作者：易勇
编辑：钟然 校对：熊辩 翻译：彭小梅

 长期以来，中共叙事将中国的经济成就归功于其政权领导。通过对东亚文化底层逻辑的深度剖析，中国人的竞争力源于几千年极端环境筛选出的“生存基因”与“延迟满足”能力。对比日、韩、台、新等东亚经济体的成功，揭示了中国大陆经济腾飞的真相，并非制度神话，而是民间力量在政权权力稍作松绑后的自我修复与爆发。

观察整个东亚文化圈，日本在废墟上仅用20余年便跃居世界第二大经济体；韩国、台湾与新加坡在缺乏资源的前提下稳居发达行列。这些地区从未经历过共产主义的教条统治，却同样实现了跨越式的腾飞。

究其根本，东亚文明真正的核心竞争力在于一种被极端历史环境筛选出的“生存优势”。华夏大地在两千多年间经历了密集的战乱、屠杀与大饥荒，这种残酷的自然选择，使得活下来的族群骨子里刻着极强的耐受力和“延迟满足”的能力，为了长远目标，可以忍受当下极端枯燥、高压和艰辛。这种特质，才是中国人在现代工业体系中无往不利的“核动力”。这种力量早在政党诞生前就已存在于我们的血脉中，它不是权力的恩赐，而是祖先用血汗拼杀出的生命本能。

中共常吹嘘1978年后的经济成就，却刻意回避了前三十年的荒诞与残酷。在那段黑暗时期，政权通过政治运动打断了中国人的腿，禁锢了百姓的双手。

1978年后的所谓“崛起”，本质上根本不是什么“制度神话”，而是这个政权终于在崩溃边缘意识到，只要不再折腾，只要松开枷锁，让中国人融入全球化分工，中国人民就能凭借自发的勤勉养活自己。这就像是一个劫匪在打断你的腿后送你一副拐杖，然后每天在你耳边宣称，没有我，你就无法走路。中国人民的成功，完全是由于他们巨大的吃苦耐劳能力抵消了制度性阻碍。如果同样的文化土壤配合自由、法治的制度，产出的能量绝非今日所能比拟。

讽刺的现实在于，在所有以华裔为主的经济体中，中国大陆的人均GDP依然处于落后位置。新加坡的人均产出是大陆的数倍；港澳台的富足也是不争的事实。同样的文化基因，为何在所谓“先进制度”下，百姓却要承受全球最长的工时、最薄弱的福利和最沉重的税收负担？       

真相是中共的宣传掩盖了其掠夺性的本质。他们利用中国人的忍耐力，将劳动力压榨到极致，却将创造的财富挥霍在维稳、大撒币和权力寻租上。他们不仅掠夺了财富，更试图掠夺“解释权”，把中国人的坚韧说成是他们的教化，把中国人的成功说成是他们的功劳。

拆穿这个“没党就没饭吃”的自卑骗局，中国人的成功，是几千年苦难筛选出的基因力量，是每一个在工位流汗、在烈日下奔波的普通人挣来的。

历史已经证明，没有那个政权，东亚人照样能惊艳世界。认清这一点，不仅是为了戳破谎言，更是为了让每一个中国人拿回属于自己的，本就不该被窃取的尊严。

Tearing Away the Fig Leaf of “Institutional Superiority”: Who Is Harvesting the Sweat of the Chinese People?

Author: Yi Yong Editor: Zhong Ran Proofreader: Xiong Bian Translator: Peng Xiaomei

Abstract: China’s economic achievements stem from the endurance and capacity for delayed gratification embedded in East Asian culture, rather than from institutional superiority. The so-called “rise” is in fact the release of popular forces after partial loosening, while the regime conceals its predatory nature and monopolizes the power of interpretation.

For a long time, the Chinese Communist Party’s narrative has attributed China’s economic achievements to its political leadership. Through an in-depth analysis of the underlying logic of East Asian culture, the competitiveness of Chinese people originates from “survival genes” and the capacity for “delayed gratification” shaped by thousands of years of extreme environmental selection. By comparing the successes of East Asian economies such as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore, the truth behind the economic takeoff of mainland China is revealed: it is not an institutional myth, but rather the self-repair and eruption of popular forces after a slight loosening of state power.

Looking across the entire East Asian cultural sphere, Japan rose to become the world’s second-largest economy in just over twenty years from the ruins; South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore, despite lacking resources, have firmly ranked among developed economies. These regions have never experienced the doctrinaire rule of communism, yet they have achieved similar leapfrog development.

At its root, the true core competitiveness of East Asian civilization lies in a “survival advantage” shaped by extreme historical conditions. Over more than two thousand years, the Chinese land has experienced dense warfare, massacres, and great famines. This harsh natural selection has left the surviving populations with deep-seated endurance and the ability for “delayed gratification”—the capacity to endure extreme monotony, high pressure, and hardship in the present for long-term goals. This trait is the “nuclear power” that allows Chinese people to thrive within the modern industrial system. This force existed in our blood long before the birth of any political party; it is not a gift of power, but a life instinct forged through the blood and sweat of our ancestors.

The Chinese Communist Party often boasts about the economic achievements after 1978 yet deliberately avoids the absurdity and cruelty of the preceding thirty years. During that dark period, the regime crippled the Chinese people’s legs and bound their hands through political campaigns.

The so-called “rise” after 1978 is essentially not an “institutional myth” at all, but rather that this regime, on the verge of collapse, finally realized that as long as it stopped tormenting society, loosened its shackles, and allowed Chinese people to integrate into the global division of labor, the Chinese people could sustain themselves through their own diligence. It is like a robber who breaks your legs and then hands you a pair of crutches, while proclaiming every day that without him, you would not be able to walk. The success of the Chinese people is entirely due to their immense capacity for hardship, which offsets institutional obstacles. If the same cultural foundation were paired with a system of freedom and rule of law, the energy produced would be far beyond what we see today.

The ironic reality is that among all economies dominated by ethnic Chinese populations, mainland China still lags in per capita GDP. Singapore’s per capita output is several times that of the mainland; the prosperity of Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan is also an undeniable fact. With the same cultural foundation, why must ordinary people under the so-called “advanced system” endure the world’s longest working hours, the weakest welfare, and the heaviest tax burdens?

The truth is that the Chinese Communist Party’s propaganda conceals its predatory nature. They exploit the endurance of the Chinese people, pushing labor to the extreme, while squandering the wealth created on stability maintenance, indiscriminate spending, and rent-seeking tied to power. They not only plunder wealth but also attempt to seize the “right to interpretation,” portraying the resilience of the Chinese people as their own cultivation, and the success of the Chinese people as their own achievement.

To expose this inferiority-driven illusion that “without the Party, there would be no food to eat,” the success of the Chinese people is the genetic strength forged through thousands of years of hardship, earned by every ordinary person who sweats at their workstation and toils under the blazing sun.

History has already proven that without that regime, East Asians can still astonish the world. Recognizing this is not only to pierce through falsehoods, but also to allow every Chinese person to reclaim the dignity that rightfully belongs to them and should never have been taken away.

编辑：胡丽莉 校对：熊辩 翻译：周敏

浙江省杭州市中级人民法院刑事判决书

[1998]杭法刑初字第183号

公诉机关：浙江省杭州市人民检察院

被告人王有才，1966年6月29日出生，汉族，浙江省淳安县人，无业，住浙江省杭州市西湖区翠苑区14幢2单元401室。一九九０年十二月因犯反革命宣传煽动罪被北京市中级人民法院判处有期徒刑四年，剥夺政治权利一年；后被北京市高级人民法院改判有期徒刑三年，剥夺政治权利一年。一九九一年十一月被假释，一九九八年七月十日被刑事拘留，同年八月七日被逮捕，同月三十日被监视居住，同年十一月三十日被逮捕，现押浙江省公安厅看守所。

浙江省杭州市人民检察院以被告人王有才煽动颠覆国家政权罪，于一九九八年十二月五日向本院提起公诉。本院依法组成合议庭，公开开庭对本案进行了审理。浙江省杭州市人民检察院检察员荣华、代理检察员张哲峰出庭支持公诉。被告人王有才到庭参加诉讼，本案经合议庭评议，审判委员会进行了讨论并作出决定，现已审理终结。

       浙江省杭州市人民检察院指控被告人王有才于一九九八年六月结伙他人商议成立“中国民主党”，决定率先在浙江省成立“中国民主党浙江筹备委员会”，拟定了公然诽谤、诬蔑我国国家政权和社会主义制度的“中国民主党章程（草案）”和“中国民主党浙江筹备委员会成立公开宣言”。王有才通过国际互联网将上述“章程”及“宣言”向美国、香港等地组织及个人发送了十八份电子邮件。按照事先商定，由其同伙将“中国民主党浙江筹备委员会成立公开宣言”印刷并在杭州市的上城区房管局城南房管站及采荷路与凯旋路交叉口一带进行散发。同年七月，被告人王有才分别通知他人于七月十一日在杭州以“喝茶”形式聚会，准备继续讨论成立“中国民主党”事宜，后被公安机关查获而未逞。同年十一月，被告人王有才被监视居住期间，在杭州市与境外敌对组织成员会面商谈并接受1000美元。此外，同年五月和九月，被告人王有才还分别接受境外敌对组织成员资助的人民币4000元、300美元。公诉机关认为，被告人王有才的行为已构成煽动颠覆国家政权罪，且系累犯，应依法严惩。

被告人王有才对所控的事实供认不讳，但辩解其行为仅针对现实社会现象，与煽动颠覆国家政权无关，故其行为不构成犯罪。

经开庭审理查明：被告人王有才以颠覆国家政权，推翻社会主义制度为目的，积极进行组建非法政党的活动，一九九八年六月，被告人王有才纠集祝正明、吴义龙（均另行处理）在杭州市原杭州大学草坪上就王有才提出的成立政党一事进行商议，决定将政党定名为“中国民主党”，率先在浙江省成立“中国民主党浙江筹备委员会”，并各自拟写该党章程。

同年六月二十四日晚，被告人王有才与祝正明、吴义龙及王东海、林辉等人（均另行处理）在祝正明家讨论并拟定了“中国民主党章程（草案）”（以下简称“章程）和”中国民主党浙江筹备委员会成立公开宣言（以下简称“宣言”），诬蔑攻击国家政权和社会主义制度是“封建专制”“政治独裁”和“强权暴政”等，明确提出“获取政治权利、修改宪法、废除一党专政”，“建立宪政民主政治体制，建立政治分权机制”等等，并商定将上述两文公开散发，同时王有才等人分别就联络、宣传、协商等具体行动进行了分工。

同年六月二十五日上午，被告人王有才通过国际互联网向美国、香港等地的组织及个人发送载有“章程”、“宣言”内容的电子邮件十八份，并要求接收方广为传播。同月三十日上午，按商定由其同伙朱虞夫（另行处理）携带“宣言”印刷件在杭州市上城区房管局城南房管站秋涛南苑物业管理办公室及杭州市采荷路与凯旋路交叉口一带进行散发。

同年七月四日、五日，被告人王有才又分别通知祝正明、王东海等人于七月十一日在杭州以“喝茶”形式聚会，并要求各人尽可能联络其他人员参加，继续讨论“中国民主党”的成立事宜。经联络，林辉等人赶至杭州，准备聚会。后因被公安机关及时查获而未得逞。

    同年十一月，被告人王有才在涉嫌危害国家安全被杭州市公安局监视居住期间，违反法律规定在杭州市与境外敌对组织的成员会面，就成立“中国民主党”筹备会等有关情况进行了介绍和交流，并接受资助的经费1000美元。此外，被告人王有才还于同年五月、九月分别接受境外敌对组织成员所资助的经费人民币4000元和300美元。

上述事实，有下列证明经庭审质证予以证实：

１、祝正明、吴义龙证言证明：一九九八年六月与王有才商议成立政党并决定在浙江省率先成立“中国民主党浙江筹备委员会”；

２、祝正明、吴义龙、王东海、林辉证言证明：一九九八年六月二十四日与王有才在祝家共同讨论修改、定稿“章程”、“宣言”并决定公开散发；王东海证言还证实当晚进行了具体分工；公安机关从王有才、祝正明、朱虞夫家中搜查到的“章程”、“宣言”等打印件、印刷件、底稿、电脑文档等书证在案；“宣言”打印件上园珠笔修改的笔迹经鉴定系王有才所写；

