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“好学生”修炼手册

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作者:徐陈鹏  

摘要:中共从学生时代就开始进行奴化教育,“中国式校园”是一所未成年人的监狱。

偶然间,我看到了一段初中政治老师曹志星的教师节采访视频。

他如今已是我们镇上中学的校长,坐在镜头前,语气和蔼地谈论自己的管理经验,对学生的用心,以及学校成绩的提高。

这与我记忆中的他极不相符。

他曾把一个个头很小的学生抱起来往墙上撞,让一个比他还高的学生蹲下去,往他的背上猛踩,还经常用黑板擦给学生“洗头”。

想起他当年的那些畜生行为,我忍不住在朋友圈发了几句牢骚。

我预料到爸妈会劝我删掉。毕竟都是一个镇上的人,抬头不见低头见。

可我没想到,第一个劝我删除朋友圈的,竟然是我三姨。

一、一个“好女人” 

三姨是个可怜人。

她结婚第二天就开始遭受家暴,这样的生活持续了二十多年。

亲戚们骂过她丈夫,劝过他不要那么冲动,我外公也后悔把女儿嫁给这样一个人渣,却没有一个人劝她离婚。

我读高中时,三姨和丈夫已经分居,他却仍会跑到县城骚扰她,找她要钱、打她。

我劝三姨离婚。

她说两个孩子还在念书,等表妹考上大学再说。

后来,前三姨父嫖娼、出轨被发现,亲戚们才终于一致认为:这个男人实在太不是东西了,必须离婚。

我那时觉得非常荒唐。

一个“好女人”被丈夫打了,是不能还手的;天天挨打,也不能轻易离婚。丈夫第一次嫖娼,要劝他回头;第一次出轨,要强烈谴责。只有屡教不改,在亲朋好友一致同意的情况下,她才终于可以离婚。

仿佛二十多年的殴打,还不足以成为结束婚姻的理由。

而三姨这个“好女人”,又要教育自己的女儿成为“好女人”:不要早恋,远离男生,出去玩要报备,胖了要减肥。

最重要的是,好好学习。

“我这辈子辛辛苦苦,都是为了你们。”

她经常跟我讲述自己受过的苦,又反复强调自己从来没跟别人诉过苦。

可想而知,表姐和表妹听过多少次:

“我从来没跟别人诉过苦。”

二、我们是怎样成为“好学生”的

初中时,老师打学生是常态,羞辱更是不在话下。

我的语文老师郝德义是二班班主任。他在我们三班从来不打人,教课认真,大家都喜欢他,我也觉得他是个好老师。

直到有一次课间,我看到他用三角板的一角往二班学生的手掌上猛斩下去。

他打人时脸上发狠,完全不像在我们班上那副和风细雨的模样。

我开始讨厌他。

而比厌恶更强烈的,是恐惧。

我曾试探着跟朋友说他打人多么凶狠,得到的回复却是:

“他也是为了我们好。他从来不乱打人,我们有时候太皮了,他才打我们。”

甚至有时候,我直接叫他的名字,也会被制止:

“不准叫他名字,要叫郝老师。”

我开始怀疑自己。

大家都认为他是好老师,我讨厌他,是不是说明我是一个坏学生?

多年以后,我又见过一次郝德义。

与他重逢,我甚至有一种亲切感。

但是,他一笑,我依然感觉到恐惧。

其实,我也不是从一开始就反对老师打学生。

看到同学因为上课吵闹而挨打,我有时也觉得他是应该的。甚至我自己因为讲话被老师打了,也觉得没什么好委屈的。

毕竟,是我破坏了课堂纪律。

我的班主任聂祥斌,在我看来是初中老师中最有人味的一个,但他有时也会发神经。

有段时间,一个同学经常欺负我。他每次打我一下就跑,我总是追不上,只好向班主任求助。

周一的升旗仪式上,班主任把我们两个叫上台,让我当众扇他耳光。

站在那里,我手足无措。

以前他打我,我总想追上去还手;而这一次,我却希望他跑,飞快地跑。

他没有跑。

他安静地站在那里,等待着惩罚。

最后,我伸出手,在他的脸上摸了一下。

他哭了出来。

我感到非常愧疚,而随之而来的,是一股巨大的无聊感。

那时候的我还不懂,这种无聊感究竟是怎么回事。

原本在两个同学之间流动的关系,在老师绝对权力的干预下,被粗暴地画上了句号。

三、你有农民工辛苦吗? 

大一暑假,我自己办了一个辅导班,赚了点钱。

后来去东至县城玩,请一帮高中同学吃饭。席间聊起办辅导班的经历,我说自己又要教学,又要管事,很辛苦。

一个我一直认为很聪明的同学突然问我:

“你有农民工辛苦吗?”

如果是别人说出这样的话,我大概不会奇怪。

可偏偏是他。

我一直觉得他很聪明,应该能够想到许多别人想不到的事情,所以我始终想不明白,他为什么会问出这样一个问题。

我当然没有说自己比农民工更辛苦。

我只是说自己很累。

难道因为有人比我更辛苦,我就不能说自己累了吗?

后来,我看电影《狗十三》,看到一些弹幕:

“还是打少了。”

“矫情。”

“都是闲的。”

“我小时候比她苦多了。”

这种口气,我太熟悉了。

我小时候挨过打,也没怎么样;我吃过那么多苦,也没见我整天抱怨。

既然我能忍受,你凭什么不能?

仿佛一个人过去忍受过多少痛苦,就获得了要求别人忍受同样痛苦的资格。

而那些不愿意忍受的人,不是太矫情,就是太闲了。

四、另一种服从

我有一个朋友,从小生长在重男轻女的家庭里。

父母对弟弟的偏爱和对她的忽视,让她总觉得自己不够好。她努力表现,希望获得父母的爱;父母偶尔给她一点体贴,她便又觉得他们终究还是爱自己的。

有一次,她又被父母辱骂、贬低,独自坐上了去拉萨的火车。

她在火车上给我打电话,讲起自己的成长经历。

她理智上知道父母对她很残忍,却始终放不下对亲情的渴求。

我告诉她,不是所有父母都会真正爱自己的子女,也没有必要非得获得父母的认可。

你还有朋友,有男朋友,世界那么大,为什么一定要把自己困在那个得不到爱的家庭里?

她在电话那头大哭了一场。

我静静地听着,预感到这可能是她人生的一个重要节点:

她会默然忍受命运暴虐的毒箭,还是挺身反抗人世无涯的苦难?

后来,她开始接触心灵疗愈,花钱报班,修行、感悟,还经常向我分享自己吸收了宇宙高维度能量的心得。

她甚至开始给别人做心灵顾问。

有一次,我让她给我做疗愈。

我向她抱怨,领导不看具体工作成果,只看员工工作的姿态。你好像稍微闲一点,就是在偷她的钱,而且她说话极不尊重人。

朋友劝我站在领导的立场考虑问题,理解领导的压力,反省自己是不是工作没做好,是不是太冲动了。

我又问她:

“我有一个手下,安排给他的活总是做不好,我应该怎么办?”

她说有事,下次再聊。

后来,她再也没有续上这个话题。

从她平时写的文章、制作的视频和做疗愈的方式来看,在她的体系里,似乎只有面对上位者时,你的心态才是一个需要解决的问题。

她很喜欢一些宏大的词语:

疗愈、成长、宇宙能量、高维度……

当有人诉说来自父母、老师、领导的压力时,她总会和风细雨地告诉对方:

你要改变自己。

你要提高自己。

而当我告诉她,我的下属给我带来了怎样的烦恼时,却几乎毫无悬念地得不到答案。

扎在她身上的毒箭,被她稀释成莲花清瘟注射液,推销了出去。


五、那个被打进医院的“刺头”

忘记是哪一年,石门街政府和外地开发商合作拆迁新街。

大部分居民都同意了,只有街口一家始终不肯签字。

后来,开发商找人把那家的男人打进了医院。

我爸说:

“那个人就是个刺头。别人都同意了,就他不同意,耽误大家的事,无非是想多要点钱。”

最后又补了一句:

“被打活该。”

我不知道那个男人为什么拒绝拆迁,也不知道他提出过什么要求。

但在我爸的叙述里,这些似乎都不重要。

因为大多数人都同意了。

于是,唯一不同意的人,就成了那个“不懂事”的人。

而因为你不懂事,所以你活该被打。

六、“好学生”长大了,就成了“良民” 

疫情解封以后,我和一个老同学聊起过去三年的防疫。

我跟她说起封控期间发生的种种问题。

她说:

“国家也没有办法,疫情多难控制。我们好不容易挺过这三年,你看,一解封,多少人阳了?”

我问:

“清零这么好,为什么不继续呢?”

她说:

“国家也不容易,保护了我们三年,总要发展吧。”

我又说起那些走上街头反对严格防疫政策的白纸抗议者。

她说:

“国家防疫多不容易,这些人捣什么乱啊。”

我一时不知道该怎么继续说。

我绝不能说她是个坏人。

她平时待人很有礼貌,性格甚至有些软弱。

可无论政策继续还是停止,无论前后发生什么,她似乎总能替一个比她强大得多的东西找到理由。

防疫后期,我经常在QQ空间发一些所谓“负能量”的东西。

之所以发在那里,是因为我希望以前的学生们能够看到一些和官方宣传不同的东西。

后来,一个高中隔壁班的同学在qq上找我,问我既然对中国这么不满意,为什么不去国外。

我跟他说了一些自己不满的原因,他几乎听不进去。

他既愤怒于我的“不忠”,又可怜我这只迷途的羔羊,告诉我现在中国发展得多好,社会主义必将战胜资本主义,将来中国一定会超过美国,成为世界第一强国。

最后他说:

“只有弱者才会抱怨环境,强者从不抱怨,只会努力奋斗,让自己过得更好。”

前段时间,我一个表姐在朋友圈发视频,教儿子模拟杀“日本鬼子”。

我打电话劝她,不要让一个孩子从小去憎恨自己从未见过的人。

后来谈到中国的宣传教育,她突然说:

“弟弟,你不能不爱国啊。”

我说:

“我不是不爱国,我只是不爱共产党,也不爱习近平。”

她马上紧张起来:

“你别再说了,再说我挂了。”

我问:“你怕什么?你是怕我,还是怕习近平?”

后来我们没有再争下去。

我同样不能说她是坏人。她一直很关心我。

也正因为如此,我才感到害怕。

我害怕的并不是几个面目狰狞的恶人。

我害怕的是,一个普通人如何在日复一日的教育、宣传和生活经验里,慢慢学会什么叫“懂事”,什么叫“顾全大局”,什么叫“感恩”,什么叫“爱国”。

然后,再把这些标准用在别人身上。

小时候,我们被教育要做“好学生”。

老师打你,是为了你好。

你受了委屈,要先想想自己哪里做错了。

长大以后,我们又学会了做“良民”。

国家有国家的难处。

政府有政府的安排。

别添乱。

别抱怨。

最可怕的不是我们自己学会了低头。

而是有一天,当别人不肯低头时,我们会主动走过去,替掌权者按住他的头。

然后告诉他:谁让你不听话。


七、你为什么要活在仇恨里?

妈妈看到我的朋友圈后,果然劝我删掉。

她苦口婆心地问我:

“你为什么要活在仇恨里?为什么不懂得宽恕?”

我觉得莫名其妙。

我仇恨他什么呢?

他又没有打过我。

为什么我骂他几句畜生,就成了活在仇恨里?

曹志星当我们的老师还不足一年,我却记了他将近二十年。

因为恐惧。

他的暴力虽然没有施加在我身上,却随时可能施加在我身上。

我不知道他什么时候会突然发作,也不知道下一个被抱起来往墙上撞的人会不会是我。

二十年前,我亲眼看见那些暴力。

二十年后,我看到的却是他坐在教师节采访的镜头前,和蔼地谈论自己如何关心学生。

那些被他打过的学生有没有得到过道歉?

这些年里,他有没有真正反省过自己?

我不知道。

可我不过是在朋友圈说出自己亲眼见过的事情,就已经有人来劝我放下仇恨、学会宽恕。

我不删。

因为我不服。

要不要宽恕,是受害者自己的事情。

我没有被他打过,也没有资格替那些被他殴打过的学生宽恕他。

只有加害者的帮凶,才会首先劝受害者放下仇恨,而不是劝施暴者放下棍棒。

我不宽恕,因为我不配。

那些被他殴打过的学生没有得到道歉,还轮不到我替他们原谅。

更何况,我从来不相信,一个没有忏悔过的人,仅仅因为时间过去了,就自然变成了一个好人。

我也不相信,一个没有真正面对自己过去错误的政府,仅仅因为那些错误已经成为历史,就不会在将来犯下同样的、甚至更大的错误。

时间不会自动带来悔改。

遗忘更不会。

八、毛病不改,积恶成习

这种“听话”的教育,并不是从我们这一代才开始的。

我的爷爷奶奶那一代人经历了三年饥荒、一场又一场政治运动和文革。这样的经历,留给下一代的往往不是反抗的经验,而是更实际的生存智慧:少惹事,少说话,离权力远一点。

他们被折磨成了共产党的“良民”。

这些生存经验,又变成了对子女的教育。

而到了我的父母这一代,他们在成长过程中又经历了“严打”、反自由化、1989年的政治风波和严格的计划生育年代。

他们见识过暴力执法的冤狱,做小生意的以“投机倒把”罪抓进牢里,超生被牵牛扒房,以及89年前后权力主导的社会氛围的迅速变化。

这些事情一次又一次告诉他们:不要和权力较劲。

于是,上一代传下来的“听话”,不再只是一句家训,而成了一种被现实反复验证过的生存经验。

所以,我从小也被教育要听话、要顺从、要尊重老师、尊重长辈、不要惹事,不要跟国家对着干。

而到了我们这一代,我又看见很多人正在用类似的话教育自己的孩子。

一代人被这样教育长大,然后再把同样的标准交给下一代。

父母要求孩子服从,老师要求学生服从。

我们在成长过程中,也慢慢学会了彼此监督,看谁还不够听话。

我们不仅继承了上一代人的恐惧,也继承了他们解释恐惧的方式。

于是,很多本来应该被追问的事情,就这样一代一代变成了:

“算了。”

很多本来应该被纠正的伤害,也一代一代变成了:

“都过去了。”

没有被反省的东西,就这样被一代一代传了下来。

毛病不改,积恶成习。

正因如此,我才越来越反感那句:

“为什么不能宽恕?”

为什么一个人说自己累了,要先证明世界上没有比他更累的人?

为什么一个人受了伤,要先反省自己是不是太矫情?

为什么一个人不愿服从,就有人觉得他被打也是活该?

为什么到了最后,总是受伤的人被要求成熟一点、宽容一点、懂事一点?

我已经做过太多年的“好学生”,不想再做“良民”了。

如果连正常表达自己的感受,都要先自省自查,反省自己是不是不够宽容、不够成熟,那么我宽恕的恐怕不是那个曾经施暴的老师。

我只是又一次宽恕了自己的懦弱。

                                                                                 编辑:李晶   校对:孔祥庆 翻译:沈美花

“Good Student” Training Manual

Author: Xu Chenpeng

Abstract: The Chinese Communist Party implements indoctrination and submissive education starting in student days; the “Chinese-style campus” is essentially a prison for minors.

By chance, I stumbled upon an interview video of Cao Zhixing, my junior high political science teacher, recorded for Teachers’ Day.

He is now the principal of our town’s middle school. Sitting before the camera, he spoke in a gentle, kindly tone about his management experience, his dedication to the students, and the improvement in the school’s academic scores.

This was completely inconsistent with the man in my memory.

He had once picked up a small-statured student and slammed him against the wall, ordered a student taller than himself to squat down so he could stomp heavily on his back, and frequently used blackboard erasers to “wash” students’ heads.

Recalling those brutal, animalistic acts of his back then, I couldn’t help but vent a few complaints on my WeChat Moments.

I expected my parents to urge me to delete it. After all, everyone lives in the same small town, and you constantly bump into each other.

What I didn’t expect was that the first person to urge me to delete the post was my Third Aunt.

I. A “Good Woman”

Third Aunt is a tragic person.

Her domestic abuse began on the second day of her marriage, and that way of life persisted for over twenty years.

Relatives cursed her husband and advised him not to be so short-tempered; my grandfather regretted marrying his daughter off to such scumbag, yet not a single person advised her to get a divorce.

When I was in high school, Third Aunt and her husband were already living apart, but he would still run to the county town to harass her, demand money from her, and beat her.

I advised Third Aunt to get a divorce.

She said her two children were still in school, so she would wait until my cousin got into college.

Later, after her ex-husband was caught soliciting prostitutes and having an affair, the relatives finally came to a unanimous conclusion: this man was truly too much of a bastard, she must divorce him.

At that time, I felt it was completely absurd.

A “good woman” gets beaten by her husband and cannot hit back; even if she gets beaten every day, she cannot easily get a divorce. The first time her husband solicits a prostitute, she must persuade him to reform; the first time he has an affair, she must strongly condemn it. Only when he proves repeatedly incorrigible—and after all relatives and friends unanimously agree—is she finally allowed to get a divorce.

It was as if twenty years of physical beatings were not enough to constitute a valid reason to end a marriage.

And Third Aunt, this “good woman,” went on to educate her own daughters to become “good women”: don’t engage in puppy love, stay away from boys, report your itinerary when going out, and lose weight if you get fat.

Most importantly: study hard.

“I have suffered and worked hard my entire life, all for you.”

She frequently recounted to me the suffering she had endured, while repeatedly emphasizing that she had never complained to anyone else about her hardships.

One can only imagine how many times my older and younger female cousins had heard:

“I have never complained about my hardships to anyone.”

II. How We Became “Good Students”

In junior high school, teachers hitting students was the norm, and public humiliation was taken for granted.

My Chinese teacher, Hao Deyi, was the class teacher of Class 2. In our Class 3, he never hit anyone, taught conscientiously, and everyone liked him. I also thought he was a good teacher.

Until one day during a recess, I saw him use the sharp corner of a set square to chop down violently onto a Class 2 student’s palm.

His face turned fierce as he hit the student, looking completely different from the gentle and mild-mannered demeanor he displayed in our class.

I began to hate him.

And even stronger than hatred was fear.

I once tentatively mentioned to a friend how viciously he hit people, but the response I received was:

“He is doing it for our own good. He never hits people without reason; he only hits us when we get too naughty.”

Sometimes, when I called him directly by his name, I would even be stopped:

“You’re not allowed to call him by his name, you must call him Teacher Hao.”

I began to doubt myself.

Everyone thought he was a good teacher; if I hated him, did that mean I was a bad student?

Many years later, I met Hao Deyi once more.

Reuniting with him, I even felt a sense of familiarity.

However, when he smiled, I still felt fear.

In truth, I didn’t oppose teachers hitting students right from the beginning either.

Seeing classmates get beaten for being noisy in class, I sometimes felt they deserved it. Even when I was beaten by a teacher for talking, I felt there was nothing to feel aggrieved about.

After all, I was the one who broke the classroom discipline.

My class teacher, Nie Xiangbin, was in my view the most human among all the junior high teachers, but he too would go crazy at times.

For a period of time, a classmate constantly bullied me. Every time he hit me, he would run away, and I could never catch up to him, so I had to seek help from the class teacher.

During Monday’s flag-raising ceremony, the class teacher called the two of us up to the stage and ordered me to slap him in the face in front of everyone.

Standing there, I was at a complete loss.

Previously when he hit me, I always wanted to chase after him and strike back; but this time, I wished he would run—run away as fast as he could.

He didn’t run.

He stood there quietly, waiting for the punishment.

In the end, I reached out my hand and lightly touched his face.

He burst into tears.

I felt immense guilt, followed by a profound sense of emptiness and boredom.

Back then, I didn’t understand what this sense of emptiness was about.

The dynamic between two classmates, which should have developed naturally, was brutally cut short under the intervention of the teacher’s absolute authority.

III. Are You Working Harder Than Migrant Workers?

During the summer of my freshman year in college, I ran a tutoring class by myself and made some money.

Later, I went to Dongzhi county town to hang out and invited a group of high school classmates to dinner. At the table, when we talked about the experience of running the tutoring class, I mentioned that I had to both teach and manage operations, which was very exhausting.

A classmate whom I had always considered very smart suddenly asked me:

“Are you working harder than migrant workers?”

If someone else had said this, I probably wouldn’t have found it strange.

But it was him, of all people.

I had always thought he was smart and should be able to consider things that others couldn’t, so I could never understand why he would ask such a question.

Of course, I didn’t claim that I worked harder than migrant workers.

I merely said that I was tired.

Just because someone else works harder than me, does that mean I don’t even have the right to say I’m tired?

Later, when I watched the movie Einstein and Einstein (Dog 13), I saw some bullet comments scrolling across the screen:

“She still got beaten too little.”

“So melodramatic.”

“It’s just because she has too much free time.”

“I suffered way more than her when I was young.”

This tone was all too familiar to me.

I got beaten when I was little and turned out fine; I ate so much bitterness, yet you don’t see me complaining all day.

Since I could endure it, what right do you have to be unable to?

It was as if by having endured a certain amount of pain in the past, a person gained the qualification to demand that others endure the exact same pain.

And those who were unwilling to endure were either too dramatic or simply had too much time on their hands.

IV. Another Form of Obedience

I have a friend who grew up in a family that favored boys over girls.

Her parents’ partiality toward her younger brother and their neglect of her made her always feel that she wasn’t good enough. She strived to perform well, hoping to earn her parents’ love; whenever her parents showed her a bit of care, she would feel again that they ultimately did love her after all.

Once, after being verbally abused and demeaned by her parents yet again, she boarded a train to Lhasa alone.

On the train, she called me and talked about her experience growing up.

Rationally, she knew her parents were very cruel to her, but she could never let go of her craving for parental affection.

I told her that not all parents truly love their children, and there is no need to gain parental validation at all costs.

