举产生,伊斯兰世界的宗教学者由宗教传统形成影响力,佛教高僧的地位也来自僧团与信众认可。若国家可以决定达赖喇嘛的转世,那么理论上也可以决定主教、教宗、伊玛目或其他宗教领袖的人选。这显然违背普世的信仰自由原则,也会构成国家权力对公民精神生活的过度延伸。一个真正自信且成熟的国家,应当保障宗教自由,而不是取代宗教本身。

从西藏历史传统来看,达赖喇嘛制度自始至终也不是国家任命制度,而是建立在宗教体系内部长期演化而成的机制。西藏历史上长期拥有高度自治传统。历代中央王朝与西藏之间关系复杂,既有宗教施主关系,也有政治联盟关系,并非现代民族国家意义上的直接统治。历史上的政治互动、宗教往来与战略安排,但并不意味着现代政府天然继承了宗教决定权。

中国官方常引用清代“金瓶掣签”制度作为介入依据,但历史事实远比这一说法复杂。金瓶掣签并非每次实施,也并非唯一程序,转世认定仍依赖宗教体系内部确认。即便在帝制时代,中央政权更多扮演认可角色,而非全面主导角色。也就是说,历史上的中央政府从未像现代中共行政国家这样,以法规文件要求所有转世必须报批。2007年中国出台《藏传佛教活佛转世管理办法》(俗称5号令),规定活佛转世必须经过政府审批,这实际上是现代政权将官僚管理体系延伸至宗教领域,而不是简单“恢复传统”。

1995年,第十世班禅喇嘛圆寂后,达赖喇嘛认定一名六岁男童为第十一世班禅喇嘛,但该男童随后失踪,至今未公开露面。中国政府随后另行指定一位班禅喇嘛。官方任命者虽然拥有国家支持,却始终未能获得藏人社会的自然认同。藏人们仍将失踪男童视为真正的班禅喇嘛。

这成为全球最具争议的宗教继承事件之一,这也说明一个现实:宗教权威无法靠行政命令制造。

若以现代民族国家的行政逻辑重新解释古代帝国与宗教之间的关系,再据此主张今日国家拥有最终裁决权,既缺乏历史连续性,也是一种政治性改写。

从现代治理逻辑来看,政府过度介入宗教事务往往适得其反。国家若试图控制信仰象征,只会加深民众的不信任,并使原本可协商的宗教问题转化为身份、尊严与历史记忆问题。对于西藏这样具有强烈文化特色与精神传统的地区而言,尊重传统远比强行管理更有利于长期稳定。压制认同不会消除认同,反而会强化认同;干预信仰不会削弱信仰,反而会使其更具象征力量。许多国家经验表明,当文化群体感受到被尊重时,更容易形成合作关系;当其感受到被否定时,则容易产生长期疏离。

例如,加拿大在处理魁北克法语文化认同时,并未单纯采取压制方式,而是通过双语政策、地方自治安排以及对法语文化的制度性保障,使魁北克虽长期存在独立声音,但整体仍留在加拿大联邦框架之内。尊重文化差异,反而增强了国家的整体凝聚力。

再如,英国面对苏格兰的民族认同问题,选择建立苏格兰议会、扩大地方自治权,并允许通过公投表达政治诉求。虽然分歧仍然存在,但制度化尊重降低了激烈对抗的可能,使矛盾能够在政治程序内解决。

相反的例子则是北爱尔兰冲突。长期以来,当地部分群体在政治代表权、宗教身份与文化地位上感到被边缘化,最终导致数十年的暴力冲突与社会撕裂。直到和平协议建立权力分享机制、承认多元身份之后,局势才逐步稳定。

另一个例子是西班牙与加泰罗尼亚的关系。加泰罗尼亚拥有独特语言与历史传统,当中央政府与地方认同之间缺乏互信时,政治紧张便迅速升级;而在给予文化自治、语言保护与地方治理空间时,社会关系则相对缓和。

这些案例说明,现代国家的稳定并不来自消除差异,而来自管理差异。文化群体若感受到自己的语言、信仰与历史被尊重,更愿意参与共同体建设;若长期感受到否定与压制,则容易形成代际不信任与心理疏离。尊重多元文化,不是国家软弱,而是成熟治理的体现。

此外,政治介入宗教继承制度还可能制造“双重合法性危机”。 政府可以控制媒体、仪式、机构,却难以控制信仰本身。如果未来中国政府指定一位官方认可的达赖喇嘛,而流亡藏人社会及广大信众承认另一位依据传统程序产生的达赖喇嘛,那么世界可能同时出现两位竞争性的达赖喇嘛。一位拥有国家支持,一位拥有信众支持。这样的局面不仅无法解决问题,反而会让争议持续数十年,并使宗教继承问题永久政治化。届时国家虽控制形式,却失去实质认同。这种结果只会造成长期分裂。

国际层面上,达赖喇嘛早已不仅是西藏地区人物,而是全球知名的宗教领袖与和平象征。他长期倡导非暴力、慈悲与跨文化对话,在全球拥有广泛影响力。关于其继承问题的任何政治操作,都必然受到国际舆论关注。今天的国家形象,不能仅由经济实力和军事力量决定,也越来越取决于其如何对待少数民族、文化差异与宗教自由。若一个政府被普遍视为试图控制宗教领袖继承,其国际信誉难免受损。真正希望获得全球尊重的国家,应展示制度自信与文明包容,而不是对精神领域进行管制。

更深层次来看,西藏问题折射的是现代国家治理的一项基本原则:国家权力必须存在边界。国家负责道路、税收、治安、教育、外交等公共事务,这是现代政治共同体的正常功能。但人的信仰、灵魂归属与终极意义追求,则属于个人与社群的精神空间。当国家开始决定谁可以被信仰、谁能够继承宗教地位时,就意味着政治权力进入本不属于它的领域。任何无限扩张的权力,最终都会损害自身合法性。

一个成熟的国家,并不会因为允许宗教自治而削弱自身。相反,懂得克制的国家更容易获得人民信任。尊重宗教传统,允许文化差异,不代表失去与放弃;保障信仰自由,也不代表威胁。真正稳定的社会,从来不是所有声音一致,而是不同声音能够和平共存。真正强大的国家,也不是控制一切,而是知道哪些事情不应该控制。

中共政府对达赖喇嘛转世制度的政治控制,从根本上缺乏宗教合法性,进一步加剧了民族之间的矛盾,扩大藏人与汉人的心理距离,并损害国家在国际社会中的信誉。它看似展现中共的权力,实则暴露其政权的不安全感;看似维护秩序,实则制造长期不信任。任何依赖强制维系的稳定,都是脆弱的。

西藏问题若要走向真正的和解与稳定,其前提之一,就是让宗教回归宗教,让政治止于边界。政府可以维护社会秩序,可以保障法律框架,可以确保公共安全,但不应决定谁是达赖喇嘛。这个决定应当属于藏传佛教传统、僧团体系与信仰共同体。唯有如此,才能使继承具有真正的精神合法性,也才能减少政治对立。

历史已经证明,权力可以统治土地,却难以统治人心;行政命令可以改变制度,却难以改变信仰。

任何国家若希望获得长久稳定与真正认同,必须明白一个简单而深刻的道理:文化可以被尊重,宗教可以被保护,灵魂不能被任命。

一个政府可以管理土地,最不应统治人的灵魂。

编辑:张宇 校对:周敏 翻译:戈冰

The CCP is the Greatest “Separatist” in Action (Tibet / Tubo Edition)

By Zhang Zhijun

In 2026, the CCP authorities promulgated the “Law of the People’s Republic of China on Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress” to propagate Party compliance education and suppress the cultural inheritance of ethnic minorities, further widening ethnic fractures at the institutional level. In its actual conduct, the Chinese Communist Party is “manufacturing division” and “exacerbating antagonism,” yet it weaponizes the label of “separatism” to accuse others.

As the number of exiled Tibetans exceeds 90,000 registered voters worldwide, their successful parliamentary elections have demonstrated remarkable political capability. Furthermore, the Dalai Lama was honored with the 68th Grammy Award, marking a significant international milestone for Tibetan spiritual culture in spreading the concepts of compassion and peace. Conversely, the CCP authorities arrested Zhang Yadi, who returned to the country after promoting Tibetan culture abroad, prosecuting and detaining her on charges such as “endangering national security” and “splittism.”

The Tibet issue has long been not merely a political topic, but a comprehensive issue involving civilizational traditions, ethnic identity, religious beliefs, historical memory, and modern modes of governance. If one comprehends the Tibet issue solely through the lenses of territorial integrity, administrative sovereignty, or national security, one often overlooks its most core and sensitive dimension—namely, Tibet’s unique cultural system and the deep-seated position of Tibetan Buddhism within the local social structure.

For Tibetans, religion is not an dispensable part of private life; rather, it constitutes the vital foundation for language transmission, educational systems, ethical concepts, festival customs, community organization, and even individual identity. Monasteries are not merely religious venues; they have also long undertaken the functions of educational hubs, cultural preservation centers, and social coordination mechanisms.

Any external intervention targeted at religious institutions is never just a policy-level adjustment, but an intrusion into the cultural lifeblood of an entire nation.

The reason the Tibet issue continues to garner international attention is precisely because it is not just a problem of regional governance, but a question of how a modern state confronts historical civilizations, minority cultures, and religious freedom. Many countries around the world face the challenges of multicultural governance, but what truly tests a nation’s maturity should not be how it uniformizes differences, but how it respects differences within a unified political framework. Tibet is precisely such a quintessential case. Here, there exists both a highly distinctive religious tradition and a potent historical memory paired with a sense of cultural agency; any mode of governance that relies purely on administrative decrees will find it difficult to reach the essence of the problem.

Among numerous controversies, one of the most symbolic and internationally scrutinized issues is the Chinese government’s intervention into the reincarnation system of the Dalai Lama. The Dalai Lama is not only the paramount spiritual leader of the Gelug school of Tibetan Buddhism, but also a symbolic figure of compassion, wisdom, and cultural continuity in the hearts of the Tibetan people. Over the past several centuries, the institution of the Dalai Lama has transcended being a mere religious office and has become a vital component of the collective memory of Tibetan society. For believers, the Dalai Lama represents not just a single individual, but the continuity of a spiritual tradition.

The Dalai Lama’s reincarnation system itself possesses profound religious connotations. According to Tibetan Buddhist tradition, after a high lama passes away, he may return to the world by means of reincarnation to continue propagating the Dharma and benefiting all sentient beings. Furthermore, the search for the reincarnated soul boy is not an election or an appointment in the modern sense; rather, it is a complex and sacred set of religious protocols. This process typically includes clues from the predecessor’s final testaments, meditation and visions of high lamas, divine oracles from dharma protectors, revelations from sacred lakes, specific auspicious signs, the identification of personal items left behind from the previous life by candidate children, and the collective verification by a monastic council of senior monks. The reason this process is universally accepted does not lie in any legal authorization, but rather because believers possess faith in its religious significance and are willing to accept its outcome. In other words, the core foundation of the reincarnation system is the recognition of the faith community, rather than the permission of state power.

However, in recent years, the Beijing authorities have publicly stated multiple times that the recognition of the next Dalai Lama must receive the approval of the Chinese government, emphasizing that the central government possesses the so-called “final decision-making power.” This formulation implies that the state is attempting to use administrative power to intervene in the succession of a religious leader, bringing what originally belonged to the internal affairs of a religious community into a framework of political control. In 2025, Chinese officials explicitly declared once again that the future reincarnation of the Dalai Lama will be spearheaded by the Chinese government, rather than being determined by religious institutions designated by the current Dalai Lama. This stance has triggered widespread anxiety within Tibetan society and among believers. The government’s leadership over this process has moved past a general policy dispute and touched upon a more fundamental question: whether a modern state has the right to determine a religious spiritual leader.

The crux of the matter lies in the fact that religious authority and political authority stem from completely different sources of legitimacy.

Political power derives from constitutions, laws, institutions, and the state apparatus; its core function is to manage public order, provide security guarantees, and maintain the functioning of society. Religious authority, conversely, derives from faith, tradition, ethical influence, and spiritual identity; its core function is to respond to human internal needs and provide a sense of meaning and moral direction. The two can coexist and interact, but they should not substitute for one another. A government may be able to control administrative procedures, propaganda systems, and organizational resources, yet it cannot command people to sincerely believe in who possesses the orthodoxy validated by faith. Without the recognition of the religious community, even an individual possessing an official title will find it difficult to acquire true spiritual authority. History has proven time and again that a state can appoint a position, but it can never manufacture faith.

From the principle of religious freedom, no government should determine who a religious leader is. Modern civilized societies universally recognize that religious groups possess the right to handle their internal affairs based on their own doctrines, including leadership succession, doctrinal interpretation, ritual arrangements, and organizational governance. The Pope of Catholicism is elected by the church hierarchy; Islamic religious scholars derive their influence from religious traditions; and the status of high Buddhist lamas similarly stems from the recognition of the monastic community and believers. If a state can determine the reincarnation of the Dalai Lama, then theoretically, it can also determine the choice of bishops, popes, imams, or other religious leaders. This clearly violates the universal principle of freedom of belief and constitutes an excessive extension of state power into the spiritual lives of citizens. A truly confident and mature nation should safeguard religious freedom rather than replace religion itself.

From the perspective of Tibetan historical tradition, the institution of the Dalai Lama has never been a system of state appointment from beginning to end; instead, it is built upon mechanisms that evolved over a long period within the religious system itself. Historically, Tibet long possessed a tradition of high autonomy. The relationship between successive central dynasties and Tibet was complex, embodying both a religious priest-patron relationship and a political alliance relationship, rather than direct rule in the sense of a modern nation-state. Historical political interactions, religious exchanges, and strategic arrangements do not mean that a modern government naturally inherits the right of religious determination.

Chinese official narratives frequently cite the Qing Dynasty’s “Golden Urn” lottery system as the basis for their intervention, but the historical facts are far more complex than this claim. The Golden Urn lottery was not implemented every single time, nor was it the sole procedure; the validation of reincarnations still relied on confirmation within the religious hierarchy. Even during the imperial era, the central political power played a role of validation and recognition rather than a dominant, comprehensive role. In other words, historical central governments never issued regulatory documents requiring all reincarnations to be submitted for approval in the way the modern CCP administrative state does. In 2007, China promulgated the “Measures on the Management of the Reincarnation of Living Buddhas in Tibetan Buddhism” (commonly known as Order No. 5), which mandates that the reincarnation of Living Buddhas must undergo government review and approval. This is actually an extension of the bureaucratic management apparatus of a modern regime into the religious domain, rather than a simple “restoration of tradition.”

In 1995, after the passing of the 10th Panchen Lama, the Dalai Lama recognized a six-year-old boy as the 11th Panchen Lama, but the boy subsequently disappeared and has not appeared in public to this day. The Chinese government subsequently designated an alternative Panchen Lama. Although the official appointee possesses the backing of the state, he has consistently failed to garner organic recognition within Tibetan society. Tibetans still regard the missing boy as the true Panchen Lama.

This has become one of the most controversial religious succession events globally, and it illustrates a reality: religious authority cannot be manufactured by administrative decrees.

To re-interpret the relationship between ancient empires and religion through the administrative logic of the modern nation-state, and to subsequently assert on this basis that the contemporary state possesses the right of final adjudication, not only lacks historical continuity but also constitutes a political re-writing.

From the perspective of modern governance logic, excessive government intervention in religious affairs often produces the exact opposite of the desired effect. If a state attempts to control symbols of faith, it will only deepen public mistrust and transform what were originally negotiable religious issues into matters of identity, dignity, and historical memory. For a region like Tibet, which possesses intense cultural characteristics and spiritual traditions, respecting tradition is far more conducive to long-term stability than enforcing compulsory management. Suppressing identity will not eliminate identity, but will instead reinforce it; intervening in faith will not weaken faith, but will instead endow it with greater symbolic power. The experiences of many countries demonstrate that when cultural groups feel respected, it is easier to forge a cooperative relationship; conversely, when they feel negated, it easily engenders long-term alienation.