３、公安机关于一九九八年六月二十六日在国际互联网公开结点上的浏览发现“章程”、“宣言”已发往境外的证明材料；对王有才住处查获的“东芝Satellite Pro 430 CDT”笔记本电脑中的“发件箱”（NETSCAPE MAIL）检查证实，一九九八年六月二十五日上午，该电脑通过国际互联网向境外发送了载有“章程”、“宣言”内容的电子邮件十八份的鉴定书；胡江霞证言证明该笔记本电脑系其从单位借用，其曾将单位专门配置的网址告诉过王有才；

４、祝正明证言证明：一九九八年六月二十九日，据与王有才商定，其将“宣言”交朱虞夫散发；包建林、袁伯庭、俞水华证言证明朱虞夫在秋涛南苑物业管理办公室向其分发“宣言”；洪照娣、徐水英证言证明目击被公安机关抓获的朱虞夫在凯旋路一带散发传单；公安机关从散发现场提取的“宣言”，经鉴定与朱虞夫、祝正明家中查获的“宣言”内容一致，并系同一版本；朱虞夫的证言与上述证据证实的情况相符；

５、祝正明、王东海证言证明王有才定于七月十一日聚会讨论“中国民主党”事宜，并被要求分别通知其他人员来参加；林辉证言证明其按通知来杭准备聚会；

６、公安机关从王有才身上搜得的美元及从王有才住处搜获的邮政汇款通知、美元定期存单及敌对组织成员发给王月才有关资助王的电子邮件在案；

７、被告人王有才对上述事实供认不讳，所供与上述证据证实的情况相符。

上述证据，本院予以确认，本案事实清楚，证据确实、充分。

本院认为：被告人王有才组织、策划颠覆国家政权，推翻社会主义制度，其行为已构成颠覆国家政权罪，且罪行重大，被告人王有才在进行颠覆国家政权的活动中，与境外组织相勾结，接受资助；其曾因危害国家安全被判刑，现又再犯危害国家安全罪，系累犯，均应依法从重处罚。公诉机关指控事实成立，但指控罪名不当，应予纠正，被告人王有才提出其不构成犯罪的辩解，经查与事实与法律均不相符，故本院不予采纳。据此，依照《中华人民共和国刑法》第一百零五条第一款、第一百零六条、第六十六条、第五十六条第一款、第五十五条第一款，第六十四条之规定，判决如下：

一、被告人王有才犯颠覆国家政权罪，判处有期徒刑十一年，剥夺政治权利三年；

二、被告人王有才违法所得的1300美元(其中300美元系被冻结在中国银行杭州市高新技术开发区支行户名为“胡江霞”的“定期一本通”内的存款，帐号： 4531711006500900003575)，予以追缴。

如不服本判决，可于接到判决书的次日起十日内，通过本院或直接向浙江省高级人民法院提出上诉。书面上诉的，应交上诉状正本一份，副本二份。

审判长 刘舒海

审判员 孙 伟

审判员 何 敏

一九九八年十二月二十日

本件与原本核对无异

书记员 冯 菁

Criminal Judgment of the Hangzhou Municipal Intermediate People’s Court, Zhejiang Province

Editor: Hu Lili Proofreader: Xiong Bian Translator: Zhou Min

[1998] Hang Fa Xing Chu Zi No. 183

Public Prosecution Organ: People’s Procuratorate of Hangzhou City, Zhejiang Province.

Defendant Wang Youcai, born on June 29, 1966, Han nationality, native of Chun’an County, Zhejiang Province, unemployed, residing at Room 401, Unit 2, Building 14, Cuiyuan District, Xihu District, Hangzhou City, Zhejiang Province. In December 1990, he was sentenced to four years of fixed-term imprisonment and one year of deprivation of political rights by the Beijing Municipal Intermediate People’s Court for the crime of counter-revolutionary propaganda and incitement; later, the Beijing Municipal Higher People’s Court changed the sentence to three years of fixed-term imprisonment and one year of deprivation of political rights. He was released on parole in November 1991. He was criminally detained on July 10, 1998, arrested on August 7 of the same year, placed under residential surveillance on the 30th of the same month, and arrested again on November 30 of the same year. He is currently held in the Detention Center of the Zhejiang Provincial Public Security Department.

The People’s Procuratorate of Hangzhou City, Zhejiang Province, initiated a public prosecution against the defendant Wang Youcai for the crime of inciting subversion of state power to this Court on December 5, 1998. This Court formed a collegial bench according to law and conducted a public trial of this case. Procurator Rong Hua and Acting Procurator Zhang Zhefeng of the People’s Procuratorate of Hangzhou City, Zhejiang Province, appeared in court to support the public prosecution. The defendant Wang Youcai appeared in court to participate in the proceedings. Following deliberation by the collegial bench and discussion/decision by the Judicial Committee, the trial of this case is now concluded.

The People’s Procuratorate of Hangzhou City, Zhejiang Province, charges that in June 1998, the defendant Wang Youcai colluded with others to discuss the establishment of the “China Democracy Party,” deciding to take the lead in establishing the “Zhejiang Preparatory Committee of the China Democracy Party” in Zhejiang Province. They drafted the “Constitution of the China Democracy Party (Draft)” and the “Declaration of the Establishment of the Zhejiang Preparatory Committee of the China Democracy Party,” which publicly slandered and vilified our country’s state power and the socialist system. Wang Youcai sent eighteen emails containing the aforementioned “Constitution” and “Declaration” to organizations and individuals in the United States, Hong Kong, and other places via the international Internet. According to a prior agreement, his accomplices printed and distributed the “Declaration of the Establishment of the Zhejiang Preparatory Committee of the China Democracy Party” in the vicinity of the Chengnan Housing Management Station of the Shangcheng District Housing Bureau in Hangzhou and the intersection of Caihe Road and Kaixuan Road. In July of the same year, the defendant Wang Youcai respectively notified others to gather in the form of “drinking tea” in Hangzhou on July 11, preparing to continue discussing the establishment of the “China Democracy Party,” which was later discovered by public security organs and failed. In November of the same year, while the defendant Wang Youcai was under residential surveillance, he met and discussed with members of overseas hostile organizations in Hangzhou and accepted 1,000 US dollars. In addition, in May and September of the same year, the defendant Wang Youcai respectively accepted 4,000 RMB and 300 US dollars in funding from members of overseas hostile organizations. The public prosecution organ believes that the behavior of the defendant Wang Youcai has constituted the crime of inciting subversion of state power, and as he is a recidivist, he should be severely punished according to law.

The defendant Wang Youcai confessed to the charged facts without reservation but defended that his actions were only directed at actual social phenomena and had nothing to do with inciting the subversion of state power, therefore his actions did not constitute a crime.

It has been found through the trial: With the purpose of subverting state power and overthrowing the socialist system, the defendant Wang Youcai actively carried out activities to organize an illegal political party. In June 1998, the defendant Wang Youcai gathered Zhu Zhengming and Wu Yilong (both handled separately) on the lawn of the former Hangzhou University in Hangzhou to discuss the establishment of a political party proposed by Wang Youcai. They decided to name the party the “China Democracy Party,” take the lead in establishing the “Zhejiang Preparatory Committee of the China Democracy Party” in Zhejiang Province, and each draft the constitution of said party.

On the evening of June 24 of the same year, the defendant Wang Youcai, along with Zhu Zhengming, Wu Yilong, Wang Donghai, Lin Hui, and others (all handled separately), discussed and drafted the “Constitution of the China Democracy Party (Draft)” (hereinafter referred to as the “Constitution”) and the “Declaration of the Establishment of the Zhejiang Preparatory Committee of the China Democracy Party” (hereinafter referred to as the “Declaration”) at Zhu Zhengming’s home. They vilified and attacked the state power and the socialist system as “feudal autocracy,” “political dictatorship,” and “power tyranny,” and explicitly proposed “obtaining political rights, amending the Constitution, abolishing the one-party dictatorship,” “establishing a constitutional democratic political system, establishing a political power-sharing mechanism,” etc. They agreed to publicly distribute the two aforementioned documents, and at the same time, Wang Youcai and others respectively divided specific tasks regarding communication, propaganda, and consultation.

On the morning of June 25 of the same year, the defendant Wang Youcai sent eighteen emails containing the contents of the “Constitution” and “Declaration” to organizations and individuals in the United States, Hong Kong, and other places through the international Internet, and requested the recipients to disseminate them widely. On the morning of the 30th of the same month, as agreed, his accomplice Zhu Yufu (handled separately) carried printed copies of the “Declaration” and distributed them in the vicinity of the Qiutao Nanyuan Property Management Office of the Chengnan Housing Management Station of the Shangcheng District Housing Bureau in Hangzhou and the intersection of Caihe Road and Kaixuan Road in Hangzhou.

On July 4 and 5 of the same year, the defendant Wang Youcai respectively notified Zhu Zhengming, Wang Donghai, and others to gather in the form of “drinking tea” in Hangzhou on July 11, and requested each person to contact other personnel to participate as much as possible to continue discussing the establishment of the “China Democracy Party.” Through these contacts, Lin Hui and others rushed to Hangzhou to prepare for the gathering. This did not succeed as it was discovered in time by public security organs.

In November of the same year, while the defendant Wang Youcai was under residential surveillance by the Hangzhou Municipal Public Security Bureau on suspicion of endangering national security, he violated legal regulations to meet with members of overseas hostile organizations in Hangzhou, introduced and exchanged information regarding the establishment of the preparatory committee of the “China Democracy Party,” and accepted 1,000 US dollars in funding. In addition, the defendant Wang Youcai also respectively accepted funding of 4,000 RMB and 300 US dollars from members of overseas hostile organizations in May and September of the same year.

The above facts are confirmed by the following evidence verified through court cross-examination:

1. Testimony of Zhu Zhengming and Wu Yilong proves: In June 1998, they discussed the establishment of a political party with Wang Youcai and decided to take the lead in establishing the “Zhejiang Preparatory Committee of the China Democracy Party” in Zhejiang Province;

2. Testimony of Zhu Zhengming, Wu Yilong, Wang Donghai, and Lin Hui proves: On June 24, 1998, they discussed, revised, and finalized the “Constitution” and “Declaration” together with Wang Youcai at Zhu’s home and decided on public distribution; the testimony of Wang Donghai also confirms that specific labor division was carried out that night; documentary evidence such as printed copies, printed materials, drafts, and computer documents of the “Constitution” and “Declaration” searched by public security organs from the homes of Wang Youcai, Zhu Zhengming, and Zhu Yufu are on file; the handwriting of ballpoint pen revisions on the printed copy of the “Declaration” was appraised as being written by Wang Youcai;

3. Certifying materials of the public security organs’ discovery on June 26, 1998, through browsing international Internet public nodes that the “Constitution” and “Declaration” had been sent overseas; an appraisal report from the inspection of the “Sent” folder (NETSCAPE MAIL) in the “Toshiba Satellite Pro 430 CDT” laptop seized from Wang Youcai’s residence confirming that on the morning of June 25, 1998, the computer sent eighteen emails containing the “Constitution” and “Declaration” to overseas destinations; the testimony of Hu Jiangxia proves that the laptop was borrowed from her workplace and she had told Wang Youcai the specific web address configured by the workplace;

4. Testimony of Zhu Zhengming proves: On June 29, 1998, as agreed with Wang Youcai, he gave the “Declaration” to Zhu Yufu for distribution; testimony of Bao Jianlin, Yuan Boting, and Yu Shuihua proves that Zhu Yufu distributed the “Declaration” to them at the Qiutao Nanyuan Property Management Office; testimony of Hong Zhaodi and Xu Shuiying proves they witnessed Zhu Yufu, who was caught by public security organs, distributing leaflets in the Kaixuan Road area; the “Declaration” extracted from the distribution site was appraised to be identical in content and version to the “Declaration” found in the homes of Zhu Yufu and Zhu Zhengming; the testimony of Zhu Yufu is consistent with the circumstances proven by the above evidence;

5. Testimony of Zhu Zhengming and Wang Donghai proves that Wang Youcai scheduled a gathering on July 11 to discuss “China Democracy Party” matters and requested that they respectively notify other personnel to attend; the testimony of Lin Hui proves he came to Hangzhou to prepare for the gathering as notified;

6. The US dollars seized from Wang Youcai’s person and the postal remittance notices, US dollar fixed-term certificates of deposit, and emails sent by members of hostile organizations to Wang Youcai regarding funding for Wang, which were seized from Wang Youcai’s residence, are on file;

7. The defendant Wang Youcai confessed to the above facts without reservation, and his confession is consistent with the circumstances proven by the above evidence.