You still have friends, you have a boyfriend, and the world is so vast—why must you trap yourself in a family where you cannot get love?

She cried bitterly on the other end of the line.

I listened quietly, sensing that this might be an important turning point in her life:

Would she silently endure the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune, or would she stand up and fight back against the endless suffering of the human world?

Later, she started getting into spiritual healing, spending money to enroll in courses, practicing, gaining enlightenment, and often sharing with me her reflections on absorbing high-dimensional energy from the universe.

She even began working as a spiritual consultant for others.

Once, I asked her to give me a healing session.

I complained to her that my boss didn’t look at actual work results, but only cared about the posture and appearance of employees working. If you seemed even slightly idle, it was as if you were stealing her money, and her manner of speaking was extremely disrespectful.

My friend advised me to consider the problem from the boss’s perspective, to understand the boss’s pressure, and to reflect on whether I hadn’t done my job well or had been too impulsive.

I then asked her:

“I have a subordinate who always fails to do the work assigned to him. What should I do?”

She said she had something to attend to and would chat next time.

Later, she never brought up this topic again.

Judging from the articles she usually wrote, the videos she made, and her way of conducting healing sessions, in her system, it seemed that mindset was a problem needing resolution only when facing superiors.

She was very fond of grand vocabulary:

Healing, growth, cosmic energy, high dimensions…

When someone voiced pressure coming from parents, teachers, or bosses, she would always gently and softly tell them:

You need to change yourself.

You need to improve yourself.

Yet when I told her about the troubles my subordinate brought me, I almost inevitably received no answer.

The poison arrow shot into her body was diluted by her into a Lianhua Qingwen injection and marketed out to others.

V. The “Troublemaker” Beaten into the Hospital

I forget which year it was, but the Shimen Street government partnered with an outside developer to demolish and relocate the old street.

Most residents agreed, but the household at the entrance of the street refused to sign the agreement all along.

Later, the developer hired people who beat the man of that household so badly he was sent to the hospital.

My dad said:

“That guy is just a troublemaker. Everyone else agreed, and he’s the only one who didn’t, delaying things for everyone. He just wants to demand more money.”

Finally, he added a line:

“He deserved to get beaten.”

I don’t know why that man refused the demolition, nor do I know what demands he had raised.

But in my dad’s narrative, these details didn’t seem to matter.

Because the majority of people had agreed.

Thus, the only person who disagreed became the “unreasonable” one.

And because you are unreasonable, you deserve to be beaten.

VI. When “Good Students” Grow Up, They Become “Submissive Subjects”

After the pandemic lockdowns were lifted, I talked with an old classmate about the epidemic prevention over the past three years.

I spoke to her about the various problems that occurred during the lockdown period.

She said:

“The country had no choice either; the epidemic is so difficult to control. We finally made it through these three years, and look, as soon as restrictions were lifted, how many people tested positive?”

I asked:

“If zero-COVID was so good, why not continue it?”

She said:

“It wasn’t easy for the country either. It protected us for three years, but ultimately it needs to develop the economy.”

I then mentioned the White Paper protesters who took to the streets to protest against the strict epidemic prevention policies.

She said:

“Epidemic prevention was so hard on the country; why are these people causing trouble?”

For a moment, I didn’t know how to continue speaking.

I certainly could not say she was a bad person.

She was usually very polite to others, and her personality was even a bit meek.

Yet regardless of whether the policy continued or stopped, and regardless of what happened before or after, she always seemed able to find justification for an entity far more powerful than herself.

During the late stage of the epidemic control, I often posted some so-called “negative energy” content on my QQ Zone.

The reason I posted them there was that I hoped my former students might see something different from the official propaganda.

Later, a classmate from the neighboring class in high school reached out to me on QQ, asking me that since I was so dissatisfied with China, why didn’t I move abroad.

I explained to him some of the reasons for my dissatisfaction, but he could hardly listen.

He was both angry at my “disloyalty” and felt pity for me as a lost lamb, telling me how well China was developing now, how socialism would inevitably triumph over capitalism, and how China would definitely surpass the United States in the future to become the world’s leading superpower.

Finally he said:

“Only the weak complain about the environment; the strong never complain, they only work hard to strive for a better life for themselves.”

A while ago, one of my female cousins posted a video on her WeChat Moments, teaching her son how to simulate killing “Japanese devils.”

I called to advise her not to let a child learn to hate people he had never seen from a young age.

Later, when discussing Chinese propaganda and education, she suddenly said:

“Younger brother, you cannot not love our country.”

I said:

“It’s not that I don’t love the country; I just don’t love the Communist Party, and I don’t love Xi Jinping.”

She immediately grew tense:

“Don’t say any more; if you say more, I’m hanging up.”

I asked: “What are you afraid of? Are you afraid of me, or are you afraid of Xi Jinping?”

We didn’t argue further after that.

Similarly, I cannot say she is a bad person. She has always cared about me.

And it is precisely because of this that I feel afraid.

What I fear is not a few hideous, evil individuals.

What I fear is how an ordinary person, through day after day of education, propaganda, and life experience, slowly learns what it means to be “sensible,” what it means to “look at the big picture,” what it means to be “grateful,” and what it means to be “patriotic.”

And then, apply these standards to others.

When we were young, we were educated to be “good students.”

The teacher hits you for your own good.

If you suffer an injustice, you must first reflect on what you did wrong.

When we grew up, we learned to be “submissive subjects” (liangmin).

The country has the country’s difficulties.

The government has the government’s arrangements.

Don’t cause trouble.

Don’t complain.

The most terrifying thing is not that we ourselves have learned to bow our heads.

It is that one day, when someone else refuses to bow his head, we will actively walk over and press down his head on behalf of those in power.

And then tell him: Who told you to be disobedient?

VII. Why Do You Want to Live in Hatred?

After my mother saw my WeChat Moments post, she expectedly urged me to delete it.

She asked me earnestly:

“Why do you want to live in hatred? Why don’t you know how to forgive?”

I felt it was utterly baffling.

What do I hate him for?

He didn’t hit me.

Why did calling him a brute a few times turn into “living in hatred”?

Cao Zhixing was our teacher for less than a year, yet I remembered him for nearly twenty years.

Because of fear.

Although his violence was not inflicted on me, it could have been inflicted on me at any moment.

I didn’t know when he would suddenly explode, nor did I know whether the next person picked up and slammed against the wall would be me.

Twenty years ago, I witnessed those acts of violence with my own eyes.

Twenty years later, what I saw was him sitting before the camera for a Teachers’ Day interview, talking benignly about how he cared for students.

Did the students who were beaten by him ever receive an apology?

Over all these years, has he ever truly reflected on himself?

I don’t know.

Yet I merely spoke out on WeChat Moments about what I had seen with my own eyes, and already people came to persuade me to let go of hatred and learn to forgive.

I will not delete it.

Because I refuse to accept this.

Whether or not to forgive is the victim’s own business.

I was not beaten by him, so I have no standing to forgive him on behalf of those students who were beaten.

Only accomplices of the perpetrators would first persuade the victims to drop their hatred, rather than persuading the abusers to put down their batons.

I do not forgive, because I am not worthy to do so.

Those students who were beaten never received an apology; it is not my turn to grant forgiveness on their behalf.

Furthermore, I never believe that a person who has never repented will naturally become a good person simply because time has passed.

Nor do I believe that a government that has never genuinely faced its past mistakes will not commit the same—or even greater—mistakes in the future simply because those mistakes have become history.

Time does not automatically bring repentance.

And oblivion certainly does not.

VIII. If Bad Habits Are Not Corrected, Accumulated Evils Become Routine

This education of “obedience” did not start with our generation.

My grandparents’ generation lived through the Three Years of Famine, one political movement after another, and the Cultural Revolution. What such experiences left to the next generation was often not the lessons of resistance, but rather more pragmatic survival wisdom: cause less trouble, speak less, and stay away from power.

They were broken and molded into the Communist Party’s “submissive subjects.”

These survival experiences were then turned into education for their children.

As for my parents’ generation, during their upbringing they experienced the “Strike Hard” campaigns, the movement against bourgeois liberalization, the political turmoil of 1989, and the era of strict family planning.

They witnessed unjust imprisonments under violent law enforcement, small business owners jailed under the crime of “speculation and profiteering,” people having their cattle confiscated and homes demolished for exceeding birth quotas, and the rapid shift in the social atmosphere dominated by power around 1989.

These events proved to them time and time again: do not contend with power.

Thus, the “obedience” passed down from the previous generation was no longer just a family motto, but a survival strategy repeatedly validated by reality.

So, growing up, I too was taught to be obedient, to be submissive, to respect teachers, to respect elders, not to cause trouble, and not to oppose the state.

And when it came to our generation, I once again saw many people using similar words to educate their own children.

One generation is educated to grow up this way, and then hands down the exact same standards to the next generation.

Parents demand obedience from children; teachers demand obedience from students.

In the process of growing up, we also slowly learned to monitor one another, seeing who was still not obedient enough.

We not only inherited the fear of the previous generation, but also inherited their way of explaining that fear.

Thus, many things that originally should have been questioned were passed down generation after generation into:

“Forget it.”

Many harms that originally should have been corrected were also passed down generation after generation into:

“It’s all in the past.”

Things that were never reflected upon were thus passed down from one generation to the next.

If bad habits are not corrected, accumulated evils become routine.

It is precisely because of this that I feel an increasing aversion to that sentence:

“Why can’t you forgive?”

Why must a person who says he is tired first prove that there is no one more tired than him in the world?

Why must a person who is hurt first reflect on whether he is being too melodramatic?

Why is it that when a person refuses to submit, some people feel he deserves to be beaten?

Why, in the end, is it always the injured party who is required to be a little more mature, a little more tolerant, and a little more sensible?

I have played the “good student” for too many years; I no longer want to be a “submissive subject.”

If even expressing my normal feelings requires self-examination and self-scrutiny first—reflecting on whether I am not tolerant enough or not mature enough—then what I am forgiving is probably not that teacher who once committed violence.

I am merely forgiving my own cowardice once again.

Editor: Li Jing

Proofreader: Kong Xiangqing

Translator: Shen Meihua

中国人为什么越来越冷漠

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–中共统治下的戾气、恐惧与信任崩塌

作者:赵雪峰

这些年来,许多人都有一种感受:中国社会的戾气似乎越来越重。地铁里一次碰撞可能演变成争吵,开车时谁也不愿让步,网络上一句意见不合就可能招来辱骂。面对陌生人的困难,有些人的第一反应并非帮助,而是警惕:“会不会被骗?”“会不会被讹?”

于是有人问:中国人为什么变得越来越冷漠?

但真正应该问的,也许不是“中国人怎么了”,而是:究竟是什么样的社会环境,让越来越多的普通人学会了防备、沉默和攻击?

中国人当然不是天生缺乏善意。灾难发生时有人捐款,陌生人遇到危险时也有人挺身而出。真正值得思考的是:一个社会究竟是在鼓励善意,还是在不断提高信任和善良的成本?

过去几十年,中国在高速发展的同时,也形成了极其激烈的竞争环境。住房、教育、工作、医疗、养老,每一样都关系到家庭的安全感。如今又叠加了房地产调整、就业和收入压力。当越来越多人觉得生活空间正在被压缩,人就更容易把身边的人视为竞争者。

问题不再是“规则为什么不公平”,而变成了“别人是不是占了我的便宜”。

更值得注意的是愤怒的流向。

任何社会都会有不满。工资被拖欠、房子烂尾、政策不合理,人自然会愤怒。区别在于,人有没有安全而有效的渠道表达这种愤怒。一个值得讨论的现象是:当向权力表达不满的成本很高,而攻击普通人的成本很低时,愤怒就更容易横向释放。

对老板的不满不能说,于是回家骂孩子;对现实的不满无处表达,于是在网络上攻击陌生人;自己曾遭受过不公平待遇,等拥有一点权力,又把同样的不公平施加给更弱的人。最终形成了一种令人悲哀的社会关系:面对强者谨小慎微,面对弱者却异常苛刻。

而冷漠,有时也未必意味着没有良心。中国人从小常听到一句话:“少管闲事。”为什么看到别人遇到困难不愿帮?因为怕惹麻烦。为什么看到不公平选择沉默?因为担心影响自己。

当一个社会长期让参与公共事务、帮助陌生人、公开表达不同意见意味着额外风险时,“冷漠”就可能成为一种自我保护。于是人们逐渐学会:不要相信陌生人,不要多说话,不要出头,不要管与自己无关的事情。久而久之,被消耗掉的正是社会最宝贵的东西——人与人之间的信任。

所以,我不愿意把这些问题简单归结为“中国人素质差”。

在中共长期一党执政、政治权力高度集中的体制下,媒体、结社和政治表达受到了严格限制。当批评权力的成本高于攻击普通人的成本,当人无法改变规则却又每天承受规则带来的压力,那么压力就更容易在人群之间转移。这正是我所说的中共长期统治之下形成的一种畸形社会生态。

所谓“畸形”,不是说中国这个民族出了问题,而是正常的人被放进了一个不正常的激励结构之中。当说真话需要计算代价,沉默就会成为理性选择;当帮助别人可能带来麻烦,冷漠就会成为自我保护;当正常的利益表达渠道受到限制,愤怒就更容易变成人与人之间的攻击。

所以真正应该追问的不是“中国人怎么了”,而是:为什么一个拥有无数善良普通人的社会,会逐渐形成彼此防备、彼此伤害的生存逻辑。

如果一个社会最终让人害怕权力、提防邻居、攻击弱者、习惯沉默,那么最值得反思的就不只是人的“素质”,而是这个社会为什么会被塑造成今天这个样子,作为统治者的中共,难辞其咎。

编辑:李晶 校对:孔祥庆 翻译:戈冰

Why Are Chinese People Becoming Increasingly Indifferent?

— Hostility, Fear, and the Collapse of Trust Under CCP Rule

By Zhao Xuefeng

Abstract: Under the dictatorial cultural rule constructed by the CCP, the Chinese people are becoming increasingly fractured and atomized.

In recent years, many people have felt that society in China seems to be growing ever more hostile. A minor bump on the subway can escalate into a heated quarrel; drivers on the road refuse to yield an inch; and a single disagreement online can invite a barrage of verbal abuse. Faced with a stranger in distress, the first reaction of some is not to offer help, but to remain vigilant: “Is this a scam?” “Will I be framed?”

Thus, some ask: Why have Chinese people become increasingly indifferent?

However, the question that truly ought to be asked is perhaps not “What is wrong with the Chinese people?”, but rather: What kind of social environment has driven an increasing number of ordinary people to learn self-defense, silence, and aggression?

Chinese people, of course, are not naturally devoid of goodwill. When disaster strikes, there are those who donate; when strangers are in danger, there are also those who step forward. What is truly worth pondering is: is a society ultimately encouraging goodwill, or is it continually raising the cost of trust and kindness?

Over the past few decades, along with rapid development, China has also fostered an intensely fierce competitive environment. Housing, education, employment, healthcare, and eldercare—every single one directly impacts a family’s sense of security. Today, this is further compounded by real estate market adjustments, as well as employment and income pressures. As more and more people feel that their living space is being squeezed, they become far more prone to viewing those around them as competitors.

The question is no longer “Why are the rules unfair?”, but has transformed into “Is someone else taking advantage of me?”

What deserves even greater attention is the direction in which anger flows.

Dissatisfaction exists in any society. When wages are withheld, housing developments are left unfinished, or policies are unreasonable, people naturally feel angry. The difference lies in whether people possess safe and effective channels to express this anger. A phenomenon worth discussing is that when the cost of expressing dissatisfaction to authority is exceedingly high, while the cost of attacking ordinary people is exceedingly low, anger flows far more easily horizontally.

Dissatisfaction with one’s boss cannot be voiced, so one goes home to scold the children; discontent with reality has no outlet for expression, so one attacks strangers on the internet; having once suffered unfair treatment oneself, upon gaining a small measure of power, one imposes the exact same unfairness onto those who are even weaker. Ultimately, this forms a tragic pattern of social relations: displaying utmost caution and deference before the powerful, yet being exceptionally harsh toward the weak.

And indifference, at times, does not necessarily signify a lack of conscience. Chinese people often hear a saying from childhood: “Mind your own business.” Why are people reluctant to help when they see others in difficulty? Because they fear bringing trouble upon themselves. Why do people choose silence when facing injustice? Because they worry it will affect them.

When a society systematically makes participating in public affairs, helping strangers, and publicly expressing dissenting views carry extra risk over a prolonged period, “indifference” can become a form of self-preservation. People thus gradually learn: do not trust strangers, do not say too much, do not stick your neck out, and do not meddle in matters that do not concern you. Over time, what gets eroded away is precisely society’s most precious asset—trust among people.

Therefore, I am unwilling to simply attribute these problems to “poor moral character among Chinese people.”

Under the regime of long-term one-party rule and highly centralized political power by the CCP, the media, freedom of association, and political expression are severely restricted. When the cost of criticizing power is higher than the cost of attacking ordinary citizens, and when people cannot change the rules yet endure the pressures imposed by those rules every single day, that pressure becomes far more likely to shift laterally among the population. This is precisely what I refer to as the distorted social ecology formed under the CCP’s long-term rule.

What is called “distorted” does not mean that something is wrong with the Chinese nation as a people; rather, it means that normal human beings have been placed inside an abnormal incentive structure. When telling the truth requires calculating the cost, silence becomes a rational choice; when helping others may bring trouble, indifference becomes self-preservation; and when normal channels for expressing interests are restricted, anger far more easily turns into mutual attack among individuals.

Therefore, what truly ought to be questioned is not “What is wrong with the Chinese people?”, but rather: why does a society possessing countless kind-hearted, ordinary individuals gradually develop a logic of survival defined by mutual guard and mutual harm?

If a society ultimately causes people to fear power, beware of neighbors, attack the weak, and grow accustomed to silence, then what is most worthy of reflection is not merely the “moral quality” of its people, but why this society came to be shaped into what it is today—a state of affairs for which the CCP, as the ruling entity, bears undeniable responsibility.

Editor: Li Jing Proofreader: Kong Xiangqing Translator: Ge Bing

揭秘墨镜男的雨伞

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习近平访美期间抗议者遭袭事件调查纪实

《在野党》特刊记者 缪青报道

作者:缪青

2026年9月24日,美国华盛顿特区。

中共党魁习近平窜访美国期间,其夫人彭丽媛与美国第一夫人梅拉尼娅共同前往史密森尼国家亚洲艺术博物馆参观。公开报道显示,当天博物馆外聚集了欢迎人员以及不同立场的抗议者,现场出现了中美两国旗帜和不同政治诉求的标语。

然而,在这场受到国际社会关注的访问活动之外,一场围绕中国政治表达而发生的现场袭击冲突,同样值得追问:

首先,这些亲共的集会人群,现场人员是谁组织的?是谁实施了对民主抗议者的攻击行为?现场统一佩戴相同款式鸭舌帽的墨镜男,他们的真实身份是谁?他们手中的黑色长柄雨伞又究竟是什么?

这些问题,至今仍有许多细节有待美国有关部门进一步调查。

揭秘墨镜男的雨伞

民主和平抗议者集会现场(图片来源网络)

一、从抗议现场到辣椒喷雾

记者事后采访了在现场的中国民主党党员,民主党河南工委主任蔡晓丽女士,据她提供的叙述,攻击行为发生了多次,最激烈一次是发生在彭丽媛参观博物馆期间。

当中国民主人士在博物馆外围,和平表达反对中共一党专政的政治诉求时,她和其他抗议者忽然遭到身份不明人员攻击,攻击者是一群统一戴着墨镜,口罩,鸭舌帽的人,他们推搡、拉扯,并有人使用辣椒喷雾对现场抗议者眼部进行攻击。

据另一现场当事人,中国民主党党员,民主党旧金山支部主任郭鉴鑫介绍,喷射动作非常迅速,训练有素,辣椒喷雾器藏在衣袖处,他们中有人撑开黑色长柄雨伞负责掩护,有人在掩护下实施攻击。现场抗议者中有人的眼部,在数秒之内连续遭到喷射。他还称,同时现场有人被掐脖子、拖拽。

这些说法目前主要来自现场当事人的陈述。究竟谁实施了喷射、谁首先动手,以及是否存在统一组织指挥,仍应由现场视频、警方记录、医疗记录以及其他独立证据予以确认。

但一个值得关注的事实是:类似的冲突并非第一次出现在习近平访美相关活动中。

口罩墨镜男袭击抗议者网络截图

二、2023年旧金山:冲突已经留下记录

2023年11月习近平赴美国旧金山参加APEC峰会期间,大批亲共支持者从美国不同地区前往旧金山举行活动。

公开报道显示,美国亚裔社团联合总会主席陈善庄曾从纽约前往旧金山组织欢迎活动。相关报道和研究资料称,他负责动员、运输纽约地区的支持者,并在现场使用对讲机等方式进行组织。

《纽约时报》相关报道还指出,2023年习近平访问旧金山期间,陈善庄组织团体欢迎习近平,现场活动后来发生了支持者与抗议者之间的冲突;陈善庄本人也曾被拍摄到与抗议者发生争执。

这意味着,2026年的华盛顿现场并不是孤立事件。

至少从公开资料来看,一条值得关注的线索已经出现:

习近平访美——海外侨团动员——亲共团体与民主抗议者同时出现——双方发生冲突。

这条线索值得美国执法部门和新闻机构继续调查。

三、“欢迎习近平”的人群究竟代表多少真实民意?

