作者：王小光   

编辑：Geoffrey 校对：熊辩 翻译：周敏

北风过城墙，

灰瓦不语，灯影如旧。

七个人的名字

在纸上被反复按压，

像钉子，

敲进一段不肯低头的历史。

他们不是风暴，

却执意迎向风暴——

以中国民主党的名义，

用微弱却坚定的声音，

说出“民主”，说出“自由”，

说出一个尚未被允许的未来。

在拥挤的街口，

在昏黄的台灯下，

他们交换的不是秘密，

而是信念——

相信人可以不再沉默，

相信光不必被遮蔽。

夜却来得太快。

脚步声整齐，

门被敲响三次，

世界便换了方向。

档案替他们作证，

沉默替他们辩护，

而远方无人知晓——

连回声都被收走。

有人问：

自由为何如此沉重？

他们回答：

因为它属于每一个人。

于是铁门合拢，

时间开始变慢，

七个影子被分开，

却在黑暗中

悄悄重叠。

北城依旧喧哗，

车流如水，霓虹如潮。

只有风记得——

那一夜，有人为了明天

被带走，

天还没有亮，路依旧很长！

Silence in the Northern City

Author: Wang Xiaoguang

Editor: Geoffrey Proofreader: Xiong Bian Translator: Zhou Min

The north wind sweeps over the city walls,

Grey tiles remain silent, lamp shadows as they were.

Seven names

Pressed repeatedly onto paper,

Like nails,

Hammered into a history that refuses to bow.

They were not the storm,

Yet they chose to face it—

In the name of the China Democracy Party,

With voices faint yet firm,

Speaking “Democracy,” speaking “Freedom,”

Speaking of a future not yet allowed.

At crowded intersections,

Under the dim glow of desk lamps,

What they exchanged were not secrets,

But convictions—

The belief that humans need no longer be silent,

The belief that light need not be obscured.

But the night came too soon.

The footsteps were rhythmic,

The door was knocked thrice,

And the world changed its course.

Archives testify for them,

Silence defends them,

While in the distance, no one knows—

Even the echoes have been confiscated.

Someone asks:

Why is freedom so heavy?

They answer:

Because it belongs to everyone.

So the iron gates swing shut,

Time begins to slow,

Seven shadows are pulled apart,

Yet in the darkness,

They quietly overlap.

The northern city remains clamorous,

Traffic flows like water, neon glows like a tide.

Only the wind remembers—

That night, for the sake of tomorrow,

Someone was taken away;

The dawn has not yet broken, and the road is still long.

《全球覺醒》第六十九期

自由之鐘 時刻敲響 全球覺醒 民主聯盟 消滅獨裁 推翻暴政

活動主題：抗議中共非法審判歸國的親民主留學生

2026年4月，一名在澳洲雪梨大學就讀的中國留學生，在回國探親期間遭到秘密逮捕。近日，中共法院竟以「分裂國家罪」對其重判有期徒刑六年。這不僅是對一個年輕生命的殘酷摧殘，更是對每一位身在海外、嚮往自由的異見人士脊樑上刺下的一根毒針。它告訴我們：即便相隔萬裡，中共極權的陰影也從未離開。

該同學被定罪的所謂“罪證”，僅僅是因為他在悉尼求學期間，行使了生而為人的良知。他曾出現在聲援新疆維吾爾同胞的集會現場，為那些失去自由、遭受折磨的人吶喊；他曾加入西藏人權抗議，呼籲保護那片土地逐漸枯萎的文化與信仰。他以為在澳洲的陽光下發聲是安全的，卻不曾料到，自己的一言一行早已被記錄在案。他原本光明的未來，踏入國門的那一刻，變成了長達六年的鐵窗寒夢。

自2025年初失聯以來，該同學已在黑暗中被囚禁超過一年。家屬收不到判決書，律師進不去看守所，所有的正義都在「國家安全」的幌子下被絞殺。這根本不是法律的審判，而是勇氣的定罪；這根本不是法庭，而是用來恐嚇所有異議人士的秘密刑場！它在警告每一個人：中共的眼睛始終盯著你，即使在自由的土地上，你也不被允許擁有獨立的靈魂。

即便高牆厚土可以遮住他的身影，但公義的怒火不會熄滅。中共可以帶走一個學生，但帶不走天底下的良知！

我們的口號：

釋放留學生，言論自由無罪

聲援新疆，停止屠殺！

停止種族滅絕，關閉新疆集中營！

聲援西藏，停止滅絕！

真相無罪！良知無罪

時間：2026年4月26日（星期日）3:30PM (下午)

地點：中共駐洛杉磯總領館

地址：443 Shatto Pl, Los Angeles, CA 90020

活動召集人：廖军/劉廣賢

活動規劃： 孫曄/易勇

活動主持：张维清

組織者：

胡月明4806536918/史洪亮 9099263777

陳健 6266178615/ 王小光 6268190900

于越 6266498381/孔德翠6265588877

活動義工：于海龍 /朱明昌/楊郭軍 /穆偉 /黃思博/張健

攝影：Ji Luo /劉樂園

主辦單位：

中國民主黨聯合總部美西黨部

中國民主黨聯合總部美南黨部

自由鐘民主基金會

攝影記者：關永傑

編輯：鍾然 校对：孔祥庆 翻译：周敏

2026年4月18日（週六），中國民主黨舊金山黨部在灣區聖荷西舉行了首屆換屆選舉。大灣區黨員齊聚一堂，同時也吸引了灣區各界黨外人士，以及從洛杉磯遠道而來的中國民主黨洛杉磯黨部代表前來觀摩學習。選舉大會全程5小時，經過競選發言、投票、計票三個環節，共選出24個黨部幹部職位，以及10個支部共20個正副支部主任職位，合計44個職位。

中國民主黨舊金山黨部已成立多年，但為何在2026年才舉行首屆選舉？舊金山黨部主席方政在選舉前就記者的提問作出了回應：舊金山黨部雖成立於2010年，但長期規模有限，黨員人數一直維持在三、四十人的動態平衡。自2020年起，中國國內形勢發生劇烈變化，共產黨在習近平的領導下倒行逆施，使得民眾追求自由、用腳投票的人數明顯增加，海外民運生態也隨之發生重大變化，大批逃離專制、追求自由的人士加入中國民主黨，使舊金山黨部黨員人數在2025年4月激增至60余人。在2025年4月20日的“整合大會”上，考慮到多數黨員為新近加入，彼此缺乏深入瞭解，尚不具備成熟的選舉條件，因此首屆領導層採取“任命制”，由主席、執行長及資深黨員（秘書長）任命骨幹，旨在快速規範組織框架。

經過一年的蓬勃發展，黨員人數現已再次翻倍至120余人。通過一年的運作與磨合，成員間已建立起基本的信任與熟悉度。2026年改推競選制，是為了給踴躍參與的黨員提供展現才能、代表民意的機會。這不僅有利於黨部建設、選拔優秀人才，也成為全體黨員實踐民主、學習民主規則的重要過程。

選舉大會主持人、現任舊金山黨部秘書長鄭雲向記者表示，此次選舉的候選人採用推薦與自薦相結合的形式，其中自薦候選人須獲得至少兩人聯名推薦，通過競選演講與黨員投票，以差額選舉方式產生最終人選，作為黨部實踐民主程序的重要一步。

候選人有序上台進行競選演講。各候選人準備充分、熱情高漲，在台上陳述理念、作出承諾，努力爭取更多黨員支持，整個競選發言過程持續約兩小時。

中國民主黨全委會執委耿冠軍攜觀摩學習團隊專程自洛杉磯趕赴灣區。他表示：“一年前，我與王主席共同參加了舊金山黨部的成立大會和授旗儀式。一年後的今天再次回到這裡，看到舊金山黨部正熱火朝天地開展選舉工作，我感觸頗深。這次主要是抱著參觀、觀摩和學習的心態而來。目睹現場氛圍，我對舊金山團隊展現出的凝聚力感到由衷欣慰，也十分羨慕。相比之下，我們洛杉磯黨部目前確實存在一些問題，在團隊建設和實幹精神上，需要向舊金山方面學習。”

