极权制度下的道德本质
作者：张兴贵（大陆）
编辑：韩唳 责任编辑：罗志飞 翻译：何兴强
一位从集中营地狱中爬出来的幸存者曾留下这样的哀叹：“我们这些活下来的人，绝不是最好的人，那些最好的人，早就死了。”
这句话如丧钟般回响，揭露了一个血淋淋的现实：在极权的碾压下，道德不仅脆弱，甚至可能成为通向死亡的陷阱。
在集中营的铁丝网内，生存是唯一的驱动力。你勇敢吗？若你反抗暴虐的看守，等待你的可能是枪口或绞架。你善良吗？若你将仅有的面包分给饥饿的同伴，你可能因此先倒下。在这样的环境中，道德的实践往往意味着自我牺牲，而生存则要求妥协甚至背叛。
这种现象可以称之为“道德的逆淘汰”。在极权体制的压迫下，那些坚持原则、坚守良知的人，往往最先被淘汰。幸存者并非最善良或最勇敢的人，而是那些学会了适应环境的人——他们可能更谨慎、更懂得隐藏，甚至更自私。这并非人性本恶，而是极权体制对人性的系统性扭曲，它让有道德变成了一种危险的奢侈品。
中国古代专制制度下有句谚语：“杀人放火金腰带，修桥补路无尸骸。” 这句古谚迫使我们直面一个残酷的问题：为何在一个社会中，恶行能换来荣华富贵，而善举却导向万劫不复？答案，深藏于制度的肌理之中。
一、权力至上：奖恶罚善的制度根源
我们必须直视极权制度的本质——一个权力高度集中的体系，其中法律、道德、资源都服务于统治者的意志。在这样的环境中，规则不再公平，而是成为权力的附庸。
为什么“杀人放火”能换来“金腰带”？因为这些恶行往往直接服务于权力的巩固。极权体制需要通过暴力、恐吓和绝对忠诚来维持统治，那些愿意执行“脏活”的人——无论是镇压异己、制造冤案，还是掠夺资源——都被视为“有用”的棋子，并因此获得财富、地位和特权。
反过来，“修桥补路”这样的善行却难以立足。因为它服务的是公共利益，而非统治者的私利。在极权者眼中，这种行为价值微乎其微，甚至可能因触动既得利益者的蛋糕而被视为对权力的挑战。于是，善行者不仅得不到回报，还可能被打压、被遗忘，这便是“无尸骸”的悲哀根源。
二、效率与控制：为何体制需要“恶”
极权体制之所以会“扬恶”，是因为“恶”在短期内是维持其运转的更“高效”的工具。
1. 权力的控制需求。 为了确保绝对服从，统治者必须通过恐惧和压迫来消除异议。这种手段本身就是一种“恶”，因为它限制自由、压制人性。而“善”的特质，如宽容、多元、同理心，与集权的目标天然冲突，甚至被视为软弱。因此，执行暴力任务者被视为忠诚的“自己人”并得到提拔，让恶行成为一条通往权力的“捷径”。
2. 社会控制的效率。 在极权逻辑中，效率优先于道德。恶，如暴力、监控、惩罚，能快速压制反对声音，建立表面秩序；而善，如对话、妥协、包容，则需要时间和信任，成本高昂且结果不可控。设想一位村民自掏腰包修路，方便了乡亲，却可能得罪了控制运输生意的权贵，结果不仅得不到感激，反而可能家破人亡。
因此，极权制度中的“善”往往是策略性的，它服务于权力控制，而非源于真正的道德追求。在这样的绞肉机中，人性中最美好的部分被系统性地碾碎，这不是个体的道德失败，而是制度的必然之恶。
The Moral Essence Under Totalitarianism
Author: Zhang Xinggui (Mainland China)
Editor: Han Li Chief Editor: Luo Zhifei Translator: He Xingqiang
Abstract:
This essay explores how totalitarian regimes distort and subvert traditional morality. Citing the words of concentration camp survivors and ancient Chinese proverbs, it introduces the concept of “reverse moral selection.” In a power-absolutist system, evil deeds are rewarded for serving the regime, while good deeds are suppressed for being of no use to centralized control. In the end, even virtue itself becomes a strategy of manipulation in service of power.
A survivor who crawled out from the hell of a concentration camp once left behind this lament:
“Those of us who survived are not the best ones. The best of us are long gone.”
This sentence tolls like a funeral bell, exposing a bloody truth: under the crushing weight of totalitarianism, morality is not only fragile, it may even become a trap leading directly to death.
Behind the barbed wire of the camps, survival was the sole driving force. Are you brave? If you resist the cruelty of the guards, the price may be the gun barrel or the gallows. Are you kind? If you share your last piece of bread with a starving comrade, you may collapse before him. In such an environment, the practice of morality often meant self-sacrifice, while survival demanded compromise—even betrayal.
This phenomenon can be called “reverse moral selection.” Under the oppression of totalitarian rule, those who hold fast to principles and conscience are often the first to be eliminated. Survivors are not necessarily the bravest or kindest, but those who learned how to adapt—more cautious, more hidden, perhaps even more selfish. This is not proof of inherent human evil, but of the systemic distortion of humanity by totalitarian power, where morality itself becomes a dangerous luxury.
Ancient Chinese autocracy left us a proverb:
“Those who kill and burn gain golden belts; those who build bridges and repair roads leave no corpse behind.”
This forces us to confront a brutal question: why is it that in certain societies, evil deeds can bring wealth and honor, while virtuous acts lead to destruction? The answer lies deep within the fabric of the system itself.
I. The Supremacy of Power: The Institutional Roots of Rewarding Evil and Punishing Good
We must face the essence of totalitarianism: a system of extreme concentration of power, where law, morality, and resources all serve the will of the ruler. In such an environment, rules cease to be fair and become nothing more than appendages of power.
Why does “killing and burning” bring a golden belt? Because such acts directly serve the consolidation of power. Totalitarian regimes rely on violence, terror, and absolute loyalty to maintain rule. Those willing to perform the “dirty work”—suppressing dissent, fabricating injustice, plundering resources—are seen as “useful pawns” and are rewarded with wealth, rank, and privilege.
Conversely, why does “repairing bridges and roads” fail to gain recognition? Because it serves the public good, not the ruler’s private interest. To the totalitarian eye, such acts hold little value, and may even threaten entrenched privilege. Thus, benevolent acts not only lack reward, but may provoke suppression or oblivion—this is the tragic root of “leaving no corpse behind.”