For example, in handling the French-language cultural identity of Quebec, Canada did not simply adopt methods of suppression. Instead, through bilingual policies, local autonomy arrangements, and institutional guarantees for French culture, it ensured that although independent voices have long existed in Quebec, the region as a whole remains within the federal framework of Canada. Respecting cultural differences has, conversely, strengthened the overall cohesion of the nation.

To take another example, when faced with the national identity issue of Scotland, the United Kingdom chose to establish the Scottish Parliament, expand local autonomy, and permit the expression of political aspirations through referendums. Although divergences still exist, institutionalized respect has lowered the probability of intense confrontation, enabling conflicts to be resolved within political processes.

A contrary example, however, is the Northern Ireland conflict. For a long period, certain local groups felt marginalized in terms of political representation, religious identity, and cultural status, which ultimately led to decades of violent conflict and societal fracturing. It was not until the peace agreement established a power-sharing mechanism and recognized plural identities that the situation gradually stabilized.

Another example is the relationship between Spain and Catalonia. Catalonia possesses a unique language and historical traditions. When mutual trust is lacking between the central government and regional identity, political tensions escalate rapidly; conversely, when cultural autonomy, language protection, and space for local governance are granted, societal relations become relatively moderated.

These cases illustrate that the stability of a modern state does not derive from the elimination of differences, but rather from the management of differences. If cultural groups feel that their language, beliefs, and history are respected, they will be more willing to participate in the construction of the community; if they long experience negation and suppression, it easily engenders intergenerational mistrust and psychological alienation. Respecting multiculturalism is not a sign of state weakness, but is rather an manifestation of mature governance.

Furthermore, political intervention into the religious succession system is also highly liable to manufacture a “dual legitimacy crisis.” A government can control media, rituals, and institutions, yet it can hardly control faith itself. If, in the future, the Chinese government designates an officially sanctioned Dalai Lama, while the exiled Tibetan society and the vast body of believers recognize another Dalai Lama generated through traditional protocols, then the world may simultaneously witness two competing Dalai Lamas—one possessing state backing, and the other possessing the backing of the believers. Such a situation would not only fail to resolve the problem, but would instead cause the controversy to persist for decades and permanently politicize the issue of religious succession. When that time comes, although the state may control the outward form, it will lose substantial recognition. This outcome will only result in long-term division.

On the international level, the Dalai Lama has long ceased to be a figure limited to the Tibet region, but is rather a globally renowned religious leader and a symbol of peace. He has long advocated for non-violence, compassion, and cross-cultural dialogue, possessing extensive influence across the globe. Any political manipulation regarding his succession issue will inevitably draw the focus of international public opinion. Today’s national image cannot be determined solely by economic strength and military power; increasingly, it also depends upon how a nation treats ethnic minorities, cultural differences, and religious freedom. If a government is universally perceived as attempting to control the succession of a religious leader, its international credibility will inevitably suffer damage. A nation that truly hopes to attain global respect should demonstrate institutional confidence and civilizational tolerance, rather than imposing controls over the spiritual domain.

Looking from a deeper level, the Tibet issue reflects a fundamental principle of modern state governance: state power must have boundaries. The state is responsible for public affairs such as roads, taxation, public security, education, and diplomacy; these are the normal functions of a modern political community. However, an individual’s faith, the belonging of the soul, and the pursuit of ultimate meaning belong to the spiritual space of the individual and the community. When the state begins to determine who can be believed in and who can inherit a religious status, it means that political power has entered a domain where it fundamentally does not belong. Any power that expands without limit will ultimately undermine its own legitimacy.

A mature nation does not weaken itself by allowing religious autonomy. On the contrary, a state that exercises restraint more easily wins the trust of its people. Respecting religious traditions and permitting cultural differences do not equate to loss or abandonment; safeguarding freedom of belief does not constitute a threat. A truly stable society is never one where all voices are identical, but one where different voices can peacefully coexist. A truly powerful nation, moreover, does not control everything, but knows what should not be controlled.

The Chinese Communist Party government’s political control over the reincarnation system of the Dalai Lama fundamentally lacks religious legitimacy. It further exacerbates inter-ethnic contradictions, widens the psychological distance between Tibetans and Han Chinese, and damages the nation’s credibility within the international community. While it appears to demonstrate the power of the CCP, it actually exposes the regime’s sense of insecurity; while it appears to maintain order, it actually creates long-term distrust. Any stability that relies on coercion to sustain itself is fragile.

If the Tibet issue is to move toward true reconciliation and stability, one of its prerequisites is to let religion return to religion and let politics stop at its borders. The government can maintain social order, safeguard the legal framework, and ensure public safety, but it should not determine who the Dalai Lama is. This decision should belong to the Tibetan Buddhist tradition, the monastic community, and the community of faith. Only in this way can the succession possess genuine spiritual legitimacy, and only thus can political antagonism be reduced.

History has already proven that power can rule over land, but can hardly rule over hearts and minds; administrative decrees can change systems, but can hardly change faith.

If any nation hopes to achieve long-lasting stability and true identity, it must understand a simple yet profound truth: culture can be respected, religion can be protected, but the soul cannot be appointed.

A government can manage the land, but it should least of all rule over the human soul.

Editor: Zhang Yu Proofreader: Zhou Min Translator: Ge Bing

圣荷西集会呼吁加拿大庇护董广平

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作者:关永杰

2026年5月31日,来自中国民主人权联盟、中国民主党及当地民主人士等十余人,在美国加州圣荷西市政厅前举行集会,声援中国异议人士董广平,并恳请加拿大政府尽快给予其政治庇护身份,使其能够与已定居加拿大的家人团聚。

活动由中国民主人权联盟北加州负责人李海风等人发起。李海风在开场发言中介绍了董广平的经历,并表示此次活动虽在美国举行,但声援不受地域限制,只要发出声音,世界各地都能听见。

圣荷西集会呼吁加拿大庇护董广平

据介绍,董广平出生于1958年,河南郑州人,曾担任警察。1999年因公开声援“六四”而被开除公职。此后,他长期参与民主维权活动,多次因政治原因遭到拘押和判刑。2001年因参与民主活动被判刑三年;2014年参加纪念“六四”活动后再次遭到关押。董广平在出狱后并未停止追求民主与自由,而是持续进行抗争。2015年,他携家人离开中国前往泰国,当时加拿大已同意向其提供庇护,但在中共当局施压下,泰国警方将其遣返回中国,其家人则先行抵达加拿大。此后多年间,董广平不断尝试离开中国,与家人团聚。他曾尝试游泳前往台湾金门,也曾经由越南出逃,但均遭挫折并再次被遣返。今年5月25日,68岁的董广平驾驶皮划艇从山东烟台出发,横渡黄海抵达韩国,再次引发国际社会关注。李海风表示,数百公里的海上航程充满危险,对于一位年近七旬的老人而言,需要极大的勇气和决心。他认为,支撑董广平一次次逃离中国的,是对自由的向往以及与家人团聚的强烈愿望。

李海风还透露,据维权人士盛雪传来的消息,加拿大方面已经传出积极信号,董广平获得庇护身份“应当没有问题”,但最终官方文件尚未公布。因此,集会参与者仍希望通过公开声援,向加拿大政府表达支持,也让远在韩国的董广平及其在加拿大的家人感受到来自海外民众的关心与支持。

活动期间,中国民主党人士马相平带来了自己亲笔书写的声援标语,并发表感言说:“自由对于许多人来说是与生俱来的,而对他来说却需要拼尽全力,甚至要用生命去争取。68岁的他独自驾驶一艘小小的皮划艇,从中国海岸出发,穿越茫茫黄海,在惊涛骇浪与黑夜之中漂泊了三十多个小时,没有护航,没有退路,只有一个坚定的方向,因为在海的那一边有他向往已久的自由世界。当一个人宁愿把生命交给大海,也不愿意继续留在中共这个牢笼之中,这趟远航便不再是一次简单的逃离,而是一场关于勇气、信念和尊严的抗争。有人跨越山河去寻找财富,有人跨越国境去追寻梦想,而他跨越生死只为投奔自由。这一段真实的人生传奇,一次用生命完成的远航,世界上最遥远的距离不是海的彼岸,而是从恐惧走向自由。”

多位与会者随后发言,对董广平长期坚持民主抗争、追求自由的精神表达敬意。

中国民主党成员惠汝涛回顾了董广平数十年来的维权历程。他表示,董广平出身于官员家庭,曾经当过兵和警察,但最终选择站在良知与正义一边。无论是因纪念“六四”而遭受迫害,还是后来多次尝试逃离中国,都体现出他对民主、法治和人权理念的坚定坚持。

活动发起人之一张勇则指出,董广平原本属于体制内人士,家庭条件优越,可以说是共产党体制中的既得利益者。然而,他在认清中共本质后,选择站到人民一边,为民主自由持续抗争,最终失去了工作、家庭团聚和国内的一切根基,却始终没有放弃自己的信念。他认为,这种精神尤其令人敬佩。

陈伟文、杨坤等与会者则从个人感受出发,表达了对董广平勇气的钦佩。陈伟文回顾自己当年在国内开始“网络翻墙”时那突然之间的信念崩塌,夹杂着惊讶、恐惧与绝望,但从未有董先生这样的勇气,董先生多次冒死出逃,这次同样是冒着生命危险横渡一望无边的黄海,说明其对中共政府现状已经彻底绝望,也体现出对自由的强烈渴望。杨坤还分享了自己疫情期间骑自行车从上海返回河南与家人团聚的经历,认为董广平为追求自由和与家人团聚所付出的代价远超常人想象。

何冬玲表示,无论政治立场如何,人们都应尊重每个人追求自由、尊严和表达权利的基本权利。她呼吁相关政府部门本着人道主义原则,公平、公正地审理董广平的庇护申请。

张辉、杨宗阔、盛虎等发言者则认为,董广平事件不仅是个人遭遇,更反映了中国异议人士长期面临的政治压力和人权困境。他们表示,越来越多的人“用脚投票”,试图离开中国,反映出中共专制统治所带来的深层问题。董广平作为曾经的警察和体制内人士,仍然坚持公开纪念“六四”、表达政治观点,并因此长期遭受打压,其经历具有象征意义。

发言者们普遍表示,希望韩国政府能够保障董广平的人身安全,不将其遣返回中国,并期待他能够尽快前往加拿大,与家人团聚。

活动结束前,李海风再次重申了当天集会的主题——“恳请加拿大政府给予董广平政治庇护身份”。他感谢所有参与者到场发声,并表示每一次公开表达都将成为历史记录的一部分。与会者随后在圣荷西市政厅前合影留念,为此次声援活动画上句号。

编辑:钟然

校对:孔祥庆

翻译:戈冰

San Jose Rally Calls on Canada to Grant Asylum to Dong Guangping

By Guan Yongjie

Abstract: On May 31, 2026, democracy activists in the Bay Area held a rally in San Jose to voice their support for Dong Guangping. They called upon the Canadian government to grant him political asylum as soon as possible, safeguard his security, and facilitate an early reunion with his family, who have already settled in Canada.

On May 31, 2026, more than ten individuals from the China Coalition for Democracy and Human Rights, the China Democracy Party, and local democratic circles held a rally in front of City Hall in San Jose, California, USA. The gathering was organized to voice support for the Chinese dissident Dong Guangping and to earnestly request the Canadian government to grant him political asylum status as soon as possible, enabling him to reunite with his family who have already settled in Canada.

The event was initiated by figures including Li Haifeng, the head of the Northern California branch of the China Coalition for Democracy and Human Rights. In his opening remarks, Li Haifeng introduced Dong Guangping’s background and stated that although this event was being held in the United States, solidarity knows no geographical boundaries; as long as a voice is raised, it can be heard across the world.

圣荷西集会呼吁加拿大庇护董广平

According to reports, Dong Guangping was born in 1958 and is a native of Zhengzhou, Henan Province. He formerly served as a police officer. In 1999, he was dismissed from his public office for publicly voicing support for “June Fourth.” Since then, he has long participated in democratic and rights-defense activities, and has been detained and sentenced multiple times for political reasons. In 2001, he was sentenced to three years in prison for his involvement in democratic activities; in 2014, he was detained again after participating in an event commemorating “June Fourth.”

Following his release from prison, Dong Guangping did not cease his pursuit of democracy and freedom, but instead continued his resistance. In 2015, he left China with his family and traveled to Thailand. At that time, Canada had already agreed to grant him asylum; however, under pressure from the Chinese Communist authorities, the Thai police forcibly repatriated him to China, while his family members managed to arrive in Canada ahead of him.

In the years that followed, Dong Guangping made continuous attempts to leave China and reunite with his family. He once attempted to swim to Kinmen, Taiwan, and had also escaped via Vietnam, but both efforts met with setbacks and resulted in him being repatriated once again. On May 25 of this year, the 68-year-old Dong Guangping departed from Yantai, Shandong Province, in a kayak and crossed the Yellow Sea to arrive in South Korea, once again drawing the attention of the international community.

Li Haifeng stated that the sea voyage spanning hundreds of kilometers was fraught with danger, and for an elderly man nearing the age of seventy, it required immense courage and determination. He believes that what sustained Dong Guangping through his repeated escapes from China was his yearning for freedom and his profound desire to be reunited with his family.

Li Haifeng also revealed that according to information conveyed by rights activist Sheng Xue, positive signals have already emerged from the Canadian side, and it “should not be a problem” for Dong Guangping to secure asylum status, though the final official documentation has not yet been publicly released. Consequently, the participants of the rally still hope, through their public show of solidarity, to express their support to the Canadian government, and to ensure that Dong Guangping far away in South Korea, along with his family in Canada, can feel the care and support coming from the overseas public.

During the event, Ma Xiangping, a member of the China Democracy Party, brought a solidarity banner written in his own handwriting and shared his reflections, saying: “For many people, freedom is an inherent birthright, but for him, it requires exerting every ounce of his strength, and even risking his life to strive for it. At 68 years old, he steered a tiny kayak all by himself, departing from the Chinese coast and crossing the vast Yellow Sea. He drifted for over thirty hours amidst turbulent waves and the dark of night—with no escort, and no path of retreat, guided only by one steadfast direction, because on the other side of the ocean lies the free world he has yearned for so long. When a person would rather entrust his life to the sea than continue to remain inside the cage of the CCP, this long voyage is no longer a simple escape, but a struggle defined by courage, conviction, and dignity. Some cross mountains and rivers in search of wealth, some cross national borders to pursue dreams, but he crossed life and death just to seek freedom. This is a true living legend, a long voyage fulfilled at the risk of one’s life; the furthest distance in the world is not the opposite shore of an ocean, but the journey from fear toward freedom.”

Multiple attendees spoke subsequently, expressing their profound respect for Dong Guangping’s long-standing perseverance in the democratic struggle and his spirit in the pursuit of freedom.

Hui Rutao, a member of the China Democracy Party, reviewed Dong Guangping’s decades-long journey of defending human rights. He stated that Dong Guangping came from a family of officials and had previously served in the military and as a police officer, yet he ultimately chose to stand on the side of conscience and justice. Whether through suffering persecution for commemorating “June Fourth,” or through his multiple subsequent attempts to escape China, his actions consistently reflect his steadfast commitment to the ideals of democracy, the rule of law, and human rights.

Zhang Yong, one of the initiators of the event, pointed out that Dong Guangping was originally an individual “inside the system” who enjoyed excellent family conditions and could be considered a vested interest beneficiary within the Communist Party apparatus. However, after recognizing the true nature of the CCP, he chose to align himself with the people and engage in a continuous struggle for democracy and freedom. Consequently, he lost his job, his family reunion, and all of his foundations within China, yet he never once abandoned his convictions. Zhang Yong emphasized that this spirit is particularly admirable.

Attendees such as Chen Weiwen and Yang Kun shared their personal perspectives to express their admiration for Dong Guangping’s courage. Chen Weiwen recalled the sudden collapse of his own beliefs when he first began “flipping the wall” on the internet while in China—a moment compounded by astonishment, fear, and despair. Yet, he noted that he never possessed the kind of courage shown by Mr. Dong. Mr. Dong has risked his life to flee multiple times, and this latest endeavor of braving mortal peril to cross the boundless Yellow Sea demonstrates that he has reached a state of absolute despair regarding the current reality of the CCP government, while simultaneously reflecting his intense thirst for freedom. Yang Kun also shared his own experience of riding a bicycle from Shanghai back to Henan during the pandemic lockdown to reunite with his family, noting that the price Dong Guangping paid in his pursuit of freedom and family reunion far exceeds what ordinary people can comprehend.