另一个值得追问的问题,是习近平访问美国期间出现的大规模亲共欢迎人群。

2026年9月23日,纽约等地闽籍侨团组织人员前往华盛顿欢迎习近平。公开报道显示,参加活动的侨团包括美国福建同乡会、美国福建三山会、美国福建联合总会等多个组织。陈善庄接受采访时也表示自己是提前数日抵达华盛顿参加欢迎活动。

类似的组织动员并不是第一次。

2023年习近平访问旧金山期间,陈善庄也曾公开表示,有来自纽约的50多个机构、超过1000人前往加州欢迎习近平。

与此同时,一些海外媒体曾报道并证实,参与者可以获得交通、食宿和现金补贴。但有关具体金额和资金来源的说法主要来自媒体报道、现场人士及匿名知情人,并没有得到美国政府公开调查结论的全面证实。

因此,一个更加准确的问题不是简单地说“所有欢迎者都是花钱雇来的”,而是:这些欢迎队伍中究竟有多少人是自发参加?多少人由侨团组织?是否存在统一交通、食宿或现金补贴?资金来自哪里?组织者与中国驻美外交机构之间是什么关系?

这些问题都可以通过银行记录、车辆租赁记录、微信群通知、活动组织文件以及美国有关部门调查得到进一步确认。

亲共团体组织者陈善庄(图片来源网络)

四、同乡会:文化组织还是政治动员网络?

中国海外同乡会本身并不等于政治组织。

许多华人同乡会长期承担联络乡亲、慈善、文化交流和社区服务等功能。

但另一方面,中国官方公开资料也显示,中国共产党长期高度重视海外华侨华人工作。

新华社曾刊载习近平在福建工作期间有关海外侨务和统战工作的材料,其中明确提到加强与海外华侨华人的联络、团结海内外闽籍乡亲,以及发挥侨务工作作用。

一个合乎逻辑的推断,这些海外同乡会是否已经是中共的海外代理人组织?海外同乡会是否已经接受中共的直接指挥?

当某些侨团在政治人物访美期间能够迅速跨州动员大量人员、组织车辆、安排住宿,并集中出现在特定地点时,其组织能力和资金来源同样值得公共监督!

民主社会政治活动最重要的原则之一,就是:谁组织,谁出资,谁指挥,谁负责!

五、陈善庄与中国官方体系的公开联系

陈善庄的身份及其与中国官方体系之间的公开联系,也值得放在这一背景下观察。

福建官方媒体2024年报道,陈善庄曾以海外侨胞身份回国参加全国政协十四届二次会议,并受到福建当地侨联及地方政府官员接待。报道还介绍他担任美国亚裔社团联合总会主席同时兼任美国福州琅岐联合总会创会会长。

一些美国媒体和研究机构则长期关注陈善庄在美国华人社团中的政治影响力,以及他参与组织习近平访美欢迎活动的情况。

这些公开事实可以说明他的政治和侨团活动具有一定影响力,但是否足以证明他是“中共海外代理人”,仅凭政治立场或者参加欢迎活动不能作出结论,这需要依据美国法律意义上的证据和正式立案调查,

六、最神秘的“墨镜男”

回到现场。

抗议者拍摄的视频和照片中,可以看到一些墨镜男携带黑色长柄雨伞。

据现场民主人士中国民主党党员旧金山支部主任郭鉴鑫介绍,在现场的抓扯中有人拿到了这种雨伞,这种雨伞是特制的雨伞,手感很沉,中间的雨伞柄是钢制实心的,与中国国内重大政治活动中安保人员使用的黑色雨伞十分相似,与北京天安门巡逻的中央特勤局使用的警用器具也十分类似,兼有现场遮蔽与攻击功能。

网络上还有说法称,这可能是所谓“警棍伞”或特殊安保器械。

但是,截至目前,没有可靠公开证据能够证明此次华盛顿现场出现的黑色雨伞都属于中国警卫部门。因此我们必须客观的说,携带相似雨伞不能证明其持有者身份属于中国安保系统。

“墨镜男”真正值得调查的,不是它携带的什么器械,而是:谁携带?谁购买?谁组织?谁授权?是否有人使用器械攻击抗议者?是否存在来自中共官方人员的指挥?

这些问题都需要后期通过视频、现场证人、警方调查以及物证得到答案,那么所谓“墨镜男”的真正来历自然会水落石出。

“墨镜男” 与中共特勤局使用的警用器具十分类似(图片来源网络)

七、如果跨国镇压发生在美国,性质就完全不同

中国境内的政治异议人士面对的是中国国内的政治和司法体系。

但这在美国,美国是一个拥有宪法第一修正案、保护言论自由和和平集会权利的国家。

任何人,无论支持习近平还是反对习近平,都可以表达自己的政治立场;任何人也不能因为政治观点不同,就在美国街头遭受暴力攻击。

因此,如果最终调查确认,有人因为政治立场而遭到一个外国政府有组织地攻击、威胁或者骚扰抗议者,那么问题就不再只是一次普通的街头冲突,而可能涉及美国刑事法律、民事责任以及外国政府跨境影响活动等多个层面。

这也是所谓“跨国镇压”问题受到美国社会关注的原因。

真正的调查目标,不应该是简单给某一个人贴标签,而应该追问背后的事实:

亲共同乡会与中共的关系?有没有资金?有没有指挥?有没有来自外国政府的参与?有没有违法行为?打人事件谁应该承担责任?

抗议者人群里的疑似中共特工(图片来源网络)

抗议者人群里的疑似中共特工(图片来源网络)

结语:让事实揭开“墨镜男”的面纱

从旧金山到华盛顿,从2023年到2026年,习近平访美期间海外华人社会中出现的“欢迎”与“抗议”,已经成为美国华人社区政治生态中的一个特殊现象。

一边是由多个亲共侨团组织的欢迎队伍;

另一边是来自中国大陆、香港、台湾以及海外的民主、人权和反共人士。

两种完全不同的政治声音,在美国土地上发生碰撞,本身就是一个值得记录的时代切片。

但美国的答案不能是“谁的声音更大”,更不能是“谁的人更多”。

答案只能是:法律面前人人平等。

如果有人组织暴力,就调查组织者;

如果有人实施攻击,就追究实施者;

如果有人非法接受外国政府指挥或资金,就依法调查;

而对于“墨镜男”“黑雨伞”以及背后的组织网络,最有价值的问题始终只有一个:

他们究竟是谁?

答案不应该由政治口号决定,而应该由视频、证人、物证、资金流和美国执法部门的调查来揭开。

只有事实,才能真正揭开“墨镜男和他们的雨伞”的秘密。 真正需要维护的,是所有人在美国法律框架下和平表达意见的权利。

《在野党》旧金山记者站 09/27/26

编辑:李晶 校对:程筱筱 翻译:戈冰

Unveiling the Sunglasses-Wearing Man’s Umbrella

A Fact-Finding Report on the Attack on Protesters During Xi Jinping’s Visit to the United States

Reported by Miao Qing, Special Correspondent for The Opposition Party

Author: Miao Qing

September 24, 2026, Washington, D.C., United States. During the CCP chief Xi Jinping’s sneak-visit to the United States, his wife Peng Liyuan and American First Lady Melania Trump jointly visited the Smithsonian’s National Museum of Asian Art. Public reports indicate that on that day, welcoming crowds as well as protesters holding different stances gathered outside the museum, where flags of both China and the United States alongside banners representing various political demands were present on-site. However, beyond this visit covered under international spotlight, an on-site violent conflict involving physical attacks centered around Chinese political expression likewise deserves deeper questioning: First of all, regarding these pro-CCP rally crowds, who organized the personnel on the ground? Who executed the acts of assault against democratic protesters? Who are these men wearing sunglasses and identical baseball caps on-site, and what are their true identities? Furthermore, what exactly are those long-handled black umbrellas held in their hands? As for these questions, many details still await further investigation by relevant U.S. authorities.

揭秘墨镜男的雨伞
The Scene of the Assembly of Peaceful Democratic Protesters (Photo credit: Internet)

I. From the Protest Site to Pepper Spray

Afterward, the reporter interviewed China Democracy Party members who were present at the scene, including Ms. Cai Xiaoli, Director of the Henan Working Committee of the China Democracy Party. According to the narrative she provided, the acts of assault occurred multiple times, with the most violent one occurring during Peng Liyuan’s visit to the museum.

When Chinese pro-democracy figures were on the perimeter of the museum peacefully expressing political demands opposing the Chinese Communist Party’s one-party dictatorship, she and other protesters were suddenly attacked by unidentified individuals. The attackers were a group of people wearing matching sunglasses, face masks, and baseball caps. They shoved and pulled at the protesters, and some used pepper spray to attack the eyes of protesters on-site.

According to another party involved at the scene, China Democracy Party member and Director of the Democracy Party’s San Francisco Branch Guo Jianxin, the spraying actions were extremely rapid and well-trained, with the pepper spray canisters hidden at their sleeves. Among them, some opened long-handled black umbrellas to provide cover, while others carried out attacks under that cover. The eyes of some protesters on-site were sprayed repeatedly within a few seconds. He also stated that simultaneously, people at the scene were put in chokeholds and dragged.

These assertions currently come primarily from statements made by the parties involved at the scene. Who actually executed the spraying, who initiated the violent physical confrontation, and whether there existed unified organization and command should still be confirmed through on-site video footage, police records, medical records, and other independent evidence.

However, a noteworthy fact remains: similar conflicts are not occurring for the first time in events related to Xi Jinping’s visits to the United States.

Network Screenshot of the Men in Sunglasses and Face Masks Attacking Protesters

II. San Francisco 2023: Conflicts Were Already Recorded

In November 2023, during Xi Jinping’s visit to San Francisco to attend the APEC summit, large numbers of pro-CCP supporters traveled from various regions across the United States to San Francisco to hold activities.

Public reports indicate that Chen Shanzhuang, chairman of the American Asian Community Association (and American Asian Federation), traveled from New York to San Francisco to organize welcoming activities. Relevant reports and research materials state that he was responsible for mobilizing and transporting supporters from the New York area and conducting on-site organization using walkie-talkies and other means.

Relevant reports by The New York Times also pointed out that during Xi Jinping’s visit to San Francisco in 2023, Chen Shanzhuang organized groups to welcome Xi Jinping, where on-site activities later led to clashes between supporters and protesters; Chen Shanzhuang himself was also photographed engaging in altercations with protesters.

This implies that the scene in Washington in 2026 was not an isolated incident.

At least judging from public data, a noteworthy clue has emerged:

Xi Jinping’s U.S. visit — Overseas hometown association mobilization — Pro-CCP groups and democratic protesters appearing simultaneously — Violent clashes erupting between the two sides.

This thread deserves continued investigation by U.S. law enforcement agencies and news organizations.

III. How Much Genuine Public Opinion Do the “Welcome Xi Jinping” Crowds Actually Represent?

Another question worth pursuing further is the large-scale pro-CCP welcoming crowd that appeared during Xi Jinping’s visit to the United States.

On September 23, 2026, Fujianese overseas Chinese associations from New York and other regions organized personnel to travel to Washington to welcome Xi Jinping. Public reports show that participating associations included multiple organizations such as the Fukien Benevolent Association of America, the Fujian Sanshan Association of USA, and the United Association of Fujian American. Chen Shanzhuang also stated in an interview that he had arrived in Washington several days in advance to participate in the welcoming activities.

Such organizational mobilization is not happening for the first time.

During Xi Jinping’s visit to San Francisco in 2023, Chen Shanzhuang also publicly stated that more than 1,000 people from over 50 organizations in New York had traveled to California to welcome Xi Jinping.

At the same time, some overseas media outlets have reported and confirmed that participants were able to receive transportation, room and board, as well as cash stipends. However, claims regarding specific amounts and sources of funding have come primarily from media reports, on-site individuals, and anonymous insiders, and have not been fully confirmed by official public investigative conclusions from the U.S. government.

Therefore, a more accurate question is not simply asking whether “all welcomers were paid hires,” but rather: How many people in these welcoming contingents participated spontaneously? How many were organized by overseas Chinese associations? Was there unified transportation, room and board, or cash stipends? Where did the funding come from? And what is the relationship between the organizers and Chinese diplomatic missions in the United States?

These questions can all be further verified through bank records, vehicle rental receipts, WeChat group notices, event planning documents, and investigations by relevant U.S. agencies.

Pro-CCP group organizer Chen Shanzhuang (Photo credit: Internet)

IV. Hometown Associations: Cultural Organizations or Networks of Political Mobilization?

Chinese overseas hometown associations themselves are not equal to political organizations.

Many Chinese overseas hometown associations have long served functions such as connecting fellow provincials, undertaking charity work, facilitating cultural exchanges, and rendering community services.

On the other hand, however, official Chinese public materials also show that the Chinese Communist Party has long attached high importance to work concerning overseas Chinese.

Xinhua News Agency once published materials regarding overseas Chinese affairs and United Front work during Xi Jinping’s period of work in Fujian, which explicitly mentioned strengthening liaison with overseas Chinese, uniting Fujianese compatriots both at home and abroad, as well as giving full play to the role of overseas Chinese affairs work.

A logical inference follows: Have these overseas hometown associations already become the CCP’s overseas proxy organizations? Have overseas hometown associations already accepted the direct command of the CCP?

When certain overseas Chinese associations, during visits by political figures to the United States, are capable of rapidly mobilizing large numbers of personnel across states, organizing vehicles, arranging accommodation, and appearing en masse at specific locations, their organizational capacity and funding sources likewise deserve public scrutiny!

One of the most important principles of political activities in a democratic society is: Whoever organizes, funds, commands, shall be held accountable!

V. Chen Shanzhuang’s Public Connections with the Official Chinese System

Chen Shanzhuang’s identity and his public connections with the official Chinese system are also worth observing against this background.

Fujian official media reported in 2024 that Chen Shanzhuang had returned to China as an overseas Chinese representative to attend the second session of the 14th National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), and was received by the local Fujian Federation of Returned Overseas Chinese as well as local government officials. Reports also noted that while serving as Chairman of the American Asian Community Association (and American Asian Federation), he concurrently served as the Founding President of the American Fuzhou Langqi United Association.

Some American media outlets and research institutions have long paid attention to Chen Shanzhuang’s political influence within Chinese American community associations, as well as his involvement in organizing welcoming activities for Xi Jinping’s visits to the United States.

These public facts demonstrate that his political and overseas Chinese association activities carry a certain level of influence. However, whether this is sufficient to prove that he is an “overseas agent of the CCP” cannot be concluded based solely on his political stance or his participation in welcoming activities; this requires evidence in the legal sense of the United States and formal case investigations.

VI. The Most Mysterious “Men in Sunglasses”

Returning to the scene.

In the videos and photos captured by protesters, several men in sunglasses can be seen carrying long-handled black umbrellas.

According to Guo Jianxin, a pro-democracy figure present at the scene, China Democracy Party member, and Director of the Democracy Party’s San Francisco Branch, during the physical tussle on-site, someone managed to grab one of these umbrellas. This type of umbrella is custom-made, heavy to the touch, with a solid steel shaft in the center, bearing a strong resemblance to the black umbrellas used by security personnel during major political events in mainland China, as well as to the police gear used by the Central Special Police Bureau patrolling Tiananmen in Beijing, possessing both on-site obscuring and offensive capabilities.

There are also claims on the internet suggesting that these might be so-called “baton umbrellas” or specialized security equipment.

However, as of now, there is no reliable public evidence that can prove all the black umbrellas that appeared on-site in Washington belonged to Chinese security departments. Therefore, we must objectively state that carrying similar umbrellas does not prove that their holders belong to the Chinese security system.

What truly deserves investigation regarding the “men in sunglasses” is not what equipment they carried, but rather: Who carried it? Who purchased it? Who organized them? Who authorized them? Did anyone use the equipment to attack protesters? Was there command coming from official CCP personnel?

All these questions require answers to be provided down the line through videos, eyewitnesses, police investigations, and physical evidence; then, the true origin of the so-called “men in sunglasses” will naturally come to light.

The “Men in Sunglasses” Are Very Similar to the Police Gear Used by the CCP Special Service Bureau (Photo credit: Internet)

VII. If Transnational Repression Occurs in the United States, the Nature Is Completely Different

Political dissidents inside China face China’s domestic political and judicial system.

However, in the United States, the U.S. is a country governed by the First Amendment of the Constitution, protecting freedom of speech and the right to peaceful assembly.

Anyone, whether supporting Xi Jinping or opposing Xi Jinping, can express their political stance; nor can anyone be subjected to violent attacks on the streets of the United States simply due to differing political views.

Therefore, if eventual investigation confirms that individuals were systematically attacked, threatened, or harassed by a foreign government for their political stances, then the issue is no longer just an ordinary street clash, but may involve multiple dimensions including U.S. criminal law, civil liability, and foreign government transnational influence activities.

This is also why the issue of so-called “transnational repression” receives attention from American society.

The true goal of investigation should not be simply labeling a particular individual, but rather pursuing the facts behind the scenes:

What is the relationship between pro-CCP hometown associations and the CCP? Is there funding? Is there command? Is there participation from a foreign government? Are there unlawful acts? Who should bear responsibility for the assault incidents?

Suspected CCP agents among the crowd of protesters (Photo credit: Internet)

Suspected CCP agents among the crowd of protesters (Photo credit: Internet)

Conclusion: Let Facts Unveil the “Men in Sunglasses”

From San Francisco to Washington, from 2023 to 2026, the “welcoming” and “protesting” that emerged in overseas Chinese society during Xi Jinping’s visits to the United States have become a unique phenomenon in the political ecology of the Chinese American community.

On one side are the welcoming contingents organized by multiple pro-CCP overseas Chinese associations;

On the other side are pro-democracy, human rights, and anti-communist figures from mainland China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and overseas.

Two completely different political voices colliding on American soil is in itself a slice of the era worth recording.

However, America’s answer cannot be “whoever speaks louder,” nor can it be “whoever has more people.”

The answer can only be: Everyone is equal before the law.

If someone organizes violence, investigate the organizers;

If someone carries out an attack, hold the perpetrator accountable;

If someone illegally accepts direction or funds from a foreign government, investigate them in accordance with the law;

And as for the “men in sunglasses,” the “black umbrellas,” and the organizational network behind them, there has always been only one single most valuable question:

Who on earth are they?

The answer should not be determined by political slogans, but should rather be unveiled through videos, witnesses, physical evidence, financial flows, and investigations by U.S. law enforcement.

Only facts can truly unveil the secrets of the “men in sunglasses and their umbrellas.” What truly needs to be safeguarded is everyone’s right to peacefully express their opinions within the framework of U.S. law.

The Opposition Party San Francisco Bureau 09/27/26

Editor: Li Jing Proofreader: Cheng Xiaoxiao Translator: Ge Bing

当荒诞成为武器,小熊维尼刺痛独裁者的神经

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作者:卢超

2026年9月23日,习近平飞抵华盛顿。白宫门前铺着红地毯,特朗普用军乐队和国宴接待他,桌上聊的是关税、AI和高科技竞争那些大牌局。而在白宫外的街头,我和民主党朋友从洛杉矶飞了三千英里赶过来,套着黄色的毛绒维尼熊服装,站在抗议人群的最前排。

当荒诞成为武器,小熊维尼刺痛独裁者的神经

有人可能会问:人家在大搞元首外交,你们套个卡通服折腾这一趟,能有什么用?

答案很简单,就是为了用荒诞反击荒诞。在中国,因为网民把维尼熊和习近平放在一起对比,这只原本再正常不过的卡通熊,硬生生成了互联网上最敏感的禁忌词。一个手握核按钮、掌管十四亿人的政权,居然会害怕一只没武器、不戴皇冠的黄毛熊,把它删得干净彻底。这种极度的敏感和脆弱,在维尼熊这面镜子面前显露无遗。

这几天华盛顿天气不错,白宫附近的道路封得死死的。政客们在里面握手合影、喝茶晚宴,我们就在外面的街上晃悠。

走在街头,很多美国人好奇地围上来问我:“你们为啥要穿成维尼熊的样子?”

每一次,我都会跟她们解释:“因为维尼熊在中国代表习近平,而这只可爱的卡通熊在当下的中国是完全被封禁的敏感词。”

听完我的解释,路人们的表情瞬间从看热闹变成了不可思议。当她们知道墙内的普通人仅仅因为发一张维尼图、或者说错一句话就可能被封号甚至被警察找上门时,这套搞笑的衣服就成了一堂最直观的课——它用最轻松的方式,让西方普通人一眼看清了那个体制对言论控制到了多么可笑的地步。不少美国人当场对我们竖起大拇指,喊着让我们加油。

9月24日下午,我们加入了一支近三千人的藏人抗议队伍,一路游行到了白宫门口。那场面极其壮观,震耳欲聋的抗议声响彻了白宫附近的整条街区。我们穿着维尼熊服站在人群中,跟着大家一起呐喊。那一刻我心里无比坚定:坐在白宫高墙里的习近平,绝对能清清楚楚地听到我们的声音!

不少路过的海外华人也走过来跟我们合影、握手。一位同在加州生活的朋友跟我说:“在墙内,大家连提到那个名字都要用拼音缩写;但今天在华盛顿,我们终于能把这个‘禁忌’穿在身上,光明正大站在阳光下了。”

说实话,穿着这么厚重的毛绒服在华盛顿的大太阳下站几个小时,衣服早被汗水湿透了。但想想墙内无数连声都发不出来、甚至因言获罪的同胞,这点辛苦根本不算什么。特朗普和习近平可以在谈判桌上达成各种商业妥协,但外交礼仪再隆重,也盖不住民间对自由和尊严的追求。

从洛杉矶到华盛顿,我们用这场看起来有点滑稽的“行为艺术”,做了一次正经的发声。独裁者最怕的未必是义正辞严的批判,而是其权威在幽默和嘲讽面前荡然无存。当荒诞成为反抗的武器,小熊维尼刺痛的不只是他的敏感神经,也是在告诉全世界:权力可以封锁网络,但永远封不住追求自由的人。

编辑:李晶 校对:孔祥庆 翻译:戈冰

When absurdity becomes a weapon, Winnie the Pooh touches a raw nerve with dictators.