II. Efficiency and Control: Why the Regime Needs “Evil”
The reason totalitarian systems elevate evil is that evil is the more “efficient” tool for sustaining their rule.
The need for control through power.To ensure absolute obedience, rulers must wield fear and repression to extinguish dissent. This is itself evil, for it shackles freedom and suppresses human nature. “Good” qualities—tolerance, diversity, empathy—naturally conflict with centralized power and are even regarded as weakness. Thus, those who carry out violent acts are hailed as loyal insiders and promoted, making evil a fast track to power.
The efficiency of social control.In the logic of totalitarianism, efficiency trumps morality. Evil—violence, surveillance, punishment—quickly silences opposition and creates a façade of order. Good—dialogue, compromise, inclusiveness—requires time and trust, with high costs and uncertain outcomes. Imagine a villager who spends his own savings to repair a road for his neighbors, only to offend a local powerbroker who controls transport profits. Rather than gratitude, he may face ruin and death.
Thus, in totalitarian regimes, “good” often becomes strategic—performed only when it serves power’s control, not out of true moral pursuit. In this meat grinder, the noblest parts of human nature are systematically crushed. This is not the failure of individual morality, but the inevitable evil of the system itself.
贺新郎·感怀
——狱中寄朱虞夫先生暨诸友
作者：吕耿松
休弹男儿泪。
怅人生，
狙公有术，
财迷纸醉。
最忆皋亭山上路，（1）
弼教坊口苍水。（2）
数历历、
千秋功罪。
吟罢石灰胸臆促，(3)
更栖霞岭畔风篁翠。(4)
壮志在，
应不悔。
悲歌击筑惊魑魅。(5)
抗暴秦、
大泽苦雨，(6)
项刘兵锐。(7)
常恨乾坤依然浊，
难消胸中块垒。
但盼得、
日融冻蕊。(8)
回首八卦炉内火，
料催开遍地春蓓蕾。
啼血处，
赤县萃。
【注释】
（1）文天祥在杭州皋亭山被捕。
（2）张蒼水在杭州官巷口弼教坊被刑。
（3）于謙墓在杭州三臺山，于謙写有《石灰吟》明志。
（4）岳飛墓在杭州棲霞嶺。風篁：竹。
（5） 築，古樂器；史載:荆軻刺秦，義無反顧，視死如歸。燕太子丹及賓客皆白衣相送於易水。高漸離擊築，荆軻和之，士皆悲憤。
（6）陳勝大澤鄉揭竿。
（7）項羽、劉邦起兵伐秦。
（8）南宋詞人吳文英《賀新郎·陪履齋先生滄浪看梅》：重唱梅邊新度曲，催發寒梢凍蕊。
2010-07于杭州狱中
责任编辑：罗志飞 翻译：何兴强
To the Tune of He Xinlang: Sentiments
— From Prison, Sent to Mr. Zhu Yufu and Friends
By Lü Gengsong
Hold back a man’s tears.
Alas, this life—
the tricks of false keepers,
the drunken chase of wealth and paper.
Most I recall the path on Gaoting Mountain, (1)
and at the gate of Bijiang Ward, Zhang Cangshui’s blood. (2)
How vivid still,
the rights and wrongs of a thousand years.
Reciting the “Ode to Lime,” my breast grows tight, (3)
then by Xixia Ridge, the bamboo by Yue Fei’s tomb stands green. (4)
My lofty will remains,
never to regret.
A sorrowful song struck upon the zhu startles demons. (5)
To resist the tyrant Qin,
in Dazexiang’s bitter rain, (6)
the blades of Xiang Yu and Liu Bang flashed sharp. (7)
Ever I lament Heaven and Earth still turbid,
hard to dissolve the stone in my chest.
Yet I only hope
the sun will melt the frozen buds. (8)
Looking back at the flames within the Bagua furnace,
surely they hasten spring blossoms across the land.
Where blood cries out,
the Red Earth gathers.
Notes (corresponding to references in the poem):
Wen Tianxiang was captured at Gaoting Mountain, Hangzhou.
Zhang Cangshui was executed at Bijiang Ward, Hangzhou.
Yu Qian’s tomb lies at Santai Mountain, Hangzhou; he wrote the Ode to Lime as a testament of resolve.
Yue Fei’s tomb at Xixia Ridge is flanked by green bamboo.
Refers to Jing Ke’s attempt to assassinate the Qin emperor; Gao Jianli struck the zhu (ancient instrument), moving all to grief.
Chen Sheng raised the first banner of revolt at Dazexiang.
Xiang Yu and Liu Bang rose in arms against Qin.
Alludes to Wu Wenying’s “To the Tune of He Xinlang,” where thawing buds herald spring.
投影破局
——重庆大学城反中共标语投影事件有感
作者：Geoffrey
责任编辑：罗志飞 翻译：何兴强
Projection Breakthrough
— Reflections on the Anti-CCP Slogan Projection Incident at Chongqing University Town
Author: Geoffrey
Editor-in-Chief: Luo Zhifei Translator:He XingQiang
打倒独裁者！从反思毛泽东开始
作者：袁强
编辑：胡丽莉 责任编辑：罗志飞 翻译：吕峰 校对：冯仍
从左到右：张睿信 秦雨斌 周志刚 李树青 袁强
2025年9月6日，美国加州旧金山中共总领馆门前，中国民主党旧金山党部举行每年一次的“毛泽东反思行动日”活动，呼吁国际社会认清中共掩盖历史的谎言，要求中国结束极权统治，走向民主与法治。
活动旨在揭露毛泽东执政期间的血腥暴行，反思其带来的巨大人道灾难。民主人士纷纷发言，讲述毛统治下对社会、经济的摧毁。其不仅在国内制造灾难，还输出革命，扶植朝鲜金日成、柬埔寨波尔布特、古巴卡斯特罗、罗马尼亚齐奥塞斯库等独裁者，给世界带来灾难。
参与者们强调，反思毛泽东不仅是追溯历史，更是对现实的警醒。众多参与者高举横幅与标语，高喊“还我同胞！还我土地！反对强抢！”等口号，表达对中共极权和谎言统治的强烈抗议。
Down with Dictators!