The above evidence is confirmed by this Court. The facts of this case are clear, and the evidence is reliable and sufficient.

This Court believes: The defendant Wang Youcai organized and plotted to subvert state power and overthrow the socialist system. His behavior has constituted the crime of subverting state power, and the crime is grave. During the activities of subverting state power, the defendant Wang Youcai colluded with overseas organizations and accepted funding; he had been sentenced for endangering national security and has now committed a crime of endangering national security again, making him a recidivist. Both circumstances warrant heavier punishment according to law. The facts charged by the public prosecution organ are established, but the charged charge was inappropriate and should be corrected. The defense raised by the defendant Wang Youcai that his behavior does not constitute a crime is found to be inconsistent with the facts and the law upon investigation, and therefore this Court does not adopt it. Accordingly, in accordance with the provisions of Article 105 Paragraph 1, Article 106, Article 66, Article 56 Paragraph 1, Article 55 Paragraph 1, and Article 64 of the Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China, the judgment is as follows:

1.The defendant Wang Youcai is convicted of the crime of subverting state power and is sentenced to eleven years of fixed-term imprisonment and three years of deprivation of political rights;

2.The illegal gains of 1,300 US dollars of the defendant Wang Youcai (of which 300 US dollars were frozen in the “Fixed-term All-in-one” deposit under the name of “Hu Jiangxia” at the Hangzhou High-tech Development Zone Branch of the Bank of China, Account No: 4531711006500900003575) shall be recovered.

If you disagree with this judgment, you may, within ten days from the day after receiving the judgment, submit an appeal through this Court or directly to the Higher People’s Court of Zhejiang Province. For a written appeal, the original appeal petition and two copies shall be submitted.

Presiding Judge: Liu Shuhai Judge: Sun Wei Judge: He Min

December 20, 1998 This copy is verified to be identical to the original. Court Clerk: Feng Jing

攝影記者：關永傑
編輯：鍾然 校对：熊辩 翻译：周敏

2026年4月12日下午，中國民主黨成員在中國駐舊金山總領事館門前舉行集會，聲援民主台灣，反對中共對台灣的軍事威脅與政治施壓，並譴責國民黨主席鄭麗文出訪大陸親共賣台。儘管活動開始時風雨交加，現場參與者仍堅持完成全部活動流程。

活動發起人之一、中國民主黨黨員陳森鋒表示，此次活動是在與台灣知名反共人士「八炯」交流後共同推動。他介紹，對方從台灣社會的角度提供了一些建議。他表示，作為從中國大陸出來的人，對中共體制有切身認識，不希望台灣現有的民主制度遭到破壞，並認為台灣在華語社會中具有重要示範意義。

中國民主黨舊金山黨部秘書長鄭雲在發言中指出，台灣是一個擁有選舉制度、言論自由和公民權利的社會，這些制度性成果值得被維護。她表示，中共近年來透過軍事行動、政治施壓及壓縮國際空間，對台灣形成持續壓力。她強調，應清晰表達立場，反對威脅行為，並重申台灣的未來應由台灣人民自主決定。

黨員郭志軍表示，中共對台灣的影響不僅體現在軍事層面，也包括政治、經濟以及資訊領域。中共不僅對中國人民進行資訊管控，還長期對全球民主國家進行「紅色滲透」。他提到社交媒體在輿論影響中的作用，認為相關手段正在改變社會討論環境，並呼籲台灣方面保持警惕。

黨員李栩指出，台灣的民主制度是長期發展的結果，這一成果來之不易，在外部壓力下更需要保持穩定與信心。

黨員衛仁喜表示，台灣在現實環境中面臨多方面挑戰，只有2300萬人口的台灣，要面對被中共裹挾的14億人口的大陸，處境十分艱難，更令人擔憂的是還存在來自內部的壓力與分歧，但仍需堅定信心，讓民主制度持續存在並發展。

黨員李凱認為，支持台灣不僅涉及地緣問題，也關係到自由與選擇權，應反對任何形式的外部干預，台灣的命運只能由台灣人民決定。

黨員盧占強從制度角度分析安全問題，指出台灣真正的安全不僅在於軍事裝備，區域和平除了依賴軍事平衡，也取決於治理結構與權力約束。他認為，一個走向文明、擁抱民主的中國，才是台灣走向長久和平的根本保障，也是兩岸人民共同的尊嚴所在。

黨員何聰回顧歷史經驗，認為過往教訓值得關注，並對國共關係提出批評。他表示，推動制度轉型、建立民主政體，才是中國與台灣未來發展的重要方向。

黨員劉靜濤表示，台灣的民主就是一面照妖鏡，中共懼怕站在這面鏡子面前，戳穿中共“統一”的謊言，不能讓台灣民主之光熄滅，讓這道光照遍大陸各地，中國總有一天會實現民主自由。

黨員李樹青認為，台灣的現狀對部分中國民眾具有啓發意義。事實證明，在絕對權力下，沒有任何真相能存活，我們不能去支持甘當中共“花瓶黨”在我們的民主世界存在！台灣是我們中國人民追求民主和自由的燈塔，守護台灣，保持台灣和平是我們每個愛好民主普世價值觀的人民的責任。

黨員張善城指出，制度差異是當前矛盾的重要背景之一，如果國民黨覺得靠讓步能換來平安，那完全是政治上的天真，退掉的不僅是地盤，而是保護自由的底線。台灣的民主是文明的火種，是未來的希望，一旦這盞燈被吹滅，整個民族將再次掉進權力只手遮天的黑洞。

此外，邢貴、吳志創、周忠玉、周小俊等黨員及灣區民主運動人士袁強也在現場發言，表達對台灣議題的關注與看法。

在今天眾多發言者當中，有幾位對於國民黨目前的墮落深感憤慨，並喊出“國民黨滾出台灣”的口號。對於這些激憤的情緒，鄭雲特作了補充發言，她也表示對國民黨選出一個如此親共的主席感到難過，但不能一竹竿打落一船人，灣區也有很多國民黨黨員，比如五洲洪門致公總堂的盟長趙炳賢，就是有著堅定立場的反共人士。

活動中還有一個播放影片環節，現場播放了國民黨主席鄭麗文學生時期的一段演講影片，鄭麗文早期主張台灣獨立與民族解放，她強烈抨擊國民黨為“外來政權”，號召推翻其威權統治，建立獨立的“台灣國”，展現出極其激進的反共與反核本土立場。而另一段影片則涉及台灣網紅“館長”陳之漢早年的相關言論，引發了現場討論，他的立場轉變體現了流量至上的網紅邏輯，從早期的激進批判中國共產黨到如今訪問大陸為中共站台叫好，其言行往往隨政治風向與商業利益搖擺，這種“發卡彎”式變臉，既反映了其個人信念的缺失，也揭示了他在利益驅動下的投機本質。

活動最後，與會者進行象徵性表達行動，手撕印有「中共非法政權」字樣的紙張，並集體高喊口號，表達對相關議題的立場與訴求：

維護世界和平！

捍衛民主台灣！

聲援台灣！

反對侵略！

停止軍演！

停止威脅！

拒絕出賣！

守護台灣！

隨後，現場多次重複呼喊：

台灣的未來——誰決定？

台灣人民！

再來一次——誰決定？

台灣人民！

在持續的風雨中，參與者衣物被打濕，但活動仍在有序氛圍中結束。多位參與者表示，此類行動旨在表達對民主制度與地區和平的關注，並強調台灣安全在當前局勢中的重要性。

Support Democratic Taiwan, Condemn the KMT Chairperson’s Pro-CCP and Taiwan-Betraying Trip

Photojournalist: Guan Yongjie
Editor: Zhong Ran Proofreader: Xiong Bian Translator: Zhou Min

Summary: Members of the China Democracy Party in the Bay Area gathered in front of the Consulate General of the People’s Republic of China in San Francisco to support Taiwan’s democracy, oppose CCP pressure and military threats, and pay attention to the cross-strait situation and the fact that Taiwan’s future is decided independently by its people.

On the afternoon of April 12, 2026, members of the China Democracy Party held a rally in front of the Consulate General of the People’s Republic of China in San Francisco to support democratic Taiwan, oppose the CCP’s military threats and political pressure against Taiwan, and condemn Kuomintang (KMT) Chairperson Zheng Liwen’s visit to the Mainland as pro-CCP and betraying Taiwan. Despite the wind and rain at the start of the event, participants on-site persisted in completing the entire activity process.

Chen Senfeng, one of the event organizers and a member of the China Democracy Party, stated that this activity was jointly promoted after an exchange with the well-known Taiwanese anti-communist figure “Ba Jiong.” He explained that the other party provided some suggestions from the perspective of Taiwanese society. He expressed that, as someone from Mainland China who has a personal understanding of the CCP system, he does not want Taiwan’s existing democratic system to be destroyed, and believes that Taiwan serves as an important demonstration model in the Chinese-speaking world.

Zheng Yun, Secretary-General of the San Francisco Branch of the China Democracy Party, pointed out in her speech that Taiwan is a society with an electoral system, freedom of speech, and civil rights; these institutional achievements deserve to be maintained. She stated that in recent years, the CCP has formed continuous pressure on Taiwan through military actions, political pressure, and the compression of international space. She emphasized that positions should be expressed clearly to oppose threatening behavior, and reiterated that Taiwan’s future should be decided independently by the Taiwanese people.

Member Guo Zhijun stated that the CCP’s influence on Taiwan is reflected not only at the military level but also includes the political, economic, and information fields. The CCP not only carries out information control over the Chinese people but has also long conducted “Red Infiltration” against democratic countries globally. He mentioned the role of social media in influencing public opinion, believing that relevant methods are changing the social discussion environment, and called on the Taiwan side to remain vigilant.

Member Li Xu pointed out that Taiwan’s democratic system is the result of long-term development; this achievement was not easily won and requires maintaining stability and confidence even more under external pressure.

Member Wei Renxi stated that Taiwan faces challenges from many aspects in the current environment. Taiwan, with a population of only 23 million, must face a Mainland of 1.4 billion people coerced by the CCP, making its situation extremely difficult. What is even more worrying is the existence of internal pressure and divisions, yet it is still necessary to remain firm in confidence to let the democratic system continue to exist and develop.

Member Li Kai believes that supporting Taiwan involves not only geopolitical issues but also relates to freedom and the right to choose; any form of external interference should be opposed, and Taiwan’s fate can only be decided by the Taiwanese people.

Member Lu Zhanqiang analyzed security issues from an institutional perspective, pointing out that Taiwan’s true security lies not only in military equipment. Regional peace, besides depending on military balance, also depends on governance structures and power constraints. He believes that a China that moves toward civilization and embraces democracy is the fundamental guarantee for Taiwan to move toward long-term peace, and where the common dignity of the people on both sides of the strait lies.

Member He Cong reviewed historical experiences, believing that past lessons deserve attention, and offered criticism of KMT-CCP relations. He stated that promoting institutional transformation and establishing a democratic polity is the important direction for the future development of China and Taiwan.

Member Liu Jingtao stated that Taiwan’s democracy is a “monster-revealing mirror” (Zhao Yao Jing). The CCP fears standing in front of this mirror, which exposes the CCP’s lies of “unification.” We cannot let the light of Taiwan’s democracy be extinguished; let this light shine across all parts of the Mainland. China will one day achieve democracy and freedom.

Member Li Shuqing believes that Taiwan’s current status has enlightening significance for some Chinese people. Facts prove that under absolute power, no truth can survive. We cannot support the existence of “vase parties” that willingly serve the CCP in our democratic world! Taiwan is the lighthouse for us Chinese people in the pursuit of democracy and freedom. Guarding Taiwan and maintaining peace in Taiwan is the responsibility of every person who loves democratic universal values.

Member Zhang Shancheng pointed out that institutional difference is one of the important backgrounds of current contradictions. If the KMT feels that peace can be exchanged for through concessions, that is complete political naivety; what is retreated from is not just territory, but the bottom line of protecting freedom. Taiwan’s democracy is the spark of civilization and the hope for the future. Once this lamp is blown out, the entire nation will once again fall into the black hole where power covers the sky with one hand.

In addition, members Xing Gui, Wu Zhichuang, Zhou Zhongyu, Zhou Xiaojun, and Bay Area democracy activist Yuan Qiang also spoke at the scene, expressing their concerns and views on Taiwan issues.