Author: Lu Chao

On September 23, 2026, Xi Jinping flew into Washington. Red carpet was rolled out in front of the White House; Trump received him with a military band and a state banquet, and the discussions at the table revolved around the high-stakes games of tariffs, AI, and high-tech competition. Meanwhile, on the streets outside the White House, my Democratic friends and I—having flown three thousand miles from Los Angeles—donned yellow plush Winnie the Pooh costumes and stood in the front row of the protest crowd.

当荒诞成为武器,小熊维尼刺痛独裁者的神经

Some might ask: While they are engaging in grand summit diplomacy, what good does it do for you to go through all this trouble dressed in cartoon costumes?

The answer is simple: to use absurdity to fight back against absurdity. In China, simply because netized users compared Winnie the Pooh side-by-side with Xi Jinping, this perfectly normal cartoon bear was forcibly transformed into the most sensitive taboo word on the internet. A regime possessing nuclear buttons and governing 1.4 billion people is actually terrified of a yellow-furred bear with no weapons and no crown, erasing it completely and thoroughly. This extreme sensitivity and fragility are exposed without reservation before the mirror of Winnie the Pooh.

The weather in Washington these past few days has been quite nice, with the roads near the White House completely sealed off. Inside, politicians were shaking hands, taking photos, drinking tea, and attending banquets, while we wandered the streets outside.

Walking along the streets, many Americans came up out of curiosity and asked me: “Why are you dressed up as Winnie the Pooh?”

Every time, I would explain to them: “Because Winnie the Pooh represents Xi Jinping in China, and this cute cartoon bear is a completely banned, sensitive term in China today.”

Upon hearing my explanation, the expressions of the onlookers instantly turned from mere amusement to disbelief. When they learned that ordinary people inside the Great Firewall could have their accounts banned or even have the police show up at their door just for posting a picture of Pooh or saying a wrong word, this silly costume became the most intuitive lesson—it allowed ordinary Westerners to see at a glance, in the lightest possible way, the laughable extent to which that regime controls speech. Quite a few Americans gave us thumbs-up on the spot, shouting encouragement to us.

On the afternoon of September 24, we joined a Tibetan protest group of nearly three thousand people and marched all the way to the gates of the White House. The scene was magnificent, with deafening shouts of protest echoing throughout the entire neighborhood near the White House. Dressed in our Winnie the Pooh suits, we stood among the crowd, shouting along with everyone else. At that moment, I felt completely certain in my heart: Xi Jinping, sitting inside the high walls of the White House, could absolutely hear our voices loud and clear!

Quite a few overseas Chinese passing by also came over to take photos and shake hands with us. A friend who also lives in California said to me: “Inside the Great Firewall, people have to use pinyin abbreviations even to mention that name; but today in Washington, we can finally wear this ‘taboo’ on our bodies and stand upright in the open sunlight.”

To tell the truth, wearing such heavy plush suits under the bright Washington sun for several hours left our clothes soaked in sweat. But when thinking of the countless compatriots inside the Great Firewall who cannot even make a sound, or are even imprisoned for their speech, this bit of hardship is nothing at all. Trump and Xi Jinping can reach all kinds of commercial compromises at the negotiating table, but no matter how grand the diplomatic etiquette may be, it cannot cover up the public’s pursuit of freedom and dignity.

From Los Angeles to Washington, we used this seemingly somewhat absurd “performance art” to make a serious voice heard. What a dictator fears most is not necessarily solemn and righteous criticism, but rather his authority evaporating in the face of humor and ridicule. When absurdity becomes a weapon of resistance, Winnie the Pooh touches not only his raw, sensitive nerve, but is also telling the whole world: Power can block the internet, but it can never shut down people who pursue freedom.

Editor: Li Jing Proofreader: Kong Xiangqing Translator: Ge Bing

为什么共产主义在结构上无法实现

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文:张兴贵

序言

二十世纪是人类历史上物质财富与科技文明爆发式增长的世纪,也是人类在政治哲学与社会实验中付出最惨痛代价、经历最深刻苦难的世纪。在这一百年的历史长河中,共产主义运动无疑是规模最为宏大、卷入人口最多、对全球地缘政治格局塑造最为深刻的实验。

这场运动最初肇始于一种对人类终极解放的崇高追求。面对早期工业资本主义带来的贫富分化、阶级对立与社会异化,无产阶级革命的先驱们以惊人的理论魄力,勾勒出了一幅超越阶级剥削、消灭强制性国家机器、实现人人平等与自由联合的乌托邦图景。这一宏伟蓝图曾如同一座照亮暗夜的灯塔,吸引了无数满怀理想主义情怀的知识分子、工农大众与革命先锋,为此不惜抛头颅、撒热血。

然而,当理论走出书斋、迈向暴力革命与国家政权的构建时,这场历史性实验却呈现出了与其初衷完全背道而驰的惊人走向。从莫斯科的克里姆林宫到东欧的政治剧场,从古拉格群岛的冰原到农业集体化引发的大饥荒,所有的共产主义实践无一例外地陷入了极其沉重的历史悖论:

一个宣称要“消灭国家”的理论,在实践中却建立起了人类历史上规模最庞大、控制最严密、权力最集中的全权主义国家机器;

一个宣称要“废除一切阶级特权”的革命,最终却在公有制的废墟上孕育出一个靠垄断生存资料与政治权力维系统治的“新阶级”;

一个宣称要“将人类从资本奴役下解放出来”的计划经济,最终却消灭了社会的自发秩序,导致了长期的物质匮乏、文化死寂与道德溃败;

一个宣称代表“人类最广大根本利益”的体制,在其面临全方位危机时,却遭到了统治官僚阶层自上而下的掠夺性抛弃与全民性的无声唾弃。

这绝对不是某一个历史人物的偶然性格所致,也不是某一次政策执行偏差的结果,而是一场由其内在制度逻辑决定的系统性悲剧。

历史是最好的教科书,也是最清醒的解毒药。我们回顾这段沉痛的历史,绝非为了在胜利者的姿态下进行简单的政治批判,更不是为了宣泄历史情绪,而是为了警醒当下与未来。

在二十一世纪的今天,随着数字监控技术的飞速演进、全球化逆流带来的焦虑、以及面对复杂社会问题时追求强权解决的倾向抬头,极权主义的幽灵在中国死灰复燃,在欧美文明的边际徘徊。人们必须清醒地认识到:任何以“集体”、“人民”或“终极理想”为名义建立的无约束权力,终将异化为压迫人类最深重的枷锁;而人类社会的繁荣、尊严与幸福,绝不可能建立在顶层指令之上,而只能孕育于限制权力、保护私产权、捍卫思想自由与尊重个体的宪政法治轨道之中。

谨以此书,献给所有在二十世纪的宏大实验中承受苦难与牺牲的无辜心灵,献给那些在中国新极权的黑暗中依然不懈追求真理与自由的思想者,并希望它能成为构建未来文明坚固防线的一砖一瓦。

第一章 认识论陷阱:全知理性与信息不可知性

自19世纪中叶马克思与恩格斯将社会主义从“空想”推向“科学”以来,共产主义理论便建立在一个极其雄心勃勃的哲学基础之上:人类不仅能够彻底认识自然界与人类社会的运行规律,更能够凭借这种认识,自上而下地重新设计、组装并掌控整个社会的历史进程。这种将社会视为一部精密机械、将历史视为线性演进轨迹的构想,构成了共产主义运动最核心的精神支柱。

然而,二十世纪大规模的社会实验表明,这种建立在“完全理性”与“历史必然性”之上的宏大设计,最终无一例外地陷入了严重的经济瘫痪、制度僵化与人道危机。从认识论的视角来看,共产主义的根本困境并非仅仅在于道德假设的过于崇高或政治执行中的偏差,而在于其底层认识论的根本性溃败。

共产主义理论犯了一个致命的认识论错误:它假设人类社会存在一个可以被彻底掌握的“全知视域”,并认为通过高度集权的规划机构,能够汇集、处理并运用全社会所有的知识与信息。本章将从人类理性的边界、信息的本质属性、社会系统的演化特征等维度,深刻剖析共产主义在认识论层面无法逾越的致命陷阱。

第一节 理性狂妄的起源:从启蒙运动到历史唯物主义的机械论

要理解共产主义认识论的缺陷,必须首先溯源其思想脉络。共产主义并非凭空产生的政治构想,它是18世纪欧洲启蒙运动以来“理性主义”发展到极端的产物,并结合了19世纪工业革命时期的机械主义唯物论。

一、启蒙理性的膨胀与社会工程学

启蒙运动打破了神学对人类思想的禁锢,确立了理性在探索自然世界中的崇高地位。随着牛顿经典力学体系的建立,人类第一次发现,看似浩瀚无垠、纷繁复杂的宇宙,竟然受制于几条极其简洁、精准的物理定律。这种前所未有的认知突破,给人类带来了巨大的智力自信。

在这种自信的驱动下,社会思想家们开始产生一种强烈的情结:既然自然界遵循着可被人类理智完全掌握的客观规律,那么人类社会是否也存在一套类似的“运动法则”?只要找到了这套法则,人类是否就能像工程师设计桥梁和发动机一样,精密地设计出一个没有剥削、没有匮乏、没有混乱的完美社会?

这种将自然科学的逻辑无缝迁移至社会领域的倾向,被英国学者卡尔·波普尔称为“唯科学主义”。它过度夸大了人类理性的能力,将极其复杂的社会系统简化为可以被完全计算和操控的物理模型。

二、历史唯物主义中的历史决定论与“客观规律”

马克思主义将这种理性膨胀推向了巅峰。通过将黑格尔的辩证法与费尔巴哈的唯物主义相结合,马克思构建了历史唯物主义体系,试图揭示人类历史演进的“客观规律”。

历史唯物主义认为:生产力决定生产关系,经济基础决定上层建筑。人类历史沿着原始社会、奴隶社会、封建社会、资本主义社会,最终不可避免地走向社会主义与共产主义。

这种演进是像自然规律一样不以人的意志为转移的“历史必然性”。这种理论架构赋予了共产主义一种强烈的“科学”合法性。它宣告,共产主义的到来不是某种道德诉求,而是历史规律演进的必然结果。无产阶级政党只要掌握了这套“科学真理”,就拥有了历史的绝对解释权,甚至获得了代表历史趋势去干预、塑造、加速历史进程的合法性。

三、 理性狂妄的本质

弗里德里希·哈耶克在其著作《致命的自负》中,将这种坚信人类理性可以重新设计整个社会制度的信念称为“致命的自负”。这种自负的实质在于混淆了“人造秩序”与“自发秩序”:

人造秩序(如一家工厂、一所学校、一个军队)是由人类意志有意识设计出来的,内部结构清晰,目标单一,指令自上而下贯穿。自发秩序(如语言、法律、货币、市场)并非由任何单一个人或机构有意识设计,而是在数百万个体漫长的互动、试错、演化过程中自然形成的复杂系统。

共产主义的根本谬误,就是试图用对待“人造秩序”的设计思维,去强行改造和替换极其庞大的“自发秩序”。它坚信一个由“理性精英”组成的中央计划委员会,能够替代千百年来由无数个体交易形成的市场网络。这种对理性能力的无限拔高,正是其认识论陷阱的起点。

编辑: Gloria Wang 校对:王滨 翻译:戈冰

Why Communism Is Structurally Unachievable

By Zhang Xinggui

Abstract: Looking back at the historical trajectory of the 20th-century communist movement from ideal to reality, this article explores why its practice was invariably accompanied by power concentration, economic hardship, and social oppression. Attempting to reflect on this historical paradox from the perspective of institutional logic rather than individual factors, the article contemplates its cautionary significance for 21st-century society.

Preface

The twentieth century was a century that witnessed an explosive growth in human material wealth and technological civilization, as well as a century in which humanity paid the most tragic price and endured the most profound suffering in political philosophy and social experimentation. In the long river of this hundred-year history, the communist movement was undoubtedly the experiment of the grandest scale, involving the largest population, and exerting the most profound shape on the global geopolitical landscape.

This movement originally stems from a sublime pursuit of ultimate human liberation. Confronted with the wealth disparity, class antagonism, and social alienation brought about by early industrial capitalism, the pioneers of the proletarian revolution, with astonishing theoretical boldness, sketched out a utopian vision that transcended class exploitation, abolished the coercive state apparatus, and realized equality for all as well as the free association of individuals. This magnificent blueprint once acted like a lighthouse illuminating the dark night, attracting countless intellectuals, worker-peasant masses, and revolutionary vanguards brimming with idealistic sentiment, who did not hesitate to shed their blood and sacrifice their lives for it.

However, when theory stepped out of the study and headed toward violent revolution and the construction of state power, this historical experiment exhibited an astonishing trajectory completely opposite to its original intention. From the Kremlin in Moscow to the political theaters of Eastern Europe, from the frozen wastes of the Gulag Archipelago to the massive famines triggered by agricultural collectivization, all communist practices, without exception, fell into an extremely heavy historical paradox:

A theory proclaiming to “abolish the state” instead established, in practice, a totalitarian state apparatus that was the largest in scale, most tightly controlled, and most highly concentrated in power in human history;

A revolution proclaiming to “abolish all class privileges” ended up, atop the ruins of public ownership, giving birth to a “new class” that maintained its rule by monopolizing the means of subsistence and political power;

A planned economy proclaiming to “liberate humanity from the slavery of capital” ultimately destroyed the spontaneous order of society, resulting in long-term material scarcity, cultural desolation, and moral decay;

A system proclaiming to represent the “overwhelming fundamental interests of humanity,” when confronted with an all-encompassing crisis, was subjected to predatory abandonment from above by its ruling bureaucratic class and silent repudiation by the entire populace.

This is by no means the result of an accidental personality trait of any single historical figure, nor is it the outcome of a single policy execution error; rather, it is a systemic tragedy dictated by its inner institutional logic.

History is the best textbook and the most sober antidote. Our review of this painful history is by no means intended to conduct simple political critiques from the posture of a victor, much less to vent historical emotions, but rather to serve as a warning for the present and the future.

In the twenty-first century today, with the rapid evolution of digital surveillance technology, the anxieties brought about by counter-currents of globalization, and the rising tendency to pursue authoritarian solutions when facing complex social issues, the specter of totalitarianism is experiencing a resurgence in China and wandering along the margins of Western civilization. People must soberly realize: any unrestrained power established in the name of the “collective,” the “people,” or an “ultimate ideal” will eventually alienate into the heaviest shackle oppressing humanity; whereas the prosperity, dignity, and happiness of human society can never be built upon directives from the top, but can only be nurtured within the track of constitutionalism and the rule of law that limits power, protects private property rights, defends freedom of thought, and respects the individual.

This book is respectfully dedicated to all the innocent souls who endured suffering and sacrifice in the grand experiments of the twentieth century, to those thinkers who continue to unremittingly pursue truth and freedom in the darkness of China’s neo-totalitarianism, with the hope that it may become a brick and tile in building a solid defense line for future civilization.

Chapter 1 Epistemological Trap: Omniscient Rationality and Information Unknowability

Since the mid-19th century when Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels pushed socialism from “utopian” to “scientific,” communist theory has rested on an extremely ambitious philosophical foundation: humanity can not only thoroughly comprehend the operating laws of nature and human society, but can even more so, by virtue of this comprehension, redesign, assemble, and master the entire historical process of society from the top down. This conception—viewing society as a precision machine and history as a linear evolutionary trajectory—constituted the most core spiritual pillar of the communist movement.

However, the large-scale social experiments of the twentieth century demonstrated that this grand design built upon “complete rationality” and “historical inevitability” ended up, without exception, trapped in severe economic paralysis, institutional rigidity, and humanitarian crisis. From an epistemological perspective, the fundamental dilemma of communism lay not merely in moral assumptions being overly lofty or in deviations during political execution, but rather in the fundamental collapse of its underlying epistemology.

Communist theory committed a fatal epistemological error: it assumed that there existed an “omniscient horizon” in human society that could be thoroughly mastered, and believed that through highly centralized planning agencies, all knowledge and information across the entire society could be aggregated, processed, and applied. This chapter will, from dimensions such as the boundaries of human rationality, the essential attributes of information, and the evolutionary characteristics of social systems, deeply analyze the fatal trap that communism cannot overcome at the epistemological level.

Section 1 The Origins of Rational Hubris: From the Enlightenment to the Mechanism of Historical Materialism

To understand the flaws in communist epistemology, one must first trace its intellectual pedigree. Communism was not a political concept created out of thin air; it was the product of “rationalism” pushed to its extreme since the 18th-century European Enlightenment, combined with the mechanistic materialism of the 19th-century Industrial Revolution era.

I. The Expansion of Enlightenment Rationality and Social Engineering

The Enlightenment shattered the theological shackles on human thought and established the supreme status of reason in exploring the natural world. With the establishment of the Newtonian classical mechanics system, humanity discovered for the first time that the universe, seemingly vast, boundless, intricate, and complex, was actually governed by a few extremely simple, concise, and precise physical laws. This unprecedented cognitive breakthrough brought humanity immense intellectual self-confidence.

Driven by this confidence, social thinkers began to develop a strong complex: since the natural world followed objective laws that could be completely mastered by human intellect, did human society also possess a similar set of “laws of motion”? As long as this set of laws was discovered, could humanity, much like engineers designing bridges and engines, precisely design a perfect society free of exploitation, scarcity, and chaos?

This tendency to seamlessly transfer the logic of natural science to the social domain was termed “scientism” by the British scholar Karl Popper. It excessively exaggerated the capacity of human reason, simplifying extremely complex social systems into physical models that could be completely calculated and manipulated.

II. Historical Determinism and “Objective Laws” in Historical Materialism

Marxism pushed this expansion of rationality to its apex. By combining Hegel’s dialectics with Feuerbach’s materialism, Marx constructed the system of historical materialism, attempting to reveal the “objective laws” of human historical evolution.

Historical materialism posits that: forces of production determine relations of production, and the economic base determines the superstructure. Human history evolves along primitive society, slave society, feudal society, capitalist society, and ultimately and inevitably moves toward socialism and communism.

This evolution is a “historical inevitability” that, like natural laws, does not alter according to human will. This theoretical framework endowed communism with a potent “scientific” legitimacy. It declared that the arrival of communism was not a moral appeal, but the inevitable outcome of the evolution of historical laws. As long as the proletarian party mastered this set of “scientific truths,” it possessed the absolute authority to interpret history, and even acquired the legitimacy to intervene in, shape, and accelerate the historical process on behalf of historical trends.

III. The Essence of Rational Hubris

Friedrich Hayek, in his work The Fatal Conceit, termed this firm belief that human reason can redesign the entire social system as “the fatal conceit.” The essence of this conceit lies in confusing “made order” with “spontaneous order”:

A made order (such as a factory, a school, or an army) is consciously designed by human will, possessing a clear internal structure, a singular goal, and directives running from top to bottom. A spontaneous order (such as language, law, currency, or the market) is not consciously designed by any single individual or institution, but is a complex system formed naturally during the long process of interaction, trial and error, and evolution among millions of individuals.

The fundamental fallacy of communism lies in its attempt to use the design thinking applied to a “made order” to forcibly transform and replace an extremely vast “spontaneous order.” It firmly believed that a central planning committee composed of “rational elites” could replace the market network formed over thousands of years by countless individual transactions. This infinite elevation of the capacity of reason is precisely the starting point of its epistemological trap.

Editor: Gloria Wang Proofreader: Wang Bin Translator: Ge Bing

旧金山 10月1日 国殇日联合抗议集会

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旧金山 10月1日 国殇日联合抗议集会

国殇日联合抗议集会

——为自由、人权与尊严发声

2026年10月1日,来自不同族群与社区的多个组织将在中国驻旧金山总领事馆前举行“国殇日联合抗议集会”。

本次活动由中国民主教育基金会、中国民主党旧金山党部、北加州香港會、美國香港人會館、華語青年挺藏會,并联合藏人、维吾尔人、越南人及菲律宾人相关组织团体共同发起。

不同的族群有着不同的历史经历与现实关切,但这一天,我们将在同一个地点和平集会,分别表达各自对自由、人权、民主、民族与国家尊严以及地区和平等议题的诉求。

我们诚邀关心上述议题的各界人士到场参与,共同表达立场、分享声音,并关注不同社群所面临的人权与自由问题。

活动时间:

2026年10月1日(星期四)

中午 12:00 PM(PDT)

活动地点:

中国驻旧金山总领事馆前

1450 Laguna Street, San Francisco, CA 94115

联合发起:

中国民主党旧金山党部

北加州香港會

美國香港人會館

旧金山藏青會

以及藏人、维吾尔人、越南人、菲律宾人相关组织团体

10月1日,旧金山见。

为自由、人权与尊严发声

旧金山多团体游行抗议习近平访美

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作者:吕小静

旧金山多团体游行抗议习近平访美

2026年9月24日上午,多个团体在中国驻旧金山总领馆前举行抗议集会,随后游行前往旧金山市政厅。(本文照片由关永杰提供)

【旧金山讯】2026年9月24日,在中国国家主席习近平访问华盛顿、与美国总统特朗普在白宫举行会晤之际,旧金山多个关注中国人权、香港、西藏及民主自由议题的团体,在中国驻旧金山总领事馆前举行抗议活动,并随后游行前往旧金山市政厅,通过集会、公共发声及行为艺术等方式,表达对中国人权状况及跨国镇压等问题的关切。

此次活动由中国民主党旧金山党部、中国民主教育基金会、美国香港人会馆、北加州香港会、撑港会|支持香港自由协会 AHKF、华语青年挺藏会,以及 SFRTYC 北加州藏人青年议会等七个团体联合主办,召集人为方政、郑云、胡丕政。

中领馆前:“当世界谈外交,我们要谈人权”

上午10时30分左右,参与者陆续聚集在中国驻旧金山总领事馆前。主持人崔允星、罗艳丽以中英文介绍当天活动背景、联合主办团体以及从中领馆前往旧金山市政厅的游行路线。

主持人在开场中表示,当国际社会的目光集中在美中关系、外交和国家利益之际,抗议者希望另一个议题同样受到关注——人权。

“我们要让被掩盖的现实被看见,让被压制的声音被听见,让世界看见宣传背后的真相。”

现场同时以英文表达活动诉求:

“Today, we are here for human rights, for freedom, and for truth. We are here to tell the truth.”