Begin by Reflecting on Mao Zedong
Author: Yuan QiangEditor: Hu Lili Responsible Editor: Luo Zhifei Translation: Lyu Feng
From left to right: Zhang Ruixin, Qin Yubin, Zhou Zhigang, Li Shuqing, Yuan Qiang
On September 6, 2025, in front of the Chinese Consulate General in San Francisco, California, the San Francisco Branch of the China Democracy Party held its annual “Mao Zedong Reflection Action Day.” The event called on the international community to recognize the Chinese Communist Party’s lies in covering up history and demanded an end to China’s authoritarian rule in favor of democracy and the rule of law.
The purpose of the event was to expose the bloody atrocities committed during Mao Zedong’s rule and to reflect on the immense humanitarian disasters he caused. Democracy activists delivered speeches detailing the devastation Mao’s regime inflicted on society and the economy. They emphasized that Mao not only created disasters domestically, but also exported revolution abroad, supporting dictators such as Kim Il-sung in North Korea, Pol Pot in Cambodia, Fidel Castro in Cuba, and Nicolae Ceaușescu in Romania, bringing calamity to the world.
Participants stressed that reflecting on Mao Zedong is not merely about tracing history, but also a warning for the present. Many held up banners and signs, shouting slogans such as “Return my compatriots! Return my land! Oppose forced seizure!” to voice strong opposition to the CCP’s dictatorship and its rule of lies.
中共宣传工作常识
作者：华言
编辑：冯仍 责任编辑：胡丽莉 翻译：吕峰
一、宣传作为权力工具
中国共产党的宣传体系并非凭空产生，而是根植于其革命历史与意识形态需求。中共成立于1921年，早期作为一支弱小的革命力量，宣传成为其动员群众、凝聚力量的核心工具。在土地革命和抗日战争时期，宣传以“唤醒民众”为目标，通过口号、标语、戏剧和歌曲等形式，将马克思主义的阶级斗争理念与民族救亡的诉求结合，成功塑造了“工农联盟”与“民族英雄”的形象。然而，这种看似“启发民智”的宣传，从一开始就带有强烈的目的性：通过简化复杂的政治理念，制造对立情绪，动员群众支持革命。
早期宣传的“动员”本质上是一种单向灌输，而非双向沟通。中共通过控制信息传播，筛选有利于自身合法性的叙事，压制异见声音。1920年代的“反帝反封建”宣传，将复杂的社会问题简化为“帝国主义”和“封建地主”的罪恶，忽略了社会变革的多维性。这种二元对立的叙事策略，虽然在短期内有效凝聚了革命力量，但也埋下了思想单一化的种子，为日后宣传体系的高度集中化奠定了基础。
随着1949年中华人民共和国的建立，宣传从革命工具转变为国家治理的核心机制。中共将宣传定义为“党的生命线”，通过中央宣传部等机构，将意识形态灌输嵌入国家机器的每个角落。宣传不再仅仅是动员工具，而是成为维护政权合法性、塑造社会共识的权力杠杆。这种转变标志着宣传从“启发”走向“控制”，其目标从动员群众转向统一思想，压制多元意见。
中共宣传学的理论基础源于马克思主义，马克思主义宣传观强调“阶级意识”的觉醒，认为宣传应教育无产阶级认识自身的历史使命。马克思设想的宣传是启发性的，旨在通过理性讨论唤醒工人阶级的自我意识，而非自上而下的强制灌输。列宁主义对宣传的改造强调党作为“先锋队”必须通过宣传引导群众，赋予宣传强烈的组织性和纪律性。中共在继承列宁主义宣传观的基础上，进一步将其本土化，融入了中国传统政治文化中的“教化”理念。儒家传统强调“以德治国”，通过道德教化塑造社会秩序，中共则将这一理念转化为“以意识形态治国”，通过宣传灌输党的价值观。
从理论上讲，宣传作为一种沟通形式，应当以事实为基础，通过理性说服实现共识。然而，中共宣传体系的理论基础却建立在对权力的绝对服从，而非对真理的追求。其核心逻辑是：党的意志代表人民的意志，因此宣传的任务不是启发讨论，而是确保公众接受党的叙事。
二、宣传金字塔体系
1.中央宣传部：信息控制
中央宣传部作为中共宣传体系的核心机构，是信息控制与意识形态管理的最高权力中枢。其职能涵盖制定宣传政策、指导媒体运作、审查信息内容以及协调全国宣传工作。表面上，中宣部以“引导舆论”为目标，但其核心任务是通过集中化控制，确保所有信息输出符合党的政治目标。
中宣部的权力集中体现在其对媒体、出版、教育和文化领域的全面监管。新闻出版署和国家广播电视总局等机构名义上独立，实则受中宣部直接领导。中宣部通过发布“宣传指令”和“敏感词列表”，对媒体报道的内容、语气甚至用词进行细致管控。
中宣部的运作具有明显的“黑箱”特征。其决策过程不透明，缺乏公众监督，宣传政策的制定往往基于政治需求而非事实依据。中宣部通过延迟信息发布、控制报道口径，优先维护政权形象而非公众知情权。
2.地方宣传的执行：忠诚
地方宣传机构作为中宣部的下属执行单位，负责将中央的宣传政策落实到具体实践中。每个省级、市级、县级党委都设有宣传部门，形成一个自上而下的垂直管理体系。地方宣传机构的任务包括组织本地媒体报道、开展群众宣传活动以及监控区域内舆论动态。地方宣传机构必须严格遵循中宣部的指令，确保本地舆论与中央保持一致。地方媒体在报道重大政策时，必须使用新华社通稿或中宣部指定的措辞，任何偏离都可能被视为政治错误。这种高度统一的要求，限制了地方根据实际情况调整宣传策略的空间，导致宣传内容往往与公众需求脱节。
3.宣传垄断：压制多元声音