He Dongling stated that regardless of political stance, people should respect every individual’s fundamental rights to pursue freedom, dignity, and the right to expression. She called upon the relevant government departments to review Dong Guangping’s asylum application in a fair and just manner, in accordance with humanitarian principles.

Speakers such as Zhang Hui, Yang Zongkuo, and Sheng Hu expressed the view that the Dong Guangping incident is not merely an individual ordeal, but rather reflects the long-standing political pressure and human rights plight faced by Chinese dissidents. They stated that an increasing number of people are “voting with their feet” in attempts to leave China, which reflects the deep-seated problems brought about by the CCP’s authoritarian rule. As a former police officer and an individual who was once “inside the system,” Dong Guangping nevertheless persisted in publicly commemorating “June Fourth” and expressing his political views, consequently enduring long-term suppression; thus, his experience carries profound symbolic significance.

The speakers generally expressed their hope that the South Korean government will safeguard Dong Guangping’s personal safety, refrain from repatriating him to China, and anticipated that he will be able to travel to Canada as soon as possible to reunite with his family.

Before the conclusion of the event, Li Haifeng reiterated once again the core theme of the day’s rally—”earnestly requesting the Canadian government to grant Dong Guangping political asylum status.” He thanked all participants for coming forward to raise their voices, stating that every instance of public expression will become a part of the historical record. The attendees subsequently gathered in front of San Jose City Hall for a group commemorative photo, bringing the solidarity event to a close.

Edited by Zhong Ran | Proofread by Kong Xiangqing | Translated by Ge Bing

从维园到天安门,从香港到枫叶国:我的六四记忆

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从维园到天安门,从香港到枫叶国:我的六四记忆

作者:黄维克

“六四”之前

那是1989年初春,北京的天气依然刺骨。 我刚在北大一位老师家中做完客,打电话叫“首汽”出租车来接。对方一听是“北京大学”,立刻沉默,然后挂断。 无奈,我只得步行出校。谁知刚到大门口,就听见前方一片嘈杂,人群汹涌,许多是北大、清华的学生。 他们穿得极为单薄,脚上一双解放牌球鞋,有的连袜子都没有。站在寒风中,瑟瑟发抖,真可以说是“衣着寒颤”。 游行队伍正朝城里进发,抗议几天前悼念胡耀邦的学生,在天安门纪念碑前被捕。 队伍最前方是各国记者,镜头与照明灯照亮了,北京郊区昏暗的街道。第一排的学生举着手,比出“V”字母胜利手势。 我没有别的选择,只能默默地随着人群前行。 走到人民大学门口时,队伍短暂停了下来。人群爆发出一阵高喊:“人大的,出来!” 更多“人大”同学加入了“北大、清华”的队伍。 几位看起来是学生领头的人拿着小纸条,似乎在统一口号。我记得其中一句是:“还我战友!” 还有的就是:“反对官倒”、“人民不再沉默”、…… 队伍继续沿着白石桥路前行,到了双榆树,已接近北三环,也临近我常驻的友谊宾馆。忽然,前方一阵骚动。 几百名穿制服的人列阵路中,堵住了去路。那时,他们的制服好像已经不再叫“公安”,改叫“警察”了。 庞大的队伍被迫停下,后面的人还不清楚前方发生了什么事,只听到有人沿着人群高喊:“谁愿意加入敢死队!” 显然,政府的立场是明确的:不允许学生进入市区,只能沿着环城路绕行。 大约半小时后,一支临时组织起来的“敢死队”,排成了一个方阵。学生们手挽着手,神情坚定,摆出一副“视死如归”的姿态 。 这时,大家高唱起《义勇军进行曲》:“起来!不愿做奴隶的人 …… ” 警察第一排没有携带武器,身着整齐制服,肩带与腰带在夜色中反射出冰冷的白光。警察身后藏着什么秘密? 而对面,学生们衣衫单薄,脸庞被寒风吹得通红。地面白茫茫的大雪,照得学生们的面孔格外清晰。 我爬上一处花坛,试图看清警察阵列背后有什么,但视野所及仍是一片模糊。身旁有人悄声说:“后面有机关枪。” 就在这时,最前方的学生方阵开始缓缓向前推进。我屏住了呼吸,…… 那一刻空气仿佛凝固了,连历史都屏住了呼吸。 眼看就要与警察撞上了 —— 突然警察队伍像潮水一样向两侧散开,让出一条通道。学生队缓缓地走了过去。

“六四”当天

“李鹏中枪” —— 那几天流传最离谱的一条“爆炸新闻”。那时还没有互联网,香港也谣言满天飞。 那个周末我不用上班,可以说连续两天两夜没有睡觉。六四惨案爆发后,全香港自发“罢市”一天。我宣布管理的公司停业三天,顺便补点瞌睡。 家里早早准备了足够的食物,把书房的电视机搬到客厅,手上握着两个遥控器,桌上摊着五六份中英文报纸,电话听筒随时举起,整个客厅成了作战指挥中心。 那时候我朋友圈里流行一句“老话”:“一有风吹草动,海内外的阶级敌人就蠢蠢欲动。” 香港那时虽有自由未有民主,但我们真心希望大陆的亲友两样都有。 那几天北京早已封城。全世界记者的底片和胶卷都带不出去。幸运的是,天安门广场上刻意扔下了几部移动电话,才有从6月3日到4日不断听到现场的声音。 直到6月4日天亮,才终于看到画面。 记不清是北京饭店还是外交公寓的顶楼,总之有摄影记者在那里拍摄。画面中北京人的勇敢令人落泪:手无寸铁的老百姓,面对着全副武装的野战军。 他们排成一列向前推进,前面有人中弹倒下,后面的人马上冲上去把伤者抬走。没过多久,又继续向前。这下人们终于理解,为什么有人会用肉身去挡坦克。 在屠杀发生前,支持学生的有各种人:首都各部委、中央直属机关的干部、职员、平民百姓,北京的老大爷老太太都在街上,送吃的、送喝的,那就是北京人。 最让人难受的是,香港的记者不断拨打北京各大医院,想确认死伤情况。记者们操着香港口音的普通话,那头是地道的北京腔,两种声音在我耳边至今回响。 我记得特别清楚的是一个电话,是打到我曾经常去的积水潭医院。接电话的是个女护士,声音已经沙哑近乎崩溃: “送来的时候 …… 已经死了…… 满地都是血 …… 快来帮忙吧!” 那个地方我太熟悉了,那里的人我太了解了。那些北京的街道、那些面孔,是我青春里的一部分。 六四之后的几天,从中央到地方、从北京到各省市,社会像被分成了两派。香港坊间也开始流传“兵变”的传闻。 我亲眼看到建国门外的立交桥上,军人与军人之间竟然拔枪相对,有人说是27军与38军对峙。 我当时对自己说:我一定要回去看看 —— 到底发生了什么? 可几个月之后,当那些血淋淋的照片和影片流传出来,竟然有人说那是好莱坞摄影棚里拍的!

“六四”之后

第二天,全香港爆发了罢市、罢工、罢课。据说那是香港有史以来最大规模的抗议游行,至少有上百万人走上街头。 我记得自己走在游行队伍的前列,身边有不少记者在拍照。队伍中飘扬着青天白日旗,香港人对此也早已习以为常 —— 每年十月,新界的村子里同时飘着两种旗帜。 人群中高举的标语写着:“血债血偿”、“停止屠杀”、“支持学生” …… 口号此起彼伏,如同愤怒的波浪,一浪盖过一浪。 晚上,很多人汇集到港岛中心的维多利亚公园。那里搭起了临时灵台,供市民们静默守夜、低头祈祷,还有不少人席地而坐,进行悼念活动。 接下来的几天,马路上的人们神色哀伤、行色匆匆,仿佛都失去了亲人。 我手头有一张6月8日的机票,从香港飞北京,再去南京。那几天我心里反复挣扎—— 到底还要不要成行? 那时候没人飞北京,只有人回香港。记得航空公司还让我签了一份“志愿承诺书”。

很多香港朋友都觉得我是去“送死”,但这很符合我的性格 —— 想做的事,总是要去做的。 人这一辈子,总该去做自己认为正确的事情。 北京的朋友劝我不要来,我回答说:“我要见证历史。”南京航空学院的那位在电话里苦劝我:“我们校园里全是坦克,你千万别来。” 但我还是登上了那趟飞机,几乎只有我和空乘人员,没有其他乘客。

飞机落地后,我告诉出租车司机:“我想去天安门广场。”他当场摇头:“绝对不能去!那些戒严部队,真的会开枪。” 在我坚持之下,他只愿意载我到广场附近。那一带已经被封锁,但我还是远远地看到了:地上有坦克的履带印,墙上残留着子弹痕迹,血迹大概已经被清洗了。 整座北京像被掏空一样,街上几乎没有行人。那两天我去了八达岭长城,本想散散心,没想到城墙上也驻守着士兵。 拍照时,有一位年轻士兵轻声问我:“你能不能帮我拍一张照?我想寄给家里的父母。”我犹豫了一下,终究我们还合影了。 回到香港办公室,把胶卷冲洗出来后,同事看到我和解放军士兵的合照,立刻质问我:“你怎么能和屠城部队合影?” 我解释说:“那是驻守北京郊区的农村兵。”

有人建议把照片交给媒体,我拒绝了。 从那以后每年“六四”,我都参加香港维园的烛光晚会。 后来移居加拿大,就改去多伦多大学学生会楼前,那里墙上放着一辆在天安门压坏了的自行车雕塑,令人浮想联翩。

这几年来参加的人越来越少。有人说华人对身份的认同感降低了,也有人说“六四”已经被人遗忘了。

六四,这一天,我永远不会忘记。

这些年,我一直不太愿意多提这些往事。总有人说,嘴巴乱讲话,以后就回不了中国。 我担心见不到年迈的父亲,所以这么多年来,对自己多少还是有一些约束。如今父亲已经离世,那些曾经的顾虑,也随着岁月慢慢远去了。 回头再看,当年那个独自飞往北京的我,虽然有些害怕,却从未犹豫。

作为“六四”这一代的人,何时心灵会得到安慰? 再倒上一杯威士忌吧。

编辑:黄吉洲 校对:毛一炜 翻译:戈冰

原文请点击链接查看https://x.com/_vicwong/status/1930416971134148791?s=20

From Victoria Park to Tiananmen, From Hong Kong to the Maple Leaf Country: My Memories of June Fourth

从维园到天安门,从香港到枫叶国:我的六四记忆

By Huang Weike

Before “June Fourth”

It was the early spring of 1989, and the weather in Beijing was still bone-chillingly cold. I had just finished a visit at the home of a professor at Peking University and called a “Shouqi” taxi to pick me up. As soon as the dispatcher heard “Peking University,” they fell into instant silence and then hung up. Left with no alternative, I had to walk out of the campus on foot.

To my surprise, just as I reached the main gate, I heard a massive clamor ahead. A surging crowd had gathered, many of whom were students from Peking University and Tsinghua University. They were dressed extremely thinly, wearing “Jiefang” (Liberation) sneakers on their feet, and some did not even have socks on. Standing in the freezing wind, they were shivering all over; their attire could truly be described as shabby and pitiful.

The demonstration march was heading toward the city center to protest the arrest of students a few days earlier at the Monument to the People’s Heroes in Tiananmen Square, where they had been mourning Hu Yaobang. At the very front of the procession were international journalists, whose camera lenses and spotlights illuminated the dim streets of the Beijing suburbs. The students in the front row held up their hands, making the “V” for victory sign. I had no other choice but to follow the crowd forward in silence.

When we reached the gate of Renmin University of China, the march came to a brief halt. The crowd erupted into a resounding shout: “Students of Renmin U, come out and join us!” More students from Renmin University then streamed out to join the ranks of Peking and Tsinghua universities. A few individuals who appeared to be student leaders held small slips of paper, seemingly coordinating and unifying their slogans. I remember one of the slogans was: “Return my comrades-in-arms!” Others included: “Oppose official profiteering,” “The people will no longer remain silent,” and so forth.

The march continued along Baishiqiao Road. By the time we reached Shuangyushu, we were close to the North Third Ring Road, and also near the Friendship Hotel where I was regularly staying. Suddenly, a commotion broke out at the front. Hundreds of uniformed men were deployed in formation right in the middle of the road, blocking our path. At that time, their uniform designation seemed to have shifted from “Gongan” (Public Security) to “Jingcha” (Police).

The massive procession was forced to a halt. Those at the back did not yet know what was happening ahead, but could only hear someone shouting down the line of the crowd: “Who is willing to join the dare-to-die brigade!” Clearly, the government’s stance was unequivocal: students were forbidden from entering the urban center and were only permitted to detour along the ring roads.

About half an hour later, a temporarily organized “dare-to-die brigade” formed into a tight square phalanx. The students locked arms, their expressions resolute, bearing an attitude of defying death itself. At this moment, everyone began to sing the national anthem, the “March of the Volunteers”: “Arise! Ye who refuse to be slaves…”

The front rank of the police carried no visible weapons. They wore crisp, orderly uniforms, their shoulder straps and belts reflecting a cold white glare in the darkness of the night. What secrets lay hidden behind that wall of police? Directly opposite them, the students stood in their thin garments, their faces flushed red from the biting wind. The vast expanse of white snow covering the ground cast a reflection that made the students’ faces look exceptionally clear.

I climbed onto a flowerbed, trying to catch a glimpse of what was behind the police line, but everything remained a blur as far as my eyes could see. Someone next to me whispered in a hushed tone: “There are machine guns in the back.”

Just then, the foremost student phalanx began to advance forward slowly. I held my breath… at that very instant, the air seemed to congeal, and it felt as though history itself had held its breath. Just when a head-on collision with the police seemed inevitable—suddenly, the police line parted to both sides like an ebbing tide, opening up a passageway. The student column marched through slowly.

Contextual & Historical Notes for English Readers

Li Peng (李鹏): The Premier of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China during the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests. He was widely seen as the hardline political figure behind the declaration of martial law and the subsequent military crackdown.

General Market Strike (罢市 / “Ba Shi”): A form of civil protest common in Hong Kong’s history, where businesses, shops, and markets collectively close down to show political solidarity or express deep public mourning.

“Class Enemies Both at Home and Abroad” (海内外的阶级敌人): A highly charged political idiom rooted in Marxist-Leninist-Maoist rhetoric used extensively by the Chinese Communist Party during political campaigns. The author uses it with a touch of irony to describe how anyone associating with foreign or unorthodox ideas was viewed by the authorities during a crisis.

Diplomatic Residence Compound (外交公寓 / “Waijao Gongyu”): Specifically referring to places like the Jianguomenwai or Qijiayuan Diplomatic Compounds in Beijing. These were guarded residential complexes reserved for foreign diplomats and journalists, offering elevated viewpoints over major thoroughfares (like Chang’an Avenue) and providing a degree of relative safety from which to document the military advance.

Jishuitan Hospital (积水潭医院): Located near the Xizhimen area in Beijing, renowned for its orthopedic and trauma care. During the crackdown, it was one of the major hospitals inundated with victims suffering from gunshot wounds and severe trauma.

Jianguomen (建国门): A major intersection and overpass on the eastern stretch of Chang’an Avenue. It was a strategic entry point for martial law troops moving toward Tiananmen Square and became a flashpoint for military standoffs and civilian resistance.

The 27th Army vs. The 38th Army (27军与38军对峙): A reference to intense rumors of internal military rifts immediately following the crackdown. The 38th Group Army was historically based in Baoding and its commander, Xu Qinxian, famously refused to enforce martial law, leading to local goodwill toward them. The 27th Group Army, brought in from Shijiazhuang, was widely rumored by residents and Hong Kong media to have carried out the most brutal elements of the clearing operations, sparking widespread fears of an armed clash (mutiny) between different military factions on the streets of Beijing.