Among the many speakers today, several felt deeply indignant about the current degradation of the KMT and shouted the slogan “KMT get out of Taiwan.” Regarding these agitated emotions, Zheng Yun made a supplementary speech. She also expressed sadness over the KMT electing such a pro-CCP chairperson, but said one cannot beat a whole boat of people with one pole (generalize). There are also many KMT members in the Bay Area; for example, Zhao Bingxian, the leader of the Wuzhou Hongmen Zhigong Tang, is an anti-communist person with a firm stance.

There was also a video screening segment during the event. A video of KMT Chairperson Zheng Liwen’s speech during her student days was played. In her early years, Zheng Liwen advocated for Taiwan’s independence and national liberation. She strongly attacked the KMT as an “alien regime” and called for the overthrow of its authoritarian rule to establish an independent “Republic of Taiwan,” showing an extremely radical anti-communist and anti-nuclear localist stance. Another video involved relevant early remarks by the Taiwanese internet celebrity “Genghua” Chen Zhihan, which sparked discussion on-site. His shift in stance reflects the logic of “traffic-first” internet celebrities; from early radical criticism of the Chinese Communist Party to now visiting the Mainland to stand for and cheer for the CCP, his words and deeds often sway with political winds and commercial interests. This “hairpin turn” style of face-changing reflects both the lack of his personal conviction and reveals his opportunistic nature driven by interests.

At the end of the activity, participants carried out a symbolic expressive action, hand-tearing paper printed with the words “CCP Illegal Regime” and collectively shouting slogans to express their positions and demands on relevant issues:

Maintain world peace!

Defend democratic Taiwan!

Support Taiwan!

Oppose aggression!

Stop military exercises!

Stop threats!

Refuse betrayal!

Guard Taiwan!

Subsequently, the scene repeated the shouts several times:

The future of Taiwan—who decides?

The Taiwanese people!

One more time—who decides?

The Taiwanese people!

In the continuous wind and rain, the participants’ clothes were soaked, but the activity ended in an orderly atmosphere. Multiple participants stated that such actions aim to express concern for democratic systems and regional peace and emphasize the importance of Taiwan’s security in the current situation.

作者：王小光
编辑：周志刚 校对：周敏 翻译：戈冰

当“稳定”需要被反复表演：从“习郑会”看当代政治沟通的困境

在当下的政治语境中，每一次高层会晤都不仅仅是一次会面，更是一种被精心设计的“表达行为”。近期举行的“习郑会”，正是这样一个典型样本。镜头、通稿、措辞和节奏，无不显示出高度的程式化与可控性。习近平在这样的场景中出现，既是参与者，也是整个叙事体系的核心象征。

从表面上来看，这类会晤承载着明确功能：对内稳定预期，对外释放信号。在经济承压、国际环境复杂的背景下，通过高规格会谈来展示“沟通仍在进行”“局势依然可控”，无疑具有某种现实意义。然而，当这种表达逐渐演变为一种固定模式时，它本身也开始暴露出越来越明显的局限。

首先值得注意的，是这类会晤在信息层面的高度抽象化。公开内容通常围绕“合作”“发展”“共识”等宏大叙述展开，语言稳健而谨慎，却极少触及具体政策路径、执行难点或潜在分歧。这种表达方式在形式上避免了风险，在效果上却降低了信息密度。对于需要判断趋势的市场与观察者而言，这种“高概括、低细节”的沟通，越来越难以提供足够的参考价值。

更进一步看，这种抽象化表达实际上构建了一种特殊的“安全语言体系”。在这一体系中，所有可能引发不确定性的内容都被有意弱化甚至排除，而留下的，是一套几乎可以适用于任何情境的通用表述。问题在于，当语言可以脱离具体情境而成立时，它也就失去了对现实的解释力。换句话说，当每一次会晤听起来都相似时，它所能传递的信息就越来越有限。

与此同时，这种沟通模式还带来了一个更具讽刺意味的后果：本应用于降低不确定性的表达，反而在某种程度上放大了不确定性。由于缺乏具体信息，外界只能依赖有限线索进行推测，各种解读由此层出不穷。在信息不对称的情况下，解释空间越大，分歧也就越多，最终形成一种“越强调稳定，越难以被相信”的悖论。

这种悖论，在“习郑会”中体现得尤为明显。如果一个体系的运行确实稳健，那么稳定本应是一种无需反复强调的自然状态。然而，当“稳定”需要通过频繁的高层会晤、统一的语言表达以及密集的信号释放来维持时，它就从一种客观结果，转变为一种需要不断被生产的“政治产品”。而任何需要持续生产的东西，都不可避免地面临边际效应递减的问题。

从这个角度来看，“习郑会”的意义，或许并不在于它说了什么，而在于它为何必须被举行。它所回应的，并非单一问题，而是一种更广泛的信心波动：经济预期的不确定、外部环境的复杂变化，以及内部政策节奏的调整所带来的压力。在这些因素叠加之下，单次会晤所能承担的功能被不断放大，但其实际能力却并未相应提升。

更深层的原因，则可以从决策与表达之间的关系中找到线索。在一个决策趋于集中的体系中，信息往往沿着自上而下的路径被筛选与重构。最终呈现出来的，不是多元意见的交汇过程，而是经过整理后的“统一结论”。这种模式在提升执行效率的同时，也压缩了外界理解决策逻辑的空间。

问题在于，在高度复杂的现实环境中，外界对信息的需求已经不再局限于“结论是什么”，而是进一步延伸到“结论如何形成”“是否存在不同意见”“体系是否具备纠错能力”。当这些信息缺位时，即便结论本身再明确，也难以完全消除疑问。

由此带来的结果，是一种微妙但持续的信任消耗。它并不会以剧烈的方式表现出来，而是以更隐蔽的形式逐渐累积：市场反应更加谨慎，外部观察更加保留，内部预期更加分化。在这样的背景下，单次会晤的象征意义不断上升，但其实际影响力却在缓慢下降。

从传播学的角度看，这也可以被理解为一种“信号通胀”。当信号被过度使用时，其边际价值必然下降。最初，一次高层会晤可能足以引发广泛解读；但当类似信号频繁出现且内容高度同质化时，外界对其的敏感度与信任度都会随之降低。最终，它可能仍然是必要的，但已不再具有决定性。

因此，与其将“习郑会”视为某种转折点，不如将其理解为一种持续状态的体现。它反映的，不是某一项具体政策的变化，而是一整套沟通机制在当前环境下面临的适应压力。在这一压力之下，形式与内容之间的张力愈发明显：形式需要保持稳定与权威，内容却必须面对不断变化的现实。

这种张力如果长期存在，便会产生一个耐人寻味的结果——形式逐渐独立于内容而存在。会晤继续举行，语言继续重复，结构继续维持，但其与现实之间的联系却在逐步松动。到那时，会晤的主要功能，或许不再是推动问题解决，而是确认体系本身仍在运转。

这或许正是“习郑会”最值得关注的地方。它不仅是一场具体的政治活动，更像是一面镜子，映射出当代政治沟通在复杂环境中的某种困境：既需要控制不确定性，又难以提供足够信息；既追求表达的一致性，又必须面对现实的多样性。

在这样的背景下，真正决定外界判断的，往往不再是会晤本身，而是会晤之后的行动。如果信号能够转化为具体、连贯且可验证的政策路径，那么其影响仍有可能延续；反之，如果表达与行动之间持续存在落差，那么再精致的沟通形式，也难以长期维持其说服力。

归根结底，政治沟通的有效性，并不取决于表达本身的完美程度，而取决于它与现实之间的契合程度。当“稳定”更多依赖于被展示，而不是被感知时，这种差距终究会显现出来。而“习郑会”所呈现的，正是这一差距正在被逐步放大的过程。

The Xi-Zheng Meeting: A Carefully Orchestrated Diplomatic Performance

Author: Wang Xiaoguang
Editor: Zhou Zhigang Proofreader: Zhou Min Translator: Ge Bing

Abstract: The “Xi-Zheng Meeting” was primarily intended to send a message of stability; however, due to the abstract nature of its messaging and the lack of concrete substance, it ultimately lacked persuasiveness. Over time, the primary function of the meeting began to shift: it was no longer about driving solutions to problems, but rather about confirming that the system itself was still functioning.

When “Stability” Must Be Repeatedly Performed: The Dilemma of Contemporary Political Communication as Seen Through the “Xi-Cheng Meeting”

In the current political context, every high-level meeting is not merely a gathering but a carefully designed “act of expression.” The recent “Xi-Cheng Meeting” is a prime example of this. The camera angles, press releases, wording, and timing all demonstrate a high degree of ritualization and controllability. In such settings, Xi Jinping appears not only as a participant but also as the central symbol of the entire narrative system.

On the surface, these meetings serve a clear purpose: to stabilize domestic expectations and send signals to the outside world. Against a backdrop of economic pressures and a complex international environment, using high-level talks to demonstrate that “communication is still ongoing” and “the situation remains under control” undoubtedly holds practical significance. However, as this form of communication gradually evolves into a fixed pattern, it begins to reveal increasingly obvious limitations.

First and foremost, it is worth noting the high degree of abstraction in the information conveyed during these meetings. Public statements typically revolve around grand narratives such as “cooperation,” “development,” and “consensus,” employing language that is steady and cautious, yet rarely touching upon specific policy pathways, implementation challenges, or potential disagreements. While this approach avoids risks in form, it reduces the density of information in effect. For markets and observers seeking to gauge trends, this “highly generalized, low-detail” communication is increasingly unable to provide sufficient reference value.

Looking further, this abstract expression actually constructs a special “system of safe language.” Within this system, all content that might trigger uncertainty is intentionally downplayed or even excluded, leaving behind a set of generic statements that can apply to almost any situation. The problem is that when language can stand on its own without reference to a specific context, it loses its ability to explain reality. In other words, when every meeting sounds the same, the information it conveys becomes increasingly limited.

At the same time, this communication model leads to an even more ironic consequence: expressions intended to reduce uncertainty actually amplify it to some extent. Due to the lack of concrete information, the outside world can only rely on limited clues to speculate, giving rise to a multitude of interpretations. In situations of information asymmetry, the greater the room for interpretation, the more disagreements arise, ultimately creating a paradox where “the more stability is emphasized, the harder it is to be believed.”

This paradox is particularly evident in the “Xi-Cheng Meeting.” If a system truly operates robustly, stability should be a natural state that requires no repeated emphasis. However, when “stability” must be maintained through frequent high-level meetings, unified language, and intensive signaling, it transforms from an objective outcome into a “political product” that must be constantly manufactured. And anything that requires continuous production inevitably faces the problem of diminishing marginal returns.

From this perspective, the significance of the “Xi-Cheng meeting” may not lie in what was said, but in why it had to be held. It responds not to a single issue, but to a broader fluctuation in confidence: the uncertainty of economic expectations, the complex changes in the external environment, and the pressure resulting from adjustments to the pace of domestic policy. Under the compounding effect of these factors, the functions expected of a single meeting are constantly magnified, yet its actual capacity has not increased accordingly.

A deeper explanation can be found in the relationship between decision-making and communication. In a system where decision-making tends to be centralized, information is often filtered and restructured along a top-down path. What is ultimately presented is not a process of converging diverse opinions, but a “unified conclusion” that has been organized and refined. While this model enhances execution efficiency, it also limits the outside world’s ability to understand the logic behind decisions.

The problem is that, in a highly complex real-world environment, the outside world’s demand for information is no longer limited to “what the conclusion is,” but extends further to “how the conclusion was formed,” “whether there were dissenting opinions,” and “whether the system possesses the ability to correct errors.” When this information is missing, even the clearest conclusion cannot fully dispel doubts.

The result is a subtle yet persistent erosion of trust. This does not manifest in dramatic ways, but rather accumulates gradually in more subtle forms: market reactions become more cautious, external observers grow more reserved, and internal expectations become increasingly divided. Against this backdrop, the symbolic significance of individual meetings continues to rise, while their actual influence slowly declines.

From a communication studies perspective, this can also be understood as a form of “signal inflation.” When signals are overused, their marginal value inevitably declines. Initially, a single high-level meeting might be enough to spark widespread interpretation; but when similar signals appear frequently and their content is highly homogeneous, the outside world’s sensitivity to and trust in them both diminish. Ultimately, such meetings may still be necessary, but they no longer hold decisive weight.

Therefore, rather than viewing the “Xi-Zheng meeting” as a turning point, it is better understood as an embodiment of an ongoing state. It reflects not a change in any specific policy, but the adaptive pressures faced by an entire communication mechanism in the current environment. Under this pressure, the tension between form and content becomes increasingly apparent: form must maintain stability and authority, while content must confront an ever-changing reality.