宣传部门与政府部门、司法机构乃至国有企业形成了一个紧密的协同网络，确保宣传政策在社会各领域得到贯彻。这种党政协同的核心目标是实现宣传垄断，压制任何可能挑战官方叙事的多元声音。在制度设计上，宣传部门与政府部门的联动通过“党政一体”机制实现。教育部门负责将党的意识形态融入教材，公安部门配合监控网络言论，文化部门审查文艺作品的内容。这种全方位的协同控制，确保了学校、网络、媒体及公共场所的信息环境均受党主导。官方叙事占据绝对主导地位，独立媒体、公民记者和非官方信息来源被边缘化甚至消灭。这种单一信息环境不仅限制了公众的知情权，还削弱了社会对复杂问题的讨论能力。这种垄断以牺牲思想多样性为代价，扼杀了社会创新与批判性思考。
4.民间“自愿”宣传：被操控的群众运动
除了官方机构，中共宣传体系还善于动员民间力量参与宣传，形成所谓的“自愿”宣传。然而这种“自愿”往往是被操控的结果，背后隐藏着权力结构的强制性影响。民间宣传的典型形式包括“五毛党”（网络评论员）、志愿者组织以及群众性宣传活动。这些活动表面上由民间自发组织，实则受宣传部门的直接指导和资助。
三、叙事操控：从“正面宣传”到选择性真相
中共宣传体系的核心任务是通过精心设计的叙事，塑造有利于政权合法性和社会稳定的公共认知。这种叙事操控以“正面宣传”为名，强调突出党的成就、民族复兴和社会和谐，但其本质是通过选择性真相，构建单一的、符合官方利益的现实版本。
“正面宣传”的核心策略是筛选信息，放大有利事实，掩盖或淡化不利信息。这种选择性叙事通过媒体、教科书和公共活动反复强化，旨在将党的形象与国家进步绑定。
情绪动员是中共宣传体系的重要策略，通过激发恐惧、民族主义和集体认同等强烈情绪，引导公众行为和认知。民族主义是情绪动员的另一核心工具。宣传部门通过突出民族自豪感，将党的领导与国家强盛绑定。这种民族主义动员虽然增强了内部凝聚力，却也导致了狭隘的排外情绪。这种策略虽然在短期内有效，却以牺牲理性讨论和社会包容性为代价。
恐惧动员是宣传中常用的手法，通过制造外部威胁或内部危机感，促使公众依靠官方叙事寻求安全感。宣传常将西方国家描绘为“敌对势力”，通过“反华阴谋论”激发公众警惕。
1.传统媒体的从属角色
传统媒体，包括报纸、电视和广播，在中共宣传体系中长期扮演“党喉舌”的角色。《人民日报》、中央电视台等核心媒体直接受中央宣传部领导，其内容生产严格遵循党的政治目标。传统媒体的从属性体现在内容生产的严格管控上。新闻报道必须使用新华社通稿或中宣部指定的措辞，记者和编辑的创作空间被压缩到最低限度。
2. 新媒体的控制与利用
随着互联网和移动设备的普及，中共宣传体系迅速拥抱新媒体平台，如微信、微博、抖音等，将其作为舆论引导的新阵地。表面上，新媒体以互动性和多样性吸引公众，但其核心仍是官方叙事的延伸，通过算法推荐和内容管控实现精准化的宣传。新媒体的利用体现在其“亲民化”策略上。官方账号通过短视频、表情包和直播等形式，包装严肃的宣传内容，以迎合年轻受众。
3.审查与监控
审查与监控是中共宣传体系的核心机制，技术的发展为其提供了更高效的工具。网络审查通过防火长城、关键词过滤和人工审核，限制敏感信息的传播；监控则通过大数据和人工智能，追踪公众的网络行为。批判性分析表明，这些机制以技术赋能信息封锁，严重侵蚀了言论自由和隐私权。
网络审查的规模和精度在全球范围内罕见。防火长城屏蔽了大量海外网站，如谷歌、YouTube和维基百科，确保公众只能接触国内受控的信息环境。关键词过滤系统则实时监控社交媒体内容，自动删除或屏蔽涉及政治敏感话题的帖子。网络监控则通过大数据和人工智能实现精准化管理。宣传部门与公安部门合作，部署了“天网”监控系统和社交媒体用户行为分析工具。
四、全球传播的野心：话语争夺 中共宣传体系近年来将目光投向全球，试图通过国际传播提升中国的影响力，争夺国际话语权。其核心战略被概括为“讲好中国故事”，旨在通过传播正面形象，反驳西方媒体的“负面报道”，并塑造一个“和平崛起”的中国形象。“讲好中国故事”战略自2013年提出以来，成为中共外宣的核心指导思想。官方通过国际会议、媒体报道和文化活动，推广“中国模式”的成功，如“一带一路”倡议的“合作共赢”叙事和抗疫期间的“人类命运共同体”理念。中共外宣媒体，如中国国际电视台、《中国日报》及新华社国际版，是其国际宣传的核心工具。这些媒体以多语种形式向全球传播中国视角，试图打破西方媒体的“信息垄断”。海外社交平台的利用是外宣媒体的另一尝试。中共通过在X、YouTube等平台开设官方账号，发布短视频和图文内容，试图直接接触国际受众。
面对国际舆论的批评，中共宣传体系采取了多重策略，包括反驳、转移焦点和主动塑造叙事，但这些策略因其防御性和操控性，效果有限。反驳策略通过直接否认或驳斥西方媒体的报道，试图扭转负面形象。转移焦点是另一常见策略，通过突出其他议题分散注意力。主动塑造叙事则通过国际媒体合作和舆论引导，试图抢占话语权。
五、宣传的代价
中共宣传体系以其高效的组织架构和资源投入，在短期内实现了强大的舆论控制效果。官方通过媒体、活动和网络平台的密集宣传，确保核心叙事深入社会各个角落。但这种效果更多是“虚假繁荣”，其表面成功掩盖了长期隐患。首先，强制性宣传导致公众的被动接受，缺乏真正的内心认同。其次，宣传的过度正面引发了公众的审美疲劳。诸如“正能量”“中国梦”等口号的反复使用，使部分受众产生逆反心理，降低宣传的说服力。再次，虚假繁荣掩盖了宣传体系的脆弱性。在信息时代，公众通过非官方渠道获取信息的可能性增加，官方叙事的可信度受到挑战。例如，2020年新冠疫情期间，民间信息通过社交媒体传播，揭露了官方宣传中未提及的物资短缺和基层混乱，这种“信息失控”的风险表明，宣传的短期效果难以转化为长期的信任资本。
中共宣传体系通过强制性叙事和信息控制，塑造了高度统一的思想环境，但这一过程以思想单一化和社会创造力的抑制为代价，压制了多元观点和个体表达，导致社会在文化、学术和创新领域的活力下降。
Basic Knowledge of CCP Propaganda
Abstract: This article systematically reviews the development and characteristics of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) propaganda system: from a mobilization tool during the revolutionary period, to a governance mechanism after the establishment of the PRC, and finally to today’s pyramid structure and global external propaganda strategy. The article reveals that its essence lies in maintaining regime legitimacy through information monopoly and emotional manipulation, but at the cost of ideological uniformity and suppressed social vitality.