北加州藏人青年议会主席 Lobsang Dorjee 随后发言,将焦点指向西藏的人权、文化、语言及宗教问题。

他表示:“西藏人民不是一个需要被解决的问题。我们是一个拥有自己的历史、文化、语言和信仰的民族,并且有着不可动摇的自由愿望。”

Dorjee呼吁美国民众及国际社会继续关注西藏议题。现场西藏参与者随后高呼“西藏自由”“Free Tibet”等口号。

从中领馆走向市政厅 人权口号响彻街头

中领馆前的集会结束后,游行队伍正式出发,沿旧金山市区街道向市政厅前进。

由于当天正值星期四,中国驻旧金山总领事馆仍处于正常办公时段。游行开始前,来自不同团体的参与者和民主人士在领馆办公区域门外高呼口号,表达对中国人权状况及习近平访美的抗议诉求。

现场可见,在口号持续不到一分钟后,领馆办公区域一侧的卷帘门被拉下。参与者随后继续在领馆外高呼口号,并按照原定路线向旧金山市政厅进发。

队伍中可以看到西藏旗帜、美国国旗、中国民主党相关横幅以及不同人权诉求的标语。参与者沿途呼吁关注西藏人、维吾尔人、香港活动人士、人权律师、异议人士以及法轮功学员等群体的处境,并要求停止跨国镇压。

队伍中有人背着扩音设备,一路以英文播放:

“Human rights are universal. Freedom belongs to everyone.”

“人权是普世的,自由属于每一个人。”

扩音器同时传出释放政治犯和良心犯、停止迫害及反对跨国镇压等诉求。游行途中,也有经过车辆鸣笛回应队伍。

撕开“中国梦” 压迫“OPPRESSION”出现在市政厅前

抵达旧金山市政厅后,活动进入行为艺术环节。

中国民主党旧金山党部活动部副部长、当天行动策划人李小林首先介绍巨型“中国梦”装置的设计理念。

他表示,参与者特意制作这一大型装置,并从中国领事馆一路抬至市政厅,希望将官方宣传与抗议者所批评的现实放在同一个公共空间中。

“我们不是来庆祝‘中国梦’的。我们要把它撕开,让人们看见宣传背后那些被压迫、被噤声、被剥夺自由的人。”

随后,参与者撕开巨型“中国梦”装置外层,里面巨大的“压迫/OPPRESSION”字样逐渐显露出来。部分参与者随后踩在被撕下的“中国梦”牌面上,以表达对官方政治宣传的不满。

李小林将整场行动概括为:

“从宣传走向真相,从沉默走向发声,从恐惧走向自由。”

另一组行为艺术中,多名参与者嘴上贴着胶布,象征被迫沉默,随后同时撕下封口胶布。

中国民主党奥克兰支部主任高志彬则以锁链套住身体和颈部,之后挣脱锁链,以象征摆脱噤声与束缚。

整组行为艺术以“中国梦”压迫“OPPRESSION”、封口胶布和锁链等视觉元素,表达主办方所强调的“从宣传到现实、从沉默到发声、从束缚到自由”。

行为艺术结束后,中国民主党旧金山党部主席方政发表讲话。

他表示,抗议者希望通过撕开“中国梦”装置,象征性地打破政治宣传的表象,让外界看到宏大叙事之下普通人的处境。

方政在发言中提到高智晟、许志永,以及香港的李卓人、黄之锋、邹幸彤等人,并以这些人的处境追问:“中国梦”背后究竟还有哪些声音没有被看见。

“中国梦是假的,我们已经把它打碎了。”他说。

方政同时表达“我们不欢迎习近平”的抗议立场,并在发言结束时带领现场参与者高呼口号。

从香港、西藏到跨国镇压 不同群体接连发声

中国民主党旧金山党部组织部部长周云龙随后以“悲剧,就是把美好的事物打碎”开场,谈到香港近年来的政治与社会变化。

他回顾香港曾被称为“东方明珠”,并提到香港支联会及其他民主团体过去长期声援中国民运、纪念六四。

他说:“现在是我们站出来声援香港的时候。”

现场随后响起“Free Hong Kong!”的呼喊。周云龙并表达了要求释放邹幸彤、李卓人和黄之锋等人的诉求。

美国香港人会馆成员 Jenny 施随后从1997年香港主权移交及“一国两制”谈起,并谈到2020年香港国安法实施后香港政治及公民空间的变化。

她提到黎智英、邹幸彤、黄之锋等人,呼吁美国社会持续关注香港政治犯以及海外港人所关注的跨国镇压问题。

法轮功学员代表 Eric 和 Jessie 则从中国历次政治运动谈起,呼吁美国和国际社会在讨论外交、贸易与合作时,不应让人权和人的尊严从议程中消失。

两人也谈到跨国镇压问题,表示一些人在来到美国后,仍担忧因批评中国政府或参与和平抗议而受到监视、骚扰或威胁,也担心身在中国的家人承受压力。

他们强调,无论支持还是反对中国政府,在美国都应享有和平表达自身观点的权利。

“不能只看到廉价商品,也要看到人”

中国民主党萨克拉门托支部主任卫仁喜随后发言,将焦点放在经贸与人权之间的关系上。

卫仁喜表示,世界在关注中国商品和贸易利益的同时,也应关注人权以及海外镇压等问题。

他认为,美中往来不能只讨论商品和经济利益,也应将人的自由与尊严纳入议程。

此后,多名民主人士继续从政治自由、人权、宗教信仰及跨国镇压等不同角度发言。

中国民主党旧金山党部副秘书长任梦醒以一句“人民不是权力的奴隶,国家不是独裁者的私产”开场。

她批评不受监督的权力可能侵蚀人民发声、选择信仰以及决定自身未来的权利,并表示,一个人不应因为说出自己的观点或坚持信仰而生活在恐惧之中。

她表示,人民的声音应当被听见,权利应得到保障,国家未来应由人民自己作出选择。

中国民主党宣传部副部长吕小静在发言中提到,她从社交媒体上看到华盛顿等地抗议习近平的现场视频。

她表示,看到不同城市的民主人士举起标语、高喊口号,让她感到“热血澎湃”,而自己未能前往华盛顿与当地抗议者一起参加活动,是此次最大的遗憾之一。

她同时谈到网络视频中出现的抗议者遭喷洒辣椒水、抗议标语被撕扯等情况。

吕小静表示,无论政治立场如何不同,都不应以暴力、威胁或恐吓的方式压制他人和平表达的权利。

对于个别施袭者的身份及其是否与中国官方存在关联,她在现场表达了个人质疑。

不同诉求汇聚到同一个问题:人权是否会被听见?

当天的发言者来自不同团体,关注的问题也各不相同。

有人谈西藏,有人谈香港;有人关注政治犯及良心犯,有人谈宗教信仰;有人强调言论自由,也有人将焦点放在跨国镇压以及海外人士家属可能面临的压力上。

这些不同诉求最终汇聚到一个共同的问题:

当外交、贸易与国家利益成为国际政治的重要议题时,那些无法坐到谈判桌前的人,他们的声音是否同样能够被听见?

这也是当天巨型“中国梦”装置试图呈现的对比——一边是国家层面的政治与外交叙事,另一边则是抗议者希望国际社会关注的个人权利与处境。

《We Shall Overcome》为活动收尾

随着最后一轮发言和口号结束,市政厅前的活动逐渐进入尾声。

主持人宣布,以一首与美国民权运动历史密切相关的歌曲《We Shall Overcome》(《我们终将胜利》)作为当天活动的结尾。

从中国驻旧金山总领事馆走向市政厅,参与者抬着巨大的“中国梦”装置穿过旧金山街头;抵达终点后,他们撕开装置外层,露出“OPPRESSION”;有人撕下封嘴胶布,有人挣脱象征束缚的锁链。

最后,参与者以歌声结束当天的活动。

对现场参与者而言,《We Shall Overcome》也被赋予对未来的象征意义。一名参与者在现场表示:“我们民主事业也终将会胜利!”

从“Free Tibet”到“Free Hong Kong”,从要求关注政治犯和良心犯,到反对跨国镇压,当天旧金山街头出现了来自不同群体的不同诉求,而贯穿整场活动的共同主题,是希望人权问题在国际政治及经贸往来中继续被看见和讨论。

除台前发言者外,当天活动的组织、现场协调及后勤工作也由多名参与者共同完成。

据主办方提供的名单,参与当天组织、协调及后勤工作的人员包括:李小林、崔允星、罗艳丽、范国林、周小俊、姚荣涛、周云龙、任梦醒、吕小静、高志彬、张鹏展、赵明、关永杰、杨朝全、周祺禄、高俊影等人。

活动现场剪影:

编辑:黄吉洲 校对:毛一炜 翻译:戈冰

Multiple Groups Rally and March in San Francisco to Protest Xi Jinping’s US Visit

By Lyu Xiaojing

旧金山多团体游行抗议习近平访美

On the morning of September 24, 2026, multiple groups held a protest rally in front of the Consulate-General of the People’s Republic of China in San Francisco and subsequently marched to San Francisco City Hall. (Photos for this article provided by Guan Yongjie)

[San Francisco Dispatch] On September 24, 2026, as Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Washington to hold a meeting with US President Donald Trump at the White House, multiple groups in San Francisco concerned with human rights in China, Hong Kong, Tibet, and issues of democracy and freedom held a protest activity in front of the Chinese Consulate-General in San Francisco. They subsequently marched to San Francisco City Hall, expressing their concerns regarding human rights conditions in China and transnational repression through rallies, public speeches, and performance art.

This event was jointly organized by seven organizations: the China Democracy Party San Francisco Headquarters, the Chinese Democracy Education Foundation, US HongKongers Club, Northern California Hong Kong Club, Stand With Hong Kong | Association for Hong Kong Freedom (AHKF), Chinese Youth Stand for Tibet, and SFRTYC (San Francisco Regional Tibetan Youth Congress). The conveners were Fang Zheng, Zheng Yun, and Hu Pizheng.

In Front of the Chinese Consulate: “When the World Speaks Diplomacy, We Must Speak Human Rights”

At around 10:30 AM, participants gathered one after another in front of the Consulate-General of the People’s Republic of China in San Francisco. Emcees Cui Yunxing and Luo Yanli introduced the background of the day’s event, the joint host organizations, and the parade route from the Chinese Consulate to San Francisco City Hall in both Chinese and English.

In their opening remarks, the emcees stated that as the international community’s focus was centered on US-China relations, diplomacy, and national interests, the protesters hoped another issue would receive equal attention—human rights.

“We want the concealed reality to be seen, the suppressed voices to be heard, and the world to see the truth behind the propaganda.”

At the same time, the event’s demands were expressed on-site in English:

“Today, we are here for human rights, for freedom, and for truth. We are here to tell the truth.”

Lobsang Dorjee, President of the San Francisco Regional Tibetan Youth Congress, spoke next, turning the focus to human rights, culture, language, and religious issues in Tibet.

He stated: “The Tibetan people are not a problem to be solved. We are a nation with our own history, culture, language, and faith, and we possess an unshakeable desire for freedom.”

Dorjee called on the American public and the international community to continue paying attention to Tibetan issues. Tibetan participants at the scene then chanted slogans such as “Free Tibet” in both Chinese and English.

From the Chinese Consulate to City Hall: Human Rights Slogans Resound Through the Streets

After the rally in front of the Chinese Consulate concluded, the march officially set off, advancing along the streets of downtown San Francisco toward City Hall.

Since that day was a Thursday, the Consulate-General of the People’s Republic of China in San Francisco was still during regular business hours. Before the march began, participants from various groups and pro-democracy figures chanted slogans outside the doors of the consulate’s office area, expressing their protest demands regarding human rights conditions in China and Xi Jinping’s US visit.

It could be seen on-site that after less than a minute of continuous slogan-chanting, the roller shutter door on one side of the consulate’s office area was pulled down. Participants then continued to chant slogans outside the consulate and proceeded toward San Francisco City Hall along the preplanned route.

Tibet flags, US flags, banners related to the China Democracy Party, and placards with various human rights demands could be seen within the procession. Along the route, participants called for attention to the plight of groups including Tibetans, Uyghurs, Hong Kong activists, human rights lawyers, dissidents, and Falun Gong practitioners, demanding an end to transnational repression.

Someone in the procession was carrying amplification equipment on their back, playing in English along the way: “Human rights are universal. Freedom belongs to everyone.” “Human rights are universal, and freedom belongs to every single person.”

At the same time, demands for the release of political prisoners and prisoners of conscience, an end to persecution, and opposition to transnational repression emanated from the loudspeaker. Along the march, passing vehicles also honked their horns in response to the procession.

Tearing Open the “Chinese Dream”: “OPPRESSION” Appears in Front of City Hall

Upon arriving at San Francisco City Hall, the event entered its performance art segment.

Li Xiaolin, Deputy Director of the Events Department of the China Democracy Party San Francisco Headquarters and organizer of the day’s action, first introduced the design concept of the giant “Chinese Dream” installation.

He stated that participants had specially made this large-scale installation and carried it all the way from the Chinese Consulate to City Hall, hoping to place official propaganda and the reality criticized by protesters within the same public space.

“We are not here to celebrate the ‘Chinese Dream.’ We want to tear it open, allowing people to see those behind the propaganda who are oppressed, silenced, and deprived of their freedom.”

Subsequently, participants tore open the outer layer of the giant “Chinese Dream” installation, gradually revealing the huge words “OPPRESSION / 压迫” inside. Some participants then stepped on the torn-down “Chinese Dream” panel to express their discontent with official political propaganda.

Li Xiaolin summarized the entire action as: “Moving from propaganda to truth, from silence to speaking out, and from fear to freedom.”

In another piece of performance art, multiple participants had duct tape stuck over their mouths, symbolizing forced silence, before simultaneously tearing off the tape sealing their mouths.

Gao Zhibin, Director of the Oakland Branch of the China Democracy Party, bound his body and neck with iron chains before breaking free from them, symbolizing breaking away from being silenced and restrained.

The entire suite of performance art used visual elements such as the “Chinese Dream” OPPRESSION, mouth-sealing duct tape, and iron chains to express what the organizers emphasized as “from propaganda to reality, from silence to speaking out, and from restraint to freedom.”

After the performance art concluded, Fang Zheng, Chairman of the China Democracy Party San Francisco Headquarters, delivered a speech.

He stated that protesters hoped that by tearing open the “Chinese Dream” installation, they would symbolically shatter the facade of political propaganda, allowing the outside world to see the plight of ordinary people beneath grand narratives.

In his speech, Fang Zheng mentioned Gao Zhisheng and Xu Zhiyong, as well as Lee Cheuk-yan, Joshua Wong, and Chow Hang-tung from Hong Kong, using their circumstances to ask: which voices behind the “Chinese Dream” have ultimately still not been seen?

“The Chinese Dream is false, and we have already shattered it,” he said.

At the same time, Fang Zheng expressed the protest stance that “we do not welcome Xi Jinping,” and led the participants at the scene in shouting slogans as he concluded his speech.

From Hong Kong and Tibet to Transnational Repression: Different Groups Speak Out One After Another

Zhou Yunlong, Director of the Organizational Department of the China Democracy Party San Francisco Headquarters, subsequently opened with “Tragedy is taking beautiful things and shattering them,” speaking on the political and social changes in Hong Kong in recent years.

He recalled that Hong Kong was once known as the “Pearl of the Orient,” and mentioned that the Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic Democratic Movements of China and other pro-democracy groups had long supported China’s democracy movement and commemorated June 4th in the past.

He said: “Now is the time for us to step forward and support Hong Kong.”

Shouts of “Free Hong Kong!” then resounded at the scene. Zhou Yunlong also expressed demands for the release of Chow Hang-tung, Lee Cheuk-yan, Joshua Wong, and others.

Jenny Shi, a member of the US HongKongers Club, subsequently spoke beginning with the 1997 handover of Hong Kong’s sovereignty and “One Country, Two Systems,” before addressing the changes in Hong Kong’s political and civic space following the implementation of the Hong Kong National Security Law in 2020.

She mentioned Jimmy Lai, Chow Hang-tung, Joshua Wong, and others, calling on American society to maintain continuous attention on Hong Kong’s political prisoners as well as the issue of transnational repression concerned by overseas Hong Kongers.

Falun Gong practitioner representatives Eric and Jessie spoke starting from China’s successive political campaigns, appealing to the United States and the international community not to allow human rights and human dignity to disappear from the agenda when discussing diplomacy, trade, and cooperation.

The two also spoke on the issue of transnational repression, stating that after arriving in the United States, some individuals still worry about facing surveillance, harassment, or threats due to criticizing the Chinese government or participating in peaceful protests, and also worry about their family members in China bearing pressure.

They emphasized that whether supporting or opposing the Chinese government, everyone in the United States should enjoy the right to peacefully express their own viewpoints.

“One Cannot Just See Cheap Goods, One Must Also See People”

Wei Renxi, Director of the Sacramento Branch of the China Democracy Party, spoke next, focusing on the relationship between trade and human rights.

Wei Renxi stated that while the world pays attention to Chinese goods and trade interests, it should also pay attention to issues such as human rights and overseas repression.

He maintained that exchanges between the US and China cannot solely discuss goods and economic interests, but must also incorporate human freedom and dignity into the agenda.

Thereafter, multiple pro-democracy figures continued to speak from various angles including political freedom, human rights, religious faith, and transnational repression.

Ren Mengxing, Deputy Secretary-General of the San Francisco Headquarters of the China Democracy Party, opened with the line, “The people are not slaves to power, and the nation is not the private property of a dictator.”

She criticized that unmonitored power can erode the people’s rights to speak out, choose their faith, and determine their own future, stating that no one should live in fear simply for voicing their opinions or adhering to their faith.

She expressed that the voices of the people should be heard, rights should be protected, and the nation’s future should be chosen by the people themselves.

Lyu Xiaojing, Deputy Director of the Publicity Department of the China Democracy Party, mentioned in her speech that she had seen on-site videos on social media of protests against Xi Jinping in Washington and other places.

She expressed that seeing pro-democracy activists in different cities holding up placards and shouting slogans made her feel “her blood boiling,” and that her inability to travel to Washington to participate in the activities together with local protesters was one of her biggest regrets this time.

At the same time, she spoke about situations appearing in online videos where protesters were sprayed with pepper spray and protest banners were torn up.

Lyu Xiaojing stated that no matter how different political stances may be, violence, threats, or intimidation should never be used to suppress others’ rights to peaceful expression.

Regarding the identities of individual attackers and whether they had connections to official Chinese entities, she raised her personal doubts at the scene.

Different Demands Converge on the Same Question: Will Human Rights Be Heard?

The day’s speakers came from different groups, and the issues they focused on were varied as well.

Some spoke of Tibet, while others spoke of Hong Kong; some paid attention to political prisoners and prisoners of conscience, while others spoke of religious faith; some emphasized freedom of speech, while others placed their focus on transnational repression and the pressure that family members of overseas individuals might face.

These varied demands ultimately converged on a common question:

When diplomacy, trade, and national interests become prominent issues in international politics, can the voices of those who cannot sit at the negotiating table still be heard just the same?

This was also the contrast that the giant “Chinese Dream” installation of the day attempted to present—on one side stood political and diplomatic narratives at the national level, while on the other were individual rights and plights that protesters hoped the international community would focus on.

“We Shall Overcome” Concludes the Event

As the final round of speeches and slogan-chanting came to an end, the event in front of City Hall gradually reached its conclusion.

The emcees announced that the song “We Shall Overcome”—closely tied to the history of the American Civil Rights Movement—would serve as the conclusion to the day’s event.

From the Consulate-General of the People’s Republic of China in San Francisco to City Hall, participants carried the giant “Chinese Dream” installation through the streets of San Francisco; upon reaching their destination, they tore open the outer layer of the installation to reveal “OPPRESSION”; some tore off the duct tape sealing their mouths, while others broke free from iron chains symbolizing restraint.

Finally, participants concluded the day’s event with song.

For the participants on-site, “We Shall Overcome” was also endowed with symbolic meaning for the future. One participant stated at the scene: “Our cause of democracy shall ultimately overcome as well!”

From “Free Tibet” to “Free Hong Kong,” and from demanding attention for political prisoners and prisoners of conscience to opposing transnational repression, diverse demands from different groups appeared on the streets of San Francisco that day. The common theme running through the entire event was the hope that human rights issues continue to be seen and discussed in international politics and economic and trade exchanges.

In addition to the speakers on stage, the organization, on-site coordination, and logistical support for the event were also jointly completed by numerous participants.

According to the list provided by the organizers, personnel involved in the day’s organization, coordination, and logistics included: Li Xiaolin, Cui Yunxing, Luo Yanli, Fan Guolin, Zhou Xiaojun, Yao Rongtao, Zhou Yunlong, Ren Mengxing, Lyu Xiaojing, Gao Zhibin, Zhang Pengzhan, Zhao Ming, Guan Yongjie, Yang Chaoquan, Zhou Qilu, Gao Junying, among others.