If this tension persists over the long term, it will produce an intriguing outcome—form will gradually exist independently of content. Meetings will continue to be held, language will continue to be repeated, and structures will continue to be maintained, yet their connection to reality will gradually weaken. By then, the primary function of such meetings may no longer be to advance problem-solving, but rather to confirm that the system itself is still functioning.

This is perhaps the most noteworthy aspect of the “Xi-Zheng Meeting.” It is not merely a specific political event, but rather a mirror reflecting a certain dilemma in contemporary political communication within a complex environment: the need to control uncertainty while struggling to provide sufficient information; the pursuit of consistency in expression while having to confront the diversity of reality.

Against this backdrop, what truly shapes external assessments is often not the meeting itself, but the actions that follow. If the signals can be translated into concrete, coherent, and verifiable policy pathways, their impact may endure; conversely, if a persistent gap remains between rhetoric and action, even the most sophisticated forms of communication will struggle to maintain their persuasive power over the long term.

Ultimately, the effectiveness of political communication does not depend on the perfection of the expression itself, but on how well it aligns with reality. When “stability” relies more on being displayed than on being perceived, this gap will inevitably become apparent. What the “Xi-Cheng Meeting” has revealed is precisely the process by which this gap is gradually widening.

作者：Reng Feng（冯仍）
编辑：赵杰 校对：周敏 翻译：戈冰

近日读到中国民主党北京党部成员被重判的消息，我心情沉重，也深感愤怒。据《欧洲之声》报道，2025年10月8日，中国民主党北京党部在北京成立；到2026年1月，多名成员被捕；3月30日闭门开庭，3月31日被以“颠覆国家政权罪”重判，其中副主席王石被判七年半，其余成员分别被判处七年至三年不等及缓刑。

《欧洲之声》报道截图-网址：sinoeurovoices.com

这起案件最刺痛人的地方，不只是判决之重，而是它再次暴露了中国现实政治中的一个根本荒谬：宪法写有“结社自由”，现实却把和平建党当作重罪。

《中华人民共和国宪法》第三十五条明文规定：“中华人民共和国公民有言论、出版、集会、结社、游行、示威的自由。”这说明，“结社自由”并不是海外民主人士强加给中国的概念，而是中共自己写入宪法的政治承诺。全国人大官网公布的现行宪法文本中，这一条至今仍在。(npc.gov.cn)

问题在于，这样的条文在中国长期停留于纸面。

如果公民真正按照公开、理性、和平、非暴力的方式组织起来，宣读党章、选举负责人、表达政治理念，本来正应属于“结社自由”的范围；可在中共治下，这样的行为非但得不到保护，反而会被定为“颠覆国家政权”。这就说明，中共宪法中的“自由”，很多时候只是门面，真正起作用的，仍然是一党专政下的政治禁令。

中共当然不会直接承认自己否定宪法。它更常用的办法，是在宪法之外建立一套审查、登记和监管体系，将公民自由层层架空。现行《社会团体登记管理条例》表面上说是为了保障公民结社自由，实际上却要求社会团体必须经过主管单位审查并依法登记，同时不得触碰所谓“基本原则”和“国家安全”边界。(xzfg.moj.gov.cn)

在现实政治中，这种制度安排早已不只是管理程序，而是政治过滤机制：凡是不挑战体制的组织可以存在，凡是真正独立、具有民主诉求的组织，几乎不可能获得合法空间。

因此，北京党部案所揭示的，绝不只是个别人的命运，而是整个制度的真相：中共最害怕的，不是暴力，而是中国人认真地把宪法上的自由，当成真实权利来使用。

据公开消息，中国民主党北京党部所强调的原则是“公开、理性、和平、非暴力”，所表达的目标是在遵守宪法、平等竞争的基础上，推动中国走向自由民主与社会公正。(sinoeurovoices.com)

这样的主张，在现代文明社会中，本应属于正常的公民政治活动；可在中共眼里，却成了必须消灭的威胁。这再次说明，中共所不能容忍的，不是暴力革命，而是和平结社；不是阴谋活动，而是公开表达；不是非法颠覆，而是人民不再甘于沉默。

Freedom House 在《2026年世界自由度报告》中，继续将中国列为“Not Free”，总分仅9分（满分100分）。

Freedom House 在《2026年世界自由度报告》-网址：freedomhouse.org

这个评价一点也不令人意外。一个连宪法所写“结社自由”都不能兑现、反而把和平建党定成重罪的国家，何谈真正的法治，何谈现代政治文明？

更值得警惕的是，这并非孤例。2026年2月，杭州法院又以 “寻衅滋事罪” 判处浙江民主党人邹巍有期徒刑三年六个月，独立作家昝爱宗有期徒刑三年。自由亚洲电台报道，案件开庭时家属旁听同样受到限制。

自由亚洲电台的报道-网址：rfa.org

北京案与杭州案，罪名不同，逻辑却完全一致：只要你试图在党的控制之外保留一点独立人格、独立思想和独立组织空间，维稳机器就会迅速启动。

北京是中国的首都，是中共权力最集中的地方。也正因为如此，中国民主党北京党部在北京成立，才具有格外强烈的象征意义。它所传递的信息非常明确：中国人不是只能永远活在一党专政之下，中国人也有权追求民主、多党竞争和政治自由。

我自己也是从中国走出来的人。我越来越深地意识到，在中国，很多人不是不知道压迫，而是不敢碰；不是没有公民意识，而是在一党专政下，真正像公民那样生活，往往就要付出沉重代价。也正因如此，每当我看到国内仍有人明知危险却坚持和平、理性、公开、非暴力地表达民主理念，我心里都充满敬意。因为他们的站出来，本身就是一种见证：见证中国并不是没有追求自由的人，见证中国民主运动并没有熄灭，也见证中共所谓“法治”常常不过是政治镇压的外衣。

从1998年中国民主党在大陆公开成立，到今天依然有人在北京重新举旗，这说明自由的火种并没有被扑灭。哪怕中共用抓捕、审判和判刑去压制，也无法消灭中国人对自由的渴望。

今天被重判的这些民主党人，不应被遗忘。

他们的名字，不应只停留在一纸判决书里。

海外的我们，也不应只是转发消息后继续沉默。

因为沉默，只会让暴政更加肆无忌惮；发声，至少能告诉世界，也告诉中国人民：问题从来不在人民追求自由，而在一个政权把宪法写成门面，把结社自由写成摆设，把和平建党都视为敌人。

宪法写着结社自由，现实却把和平建党判成重罪。

这不是法治的威严，而是制度的自我揭穿；

这不是国家的自信，而是专制的深层恐惧；

这不是现代文明，而是对现代政治文明最基本原则的公然践踏。

愿更多人记住这些人的名字。

愿更多中国人看清这个制度的真相。

也愿中国有一天，不再因为一次结社、一场宣誓、一句真话，就有人失去自由。

The Constitution guarantees freedom of association, so why has the peaceful establishment of a political party become a serious crime?

Author: Reng Feng
Editor: Zhao Jie Proofreader: Zhou Min Translator: Ge Bing

Recently, upon reading the news that members of the Beijing branch of the China Democratic Party had been handed down heavy sentences, I felt a heavy heart and deep anger. According to a report by *Sino-European Voices*, the Beijing branch of the China Democratic Party was established in Beijing on October 8, 2025; by January 2026, several members had been arrested; a closed-door trial was held on March 30, and on March 31, they were handed down heavy sentences for “subversion of state power.” Among them, Vice Chairman Wang Shi was sentenced to seven and a half years, while the remaining members received sentences ranging from three to seven years, some with suspended sentences.

Screenshot from the Voice of Europe report – URL: sinoeurovoices.com

What is most painful about this case is not merely the severity of the sentences, but that it once again exposes a fundamental absurdity in China’s political reality: while the Constitution guarantees “freedom of association,” in practice, the peaceful establishment of a political party is treated as a serious crime.

Article 35 of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China explicitly states: “Citizens of the People’s Republic of China enjoy freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly, of association, of procession, and of demonstration.” This demonstrates that “freedom of association” is not a concept imposed on China by overseas democrats, but a political commitment the CCP itself enshrined in the Constitution. This provision remains in the current text of the Constitution published on the National People’s Congress website to this day. (npc.gov.cn)

The problem is that such provisions have long remained mere words on paper in China.

If citizens were to genuinely organize in an open, rational, peaceful, and non-violent manner—reading the party charter, electing leaders, and expressing political views—such activities would naturally fall within the scope of “freedom of association.” Yet under CCP rule, such behavior is not only denied protection but is instead labeled as “subversion of state power.” This demonstrates that the “freedoms” enshrined in the CCP’s Constitution are often merely window dressing; what truly prevails are the political prohibitions imposed under one-party dictatorship.

Of course, the CCP would never directly admit to disregarding the Constitution. Its more common approach is to establish a system of censorship, registration, and oversight outside the Constitution, thereby eroding citizens’ freedoms layer by layer. The current “Regulations on the Registration and Administration of Social Organizations” ostensibly aim to safeguard citizens’ freedom of association, but in reality, they require social organizations to undergo review by competent authorities and register in accordance with the law, while strictly avoiding any infringement upon so-called “fundamental principles” and “national security” boundaries. (xzfg.moj.gov.cn)

In the reality of politics, this institutional arrangement has long ceased to be merely a management procedure; it has become a political filtering mechanism: any organization that does not challenge the system is allowed to exist, while any truly independent organization with democratic aspirations finds it virtually impossible to secure a legal space.

Therefore, what the Beijing Party Branch case reveals is by no means limited to the fate of a few individuals; it exposes the truth of the entire system: what the CCP fears most is not violence, but the Chinese people earnestly exercising the freedoms enshrined in the Constitution as genuine rights.

According to public reports, the principles emphasized by the Beijing branch of the China Democratic Party are “openness, rationality, peace, and non-violence.” Its stated goal is to promote freedom, democracy, and social justice in China on the basis of constitutional compliance and equal competition. (sinoeurovoices.com)

In a modern civilized society, such advocacy should be considered normal civic political activity; yet in the eyes of the CCP, it has become a threat that must be eliminated. This demonstrates once again that what the CCP cannot tolerate is not violent revolution, but peaceful association; not conspiratorial activities, but open expression; not illegal subversion, but a people no longer willing to remain silent.

In its 2026 Freedom in the World Report, Freedom House continues to classify China as “Not Free,” with a total score of just 9 out of 100.

Freedom House’s *2026 Freedom in the World Report* – Website: freedomhouse.org

This assessment comes as no surprise. How can a country that fails to uphold the “freedom of association” enshrined in its own constitution—and instead treats the peaceful formation of political parties as a serious crime—claim to have true rule of law or modern political civilization?

What is even more alarming is that this is not an isolated case. In February 2026, a Hangzhou court sentenced Zou Wei, a member of the Zhejiang Democratic Party, to three years and six months in prison, and independent writer Zan Aizong to three years in prison, both on charges of “picking quarrels and provoking trouble.” Radio Free Asia reported that family members were similarly restricted from attending the trial.

Radio Free Asia report – URL: rfa.org

The Beijing case and the Hangzhou case involve different charges, yet their logic is entirely consistent: as soon as you attempt to retain even a modicum of independent identity, independent thought, or independent organizational space outside the Party’s control, the “stability maintenance” apparatus springs into action.

Beijing is China’s capital and the place where the CCP’s power is most concentrated. Precisely for this reason, the establishment of the Beijing branch of the China Democratic Party in Beijing carries exceptionally strong symbolic significance. The message it conveys is crystal clear: the Chinese people are not destined to live forever under one-party dictatorship; they, too, have the right to pursue democracy, multiparty competition, and political freedom.

I, too, am someone who has left China. I have come to realize more and more deeply that in China, many people are not unaware of oppression, but dare not confront it; they are not lacking in civic consciousness, but under one-party dictatorship, living as true citizens often comes at a heavy price. Precisely for this reason, whenever I see people in China who, despite knowing the dangers, persist in expressing democratic ideals peacefully, rationally, openly, and nonviolently, I am filled with deep respect. Their very act of standing up serves as a testament: a testament that there are indeed people in China who seek freedom; a testament that the Chinese democracy movement has not been extinguished; and a testament that the CCP’s so-called “rule of law” is often nothing more than a cloak for political repression.

From the public establishment of the China Democracy Party on the mainland in 1998 to the fact that people are still raising its banner in Beijing today, this shows that the flame of freedom has not been extinguished. Even if the CCP uses arrests, trials, and sentencing to suppress it, it cannot eradicate the Chinese people’s yearning for freedom.