此外，耿冠軍還就黨內現狀作出回應。他表示，目前有黨外人士對王軍濤主席多年擔任主席一職提出意見。為了推動組織民主化發展，希望聯合三個以上黨部共同提出動議，推動黨主席改選。在接下來的改選計劃中，希望方政能夠成為下一任黨主席，帶領大家繼續前進。

同時，耿冠軍攜袁崛向與會人士推廣“中國議會”項目並進行選民動員。他介紹：“當前的民主舞台不能總是民主黨一家‘唱獨角戲’。為了打破這種局面、團結更多組織，我們推出了‘中國議會’項目。希望各界朋友多多支持，並現場註冊成為選民。在支部建設中，我們不僅需要腳踏實地做實事的同志，也需要表達能力強的人才，通過積極參與，讓有能力的同志競選成為議員，確保中國民主黨在中國議會中保持優勢地位。”

中國民主黨全委會執委陳闖創則通過連線表示，中國民主運動長期存在“因人設事”的問題，即圍繞個人而非制度來組織發展，這不利於整體壯大。在與極權對抗過程中，關鍵在於提升自身實力、吸引更多參與者，並結合國際形勢推進抗爭，而不是簡單迎合外界或倉促提出不成熟方案。

關於組織制度，他認為不必因外界壓力頻繁修改憲章，例如選委會主席任期問題，在許多民主國家中也並非嚴格受限，應根據現實情況靈活處理。他強調，在流亡環境下，組織運作可以保持一定彈性，例如會議時間和任期安排可根據實際情況調整，只要程序上可行即可推進。同時，各地組織分散並非壞事，反而體現活力，但需要共同承擔責任，特別是持續關注並支持中國國內付出巨大犧牲的民主人士。

據大會提供的數據，此次換屆選舉共有53人次登記參選，按不重復姓名統計為45位候選人。投票環節結束後，由黨外人士組成的義工團隊負責唱票、計票與監督。

新一屆黨部由方政擔任主席，胡丕政、張俊傑出任副主席，鄭雲任秘書長；組織架構方面，今年新增女權部與網絡技術部，支部則增設苗必達、奧克蘭、紐瓦克、聖利安珠及特別支部等5個支部。

中國民主黨舊金山黨部主席方政，副主席胡丕政、張俊傑

秘書長鄭雲，副秘書張小駒、任夢醒

組織部部長周雲龍，副部長李樹青

宣傳部部長繆青，副部長何宜城、呂小靜

活動部部長郭志軍，副部長李小林

對外聯絡部部長崔允星，副部長汪峰

女權部部長羅艷麗，副部長高俊影

青年發展部部長耿陸弢，副部長張鵬展

生活互助部部長李凱，副部長張繼順

網絡技術部部長韋旭光，副部長陳森鋒、莊帆

舊金山支部主任郭鑒鑫，副主任郝劍平

菲利蒙支部主任劉靜濤，副主任呂小靜

苗必達支部主任範國林，副主任任夢醒

聖荷西支部主任羅鳳文，副主任邢貴

海沃支部主任董新展，副主任牛建飛

奧克蘭支部主任高志彬，副主任姚榮濤

紐瓦克支部主任張善城，副主任王戰士

聖利安珠支部主任盧佔強，副主任吳志創

沙加緬度支部主任衛仁喜，副主任張小駒

特別支部主任李賢兵，副主任林嘉傑

大會在尾聲階段，四名新黨員在執委耿冠軍的帶領下，進行了莊嚴的入黨宣誓儀式。

新黨員（左二起）：唐偉逢、袁強、丁海峰、謝志城

選舉大會全部議程順利完成後，主持人與黨主席王軍濤進行連線。王軍濤表示，對舊金山黨部此次民主選舉大會的順利舉行感到鼓舞，並闡述了中國民主黨的發展思路，明確了黨的戰略核心：即通過突破常規手段，將中共暴政集團擠壓出權力中心，建立以民主憲政為目標的政治格局。他強調，民主革命本質上是一種全球化現象，單純依靠本土力量易陷入舊體制的循環，而歷史上的成功轉型往往源於海外先進規則、資本與本土政治權力的深度結合。

因此，海外民主黨人必須具備引領大局的“大氣”，將海外基地打造為政治實驗室。在自由的政治土壤中，率先進行組織體制改革和廣泛的政治表達嘗試，以此積累中國本土所缺失的憲政治理經驗。王軍濤主張，海外力量應與中國當前的經濟社會發展直接結合，通過在海外模擬和推進先進的政治嘗試，為未來中國在關鍵時期的制度對接做好人才與思想儲備，從而在轉型時刻真正代表並實現國家的民主權利。

新任黨主席方政在會後向記者透露，這次選舉在具體操作上確實存在一些不足，比如受場地、時間以及參與人數較多等客觀條件限制，整體過程在個別環節上顯得略為倉促。但無可否認，此次活動的過程本身十分重要，無論最終效果如何，都為今後類似實踐提供了經驗參考。

新任副主席張俊傑則表示，對於許多華人來說，這是一次難得的民主實踐機會。由於多數人並非美國公民，對總統選舉等制度性民主形式的參與感較弱，而這種社團內部的選舉，更容易讓人產生切身的體驗和參與感。因此，通過親身參與競選、演講、投票等環節，有助於加深對民主運作的理解。

此外，兩位受訪者一致表示，希望通過此次選舉活動，讓更多人對中國民主黨有更直觀、真實的認識，逐步消除過去的誤解與疑慮，吸引更多有志之士參與進來，共同投入到推動中國走向民主憲政的進程之中。

San Francisco Chapter of the China Democracy Party Holds Inaugural Leadership Election to Practice Democratic Mechanisms

Photojournalist: Guan Yongjie

Editor: Zhong Ran Proofreader: Kong Xiangqing Translator: Zhou Min

Summary: The San Francisco Chapter of the China Democracy Party (CDP) held its first leadership election in the Bay Area, producing a new executive team through competitive campaigning and voting. The event attracted participants from various circles, showcasing the organization’s growth and emphasizing the use of institutionalized elections to promote democratic practice and talent cultivation.

On Saturday, April 18, 2026, the San Francisco Chapter of the CDP held its inaugural leadership election in San Jose. Party members from across the Bay Area gathered for the event, which also drew non-party observers from local communities and representatives from the Los Angeles Chapter who traveled north to observe and learn. The five-hour assembly included campaign speeches, voting, and ballot counting, resulting in the election of 44 officials: 24 chapter executive positions and 20 chairpersons/vice-chairpersons for 10 local branches.

Although the San Francisco Chapter was established in 2010, it remained small for many years, maintaining a steady membership of about 30 to 40 people. Fang Zheng, Chairman of the San Francisco Chapter, explained that the landscape shifted dramatically in 2020. As the CCP under Xi Jinping’s leadership regressed, an increasing number of people “voted with their feet” to seek freedom abroad. This influx led to a membership surge, reaching over 60 by April 2025.

During an “Integration Meeting” in April 2025, leadership was initially appointed to quickly establish an organizational framework, as many new members did not yet know each other well enough for a mature election. A year later, membership has doubled again to over 120. With established trust and rapport, the chapter transitioned to a competitive election system in 2026 to allow members to represent the will of the rank-and-file and practice democratic rules.

Zheng Yun, Secretary-General of the San Francisco Chapter and moderator of the event, noted that candidates were selected through a mix of recommendations and self-nominations (the latter requiring at least two co-sponsors). The “multi-candidate election” (where there are more candidates than seats) served as a vital step in practicing democratic procedures. Candidates spent two hours delivering speeches, outlining their visions, and making pledges to win support.

Geng Guanjun, an executive member of the CDP National Committee, led a delegation from Los Angeles to observe. “Seeing the cohesion and enthusiasm here in the San Francisco team makes me feel heartened and, frankly, envious,” Geng remarked, noting that the Los Angeles chapter could learn from their organizational spirit. Geng also proposed a motion for a future national chairperson election, suggesting that Fang Zheng lead the party forward.