Snapshots from the Event:

Editor: Huang Jizhou Proofreader: Mao Yiwei Translator: Ge Bing

别让出境自由,变成一种等待批准的资格

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作者:LIU XIAOCAI

一个普通人想出国读书、工作、探亲,或者只是看看世界,应当拥有多大的自主权?当政府能够阻止一个人离开时,它又应当承担怎样的说明义务,接受怎样的监督?这些问题关系到每个人能否安排自己的生活,也关系到公民与政府之间最基本的权利边界。

2026年9月15日起施行的《国务院关于出境入境管理的规定》,使这些问题再次受到关注。需要准确地说,这份规定没有宣布全民禁止出境,不能直接等同于关闭国门。但其中涉及出境事由核实、不准出境和告知例外的内容,确实值得公众认真审视。批评应当从具体条文出发,追问权力边界与公民保障。

出境自由从来不只是买一张机票、去一个地方。它关系到一封来之不易的录取通知,一份支撑家庭生活的工作,一场等待多年的团聚,或者与病重亲人的最后一次见面。一次出境受阻,对于管理部门也许只是一个决定,对于当事人却意味着无法弥补的损失。

正因为如此,限制出境不能成为轻率的管理手段。作出决定的人,应当考虑它给一个家庭带来的后果。限制依据是否明确,证据是否充分,期限是否合理,有没有影响更小的替代措施,这些都应当经得起追问。公民需要能够理解规则,也需要能够挑战错误的决定。

新规第三条涉及身份和申请事由核实,允许有关机关要求提供相关资料,并规定提供虚假材料、作出虚假陈述导致不予签发证件或者不准出入境。这使核实标准尤为重要:一般疏漏、行程变化和故意欺骗,应当如何区分?什么资料与核实目的有关?个人需要配合到什么程度?

如果标准不够清楚,普通人就陷入一种不安:材料交了,还不知道是否足够;问题回答了,还担心表达是否会被误解。这不是说上述情况必然发生,而是任何涉及重大自由的制度,都应当提前防范这种风险。规则越具体,公民越容易遵守,执法也越容易接受监督。

第六条原则上要求书面告知不准出境的事实、理由、依据和救济途径,同时为影响国家安全、刑事案件侦查等情形设置不告知的例外。告知义务具有重要意义,而例外的适用同样需要严格约束。一个人如果难以知道自己为何被限制,就难以有效提出异议。

国家安全当然需要维护,但这一理由必须具有可审查的具体内容。即使某些信息确实需要保密,也应当有相应机制核查限制是否合法、是否必要、是否仍应继续。保密不能让错误无法纠正,更不能使受到影响的人无限期地等待。

新规第二条还涉及对特定高风险目的地的提醒和必要时劝阻。“劝阻”不能直接解释为全面禁止出境,但其执行边界应当清楚。对于具有判断能力的成年人,政府应提供可靠的风险信息,并尊重其依法作出选择的能力。任何进一步的强制措施,都需要明确依据。

保护公民的责任,与尊重公民的自主权,应当同时得到落实。人们前往某个地方,涉及工作、家庭和其他迫切需要。行政管理必须认真对待这些具体处境,不能只从管理便利出发,把复杂的人生选择简化成一句“最好不要去”。

也应看到,出境查验和不准出境制度并非此次新规才建立。2013年施行的《出境入境管理法》已经规定相关手续与限制情形。因此,讨论的重点应当是限制范围、执行标准和纠错保障,而不能把过去描述成毫无限制,再把今天描述成所有人都无法离开。

事实上的准确,不会削弱对自由的坚持。公众完全可以在承认管理制度存在的同时,要求它受到严格约束。政府掌握的决定权越大,就越应说明如何防止误用。权利保障不能停留在原则表述中,还应体现在当事人能够及时获得解释、提出异议和得到处理的每一步里。

如果一个政府担忧人才流失,或者担忧人们对未来失去信心,就应认真了解离开背后的原因。人们期待怎样的工作机会和教育环境?他们能否通过劳动获得稳定生活?遇到不公时,是否相信问题会得到公正处理?这些问题影响着人们愿不愿意留下,也影响着他们愿不愿意回来。

当然,并非所有出国的人都不愿回来。求学、探亲、旅行和移居有着不同目的,不能把每一次离开都理解为对国家的否定。一个人热爱自己的语言、文化和亲人,也可以选择在海外生活。公民不应因为拥有不同的人生计划,就被要求不断证明自己的忠诚。

即使有人决定长期定居海外,这种选择也应受到尊重。国家的发展最终应当服务于人的生活。人们愿意留下,是因为看见机会、感到安心,并相信自己的努力能够有所回报。增加离开的困难,无法代替改善这些条件,更无法自动赢得信任。

值得警惕的是自由在日常手续中逐渐缩小。如果材料要求不断增加,核实范围不断扩大,而解释、监督和救济没有同步加强,个人安排生活的空间就受到挤压。防止这种风险,需要公开的规则、清楚的责任,以及对执行情况持续而具体的监督。

所谓防止把人“焊死在国内”,应当落实为可以检验的要求:限制必须有依据,期限必须受约束,错误必须能纠正,受到影响的人必须有切实可用的救济途径。公众不必等到大门彻底关上,才有资格讨论门上的锁由谁掌握。

护照依然握在手里,航班依然起降。每个人都应能够相信,自己符合明确、合理的法律条件时,生活计划会得到尊重。一个有信心的政府,应当努力创造让人愿意留下的环境,也尊重人选择离开的自由。

编辑:张致君 校对:毛一炜 翻译:戈冰

Do Not Let Freedom of Departure Become a Privilege Awaiting Approval

By LIU XIAOCAI

How much autonomy should an ordinary person have if they wish to go abroad to study, work, visit relatives, or simply see the world? When the government is able to prevent a person from leaving, what obligation of explanation should it bear, and what oversight should it accept? These questions concern whether every individual can arrange their own life, as well as the most basic boundary of rights between citizens and the government.

The Regulations of the State Council on Exit and Entry Administration, implemented on September 15, 2026, have brought these issues under public scrutiny once again. To state it accurately, these regulations do not announce a nationwide ban on departure, nor can they be directly equated to closing the country’s borders. However, the provisions concerning the verification of exit reasons, non-permission to exit, and exceptions to notification indeed deserve serious public examination. Criticism should proceed from specific clauses, questioning the boundaries of power and citizen protections.

Freedom of departure has never been merely a matter of buying a plane ticket and going somewhere. It concerns a hard-won letter of admission, a job that supports a family’s livelihood, a reunion awaited for years, or a final meeting with a gravely ill loved one. A blocked departure may be just a decision for an administrative agency, but for the person concerned, it signifies an irreparable loss.

Precisely because of this, restricting departure cannot become a light or hasty administrative tool. Those who make such decisions should consider the consequences inflicted upon a family. Whether the basis for restriction is clear, whether the evidence is sufficient, whether the timeframe is reasonable, and whether there exist alternative measures with lesser impact—all of these should stand up to rigorous questioning. Citizens need to be able to understand the rules, and they also need to be able to challenge incorrect decisions.

Article 3 of the new regulations concerns the verification of identity and application grounds, permitting relevant organs to require the provision of pertinent materials, and stipulating that providing false materials or making false statements shall result in the non-issuance of documents or non-permission to enter or exit. This makes verification standards particularly crucial: How should general omissions, changes in itinerary, and intentional deception be distinguished? What materials are relevant to the purpose of verification? To what extent does an individual need to cooperate?

If standards are insufficiently clear, ordinary people fall into a sense of anxiety: documents have been submitted, yet one does not know whether they are sufficient; questions have been answered, yet one still worries whether their expressions might be misunderstood. This is not to say that the aforementioned situations will inevitably occur, but rather that any system involving major freedoms should guard against such risks in advance. The more specific the rules are, the easier it is for citizens to comply with them, and the easier it is for law enforcement to accept oversight.

Article 6 in principle requires written notification of the facts, grounds, legal basis, and avenues of relief regarding non-permission to exit, while simultaneously setting exceptions to notification for circumstances such as impacting national security or criminal case investigations. The obligation to notify possesses important significance, and the application of exceptions similarly requires strict constraints. If it is difficult for a person to know why they are being restricted, it becomes difficult to effectively raise an objection.

National security naturally requires safeguarding, but this reason must possess concrete content that is subject to review. Even if certain information indeed requires confidentiality, there should still be corresponding mechanisms to check whether restrictions are lawful, necessary, and whether they should still continue. Confidentiality must not render errors uncorrectable, nor should it subject affected individuals to indefinite waiting.

Article 2 of the new regulations also involves reminding and, when necessary, dissuading individuals regarding specific high-risk destinations. “Dissuasion” cannot be directly interpreted as a total ban on exit, but its boundary of enforcement should be clear. For adults with capacity for judgment, the government should provide reliable risk information and respect their ability to make choices in accordance with the law. Any further compulsory measures require an explicit legal basis.

The responsibility to protect citizens and the respect for citizens’ autonomy should be implemented simultaneously. When people travel to a certain place, it involves work, family, and other urgent needs. Administrative management must take these concrete circumstances seriously; it cannot proceed merely from administrative convenience, simplifying complex life choices into a single phrase: “it is best not to go.”

It should also be recognized that exit inspection and the system of non-permission to exit were not newly established by these regulations. The Exit and Entry Administration Law, implemented in 2013, had already stipulated relevant procedures and restriction circumstances. Therefore, the focus of discussion should be the scope of restrictions, enforcement standards, and safeguards for correcting errors, rather than describing the past as completely unconstrained and then describing today as a state where no one can leave.

Factual accuracy will not weaken adherence to freedom. The public can fully acknowledge the existence of the administrative system while simultaneously demanding that it be subjected to strict constraints. The greater the decision-making power held by the government, the more it ought to explain how to prevent misuse. The protection of rights cannot remain in principled expressions; it should also be reflected in every step where the person concerned can promptly obtain explanations, raise objections, and receive processing.

If a government worries about the brain drain, or worries that people are losing confidence in the future, it should earnestly understand the reasons behind people leaving. What kind of employment opportunities and educational environments do people look forward to? Can they obtain a stable life through their labor? When encountering injustice, do they believe the issue will be handled fairly? These questions influence whether people are willing to stay, and also influence whether they are willing to return.

Of course, not everyone who goes abroad is unwilling to return. Pursuing studies, visiting relatives, traveling, and emigrating serve different purposes; every departure cannot be understood as a negation of the nation. A person can love their language, culture, and loved ones, while also choosing to live overseas. Citizens should not be required to continuously prove their loyalty simply because they possess different life plans.

Even if someone decides to settle overseas long-term, such a choice should also be respected. A nation’s development should ultimately serve people’s lives. People are willing to stay because they see opportunities, feel at ease, and believe that their efforts can yield returns. Increasing the difficulty of leaving cannot replace improving these conditions, much less automatically win trust.

What warrants vigilance is freedom gradually shrinking within daily procedures. If documentation requirements continuously increase, if the scope of verification continuously expands, while explanation, oversight, and relief are not strengthened synchronously, the space for individuals to arrange their lives becomes squeezed. Preventing this risk requires public rules, clear accountabilities, and continuous and concrete oversight of implementation.

The so-called prevention of “welding people shut inside the country” should be implemented into verifiable requirements: restrictions must have a legal basis, time limits must be constrained, errors must be correctable, and affected individuals must possess practical and usable avenues of relief. The public does not need to wait until the main gate is completely closed before being qualified to discuss who holds the lock on the door.

Passports remain in hand, and flights continue to take off and land. Every person should be able to believe that when they meet clear and reasonable legal conditions, their life plans will be respected. A confident government should strive to create an environment that makes people willing to stay, while also respecting people’s freedom to choose to leave.

Editor: Zhang Zhijun Proofreader: Mao Yiwei Translator: Ge Bing

《红蓝对弈:2026中期选举后的美国移民政策走向》

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《在野党》杂志记者 贾嘉

2026年9月27日 洛杉矶

一、距离中期选举仅剩五周,美国政治风向正在发生变化

《红蓝对弈:2026中期选举后的美国移民政策走向》

2026年美国中期选举进入最后冲刺阶段。11月3日,美国选民将投票选出全部435名众议员以及35名参议员。当前国会仍由共和党控制,但进入9月以来,民主党在全国性民调中的表现明显改善,众议院翻蓝的可能性越来越大,参议院也逐渐进入真正的激烈竞争阶段。

Cook Political Report最新判断认为,民主党在参议院可能净增1至5席,但要重新取得参议院控制权,需要至少净增4席,因此参议院竞争依然存在很大不确定性。

与此同时,全国国会通用选票调查已经出现明显的民主党优势。近期一项Emerson College民调显示,民主党在国会通用选票中以53%对42%领先共和党11个百分点;另一项Reuters/Ipsos调查则显示民主党领先共和党8个百分点。

因此,一个越来越值得讨论的问题是:

如果11月3日民主党真的实现“蓝色横扫”,同时控制众议院和参议院,那么特朗普政府过去两年的移民政策会不会出现重大转折?

答案是:会,但不会是简单的政策翻转。

美国移民政策并不是由总统单独决定,而是总统行政权、国会立法与拨款权、联邦法院司法权共同作用的结果。

如果白宫仍由特朗普控制,而国会转为民主党控制,美国移民政策真正可能发生的变化,不是“民主党立即开放边境”,而是行政权受到更强的国会监督,移民执法与人道主义保护之间重新出现政治拉锯。

二、最直接的变化:国会可能开始“管住”移民执法

即使民主党同时控制参众两院,特朗普仍然拥有DHS、ICE和CBP的行政指挥权。

因此,民主党无法仅凭中期选举结果取消ICE,也无法直接命令白宫停止遣返。

但国会有一个非常现实的武器:拨款权。

ICE、CBP、移民拘留设施、遣返行动以及大量边境项目,都需要国会提供资金。

这意味着,如果民主党控制国会,移民政策最先发生变化的地方,很可能不是法律条文本身,而是预算谈判。民主党可能要求增加执法预算必须同时附带监督条件,例如:

强化执法人员身份识别;加强执法录像和监督;提高被拘留者获得法律援助的机会;改善拘留地点和被拘留者信息透明度;对公民被误捕等事件进行调查;要求DHS定期向国会报告拘留、遣返以及执法行动数据。

因此,民主党最现实的做法并不是“废除ICE”,而是:利用国会的拨款和监督权,对ICE的执法方式设置更多制度约束。

这将成为2027年白宫与国会之间最直接的一场权力较量。

三、第二个战场:庇护制度可能重新成为移民政策核心

如果说ICE代表特朗普政府的“执法端”,那么庇护制度则可能成为民主党重新布局的“保护端”。

过去一年,特朗普政府明显收紧庇护政策,包括限制申请、加速遣返以及扩大第三国遣返等措施。第三国遣返政策已经引发法律和政治争议,并面临联邦法院挑战。

如果民主党控制国会,预计会重点推动:恢复更完整的庇护申请程序;强化credible fear审查;增加移民法庭资源;提高被拘留者获得律师和法律咨询的机会;重新评估人道主义假释政策;对部分TPS政策进行重新审查;恢复或扩大难民安置项目。

这里真正值得注意的是一个政治逻辑:民主党未必能够直接取消特朗普的行政政策,但可以通过立法、预算和国会监督,把庇护制度重新拉回政治议程中心。

因此,对于正在等待庇护程序的人来说,国会易手可能带来的最大变化,不一定是“立即获批”,而是程序环境、法律资源和行政执行方式可能逐步改变。

四、Dreamers可能迎来新的立法窗口

DACA和Dreamers问题,则可能成为民主党最容易形成政治共识的移民议题之一。

民主党长期希望把DACA这种行政保护转化为国会正式立法,为童年时期来到美国的无证年轻人提供更加稳定的法律身份。

如果民主党同时控制众议院和参议院,Dream Act或者类似的Dreamer保护法案重新进入立法议程的可能性将明显增加。

但这里也不能过度乐观。

即便民主党控制两院,是否能够通过大规模移民改革,仍然取决于民主党内部是否团结,以及参议院具体的政治结构。因此,更现实的路线可能是:先从Dreamers等政治上较容易形成共识的群体入手,再逐步讨论更广泛的身份调整。

这比一次性推动全面移民特赦更符合美国国会的政治现实。

五、TPS、人道主义项目与合法移民:可能出现“政策修复”

特朗普政府近年来收紧TPS、humanitarian parole以及难民项目。如果民主党控制国会,这些领域可能出现一定程度的政策修复。

TPS

重新审查部分国家的TPS终止决定。

Refugee

提高难民项目的接纳和安置能力。

Humanitarian Parole

恢复部分人道主义入境渠道。

与此同时,民主党也可能把注意力扩大到合法移民。

美国移民政策并不仅仅是非法移民问题。留学生、H-1B工作者、科研人员、医生、工程师、企业家,以及家庭和职业移民,同样受到签证处理、排期和行政政策变化的影响。

因此,民主党如果重新掌握国会,可能推动:改善职业移民排期;缓解家庭移民积压;增加USCIS处理资源;改善高技能人才签证制度;保护部分留学生和国际人才。

对华人社区而言,这一点尤其重要。因为华人移民群体并非单一的“庇护群体”,其中同样包括大量留学生、技术移民、职业移民、投资移民和家庭移民。

六、但民主党不会简单走向“开放边境”

这是判断未来政策时最容易被误解的一点。如果民主党重新控制国会,并不意味着美国边境政策会完全转向。事实上,民主党内部过去几年已经出现一个越来越明显的现实主义趋势:保护移民权益,同时承认边境必须受到有效管理。

民主党过去推动的两党边境方案,本身就包含增加边境人员、技术设备、移民法庭资源以及边境管理能力等内容。

因此,2027年民主党更可能寻找的是一种新的政治组合:

边境继续管,严重犯罪继续执法;但减少无差别式执法,同时恢复庇护、人道主义和合法移民渠道。

这与“开放边境”并不是一回事。

而这恰恰可能成为民主党未来几年重新塑造移民议题的核心。

七、真正的权力冲突:白宫与国会谁说了算?

假设11月3日民主党同时拿下众议院和参议院,美国将进入典型的分裂政府状态:

白宫是共和党,国会是民主党。

这意味着特朗普仍然可以通过行政权:指挥ICE和CBP;调整DHS政策;发布行政命令;调整部分签证和边境政策。

而民主党控制的国会则可以:控制拨款;举行听证;调查行政部门;传唤政府官员;要求政府提交文件;修改移民法律;对行政部门形成持续监督。

因此,2027年美国移民政策最值得关注的,不是某一项政策会不会立即被取消,而是:总统的行政权与国会的立法、拨款和监督权将发生正面碰撞。

而在这场碰撞中,联邦法院又会成为第三个重要角色。

换句话说,美国移民政策很可能形成:

白宫 VS 国会 VS 联邦法院,三方博弈。

八、为什么参议院翻蓝尤其重要?

如果只看众议院,民主党翻蓝已经足以改变华盛顿的政治气氛。

众议院可以加强调查、举行听证、推动拨款谈判,并提出新的移民法案。

但如果谈到真正意义上的立法改革:

参议院才是关键。

目前民主党需要净增至少4席才能控制参议院。因此,即使民主党成功夺回众议院,也不意味着它能够自动推动新的移民法律。

这也是为什么2026年中期选举需要分开观察:

众议院翻蓝

意味着特朗普政府将面对更强的调查和监督。

参议院翻蓝

意味着民主党获得更大的立法和人事任命影响力。

参众两院同时翻蓝

才真正意味着特朗普政府的移民政策面临系统性的国会制约。

九、对华人移民而言,真正需要关注什么?

对于华人社区而言,与其简单讨论“民主党好还是共和党好”,不如把自己的移民身份放进不同政策类别观察。

已经拥有合法身份的人

包括永久居民、DACA、TPS以及各种合法工作身份持有人。最值得关注的是政策稳定性、身份续期以及行政审查方式。

正在移民程序中的人

包括庇护申请者、工作许可申请者、移民法庭案件以及家庭和职业移民申请者。如果未来国会增加USCIS、移民法院和法律援助资源,程序效率和法律服务环境可能有所改善。

没有合法身份、也没有正在进行有效移民程序的人

不能简单理解为“民主党赢了就安全”。民主党仍然会支持边境管理和一定程度的移民执法。

未来真正可能形成的区别,更可能体现在执法优先级、程序保障和个案处理方式上,而不是完全停止执法。

十、2027年最值得观察的五个信号

如果以《在野党》记者的角度观察,选举之后真正值得追踪的,不是竞选口号,而是以下五件事情:

第一,民主党能否控制参议院。

这是移民立法能否真正推进的第一道门槛。

第二,ICE和DHS预算谈判。

这是白宫与国会争夺移民政策实际控制权最直接的战场。

第三,Dreamer立法是否重新启动。

这可以观察民主党究竟选择“小步立法”还是继续追求全面移民改革。

第四,庇护、TPS和人道主义政策是否出现制度性恢复。

这将直接影响移民保护体系。

第五,联邦法院如何处理行政部门的移民权力。

如果法院进一步限制总统单方面改变移民政策的空间,国会的作用将更加重要。

十一、我们的判断:不会“全面翻转”,但可能发生一次再平衡

如果民主党最终实现参众两院“双翻蓝”,最可能发生的不是美国突然进入“开放移民时代”,而是一场持续两年的政策再平衡。

特朗普政府过去强调的是:

边境控制、移民执法、拘留与遣返。

民主党控制国会后,可能试图增加:

国会监督、程序保障、庇护、人道主义保护和合法移民改革。

两者之间不会迅速分出胜负。

更可能出现的是一种新的政策组合:边境安全继续存在,移民执法继续存在,但执法的范围、优先级和程序受到更多国会限制;与此同时,庇护、Dreamers、人道主义保护和合法移民渠道重新获得政治空间。

这可能是2027年美国移民政策最重要的变化方向。

所以,中期选举改变的,是移民权力的分配方式

2026年中期选举表面上是在决定435个众议院席位和35个参议院席位。但如果从移民问题来看,这场选举真正决定的,是未来两年谁能够约束总统、谁能够控制预算、谁能够推动立法,以及谁能够决定移民政策的政治议程。

如果共和党继续控制国会,特朗普政府目前的移民政策将获得更大的制度支持。

如果民主党只夺回众议院,最大的变化将是调查、监督和预算博弈。

如果民主党同时夺回参众两院,那么美国移民政策才可能真正进入一个新的阶段:

白宫继续强调执法,国会开始重新强调程序、人道主义和合法移民改革。

因此,11月3日真正值得观察的,不只是“蓝色浪潮是否出现”,而是:美国移民政策的权力中心,会不会从白宫重新部分转回国会。

这,可能才是2026年中期选举对美国移民政策最深远的影响。

编辑:黄吉洲 校对:毛一炜 翻译:戈冰

“Red vs. Blue: The Future of U.S. Immigration Policy After the 2026 Midterm Elections”

By Jia Jia, Reporter for Zaiye Dang (The Opposition Party)

September 27, 2026, Los Angeles

Section I. With Merely Five Weeks Remaining Before the Midterm Elections, the American Political Climate Is Shifting

《红蓝对弈:2026中期选举后的美国移民政策走向》

The 2026 U.S. midterm elections have entered their final sprint phase. On November 3, American voters will go to the polls to elect all 435 members of the House of Representatives and 35 members of the Senate. At present, Congress remains under Republican control, but since entering September, the Democrats’ performance in national polling has improved markedly; the possibility of the House flipping blue is growing ever larger, and the Senate is gradually entering a stage of truly fierce competition.