The Day of “June Fourth”

“Li Peng has been shot”—that was the most outrageous piece of “breaking news” circulating during those days. Back then, the internet did not yet exist, and Hong Kong was flooded with endless rumors. Since I did not have to work that weekend, I went without sleep for virtually two consecutive days and nights. After the June Fourth Massacre erupted, the entirety of Hong Kong spontaneously staged a general market strike for one day. I announced that the company I managed would suspend operations for three days, using the opportunity to catch up on some sleep.

Having prepared an ample supply of food at home well in advance, I moved the television from the study to the living room. Holding two remote controls in my hands, with five or six Chinese and English newspapers spread across the table, and the telephone receiver ready to be picked up at any second, the entire living room transformed into a combat command center. At that time, an “old saying” was highly popular among my circle of friends: “At the slightest rustle of leaves in the wind, class enemies both at home and abroad begin to make their move.” Although Hong Kong possessed freedom but lacked democracy back then, we sincerely hoped that our relatives and friends on the Mainland could have both.

During those days, Beijing had already been placed under a complete lockdown. International journalists could not smuggle out their negatives or film rolls. Fortunately, a few mobile phones had been intentionally left behind in Tiananmen Square, which made it possible to continuously hear the live sounds from the scene from June 3rd to June 4th. It was not until daybreak on June 4th that we finally saw the visual footage.

I cannot recall precisely whether it was filmed from the rooftop of the Beijing Hotel or the Diplomatic Residence Compound, but a photojournalist was definitely there capturing the scenes. The bravery of the Beijing citizens in those frames was heart-wrenching and moving to tears: unarmed, ordinary civilians facing a fully-equipped, combat-ready field army. They advanced in single file; when someone in front was shot and fell, those behind immediately rushed forward to carry the wounded away. Not long after, they continued to push forward. At that moment, people finally understood why some individuals would use their bare bodies to block tanks.

Before the massacre took place, the people supporting the students came from all walks of life: cadres and staff from various capital ministries and commissions, personnel from institutions directly under the Central Committee, ordinary citizens, and the elderly grandpas and grandmas of Beijing. They were all out on the streets, bringing food and water—that was the true essence of the people of Beijing. What felt most agonizing was listening to Hong Kong reporters continuously calling major hospitals in Beijing to confirm the casualties. The journalists spoke in Hong Kong-accented Mandarin while the other end responded in authentic Beijing dialect; those two distinct voices still echo in my ears to this day.

One phone call stands out with absolute clarity—it was placed to Jishuitan Hospital, a place I used to visit frequently. A female nurse answered the phone, her voice already hoarse and on the verge of collapse: “When they were brought in… they were already dead… there is blood all over the floor… please, come and help!” I was all too familiar with that place, and I knew the people there all too well. Those Beijing streets and those faces constitute a defining part of my youth.

In the days following June Fourth, from the central government down to local authorities, and from Beijing to various provinces and municipalities, society seemed to be fractured into two opposing factions. Rumors of a “military mutiny” also began to spread through the streets of Hong Kong. I saw with my own eyes, on the overpass outside Jianguomen, soldiers actually drawing weapons against fellow soldiers; some whispered that it was a standoff between the 27th Army and the 38th Army. I said to myself at the time: I must go back and see for myself—what exactly happened? Yet, a few months later, when those blood-stained photographs and video footages began to circulate, some people actually claimed they were filmed in a Hollywood studio!

After “June Fourth”

The next day, a wave of market strikes, labor strikes, and student strikes erupted across Hong Kong. It was said to be the largest protest demonstration in Hong Kong’s history, with at least a million people taking to the streets. I remember walking at the very front of the procession, with numerous reporters around taking photographs. The “Blue Sky with a White Sun” flags fluttered within the crowd, a sight Hong Kong citizens had long been accustomed to—every October, both types of flags would fly simultaneously in the villages of the New Territories.

The banners held high among the crowd read: “Blood Demands Blood,” “Stop the Massacre,” “Support the Students,” and so forth. Slogans rose and fell one after another like waves of fury, each cresting higher than the last.

In the evening, a massive crowd converged at Victoria Park in the heart of Hong Kong Island. A temporary memorial altar had been erected there, providing a place for citizens to hold a silent vigil, bow their heads in prayer, or sit on the ground to participate in the mourning activities.

Over the next few days, people on the streets bore expressions of deep sorrow and moved in a hurried rush, looking as though they had all lost their own family members. I held a plane ticket for June 8th, scheduled to fly from Hong Kong to Beijing, and then onward to Nanjing. During those days, I struggled intensely with my inner thoughts—should I still make this trip?

At that time, no one was flying to Beijing; people were only fleeing back to Hong Kong. I remember the airline even required me to sign a “Voluntary Waiver and Commitment Form.” Many of my Hong Kong friends felt I was going there just to throw my life away, but this was highly characteristic of my personality—if it is something I want to do, I will always go out and do it. In a person’s life, one must ultimately do what one believes is right.

My friends in Beijing urged me not to come, but I replied, “I want to witness history.” A contact at the Nanjing Aeronautical Institute pleaded with me desperately over the phone: “Our campus is completely filled with tanks, you must absolutely not come.” Yet, I still boarded that flight. It was nearly empty, occupied only by myself and the flight crew, with no other passengers.

When the plane landed, I told the taxi driver, “I want to go to Tiananmen Square.” He shook his head instantly: “You absolutely cannot go! Those martial law troops will truly open fire.” Under my persistence, he was only willing to drive me near the vicinity of the square. That entire area had been cordoned off, but I could still see it from a distance: there were tank tread marks left on the ground, bullet holes remaining on the walls, though the bloodstains had likely already been washed clean.

The entirety of Beijing felt as though it had been completely hollowed out; there were virtually no pedestrians on the streets. Over those two days, I visited the Badaling Great Wall, hoping to clear my mind, but to my surprise, soldiers were stationed along the ramparts there as well.

While I was taking pictures, a young soldier quietly asked me, “Could you take a photo for me? I want to mail it to my parents back home.” I hesitated for a moment, but in the end, we took a photo together.

When I returned to the Hong Kong office and developed the film roll, a colleague saw the photo of me standing with the People’s Liberation Army soldier and immediately questioned me sharply: “How could you take a photo with the troops that slaughtered the city?” I explained, “Those are peasant soldiers stationed in the rural outskirts of Beijing.” Someone suggested handing the photographs over to the media, but I refused.

From then on, every single year on “June Fourth,” I participated in the candlelit vigils at Hong Kong’s Victoria Park. Later, after moving to Canada, I shifted to gathering in front of the University of Toronto Student Union building, where a sculpture of a bicycle crushed in Tiananmen stands on the wall, evoking a flood of thoughts and imagery.

In recent years, the number of attendees has grown smaller and smaller. Some say that the sense of identity among ethnic Chinese has diminished, while others say that “June Fourth” has simply been forgotten by people.

June Fourth. This day, I will never forget.

For many years, I have been quite reluctant to bring up these past events frequently. People always said that if your mouth speaks recklessly, you will not be able to return to China in the future. I was worried about not being able to see my aging father, so for all those years, I placed a certain degree of restraint upon myself. Now that my father has passed away, those former worries have slowly drifted away with the passage of time.

Looking back now, the version of myself who flew alone to Beijing all those years ago may have felt a bit of fear, but never once hesitated.

As a member of the “June Fourth” generation, when will our souls finally find solace?

Let us pour another glass of whisky.

Edited by Huang Jizhou | Proofread by Mao Yiwei | Translated by Ge Bing

Please click the link to view the original text:

https://x.com/_vicwong/status/1930416971134148791?s=20

勿忘六四37周年:千古罪人 六四屠夫——邓小平

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作者:陈森锋

勿忘六四37周年:千古罪人 六四屠夫——邓小平

        1989年的六四民主运动,是中国近代史上最重要、也最惨痛的历史转折之一。

        那一年,中国本来有机会走向更开放、更文明、更接近现代民主政治的道路。学生走上街头,市民走上街头,他们提出的不是暴力对抗,也不是颠覆国家,而是反腐败、要自由、要新闻开放、要政治改革,要求政府正面回应人民的声音。

        面对这些手无寸铁的学生和市民,中共最高实际掌权者邓小平没有选择对话,没有选择尊重民意,而是把和平请愿定性为“动乱”,最后用军队、坦克和实弹,把中国人追求自由民主的希望碾碎在北京街头。

        这就是邓小平在六四中的历史角色:他不是旁观者,不是被蒙蔽者,不是事后才知道的人,而是最高政治拍板者,是武力镇压的最高责任人

  胡耀邦去世后,学生自发悼念,很快发展成全国性的民主诉求。学生要求反腐败、反官倒、新闻自由、政治改革。这些要求放在任何正常国家,都是政府应该认真面对的问题。可是中共政权面对人民最基本的政治诉求,第一反应不是反省,而是恐惧。

        4月25日前后,李鹏、杨尚昆等人向邓小平汇报学生运动情况。邓小平没有把学生看成国家未来的一代青年,没有把民众的愤怒看成社会矛盾的警钟,而是把这场运动上升到所谓“反党反社会主义”的高度。随后,《人民日报》发表“四二六社论”,把学生运动定性为“动乱”。

        这一步极其关键。

        一旦把学生说成“动乱”,就等于为下一步镇压制造政治借口。中共最惯用的手法,就是先在舆论上把人民污名化,再在行动上对人民下重手。邓小平在六四问题上的第一大罪,就是亲手推动了这种政治定性,把一场爱国、反腐、要求民主改革的群众运动,污蔑成威胁政权的敌对行动。

        这不是简单的判断失误,这是独裁者面对人民觉醒时的本能反应。

        到了5月,学生绝食,天安门广场聚集大量学生、市民和声援者。北京街头不是暴乱现场,而是一个民族在沉默多年后终于发出的政治呐喊。很多人并不是为了个人利益,而是希望中国不要继续在专制、腐败、特权和谎言中沉沦。

        当时中共内部并非没有另一种选择。赵紫阳主张缓和局势,主张对话,反对用暴力解决问题。可是邓小平不接受这条路。作为中共最高实际掌权者,他最终选择站在强硬派一边,选择戒严,选择调动军队,选择用枪口对准人民。

        5月17日前后,关于是否戒严、是否调军队进京的决定,在邓小平等中共元老主导下形成。5月20日,北京正式戒严。这个决定标志着中共已经不再把学生和市民当作可以沟通的人民,而是当作必须压服的对象。

        戒严之后,军队第一次进京受阻。大量北京市民拦住军车,给士兵送水、讲道理,劝他们不要镇压学生。那一幕说明,当时站出来的不只是学生,而是整个城市的良知。北京市民用身体挡住军队,不是为了制造动乱,而是为了保护学生,为了阻止国家机器对人民开枪。

        可是邓小平没有因此回头。

        他没有问一句:为什么这么多市民愿意冒险保护学生?

        他没有问一句:中国人民为什么会如此不满?

        他没有问一句:一个执政党如果要靠军队才能面对青年学生,这个政权到底出了什么问题?

        他选择的是继续调兵,继续加压,继续把事情推向流血结局。

        6月2日前后,清场的最后决定形成。随后,大批戒严部队向北京城内推进。6月3日晚到6月4日凌晨,枪声响起,坦克开进城市,军队向手无寸铁的学生和市民开火。长安街、木樨地、西单、天安门周边,许多普通人倒在枪口之下。有人只是围观,有人只是劝阻,有人只是想救人,有人只是站在街头表达自己的政治立场。

        他们面对的是国家军队,是本应保卫人民的军队。可是那一夜,人民解放军成了镇压人民的工具。枪口没有对准外敌,而是对准自己的学生、市民和纳税人。

        这是六四最大的罪恶。

        更可耻的是,六四之后,邓小平没有认错,没有道歉,没有追责镇压者,反而公开接见戒严部队,称他们经受住了“考验”,继续把人民的抗争污蔑为“反革命暴乱”。他悼念的是执行镇压的一方,而不是被打死、被碾压、被追捕、被判刑的普通中国人。

        这说明邓小平不是一时误判,而是从头到尾都站在独裁政权一边。他关心的不是人民生命,不是国家未来,不是中国是否能走向民主文明,而是中共政权是否能继续稳固。

        有人说邓小平推动了改革开放,因此不能仅以六四评价其历史地位。这种说法回避了最根本的问题:经济改革不能抵消屠杀人民的罪行。一个人即使推动过经济发展,也没有权力下令军队镇压学生和市民。高速公路、工厂、外资、GDP,都不能洗白天安门前后的血。

        邓小平所谓“让一部分人先富起来”,从制度结果看,本身就是一个巨大的陷阱。在一党专政、没有民主监督、没有新闻自由、没有司法独立的体制下,最容易先富起来的不是普通百姓,而是掌握政策、资源、土地、金融和审批权的权贵集团。所谓“先富带后富”,最后变成了权贵先富、官商勾结、红色家族和白手套转移财富,普通百姓却长期承受高房价、低工资、债务、失业和社会保障不足的压力。

        更根本的问题在于,邓小平先用坦克镇压人民争取民主的权利,再用经济发展给人民画饼:你们不要政治权利,只要安心赚钱就行。可是人民没有政治权利,怎么保障自己的财富权利?没有选票,没有新闻自由,没有独立法院,没有真正的宪政法治,人民所谓的财产随时可能被权力夺走。独裁体制下,人的生命都不真正属于自己,财富又怎么可能真正属于自己?

        所以,邓小平留下的不是自由市场,而是党国控制下的权贵资本主义;不是共同富裕,而是特权集团先富、普通人民被收割;不是现代文明国家的道路,而是用经济增长掩盖政治奴役的专制模式。

        六四不只是一次屠杀,也是一场历史路线的终结。

        邓小平毁掉的,不只是1989年那一代学生的生命和命运,也毁掉了中国和平转型的重大机会。如果当时中共选择对话、选择让步、选择政治改革,中国完全可能走向另一条道路:新闻可以逐步开放,权力可以逐步受到监督,腐败可以被制度约束,人民可以有真正的政治参与。

        可是邓小平选择了坦克。

        他用枪声告诉中国人:共产党可以改革经济,但绝不允许人民分享政治权力;共产党可以谈开放,但权力一旦受到挑战,就会毫不犹豫地杀人。

        这就是邓小平留给中国的真正政治遗产。

        六四之后,中共用谎言封锁真相,用审查删除记忆,用监控压制纪念,用恐惧迫使人民沉默。遇难者家属几十年不能公开悼念,幸存者长期被监控,流亡者无法回国,年轻一代在墙内甚至不知道1989年北京发生过什么。

        一个政权连死难者名字都害怕,说明它知道自己有罪。一个政府连蜡烛、鲜花、纪念日都要封杀,说明它的统治建立在血债和谎言之上。

        邓小平在六四中的罪责,不能因为时间流逝而被淡化,也不能因为中共宣传机器长期洗地而被改写。他不是所谓“伟人晚年犯错”,而是在关键历史时刻选择用军队镇压人民的独裁者。他亲手把中国从可能的政治改革道路上拖回专制轨道,把学生和市民的和平诉求变成血流成河的国家罪案。

        对手无寸铁的学生和市民开枪,是不可饶恕的罪。

        用坦克碾碎人民追求自由的希望,是不可饶恕的罪。

        事后继续污蔑死难者、赞扬镇压者,更是不可饶恕的罪。

        六四是中共永远洗不掉的血债。邓小平作为最高拍板者,必须被钉在历史的耻辱柱上。

        他不是中国民主的改革者,而是中国民主机会的毁灭者。

        他不是所谓民族功臣,而是镇压人民的民族败类。

        他不是值得纪念的伟人,而是六四屠夫、千古罪人。

        历史可以被中共暂时封锁,但不可能永远被埋葬。死难者的名字终有一天会被公开记住,屠杀者的责任终有一天会被追究。六四不是过去式,而是中国人必须面对的真相。

        忘记六四,就是纵容屠杀。

        美化邓小平,就是侮辱死难者。

        只要天安门的血债没有追责,邓小平“六四屠夫”的历史定性就永远不能改变。

编辑:钟然

校对:王滨

翻译:沈美花

Never Forget the 37th Anniversary of June Fourth:Deng Xiaoping — Butcher of June Fourth and Sinner Before History

Author: Chen Senfeng

Abstract: This article reviews the June Fourth Democracy Movement of 1989 and the subsequent crackdown, analyzes Deng Xiaoping’s role in the decision-making process, criticizes his choice to end a historic opportunity for political reform through military force, and examines the profound impact of the June Fourth Incident on China’s political development.