Additionally, Geng and Yuan Jue promoted the “China Parliament” project, urging attendees to register as voters. He emphasized that the democratic stage should not be a “one-man show” for the CDP alone, but a collaborative effort to unite various organizations.

Chen Chuangchuang, another executive member of the National Committee, joined via video link. He pointed out that the Chinese democracy movement has long suffered from being organized around “personalities rather than institutions.” He argued that the key to resisting totalitarianism lies in institutional strength and international cooperation, rather than merely catering to external pressures to change party charters. He emphasized that while exile organizations require flexibility, they must remain committed to supporting those making sacrifices within China.

According to data provided by the assembly, 45 candidates ran for various positions. A volunteer team of non-party individuals handled the counting and supervision of ballots.

The newly elected leadership includes:

Chairman: Fang Zheng

Vice Chairmen: Hu Pizheng, Zhang Junjie

Secretary-General: Zheng Yun

New Departments: A Women’s Rights Department and a Network Technology Department were added this year.

New Branches: Five new branches were established in Milpitas, Oakland, Newark, San Leandro, and a Special Branch.

The ceremony concluded with four new members—Tang Weifeng, Yuan Qiang, Ding Haifeng, and Xie Zhicheng—taking their induction oaths.

In a closing video call, CDP National Chairman Wang Juntao praised the San Francisco Chapter. He articulated a strategy to push the CCP out of power and establish a constitutional democracy. He described overseas bases as “political laboratories” where members can gain experience in constitutional governance and organizational reform that is currently impossible within China.

New Vice Chairman Zhang Junjie noted that for many participants who are not yet U.S. citizens, this was a rare and tangible opportunity to participate in a democratic system. Chairman Fang Zheng acknowledged that while some parts of the five-hour process were rushed due to logistics, the experience itself provides an invaluable reference for future democratic practice.

Both expressed hope that this transparency would dispel old misunderstandings and attract more people to the cause of a democratic China.

新疆对维吾尔族的镇压已经演变，而非结束

一份罕见的内部证词揭露了中共政权如何掩盖新疆地区的国家暴力行为

作者：Adrian Zenz     

编辑：黄吉洲 校对：孔祥庆 翻译：周敏

根据一位来自中国警察系统内部的前成员的第一手证词揭露，北京并未拆除其在新疆的压制体系，而是对其进行了“调整”。强制性政策仍主导着日常生活，但其运作方式更加隐蔽、更加分散，也因此更难被外界察觉。

这一“调整”体系的设计者是马兴瑞，他于2021年12月接替以强硬政策著称的陈全国，出任新疆党委书记。在陈全国时期，国家依赖高度可见的运动式治理，将大量维吾尔人及其他少数民族族群送入法外拘禁营地。当时的行动由自上而下的拘押指标推动，也为当前短期拘留目标提供了行政先例。

当曾任广东省省长、被视为技术官僚的马兴瑞上任时，外界一度猜测他可能会推动新疆从高度安全化治理转向以经济发展为导向。

多位目击者回忆称，马兴瑞初到新疆时确实带来了一定程度的谨慎乐观。他取消了一些最显眼的警务措施，并暂时放松了部分社会管控。但事实上，他的治理只是将压制从“高可见度”转向“高度隐蔽”。

这些隐蔽压制的具体运作方式，来自张亚博的证词。张是一名汉族公民，2006年进入新疆工作。经过教师生涯后，他于2014年加入警察系统，被派往维吾尔族聚居的和田地区。

在2014年至2016年间，张作为拘留中心的看守，目睹了对维吾尔被拘人员的日常殴打与酷刑，包括将人悬吊于天花板长达24小时。他还目睹一名同事在审讯过程中强奸女性被拘者，并见证有人因虐待而死亡。2017年，在一次为期两周的拘留中心工作中，他看到严重的拥挤状况、“极其恶劣”的环境，以及“频繁发生”的死亡事件。

2016年底至2023年间，张在基层担任村级警察。他负责将“再教育营”释放的维吾尔人转送至拘留所，其中许多人随后被判处长期监禁。张估计，在他所辖区域，至少一半以上被释放人员最终进入监狱。

官方数据也印证了这一大规模“监禁转移”的趋势：2017年至2021年间，有超过50万人被判刑入狱。张还负责监督国家主导的劳动力转移，包括组织维吾尔人群体在警方看守下采摘棉花。

张的证词还显示，实际的拘禁规模可能甚至超过地方领导层的内部估计。2019年，他在和田县再教育总部工作时发现，地方官员经常向上级隐瞒真实拘押人数。在多重政策压力下，基层既执行大规模拘押，又为避免被指责“治理不力”而刻意隐瞒数据。

张估计，在他所在的村庄，大约25%的成年人口曾被送入再教育营（不包括另行送入监狱者）。为掩盖这一行动，2020年初，当局下令销毁所有与再教育营相关的档案。

2023年底，张辞去警职并逃离中国。此后，中国当局指控他“危害国家安全”，冻结其银行账户，并威胁其在国内的家人。

张参与执行的2023年和田地区拘押行动，也与更广泛的区域趋势相吻合。他获取的证词显示，在乌鲁木齐等地，在清零政策结束后，也出现了一波针对年轻维吾尔人的任意拘留潮，特别是在反封控抗议之后。

新疆新一轮压制与中国领导人习近平的政策表述变化相一致。2020年中央新疆工作座谈会上，习近平曾强调新疆政策“取得全面胜利”，突出经济发展。但在2023年8月一次未公开行程中，他则警告“存在隐患”，要求加强安全治理。

为延续大规模拘禁时期所建立的深层恐惧，马兴瑞时期采用了“预防性、轮换式短期拘留”机制。通过短期但持续的拘押，既维持普遍恐惧，又在表面上营造“正常生活”的假象。在这种“稳定”之下，是对民族同化的系统性推进。

张表示，对维吾尔语言、文化与宗教的压制在马上任后仍在持续。到他离职时，当地传统习俗和宗教信仰几乎被消除：诵读《古兰经》、在家祈祷、斋月禁食均被严格禁止；维吾尔干部甚至被强制食用猪肉以示“忠诚”；多数清真寺被拆毁，仅存的一座也全天候看守。

文化抹除还深入教育体系和日常生活。学校禁止使用维吾尔语，新一代正在与自身语言逐渐脱节。

这种文化消解与经济政策密切相关，尤其是国家推动的劳动力转移。官方将其描述为“自愿扶贫”，但张的证词表明，这实际上构成一个大规模的强制劳动与人口工程体系。

在马兴瑞时期，劳动力转移规模显著扩大，从阶段性动员转变为常态化、不可逃避的制度安排。官方数据显示，到2025年，转移规模达340万人次（涉及超过300万人，部分人员一年内被多次转移）。

但与此同时，持续的拘禁与劳动力抽调造成劳动力短缺，基层面临巨大压力，被迫“想方设法完成指标”。村委会与警方利用其权力，对居民施加各种行政骚扰与威胁，迫使其接受工作安排。

拒绝者将面临额外普通话学习、无偿劳动以及频繁上门“走访”。多次拒绝者则会被送入短期拘留设施，在张的话中，被“刻意置于困苦环境中以迫使服从”。

这种对劳动年龄人口的抽取正在掏空农村社会结构。张观察到村庄人口锐减，仅剩老人、病人和儿童。这种人为造成的人口空洞甚至导致无人照看的儿童溺亡，当地不得不发布禁止儿童靠近水域的警告。

官方文件也印证了这一环境。一份2023年的地方指令要求干部“转变农民思想”，以确保劳务转移执行；另一份规划文件则提出扩大跨省转移，并通过“感恩教育”“民族团结教育”将农民转化为产业工人。

张指出，所谓“思想转化”在实际操作中，就是通过威胁、惩罚以及长时间（甚至持续到凌晨两三点）的会议来施压。

这种制度化的强制迁移，体现了新疆治理模式的根本转变：从陈全国时期的显性高压，转向一种长期、无处不在的隐性控制。在政治学上，这意味着从“专制性权力”向“基础设施性权力”的转型。