The latest dynamic assessment by the Cook Political Report considers that the Democratic Party may achieve a net gain of 1 to 5 seats in the Senate, but to regain Senate control, a net gain of at least 4 seats is required, meaning that competition for the Senate still retains high uncertainty.

Meanwhile, national generic Congressional ballot surveys have already demonstrated a distinct Democratic advantage. A recent Emerson College poll shows the Democratic Party leading the Republican Party by 11 percentage points in the generic Congressional ballot, at 53% to 42%; another Reuters/Ipsos survey shows the Democrats leading the Republicans by 8 percentage points.

Therefore, an increasingly worthy question for discussion is:

If on November 3 the Democratic Party truly accomplishes a “Blue Wave Sweep,” simultaneously controlling both the House of Representatives and the Senate, will the Trump administration’s immigration policy of the past two years experience a major turning point?

The answer is: Yes, but it will not be a simple policy reversal.

American immigration policy is not determined by the President alone, but is the combined result of the presidential executive power, congressional legislative and appropriations power, and federal court judicial power acting together.

If the White House remains under Trump’s control while Congress shifts to Democratic control, the real changes that could occur in U.S. immigration policy will not be “the Democratic Party immediately opening the borders,” but rather the executive power being subject to stronger Congressional oversight, and a renewed political tug-of-war emerging between immigration enforcement and humanitarian protection.

Section II. The Most Direct Change: Congress May Begin to “Rein In” Immigration Enforcement

Even if the Democratic Party simultaneously controls both the Senate and the House of Representatives, Trump still retains executive command authority over DHS, ICE, and CBP.

Therefore, the Democratic Party cannot abolish ICE solely on the basis of the midterm election results, nor can it directly order the White House to halt deportations.

However, Congress possesses a highly pragmatic weapon: the power of the purse.

ICE, CBP, immigration detention facilities, deportation operations, and a vast array of border projects all require Congress to provide funding.

This means that if the Democratic Party controls Congress, the place where immigration policy changes first will very likely not be the text of the law itself, but budget negotiations. The Democratic Party may demand that any increase in the enforcement budget must simultaneously carry oversight conditions, such as:

Strengthening identity verification for enforcement personnel; enhancing enforcement video recording and oversight; increasing detained individuals’ access to legal aid; improving the transparency of detention facilities and detainee information; launching investigations into incidents such as the wrongful arrest of citizens; and requiring DHS to regularly report detention, deportation, and enforcement operation data to Congress.

Therefore, the most realistic approach for the Democratic Party is not to “abolish ICE,” but rather to leverage Congress’s power of the purse and oversight authority to impose more institutional constraints on ICE’s enforcement methods.

This will become the most direct contest of power between the White House and Congress in 2027.

Section III. The Second Battlefield: The Asylum System May Once Again Become the Core of Immigration Policy

If ICE represents the “enforcement end” of the Trump administration, then the asylum system may become the “protection end” of the Democratic Party’s redeployment.

Over the past year, the Trump administration has noticeably tightened asylum policy, including measures such as restricting applications, accelerating deportations, and expanding third-country deportations. The third-country deportation policy has already sparked legal and political controversy and faces federal court challenges.

If the Democratic Party controls Congress, it is expected to focus on promoting: restoring more complete asylum application procedures; strengthening credible fear screenings; increasing resources for immigration courts; improving detained individuals’ access to attorneys and legal counsel; reassessing humanitarian parole policies; conducting re-examinations of certain TPS policies; and restoring or expanding refugee resettlement programs.

What is truly worthy of attention here is a political logic: the Democratic Party may not necessarily be able to directly revoke Trump’s executive policies, but through legislation, budget allocation, and congressional oversight, it can pull the asylum system back into the center of the political agenda.

Therefore, for individuals currently waiting in asylum proceedings, the greatest change that a change of hands in Congress may bring is not necessarily an “immediate approval,” but rather that the procedural environment, legal resources, and executive implementation methods may gradually change.

Section IV. Dreamers May Usher in a New Legislative Window

The DACA and Dreamers issue may become one of the immigration topics where it is easiest for the Democratic Party to form a political consensus. The Democratic Party has long sought to transform executive protection like DACA into formal congressional legislation, providing undocumented young people who arrived in the United States during childhood with a more stable legal status. If the Democratic Party simultaneously controls both the House of Representatives and the Senate, the likelihood of the Dream Act or similar Dreamer protection legislation re-entering the legislative agenda will increase markedly.

However, one cannot be overly optimistic here either. Even if the Democratic Party controls both houses, whether it can pass large-scale immigration reform still depends on whether internal Democratic solidarity holds, as well as the specific political structure of the Senate. Therefore, a more realistic path might be: starting first with politically easier-to-agree-upon groups such as the Dreamers, and then gradually discussing broader status adjustments.

This conforms to the political reality of the U.S. Congress far better than pushing for a comprehensive immigration amnesty all at once.

Section V. TPS, Humanitarian Programs, and Legal Immigration: “Policy Repair” May Emerge

In recent years, the Trump administration has tightened TPS, humanitarian parole, and refugee programs. If the Democratic Party controls Congress, a certain degree of policy repair may emerge in these domains.

TPS Re-examining decisions to terminate TPS for certain countries.

Refugee Raising the intake and resettlement capacity of refugee programs.

Humanitarian Parole Restoring certain humanitarian entry channels.

At the same time, the Democratic Party may also expand its attention to legal immigration.

American immigration policy is not merely an issue of undocumented immigration. International students, H-1B workers, scientific researchers, doctors, engineers, entrepreneurs, as well as family and employment-based immigrants, are similarly impacted by visa processing, priority date backlogs, and executive policy changes.

Therefore, if the Democratic Party regains control of Congress, it may push to: improve employment-based immigration backlogs; ease family-based immigration backlogs; increase USCIS processing resources; improve visa systems for high-skilled talent; and protect certain international students and international talent. For the Chinese community, this point is especially important, because the Chinese immigrant community is not a singular “asylum group”; it similarly encompasses large numbers of international students, skilled immigrants, employment-based immigrants, investor immigrants, and family-based immigrants.

Section VI. Yet the Democratic Party Will Not Simply Head Toward “Open Borders”

This is the point most prone to misunderstanding when assessing future policy. If the Democratic Party regains control of Congress, it does not mean that U.S. border policy will undergo a total turnabout. In fact, over the past few years, an increasingly distinct realist trend has emerged within the Democratic Party: protecting immigrant rights while simultaneously acknowledging that the border must be subject to effective management.

The bipartisan border packages previously promoted by the Democratic Party themselves contained provisions such as increasing border personnel, technical equipment, immigration court resources, and border management capacity. Therefore, in 2027, what the Democratic Party is more likely to seek is a new political combination:

Border management continues, and enforcement against serious crimes continues; but indiscriminate enforcement is reduced, while asylum, humanitarian, and legal immigration channels are restored. This is not the same thing as “open borders.” And this precise approach may become the core of how the Democratic Party reshapes the immigration issue in the coming years.

Section VII. The Real Conflict of Power: Who Has the Final Say, the White House or Congress?

Assuming that on November 3 the Democratic Party takes both the House of Representatives and the Senate, the United States will enter a classic state of divided government: The White House is Republican, while Congress is Democratic.

This means Trump can still utilize executive power to: command ICE and CBP; adjust DHS policy; issue executive orders; and adjust certain visa and border policies.

Meanwhile, a Democratic-controlled Congress can: control appropriations; hold hearings; investigate executive branch departments; subpoena administration officials; demand that the administration submit documents; amend immigration laws; and exert continuous oversight over the executive branch.

Therefore, what is most worthy of attention in U.S. immigration policy in 2027 is not whether a particular policy will be immediately cancelled, but rather: the executive power of the President and the legislative, appropriations, and oversight powers of Congress will undergo a direct head-on collision.

And in this collision, the federal courts will once again serve as a third critical actor.

In other words, U.S. immigration policy is very likely to form a three-way dynamic game: The White House VS. Congress VS. Federal Courts.

Section VIII. Why Is the Senate Flipping Blue Particularly Important?

If one looks only at the House of Representatives, a Democratic flip to blue is already sufficient to alter the political atmosphere in Washington.

The House of Representatives can step up investigations, hold hearings, push appropriations negotiations, and introduce new immigration bills. However, when speaking of legislative reform in a true sense: The Senate is the key.

At present, the Democratic Party needs a net gain of at least 4 seats to control the Senate. Therefore, even if the Democratic Party successfully retakes the House of Representatives, it does not mean that it can automatically push forward new immigration laws.

This is precisely why the 2026 midterm elections need to be observed separately:

The House Flipping Blue Means that the Trump administration will confront stronger investigations and oversight.

The Senate Flipping Blue Means that the Democratic Party gains greater legislative influence and clout over personnel appointments.

If both houses of Congress flip blue simultaneously, it will truly mean that the Trump administration’s immigration policy faces systemic congressional restraint.

Section IX. For Chinese Immigrants, What Truly Warrants Attention?

For the Chinese community, rather than simply debating whether “the Democrats are good or the Republicans are good,” it is better to observe one’s own immigration status within different policy categories.

Those Who Already Possess Legal Status Including permanent residents, DACA, TPS, and various legal work status holders. What warrants the most attention are policy stability, status renewals, and administrative vetting methods.

Those Currently in Immigration Proceedings Including asylum applicants, work authorization applicants, immigration court cases, and family and employment-based immigration applicants. If Congress increases resources for USCIS, immigration courts, and legal aid in the future, procedural efficiency and the legal service environment may see some improvement.

Those Without Legal Status and Without Ongoing, Valid Immigration Proceedings This cannot be simply understood as “safe as long as the Democrats win.” The Democratic Party will still support border management and a certain degree of immigration enforcement.

The difference that may truly form in the future is more likely to be reflected in enforcement priorities, procedural safeguards, and case-by-case processing methods, rather than a complete cessation of enforcement.

Section X. Five Signals Most Worth Observing in 2027

If observed from the perspective of a reporter for Zaiye Dang (The Opposition Party), what is truly worth tracking after the election is not campaign slogans, but the following five :

1, Whether the Democratic Party can control the Senate.

This is the first threshold determining whether immigration legislation can truly move forward.

2, ICE and DHS budget negotiations.

This is the most direct battlefield where the White House and Congress contend for actual control over immigration policy.

3, Whether Dreamer legislation is restarted.

This will allow one to observe whether the Democratic Party chooses “incremental legislation” or continues to pursue comprehensive immigration reform.

4, Whether asylum, TPS, and humanitarian policies experience institutional restoration.

This will directly impact the immigration protection system.

5, How the federal courts handle the executive branch’s immigration powers.

If the courts further restrict the scope for the President to unilaterally change immigration policy, the role of Congress will become even more crucial.

Section XI. Our Assessment: No “Total Reversal,” but a Rebalancing May Occur

If the Democratic Party ultimately achieves a “double blue flip” in both the Senate and the House of Representatives, what is most likely to happen is not the United States suddenly entering an “era of open immigration,” but rather a two-year-long policy rebalancing.

What the Trump administration emphasized in the past was:

Border control, immigration enforcement, detention, and deportation.

After the Democratic Party gains control of Congress, it may attempt to increase:

Congressional oversight, procedural safeguards, asylum, humanitarian protection, and legal immigration reform.

A winner will not be rapidly decided between the two sides.

What is more likely to emerge is a new policy combination: border security continues to exist, and immigration enforcement continues to exist, but the scope, priority, and procedures of enforcement are subject to more congressional restrictions; simultaneously, channels for asylum, Dreamers, humanitarian protection, and legal immigration regain political space.

This may be the most important direction of change in U.S. immigration policy in 2027.

Therefore, What the Midterm Elections Change Is the Way Immigration Power Is Allocated

On the surface, the 2026 midterm elections are deciding 435 House seats and 35 Senate seats. But viewed from the perspective of the immigration issue, what this election truly decides is who, over the next two years, will be able to constrain the President, who will be able to control the budget, who will be able to push forward legislation, and who will be able to set the political agenda for immigration policy.

If the Republican Party continues to control Congress, the Trump administration’s current immigration policy will gain even greater institutional support.

If the Democratic Party only retakes the House of Representatives, the greatest change will be investigations, oversight, and budget maneuvering.

If the Democratic Party simultaneously retakes both the House and the Senate, only then can U.S. immigration policy truly enter a new stage:

The White House will continue to emphasize enforcement, while Congress begins to re-emphasize procedure, humanitarianism, and legal immigration reform.

Therefore, what is truly worth observing on November 3 is not merely “whether a Blue Wave appears,” but whether the power center of U.S. immigration policy will partially shift back from the White House to Congress.

This, perhaps, is the most far-reaching impact of the 2026 midterm elections on U.S. immigration policy.

Editor: Huang Jizhou Proofreader: Mao Yiwei Translator: Ge Bing

纽伦堡举行“文革60周年研讨会”

0

海内外人士反思历史与中国未来

作者:光华社编辑部

2026年9月16日至18日,“文革60周年研讨会”在德国纽伦堡举行。来自欧洲、亚洲、美洲和澳洲等地的学者、作家、媒体人士及社会活动人士参加会议,围绕文化大革命的历史记忆、政治制度、文化与宗教、群众运动、历史叙事以及中国未来等议题展开讨论。

为期三天的活动包括专题研讨、纪录片放映、烛光纪念、自由讨论、街头历史展览,以及纽伦堡审判相关历史场所、人权之路等地点的参访。会议公开资料显示,该研讨会由《北京之春》与“全球支持中国和亚洲民主化论坛”共同举办。

纽伦堡举行“文革60周年研讨会”

【图:部分与会者在纽伦堡“人权之路”前合影。(摄影:Xiaojie Yang)】

中国民主党(荷兰总部)德国委员会——光华社及法国委员会也派出代表参加此次活动。光华社成员除参与会议讨论、纪念及历史参访外,还承担了部分现场直播、摄影和视频记录工作。其中,光华社社长张冠元和杨肖杰分别进入正式研讨议程并发表演讲。

多角度反思文革历史与制度问题

9月17日上午,研讨会进入正式议程。开幕环节首先为文革、六四死难者及已故民主运动人士默哀。

《北京之春》社长于大海的开幕词由薛伟代读,随后西藏方面代表宣读达赖喇嘛致研讨会的电文。首场研讨由费良勇、薛伟主持。

【图:费良勇在研讨会现场。(摄影:Xiaojie Yang)】

费良勇首先代读严家祺为大会撰写的文章《文革和“六四”的共同根源》。文章从政治体制和权力运行角度,讨论文化大革命与1989年六四事件之间的历史关联。

德国学者Dr. Thomas Weyrauch以“德国人及其‘文革’”为题,回顾毛主义及文化大革命在当时西德部分激进左翼群体中的传播和影响,并讨论部分欧洲左翼人士当年对中国文革形成理想化认识的历史背景。

胡平则通过视频发言,以“中央文革在文革中的角色与命运”为题,回顾中央文化革命小组的权力形成、政治作用及最终结局。

第二场研讨围绕制度转型、历史经验及社会治理等议题展开。

台湾政治大学李酉潭教授发表《从文革反思中国极权体制的民主转型》,从文革政治经验出发,讨论威权及极权政治向民主制度转型的问题。

【图:李酉潭教授发表演讲。(摄影:Xiaojie Yang)】

水利工程专家王维洛博士从重大水利灾难切入,讨论重大公共事件背后的决策、制度及责任机制。

台湾学者赖盈铨教授结合苏联及俄罗斯政治发展的历史经验,讨论极权政治遗产以及社会转型问题。

旅居瑞典的作家茉莉发表《中国文革与川普时代的镜像奇观——人性疯狂与历史荒诞卷土重来》,从她的观察角度比较文革时期群众政治与当代美国部分政治现象。这一比较属于发言者本人的政治分析。

【图:作家茉莉在研讨会现场发言。(摄影:Xiaojie Yang)】

西藏方面代表则以《从文化大革命到“文革2.0”:图伯特的历史记忆与文化传承》为题,从藏人的历史经验讨论文革、历史记忆和文化传承。

旅德学者彭小明回顾文革时期家庭出身、政治身份对个人教育、就业及社会命运造成的影响,并从政治歧视角度进行分析。

历史叙事、宗教与非暴力运动进入讨论

下午的第三场研讨由李酉潭、李力主持。

台湾媒体人、淡江大学教授廖雨诗博士发表《从文革到“说好中国故事”:历史记忆如何塑造中国与台湾的国家叙事》,讨论历史记忆如何经过选择、解释和传播,进而影响两岸不同的社会及国家叙事。

【图:廖雨诗博士在研讨会上发言。(摄影:Xiaojie Yang)】

作家、媒体人长平以“从‘历史决议’看中共长期隐藏的议程设置”为题,从中共历史文件和政治语言出发,分析官方历史叙事及政治议程设置。

芮虎以“文革对宗教信仰的冲击”为题,讨论文革时期宗教遭受冲击,以及这一历史对个人信仰和社会精神生活产生的长期影响。

来自澳大利亚的钟锦江博士则围绕“文革群众运动与非暴力抗争群众运动的本质差别”展开讨论,并以“和平、理性、非暴力”为框架比较不同类型的群众运动。

此外,陈泱潮提交文章讨论毛泽东发动文革的政治目的,由费良勇代读;李东澄则以《土匪体制、流氓性质与文革遗毒》为题,从政治制度和政治文化角度讨论文革遗产。

从上山下乡到内蒙古“内人党”案件

当天第四场研讨由张裕、凯撒主持。

钱跃君博士以“文革的上山下乡运动”为题,讨论这一政策及其对一代知识青年人生轨迹产生的影响。

王龙蒙结合蒙古族后裔的个人及族群记忆,回顾文革时期内蒙古“内人党”案件,以及相关政治运动留下的长期创伤。

【图:王龙蒙在现场发言。(摄影:Xiaojie Yang)】

费良勇则从他所称的“现代政治文明”角度重新分析文革政治文件。他主张从人权、法治、程序正义和权力制约等原则重新审视文革及其政治机制。

光华社代表团参与会议

中国民主党(荷兰总部)德国委员会——光华社与法国委员会此次派出多名成员参加活动,其中包括法国委员会负责人艾时诚,以及张冠元、吴伟光、唐国刚、张娜、杨肖杰、李桃红等。

【图:光华社部分与会成员合影。(摄影:Xiaojie Yang)】

据光华社方面介绍,代表团中有多名较年轻成员参加此次活动。会议期间,一些长期参与海外中国民主运动的年长人士也与年轻与会者进行了交流。

现场另有一名维吾尔族第二代德国移民代表以英语发言。由于她不会汉语,张冠元现场进行中文翻译。她在发言中谈到与故乡部分亲人联系困难的个人经历,并表达对维吾尔人处境和威权政治影响的担忧。

【图:维吾尔族代表在活动现场。(摄影:Xiaojie Yang)】

张冠元谈“反双极、生活化”

光华社社长张冠元发表《只缘妖雾又重来——浅谈中共八十年对中国文化精神之戕害》。

张冠元从个人经历和近现代中国政治文化切入,讨论他认为中共历次政治运动对传统文化、社会心理以及人与人关系造成的影响。

他的演讲同时提出“反双极、生活化”的理念。

张冠元认为,极权主义不仅是一种政治制度,也可能形成“非黑即白”的思维方式。如果反对专制的人在组织内部仍以压制不同意见、制造敌我关系的方式处理分歧,就可能在行为方式上复制自己所反对的政治文化。

他由此提出,民主转型不应仅被理解为一次短期政治事件,而应该是一个长期的社会和文化建设过程;政治表达也应减少空洞口号和人身攻击,通过更容易被普通人理解的语言、幽默、音乐和生活经验传播价值理念。

发言最后,张冠元根据《东方红》的旋律重新填词演唱《东方黑》,以音乐和戏谑方式表达自己的政治观点。

【图:光华社社长张冠元发表演讲。(摄影:Xiaojie Yang)】

杨肖杰:“文革不是历史,文革仍在继续”

杨肖杰发表题为《文革不是历史,文革仍在继续》的主题演讲。他认为,对文化大革命的反思不能只停留在红卫兵、批斗会、抄家和武斗等历史现象,还应进一步追问:为什么这样的政治灾难能够发生,又为什么长期无法得到有效制止。

杨肖杰认为,当最高权力缺乏有效约束,司法、媒体以及社会监督无法发挥独立作用时,最高层的政治意志可能通过行政、宣传和社会动员体系不断向下传递,并在执行过程中产生“层层加码”。

他引用费良勇提出的“邪恶共振”概念,将这一机制描述为最高权力、党政体系、宣传系统、地方官员以及普通个人在不同程度上共同参与并彼此强化。演讲随后由文革历史延伸到当代中国。

杨肖杰提到,2018年中国修改宪法,删除了国家主席、副主席“连续任职不得超过两届”的规定。这一修改属于已经公布的宪法修正案内容;中国官方当时将修改解释为完善国家领导体制、维护集中统一领导。