勿忘六四37周年:千古罪人 六四屠夫——邓小平

The June Fourth Democracy Movement of 1989 was one of the most important—and most tragic—turning points in modern Chinese history.

That year, China had an opportunity to move toward a path that was more open, more civilized, and closer to modern democratic politics. Students took to the streets. Citizens took to the streets. What they demanded was not violent confrontation, nor the overthrow of the state. They called for an end to corruption, for freedom, for greater press openness, and for political reform. They asked the government to respond seriously to the voices of the people.

Faced with these unarmed students and citizens, Deng Xiaoping, the highest de facto ruler of the Chinese Communist Party, chose neither dialogue nor respect for public opinion. Instead, he labeled the peaceful petition movement as “turmoil” and ultimately used troops, tanks, and live ammunition to crush the Chinese people’s hopes for freedom and democracy on the streets of Beijing.

This was Deng Xiaoping’s historical role in June Fourth: he was not a bystander, not someone who had been misled, nor someone who learned of events only afterward. He was the highest political decision-maker and the person bearing ultimate responsibility for the military suppression.

After the death of Hu Yaobang, students began spontaneous memorial activities, which soon developed into a nationwide movement advocating democratic reform. The students called for anti-corruption measures, opposition to official profiteering, freedom of the press, and political reform. In any normal country, such demands would have been issues the government should have addressed seriously. Yet when faced with the most basic political demands of the people, the Communist regime’s first reaction was not self-reflection, but fear.

Around April 25, Li Peng and Yang Shangkun reported the situation of the student movement to Deng Xiaoping. Deng did not view the students as the future generation of the nation, nor did he regard public anger as a warning sign of social contradictions. Instead, he elevated the movement to the level of what he called an “anti-Party and anti-socialist” challenge. Soon afterward, the April 26 People’s Daily Editorial labeled the student movement as “turmoil.”

This step was critically important.

Once the students were branded as perpetrators of “turmoil,” a political justification for subsequent repression had effectively been created. One of the Chinese Communist Party’s most frequently used methods has been to first stigmatize the people through propaganda and then deal harshly with them through action. Deng Xiaoping’s first major crime in the June Fourth crisis was personally advancing this political characterization, transforming a patriotic mass movement demanding anti-corruption measures and democratic reform into what was portrayed as a hostile threat to the regime.

This was not merely a mistake in judgment. It was the instinctive reaction of a dictator confronted by an awakening people.

By May, students had begun a hunger strike, and Tiananmen Square was filled with students, citizens, and supporters. The streets of Beijing were not scenes of riot and chaos; they were the stage for a nation finally giving voice to its political aspirations after years of silence. Many participants were not acting for personal gain. They hoped only that China would not continue sinking into authoritarianism, corruption, privilege, and deception.

At the time, there was not only one possible course of action within the Communist Party leadership. Zhao Ziyang advocated easing tensions, pursuing dialogue, and opposing the use of violence to resolve the crisis. But Deng Xiaoping rejected this path. As China’s highest de facto ruler, he ultimately sided with the hardliners. He chose martial law. He chose to mobilize the military. He chose to point the guns at the people.

Around May 17, under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping and other Party elders, decisions regarding martial law and troop deployment into Beijing took shape. On May 20, martial law was formally declared in Beijing. This decision marked the point at which the Communist Party no longer viewed students and citizens as people with whom dialogue was possible, but as subjects that had to be subdued.

After martial law was imposed, the military’s first attempt to enter Beijing was blocked. Large numbers of Beijing residents stopped military vehicles, brought water to soldiers, reasoned with them, and urged them not to suppress the students. That scene demonstrated that it was not only students who had stood up, but the conscience of an entire city. The citizens of Beijing used their own bodies to block the military—not to create turmoil, but to protect the students and prevent the machinery of the state from opening fire on its own people.

But Deng Xiaoping did not turn back.

He did not ask:Why were so many citizens willing to risk themselves to protect the students?

He did not ask:Why were the Chinese people so dissatisfied?

He did not ask:If a ruling party must rely on the military to confront university students, what has gone wrong with that regime?

Instead, he chose to send more troops, apply greater pressure, and push events toward a bloody conclusion.

Around June 2, the final decision to clear the square was made. Soon afterward, large numbers of martial-law troops advanced into central Beijing. On the night of June 3 and into the early hours of June 4, gunfire erupted, tanks rolled into the city, and the military opened fire on unarmed students and civilians. Along Chang’an Avenue, at Muxidi, Xidan, and in areas surrounding Tiananmen, many ordinary people fell before the guns.

Some were merely bystanders.Some were trying to persuade the troops to stop.Some were attempting to rescue the wounded.Some were simply standing in the streets expressing their political views.

What they faced was the national army—the very army that was supposed to protect the people.

Yet on that night, the People’s Liberation Army became an instrument for suppressing the people. Its guns were not aimed at foreign enemies, but at its own students, citizens, and taxpayers.

This was the greatest crime of June Fourth.

Even more disgraceful was what followed. After June Fourth, Deng Xiaoping neither admitted fault, apologized, nor held those responsible for the crackdown accountable. Instead, he publicly met with the martial-law troops, praised them for having withstood the “test,” and continued to label the people’s resistance as a “counterrevolutionary riot.”

He mourned and honored those who carried out the suppression, not the ordinary Chinese people who had been shot, crushed, hunted down, imprisoned, or sentenced.

This demonstrates that Deng Xiaoping’s actions were not the result of a momentary misjudgment. From beginning to end, he stood on the side of authoritarian rule.

What concerned him was not the lives of the people, not the future of the nation, and not whether China could move toward democracy and civilization. What concerned him was whether the Chinese Communist Party could continue to maintain its hold on power.

Some argue that Deng Xiaoping promoted Reform and Opening-Up and therefore his historical legacy should not be judged solely by June Fourth.

Such an argument avoids the most fundamental issue: economic reform cannot erase the crime of killing one’s own people.

Even if a person contributed to economic development, that does not give him the right to order the military to suppress students and civilians.

Highways, factories, foreign investment, and GDP growth cannot wash away the blood spilled in and around Tiananmen.

Deng Xiaoping’s famous policy of “letting some people get rich first,” viewed from the perspective of its institutional consequences, became a massive trap.

Under a one-party dictatorship lacking democratic oversight, freedom of the press, and judicial independence, those most likely to become rich first were not ordinary citizens, but those who controlled policies, resources, land, finance, and administrative approval powers.

What was supposed to be “some getting rich first in order to help others become prosperous later” ultimately became a system in which political elites accumulated wealth first. Collusion between officials and business interests flourished. Families connected to the revolutionary elite and their intermediaries transferred enormous amounts of wealth, while ordinary people endured high housing prices, low wages, debt burdens, unemployment, and inadequate social welfare protections.

More fundamentally, Deng Xiaoping first used tanks to suppress the people’s struggle for democratic rights and then offered economic development as compensation, effectively saying:

You do not need political rights; you only need to focus on making money.

But without political rights, how can people protect their property rights?

Without elections, freedom of the press, independent courts, and genuine constitutional rule of law, the property of ordinary citizens can be taken away by power at any time.

In an authoritarian system, if people’s lives do not truly belong to themselves, how can their wealth truly belong to them?

Thus, what Deng Xiaoping left behind was not a free market, but crony capitalism operating under a Party-state system.

It was not common prosperity, but a system in which privileged groups became wealthy first while ordinary people were exploited.

It was not a path toward a modern and civilized nation, but an authoritarian model that used economic growth to conceal political oppression.

June Fourth was not merely a massacre.

It was also the end of an alternative historical path.

What Deng Xiaoping destroyed was not only the lives and destinies of the students of 1989.

He also destroyed one of China’s greatest opportunities for a peaceful political transformation.

Had the Communist Party chosen dialogue, compromise, and political reform, China might have followed a different path.

The press could gradually have become more open.

Political power could gradually have become subject to oversight.

Corruption could have been constrained by institutions.

Citizens could have gained genuine political participation.

But Deng Xiaoping chose tanks.

Through gunfire, he sent a message to the Chinese people:

The Communist Party may reform the economy, but it will never allow the people to share political power.

The Communist Party may speak of openness, but once its power is challenged, it will not hesitate to kill.

This, according to the author, is Deng Xiaoping’s true political legacy.

After June Fourth, the Chinese Communist Party used falsehoods to conceal the truth, censorship to erase memory, surveillance to suppress commemoration, and fear to force people into silence.

For decades, the families of those who died have been unable to mourn publicly.

Survivors have lived under long-term surveillance.

Exiles have been unable to return home.

Within China’s internet censorship system, many members of the younger generation do not even know what happened in Beijing in 1989.

A regime that fears even the names of the dead knows that it is guilty.

A government that bans candles, flowers, and commemorative dates demonstrates that its rule rests upon blood debt and lies.

Deng Xiaoping’s responsibility for June Fourth cannot be diminished by the passage of time, nor can it be rewritten through the long-term efforts of the Chinese Communist Party’s propaganda machinery.

He was not merely a “great leader who made mistakes in his later years.”

Rather, at a critical moment in history, he chose to use the military to suppress his own people.

He personally dragged China away from a possible path of political reform and back onto the track of authoritarian rule.

He transformed the peaceful demands of students and citizens into a national tragedy marked by bloodshed.

Opening fire on unarmed students and civilians is an unforgivable crime.

Using tanks to crush the people’s hope for freedom is an unforgivable crime.

Afterward, continuing to vilify the victims and praise those who carried out the suppression is an even more unforgivable crime.

June Fourth is a blood debt that the Chinese Communist Party can never wash away.

As the ultimate decision-maker, Deng Xiaoping must be nailed to the pillar of historical shame.

He was not a reformer of Chinese democracy.

He was the destroyer of China’s opportunity for democracy.

He was not a national hero.

He was, according to the author’s judgment, a betrayer of the nation who suppressed his own people.

He was not a great man worthy of commemoration.

He was the Butcher of June Fourth and a sinner before history.

History may be temporarily concealed by the Chinese Communist Party, but it can never be buried forever.

One day, the names of those who died will be openly remembered.

One day, responsibility for the killings will be pursued.

June Fourth is not merely a matter of the past.

It is a truth that the Chinese people must still confront.

To forget June Fourth is to tolerate massacre.

To glorify Deng Xiaoping is to insult the dead.

So long as responsibility for the bloodshed at Tiananmen has not been established, the historical judgment of Deng Xiaoping as the “Butcher of June Fourth” can never be changed.

Editor: Zhong Ran

Proofreader: Wang Bin

Translator: Shen Meihua

我的五月三十五日

0

作者:漠北孤侠

我的五月三十五日
天安门广场的血和母亲们的泪
依旧未干
维园的烛光和自由女神像前的标语
依然斑驳
任谁秀口一吐
整个盛唐 尽毁
但我不 我偏诗行孤岛角落

我的五月三十五日

视频中被老师塞到角落里的孩子孤苦伶仃的坐着,当班里其他所有同学都兴奋地举起手中六一节学校送的礼物时,我的心一阵阵剧烈抽搐,整个人崩溃。

这分明是我的孩子一一当年我刚刚青春期高中一年级的孩子,就是这样被班主任朱老师塞到挨着圾圾柜的角落座位里;而且其他所有同学都有“同桌的你”,就他一个人。该老师还组织全班同学尤其是坐在孩子周围前后左右的四个女同学欺凌孩子。孩子做好作业交给四个组长都被拒收、作业都交不上去。

孩子拼命展视自己的优秀和对班级荣誉的维护以换取同学们的认可。校运会勇敢参与比赛项目,没有一位同学围观,更无一人喝彩,须知他平时连最简单的运动和动作都做不来。

孩子到今天尚留下极重心理隐患,怕别人负面评价、怕别人拒绝,形成了极度的讨好型人格,至今不敢接触女生。

这视频也再次重击了我心里的旧伤,40多年了!我少年时遭遇的校长儿子带领全班同学霸凌我、甚至成年了还变着法子欺侮我的往事,翻江倒海般翻腾出来。

初中一年级时年幼小、身体更孱弱,无法适应远离父母一人独立读书、生活,被迫放弃当时所谓的地区重点学校尖子班学位,回到我一天没上过的家乡小学。从上学第一天开始全班同学以侮辱的外号称我,连自小村子里一起长大的玩伴也孤立我。我当时百思不得其解,整天笼罩在恐惧中,只能用拼命的学习来躲避同学们异样的眼光和闲言碎语,用考试成绩的优秀来证明自己。直到最近些年或许年岁渐大,年少时的往事不知不觉的会在脑海里回放,也找不出当年班上的同学集体一致的霸凌我的原因。只是透过回忆追溯才有所发现,成年后直至几年前,同班同学以当年那几位带头和组织霸凌我的,仍组织班上同学搞“统一战线”孤立、排挤和欺辱我,一个例证就是10年前原初一班同学30周年同学会刻意不通知我。原因无他,就是我一直比他们优秀!

此时我心如刀绞,为视频中孩子、为我的孩子、为我自己,为当下千千万万曝光和未曝光出来的被霸凌的孩子与家庭。

前后跨越40年三代人,不变的霸凌与欺辱!我不会是孤例!

40年过去了,这土地一丝也没有改良,千年盐碱依旧,甚至酱缸味更浓,芸芸韭菜己经被压榨一次又一次,血泪干枯。 此刻窗外,阴雨连绵,一个多小时后又是五月三十五日了,何日是尽头?!

2026年5月35日于东山下烟雨小木屋

编辑:李晶 校对:王滨 翻译:戈冰

My May 35th

Author: Mobei Guxia (The Lonely Knight of Mobei)

My May 35th,
The blood on Tiananmen Square and the tears of the mothers
Have still not dried.
The candlelight in Victoria Park and the slogans before the Goddess of Democracy
Remain mottled and faded.
No matter who opens their elegant mouth to spit a word,
The entire High Tang Dynasty is utterly destroyed.
But not I. I choose instead to anchor my lines of poetry in the corner of an isolated island.

我的五月三十五日

In the video, the child, shoved into a corner by the teacher, sits all alone. As all the other classmates in the room excitedly raise the Children’s Day gifts given by the school, my heart convulses in violent waves of pain, and I break down completely.

This is clearly my own child—my child years ago, who had just entered adolescence in the first year of high school, and was shoved exactly like this by the homeroom teacher, Teacher Zhu, into a corner seat right next to the trash bin. What’s more, every other student had a “desk-mate of their own,” while he was left entirely alone.

This teacher even organized the entire class, especially the four female students sitting directly around him—in front, behind, to his left, and to his right—to bully the child. When the child finished his homework and tried to hand it to the four group leaders, it was rejected every time; he could not even submit his schoolwork.

The child desperately tried to display his excellence and his defense of the class’s honor in exchange for his classmates’ recognition.

He bravely took part in events during the school sports meet, yet not a single classmate came to watch, let alone cheer for him—even though, ordinarily, he could not even manage the simplest sports or physical movements.

To this day, the child is left with severe psychological trauma: he fears negative evaluations from others, dreads rejection, has developed an extreme people-pleasing personality, and still does not dare to interact with girls.

This video has once again struck the old wounds in my heart—it has been over 40 years! The past, where the principal’s son led the entire class to bully me during my youth, and even found twisted ways to humiliate me into my adulthood, has come roaring back like churning, tempestuous seas.

During my first year of junior high, I was young and physically weak. Unable to adapt to living and studying independently far away from my parents, I was forced to give up my spot in the elite class of a so-called regional key school, and return to my hometown’s primary school—a place I had never attended for a single day.

From my very first day of school, the entire class called me by insulting nicknames, and even the childhood playmates I grew up with in the village isolated me.

At the time, no matter how hard I thought, I could not understand why. Enveloped in fear all day long, I could only study frantically to escape my classmates’ strange stares and gossiping tongues, using my excellent exam scores to prove my worth.

Only in recent years, perhaps as I grow older, the events of my youth have begun to replay involuntarily in my mind, yet I still cannot find the reason why the classmates back then collectively and unanimously bullied me.