前者依赖明显的暴力与压制，而后者则依赖国家通过官僚体系深入社会、实施控制的能力。

通过将维稳体系嵌入基层治理，国家从大规模拘禁的公开暴力，转向更隐蔽却更彻底的行政控制。

与此同时，马兴瑞还推动对外贸易大幅增长。官方数据显示，2021至2025年间，新疆对美国、加拿大、英国及欧盟的直接出口增长了465%，其中2024至2025年间增长达71%。

尽管实现了其所称的“高质量发展与高水平安全的良性互动”，马兴瑞仍在2025年7月被突然撤换，并因腐败问题接受调查。

在国际社会难以监测这一“由显转隐”的压制体系之际，像张这样的内部证人打破了“新疆趋于宽松”的假象。压制机制并未结束，而是演化为一种更持久、更深入的结构性控制，导致维吾尔社会的瓦解成为长期现实。

在对“绝对安全”的执念驱动下，这种无止境的社会控制需求，最终为大规模人权灾难的持续提供了条件。

原文链接https://foreignpolicy.com/author/adrian-zenz/

“The Opposition” China Human Rights Watch Briefing No. 24 (April 16, 2026)

The Repression of Uyghurs in Xinjiang Has Evolved, Not Ended

A rare internal testimony reveals how the CCP regime conceals state violence in the Xinjiang region.

Author: Adrian Zenz

Editor: Huang Jizhou Proofreader: Kong Xiangqing Translator: Zhou Min

According to first-hand testimony from a former member of the Chinese police system, Beijing has not dismantled its apparatus of repression in Xinjiang, but has instead “adjusted” it. Coercive policies still dominate daily life, but they operate in a more hidden and decentralized manner, making them increasingly difficult for the outside world to detect.

The architect of this “adjusted” system is Ma Xingrui, who succeeded Chen Quanguo—known for his hardline policies—as the Party Secretary of Xinjiang in December 2021. Under Chen, the state relied on highly visible, campaign-style governance, sending vast numbers of Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities into extrajudicial detention camps. Those actions were driven by top-down detention quotas, which set the administrative precedent for current short-term detention targets.

When Ma Xingrui, a former governor of Guangdong Province regarded as a technocrat, took office, there was initial outside speculation that he might shift Xinjiang from high-security governance toward economic development.

Witnesses recall a degree of cautious optimism upon Ma’s arrival. He removed some of the most conspicuous police measures and temporarily relaxed certain social controls. However, in reality, his governance merely shifted repression from “high visibility” to “high invisibility.”

The specific workings of this concealed repression come from the testimony of Zhang Yabo. A Han Chinese citizen who began working in Xinjiang in 2006, Zhang joined the police force in 2014 after a career in teaching and was stationed in the Uyghur-populated Hotan region.

Between 2014 and 2016, as a detention center guard, Zhang witnessed daily beatings and torture of Uyghur detainees, including individuals suspended from ceilings for up to 24 hours. He also witnessed a colleague rape a female detainee during interrogation and saw deaths resulting from abuse. In 2017, during a two-week stint at a detention center, he observed severe overcrowding, “extremely appalling” environments, and “frequent” deaths.

From late 2016 to 2023, Zhang served as a village-level police officer at the grassroots. He was responsible for transferring Uyghurs released from “re-education camps” to detention houses, many of whom were subsequently sentenced to long prison terms. Zhang estimates that in his jurisdiction, more than half of those released eventually entered the prison system.

Official data corroborates this trend of mass “detention transfer”: between 2017 and 2021, over 500,000 people were sentenced to prison. Zhang was also responsible for supervising state-led labor transfers, including organizing groups of Uyghurs to pick cotton under police watch.

Zhang’s testimony suggests that the actual scale of detention may exceed even the internal estimates of local leadership. In 2019, while working at the Hotan County Re-education Headquarters, he discovered that local officials frequently hid true detention numbers from superiors. Under multifaceted policy pressure, the grassroots both executed mass detentions and deliberately falsified data to avoid accusations of “ineffective governance.”

Zhang estimates that in his village, approximately 25% of the adult population had been sent to re-education camps (excluding those sent directly to prison). To cover up these actions, authorities ordered the destruction of all archives related to re-education camps in early 2020.

Zhang resigned from the police force and fled China in late 2023. Since then, Chinese authorities have accused him of “endangering national security,” frozen his bank accounts, and threatened his family members remaining in the country.

The 2023 detention operations in Hotan that Zhang participated in align with broader regional trends. Testimony he obtained shows that in places like Urumqi, a wave of arbitrary detentions targeting young Uyghurs emerged after the end of the “Zero-COVID” policy, particularly following anti-lockdown protests.

The new round of repression in Xinjiang aligns with shifts in the policy rhetoric of Chinese leader Xi Jinping. At the 2020 Central Symposium on Xinjiang Work, Xi emphasized that Xinjiang policy had “achieved a comprehensive victory,” highlighting economic development. However, during an unannounced visit in August 2023, he warned of “hidden dangers” and demanded strengthened security governance.

To maintain the deep-seated fear established during the era of mass internment, the Ma Xingrui era adopted a mechanism of “preventative, rotating short-term detention.” Through short but continuous detentions, the state maintains pervasive fear while maintaining a surface illusion of “normal life.” Beneath this “stability” lies a systematic push for ethnic assimilation.

Zhang states that the suppression of Uyghur language, culture, and religion continued under Ma. By the time of Zhang’s departure, local traditional customs and religious beliefs had been nearly eradicated: reciting the Quran, praying at home, and fasting during Ramadan were strictly prohibited. Uyghur cadres were even forced to consume pork to demonstrate “loyalty.” Most mosques were demolished, and the few remaining were under 24-hour surveillance.

Cultural erasure has also permeated the education system and daily life. Schools prohibit the use of the Uyghur language, causing the younger generation to gradually lose touch with their own tongue.

This cultural dissolution is closely linked to economic policies, particularly state-mandated labor transfers. While official narratives describe this as “voluntary poverty alleviation,” Zhang’s testimony indicates it actually constitutes a system of mass forced labor and demographic engineering.

Under Ma Xingrui, the scale of labor transfers expanded significantly, evolving from episodic mobilization into a normalized, unavoidable institutional arrangement. Official data shows that by 2025, the scale of transfers reached 3.4 million person-times (involving over 3 million people, some transferred multiple times a year).

Simultaneously, continuous detentions and labor extractions caused labor shortages, placing immense pressure on grassroots officials who were forced to “find any means necessary to complete quotas.” Village committees and police used their power to subject residents to administrative harassment and threats to force acceptance of work assignments.

Those who refuse face additional Mandarin language study, unpaid labor, and frequent “home visits.” Repeat refusers are sent to short-term detention facilities, which, in Zhang’s words, are “deliberately placed in hardships to coerce compliance.”

This extraction of the working-age population is hollowing out rural social structures. Zhang observed a sharp decline in village populations, leaving only the elderly, the sick, and children. This man-made demographic void even led to the drowning of unsupervised children, prompting local authorities to issue warnings against children approaching bodies of water.

Official documents also reflect this environment. A 2023 local directive required cadres to “transform the thoughts of farmers” to ensure the execution of labor transfers; another planning document proposed expanding inter-provincial transfers and transforming farmers into industrial workers through “gratitude education” and “ethnic unity education.”

Zhang noted that “thought transformation” in practice meant applying pressure through threats, punishments, and marathon meetings that often lasted until 2 or 3 AM.

This institutionalized forced migration embodies a fundamental shift in Xinjiang’s governance model: from the explicit high-pressure tactics of the Chen Quanguo era to a long-term, ubiquitous form of implicit control. In political science terms, this represents a transition from “despotic power” to “infrastructural power.”

The former relies on overt violence and repression, while the latter relies on the state’s ability to permeate society and implement control through bureaucratic systems. By embedding the stability-maintenance apparatus into grassroots governance, the state has pivoted from the public violence of mass internment to a more concealed yet more totalizing administrative control.

Meanwhile, Ma Xingrui also oversaw a significant surge in foreign trade. Official data shows that between 2021 and 2025, Xinjiang’s direct exports to the US, Canada, the UK, and the EU grew by 465%, with a 71% increase between 2024 and 2025 alone.