Author: Hua Yan Editor: Feng Reng Responsible Editor: Hu Lili Translation: Lyu Feng
1. Propaganda as a Tool of Power
The CCP’s propaganda system did not emerge out of thin air; it is rooted in its revolutionary history and ideological needs. Founded in 1921, the CCP was initially a small revolutionary force, and propaganda became a core tool for mobilizing the masses and consolidating strength. During the Land Revolution and the Anti-Japanese War, propaganda aimed to “awaken the people” by combining Marxist class struggle concepts with the call for national salvation through slogans, banners, theater, and songs. This successfully shaped the image of the “worker-peasant alliance” and “national heroes.”
However, this seemingly “enlightening” propaganda was highly purposeful from the outset: by simplifying complex political ideas and creating oppositional emotions, it mobilized the masses to support the revolution.
Early CCP propaganda was essentially a one-way indoctrination rather than a two-way communication. By controlling the flow of information, the CCP selectively promoted narratives favorable to its legitimacy while suppressing dissenting voices. In the 1920s, campaigns such as the “anti-imperialist, anti-feudal” propaganda simplified complex social problems into the evils of “imperialism” and “feudal landlords,” ignoring the multidimensional nature of social transformation. Although this binary narrative strategy effectively consolidated revolutionary forces in the short term, it also planted the seeds of ideological uniformity, laying the foundation for the later highly centralized propaganda system.
With the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, propaganda shifted from a revolutionary tool to a core mechanism of state governance. The CCP defined propaganda as the “lifeline of the Party,” embedding ideological indoctrination into every corner of the state apparatus through institutions such as the Central Propaganda Department. Propaganda was no longer merely a mobilization tool but became a lever of power to maintain regime legitimacy and shape social consensus. This shift marked a transition from “enlightenment” to “control,” with its goal moving from mobilizing the masses to unifying thought and suppressing pluralistic opinions.
The theoretical foundation of CCP propaganda lies in Marxism, which emphasizes the awakening of “class consciousness” and the education of the proletariat about their historical mission. Marx envisioned propaganda as an enlightening process aimed at awakening self-awareness in the working class through rational discussion, rather than a top-down imposition. Leninist adaptation stressed that the Party, as the “vanguard,” must guide the masses through propaganda, giving it strong organizational and disciplinary characteristics. Building on this Leninist foundation, the CCP further localized propaganda, integrating it with the Chinese traditional political concept of “moral education” (教化). Whereas Confucianism emphasized governing through virtue to shape social order, the CCP transformed this into “governing through ideology,” instilling Party values through propaganda.
Theoretically, propaganda as a form of communication should be fact-based and use rational persuasion to build consensus. However, the CCP’s propaganda system is founded on absolute obedience to power rather than a pursuit of truth. Its core logic is that the Party’s will represents the will of the people; therefore, propaganda’s task is not to stimulate discussion, but to ensure public acceptance of the Party’s narrative.
II. The Propaganda Pyramid
1. Central Propaganda Department: Information Control
The Central Propaganda Department (CPD) is the core institution of the CCP propaganda system, serving as the highest authority for information control and ideological management. Its responsibilities include formulating propaganda policies, guiding media operations, censoring content, and coordinating nationwide propaganda work. While it ostensibly aims to “guide public opinion,” its core mission is to ensure all information output aligns with Party objectives through centralized control.
The CPD’s concentrated power is evident in its comprehensive oversight of media, publishing, education, and culture. Institutions such as the National Press and Publication Administration and the National Radio and Television Administration, although nominally independent, are directly subordinate to the CPD. The CPD exercises meticulous control through “propaganda directives” and “sensitive word lists,” regulating not only content but also tone and language.
The CPD operates as a “black box,” with opaque decision-making processes and no public oversight. Propaganda policies are often based on political necessity rather than factual evidence. By delaying the release of information and controlling reporting standards, the CPD prioritizes regime image over public right to know.
2. Local Propaganda Implementation: Loyalty
Local propaganda offices, subordinate to the CPD, are tasked with implementing central policies in practice. Every provincial, municipal, and county-level Party committee has propaganda departments, forming a top-down vertical management system. Their responsibilities include organizing local media reports, conducting public outreach, and monitoring regional public opinion. Local offices must strictly follow CPD directives to align local discourse with central mandates. When reporting major policies, local media must rely on Xinhua press releases or CPD-specified wording; deviations may be considered political errors. This strict uniformity limits local adaptation, often disconnecting propaganda from public needs.
3. Propaganda Monopoly: Suppression of Plurality
Propaganda departments coordinate closely with government agencies, the judiciary, and state-owned enterprises to ensure Party narratives permeate all sectors of society. The core goal of this party-government collaboration is to establish a propaganda monopoly and suppress any voices that could challenge the official narrative. Structurally, this is achieved through the “party-government integration” mechanism: education embeds Party ideology into curricula, police monitor online discourse, and cultural departments censor artistic content. This all-encompassing control ensures that schools, the internet, media, and public spaces are dominated by Party-led narratives. Independent media, citizen journalists, and unofficial sources are marginalized or eliminated. This monopolization, achieved at the expense of ideological diversity, stifles social innovation and critical thinking.
4. Civil “Voluntary” Propaganda: Manipulated Mass Participation
The CCP propaganda system also mobilizes civilian forces to participate in “voluntary” propaganda, which is often tightly controlled. Typical forms include online commentators (the “50-cent party”), volunteer organizations, and mass campaigns. Although these activities appear spontaneous, they are directly guided and funded by propaganda departments.
III. Narrative Control: From “Positive Propaganda” to Selective Truth
The CCP’s propaganda system seeks to shape public perception to reinforce regime legitimacy and social stability. Narrative control, under the guise of “positive propaganda,” emphasizes Party achievements, national rejuvenation, and social harmony, but its essence lies in selective truth-telling, constructing a singular reality that serves official interests.
The core strategy of “positive propaganda” is to filter information, amplify favorable facts, and conceal or downplay unfavorable ones. This selective narrative is repeatedly reinforced through media, textbooks, and public events, linking Party image to national progress.
Emotional mobilization is another key tactic, using fear, nationalism, and collective identity to guide public perception and behavior. Nationalism strengthens internal cohesion but fosters narrow-minded xenophobia. Fear is also leveraged by portraying external threats or internal crises, compelling citizens to rely on official narratives. Western countries are often depicted as “hostile forces,” with “anti-China conspiracy theories” promoting vigilance.