These members of the China Democracy Party who have been handed down heavy sentences today must not be forgotten.

Their names should not be confined to a mere piece of paper—a court verdict.

We overseas should not merely share news reports and then remain silent.

For silence only embolden tyranny; speaking out, at the very least, tells the world—and the Chinese people—that the problem has never been the people’s pursuit of freedom, but rather a regime that treats the constitution as a facade, freedom of association as a mere formality, and the peaceful establishment of a political party as an act of treason.

The constitution guarantees freedom of association, yet reality condemns the peaceful establishment of a political party as a grave crime.

This is not the dignity of the rule of law, but the system’s self-exposure;

This is not national confidence, but the deep-seated fear of an authoritarian regime;

This is not modern civilization, but a blatant trampling of the most fundamental principles of modern political civilization.

May more people remember the names of these individuals.

May more Chinese people see through the true nature of this system.

And may the day come when, in China, no one loses their freedom simply for forming an association, taking an oath, or speaking the truth.

作者：付静争
编辑：赵杰 校对：周敏 翻译：戈冰

近日，在中国北京，中国民主党副主席王石被判刑7年半，党组成员：李武、赵强、李云、孙帅、李飞、于阳、被判处三至七年不等的刑期及缓刑，党主席：王蕴溥已流亡海外。被北京第二人民法院闭门判刑“颠覆国家政权罪”这样被秘密审判并判处重刑的消息，引发外界高度关注。作为一名身处海外的中国民主党成员，我对此深感震惊与愤怒。

这些被判刑的民主党成员，以公开、理性、和平、非暴力方式进行政治表达。他们主张宪政、法治与基本人权，这些理念，在任何现代社会中都应属于公民的基本权利范畴。然而在中国，这样的行为却被定性“颠覆国家政权”这是刑事的重罪。

值得注意的是，中国现行宪法序言中明确提出：“中国共产党领导的多党合作和政治协商制度将长期存在和发展。”然而，这一制度在现实运作中，主要限于体制内党派。既然是共产党的体制内的多党派，那请问：何谈民主多党协商？还是你共产党自己说的算。任何试图在这一体系之外独立组织力量的行为，往往会被迅速压制，甚至被定性为“颠覆国家政权” “扰乱社会治安、“寻衅滋事”等很奇怪的罪行。

这种文本与现实之间的落差，不仅削弱了法律本身的权威，也使公民对制度的信任不断流失。一个真正稳定与自信的社会，不应惧怕不同声音，更不应将和平表达视为威胁。

近年来，类似案件在不同地区反复出现。从拘捕、秘密审理，被消失，没收护照，限制出境，软禁不许与家人接触等等，这些做法持续引发外界对基本权利状况的担忧。言论自由、结社自由以及政治参与权，早就没有了。

在此，我郑重发出以下呼吁：

第一，呼吁国际社会，特别是美国政府，将相关案件纳入人权评估、签证政策及外交议题之中，对涉及严重人权问题的行为施加持续关注与实际压力；

第二，呼吁海外华人社会，不应对正在发生的现实保持沉默。无论立场如何，基本人权问题不应被忽视，更不应被遗忘；

第三，要求中国政府遵守其已签署并承诺推进的人权原则，并切实履行已批准的国际人权义务，停止以“国家安全”为名打压和平表达、释放所有因言论、曾教与结社而被拘押的人员。

历史反复证明，压制无法消除对自由的追求。相反，在持续的高压之下，仍有人选择站出来，这本身就说明，追求权利与尊严的意志从未消失。

也许个人的声音有限，但当越来越多的人拒绝沉默，改变便有可能发生。

我发声，并非因为没有恐惧，而是因为深知沉默的代价更为沉重。

When “Multi-Party Cooperation” Exists Only on Paper: A Member of the China Democratic Party’s Realistic Concerns and Appeal

Author: Fu Jingzheng
Editor: Zhao Jie Proofreader: Zhou Min Translator: Ge Bing

Recently in Beijing, China, Wang Shi, Vice Chairman of the China Democratic Party, was sentenced to seven and a half years in prison. Party members Li Wu, Zhao Qiang, Li Yun, Sun Shuai, Li Fei, and Yu Yang were sentenced to prison terms ranging from three to seven years, with some receiving suspended sentences. Party Chairman Wang Yunpu has gone into exile overseas. The news of these secret trials and harsh sentences—handed down behind closed doors by the Beijing No. 2 Intermediate People’s Court on charges of “subversion of state power”—has drawn significant international attention. As a member of the China Democracy Party living abroad, I am deeply shocked and outraged by this.

These sentenced members of the China Democracy Party engaged in political expression through open, rational, peaceful, and nonviolent means. They advocate for constitutional government, the rule of law, and basic human rights—principles that should fall within the scope of citizens’ fundamental rights in any modern society. Yet in China, such actions are characterized as “subversion of state power,” a serious criminal offense.

It is worth noting that the preamble to China’s current Constitution explicitly states: “The system of multiparty cooperation and political consultation under the leadership of the Communist Party of China will continue to exist and develop for a long time.” Yet in practice, this system is largely confined to parties operating within the regime. If these are merely “multi-party” entities within the Communist Party’s framework, then one must ask: where is the democratic multi-party consultation? Or does the Communist Party simply call the shots? Any attempt to organize independently outside this system is often swiftly suppressed and even labeled with bizarre charges such as “subversion of state power,” “disturbing public order,” or “picking quarrels and provoking trouble.”

This disconnect between the text of the law and reality not only undermines the authority of the law itself but also causes citizens’ trust in the system to erode continuously. A truly stable and self-confident society should not fear dissenting voices, nor should it view peaceful expression as a threat.

In recent years, similar cases have repeatedly emerged in various regions. From arrests and secret trials to “disappearances,” passport confiscations, travel restrictions, and house arrest with no contact allowed with family members—these practices continue to raise international concerns about the state of fundamental rights. Freedom of speech, freedom of association, and the right to political participation have long since vanished.

Here, I solemnly issue the following appeals:

First, I call upon the international community, particularly the U.S. government, to incorporate these cases into human rights assessments, visa policies, and diplomatic agendas, and to maintain sustained attention and exert practical pressure on actions involving serious human rights violations;

Second, I call upon the overseas Chinese community not to remain silent in the face of these unfolding realities. Regardless of one’s stance, fundamental human rights issues must not be ignored, much less forgotten;

Third, I demand that the Chinese government adhere to the human rights principles it has signed and pledged to advance, and earnestly fulfill the international human rights obligations it has ratified. It must cease suppressing peaceful expression under the pretext of “national security” and release all individuals detained for their speech, teaching, or association.

History has repeatedly proven that suppression cannot extinguish the pursuit of freedom. On the contrary, the fact that people still choose to stand up in the face of sustained oppression demonstrates that the will to pursue rights and dignity has never faded.

Perhaps the voice of an individual is limited, but when more and more people refuse to remain silent, change becomes possible.

I speak out not because I am without fear, but because I know full well that the cost of silence is far heavier.

《全球覺醒》第六十八期

自由之鐘 時刻敲響 全球覺醒 民主聯盟 消滅獨裁 推翻暴政

活動主題：譴責中共非法重判北京黨部成員 民主火種不滅 自由意志不屈

2026年3月30日，中共當局在黑箱操作下，對中國民主黨联合总部北京黨部的七名志士實施了喪心病狂的秘密審判與非法重判。北京黨部副主席王石被非法判處有期徒刑七年六個月，其餘六名成員也分別遭到三年至七年的重刑。這不僅是對這七位勇士個人的政治迫害，更是中共對所有追求自由、嚮往憲政的中國人的公然恐嚇。

這些志士所從事的，是基於「公開、理性、和平、非暴力」原則的政治表達。他們主張在憲政框架下推動法治，這本是人類文明社會賦予公民的神聖權利。然而，在中共這個極權毒瘤的邏輯裡，和平的訴求竟成了必須用重牢鎮壓的罪名。他們害怕有組織的理性反抗，更害怕中國民主黨的信念在民間紮根生輝。

中國民主黨自1998年由王炳章、王有才等先賢籌建以來，始終是當代民主運動的中流砥柱。這次北京黨部在極端高壓下的堅守與犧牲，正是這種「公開組成、公開活動」精神的延續。中共妄想透過幾張非法的判決書就掐滅火種，這完全是癡心妄想。歷史早已證明，牢獄鎖不住靈魂，屠刀殺不死信念。

我們要在這裡正告領館內的官僚：只要中國民主黨還有一個成員在呼吸，我們揭露暴政、追求自由的腳步就永遠不會停止。我們將動員全球的正義力量，持續營救這些為自由付出代價的先行者，直到所有的高牆被推倒，直到民主的陽光照亮每一寸國土。

我們的口號：

释放王石，释放所有政治犯！

结社自由无罪，秘密审判可耻！

坚持和平理性非暴力，抗议中共政治迫害！

强烈谴责非法审判，立即释放北京党部成员！

時間：2026年4月19日（星期日）3:30PM (下午)

地點：中共駐洛杉磯總領館

地址：443 Shatto Pl, Los Angeles, CA 90020

活動召集人：劉廣賢/廖军

活動規劃： 孫曄/ 王付青

活動主持：易勇

組織者：

胡月明4806536918/史洪亮 9099263777

劉玉芝6263210146/ 王磊 6262354824

周蘭英6264924286/陳文輝6263412820

活動義工：于海龍 /王尊福/楊郭軍/朱明昌/穆偉/李克輝/于越/陳健/孔德翠

攝影：Ji Luo /劉樂園

主辦單位：

中國民主黨聯合總部美西黨部

中國民主黨聯合總部美南黨部

自由鐘民主基金會

攝影記者：關永傑
編輯：鍾然 校對：程筱筱 翻译：周敏

2026年4月11日，由灣區香港人社區中心（HKCC）及美國香港人會館（US HongKongers Club）發起，一場以「新聞自由無價」為主題的義賣籌款活動在灣區舉行。來自灣區各市，甚至從洛杉磯遠道而來的香港人齊聚一堂，以實際行動支持在高壓環境下仍然堅守崗位的香港新聞工作者，並向長期捍衛新聞自由的香港記者協會致敬。

（熱心人士捐贈的義賣品——自由無價）

主辦方代表在開場致辭中指出，媒體不僅承擔著客觀報導事實的責任，更是法治社會中不可或缺的「第四權力」，對公權力進行監督，維繫社會應有的制衡機制。一旦新聞工作者無法獨立履行職責，公眾的知情權亦將隨之受損，社會的透明度與公義基礎也會受到嚴重影響。

【熱心人士捐贈的義賣品——以香港獅子山為背景：Truth Matters in the Old Time (2026)，To most Hongkongers, freedoms of speech and press have always been a right that are there to embrace until they are gone in a flash. However, from the loss of it, we should learn how to use our wisdom and critical minds to grasp and understand truth, especially in this world of fake media.】

主持人在介紹香港新聞界現狀時，引用無國界記者公布的世界新聞自由指數，香港在2002年獲得歷史上最高排名：全球第18位，當時香港曾被視為亞洲新聞自由的堡壘。而在剛過去的2025年，香港獲得有史以來最低的評分，排名跌至140位，狀況等級已跌至接近該組織定義的最差級別（Very serious）。這是香港首次跌入該組織所界定的最差區間，因此近年來香港記者所面臨的環境愈發嚴峻，壓力來自多個層面。

首先，在法律層面，記者及相關組織不斷捲入司法程序。香港記者協會近年持續通過司法覆核，為新聞採訪權及資訊獲取權據理力爭，但相關案件不僅耗時漫長，亦伴隨著高昂的法律費用風險。部分案件雖未能改變整體環境，仍體現新聞界對原則的堅持。其次，行業支援需求顯著上升。隨著媒體生態收縮，不少記者失去原有崗位，香港記者協會需為受影響從業者提供短期經濟援助、專業培訓，以及法律與心理支援。這些原本屬於行業基礎保障的工作，在當前環境下變得尤為關鍵，同時也對協會的資源構成沉重壓力。

（熱心人士捐贈的義賣品——有灣區名人親筆簽名的週年紀念版紅酒一瓶）

在採訪環境方面，主持人特別強調，自我審查現象日益普遍且複雜。過去，編輯層面的取捨較為常見；而今日，記者在採訪及報導過程中往往需要同時考慮法律風險、機構立場，甚至受訪者的安全。有時，即使掌握事實，也需反覆權衡是否完整呈現，以避免對他人造成潛在風險。這種「全方位審查」已成為不少前線記者的日常處境。

（熱心人士捐贈的手工藝品）

此外，主持人還提到，香港記者協會在籌款及日常運作上亦面臨困難，包括活動場地臨時取消、資源獲取受限等問題，使維持正常運作更加艱難。然而，儘管挑戰重重，該會仍持續運作，致力為新聞工作者發聲，並探索支持獨立記者及小型媒體的新方式。

當晚活動採取義賣及聚餐形式進行，既為籌款，也讓參與者在交流中凝聚共識。主辦方表示，希望通過「化整為零」的方式，讓更多身處海外的香港人參與支持行動，在不同國家與地區延續對新聞自由的關注。義賣競投環節中，與會者反應熱烈，港人的堅韌與團結精神，賦予了義賣品更多情感意義，令競投價格一再攀升。活動最終籌得的款項，超出主辦方預期。

（展示現場籌得的部分款項，主持人感謝熱心人士的支持）

活動最後，主持人再次感謝所有到場人士的支持，並強調，每一份捐助都將轉化為對新聞工作的實際支援。在充滿不確定性的時代，這種跨地域的連結與守望，正是新聞自由得以延續的重要力量。

Bay Area Hongkongers Hold Charity Sale to Support HKJA

Photojournalist: Kwan Wing-kit
Editor: Zhong Ran Proofreader: Cheng Xiaoxiao Translator: Zhou Min

Summary: Bay Area Hongkongers organized a charity sale and fundraiser to support the Hong Kong Journalists Association (HKJA). The event focused on the deteriorating press freedom and industry hardships, gathering overseas strength to support front-line journalists and continuing the guardianship of and attention to journalistic values.