Despite achieving what he termed a “positive interaction between high-quality development and high-level security,” Ma Xingrui was abruptly replaced in July 2025 and placed under investigation for corruption.

As the international community struggles to monitor this “visible to invisible” system of repression, internal witnesses like Zhang shatter the illusion that Xinjiang is trending toward leniency. The repressive mechanisms have not ended; they have evolved into a more enduring, deeper structural control, making the disintegration of Uyghur society a long-term reality.

Driven by an obsession with “absolute security,” this endless demand for social control ultimately sustains the conditions for ongoing mass human rights disasters.

Original Link: https://foreignpolicy.com/author/adrian-zenz/

第787次茉莉花行动

主题：声援程方维—-抗议中共跨国鎮压

活动时间：2026年4月25日15:00（周六）

活动地点：洛杉矶中领馆

地址：443 Shatto Place, Los Angeles, CA 90020

程方维是一名充满良知的汉族青年，拥抱不同的信仰，在海外自由的土地上，为遭遇系统性迫害的新疆少数民族同胞公开发声。

没有公开审判，没有判决书，只有黑箱操作下长达六年的重刑，以及一项莫须有的“分裂国家罪”。

那些真正分裂国家的，是建起高墙、制造仇恨与隔离的强权；而不是一个试图保护父母、声援弱势群体的年轻学子。

今天，我们站在这里，向世界发声：

停止跨国镇压，保障海外华人与留学生的基本人权！

停止秘密审判，立刻无罪释放程方维！

抗议株连家属，还人民以自由与尊严！

关闭再教育集中营，停止对维吾尔等少数民族的系统性迫害！

活动发起：张致君 马群 

活动策划：姜俊良 张致君

活动主持人：郑洲 吕聪

摄影摄像：陀先润

义工负责人：郑洲

秩序维护义工：张磊 周富权 李铁

媒体联络：张致君

新闻发布：马群

活动现场负责人：倪世成 卓皓然

发言人：姜俊良

记者：林小龙 编辑：张致君 责任编辑：朱虞夫 资料整理：邢志远 翻译：周敏

高智晟，中国人权律师，曾被外界誉为“中国最勇敢的律师之一”。

他出生贫寒，靠着自学一步步走上法律道路，通过司法考试后，在北京创办律师事务所，很快在业内崭露头角。那时的他，拥有令人羡慕的事业前景，也完全可以像许多成功律师一样，在商业案件与现实秩序之间找到一个安全、体面的立足点。

但高智晟没有这样选择。

随着执业深入，他接触到越来越多普通人无力发声、也无人愿意接手的案件：弱势群体的维权、宗教信仰者的处境、政治异议者的申诉。这些案件往往不只是法律问题，更意味着触碰权力最敏感的边界。在中国多数律师迫于政治压力，对敏感案件避之不及，而他却一步步走了进去。

2000年代初的中国，正沉浸在经济高速增长的叙事之中。高楼拔地而起，资本涌动，世界也开始越来越多地将目光投向这个正在崛起的大国。在那样一个普遍歌颂“发展”与“稳定”的年代，高智晟选择走向另一条路：他没有停留在繁荣表象之中，而是进入制度最幽暗的边缘地带，去触碰那些不被允许触碰的问题，去凝视那些被刻意遮蔽的人。

为受迫害的法轮功学员伸冤成为他人生真正的转折点。

2004年底开始，他连续三次向胡锦涛、温家宝为代表的中国最高层发出公开信，揭露针对法轮功学员的系统性迫害，并呼吁立即停止相关行动。这些信件措辞直接、内容尖锐，既带有法律人的理性，也带有一种几近孤绝的道德勇气。它们迅速引发国际社会的强烈关注，也让高智晟从一名执业律师，转变为当局重点打压和清除的对象。

从那之后，他的人生轨迹被彻底改写。

他的律师执照被吊销，律师事务所被关闭，原本建立起来的职业生涯被强行中断。他本人则陷入长期的拘押、软禁、监控与强迫失踪之中。与许多政治案件不同，高智晟所遭遇的，并不是一次明确的审判、一段清晰的刑期，然后一切结束；相反，他面对的是一种更为模糊、也更令人窒息的状态——反复发生的“消失”。长时间里，外界无法得知他的确切处境，也无法确认他是否安全。即便偶尔获释，也只是短暂回到公众视野，不久之后便再次进入同样的循环。这样的命运，不是单纯的惩罚，而是一种持续性的摧毁：它不只是剥夺人的自由，更是要摧毁一个人稳定生活，摧毁他与社会、与家人、与公共记忆之间的连接。

关于他在拘押期间究竟经历了什么，外界至今仍难以获得完整而权威的答案。人们只能通过极少数流出的描述，拼接出一个令人不寒而栗的轮廓：长期隔离、严密监控、持续施压，以及那些始终难以被完全证实、却又从未真正消散的酷刑指控。正是这种“无法被证实”的状态，构成了另一种意义上的恐惧——因为它让暴力不必公开，也不必承担解释。

2017年，高智晟再次失踪。

自那以后，关于他的下落，始终缺乏公开、明确、可信的信息。多年过去，一个曾在中国法律界公开执业、曾以文字和行动震动国际社会的人，就这样在中共制度深处被“抽离”出公众视野，仿佛一个名字仍在流传，但一个具体的人却被有意从现实中抹去。

从个人命运的角度去看，这是一个律师职业道路的悲剧性终结：一个本有才华、有理想、有影响力的人，被权力机器层层碾压，最终归于沉寂。

把他的经历放到更大的时代语境中来看，它显然不止于个人悲剧，而是制度性现象的缩影。

2026年在美国加州雕塑公园，一座以高智晟的雕像落成。人们在现场集会、发言，而高智晟律师本人依然被囚禁在中国。

《在野党》杂志社有幸采访到高智晟律师的家属——耿和女士。

问：耿和老师，如今在很多人眼中，高智晟律师已经不仅仅是一个具体的人物，更像是一种象征。那么，在家庭里、在您的心中，他究竟是一个什么样的人？

耿：在我心里，他是一个非常善良、幽默，而且极有智慧的人。真的，我觉得没有人能像他那样。他还很会唱歌，而且唱得特别好听。

如果要说他的为人，我会说，他特别善良，也特别正直。正是这些品行，这么多年来一直深深影响着我们一家人。

我想跟大家分享一件小事。2005年3月，高智晟的母亲去世了，去世时才67岁。自那以后，他每年回陕北老家，无论是一年回去一次、两次，还是三次，每次回去，他都会专门去看望村里70岁以上的老人，并给每位老人送上20块钱。虽然钱不多，但那份心意非常珍贵。

在我看来，这不仅仅是一点物质上的表达，更体现了他内心深处的善良、体贴和对长者的尊重，也代表着一种非常可贵的中国传统美德。

问：作为家属，您第一次真正意识到他所做的这些事情会带来危险，是在什么时候？

耿：应该就是在2006年。那年8月15日他被抓捕之后，我们家就一直处在警方的严密监控之下，家门口有人跟踪，家里也住进了警察。也是从那个时候开始，我才真正意识到，他所做的这一切，已经不仅仅是承受压力，而是随时可能付出自由甚至更沉重的代价。

其实在那之前，我从来没有想过他会被抓捕。虽然我们已经能感觉到外部的压力越来越大，但我没有想到，事情最终会发展到那一步。

问：当高智晟律师面临的政治风险越来越明显的时候，您和他之间有没有发生过思想上的争执？

耿：我和他之间没有过这样的争执。因为在我们家里，我更多是负责家庭这一边，他主外。在国内的时候，他也很少跟我讲这些事情，很多事他都是自己在承担。

问：高智晟律师失踪以后，对您来说，这意味着什么？是一种突如其来的恐惧，还是一种漫长而持续的消耗？

耿：最开始的时候，其实我们总还是抱着一点希望。因为有时候他会消失三天、两天，我们就会想，也许再等一等，他就回来了。我甚至会拿着给他准备的钱，心里想着，他大概还是抱着“我明天就能回来”的念头离开的。