1. Subordinate Role of Traditional Media
Traditional media, including newspapers, television, and radio, serve as the Party’s “mouthpiece.” Core outlets such as People’s Daily and CCTV are directly controlled by the CPD, producing content strictly aligned with Party objectives. Journalists and editors have minimal creative freedom; news must use Xinhua releases or CPD-approved wording.
2. Control and Use of New Media
With the rise of the internet and mobile devices, the CCP quickly embraced platforms like WeChat, Weibo, and Douyin as new fronts for opinion guidance. While these platforms appear interactive and diverse, they extend official narratives through algorithmic recommendations and content control. Official accounts use short videos, stickers, and livestreams to make serious propaganda appealing to younger audiences.
3. Censorship and Surveillance
Censorship and surveillance are core mechanisms. Internet filtering, the Great Firewall, keyword blocking, and human review restrict sensitive information. Big data and AI track online behavior. These mechanisms enforce information control, severely limiting free speech and privacy. The Great Firewall blocks sites like Google, YouTube, and Wikipedia, while keyword systems monitor social media in real-time. Surveillance networks like “Skynet” further enforce compliance.
IV. Global Ambitions: Narrative Competition
Recently, the CCP has expanded its propaganda globally, seeking to enhance China’s influence and international discourse power. The strategy “telling China’s story well” promotes a positive image, counters Western criticism, and presents China as a “peaceful rising” power. Since 2013, this strategy has guided external propaganda. Key tools include China Global Television Network, China Daily, and Xinhua International Edition, broadcasting Chinese perspectives in multiple languages. Social media platforms like X and YouTube are also used to reach international audiences directly.
In response to criticism, the CCP uses rebuttals, distraction, and proactive narrative shaping. These defensive and manipulative tactics have limited effectiveness. Rebuttals deny or refute Western reports; distraction shifts focus to other topics; proactive shaping attempts to dominate discourse through media collaboration and guided messaging.
V. The Costs of Propaganda
The CCP propaganda system, with its highly organized structure and resources, achieves strong short-term control over public opinion. Intensive coverage through media, events, and online platforms ensures the core narrative reaches all corners of society. However, this “illusory prosperity” hides long-term risks. Coercive propaganda fosters passive acceptance rather than genuine belief. Overuse of positive messaging, such as slogans like “positive energy” or the “Chinese Dream,” can provoke resistance, reducing persuasive impact.
Moreover, the system’s artificial success masks its vulnerabilities. In the information age, citizens access unofficial channels, challenging the credibility of official narratives. For instance, during the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic, social media revealed shortages and local disorder ignored in official propaganda, showing the short-term effects cannot be easily converted into lasting trust.
By enforcing unified narratives and controlling information, the CCP propaganda system suppresses diverse viewpoints and individual expression, stifling creativity and vitality in cultural, academic, and innovative fields.
方舱纪事：防疫的权宜之计与荒废的遗产
作者/编辑：钟然
责任编辑：罗志飞 翻译：吕峰 校对：冯仍
自2020年武汉疫情爆发起，中国紧急建设方舱医院，将体育馆、展览馆等大空间临时改造成收治轻症和无症状患者的隔离区，以缓解正规医院的床位压力。然而，这些人群密集、条件简陋的方舱在一定程度上成为了病毒的温床，存在交叉感染风险。随后，全国多地在疫情高峰期纷纷跟进，尤其是2022年上海大规模封控期间，不仅设立普通方舱，还专门将儿童与成人单独隔离，社会争议巨大。随着疫情缓解，这些方舱医院迅速闲置，设施荒废，暴露出应急医疗建设缺乏长远规划、资源利用低效的问题，也反映出防疫决策在保护民众利益方面的严重缺失。
2020年2月 武汉市连夜建了洪山体育馆、武汉客厅、武汉国际会展中心三处“方舱医院”
2020年武展方舱医院
2020年武展方舱医院
2021年1月 石家庄集中隔离点
2022年4月 上海公共卫生临床中心的“婴幼儿隔离点”
2022年11月 广州白云区隔离转运点
2022年11月中旬，在广州南沙万顷沙，成为当时“动态清零”政策下的“抗疫堡垒”。
南沙方舱医院自2022年11月14日动工，至少9000名建设者在项目一线战斗，700余台施工机械全面投入建设。11月25日，南沙方舱全面建成并交付，历时仅12天。2022年12月7日，国务院公布新冠病毒防疫措施“新十条”彻底放开新冠防疫政策,投入使用仅10天的南沙万顷沙方舱，顿时失去了用武之地。两年后，它已变身成为“小商品市场”，成批出售曾用于隔离的集装箱、各类家电和生活物资，曾经的“防疫阵地”如今正被清仓出货。记忆与现实交叠，一处特殊时期的城市“遗迹”，在一张张成交单据中渐渐隐没。
南沙方舱1号销售处的“商品展厅”
2025年4月底，南沙方舱的部分厢式隔离屋已被预定或售完
南沙方舱内部，单间隔离房还保留着完整洗漱设施，如今堆放着各类生活用品
最终，那些在日夜赶工中堆砌出来的床位、隔板和器械，成了堆积如山的废品，被低价贱卖。曾经被宣传为“防疫奇迹”的方舱，在拆除与荒废中露出本来面目：一场以人民为代价的权力表演。喧嚣过后，留下的不是荣耀，而是冷清的空地与沉默的讽刺。这场疯狂与荒诞，终究还是落下了帷幕。
Chronicles of the Fangcang:A Makeshift Measure and a Wasted Legacy
Author/Editor: Zhong Ran Executive Editor: Luo Zhifei Translation: Lyu Feng
Since the outbreak of COVID-19 in Wuhan in 2020, China urgently built fangcang hospitals, converting large venues such as sports arenas and exhibition halls into temporary isolation facilities to accommodate patients with mild or asymptomatic infections, thereby easing the bed shortage in regular hospitals. However, these densely populated and poorly equipped facilities, to some extent, became breeding grounds for the virus and carried significant risks of cross-infection.
Subsequently, many regions across the country followed suit during peak waves of the pandemic. Notably, during the large-scale lockdowns in Shanghai in 2022, authorities not only established general fangcang hospitals but also separated children from adults, sparking enormous social controversy.