It is only by tracing back through my memories that I discovered something: into adulthood and up until a few years ago, those same former classmates who took the lead in organizing the bullying still organized the class to form a “United Front” to isolate, ostracize, and humiliate me. A clear example of this is that ten years ago, during the 30th anniversary reunion of our original first-year junior high class, they deliberately chose not to notify me. The reason was none other than this: I have always been more excellent than them!

At this moment, my heart feels as if it is being pierced by knives—for the child in the video, for my own child, for myself, and for the thousands upon thousands of bullied children and families today, both those who have been brought to light and those who remain unseen.

Spanning 40 years across three generations, the bullying and humiliation remain unchanged! I am surely not an isolated case!

Forty years have passed, and this land has not improved in the slightest. The millennium-old saline-alkali soil remains as it was, and the stench of the culture’s soy sauce vat has grown even thicker. The masses of “leeks” have been squeezed and harvested time and time again, until their blood and tears have run dry.

At this moment outside my window, the gloomy rain falls incessantly. In a little over an hour, it will once again be May 35th. When will this ever end?!

May 35th, 2026, in a misty and rainy small wooden cabin at the foot of the Eastern Mountain.

Editor: Li Jing Proofreader: Wang Bin Translator: Ge Bing

六四的焰火—民主

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作者:烟青

六四距今37年了。37年过去,当初莘莘学子们热切期盼的政改依然没有实现,不仅没有实现 ,还出现了某些层面的倒退。比如言论的自由、新闻的真实,还有最近几天的外国投资管理34条体现的营商环境等。随着这些威权统治带来的社会倒退,民生益艰,社会叙事愈加荒诞。

上个月,湖南、湖北、贵州和广东发生了严重的洪灾,仅湖南常德市石门县就超过10万人受灾,特大洪水还引发了泥石泥,多人伤亡。与此同时,远方的河南,也因为这场洪灾“轰动”了。原因是河南省伊川、宜阳、嵩县三支蓝天救援队因为跨区域救援这场洪灾。5月22日,被责令立即全员撤回,全队被给予书面警告一次。

2023年河北涿州洪灾更加严重,同样也是明令禁止民间救援,救援队在途中被要求立即遣返。这时候,没有灾情就是命令了,不说人命关天了!在共产党眼里,普通老百姓的命真不算命!

大名鼎鼎的红十字会,中国红十字会,其救援资格都要被政府行政权力垄断,这才是要命的!不要以为他们是热心救援。其实,他们的热心只是通过垄断救援来垄断捐赠。没有民间的救援,自然就没有民间的募捐了。不然,郭美美哪来的那么多干爹可以坑。

至于什么中国青基会、中华儿慈会,更是一伙牛鬼蛇神。同样是大河南,中华少年儿童慈善救助基金会9958项目区域负责人雷克,就因为掌握着本应该付给患儿的60多万募捐款,拖着不付来挟持着患儿的妈妈陪睡,每次给三五两千元,可前后总共也才给了不足二万元,后该儿童还是因医疗不足离世,这他妈真是畜牲不如!更可恶之处是你给那些捐赠者怎么想:我捐款不是在扶危济困,挽救生命,而是在帮你去祸祸别人的妈妈!

中国是一个独裁国家,它的政治结构同样有一个显著特点,就是它的权力来源是自上而下,那么,在这种制度下的权力参与者稍微一熟悉这种环境,真的是用脚指头想都能明白,我只要依附好上级,其它的民生啊什么的,一切都不重要。所以你看得到上海读不到书的孩子家长会跪在教育局门口;城管会追着很多像夏俊峰的小贩满街跑;北京会驱逐他们认为的低端人口。

有人会说,我说的这些都是中共的下层官员们干的,中央上层领导还是好的,对于这个说法,我只想告诉你:下面烂完了,上面还是好的,那是梅毒晚期;再者,不要忘了:中国网球名将彭帅,风华正茂的年龄,被张高丽长期侵占的事。你们想想:专业网球运动员,那腕力和小臂的力量是多强啊,会抗拒不了一个70多岁的糟老头子?她只是抗拒不了强权而已,更不要天真的以为上面是好的,那只是他们想让你以为的。上有所好,才下必盛焉,上面才是那个“根”。

37年前的六四,先驱们为民主和宪政而争,为民族未来而争,为理想和知识份子的良知而争,虽然付出了鲜血和生命,而且尚未成功,但她却真正开启了反抗中共铁幕的民主运动。有人说,民主又不能当饭吃,但是,从中共改革后到最近这几年的状况,难道还不能明白:没有民主,你最终连饭都没得吃!在一个正常的民主国家,如果孩子上不了学,下跪的应该是教育局吧;一个正常的民主国家,没有谁敢随便把一些人定义为低端,然后驱逐吧,所以不要为你们的街上见不到流浪汉而自豪,更不要嘲笑美国的流浪汉。

     2026.6.4

编辑:李晶 校对:毛一炜 翻译:沈美花

The Fireworks of June Fourth — Democracy

Author: Yan Qing

Thirty-seven years have passed since June Fourth. Over these 37 years, the political reforms that the students of that era eagerly hoped for have still not been realized. Not only have they failed to materialize, but in some respects there has even been regression. Examples include freedom of speech, the authenticity of news reporting, and, more recently, the business environment reflected in the 34 Measures on the Administration of Foreign Investment. As society regresses under authoritarian rule, people’s livelihoods become increasingly difficult, and the narratives presented by society grow ever more absurd.

Last month, severe flooding struck Hunan, Hubei, Guizhou, and Guangdong provinces. In Shimen County of Changde City, Hunan Province alone, more than 100,000 people were affected. Torrential floods also triggered mudslides, causing multiple casualties. Meanwhile, far away in Henan Province, the disaster also attracted widespread attention. The reason was that three Blue Sky Rescue teams from Yichuan, Yiyang, and Song County in Henan crossed regional boundaries to assist in flood relief. On May 22, they were ordered to withdraw immediately, and the entire teams received written warnings.

The flooding in Zhuozhou, Hebei Province, in 2023 was even more severe. Yet private rescue efforts were likewise explicitly prohibited, and rescue teams were ordered to return before reaching the disaster area. At such moments, the absence of a reported disaster seems more important than human lives. In the eyes of the Communist Party, the lives of ordinary people simply do not count.

Even the well-known Red Cross Society of China must operate under the government’s monopoly over rescue qualifications. That is the truly alarming part. Do not assume they are simply enthusiastic about disaster relief. In reality, their enthusiasm lies in monopolizing rescue operations so that they can monopolize donations. Without private rescue efforts, there will naturally be no private fundraising. Otherwise, where would Guo Meimei have found so many wealthy patrons to exploit?

As for organizations such as the China Youth Development Foundation and the China Charities Aid Foundation for Children, they are even more troubling. Again in Henan, Lei Ke, a regional manager of the 9958 Project under the China Charities Aid Foundation for Children, allegedly controlled more than 600,000 yuan in donations that should have gone to a sick child. By withholding the funds, he coerced the child’s mother into sexual relations. Each time, he released only a few thousand yuan, and in total provided less than 20,000 yuan. Ultimately, the child died due to inadequate medical treatment. This was truly inhumane. What is even more outrageous is how donors must feel: they donated to help those in need and save lives, not to enable someone to exploit a desperate mother.

China is an authoritarian state, and its political structure has a distinctive characteristic: power flows from the top down. Under such a system, anyone familiar with the environment can easily understand that as long as they remain loyal to their superiors, everything else—including people’s livelihoods—is secondary. That is why parents in Shanghai whose children cannot attend school may end up kneeling outside education bureau offices. It is why street vendors such as Xia Junfeng were relentlessly chased by urban management officers. It is why people deemed “low-end population” can be driven out of Beijing.

Some may argue that these are merely the actions of lower-level officials and that the central leadership remains good. To such claims, I would respond: if everything below is rotten while everything above remains good, then the disease is already in its terminal stage. Furthermore, consider the case of Chinese tennis star Peng Shuai, who alleged that she was subjected to a long-term relationship with former senior leader Zhang Gaoli. Think about it: a professional tennis player possesses tremendous physical strength and endurance. Was she truly incapable of resisting a man in his seventies? What she could not resist was power itself. Do not naively assume that those at the top are virtuous. That is merely what they want you to believe. When those above favor something, those below will pursue it with even greater zeal. The root of the problem lies at the top.

Thirty-seven years ago, during the June Fourth Movement, countless pioneers struggled for democracy and constitutional government, for the future of the nation, and for the ideals and conscience of intellectuals. Although they paid with blood and lives, and although success has yet to be achieved, they truly initiated a democratic movement against the Communist Party’s iron curtain.

Some people say that democracy cannot be eaten. Yet considering China’s development from the reform era to the present, should it not be clear by now that without democracy, one may ultimately not even have food to eat? In a normal democratic country, if children cannot attend school, it is the education authorities who should feel ashamed. In a normal democratic country, no one would dare arbitrarily label certain people as “low-end” and expel them. Therefore, do not take pride in the absence of homeless people on your streets, nor mock the homeless population in the United States.

June 4, 2026

Editor: Li JingProofreader: Mao YiweiTranslator: Shen Meihua

追寻文明的郑酋午

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作者:郑酋午

从读大学有了公民权利意识之后, 我一直都在追寻文明。我理解的文明是四必须:1、必须有公平正义,2、必须公民在法律上平等, 3、必须有效遏制腐败,4、必须有个人自由。而要做到如此,从人类治理几千年的经验看,只有宪政才能提供。我从大学毕业后到现在一直努力在坚持宪政的梦想。

我1959年出生于海南三亚,十五岁高中毕业后上山下乡,去农场干农活。1976年有幸参加社会主义基本路线教育运动,在其间有一件事对我触动很大,我所主管的生产队,有一个农民右派,一天晚上全家七口人食物中毒,由于事情紧迫,没有向工作队长汇报,自己就决定联系当地国营农场车队派出一辆解放牌车,拉右派全家去公社卫生院治疗,全家人的“狗命”被救下了。这本是一件好事,本应表扬,但出乎意料的是,工作队长在全体队员会议上严厉批评了我。当时工作队长的认识是我的阶级立场有问题。受批评后,我感觉到,这是人都应拥有的同情心,不应被批,当然,这个感觉跟当时的阶级斗争氛围不合。

我1982年毕业于华南师大中文系 。在读大学期间,受魏京生《探索》中的文章《第五个现代化》影响 ,开始思考政治问题。同时,广泛阅读所谓的禁书。我读书的图书馆,最高一层都是禁书集中地。这要由授课教师出证明系主任签字才可以借阅。我多次进出,读了《圣经》和孙文的《三民主义》 。我现在还记得,三民主义封面上有蒋中正的宣扬主义的题词。

读了魏京生的文章和学校的禁书,思想有很大的转变,认为暴力、革命和专政不是文明人该过的生活,更应该提倡的是公民、选举、反对党、权力分立、司法独立、个人自由和非暴力。思维有转变,视野突然开阔,由于年轻,血气方刚,在大学时经常跟同学和上课教师辩论,给大家的感觉是资产阶级自由化严重。毕业鉴定里就有该学生有资产阶级自由化思想。当时,不仅喜欢辩论,还喜欢寻找有共同认识的学生组织社团,比如震旦学社。当时每一两个月就进行交流,力图改变社会。

大学毕业后被分配到海南通什师范教书;教书期间组织华师大通什交友会,同时,跟全国各地异议人士联系,企图组织全国政治社团。当时,写了十多篇文章,比如持不同政见者宣言、改革方向,等等。1982年寒假,到广州、上海、杭州、重庆、贵阳等地联络朋友,准备成立政治反对派。1982年底回来海南途中被抓,1983年上半年被以反革命罪(组织集团罪和煽动罪)判处十四年(数罪并罚加限制)。坐牢的监狱先是在广东坪石监狱(对外是罗家渡煤矿)机械厂,我的工作是开机床。一九九零年后,集中于广东怀集监狱。在怀集监狱是单独关押,当时我们四人王希哲、刘青山、何求和我是分别从不同监狱调来集中于此的。每人单独一个空间,里面有睡觉、洗澡以及活动场所。我跟他们交流都是爬上窗口进行。他们当时自称马克思主义者,王希哲是毛主义理论家、刘青山是托派国际香港支部的宣传部长。只有我是民主法治人士,相互辩论,甚至对怼。在监狱的干警中,除一个指导员和一个管教外,都是年纪较大的人,他们特别恨民主自由人士。多次看病,他们都经常在医生开的药上动手脚,比如医生开三种药,他们就送两种。有一次看病,我乘他们不注意,叫医生开三种药,医生点头,但送进来的是两种。虽然都是小病,吃不吃药都不会死人,但通过此件事情可以看出他们多么厌恨民主自由人士,他们内心多么丑陋。他们中还有一个是我的海南老乡,有一次送饭并送药,我感觉不对,就用饭碗打他他躲开了。 因为单独关押,很少有机会说话,其他三人由都是极左派人士,三观不一致,说话也没有力气,担心刑期长坐久了出狱不会讲话。我就用现有资料朗读文章,声音很大,值班的干警怒气冲冲冲进来说,你以后出去还要到大街上煽动吗?我立刻顶回去,邓小平文选读不得吗?并翻手中书名给他看,他一看是邓小平文选就没有再说什么。

大约是1992年,在海南建省后,父母经过努力,我被转移回海南监狱。这里没有单独关押,而是放在一个中队劳动,主要是编椰子扫把。在海南监狱伙食比较好,离家近,父母每月都送钱送食品。基本没有大的问题,但发生一件小事。有一次去看病,卫生所长跟我开药,我错误以为,开的药不对,我便随口说一句,医生应该有医德。现在想来,是我不对,但当时不这样看。我回中队后,指导员把我找去医务所(卫生所在监狱中)要求我向所长道歉。我不肯,被中队指导员打了一巴掌。

1996年刑满释放,父母户口在海南文昌市,所以回来文昌落户。起初做小生意,后来到一家小型房地产公司打工,做到副总经理。同时,努力学习,1999年考上私立学校当老师。当老师一年后到琼海一所私立学校应聘校长。这是一所完全中学,也兼办职业中专。2003年我离开海南到湖南省长沙市一所私立学校任教。在湖南我认识民主党湖南主委谢长发,还有几个异议人士。经常参加当地的政治活动。在我的印象中,谢长发是一位领袖型的人才,既有理论也有实际操作能力(可惜的是生不逢国不逢时,后来他被判了十三年)。一年后,我到深圳市清华实验参加考试,考上高中部语文教师,当时参加考试的有来自全国的教师和教授近两百人。

在深圳清华实验工作了六年,在深圳认识了赵达功、赖锦东、郭永丰、任铭、张津郡和李铁等异议人士,经常参加他们的活动,印象中任铭喜欢组织活动,赖锦东和郭永丰是神学家和传道人。我也经常跟任铭到广州参加活动,在广州认识了唐荆陵、赵卫红赵卫东兄弟俩、刘士辉、郭飞雄、刘远东等异议人士。印象中,这些人都是精英中的精英,属于高水平人士,未来的各路领袖。由于在广州和深圳频繁活动,于2012年被深圳国保赶出深圳。

在深圳的六年,我除了参加异议人士的活动外,还勤于写作。写了三本书和数百篇文章。引用深度求索的ai讲的话即是如此。“根据公开信息,郑酋午先生是一位活跃的思想评论者,其公开经历主要围绕学术著作发表与时事评论展开:

·学术著作者:著有《社会进程》、《二十一世纪哲学思想范式》和《试问未来,“谁”主沉浮》三部专著。

·文章发表者:在国内多家媒体和机构平台发表了数百篇文章。例如在期刊《教书育人》发表过《学校管理与探究式教学》;在“爱思想网”发表过《现代文明型国家:政治、经济、文化的多元化》等数十篇文章;在山东政法学院文化中心发表过《圣经文化与中华儒学》;在“宣讲家网”也发表过相关文章。

·思想家/时评人:媒体曾将其描述为“中国新时代的思想家”。

·观点输出者:其文章议题涵盖文化、哲学、教育等领域,如探讨中华儒学与圣经文化、作者张维迎教授观点,以及发表《人究竟是什么?》等哲学思考。”