可是后来，等待的时间越来越长。原本以为只是几天，结果变成了两个月、几个月，最后变成一种看不到尽头的等待。那种感觉，不只是恐惧，更是一种无止境的消耗。你一直在期盼，一直在等，一直在盼着会不会突然有一点关于他的消息。

到后来，我几乎像看天气预报一样，时刻关注外界的变化，总觉得是不是国家发生了什么大事，是不是哪一天，就会传来一点关于他的消息。就是这样，在盼望和失望之间，一天天熬着，整整盼了八年零八个月。

问：这些年里，支撑您一路走下来的，主要是什么？是一种什么样的信念？

耿：这些年来，我一直都在往前走，也一直在不断调整自己。我也一直在学习，慢慢让自己变得更坚强一些。我觉得，最重要的是先把自己调整好，把当下的日子过好，把眼前的每一天过稳。只有先把自己撑住，才能继续走下去。

问：耿和老师，您有没有什么话，是一直想对高智晟说，却始终没有机会说出口的？

耿：其实，我常常也会想这个问题。但到了今天，我觉得自己最想的，已经不只是说一句什么话，而是如果每天还有一点时间、还有一点力量，我们还能为他做些什么。

因为这样的分离，已经持续了17年。到了今天，我们能做的，好像已经不只是等待，而是继续坚持，继续想办法营救他。某种程度上说，我们现在更像是同在一个战壕里的战士，仍然在为把他救出来而努力。

问：今天，我们在美国加州的这座雕塑公园里，看到了这座关于高智晟的雕像。对您来说，它意味着什么？ 

耿：这座雕塑从开始筹备、制作到现在，已经快一年的时间了。它承载的不只是我们全家的希望，也承载着陈维明老师的心血和希望。我们都希望，能够借由这样的方式，让更多人知道高智晟，关注高智晟，也希望有一天，我们能够真正迎来一个好的结果。

说实话，我今天是发自内心地感动。你看，今天现场来了这么多认识的、不认识的人，大家都愿意来到自由雕塑公园，愿意为高智晟律师的雕塑落成仪式伸出援手，愿意关注这件事。我们真的非常希望高智晟被囚禁、被失踪的日子能够尽快结束。

我们更希望，有一天高智晟能够重新回到公众面前，重新回到家人面前，也希望有一天，他能够亲眼看到这座雕像。

问：您觉得，如果高智晟本人今天站在这里，看到这座雕像，他会说些什么？

耿：其实，我也不知道他会说些什么。但我觉得，这座雕塑所代表的，已经不仅仅是高智晟个人。它承载的是一个真相，也是一种揭露。它让人看到，在暴政之下，一个因为说真话、因为坚持良知而遭受迫害的人，究竟经历了什么。

我觉得，高智晟的雕像就像一面镜子。透过这座雕塑，人们看到的不只是一个人的遭遇，更能看到中共暴政本身的丑陋和残酷。

在加州自由雕塑公园里，高智晟律师的雕像静静矗立。它沉默无声，却仿佛始终在传递着某种讯息:即使身处黑暗，人依然会抬起头，去寻找光的方向。

对于耿和来说，时间从来不是简单地流逝。它被分解为漫长的等待、反复的回忆，以及日复一日的坚持。

这些片段拼凑出了一种更为具体、也更为沉重的现实。而在这样的现实之中，仍有一些问题，至今没有答案。

但也许，正如那尊雕像所隐含的意义：人未必总能改变自己的处境，却仍然可以选择——在黑暗中，仰望星空。

编者按：

高智晟律师的被中共当局“失踪”的案件中，我们看到的是一种持续性的权力运作方式：惩罚并不以法律程序的终结为终点，甚至很多时候，真正沉重的打压发生在法律程序之外。行政权力、国保体系、社会控制、信息封锁、职业剥夺、人格污名化——这些机制交错运作，使一个人即便在形式上“服完刑”或“结束处理”，其身份、权利与行动空间，仍然被随时重新定义、重新限制、重新剥夺，乃至强制失踪。

高智晟的失踪，绝不只是针对他个人的迫害，更是中共当局向所有仍试图在制度框架内争取权利、推动改变、坚守原则的人发出的一种威胁与警告。

而这，也正是“高智晟”这个名字之所以重要的原因。

他的意义，早已超出一个律师的职业范畴，也超出一桩个案本身的范围。他是一个时代留下的注脚：当法律不再是限制权力的工具，而逐渐成为权力运作的一部分；当程序不能保证正义，反而可能被用来包装压制；当一个以法律为武器的人，最终被法律与法律之外的力量共同吞没——那么，人们就不得不重新追问那个最根本的问题：

当法律本身成为权力的一部分时，个体还能在多大程度上依赖它来保护自己？

对于这个问题，高智晟用自己的一生，提出了一个极其沉重的诘问。而遗憾的是，直到今天，这个问题依然没有答案。

The Seventeenth Year of Waiting for Gao Zhisheng

Reporter: Lin Xiaolong Editor: Zhang Zhijun
Executive Editor: Zhu Yufu Data Compilation: Xing Zhiyuan Translator: Zhou Min

Gao Zhisheng, a Chinese human rights lawyer, was once hailed by the outside world as “one of China’s bravest lawyers.”

He was born into poverty and stepped onto the legal path step by step through self-study. After passing the judicial examination, he founded a law firm in Beijing and quickly rose to prominence in the industry. At that time, he possessed enviable career prospects and could have completely found a safe, decent foothold between commercial cases and the realistic order, just like many successful lawyers.

But Gao Zhisheng did not choose this.

As his practice deepened, he came into contact with more and more cases where ordinary people were powerless to speak out and no one was willing to take them on: the rights protection of vulnerable groups, the situation of religious believers, and the appeals of political dissidents. These cases were often not just legal issues, but meant touching the most sensitive boundaries of power. While most lawyers in China, under political pressure, avoided sensitive cases, he walked into them step by step.

China in the early 2000s was immersed in the narrative of high-speed economic growth. High-rise buildings rose from the ground, capital surged, and the world began to cast its gaze more and more toward this rising major power. In an era that generally praised “development” and “stability,” Gao Zhisheng chose to walk another path: he did not stay within the superficial appearance of prosperity, but instead entered the darkest peripheral zones of the system to touch those issues that were not allowed to be touched, and to gaze at those people who were deliberately obscured.

Seeking justice for persecuted Falun Gong practitioners became the true turning point of his life.

Starting from the end of 2004, he sent three consecutive open letters to China’s highest leadership, represented by Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao, exposing the systematic persecution of Falun Gong practitioners and calling for an immediate end to related actions. These letters were direct in phrasing and sharp in content, carrying both the rationality of a legal professional and a nearly desolate moral courage. They quickly triggered strong attention from the international community and caused Gao Zhisheng to transform from a practicing lawyer into a key target for suppression and elimination by the authorities.

From then on, the trajectory of his life was completely rewritten.

His law license was revoked, his law firm was closed, and his established professional career was forcibly interrupted. He himself fell into long-term detention, house arrest, surveillance, and enforced disappearance. Unlike many political cases, what Gao Zhisheng encountered was not a clear trial and a clear prison term after which everything ended; on the contrary, he faced a more blurred and suffocating state—repeated “disappearances.” For long periods, the outside world could not know his exact situation or confirm whether he was safe. Even if occasionally released, it was only a brief return to public view before entering the same cycle again soon after. Such a fate is not simple punishment, but a continuous destruction: it does not just deprive a person of freedom, but aims to destroy a person’s stable life and destroy the connection between him and society, his family, and public memory.

As to what exactly he experienced during his detention, the outside world still finds it difficult to obtain a complete and authoritative answer. People can only piece together a spine-chilling outline through a very few leaked descriptions: long-term isolation, close surveillance, continuous pressure, and those allegations of torture that have always been difficult to fully confirm yet have never truly dissipated. It is precisely this “unconfirmable” state that constitutes another kind of fear—because it allows violence to not be public and to not bear the burden of explanation.

In 2017, Gao Zhisheng disappeared again.