杨肖杰则从不同政治立场对此提出批评,并认为现代政治控制虽然与1960年代所使用的工具明显不同,但最值得关注的仍然是权力能否受到法律和制度的有效制约。

他说:“真正重要的问题,不是能不能遇到一个好皇帝,而是当一个坏的领导人出现时,人民有没有办法限制他、监督他,并通过和平方式更换他。”

演讲最后,杨肖杰把讨论重点放在民主、法治、司法独立、新闻自由、基本人权及权力制衡等制度问题上。

他认为,纪念文革受害者不应只停留在纪念活动本身,而应建立防止权力再次失控的制度。

杨肖杰以一句“文革,结束了”结束演讲,并解释说,只有当任何个人或政党都不能凌驾于宪法和法律之上时,这句话才真正具有制度意义。

【图:杨肖杰在纽伦堡圣洛伦茨教堂前历史展览现场参与布展。(图片提供:光华社)】

网络直播与影像记录

除了参与专题讨论,光华社成员还承担了部分会议传播和影像记录工作。

唐国刚在活动期间进行了网络直播,将部分研讨、演讲及现场活动通过网络传播。

杨肖杰则连续数日进行摄影和视频拍摄,对会议发言、纪念仪式、历史展览、纽伦堡历史地点参访以及与会者合影等进行记录。

【图:部分与会者在文革60周年研讨会现场合影留念。(摄影:Xiaojie Yang)】

光华社方面表示,希望这些照片和视频能够作为此次活动的视觉资料,用于后续新闻报道、人物资料及历史档案整理。

会议结束后,部分光华社成员还分别接受海外中文媒体采访,介绍此次研讨会及该组织对中国民主、法治和人权问题的观点。

烛光纪念后 与会者以音乐和幽默交流

9月17日晚,与会者举行烛光纪念活动,悼念文革、六四死难者及已故民主运动人士。

中文笔会张裕介绍作家一平的创作,一平夫人周琳朗诵其作品。

【图:与会者在会议现场默哀。(摄影:Xiaojie Yang)】

当天晚间的活动随后由严肃的历史讨论转向较为轻松的文化交流。在音乐人现场伴奏下,来自不同地区的与会者演唱港台歌曲和校园民谣。

廖雨诗博士曾从事广播工作,她还应与会者邀请,以播音方式重现过去面向中国大陆的广播场景。

费良勇、长平、张冠元等人也以政治笑话和幽默表达参与交流。张冠元认为,通过音乐、幽默和生活化方式讨论政治,可以减少宏大政治话语与普通人之间的距离,这与其在演讲中提出的“反双极、生活化”理念相呼应。

参访纽伦堡审判历史遗址

9月18日,与会者从会议室走向纽伦堡的历史现场,先后前往纽伦堡审判相关场所,并参访原纳粹党代会集会场、文档中心、人权之路、市政厅及皇帝城堡等地点。这些历史场所参访也是会议原定议程的一部分。

【图:与会者在纽伦堡审判相关建筑前合影。(摄影:Xiaojie Yang)】

部分参与者表示,纽伦堡审判所涉及的国家犯罪、个人责任和司法追责问题,使他们联想到中国历史上的政治迫害,并进一步思考未来如何通过法律程序处理严重侵犯人权的行为。

这一表达与原稿中的“北京大审判”相比更适合新闻稿:它保留了参与者对未来追责的设想,但不把一个尚未发生的政治结果写成确定事实。

当天下午,与会者还在纽伦堡圣洛伦茨教堂附近举行以“从文革到六四,再到二文革”为主题的街头历史展览。

活动现场有当地居民和游客驻足阅读展板,一些人同参与者进行交流或合影。

当天晚间,会议举行最后一场自由讨论,主题为“反对二文革,推进民主化”,由费良勇、薛伟主持。

21时30分,费良勇对三天会议及相关活动作总结,随后薛伟宣布此次纽伦堡“文革60周年研讨会”闭幕。相关会后报道也记录了张冠元、杨肖杰的发言,以及烛光纪念、历史展览和纽伦堡历史地点参访等活动。

三天活动通过专题报告、个人历史记忆、纪录片、烛光纪念、文化交流、街头展览和历史遗址参访等不同形式,使文革讨论不只停留在六十年前的历史事件,也延伸到政治制度、历史记忆、个人权利以及如何防止类似灾难重演等现实问题。

对与会者而言,文革六十周年所留下的问题仍然是:

历史为什么会发生,又应该建立怎样的制度,才能使历史不再重演?

作者简介:

德国光华社(Kuanghua Society e.V.)是一个总部位于德国的非营利性华裔互助与人权社团,由张冠元担任社长。

社团主要致力于为在德的华人提供生活融入与法律援助,同时联合欧洲华裔民主力量,开展人权倡导、历史纪念及学术研讨活动,推动自由、民主与宪政理念。

编辑:Geoffrey Jin 校对:王滨 翻译:戈冰

“Symposium on the 60th Anniversary of the Cultural Revolution” Held in Nuremberg

Figures at Home and Abroad Reflect on History and China’s Future

Author: Editorial Department of Guanghua Press

Abstract: The “Symposium on the 60th Anniversary of the Cultural Revolution” was held in Nuremberg, Germany, where attendees from many parts of the world engaged in discussions and commemorative activities around topics such as historical memory of the Cultural Revolution, political systems, and China’s future.

From September 16 to 18, 2026, the “Symposium on the 60th Anniversary of the Cultural Revolution” was held in Nuremberg, Germany. Scholars, writers, media personnel, and social activists from Europe, Asia, the Americas, Australia, and other regions attended the conference, carrying out discussions centered on topics including historical memory of the Cultural Revolution, political systems, culture and religion, mass movements, historical narratives, and China’s future.

The three-day event included panel discussions, documentary screenings, a candlelight commemoration, open discussions, a street historical exhibition, and visits to sites related to the Nuremberg trials, the Way of Human Rights, and other historical locations. Public materials from the conference show that the symposium was co-hosted by Beijing Spring and the “Global Forum for Supporting Democratization in China and Asia.”

纽伦堡举行“文革60周年研讨会”
[Photo: Some attendees taking a group photo in front of the “Way of Human Rights” in Nuremberg. (Photo: Xiaojie Yang)]

The German Committee — Guanghua Press and the French Committee of the China Democracy Party (Netherlands Headquarters) also sent representatives to participate in this event. In addition to participating in conference discussions, commemorations, and historical visits, members of Guanghua Press also undertook part of the live streaming, photography, and video recording tasks on site. Among them, Zhang Guanyuan, President of Guanghua Press, and Yang Xiaojie respectively entered the official symposium agenda and delivered speeches.

Multi-Angle Reflection on the History and Systemic Issues of the Cultural Revolution

On the morning of September 17, the symposium entered its official agenda. The opening segment began with a period of silent tribute for the victims of the Cultural Revolution and the June 4th Massacre, as well as deceased pro-democracy movement figures.

The opening speech by Yu Dahai, President of Beijing Spring, was read on his behalf by Xue Wei, following which a representative from the Tibetan side read a telegram sent to the symposium by the Dalai Lama. The first session of the panel was hosted by Fei Liangyong and Xue Wei.

[Photo: Fei Liangyong at the symposium. (Photo: Xiaojie Yang)]

Fei Liangyong first read on behalf of Yan Jiaqi the article written for the conference titled “The Common Root of the Cultural Revolution and ‘June 4th’.” From the perspective of political systems and the operation of power, the article discussed the historical connection between the Cultural Revolution and the June 4th Incident of 1989.

German scholar Dr. Thomas Weyrauch, under the title “The Germans and Their ‘Cultural Revolution’,” reviewed the dissemination and impact of Maoism and the Cultural Revolution among certain radical left-wing groups in West Germany at the time, and discussed the historical background of how some European leftists formed an idealized perception of China’s Cultural Revolution back then.

Hu Ping, speaking via video, delivered a presentation titled “The Role and Fate of the Central Cultural Revolution Group in the Cultural Revolution,” reviewing the power formation, political function, and ultimate fate of the Central Cultural Revolution Group.

The second session of the panel revolved around topics such as institutional transformation, historical experience, and social governance.

Professor Lee Yo-tan of National Chengchi University in Taiwan delivered a presentation titled “Reflecting on the Democratic Transformation of China’s Totalitarian System from the Cultural Revolution,” starting from the political experience of the Cultural Revolution to discuss the issue of transition from authoritarian and totalitarian politics to a democratic system.

[Photo: Professor Lee Yo-tan delivering a speech. (Photo: Xiaojie Yang)]

Dr. Wang Weiluo, a hydraulic engineering expert, approached the topic through major hydraulic disasters, discussing the decision-making, systemic, and accountability mechanisms behind major public events.

Taiwanese scholar Professor Lai Ying-chuan, combining the historical experience of Soviet and Russian political development, discussed totalitarian political legacies and issues of social transformation.

Molly, a writer residing in Sweden, presented “The Cultural Revolution in China and the Mirror Spectacle of the Trump Era: Human Madness and Historical Absurdity Return,” comparing the mass politics of the Cultural Revolution era with certain contemporary American political phenomena from her observational perspective. This comparison represents the speaker’s own political analysis.

[Photo: Writer Molly speaking at the symposium. (Photo: Xiaojie Yang)]

The representative from the Tibetan side presented under the title “From the Cultural Revolution to ‘Cultural Revolution 2.0’: Historical Memory and Cultural Heritage of Tibet,” discussing the Cultural Revolution, historical memory, and cultural heritage from the historical experience of the Tibetan people.

Germany-based scholar Peng Xiaoming reviewed the impact of family background and political status on individual education, employment, and social destiny during the Cultural Revolution era, analyzing it from the perspective of political discrimination.

Historical Narratives, Religion, and Nonviolent Movements Enter Discussion

The third session of the panel in the afternoon was hosted by Lee Yo-tan and Li Li.

Taiwanese media practitioner and Tamkang University professor Dr. Liao Yu-shih presented “From the Cultural Revolution to ‘Telling the China Story Well’: How Historical Memory Shapes the National Narratives of China and Taiwan,” discussing how historical memory undergoes selection, interpretation, and dissemination, which in turn influences differing social and national narratives across the Taiwan Strait.

[Photo: Dr. Liao Yu-shih speaking at the symposium. (Photo: Xiaojie Yang)]

Writer and media professional Chang Ping delivered a speech titled “Looking at the CCP’s Long-Concealed Agenda Setting from the ‘Resolutions on History’,” analyzing official historical narratives and political agenda setting starting from CCP historical documents and political language.

Rui Hu discussed “The Impact of the Cultural Revolution on Religious Faith,” examining how religion suffered blows during the Cultural Revolution era and the long-term effects this history had on individual faith and social spiritual life.

Dr. Zhong Jinjiang from Australia led a discussion around “The Essential Differences Between the Mass Movement of the Cultural Revolution and Nonviolent Resistance Mass Movements,” comparing different types of mass movements within the framework of “Peace, Rationality, and Nonviolence.”

In addition, Chen Yangchao submitted an article discussing Mao Zedong’s political objectives in launching the Cultural Revolution, which was read on his behalf by Fei Liangyong; Li Dongcheng presented under the title “Bandit System, Hooligan Nature, and the Toxic Legacy of the Cultural Revolution,” discussing the legacy of the Cultural Revolution from the perspectives of political system and political culture.

From “Down to the Countryside” to the Inner Mongolia “Neiren Dang” Incident

The fourth panel session of the day was hosted by Zhang Yu and Kai Sa.

Dr. Qian Yuejun presented “The Up to the Mountains and Down to the Countryside Movement of the Cultural Revolution,” discussing this policy and its impact on the life trajectories of a generation of educated youth.

Wang Longmeng, combining personal and ethnic memories as a descendant of the Mongol ethnic group, reviewed the Inner Mongolia “Neiren Dang” (Inner Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party) incident during the Cultural Revolution, as well as the long-term trauma left behind by related political movements.

[Photo: Wang Longmeng speaking on site. (Photo: Xiaojie Yang)]

Fei Liangyong, from the perspective of what he termed “modern political civilization,” reanalyzed political documents of the Cultural Revolution. He advocated re-examining the Cultural Revolution and its political mechanisms through principles such as human rights, the rule of law, procedural justice, and checks and balances on power.

Guanghua Press Delegation Participates in the Conference

The German Committee — Guanghua Press and the French Committee of the China Democracy Party (Netherlands Headquarters) sent multiple members to participate in the event this time, including Ai Shicheng, head of the French Committee, as well as Zhang Guanyuan, Wu Weiguang, Tang Guogang, Zhang Na, Yang Xiaojie, Li Taohong, and others.

[Photo: Group photo of some attending Guanghua Press members. (Photo: Xiaojie Yang)]

According to information provided by Guanghua Press, several younger members in the delegation participated in this event. During the conference, a number of older figures who have long been involved in the overseas Chinese democracy movement also engaged in exchanges with the younger attendees.

On site, another representative, a second-generation Uyghur German immigrant, spoke in English. Because she does not speak Chinese, Zhang Guanyuan provided live Chinese translation. In her speech, she spoke of her personal experience facing difficulties contacting some of her relatives in her homeland, and expressed concern over the situation of the Uyghur people and the impact of authoritarian politics.

[Photo: The Uyghur representative at the event site. (Photo: Xiaojie Yang)]

Zhang Guanyuan Discusses “Anti-Bipolarity and Everyday Integration”

Zhang Guanyuan, President of Guanghua Press, presented “Simply Because the Evil Fog Has Risen Once More: On the CCP’s Eighty-Year Devastation of the Chinese Cultural Spirit.”

Starting from personal experience and modern Chinese political culture, Zhang Guanyuan discussed what he sees as the impact of successive CCP political campaigns on traditional culture, social psychology, and interpersonal relations.

His speech simultaneously proposed the concept of “anti-bipolarity and everyday integration.”

Zhang Guanyuan expressed that totalitarianism is not only a political system, but can also shape a “black-or-white” way of thinking. If those opposing authoritarianism still handle differences within their own organizations by suppressing dissenting views and manufacturing enemy-versus-us relationships, they risk replicating in their behavior the very political culture they oppose.

From this, he proposed that democratic transformation should not merely be understood as a short-term political event, but rather a long-term process of social and cultural construction; political expression should also reduce empty slogans and personal attacks, communicating values and ideals through language, humor, music, and everyday life experiences that are more easily understood by ordinary people.

At the conclusion of his speech, Zhang Guanyuan re-lyricized and performed “The East is Black” to the melody of “The East is Red,” expressing his political views through music and banter.

[Photo: Zhang Guanyuan, President of Guanghua Press, delivering a speech. (Photo: Xiaojie Yang)]

Yang Xiaojie: “The Cultural Revolution is Not History; the Cultural Revolution Continues”

Yang Xiaojie delivered a keynote speech titled “The Cultural Revolution is Not History; the Cultural Revolution Continues.” He expressed that reflections on the Cultural Revolution should not remain solely on historical phenomena such as Red Guards, struggle sessions, house ransackings, and armed clashes, but should further question: why such a political disaster was able to occur, and why it could not be effectively halted over a long period.

Yang Xiaojie expressed that when supreme power lacks effective constraints, and the judiciary, media, and social oversight cannot exercise independent roles, the political will at the highest level can be continuously transmitted downward through administrative, propaganda, and social mobilization systems, resulting in “intensification at every level” during execution.

Citing the concept of “evil resonance” proposed by Fei Liangyong, he described this mechanism as supreme power, the party-government structure, the propaganda system, local officials, and ordinary individuals participating to varying degrees and reinforcing one another. The speech subsequently extended from the history of the Cultural Revolution to contemporary China.

Yang Xiaojie mentioned that in 2018, China amended its constitution, removing the provision that the President and Vice President “shall serve no more than two consecutive terms.” This modification belongs to the content of the promulgated constitutional amendments; Chinese officials at the time explained the change as improving the national leadership system and maintaining centralized, unified leadership.

Yang Xiaojie, however, offered criticism on this from a different political stance, expressing that although modern political control clearly differs in the tools used compared to the 1960s, what remains most worthy of attention is whether power can be effectively constrained by law and institutions.

He said: “The truly important question is not whether one can encounter a good emperor, but whether, when a bad leader appears, the people have ways to limit him, oversee him, and replace him through peaceful means.”

At the conclusion of the speech, Yang Xiaojie placed the focus of discussion on systemic issues such as democracy, the rule of law, judicial independence, freedom of the press, fundamental human rights, and the checks and balances on power.

He expressed that commemorating the victims of the Cultural Revolution should not remain merely at the commemorative event itself, but rather establish institutions to prevent power from losing control again.

Yang Xiaojie ended his speech with the phrase “The Cultural Revolution is over,” explaining that only when no individual or political party can stand above the constitution and the law does this sentence truly hold institutional meaning.

[Photo: Yang Xiaojie participating in setting up the exhibition at the street historical exhibition site in front of St. Lorenz Church in Nuremberg. (Photo provided by: Guanghua Press)]

Live Streaming and Visual Recording

In addition to participating in the panel discussions, members of Guanghua Press also undertook part of the conference dissemination and visual recording work. Tang Guogang conducted live streaming during the event, disseminating portions of the panel discussions, speeches, and on-site activities over the internet.

Yang Xiaojie carried out photography and video recording over several consecutive days, documenting conference speeches, commemorative ceremonies, the historical exhibition, visits to Nuremberg’s historical sites, and group photos of attendees.

[Photo: Some attendees taking a group photo to mark the occasion at the site of the Symposium on the 60th Anniversary of the Cultural Revolution. (Photo: Xiaojie Yang)]

Guanghua Press stated that it hopes these photos and videos will serve as visual materials for this event, to be used for subsequent news reporting, biographical materials, and historical archiving.

After the conclusion of the conference, several members of Guanghua Press also gave separate interviews to overseas Chinese-language media, introducing the symposium as well as the organization’s views on issues of China’s democracy, rule of law, and human rights.

Attendees Engage via Music and Humor Following Candlelight Commemoration

On the evening of September 17, attendees held a candlelight commemoration to mourn the victims of the Cultural Revolution and the June 4th Massacre, as well as deceased pro-democracy movement figures.

Zhang Yu of the Independent Chinese PEN Center introduced the literary creations of writer Yi Ping, and Yi Ping’s wife, Zhou Lin, recited his work.

[Photo: Attendees observing a moment of silence at the conference site. (Photo: Xiaojie Yang)]

The evening event of that day subsequently shifted from serious historical discussion to more relaxed cultural exchanges. Accompanied by live music from musicians, attendees from different regions sang Hong Kong and Taiwan songs as well as campus folk songs.

Dr. Liao Yu-shih, who previously worked in broadcasting, was also invited by attendees to recreate past broadcasting scenes directed toward Mainland China using her broadcasting presentation style.

Fei Liangyong, Chang Ping, Zhang Guanyuan, and others also participated in the exchanges with political jokes and humorous expressions. Zhang Guanyuan expressed that discussing politics through music, humor, and everyday life approaches can reduce the distance between grand political discourse and ordinary people, echoing the concept of “anti-bipolarity and everyday integration” he proposed in his speech.

Visiting Historical Sites of the Nuremberg Trials

On September 18, attendees moved from the conference room to the historical sites of Nuremberg, visiting in succession locations related to the Nuremberg trials, as well as visiting the former Nazi Party Rally Grounds, Documentation Center, Way of Human Rights, City Hall, and Imperial Castle, among other places. Visits to these historical locations were also part of the conference’s original agenda.

[Photo: Attendees taking a group photo in front of a building related to the Nuremberg trials. (Photo: Xiaojie Yang)]

Some participants stated that issues of state crime, individual responsibility, and judicial accountability involved in the Nuremberg trials reminded them of political persecutions in Chinese history, leading them to further ponder how to address severe human rights violations through legal procedures in the future.

This phrasing is more suitable for a news release compared to the “Beijing Grand Trials” in the original draft: it retains the participants’ envisioning of future accountability without framing an unfulfilled political outcome as a established fact.

On the afternoon of that day, attendees also held a street historical exhibition near St. Lorenz Church in Nuremberg, themed “From the Cultural Revolution to June 4th, and On to Cultural Revolution 2.0.”

At the event site, local residents and tourists stopped to read the display boards, and some engaged in conversations or took photos with the participants.

On the evening of that day, the conference held its final open discussion with the theme “Opposing Cultural Revolution 2.0, Advancing Democratization,” hosted by Fei Liangyong and Xue Wei.

At 21:30, Fei Liangyong delivered a summary of the three-day conference and related activities, after which Xue Wei announced the conclusion of this “Symposium on the 60th Anniversary of the Cultural Revolution” in Nuremberg. Post-conference reports also documented the speeches by Zhang Guanyuan and Yang Xiaojie, as well as activities including the candlelight commemoration, historical exhibition, and visits to historical sites in Nuremberg.

Through various formats such as special reports, personal historical memories, documentaries, candlelight commemorations, cultural exchanges, street exhibitions, and visits to historical sites, the three-day event ensured that discussions on the Cultural Revolution did not merely remain on historical events of sixty years ago, but also extended to practical issues such as political systems, historical memory, individual rights, and how to prevent similar disasters from recurring.

For the attendees, the question left by the 60th anniversary of the Cultural Revolution remains:

Why did history happen, and what kind of system should be established to ensure that history does not repeat itself?

About the Author:

Kuanghua Society e.V. is a Germany-based non-profit mutual-aid and human rights association of ethnic Chinese, with Zhang Guanyuan serving as president.

The association is primarily dedicated to providing social integration support and legal aid to Chinese people in Germany, while uniting European pro-democracy forces of ethnic Chinese to carry out human rights advocacy, historical commemorations, and academic symposiums, promoting the ideals of freedom, democracy, and constitutionalism.

Editor: Geoffrey Jin Proofreader: Wang Bin Translator: Ge Bing