On April 11, 2026, a charity fundraising event themed “Press Freedom is Priceless” was held in the Bay Area, initiated by the Hong Konger Community Center (HKCC) and the US HongKongers Club. Hongkongers from various cities in the Bay Area, and even some who traveled from as far as Los Angeles, gathered to take practical action in support of Hong Kong news practitioners who still hold their posts under high-pressure environments, and to pay tribute to the Hong Kong Journalists Association for its long-term defense of press freedom.

(Charity sale item donated by a warm-hearted individual — Freedom is Priceless)

In the opening remarks, a representative of the organizers pointed out that the media not only bears the responsibility of reporting facts objectively but is also the indispensable “Fourth Estate” in a society governed by the rule of law. It monitors public power and maintains the necessary checks and balances of society. Once news practitioners are unable to perform their duties independently, the public’s right to know will suffer accordingly, and the transparency and foundation of justice in society will be severely affected.

【Charity sale item donated by a warm-hearted individual — featuring Hong Kong’s Lion Rock as the background: Truth Matters in the Old Time (2026). “To most Hongkongers, freedoms of speech and press have always been a right that are there to embrace until they are gone in a flash. However, from the loss of it, we should learn how to use our wisdom and critical minds to grasp and understand truth, especially in this world of fake media.”】

While introducing the current status of the Hong Kong news industry, the host cited the World Press Freedom Index published by Reporters Without Borders (RSF). Hong Kong achieved its highest historical ranking in 2002: 18th in the world. At that time, Hong Kong was regarded as a bastion of press freedom in Asia. However, in the just-passed year of 2025, Hong Kong received its lowest score ever, with its ranking plummeting to 140th. Its status level has dropped to near the worst category defined by the organization (“Very serious”). This is the first time Hong Kong has fallen into the worst bracket defined by the organization; thus, the environment faced by Hong Kong journalists in recent years has become increasingly severe, with pressure coming from multiple levels.

First, at the legal level, journalists and related organizations are continuously embroiled in judicial proceedings. In recent years, the Hong Kong Journalists Association has persisted in fighting for news gathering rights and the right to access information through judicial reviews. However, these cases are not only time-consuming but also carry the risk of high legal fees. Although some cases failed to change the overall environment, they still embody the journalism industry’s adherence to principles. Secondly, the demand for industry support has risen significantly. As the media ecology shrinks, many journalists have lost their original positions. The HKJA must provide short-term financial aid, professional training, and legal and psychological support for affected practitioners. These tasks, which originally belonged to basic industry protections, have become particularly crucial in the current environment, while also posing a heavy strain on the Association’s resources.

(Charity sale item donated by a warm-hearted individual — a bottle of anniversary edition red wine with the personal signature of a Bay Area celebrity)

Regarding the reporting environment, the host particularly emphasized that the phenomenon of self-censorship is becoming increasingly prevalent and complex. In the past, selection and omission at the editorial level were more common; today, however, journalists often need to simultaneously consider legal risks, institutional stances, and even the safety of interviewees during the interview and reporting process. Sometimes, even when the facts are in hand, one must repeatedly weigh whether to present them in full to avoid potential risks to others. This “all-encompassing censorship” has become the daily reality for many front-line journalists.

(Handicrafts donated by warm-hearted individuals)

Furthermore, the host mentioned that the Hong Kong Journalists Association also faces difficulties in fundraising and daily operations, including the last-minute cancellation of event venues and restricted access to resources, making it even harder to maintain normal operations. However, despite the numerous challenges, the Association continues to operate, striving to speak up for news practitioners and exploring new ways to support independent journalists and small media outlets.

The event that evening was conducted in the form of a charity sale and dinner, serving both as a fundraiser and a way for participants to build consensus through exchange. The organizers stated that they hoped to use a “decentralized” (break into parts) approach to allow more Hongkongers living overseas to participate in supportive actions, continuing the focus on press freedom across different countries and regions. During the charity auction segment, participants responded enthusiastically. The resilience and spirit of solidarity of the Hong Kong people gave the items more emotional significance, causing the bidding prices to rise repeatedly. The final funds raised by the event exceeded the organizers’ expectations.

(Displaying a portion of the funds raised on-site; the host thanks the warm-hearted individuals for their support)

At the end of the event, the host once again thanked all attendees for their support and emphasized that every donation would be transformed into practical support for journalistic work. In an era full of uncertainty, this cross-regional connection and mutual support are precisely the vital forces that allow press freedom to endure.

作者：陀先润
编辑：李晶 校对：熊辩 翻译：周敏

前不久，富华国际集团荣誉主席、中国紫檀博物馆馆长陈丽华在北京去世，享年85岁。消息传出后，舆论迅速聚焦于她与《西游记》中“唐僧”扮演者迟重瑞的婚姻，以及其规模庞大的家族财富。与以往类似公众人物离世后的叙事路径相似，关于她的评价很快被归纳为“励志传奇”：从北京胡同中的普通女工，到赴港发展，再回到北京成为地产领域的重要人物，打造长安俱乐部、金宝街等项目，并以“紫檀女王”之名广为人知。

然而，若对其发家路径进行更为细致的梳理，这一“白手起家”的叙事却存在诸多值得追问之处。与其说这是一个典型的商业成功故事，不如说它更像是改革开放初期特定历史条件下，个体通过特殊渠道与资源整合迅速积累财富的案例之一。这种现象本身，也反映出当时制度转型过程中权力、资源与市场之间复杂的互动关系。

根据公开资料及其本人陈述，陈丽华早年为高中文化，在家具修理厂工作，并因此获得“第一桶金”。1981年至1982年前后赴香港发展，通过房地产投资迅速致富，至1986年已跻身富裕阶层。坊间还流传其在香港低价购入多栋法院拍卖物业并转手获利的说法。

但上述叙事在细节层面存在多重疑问。首先是“第一桶金”的来源问题。较为广泛流传的说法认为，她曾通过渠道接触到存放文革时期抄家所得的贵重古典家具，并将其转售获利。若此类说法成立，则涉及两个关键问题：其一，这类物资的取得渠道在当时是否对普通个体开放；其二，这些资产如何在当时市场环境下实现价值变现。

需要指出的是，20世纪80年代初，中国尚未形成成熟的古董家具市场，相关交易极为有限。如果在国内出售，其所得人民币在外汇严格管制的背景下，如何转移至香港用于后续投资？如果选择直接将家具运往香港，则涉及跨境运输审批、进出口管制等多重制度限制。对于一位缺乏制度性资源的普通从业者而言，这些操作的可行性值得进一步讨论。

其次是其赴港路径及初始资本来源。1980年代初期，大陆居民赴港定居需经严格审批，且通常需具备一定资金证明。若相关说法属实，则其启动资金来源及审批过程同样有待说明。

再看其回到北京后的发展轨迹。陈丽华以“港商”身份进入房地产领域，其代表项目包括长安大厦、长安俱乐部及金宝街改造等。这些项目均位于北京核心地段，特别是长安街沿线开发，在当时属于高度敏感区域，审批权限集中于更高层级。相关项目的获取与推进，显然不仅仅是一般市场主体所能完成。

以长安俱乐部为例，其定位为高端会员制会所，准入机制严格，更多承担的是信息交流与关系网络构建功能，而非单纯的商业盈利空间。这类场所的存在，本身也反映出当时经济与权力结构之间的某种交织。

此外，金宝街项目涉及大规模城市改造与历史建筑拆除，在当时亦曾引发争议。相关地块原有机构与资源属性复杂，其开发过程所依赖的制度条件，同样值得纳入分析。

另一个值得关注的现象是信息的“低可见性”。与许多同体量企业不同，富华集团长期以来公开信息相对有限，除紫檀博物馆等文化项目外，其核心业务及项目细节较少进入公众讨论。这种低曝光状态，在一定程度上也增加了外界理解其商业路径的难度。

围绕其早年经历，还存在诸如“保姆背景”等未经证实的传闻。此类说法本身或许难以考证，但其流传范围之广，恰恰反映出公众对这一“成功叙事”的不确定感与解释需求。

相比之下，关于其婚姻的讨论则更为个人化。陈丽华与迟重瑞因京剧相识，婚姻持续三十余年。无论外界如何评价，其家庭关系本质上属于私人领域，无需过度延伸解读。

陈丽华的去世，让这一“传奇人生”再次进入公共视野。值得强调的是，对个体经历的反思，并非否认其在特定领域（如紫檀文化保护）所作的投入，而是试图在更宏观的历史语境中，重新审视“成功”的生成机制。

改革开放初期，中国正处于制度与市场并行探索的阶段，一部分人凭借信息优势、制度窗口与人际网络，获得了超出常规路径的上升机会。这类现象并非个案，而是一种阶段性特征。将其简单归结为“个人奋斗”，或许难以完整解释其复杂性。

因此，当类似“白手起家”的叙事再次被反复讲述时，有必要保持基本的审视意识：个体成功固然重要，但其背后的制度环境、资源分配方式以及权力结构，同样构成不可忽视的变量。只有在更透明与公平的规则之下，市场竞争才具有真正意义上的可复制性。

逝者已矣，但历史叙事不应止于表层的赞颂。对这些“传奇”的再讨论，本质上是对一段发展路径的反思。如何减少灰色空间、提升制度公正性，或许才是更具现实意义的问题。

From Ordinary Worker to Real Estate Tycoon: Structural Questions Regarding a Success Narrative

Author: Tuo Xianrun
Editor: Li Jing Proofreader: Xiong Bian Translator: Zhou Min

Not long ago, Chen Lihua, Honorary Chairperson of Fu Wah International Group and Curator of the China Red Sandalwood Museum, passed away in Beijing at the age of 85. Following the news, public discourse quickly focused on her marriage to Chi Zhongrui—famous for playing “Tang Sanzang” in Journey to the West—as well as her vast family fortune. Similar to the narrative paths taken after the passing of other public figures, evaluations of her were swiftly summarized as an “inspirational legend”: moving from an ordinary female worker in Beijing’s hutongs to developing her career in Hong Kong, then returning to Beijing to become a titan of real estate, creating projects like the Chang’an Club and Jinbao Street, and becoming widely known as the “Red Sandalwood Queen.”

However, upon a more meticulous examination of her path to wealth, this “self-made” narrative presents several points worth questioning. Rather than a typical story of commercial success, it appears more like a case study of an individual utilizing specific channels and resource integration to rapidly accumulate wealth under the unique historical conditions of the early Reform and Opening-up era. This phenomenon itself reflects the complex interaction between power, resources, and the market during that period of institutional transition.

According to public records and her own statements, Chen Lihua possessed a high school education in her early years and worked in a furniture repair factory, where she reportedly earned her “first pot of gold.” Around 1981 to 1982, she moved to Hong Kong to develop her career, quickly amassing wealth through real estate investment; by 1986, she had already joined the ranks of the wealthy. Rumors also circulated that she profited by purchasing multiple properties at low prices through court auctions in Hong Kong and flipping them.