Since then, there has been a consistent lack of public, clear, and credible information regarding his whereabouts. Many years have passed, and a person who once publicly practiced in the Chinese legal circle and shook the international community with his words and actions has thus been “extracted” from public view deep within the CCP system, as if a name is still circulating, but a specific person has been intentionally erased from reality.

Viewed from the perspective of personal fate, this is the tragic end of a lawyer’s career path: a person who originally had talent, ideals, and influence was crushed layer by layer by the power machine and finally returned to silence.

Putting his experience into a larger historical context, it is clearly more than an individual tragedy; it is a microcosm of a systemic phenomenon.

At the end of 2026, a statue of Gao Zhisheng was unveiled in the Liberty Sculpture Park in California, USA. People gathered and spoke at the scene, while Lawyer Gao Zhisheng himself remains imprisoned in China.

Opposition Party magazine had the honor of interviewing Lawyer Gao Zhisheng’s family member—Ms. Geng He.

Q: Ms. Geng He, today in the eyes of many, Lawyer Gao Zhisheng is no longer just a specific figure, but more like a symbol. In the family and in your heart, what kind of person is he exactly?

Geng: In my heart, he is a very kind, humorous, and extremely wise person. Truly, I feel no one can be like him. He is also very good at singing, and he sings particularly beautifully.

If I were to speak of his character, I would say he is exceptionally kind and exceptionally upright. It is precisely these qualities that have deeply influenced our whole family for all these years.

I want to share a small story with everyone. In March 2005, Gao Zhisheng’s mother passed away; she was only 67 when she died. Since then, every time he went back to his old home in Northern Shaanxi—whether he went back once, twice, or three times a year—every time he returned, he would specifically go to visit the elderly in the village over 70 years old and give each elderly person 20 yuan. Although it wasn’t much money, that sentiment was very precious.

In my view, this is not just a small material expression, but it reflects the kindness, thoughtfulness, and respect for elders deep in his heart, and represents a very valuable traditional Chinese virtue.

Q: As a family member, when did you first truly realize that the things he was doing would bring danger?

Geng: It should have been in 2006. After he was arrested on August 15 of that year, our home was under close surveillance by the police; there were people tailing us at the door, and police moved into the house. It was also from that time that I truly realized that everything he was doing was no longer just about enduring pressure, but that he might pay the price of his freedom or even a heavier price at any time.

Actually, before that, I never thought he would be arrested. Although we could already feel the external pressure growing, I did not expect that things would eventually develop to that point.

Q: When the political risks faced by Lawyer Gao Zhisheng became more and more obvious, were there any ideological disputes between you and him?

Geng: There were no such disputes between him and me. Because in our home, I was more responsible for the family side, and he handled the outside. When we were in China, he rarely spoke to me about these things; he bore many things by himself.

Q: After Lawyer Gao Zhisheng disappeared, what did this mean to you? Was it a sudden fear, or a long and continuous exhaustion?

Geng: At the very beginning, we actually always held on to a bit of hope. Because sometimes he would disappear for three days or two days, and we would think, maybe if we wait a little longer, he will come back. I would even hold the money I prepared for him, thinking in my heart that he probably left with the thought that “I can come back tomorrow.”

But later, the waiting time became longer and longer. What I originally thought was just a few days turned into two months, several months, and finally became a kind of wait with no end in sight. That feeling is not just fear, but an endless exhaustion. You are constantly hoping, constantly waiting, constantly looking forward to whether there will suddenly be a little news about him.

Later on, I almost watched the changes in the outside world like watching a weather forecast, always thinking whether some major event had happened in the country, whether one day, a little news about him would come. Just like that, between hope and disappointment, enduring day by day, I waited for a full eight years and eight months.

Q: Over these years, what has mainly sustained you to keep going? What kind of belief is it?

Geng: Over these years, I have always been moving forward and constantly adjusting myself. I have also been learning, slowly letting myself become a bit stronger. I feel the most important thing is to first adjust myself well, live the current days well, and stabilize each day before me. Only by supporting yourself first can you continue to walk on.

Q: Ms. Geng He, is there anything you have always wanted to say to Gao Zhisheng but have never had the chance to say out loud?

Geng: Actually, I often think about this question too. But today, I feel that what I want most is no longer just to say a certain sentence, but if there is still a little time and a little strength every day, what more can we do for him.

Because this separation has lasted for 17 years. Today, what we can do seems to be no longer just waiting, but continuing to persist, continuing to find ways to rescue him. To some extent, we are now more like soldiers in the same trench, still working hard to get him out.

Q: Today, in this sculpture park in California, USA, we see this statue of Gao Zhisheng. What does it mean to you?

Geng: This sculpture has taken nearly a year from the beginning of preparation and production until now. It carries not only the hopes of our whole family but also the hard work and hope of Teacher Chen Weiming. We all hope that through this method, more people can know about Gao Zhisheng and pay attention to Gao Zhisheng, and we also hope that one day, we can truly welcome a good result.

To tell the truth, I am moved from the bottom of my heart today. Look, so many people I know and don’t know came to the scene today; everyone is willing to come to the Liberty Sculpture Park, willing to lend a hand for the unveiling ceremony of Lawyer Gao Zhisheng’s statue, and willing to pay attention to this matter. We really hope that the days of Gao Zhisheng being imprisoned and disappeared can end as soon as possible.

We hope even more that one day Gao Zhisheng can return to the public again, return to his family again, and hope that one day, he can see this statue with his own eyes.

Q: If Gao Zhisheng himself were standing here today and saw this statue, what do you think he would say?

Geng: Actually, I don’t know what he would say either. But I feel that what this sculpture represents is no longer just Gao Zhisheng as an individual. It carries a truth and is also an exposure. It lets people see what a person who suffered persecution for speaking the truth and for persisting in conscience actually went through under tyranny.

I feel that Gao Zhisheng’s statue is like a mirror. Through this sculpture, people see not just one person’s encounter, but can see even more the ugliness and cruelty of the CCP tyranny itself.

In the California Liberty Sculpture Park, Lawyer Gao Zhisheng’s statue stands quietly.

It is silent, yet it seems to be constantly transmitting a message: even when in darkness, people will still lift their heads to look for the direction of the light.

For Geng He, time never simply flows by. It is decomposed into long waiting, repeated memories, and day-after-day persistence.

These fragments piece together a more concrete and heavier reality. And within such a reality, there are still some questions that have no answers to this day.

But perhaps, just as the meaning implied by that statue: humans may not always be able to change their circumstances, yet they can still choose—to look up at the stars in the dark.

Editor’s Note: In the case of Lawyer Gao Zhisheng being “disappeared” by the CCP authorities, what we see is a continuous mode of power operation: punishment does not end with the conclusion of legal procedures; in fact, many times, the truly heavy suppression occurs outside of legal procedures. Administrative power, the domestic security (Guobao) system, social control, information blockade, professional deprivation, and character stigmatization—these mechanisms operate interchangeably, so that even if a person has formally “served their sentence” or “ended processing,” their identity, rights, and space for action are still redefined, restricted, and deprived again at any time, even resulting in enforced disappearance.

Gao Zhisheng’s disappearance is absolutely not just persecution directed at him personally, but is a threat and warning issued by the CCP authorities to all who still attempt to strive for rights, promote change, and uphold principles within the institutional framework.

And this is precisely the reason why the name “Gao Zhisheng” is important.

His significance has long exceeded the professional scope of a lawyer and exceeded the scope of a single case itself. He is a footnote left by an era: when law is no longer a tool to limit power but gradually becomes a part of power operation; when procedures cannot guarantee justice but may instead be used to package suppression; when a person who uses the law as a weapon is ultimately swallowed by the law and forces outside the law together—then, people have to re-ask that most fundamental question:

When the law itself becomes a part of power, to what extent can an individual still rely on it to protect themselves?

Regarding this question, Gao Zhisheng, with his own life, put forward an extremely heavy interrogation.

And unfortunately, until today, this question still has no answer.