被国保赶出深圳回家休养后,我又去北京一家出版公司任编辑(副总编兼创作部主任)。在北京有幸认识查建国、李海、何德普、扬子立等等十几个人。他们都是大才。当时中共任命新领袖,对异议人士严加管理。海南省国保打电话叫我回海南,我不理会,他们就抓了我爱人然后逼我爱人在口供上签字,拿着这个签字申请抓捕令,派七人到大陆抓捕我。我当时到杭州办理业务,他们到杭州后四处找我。我关闭手机,在朋友帮助下,躲到一个旅馆里。6月3日,他们已经知道我在旅馆,我便离开,到了西湖(不是杭州西湖)躲闪。我在一个小亭子里过夜,第二天早上打开手机后不久被七人围住,他们抓捕完成,用飞机送回海南关押。一共关押六个月,罪名从非法经营罪到销售有毒有害产品罪。后取保候审,一年后公安送材料到海南检察院,检察院做出不起诉的决定。

我一共到杭州三次,第一次是1982年底,第二次是2012年,第三次是2013年。我在杭州结识许多异议人士,徐光、吴义龙、来金彪等十多人,他们都是民主党人。我印象中,杭州民主党充满活力,人才济济。认识杭州民主党人是我这一生中的荣幸。

回海南后,一直受到监视,无法离岛外出。在海南有幸结识六十多位异议人士,经常参加岛内旅游和聚餐活动。在海南有一位老师叫吴孔大,因在厕所墙上写打倒某某和在脸书上发言被判煽巅罪三年半。吴老师理念清晰、品行端正、勇敢坚毅,是海南省的人才。我从被抓回在海南这些年也经常写一些文字,大约有百来篇文章发表于重庆西文主编的佳作上。由于手机受监控,西文的佳作寄来我处,国保企图搜查。今年三月的一天,公安、城管和宣传部上午派人来我家要搜查,由于没有搜查令,我坚决不让他们进屋,下午公安国保拿搜查证来但没有局长签字,我也不让他们进屋。这是我的权利,不希望被非法剥夺。

现在我已经六十七岁了,宪政理想还没有实现,从坐牢以来,一生总是不顺,困苦多艰,生不逢时。这一生已经时日无多,如果进地下之前,能够看到宪政落实,文明到来,也就死而无憾了。人生其实就是过客,每一个人都要走向死亡,现在的我,回顾过去,虽然不幸,但绝不后悔。如果还有来生,我也一定不断追寻文明。

2026年5月8日

编辑:李晶

校对:毛一炜

翻译:戈冰

In Pursuit of Civilization

By Zheng Qiuwu

Ever since I developed an awareness of civic rights during my university years, I have been in pursuit of civilization. My understanding of civilization consists of four prerequisites: 1. There must be fairness and justice; 2. Citizens must be equal before the law; 3. Corruption must be effectively curbed; and 4. There must be individual freedom. To achieve this, judging from thousands of years of human governance experience, only constitutionalism can provide the framework. Since graduating from university, I have consistently strived to adhere to this dream of constitutionalism.

I was born in Sanya, Hainan, in 1959. After graduating from high school at the age of fifteen, I was sent to the countryside to perform agricultural labor on a farm. In 1976, I had the privilege of participating in the Socialist Basic Line Education Movement. During that time, one particular incident moved me deeply. A peasant classified as a “rightist” in the production team I was in charge of, along with his entire family of seven, suffered from food poisoning one evening. Because of the urgency of the situation, I decided to contact the fleet of the local state-owned farm to dispatch a Jiefang truck to rush the rightist’s family to the commune health center for treatment without first reporting to the work team leader. The “worthless lives” of the entire family were saved.

This should have been a good deed worthy of praise. To my surprise, however, the work team leader severely criticized me at a meeting of all team members. At the time, the leader’s perception was that there was a problem with my class-conscious standpoint. After being criticized, I felt that this was a form of compassion that any human being should possess and should not be condemned. Of course, this feeling was at odds with the pervasive atmosphere of class struggle at the time.

I graduated from the Department of Chinese Language and Literature at South China Normal University in 1982. During my college years, influenced by Wei Jingsheng’s article “The Fifth Modernization” in the journal Exploration, I began to ponder political issues. At the same time, I read extensively from what were then considered “forbidden books.” The top floor of the library where I studied was the designated storage area for these banned titles. Borrowing them required a certificate from the course instructor and the signature of the department head. I entered and exited that floor many times, reading the Holy Bible and Sun Yat-sen’s Three Principles of the People. I still remember that on the cover of the Three Principles of the People, there was an inscription by Chiang Kai-shek promoting the doctrine.

Reading Wei Jingsheng’s articles and the school’s forbidden books brought about a major transformation in my thinking. I came to believe that violence, revolution, and dictatorship were not the kind of life civilized people should live; instead, what should be advocated were citizenship, elections, opposition parties, the separation of powers, judicial independence, individual freedom, and nonviolence. With this shift in my mindset, my horizons suddenly broadened. Being young and full of vigor, I frequently debated with my classmates and professors during my university years, giving everyone the impression that I was deeply influenced by “bourgeois liberalization.” In fact, my graduation appraisal explicitly stated that this student possessed bourgeois liberal thoughts. Back then, I not only enjoyed debating but also loved seeking out like-minded students to organize societies, such as the Aurora Society (Zhendan Xueshe). We would meet for exchanges every one or two months, striving to change society.

After graduating from university, I was assigned to teach at Tongshi Teachers’ College in Hainan. During my teaching tenure, I organized the South China Normal University Tongshi Fellowship while simultaneously maintaining contact with dissidents across the country in an attempt to form a national political organization. At that time, I wrote over a dozen articles, including titles such as The Dissident Manifesto and The Direction of Reform. During the winter vacation of 1982, I traveled to Guangzhou, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Chongqing, Guiyang, and other places to network with friends, preparing to establish a political opposition party. At the end of 1982, I was arrested on my way back to Hainan. In the first half of 1983, I was sentenced to 14 years in prison for counter-revolutionary crimes (specifically, the crime of organizing a counter-revolutionary group and the crime of counter-revolutionary incitement, with the combined punishment for multiple offenses plus restrictions). The prison where I was initially incarcerated was the machine factory of Guangdong Pingshi Prison (externally known as the Luojiadu Coal Mine), where my job was operating a machine tool. After 1990, we were centralized at Guangdong Huaiji Prison. In Huaiji Prison, I was held in solitary confinement. At the time, the four of us—Wang Xizhe, Liu Qingshan, He Qiu, and myself—had been transferred there from different prisons to be centralized. Each of us had an individual space that included areas for sleeping, bathing, and physical activity. To converse with them, I had to climb up to the window. Back then, they identified themselves as Marxists; Wang Xizhe was a Maoist theorist, and Liu Qingshan was the propaganda director of the Hong Kong branch of the Trotskyist International. I was the only advocate for democracy and the rule of law, which led to mutual debates and even fierce arguments between us. Among the prison guards, except for one political instructor and one officer, most were older individuals who harbored a particular hatred toward advocates of democracy and freedom. On several occasions when I sought medical attention, they frequently tampered with the medication prescribed by the doctors; for instance, if the doctor prescribed three types of medicine, they would only deliver two. During one medical visit, taking advantage of their lack of attention, I asked the doctor to prescribe three types of medicine. The doctor nodded, but only two types were eventually delivered to me. Although these were all minor illnesses and going without the medication would not be fatal, this incident clearly demonstrated how deeply they detested proponents of democracy and freedom, revealing the profound ugliness in their hearts. One of them was even a fellow Hainan local. Once, when he brought my meals and medication, I felt something was wrong, so I threw my rice bowl at him, but he dodged it. Because of the solitary confinement, I had very few opportunities to speak. The other three individuals were all ultra-leftists with completely different values, making conversations draining. I worried that serving such a long sentence would leave me unable to speak properly upon release. Therefore, I began reading articles aloud from the materials I had available, doing so very loudly. A guard on duty rushed in furiously and demanded, “Are you preparing to go out onto the streets to incite people again after you get out?” I immediately shot back, “Am I not allowed to read The Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping?” I flipped the book over to show him the title. Seeing that it was indeed The Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, he said nothing more.

Around 1992, after Hainan became a province, my parents made great efforts and managed to have me transferred back to a prison in Hainan. There was no solitary confinement here; instead, I was placed in a squadron to perform labor, which mainly consisted of weaving coconut-fiber brooms. The food was relatively good in the Hainan prison, and since it was close to home, my parents sent me money and food every month. For the most part, there were no major issues, but one minor incident did occur. During a medical visit, the head of the clinic prescribed some medicine for me. I mistakenly believed the prescription was incorrect and casually remarked that a doctor ought to possess medical ethics. Looking back now, I realize I was in the wrong, though I did not see it that way at the time. After I returned to my squadron, the political instructor took me back to the clinic (which was located inside the prison) and demanded that I apologize to the clinic head. I refused, and the squadron instructor slapped me across the face.

I was released in 1996 upon completing my sentence. Since my parents’ household registration (hukou) was in Wenchang City, Hainan, I returned there to settle down. At first, I ran a small business, but later I went to work for a small real estate company, eventually rising to the position of vice general manager. At the same time, I studied diligently, and in 1999, I passed the necessary examinations to become a teacher at a private school. After teaching for a year, I applied for the position of principal at a private school in Qionghai. This was a complete secondary school that also ran a vocational technical school on the side. In 2003, I left Hainan to teach at a private school in Changsha City, Hunan Province. While in Hunan, I became acquainted with Xie Changfa, the chairman of the Hunan branch of the Democracy Party, as well as several other dissidents, and I frequently participated in local political activities. In my impression, Xie Changfa was a leader-type talent who possessed both theoretical knowledge and practical execution capabilities (sadly, he was born in the wrong country at the wrong time, and was later sentenced to 13 years in prison). A year later, I went to Shenzhen Tsinghua Experimental School to take their recruitment exam. Out of nearly two hundred teachers and professors from all over the country who took the test, I passed and was hired as a high school Chinese language teacher.

I worked at Shenzhen Tsinghua Experimental School for six years. While in Shenzhen, I met dissidents such as Zhao Dagong, Lai Jindong, Guo Yongfeng, Ren Ming, Zhang Jinjun, and Li Tie, and frequently joined their activities. In my memory, Ren Ming loved organizing events, while Lai Jindong and Guo Yongfeng were theologians and preachers. I also often traveled with Ren Ming to Guangzhou to attend events, where I met other dissidents including Tang Jingling, the brothers Zhao Weihong and Zhao Weidong, Liu Shihui, Guo Feixiong, and Liu Yuandong. My impression was that these individuals were the elite of the elite—highly capable people and the future leaders of various factions. Due to my frequent activities in Guangzhou and Shenzhen, I was forced out of Shenzhen by the Domestic Security Department (Guobao) in 2012.

During my six years in Shenzhen, in addition to participating in dissident activities, I also wrote diligently. I authored three books and hundreds of articles. To quote the words of the DeepSeek AI regarding this: “According to public information, Mr. Zheng Qiuwu is an active ideological commentator whose public experience primarily revolves around the publication of academic works and current affairs commentary:

Academic Author: He is the author of three monographs: The Social Process, The Paradigm of Twenty-First Century Philosophical Thought, and Asking the Future, “Who” Will Direct the Course.

Article Contributor: He has published hundreds of articles across various domestic media outlets and institutional platforms. For example, he published School Management and Inquiry-Based Teaching in the journal Teaching and Educating; dozens of articles, including The Modern Civilized State: The Pluralism of Politics, Economics, and Culture, on the website “Aisixiang”; Biblical Culture and Chinese Confucianism at the Cultural Center of Shandong University of Political Science and Law; and related articles on the website “Xuanjiangjia.”

Thinker/Current Affairs Commentator: Media outlets have previously described him as a “thinker of China’s new era.”

Commentator on Diverse Topics: The topics of his articles span across the fields of culture, philosophy, and education, such as exploring Chinese Confucianism and biblical culture, discussing the views of Professor Zhang Weiying, and publishing philosophical reflections like What Exactly Is a Human Being?”

After being forced out of Shenzhen by the Domestic Security Department (Guobao) and returning home to recuperate, I went to Beijing to work as an editor (serving as vice editor-in-chief and director of the creative department) at a publishing company. In Beijing, I had the privilege of meeting over a dozen people, including Zha Jianguo, Li Hai, He Depu, and Yang Zili. All of them were individuals of great talent. At that time, the Chinese Communist Party appointed a new leader and tightened its control over dissidents. The Hainan Provincial Domestic Security Department called and ordered me to return to Hainan. When I ignored them, they detained my wife and forced her to sign a deposition. Using that signature, they applied for an arrest warrant and dispatched seven officers to the mainland to apprehend me. I had traveled to Hangzhou to handle some business, and upon their arrival in Hangzhou, they searched for me everywhere. I turned off my mobile phone and, with the help of a friend, hid in a hotel. By June 3, they discovered I was at the hotel, so I left and went to West Lake (not the West Lake in Hangzhou) to evade them. I spent the night in a small pavilion. The next morning, shortly after I turned on my phone, I was surrounded by the seven officers. Having completed the arrest, they flew me back to Hainan to be detained. I was held for a total of six months, with charges ranging from illegal business operations to the sale of toxic and harmful products. Later, I was released on bail pending trial. A year later, when the public security bureau submitted the case files to the Hainan Procuratorate, the procuratorate made the decision not to prosecute.

I have been to Hangzhou three times in total: the first time was at the end of 1982, the second in 2012, and the third in 2013. In Hangzhou, I became acquainted with over a dozen dissidents, including Xu Guang, Wu Yilong, and Lai Jinbiao, all of whom were members of the Democracy Party. In my impression, the Hangzhou Democracy Party was vibrant and brimming with talented individuals. Getting to know the Hangzhou Democrats has been an honor of my life.

Since returning to Hainan, I have been under constant surveillance and unable to leave the island. In Hainan, I have had the privilege of meeting over sixty fellow dissidents, and I frequently participated in local travel and dining gatherings. There is a teacher in Hainan named Wu Kongda, who was sentenced to three and a half years in prison for “inciting subversion of state power” because he wrote “Down with [X]” on a restroom wall and posted comments on Facebook. Teacher Wu possesses clear principles, upright character, and brave fortitude; he is a true asset to Hainan Province. Over these years since being captured and brought back to Hainan, I have also continued to write regularly, with around a hundred of my articles published in Jiazuo (Excellent Works), edited by Xi Wen in Chongqing. Because my mobile phone is monitored, when copies of Xi Wen’s Jiazuo were sent to my address, the Domestic Security Department attempted to conduct a search. One morning this past March, personnel sent by the public security bureau, urban management (chengguan), and the propaganda department arrived at my home demanding a search. Because they lacked a search warrant, I resolutely refused to let them enter. That afternoon, the public security and domestic security officers returned with a search warrant, but it lacked the signature of the bureau chief, so I again refused them entry. This is my right, and I do not wish to see it unlawfully stripped away.

I am now sixty-seven years old, and the ideal of constitutionalism has still not been realized. Ever since my imprisonment, my life has been a succession of setbacks, filled with hardship and adversity—I was simply born in the wrong era. There is not much time left in this life of mine. If, before I go underground, I could witness the implementation of constitutionalism and the arrival of civilization, I would die with no regrets. Life is ultimately just a passing journey, and every single person walks toward death. Looking back on the past now, though it has been unfortunate, I absolutely have no regrets. If there is a next life, I will undoubtedly continue to pursue civilization.