As the pandemic subsided, these facilities were quickly abandoned, left to decay, exposing the lack of long-term planning in emergency medical infrastructure and the inefficiency in resource utilization. More importantly, they reflected a severe failure in epidemic control policies to safeguard the interests of the people.
In February 2020, Wuhan overnight converted three sites—the Hongshan Gymnasium, Wuhan Living Room, and Wuhan International Convention and Exhibition Center—into “fangcang” hospitals.
The 2020 Wuhan Exhibition Fangcang Hospital
The 2020 Wuhan Exhibition Fangcang Hospital
January 2021, Shijiazhuang centralized quarantine site
April 2022, “Infant and Toddler Isolation Facility” at Shanghai Public Health Clinical Center
November 2022, Baiyun District Quarantine Transfer Facility, Guangzhou
In mid-November 2022, in Wanqingsha, Nansha District, Guangzhou, it became a “pandemic stronghold” under the then “dynamic zero-COVID” policy.
The Nansha Fangcang Hospital began construction on November 14, 2022, with at least 9,000 workers on site and over 700 pieces of construction machinery fully deployed. By November 25, the hospital was fully completed and handed over, taking only 12 days. On December 7, 2022, the State Council announced the “New Ten Measures” for COVID-19 prevention, fully lifting the pandemic control policies. The Nansha Wanqingsha Fangcang, which had been in operation for just 10 days, immediately became obsolete.
Two years later, it has been transformed into a “small goods market,” with batches of former isolation containers, household appliances, and daily necessities being sold off. The former “pandemic stronghold” is now being cleared out. Memory and reality intersect as this urban relic from a unique period gradually fades away amid rows of sales receipts.
“Product Exhibition Hall” of Nansha Fangcang No. 1 Sales Center
By the end of April 2025, some of the modular isolation units at Nansha Fangcang had already been reserved or sold out.
Inside Nansha Fangcang, the single-occupancy isolation rooms still retain complete washing facilities, but are now stacked with various household goods.
Ultimately, the beds, partitions, and equipment that had been hastily assembled day and night became mountains of scrap, sold off at bargain prices. The fangcang hospitals, once hailed as a “pandemic miracle,” revealed their true nature in demolition and decay: a display of power paid for at the people’s expense. After the clamor subsided, what remained was not glory, but empty, desolate spaces and silent irony. This frenzy and absurdity, in the end, finally came to a close.
哪怕活在黑夜，也要守护生存的光明
作者：陈婷
编辑：韩唳 责任编辑：胡丽莉 翻译：吕峰
在这个全球高速流转、技术日新月异的时代里，人类最基础的自由——生存的权利——却在某些阴暗角落悄然滑落谷底。一则原本意图掩盖的信息意外泄露，让世人短暂撕开了遮羞布，也照见了现实的冰冷真相。
9月23日中共举办的一场阅兵活动中，一段麦克风未关闭的录音引爆全球舆论：习近平与普京的对话中，涉及“器官移植”与“长生不老”字眼，引起外界广泛关注与震惊。美国众议院议长麦克·约翰逊随即发声谴责，称： “我们听过太多恐怖的中国器官移植故事，这些器官都来自‘不情愿的捐献者’，这样说已经是轻描淡写了。”他的语气不带修辞，却比任何宣传口号更具穿透力：“他们的世界观是何等邪恶！”
这不是第一次关于“活摘器官”的真相浮出水面，也不会是最后一次。早在2006年起，数以千计的证人证言、研究报告、国际媒体调查便反复指出：中国境内存在系统性、国家支持的强制器官摘取，受害者多为宗教信仰者、良心犯，尤其是法轮功修炼者、西藏僧人、维吾尔族群体。2019年“独立中国法庭”判定，中共确实“持续多年大规模活摘器官”，构成“反人类罪”。2021年，联合国人权专家再次发出警告，对中共“以种族、宗教信仰为目标群体的器官掠夺”表示“深切担忧”。
麦克风事件之所以格外刺目，在于它的“日常性”：这不是秘密会议，也不是私人访谈，而是在举国欢庆的天安门前、世界领袖聚焦的场合中自然流露出的“内部默契”。那一刻，器官并不是生命的延续，而是某些特权者用于维系自我权力、欲望与生命延长的筹码。而“人”，在这种语境下，不再是拥有独立人格与尊严的生命体，而是冰冷数字、临床指标、可替代的“零件”。
我们必须追问：当一个国家的权力中心可以将他人的身体视为备用仓库，其余的“自由”是否还有意义？在这样的体制中，生存的权利若无法保障，言论自由、信仰自由、迁徙自由等权利几乎全数归零。一个活着的人若无权保有自己的身体，那么他在精神、政治、社会上的“自由”也不过是纸面幻象。
佛教中将世界划为六道轮回，其中“人道”最为殊胜，因人具有理智、觉性与修行的可能。但若一个社会将人贬低为供他人食用、拆解的“部件”，则这个世界已从“人道”堕落为“畜生道”。那不是比喻，是现实。贪婪驱动着“器官移植产业链”；恐惧令被关押者噤声；麻木让旁观者习以为常。正是这些因素，将“人间”一步步推向失控的深渊。
藏传佛教堪布索达吉曾说：“若一个人放弃了对他人生命的尊重，他已经开始远离善根。”这一句话，不只是修行者的自警，更应是每一个人类社会制度设计的底线。器官移植本是延续生命的医学奇迹，如今却成为剥夺他人生存权利的罪恶通道。在权力遮蔽之下，它从慈悲走向残暴，从救人走向谋杀。
在这样的现实中，保持觉知，是每个清醒者的起点。觉知不是愤怒的爆发，而是持续的、不愿接受不公的决心。不因恐惧噤声，不因沉默妥协，不因疲惫遗忘。这种觉知，本身就是一种抵抗。
从宗教伦理的角度看，器官摘取并非不能讨论。但任何建立在“非自愿”基础上的器官获取，都是对伦理的践踏。基督教强调“生命是上帝的赐予”；佛教认为“身体为父母所授，不应轻毁”；伊斯兰教强调“清洁与正义”；犹太教甚至明文禁止未经同意的尸体使用。这些传统并非古旧条文，而是文明之所以为文明的根基。
面对中国日益成熟且秘密化的器官“产业链”，世界必须共同作出回应。首先，各国应通过与美国《制止强制器官摘取法案》类似的法律，禁止与涉及强摘行为的医院、研究单位、医疗供应商合作。其次，应设立全球器官移植追踪机制，严查跨国移植旅游。第三，所有信仰团体应联合发声，将此事提升为全球道义议题，抵制所有将人体视为交易对象的邪恶实践。更重要的，是我们每一个人的回应。在社交网络上转发真相；在社群中讲述事实；在自己的生活中拒绝冷漠——这些微小的行动加总，便能撬动现实的边界。
正如藏地修行者所说：“即使在最黑暗的洞穴中，哪怕一束光也能照亮方向。”这束光，不是别人给的，而是我们自己点燃的。
若世界是一片黑夜，愿我们仍能点灯前行；若制度是高墙，愿我们的声音成为裂缝中的风。生存的自由，绝不能成为少数人延命的工具，而应是所有人的底线。为此，我们必须行动、必须呼吁、必须抵抗。因为，一旦生存权被夺走，其余一切自由都将成为空谈。而一个社会、一个国家，若连最基本的生存自由都不再保障，它也终将失去合法存在的道义根基。
哪怕活在暗夜，也要守住生存的光明。
Even in the Darkest Night, We Must Guard the Light of Life—On the CCP Military Parade Microphone Incident
Author: Chen Ting
Editor: Han Li Responsible Editor: Hu Lili Translation: Lyu Feng
Abstract: This article takes the CCP’s “microphone incident” during a military parade as its point of departure to probe deeply into the issue of systemic forced organ harvesting in China. It argues that the right to life is the cornerstone of all freedoms, condemns this crime against humanity from the perspectives of universal ethics and faith, and finally calls on the international community and individuals to act together in safeguarding the bottom line of human civilization.