Yet, there are multiple questions regarding the details of this narrative. First is the issue of the source of that “first pot of gold.” A widely circulated version suggests she gained access through specific channels to valuable classic furniture confiscated during the Cultural Revolution and profited by reselling them. If this version holds true, it raises two critical questions: first, whether the channels for obtaining such materials were open to ordinary individuals at that time; and second, how these assets could be liquidated within the market environment of that era.

It should be noted that in the early 1980s, a mature antique furniture market had not yet formed in China, and related transactions were extremely limited. If sold domestically, how was the resulting RMB transferred to Hong Kong for subsequent investment given the context of strict foreign exchange controls? If she chose to ship the furniture directly to Hong Kong, this would involve multiple institutional hurdles, including cross-border transport approvals and import-export controls. For an ordinary practitioner lacking institutional resources, the feasibility of these operations merits further discussion.

Second is the path of her move to Hong Kong and the source of her initial capital. In the early 1980s, mainland residents required strict approval to settle in Hong Kong and usually needed to provide certain proof of funds. If the relevant accounts are true, the source of her startup capital and the approval process similarly require clarification.

Looking further at her trajectory after returning to Beijing, Chen Lihua entered the real estate sector as a “Hong Kong businesswoman.” Her representative projects include the Chang’an Mansion, the Chang’an Club, and the renovation of Jinbao Street. These projects are all located in core areas of Beijing; specifically, development along Chang’an Avenue was a highly sensitive zone at the time, with approval authority concentrated at the highest levels. The acquisition and progression of such projects were clearly not tasks an average market entity could accomplish.

Taking the Chang’an Club as an example: positioned as a high-end, members-only club with strict entry mechanisms, it functioned more as a hub for information exchange and networking rather than a purely commercial profit-making space. The existence of such venues reflects a certain intertwining of the economic and power structures of that time.

Furthermore, the Jinbao Street project involved large-scale urban redevelopment and the demolition of historical buildings, which sparked controversy at the time. The institutions and resource attributes originally associated with those plots were complex; the institutional conditions relied upon during the development process also deserve to be included in this analysis.

Another phenomenon worth noting is the “low visibility” of information. Unlike many enterprises of a similar scale, Fu Wah Group’s public information has long been relatively limited. Aside from cultural projects like the Red Sandalwood Museum, details of its core business and projects rarely enter public discussion. This state of low exposure has, to some extent, increased the difficulty for outsiders to understand its commercial path.

Surrounding her early experiences, there are also unconfirmed rumors, such as a “nanny background.” While such claims may be difficult to verify, their wide circulation reflects the public’s sense of uncertainty and the need for an explanation regarding this “success narrative.”

In contrast, discussions regarding her marriage are more personal. Chen Lihua and Chi Zhongrui met through their shared interest in Peking Opera, and their marriage lasted over thirty years. Regardless of public opinion, their family relationship belongs essentially to the private sphere and does not require excessive interpretive extension.

Chen Lihua’s passing has once again brought this “legendary life” into the public eye. It is important to emphasize that reflecting on an individual’s experience is not a denial of their investments in specific fields (such as the preservation of red sandalwood culture), but rather an attempt to re-examine the generative mechanisms of “success” within a broader historical context.

During the early stages of Reform and Opening-up, China was in a phase of simultaneous institutional and market exploration. Some individuals, by virtue of information advantages, institutional windows, and interpersonal networks, obtained upward mobility opportunities that exceeded conventional paths. This phenomenon was not an isolated case but a characteristic of that era. Simply attributing it to “individual struggle” may fail to fully explain its complexity.

Therefore, when narratives like “self-made” are recounted repeatedly, it is necessary to maintain a basic sense of scrutiny: while individual success is important, the underlying institutional environment, resource allocation methods, and power structures constitute non-negligible variables. Only under more transparent and fair rules does market competition possess true replicability.

The deceased has passed, but historical narratives should not stop at surface-level praise. Re-discussing these “legends” is, in essence, a reflection on a specific path of development. How to reduce gray areas and enhance institutional justice is perhaps the issue of greater practical significance.

作者：冯仍

编辑：李晶 校对：熊辩 翻译：周敏

2026年4月4日，我来到美国南加州自由雕塑公园，参加高智晟律师雕像的揭幕活动。站在现场，看着雕像正式揭幕，我心里有很深的触动。那种触动，不只是因为一尊雕像立起来了，更因为我在现场听见了许多不该被遗忘的声音，也因此对高智晟、对中国、对我们这些流亡海外的人，有了更深的思考。

高智晟曾是中国非常优秀的律师，甚至被评为“全国十佳律师”之一。但后来，因为他替弱势群体发声，替基督徒发声，替维权人士发声，替那些没有声音的人发声，最终被吊销执照，遭受绑架、酷刑和长期打压，最后被强制失踪。一个原本可以在体制中安稳生活的人，最终却落到这样的境地，这本身就已经说明了中共体制的黑暗。

在揭幕现场，美国优先政策研究所中国政策高级主任陶智先生的发言，让我印象很深。他提到，高智晟作为一名基督徒，非常清楚地表明：人的尊严，来自于人是按着上帝的形象被造的。听到这句话时，我心里很受触动。因为我自己也是基督徒，我越来越明白，中共之所以敢任意羞辱人、践踏人、消灭人，正是因为它根本不承认人的尊严来自上帝，也不承认人在政权之上，还有更高的价值和审判。

Piero Tozzi （左）翻译：傅希秋牧师（右）

而高智晟最可贵的地方，就在于他在那个人人都被逼着低头的环境里，仍然守住了这样的底线。他不只是一个勇敢的律师，更是一个不肯向邪恶妥协的人。对今天的中国来说，这样的人太少了，也太珍贵了。

陶智先生还谈到，中共的跨国镇压已经延伸到美国本土，甚至延伸到我们当天所站立的这片土地上。他提到，自由雕塑公园过去曾遭到破坏，陈维明老师的作品和工作室也遭受过袭击。听到这些，我心里既沉重，又愤怒。因为这说明，中共不仅要在中国境内压制不同声音，甚至连人在美国、站在自由土地上，也还想继续恐吓、继续伸手控制。

这让我想到，我们这些流亡海外的人，虽然离开了中国，但并不等于中共的阴影就完全远去了。很多人依然会遭到骚扰、威胁和监视。中共不仅想控制人的身体，也想控制人的记忆，控制人的恐惧，甚至控制人离开中国以后的生活。也正因为如此，在自由雕塑公园为高智晟立像就更有意义。它不只是纪念一位失踪的人权律师，更是在公开宣告：我们不会因恐吓而沉默，不会因威胁而遗忘。

那天站在雕像前，我一直在想，中共为什么会害怕一个律师？后来我越来越明白，它真正害怕的，不只是高智晟这个人，而是他身上那种不肯低头的良知，是他在黑暗中仍然坚持真理、公义和信仰的生命。因为在一个谎言成为常态的制度里，一个坚持说真话的人，本身就是一种控诉。

整个揭幕现场，也让我感到一种特别深的力量。大家聚集在那里，不只是为了看一尊雕像，而是为了共同见证：高智晟没有被彻底抹去，他的名字还在被呼喊，他的精神还在被纪念。这本身就是一种反抗：反抗遗忘，反抗谎言，反抗冷漠，也反抗中共最希望看到的那种结果——让一个人彻底从历史和记忆中消失。

作为一个流亡到美国的中国人，那天站在高智晟雕像前，我也更深地感到，我们今天还能站在自由的土地上说话、纪念、见证，并不是理所当然的。也正因为如此，我们更不能只是把自由当成一种环境，而应当把它当成一种责任。既然今天我们还能发声，就不应沉默；既然今天我们还能记住，就不应遗忘；既然今天我们还能见证，就不应退缩。

这次参加高智晟雕像揭幕活动，对我来说不只是一场活动，更像是一次提醒。提醒我不要忘记中国，不要忘记那些仍然被关押、被监视、被消失的人；也提醒我，不要因为流亡生活的忙碌，就慢慢失去对真相和正义的敏感。

高智晟至今仍然没有自由，但他的名字不该消失。而一个还愿意记住高智晟的中国，才可能还有希望。

At the Unveiling Site, I Rediscovered Gao Zhisheng’s Significance

Reflections on Attending the Unveiling Ceremony of Gao Zhisheng’s Statue

Author: Feng Reng

Editor: Li Jing Proofreader: Xiong Bian Translator: Zhou Min

On April 4, 2026, I traveled to the Liberty Sculpture Park in Southern California to attend the unveiling ceremony of lawyer Gao Zhisheng’s statue. Standing there, watching the statue officially being revealed, I felt a deep stir in my heart. That stirring was not just because a statue had been erected, but because I heard many voices on-site that should not be forgotten. It led me to deeper reflections on Gao Zhisheng, on China, and on those of us living in exile.

Gao Zhisheng was once an exceptionally talented lawyer in China, even named one of the “Top Ten National Lawyers.” However, because he spoke up for marginalized groups, for Christians, for human rights defenders, and for those without a voice, he eventually had his license revoked and suffered kidnapping, torture, and long-term suppression, eventually becoming a victim of enforced disappearance. That a man who could have lived a stable life within the system ended up in such a state is, in itself, an indictment of the darkness of the CCP (Chinese Communist Party) regime.

At the unveiling, the speech by Mr. Piero Tozzi, Senior Director of the China Policy Initiative at the America First Policy Institute, left a deep impression on me. He mentioned that as a Christian, Gao Zhisheng clearly understood that human dignity stems from the fact that humans are created in the image of God. Hearing these words touched me profoundly. As a Christian myself, I have come to understand more clearly that the reason the CCP dares to arbitrarily humiliate, trample, and eliminate people is precisely because it does not recognize that human dignity comes from God, nor does it acknowledge that there are values and a judgment higher than the state.

Piero Tozzi (Left) | Translation: Pastor Bob Fu (Right)

Gao Zhisheng’s most precious quality lies in the fact that, in an environment where everyone is forced to bow their heads, he maintained such a bottom line. He is not just a brave lawyer, but a man who refuses to compromise with evil. For today’s China, such people are far too few and far too precious.

Mr. Tozzi also discussed how the CCP’s transnational repression has extended to American soil—even to the very ground we stood on that day. He mentioned that the Liberty Sculpture Park has been vandalized in the past, and artist Chen Weiming’s works and studio have been attacked. Hearing this, I felt both heavy-hearted and angry. It proves that the CCP not only wants to suppress dissenting voices within China but even attempts to continue its intimidation and control over people standing on the soil of freedom in America.

This made me realize that for those of us in exile, although we have left China, it does not mean the CCP’s shadow has completely vanished. Many are still subjected to harassment, threats, and surveillance. The CCP seeks not only to control people’s bodies but also their memories, their fears, and even their lives after leaving China. Because of this, erecting a statue for Gao Zhisheng at the Liberty Sculpture Park is even more significant. It is not just a commemoration of a disappeared human rights lawyer; it is a public declaration: we will not be silenced by intimidation, nor will we forget because of threats.

Standing before the statue that day, I kept wondering: Why is the CCP so afraid of a lawyer? I eventually understood that what they truly fear is not just Gao Zhisheng the individual, but the unyielding conscience he embodies—his life that persists in truth, justice, and faith amidst the darkness. In a system where lies are the norm, a person who insists on speaking the truth is, in himself, an accusation.

The entire unveiling scene gave me a sense of particularly deep strength. People gathered there not just to see a statue, but to witness together: Gao Zhisheng has not been completely erased. His name is still being called; his spirit is still being commemorated. This is a form of resistance in itself: resistance against forgetting, against lies, against indifference, and against the very outcome the CCP desires most—to make a person vanish entirely from history and memory.

As a Chinese person living in exile in the United States, standing before Gao Zhisheng’s statue that day, I felt more deeply that our ability to speak, commemorate, and witness on free soil is not something to be taken for granted. Because of this, we must not treat freedom merely as an environment, but as a responsibility. Since we can still speak today, we must not remain silent; since we can still remember, we must not forget; since we can still witness, we must not shrink back.

Attending this unveiling ceremony was more than just an event for me; it was a reminder. It reminded me not to forget China, not to forget those who are still imprisoned, monitored, or disappeared. It also reminded me not to let the busyness of life in exile slowly dull my sensitivity to truth and justice.

Gao Zhisheng is still not free, but his name must not disappear.

Only a China that is still willing to remember Gao Zhisheng can still have hope.