—— 從鄭麗文訪中看台灣的安全迷思

作者：趙紀森 编辑：周志刚 校对：王滨 翻译：彭小梅

在兩岸關係持續緊張的情況下，任何與中國的接觸，都難以被視為單純交流。鄭麗文的訪中，引發了明顯分歧。有人認為這是務實溝通的嘗試，也有人質疑這樣的判斷過於樂觀，甚至可能傳遞錯誤訊號。

爭議尚未平息，她已在上海落地，並受到高規格接待。同時，她的公開發言也將台灣的選擇描繪為和平與繁榮，或戰爭與毀滅之間的對立。這樣的說法，讓原本屬於政策層面的討論，迅速轉向更強烈的政治敘事。

回到問題本身，關鍵或許不在於要不要對話，而在於對話是建立在什麼樣的現實判斷之上。

在官方互動受限的情況下，非執政政治人物的交流，確實可能在某種程度上降低誤判風險。國際政治中，維持最低限度的接觸，本來就是避免衝突升高的一種手段。因此，把所有交流一概視為錯誤，並不符合現實。

但對話從來不是安全本身。它只是一種工具，而且效果高度依賴條件。如果缺乏對等的實力基礎，也缺乏基本信任，對話往往難以轉化為實質保障。

這也是台灣社會普遍存在疑慮的原因。對於共產黨的長期戰略，多數人並不抱持信任，這並非單純情緒，而是來自過往經驗與現實觀察。在權力明顯不對等的情況下，單方面釋放善意，很可能得不到對等回應，甚至被轉化為對方的政治敘事資源。

此次訪問所呈現的高規格接待，本身也值得注意。在不對等關係中，禮遇往往不只是禮遇，同時具有明確的政治訊號。這使得相關行動的效果，不能只從表面來理解。

如果將這一爭議放入政黨競爭的背景，也更容易看出差異所在。國民黨傾向透過降低對抗與恢復交流來爭取空間，民進黨則強調防衛能力與國際合作，將嚇阻視為穩定的基礎。

這兩種路線之間，與其說是立場對立，不如說是風險排序的不同。一種更擔心衝突升高，另一種更擔心被誤判為缺乏決心。在權力不對等的條件下，後者的顧慮往往更直接影響安全。

鄭麗文的主張，確實回應了一部分人對戰爭風險的焦慮。但她在公開場合所採用的說法，也呈現出另一個問題。當複雜的安全議題被簡化為單一選項時，反而容易讓判斷失去精準度。

兩岸關係從來不是簡單的選擇題，而是一個充滿不確定性與權衡的結構。如果將不同路線理解為和平與毀滅之間的對立，不僅難以促進理性討論，也可能進一步加深社會分裂。

更重要的是，這樣的論述背後，隱含著對現實條件較為樂觀的判斷。在缺乏對等籌碼的情況下，對話本身難以轉化為穩定保障；若同時過度強調衝突的不可承受性，甚至可能在無意中影響社會對防衛的認知。

鄭麗文的訪中，不需要用情緒去否定，但也不應被過度理想化。理解其出發點並不困難，真正需要討論的，是這樣的路徑在現實條件下是否可行。

對話可以存在，但不能被高估。

在缺乏實力與清晰底線的情況下，對話未必降低風險，反而可能成為風險的一部分。

Equality Dialogue, or Misjudgment?— Viewing Taiwan’s Security Misperceptions Through Cheng Li-wen’s Visit to China

Author: Zhao Jisen Editor: Zhou Zhigang Proofreader: Wang Bin Translator: Peng Xiaomei

Abstract: Under conditions of asymmetry in cross-strait power and lack of trust, dialogue does not necessarily provide substantive security guarantees and may instead introduce risks.

Amid continued tensions in cross-strait relations, any engagement with China can hardly be regarded as a simple exchange. Cheng Li-wen’s visit to China has triggered clear divisions. Some view it as an attempt at pragmatic communication, while others question whether such judgment is overly optimistic, or even potentially conveys the wrong signals.

Before the controversy had subsided, she had already landed in Shanghai and received high-level reception. At the same time, her public remarks framed Taiwan’s choices as a dichotomy between peace and prosperity, or war and destruction. Such statements quickly shifted what was originally a policy-level discussion into a more intense political narrative.

Returning to the core issue, the key may not be whether to engage in dialogue, but on what kind of assessment of reality that dialogue is based.

Under conditions where official interactions are limited, exchanges by non-ruling political figures may indeed, to some extent, reduce the risk of misjudgment. In international politics, maintaining a minimum level of contact is itself a means of preventing escalation of conflict. Therefore, categorically viewing all exchanges as wrong does not align with reality.

However, dialogue has never been security itself. It is merely a tool, and its effectiveness is highly dependent on conditions. If there is a lack of equal strength and a lack of basic trust, dialogue often cannot be transformed into substantive guarantees.

This is also the reason why doubts are widely present in Taiwanese society. Most people do not hold trust toward the long-term strategy of the Communist Party; this is not merely an emotional reaction but stems from experience and real-world observation. Under conditions of clear power asymmetry, unilateral goodwill is likely not to receive an equal response and may even be converted into political narrative resources for the other side.

The high-level reception presented during this visit itself also deserves attention. In unequal relationships, courtesy is often not merely courtesy but also carries clear political signals. This makes the effects of such actions impossible to understand only at the surface level.

If this controversy is placed within the context of party competition, the differences become easier to see. The Kuomintang tends to seek space by reducing confrontation and restoring exchanges, while the Democratic Progressive Party emphasizes defense capabilities and international cooperation, viewing deterrence as the foundation of stability.

Between these two approaches, rather than being a simple opposition of positions, it is more a difference in the ordering of risks. One side is more concerned about the escalation of conflict, while the other is more concerned about being misjudged as lacking resolve. Under conditions of power asymmetry, the latter concern often more directly affects security.

Cheng Li-wen’s position does respond to a portion of public anxiety about the risk of war. However, the way she frames the issue in public also reveals another problem. When complex security issues are simplified into a single-choice option, it instead makes judgment lose precision.

Cross-strait relations have never been a simple multiple-choice question, but a structure full of uncertainty and trade-offs. If different approaches are understood as a dichotomy between peace and destruction, it not only fails to promote rational discussion, but may further deepen social division.

More importantly, behind such discourse lies a relatively optimistic assessment of real conditions. In the absence of equal bargaining power, dialogue itself is difficult to transform into stable guarantees; if, at the same time, the unbearable nature of conflict is overemphasized, it may even unintentionally affect society’s understanding of defense.

Cheng Li-wen’s visit to China does not need to be rejected emotionally, but it also should not be overly idealized. It is not difficult to understand its starting point; what truly needs discussion is whether such a path is feasible under real conditions.

Dialogue can exist, but it must not be overestimated.Under conditions lacking strength and clear bottom lines, dialogue may not reduce risk but may instead become part of the risk itself.

作者：张善城

编辑：胡丽莉 校对：熊辩 翻译：彭小梅

今天，我站在旧金山中国领事馆前，公开表态：

任何替中共站台、为习近平背书的行为，都是对自由的背叛。

台湾不属于中共。

台湾的未来，只属于2300万台湾人民。

中共没有选票，没有合法性，

更没有资格用导弹和军舰决定台湾的命运。

所谓“武统”，本质就是侵略战争。

我支持台湾独立。

我支持民主对抗专制。

民主火炬永不灭。

自由自然属于向往自由的人。

Support the Independence of the Taiwanese People

Author: Zhang ShanchengEditor: Hu Lili Proofreader: Xiong Bian Translator: Peng Xiaomei

Today, I stand in front of the Chinese Consulate in San Francisco and publicly state:

Any act of standing with the Chinese Communist Party or endorsing Xi Jinping is a betrayal of freedom.

Taiwan does not belong to the Chinese Communist Party.Taiwan’s future belongs only to the 23 million people of Taiwan.

The Chinese Communist Party has no votes, no legitimacy,and even less the qualification to decide Taiwan’s fate with missiles and warships.

The so-called “military unification” is, in essence, a war of aggression.

I support Taiwan independence.I support democracy in opposition to authoritarianism.

The torch of democracy will never be extinguished.Freedom naturally belongs to those who long for it.