May 8, 2026

Editor: Li Jing

Proofreader: Mao Yiwei

Translator: Ge Bing

旧金山花园角广场举行民主女神像清洗活动 纪念六四三十七周年

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作者:吕小静

旧金山花园角广场举行民主女神像清洗活动 纪念六四三十七周年

抗议中共六四大屠杀的巨大横幅及大合照

【旧金山讯】1989年春夏之交,中国爆发席卷全国的民主运动。数百万学生、市民与知识分子走上街头,呼吁反腐败、新闻自由与政治改革。然而1989年6月4日凌晨,中共当局出动军队与坦克,对北京天安门广场及周边地区展开血腥镇压,造成大量平民伤亡。三十七年过去,“六四”在中国大陆依旧被封锁,但在海外,仍有人坚持纪念历史、守护真相。

民众驻足观看六四历史图片展

2026年5月24日,六四三十七周年前夕,旧金山中国城花园角广场(Portsmouth Square)举行“民主女神像清洗活动暨六四历史图片展”。多位八九民运人士、海外民主活动人士、青年团体成员及社区民众到场参与。活动现场,许多人认真擦洗民主女神像,也有不少民众驻足观看六四历史图片展,在一张张历史照片前沉默阅读、低声交流。

广场上,民主女神像在阳光下格外醒目。现场同时展出大量六四历史图片

与文字资料,从学生绝食、市民游行,到坦克进入长安街的画面,令不少路过民众停下脚步久久凝视。

方政:希望民主女神像终有一天回到中国

中国民主党旧金山党部主席方政,前排中间

八九学运领袖方政在现场发言。1989年六四镇压期间,方政在撤离天安门途中遭坦克碾压失去双腿,成为六四惨案的重要亲历者之一。三十多年来,他始终坚持推动六四纪念与中国民主运动。

方政首先特别感谢此次“清洗民主女神像”活动的长期发起人、前“人道中国”主席葛洵。他表示,自2010年以来,葛洵每年都会提前准备清洗用品与活动物资,让这一纪念活动能够持续至今。

方政表示,旧金山民主女神像不仅是一座雕像,更是一代海外华人共同守护的历史记忆。

“每年六四前,我们来到这里清洗民主女神像,不只是擦去灰尘,更是在提醒大家,不能忘记六四,不能忘记那些为自由付出生命的人。”

他说,这座建立于1994年六四五周年期间的民主女神像,是美国西海岸极具象征意义的民主地标,也承载着无数中国人对自由与民主的希望。

方政表示,希望民主女神像所代表的自由精神,能够继续在海外华人心中传承下去。

“我们最终还是希望,有一天民主女神像能够回到中国,让中国人民能够公开纪念六四,真正拥有民主与自由。”

现场响起长时间掌声。

葛洵:让六四记忆继续被看见

清洗民主女神像活动主要发起人葛洵(左一)

活动发起人葛洵表示,自己1989年时已在美国留学,当年积极参与声援中国学生民主运动,之后长期投入海外六四纪念活动。

他回忆,2010年前后,有人提出在六四前清洗民主女神像,此后大家决定将活动持续下来。十多年来,无论天气如何变化,这项活动始终没有中断。

葛洵表示,希望通过持续纪念,让更多人知道六四历史,也让仍在中国坚持争取自由与人权的人看到希望。

周锋锁:六四是一场永久无法被抹去的历史记忆

中国人权执行主任周锋锁

中国民主运动海外联席会议主席周锋锁则从历史、现实与未来三个层面,回顾了1989年民主运动的意义。

周锋锁是1989年北京学生运动的重要领袖之一,也是天安门广场绝食团成员。六四后,他遭中共通缉,后流亡海外,长期推动中国民主与人权运动。

“六四是一场永久的纪念”

周锋锁表示,六四并不仅仅是一场学生运动,而是一场整个中国社会对于民主与自由的觉醒。

“1989年,北京有上百万人走上街头,全国三百多个城市都有人声援。这是中国人民第一次如此大规模、和平地争取民主自由。”

他说,中共最终却以坦克、机枪与屠杀回应人民的呼声。

“那些人是手无寸铁的普通人。死难者里,有九岁的孩子,也有八十岁的老人。直到今天,外界仍无法知道,那场屠杀究竟死了多少人。”

周锋锁表示,正因为历史被封锁,人们才更需要继续纪念六四。

“六四已经不只是中国的历史,它已经成为全世界反抗专制、追求自由的重要象征。”

“柏林墙倒塌,也受到六四精神影响”

周锋锁回忆,曾有参与推倒柏林墙的人亲口告诉他,1989年北京学生争取民主自由、不怕牺牲的精神,给了东欧人民巨大的鼓舞。

“他们告诉我,北京学生站出来反抗专制,让很多东欧人第一次真正意识到:人民也可以站出来争取自由。”

他说,自由与民主并不是某一个国家独有的价值,而是全世界共同追求的理想。

“无论在中国、东欧,还是世界任何地方,只要有人争取自由,这种精神就会彼此影响、彼此点燃。”

“从被嘲笑到越来越壮大”

周锋锁还回忆,早年海外纪念六四时,参与人数非常少,甚至经常遭到冷嘲热讽。

“二十多年前,我们刚开始在旧金山公开纪念六四时,很多人觉得没有意义,还有人嘲笑我们,说不会再有人记得六四。”

但他表示,即使最困难的时候,仍然有人坚持站出来。

如今,越来越多年轻人开始主动了解六四历史,民运队伍也在不断扩大。

“中共一直希望人们遗忘六四,但实际上,每一年都有新的年轻人开始认识真相。只要还有人愿意了解历史,中国就一定还有希望。”

华语青年挺藏会会长段荆棘到场声援

华语青年挺藏会会长段荆棘(右一)、年轻艺术爱好者Ruty手绘坦克图像(中)、中国民主党组织部部长周云龙(中)

华语青年挺藏会会长段荆棘(右一)、年轻艺术爱好者Ruty手绘坦克图像(中)、中国民主党组织部部长周云龙(中)

活动当天,华语青年挺藏会会长段荆棘也到场参与,并分享长期推动汉藏交流与人权倡议的理念。

她表示,中共长期利用恐惧与分化制造不同群体之间的隔阂,而真正的敌人并不是彼此,而是制造压迫与恐惧的极权制度。

段荆棘展示了一面仿制旗帜。她表示,原型来自1989年一位藏族学生在天安门民主运动期间所持旗帜,希望借此提醒世人:1989年的民主抗争,并不仅仅发生在北京。

她说,希望自己能够成为汉人与藏人之间的桥梁,让更多华人了解西藏历史与现实处境。

“如果说真话的人越来越少,人们就会完全活在谎言里,这是非常可怕的事情。”

为良心犯徐光募捐:让坚持自由的人感受到温暖

活动现场还举行了“一人一美金”募捐活动,专门为中国国内因争取民主自由而遭受迫害的良心犯及家属筹集援助资金。

此次募捐重点声援刚刚出狱的民主人士徐光。

徐光是1989年杭州学生运动的重要参与者,也是中国民主党早期成员之一。多年来,他持续公开纪念六四并推动民主理念,因此多次遭到中共打压。2022年,徐光再次因纪念六四及发表言论被捕,后被判刑四年。

在狱中,徐光长期绝食抗议,以表达对政治迫害的不满。近期出狱后,他公开表示:

“为了纪念六四,无怨无悔。”

这句话也令现场许多人深受触动。

方政在现场表示,当天活动所售出的文化衫收入,将全部捐赠给徐光,希望让所有为中国争取自由的人士感受到海外华人的温暖与关心。

“我们不能只享受自由,却忘记那些仍在黑暗中坚持的人。”

组织者表示,本次募款将通过“在野党”账户转交至徐光本人手中,希望能够为其提供实际帮助,也让更多良心犯感受到外界仍在关注他们。

活动最后,现场民众共同高喊“勿忘六四”“自由中国”“结束专制”等口号。

阳光下,民主女神像静静矗立。而围绕雕像的人群,也让人再次看到:即使三十七年过去,仍有人坚持守护历史、守护真相,也守护着中国未来走向自由的希望。

编辑:张娜

校对:冯仍

翻译:戈冰

San Francisco’s Garden Corner Plaza held a statue of democracy cleaning event to commemorate the 37th anniversary of June 4th

Author: Lyu Xiaojing

旧金山花园角广场举行民主女神像清洗活动 纪念六四三十七周年

Huge banner and photo protesting the June 4th Massacre by the Chinese Communist Party

【San Francisco News】 At the turn of spring and summer in 1989, a democratic movement swept across China. Millions of students, citizens and intellectuals took to the streets to call for anti-corruption, press freedom and political reform. However, in the early morning of June 4, 1989, the Chinese Communist Party authorities dispatched troops and tanks to launch a bloody crackdown on Tiananmen Square and surrounding areas in Beijing, causing heavy civilian casualties. Thirty-seven years have passed, and “June 4th” is still blocked in mainland China, but overseas, some people still insist on commemorating history and protecting the truth.

In the square, the Statue of Democracy stands out in the sunlight. A large number of June 4th historical pictures were exhibited at the scene

With written materials, from the students’ hunger strike, the citizens’ march, to the scene of tanks entering Chang’an Avenue, many passers-by stopped and stared for a long time.

Fang Zheng: I hope the Statue of Democracy will return to China one day

Fang Zheng, Chairman of the San Francisco branch of the China Democratic Party, front row, center

Fang Zheng, leader of the 1989 student movement, spoke on the spot. During the June 4th crackdown in 1989, Fang Zheng lost both legs when he was run over by a tank while evacuating Tiananmen Square, becoming one of the important eyewitnesses of the June 4th Massacre. For more than three decades, he has consistently promoted the June 4th commemoration and the Chinese democracy movement.

Fang Zheng first of all particularly thanked Ge Xun, the long-term initiator of this “cleansing of the Statue of Democracy” event and former chairman of “Humanitarian China”. He said that since 2010, Ge Xun has prepared cleaning supplies and event supplies in advance every year, so that this commemorative activity can continue to this day.

Fang Zheng said that the Statue of Democracy in San Francisco is not only a statue, but also a historical memory that is jointly protected by a generation of overseas Chinese.

“Every year before June 4th, we come here to clean the Statue of Democracy. It not only wipes away the dust, but also reminds everyone not to forget June 4th and those who gave their lives for freedom. ”

He said that the Statue of Democracy, which was built during the June 4th and 5th anniversaries in 1994, is a highly symbolic democratic landmark on the west coast of the United States and also carries the hopes of countless Chinese people for freedom and democracy.

Fang Zheng expressed the hope that the spirit of freedom represented by the Statue of Democracy can continue to be passed on in the hearts of overseas Chinese.

“Ultimately, we hope that one day the Statue of Democracy will return to China, allowing the Chinese people to publicly commemorate June 4th and truly possess democracy and freedom. ”

There was long applause from the audience.

Ge Xun: Let the memory of June 4th continue to be seen.

Ge Xun (first from left), the main initiator of the campaign to cleanse the Statue of Democracy

The initiator of the event, Ge Xun, said that he had studied in the United States in 1989 and actively participated in the movement to support Chinese student democracy that year. After that, he devoted a long time to overseas June 4th commemoration activities.

He recalled that around 2010, someone proposed to clean the Statue of Democracy before June 4th, and everyone decided to continue the activity. For more than a decade, this activity has remained uninterrupted, regardless of weather changes.

Ge Xun expressed the hope that through continued commemoration, more people will know the history of June 4th, and that those who are still fighting for freedom and human rights in China will see hope.

Zhou Fengsuo: June 4th is a historical memory that cannot be erased forever

Zhou Fengsuo, Executive Director of Human Rights of China

Zhou Fengsuo, Chairman of the Overseas Joint Conference of the Chinese Democratic Movement, reviewed the significance of the 1989 democratic movement from the perspectives of history, reality and the future.

Zhou Fengsuo was one of the important leaders of the 1989 Beijing student movement and a member of the Tiananmen Square hunger strike. After June 4, he was wanted by the Chinese Communist Party and later went into exile overseas, where he has long promoted China’s democracy and human rights movement.

“June 4th is a permanent commemoration ”

Zhou Fengsuo said that June 4th was not just a student movement, but an awakening of democracy and freedom in the entire Chinese society.

“In 1989, millions of people took to the streets in Beijing, and people in more than 300 cities across the country showed their support. This is the first time that the Chinese people have fought for democracy and freedom on such a large scale and peacefully.”

He said the CCP ultimately responded to the people’s calls with tanks, machine guns and massacres.

“Those people are ordinary, unarmed people. Among the dead were nine-year-olds and eighty-year-olds. To this day, the outside world still cannot know how many people died in that massacre.”

Zhou Fengsuo said that it is precisely because history is blocked that people need to continue commemorating June 4th.

“June 4th is no longer just China’s history; it has become an important symbol of the world’s resistance to authoritarianism and pursuit of freedom. ”

“The fall of the Berlin Wall was also influenced by the June 4th spirit”

Zhou Fengsuo recalled that someone who participated in the demolition of the Berlin Wall told him in person that the spirit of Beijing students fighting for democracy and freedom and not being afraid of sacrifice in 1989 gave great encouragement to the people of Eastern Europe.

“They told me that the fact that Beijing students stood up to authoritarianism made many Eastern Europeans truly realize for the first time that people can stand up for freedom, too. ”

He said that freedom and democracy are not values unique to any one country, but ideals pursued by the whole world.

“Whether in China, Eastern Europe, or anywhere else in the world, as long as there are people fighting for freedom, this spirit will influence and ignite each other. ”

“From being ridiculed to growing stronger”

Zhou Fengsuo also recalled that when commemorating June 4th overseas in the early years, the number of participants was very small and he was often even ridiculed.

“When we first began publicly commemorating June 4th in San Francisco over 20 years ago, many people felt it was meaningless, and some laughed at us, saying no one would remember it anymore. ”

But he said even in the most difficult times, some people still insist on coming forward.

Today, more and more young people are beginning to take the initiative to understand the history of June 4th, and the democratic movement team is also expanding.

“The CCP has always hoped that people would forget June 4th, but in fact, every year new young people begin to understand the truth. As long as there are people willing to understand history, there will definitely be hope for China.”

Duan Jingji, president of the Chinese Youth Support Association for Tibet, attended the event to show his support

Duan Jingji (first from right), president of the Chinese Youth Support for Tibet Association; Ruty, a young art enthusiast, hand-paints a tank image (center); and Zhou Yunlong, head of the Organization Department of the China Democratic Party (center)

On the day of the event, Duan Jingji, president of the Chinese Youth Support for Tibet Association, also attended the event and shared his ideas on promoting long-term Sino-Tibetan exchanges and human rights initiatives.

She said that the CCP has long used fear and differentiation to create barriers between different groups, and the real enemies are not each other, but a totalitarian system that creates oppression and fear.

Duan Thorns displayed a replica flag. She said that the prototype came from the flag held by a Tibetan student during the Tiananmen democracy movement in 1989, hoping to remind the world that the 1989 democratic struggle did not just happen in Beijing.

She said she hopes to become a bridge between Han Chinese and Tibetans, allowing more Chinese people to understand Tibet’s history and current situation.

“If fewer and fewer people tell the truth, people will completely live a lie, which is very scary. ”

Fundraising for prisoner of conscience Xu Guang: Let those who insist on freedom feel the warmth

A “one person, one US dollar” fundraising event was also held at the event to raise funds for assistance to prisoners of conscience and their families who are persecuted for their struggle for democratic freedoms in China.

The fundraising focused on supporting Xu Guang, a democrat who had just been released from prison.

Xu Guang was an important participant in the 1989 Hangzhou student movement and an early member of the China Democratic Party. Over the years, he continued to publicly commemorate June 4th and promote democratic ideas, and was therefore suppressed by the Chinese Communist Party many times. In 2022, Xu Guang was arrested again for commemorating June 4th and making remarks, and was later sentenced to four years in prison.

While in prison, Xu Guang went on a long hunger strike to express his dissatisfaction with the political persecution. After being released from prison recently, he publicly stated:

“To commemorate June 4th, no regrets. ”

This sentence also deeply touched many people on the scene.

Fang Zheng said at the scene that all the proceeds from the cultural shirts sold at the event that day will be donated to Xu Guang, hoping that all those who fight for freedom for China will feel the warmth and care of overseas Chinese.

“We cannot enjoy freedom and forget those who still cling in the darkness. ”

Organizers said that the fundraising funds will be transferred to Xu Guang himself through the “opposition party” account, hoping to provide him with practical help and let more prisoners of conscience feel that the outside world is still paying attention to them.

At the end of the event, the people on the scene jointly shouted slogans such as “Never forget June 4th ”“Free China ”“End Autocracy”.

The Statue of Democracy stands quietly in the sunshine. The crowd surrounding the statue also made people see again: even after 37 years, there are still people who insist on protecting history, protecting the truth, and protecting China’s hope for future freedom.

Editor: Zhang Na

Proofreader: Feng Ren

Translation: Ge Bing