In today’s world of rapid global circulation and ever-changing technology, humanity’s most fundamental freedom—the right to life—has, in some dark corners, quietly sunk to its lowest point. A piece of information originally meant to be hidden was accidentally exposed, briefly tearing away the fig leaf and revealing the cold reality.
At a CCP military parade on September 23, an unmuted microphone recording set off a global storm: in a conversation between Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin, the words “organ transplant” and “immortality” appeared, drawing widespread shock and concern. U.S. House Speaker Mike Johnson immediately condemned it, saying: “We have heard far too many horrific stories of organ transplants in China, and these organs come from ‘unwilling donors’—and that phrasing is already putting it mildly.” Without rhetorical flourish, his words pierced more sharply than any slogan: “What an evil worldview they have!”
This is not the first time the truth about “live organ harvesting” has surfaced, and it will not be the last. Since 2006, thousands of witness testimonies, research reports, and international media investigations have repeatedly pointed out that systemic, state-backed forced organ harvesting exists in China. Victims have included religious believers and prisoners of conscience, especially Falun Gong practitioners, Tibetan monks, and Uyghurs. In 2019, the Independent Tribunal into Forced Organ Harvesting from Prisoners of Conscience in China concluded that the CCP had engaged in “large-scale organ harvesting over many years,” constituting “crimes against humanity.” In 2021, United Nations human rights experts again voiced “deep concern” over China’s organ plunder targeting groups defined by ethnicity and religion.
What makes the “microphone incident” so striking is its normalcy: it was not a secret meeting nor a private interview, but a moment of “internal consensus” that slipped out in front of Tiananmen, during a national celebration, under the eyes of the world’s leaders. In that instant, organs were not about sustaining life but chips for certain elites to extend power, desire, and longevity. In this context, human beings were no longer dignified individuals, but cold numbers, clinical indicators, and replaceable “parts.”
We must ask: when a nation’s center of power can regard others’ bodies as spare warehouses, do any other freedoms retain meaning? In such a system, if the right to life cannot be guaranteed, then freedom of speech, religion, or movement all collapse into nothing. For a person who cannot even possess their own body, political, spiritual, and social “freedoms” are illusions on paper.
Buddhism speaks of six realms of reincarnation, with the human realm the most precious because humans have reason, awareness, and the potential for cultivation. But when a society reduces people to consumable parts for disassembly, it falls from the “human realm” into the “animal realm.” This is not metaphor—it is reality. Greed drives the “organ transplant industry chain”; fear silences detainees; numbness makes bystanders complicit. Together, these forces push humanity step by step toward the abyss.
As Tibetan Buddhist Khenpo Sodargye has said: “If a person abandons respect for others’ lives, he has already strayed far from virtue.” This is not merely a warning to practitioners but should be the bottom line of any human social system. Organ transplantation should be a medical miracle that prolongs life, but under the shadow of power it has become a channel of atrocity—transforming compassion into cruelty, healing into murder.
In this reality, maintaining awareness is the beginning for every awake individual. Awareness is not an outburst of rage, but a sustained refusal to accept injustice: not silenced by fear, not compromised by silence, not dulled by fatigue. This awareness is resistance in itself.
From the perspective of religious ethics, organ donation can be a subject of discussion. But any organ acquisition based on coercion is a violation of morality. Christianity teaches that life is a gift from God; Buddhism teaches that the body is bestowed by one’s parents and must not be desecrated; Islam emphasizes purity and justice; Judaism explicitly prohibits the use of a corpse without consent. These traditions are not relics of the past, but the very foundations of civilization.
In the face of China’s increasingly sophisticated and secretive organ “industry chain,” the world must respond together. First, nations should pass laws similar to the U.S. Stop Forced Organ Harvesting Act, banning cooperation with hospitals, research institutions, or suppliers implicated in such practices. Second, a global transplant-tracking mechanism should be established to investigate cross-border transplant tourism. Third, all faith communities should unite in making this a global moral issue, opposing every practice that treats the human body as an object of trade. Most importantly, each of us must respond: by sharing the truth on social networks; by telling facts within our communities; by refusing indifference in daily life. These small actions, when accumulated, can shift the boundaries of reality.
As Tibetan practitioners say: “Even in the darkest cave, a single beam of light can show the way.” That light is not bestowed by others, but lit by ourselves.
If the world is a dark night, may we still light lamps and press forward. If the system is a high wall, may our voices be the wind through its cracks. The freedom to live must never be reduced to a tool for a few to extend their lives; it must remain the bottom line for all. For this, we must act, appeal, and resist. Because once the right to life is stripped away, all other freedoms become hollow. And a society or nation that fails to safeguard the most basic freedom of survival will ultimately lose the moral foundation of its legitimacy.
Even in the darkest night, we must guard the light of life.
